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GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

A History from Beginning to End

by Hourly History.

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"“The Dardanelles might have saved millions of lives. Don’t imagine I am running away from the Dardanelles. I glory in it.”

"—Winston Churchill"

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"Located in Turkey, the Gallipoli Peninsula runs south-westerly into the Aegean Sea with the Dardanelles strait to its east. Gallipoli appears in Greek writings dating back to ancient times and has been referred to throughout the centuries. In fact, the name Gallipoli originated from the Greek word for “beautiful city,” Callipolis. The region has seen its share of military action, from the time of the Trojan Wars all the way to the defeat of the Roman Eastern Army by Attila the Hun. Military campaigns by legendary leaders such as King Xerxes and Alexander the Great have made Gallipoli part of their war plans. So, it was perhaps inevitable that this area, where the East meets the West, would play a significant role in modern twentieth-century warfare as well.

"The 1915 Gallipoli Campaign, also known as the Dardanelles Campaign or the Defense of Gallipoli, is looked back on today as one of the most disastrous operations of the First World War. However, when it was conceived, it was hoped that the campaign would bring the war to a quick end, minimizing bloodshed and loss of life. While the Gallipoli Campaign was full of heroic deeds carried out by men whose endurance was pushed to the very limit, it was also flawed from the outset. The campaign would go down as one of the worst defeats inflicted upon the Allies during the war.

"Hampered by political maneuvering and military incompetence, the Gallipoli Campaign became referred to as the “Dardanelles Dustbin” by General Ian Hamilton, the British commander-in-chief. The soldiers there had to endure disgusting conditions, a shortage of water, and inadequate equipment, as well as poor weather conditions. Nevertheless, the evacuation of the men remains one of the most remarkable events in military history. ... "

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"On February 17, 1915, a British seaplane carried out reconnaissance over the Dardanelles strait. Two days later, the British ships HMS Agamemnon, Cornwallis, Vengeance, Triumph, and Inflexible launched their attack together with the French vessels Bouvet, Suffren, and Gaulois. They began with the Turkish forts at Cape Helles and Kum Kale and their batteries at the entrance to the Dardanelles. Destroyers escorted the battleships while other smaller vessels recommended targets and reported on the damage caused.

"By the end of the day, the Turkish forts had sustained damage, but they and many of their guns were still operational. The British ships should have been supplied with high explosive shells for land bombardment but were instead using armor-piercing shells that only damaged whatever they struck. After the 19th, inclement weather meant that the attack had to be paused until the 25th when the Allied battleships resumed the attack on the forts. Close-range attacks caused severe damage that temporarily incapacitated the Turkish defenses. With the forts put out of action, British minesweepers were able to work on clearing mines in the water.

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"The Gallipoli Campaign was hamstrung from the outset. Political machinations, poor planning, unfortunate timing, and ineffective military coordination were all to blame for the Allied defeat. Also to blame was their overestimation of their abilities and not enough appreciation of just how formidable the entrenched Turkish troops would be as their own troops fought them from a weaker and more vulnerable position.

"While it was the Russians who sought help from the Allies, it was the British who decided upon a naval assault via the Dardanelles, a plan driven forward by First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill. Churchill had calculated that the big guns of the Royal Navy would destroy Turkish forts along the Dardanelles. All the ships would have to do would be to navigate enemy mines. However, Churchill had not counted on the effectiveness of Turkish mobile artillery, which quickly forced the minesweepers to retreat, leaving the battleships to clear the mines alone. The mines ended up sinking three battleships in March alone.

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"Churchill had been wary of the consequences of Russia leaving the war, and when that eventually happened, he was proved right. Without the Russian threat to contend with, Germany threw itself into attacking the West. However, there were wider repercussions that would echo through time. In the decades preceding the First World War, Russia had been edging toward democracy, but the failure of Gallipoli and the critical lack of supplies in the country contributed to the tsar’s abdication, which led to the creation of the first communist state in the world.

"There were many warning signs the British could have heeded. However, military overconfidence and Churchill’s ambition fueled the Gallipoli Campaign, a venture that was doomed from the start."

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Table of Contents

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Introduction

Conceiving the Gallipoli Campaign

Battle Plans

The Naval Attack

Preparing for the Land Attack

Landing at Cape Helles and Anzac Cove

The Land Campaign

Defeat and Evacuation

Battle Analysis

Legacy and Remembrance

Conclusion

Bibliography

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REVIEW

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Introduction

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September 03, 2024 - September 03, 2024.

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Chapter 1. Conceiving the Gallipoli Campaign

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"“The Dardanelles might have saved millions of lives. Don’t imagine I am running away from the Dardanelles. I glory in it.”

"—Winston Churchill"

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"The Gallipoli Campaign took place between February 17, 1915, and January 9, 1916, on the Gallipoli Peninsula, then part of the Ottoman Empire. However, the origins of the campaign date back to much earlier. In fact, the British Committee of Imperial Defence investigated the option of taking the Dardanelles strait as early as 1906. When Winston Churchill became Britain’s First Lord to the Admiralty in 1911, he dismissed the idea of forcing the Dardanelles, stating, “It should be remembered that it is no longer possible to force the Dardanelles, and nobody would expose a modern fleet to such peril.”

"If we go back even further, Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire were actually allies in the Crimean War between 1853 and 1856 against Russia. However, by the late nineteenth century, Britain had wrested control of Egypt and Cyprus from Ottoman Turkey before turning its attention to the oilfields of the Persian Gulf and other targets in the Mesopotamian region. Threatened by British incursions, the Ottoman-Turkish Admiralty ordered two new battleships in 1911 that would be manufactured by Armstrong Vickers in Newcastle-upon-Tyne in the U.K. and delivered in 1914. Churchill confiscated these battleships on the eve of the First World War, causing a surge of anti-British sentiment in Turkey and arguably further encouraging Turkey to fight against the British and, by extension, the Allied side.

"Spotting an opportunity to curry favor with the Ottoman Turks, the Germans sent them two cruisers by way of the Mediterranean Sea in August of 1914. If all that was not enough to sway the Turks’ decision, three months into the war, when the Germans were succeeding on every front, the £5 million German bid for their allegiance and the prospect of ending British influence in the Middle East certainly made it too tempting an offer for the sultan of the Ottoman Empire to refuse.

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"Turkey joined the war on October 28, 1914, with the bombing of Russia’s Black Sea ports, fighting alongside Germany as one of the Central Powers. In response, the Allied Powers declared war on the Ottoman Empire on November 4, and Churchill got in touch with Admiral Sackville Carden, who was head of a British fleet positioned not far from the Dardanelles. Churchill wanted to know his thoughts about a naval assault on Turkish positions there. When Carden replied, recommending a more cautious approach with a gradual attack, Churchill pushed him to develop a plan for the War Office.

"Combined, the British and French had lost almost a million men in just the first four months of the war. Ottoman Turkey’s entry into the conflict meant that territories such as Egypt and the Suez Canal also required a more robust defense. The fighting on the Western Front had become a stalemate, and the Allies knew they needed a new angle to gain an advantage. “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders?” Churchill asked at the time. Meanwhile, Russia’s Tsar Nicholas II appealed to his allies for help as Russia was being overwhelmed by Turkish troops in the Caucasus. Churchill saw Turkey as a prime target, one that, if attacked, could distract the Central Powers from other fronts.

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"With this in mind, Churchill abandoned his earlier plan to invade Germany from the Baltic Sea. Instead, he wanted an Anglo-French operation to take control of the Dardanelles, invade Gallipoli, and then seize the Ottoman capital, Constantinople (now known as Istanbul). As far as Churchill was concerned, the success of the Gallipoli Campaign would yield numerous benefits. In addition to crippling the Ottoman Empire, it would encourage other states, such as Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania, to join the Allied side. It would also keep Russia in the war as one of Britain’s key allies. Such was Churchill’s concern about keeping Russia on the Allied side that he signed a secret agreement offering Tsar Nicholas II Constantinople if the operation was a success.

"The Allied side desperately needed Russia to stay in the war to help drain German resources. This, in turn, would help British and French forces to fight the Germans on the Western Front. However, the Russians needed supplies, and there were only two realistic supply route options. One led through the Arctic Circle by sea and was dependent on weather conditions being right. The other, via the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, depended on the Allies’ ability to navigate the Dardanelles, the strait connecting the two seas. The Dardanelles, of course, was under Ottoman—and thereby the Central Powers’—control.

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"The pressure on Russia was not the only reason Britain had for going ahead with the attack on Ottoman Turkey. By early 1915, fighting on the Western Front had truly reached an impasse. Neither side could find a way through the well-fortified defenses, and neither could find a way to outflank the other. Each had predicted a war of movement, and each had been wrong. Having studied the maps for any way around, Churchill and Lord Herbert Kitchener became more and more interested in the Dardanelles strait that led from the Mediterranean to Constantinople.

"Kitchener had been appointed Secretary of State for War at the outset of the war and was one of Britain’s top military brass. Much of his early military career had been spent in the Eastern Mediterranean, so he had a solid knowledge of the Ottoman Empire. Due to this, he had his misgivings about the Gallipoli Campaign. Nevertheless, the potential gains from the campaign were hard to resist. Churchill and Kitchener calculated that a successful operation would not only open up a channel for the Russians through the Black Sea but also create a base for attacks upon the Central Powers to divert German troops from the Western Front.

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"Since the Central Powers were fighting on the Western and Eastern Fronts against formidable Russian and French armies, the German military was feeling the strain. The Austrian Army, fighting alongside Germany, had thus far been unable to contribute as many men as the Germans. Churchill gambled that the creation of another front would not only relieve the pressure on the Russians, whom the Allied Powers desperately needed to keep in the war, but he also calculated that it would force the German Army to break up and send troops to support the Turks. Churchill assumed that this would weaken German lines on existing fronts, leaving them more vulnerable to attacks.

"Given Churchill’s rejection of the idea in 1911, it is perhaps surprising that he became the driving force that turned the possibility of taking the Dardanelles into a plan that his peers seemingly reluctantly supported. Still, it makes more sense in light of the Ottoman Empire’s decline in the previous years. The Ottoman Empire had ruled the Middle East and large parts of Europe for 600 years, but by 1914, it was standing on its last legs, often referred to as the “sick man of Europe.” Meanwhile, Churchill had spent the last four years as First Lord of the Admiralty building up Britain’s Royal Navy.

"In dismissing Ottoman Turkey as “the soft underbelly of Europe,” Churchill’s overconfidence led him and the British government to assume that it would be unable to withstand a powerful attack. Churchill had seen the devastating impact the German artillery had had on Belgian forts in 1914 and was convinced that Turkish forts were even more vulnerable and would quickly crumble under a British attack."

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September 03, 2024 - September 05, 2024.

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Chapter 2. Battle Plans

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"“If our operations at the Dardanelles prosper, immense advantages may be offered. . . The opportunity may come in 3 weeks’ time, and I think at least 50,000 men should be within reach at 3 days’ notice, either to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula when it has been evacuated, or to occupy Constantinople.”

"—Winston Churchill, letter to Lord Kitchener"

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"Winston Churchill was eager to bring the war to an end, and perhaps more importantly, his ambition meant that he was keen to be the architect of the plan that would end it. He proposed his plan to create a new front in the war, a front in the Dardanelles, on November 25, 1914. The Dardanelles strait was heavily mined, and its Turkish shore along the Gallipoli Peninsula was lined with coastal forts and gun batteries. Allied ships would need to overcome these defenses and capture Constantinople to link with Russia.

"Senior Navy commanders were unsure about the swiftness with which Churchill had produced this plan and the consequent speed with which the attack would be launched. Accustomed to long-term planning, they saw it as a risky move. Despite their qualms, Churchill’s gusto appeared to have prevailed, and February was set as the month to begin the campaign. Still, it wasn’t until January 15 that the British government’s War Council agreed to it and put Allied troops in Egypt on alert.

"Interestingly, there was even disagreement over what was actually agreed upon by the War Council. Apparently, Churchill was under the impression that the War Council was in agreement for the campaign to go ahead. Meanwhile, then-British Prime Minister Herbert Asquith believed all that had been agreed was to prepare for the campaign. Churchill’s own secretary had yet another different understanding that the War Council had “only agreed to a purely naval operation on the understanding that we could always draw back—that there should be no question of what is known as forcing the Dardanelles.” Despite the confusion, the campaign went ahead.

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"The British confidence in their naval ability, as well as their arrogance in assuming the ineptitude of Turkish forces, meant that they were convinced that a victory was possible using naval force alone. Success in pursuing Britain’s objectives in the Gallipoli Campaign depended upon the Turkish defense quickly capitulating. A quick win for the British would have hamstrung the Central Powers, relieved the pressure on Russia, and allowed Britain to reinforce its position in the Middle East. “The price to be paid in taking Gallipoli would no doubt be heavy,” Churchill wrote, “but there would be no more war with Turkey. A good army of 50,000 and sea power—that is the end of the Turkish menace.” As we now know, this was not to be the case.

"All Tsar Nicholas II had requested was some help to relieve the Turkish pressure. One could say that Churchill’s ambition meant he was always eager to push the envelope. Once the Dardanelles had been taken, it would have made sense to go on to take the rest of Ottoman Turkey and thus eliminate them from the war. This would have neutralized the Ottoman threat to other territories, such as the Middle East and North Africa, and allowed Allied troops to be reallocated. Believing victory to hinge on taking the Dardanelles, Churchill was not minded to give up if the naval attack failed. Instead, he prepared for a daring amphibious attack—the first of its kind—that would require troops to wrest control of the gun batteries along the Dardanelles from the Turks.

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"Initially, the military denied the Royal Navy the use of any troops, so the Navy had no choice but to go ahead with the attack using the might of their ships alone. Admiral Carden’s staff created a plan with the aim of destroying the Turkish coastal defenses. They reckoned that once the coastal fortifications were neutralized, the ships would be able to force their way through the Dardanelles to the Sea of Marmara to seize Constantinople, forcing Turkey to surrender. Reconnaissance missions revealed that the Turks had laid mines across the Dardanelles. The British planned for these mines to be swept by the attacking British and French vessels.

"In mid-February, 18 battleships supported by an array of smaller cruisers and destroyers were ordered to set sail to the Dardanelles and the Gallipoli Peninsula."

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September 03, 2024 - September 07, 2024.

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Chapter 3. The Naval Attack

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"“I highly approve your proposal to obtain volunteers from the Fleet for Mine Sweeping. This work has to be done whatever the loss of life and small craft and the sooner it is done the better.”

"—Winston Churchill, telegram to Admiral Sackville Carden"

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"By February 26, the ships Albion, Vengeance, and Majestic were able to attack Fort Dardanus further along at the inner section of the strait. Meanwhile, Royal Marine landing parties began their attack on the neutralized forts at Cape Helles and Kum Kale to destroy them. The Royal Marines found it relatively easy to land on the shores of Cape Helles, highlighting how poorly defended they were, something the Turks would amend by April. However, the landing parties at Kum Kale were repelled by the Turks.

"On March 2 and 3, the British and French continued to bombard the Turkish while French ships also sailed along Gallipoli’s northern coast to attack a Turkish defensive line at the top of the peninsula called Bulair. HMS Irresistible meanwhile landed a Royal Marine party at Kum Kale on March 4 to continue attacking the Turkish defense there. Although the party was supported by a light cruiser and a number of destroyers, they were pushed back again by Turkish troops.

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"On March 5, the attack on the Narrows (the inner section of the strait) began in earnest. The Allied forces found the forts there more obstinately defended than those at the entrance of the Dardanelles. In the Narrows, the British and French ships faced floating mines as well as fixed mines since their minesweepers were hindered by the strong current. For two weeks, from March 5 to 18, HMS Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, and Prince George fired upon the neck of the Gallipoli Peninsula while Royal Navy seaplanes reported on the effects. Other ships meanwhile attacked forts from within the Dardanelles, contributing to the significant damage inflicted on Turkish shore defenses.

"Despite this, the Allies had still not succeeded in forcing the strait. They hoped to rectify this on March 18. With minesweepers in front of them to remove potential mines, British and French ships zigzagged through the Narrows, intending to sail straight through to the Sea of Marmara. However, the French battleship Bouvet soon hit a mine and capsized, taking some 650 sailors to the grave. It wasn’t long before HMS Irresistible also struck a mine and sank; fortunately, most of her crew survived. When HMS Ocean was sent to rescue Irresistible, it too found a mine and was lost.

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"It was assumed at the time that these losses were caused by torpedoes or floating mines, but the Turks had, in fact, laid new mines overnight in that area to ambush the Allied ships. Turkish gunfire from land was also beginning to damage the French battleships Gaulois and Suffren, which needed docked repairs. That is not to say that the Turkish did not struggle as well. They had used most of their artillery ammunition and could not get a fresh supply. Also, their mines were almost all gone. Had the Allied ships continued their attack, perhaps the Turkish forces and their German commanders would have reached their breaking point.

"Instead, the British and French ships withdrew at dusk. Admiral Carden had by this point suffered a nervous collapse and was replaced by Admiral John de Robeck. He concluded that they could not count on the mines being neutralized and that the ammunition the battleships had was unsuitable for putting the forts and mobile guns out of action. Allied troops were also assembling in the Eastern Mediterranean. With all that in mind, Admiral de Robeck abandoned the naval assault in the Dardanelles and left it to the soldiers to progress via land. They would land at Gallipoli."

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September 07, 2024 - September 09, 2024.

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Chapter 4. Preparing for the Land Attack

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"“I should feel very much happier if you could manage to have another 20,000 in the offing even if they were never landed. . . . surely you could spare them from Egypt for a fortnight?”

"—Winston Churchill, letter to Lord Kitchener

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"The British and French governments were hesitant to land troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula and waited until the naval attack had failed before committing to this action. It is possible that the military attacks would have worked if they had occurred sooner after the naval attacks. It is also possible that the military could have been more successful had they attacked without the naval assault, as they would have had the element of surprise. Nevertheless, fearing the erosion of prestige and the loss of Bulgaria and Romania to the Central Powers, the British and French pressed on with their plan.

"Lord Kitchener had already allocated the 29th Division and the Royal Naval Division to the Gallipoli Campaign on March 10, 1915. In addition, the First Australian Division and the joint Australian-New Zealand Division were combined to form the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC). As for the French, they sent a division called Orient Expeditionary Corps, comprising reservists and soldiers from their North African colonies.

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"On March 11, General Ian Hamilton was put in charge of this Allied army, which became known as the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. He was a logical choice as he had been the commander-in-chief of British forces in the Mediterranean back in 1910. Kitchener told Hamilton that he still expected the naval attack to succeed and that it was unlikely that a military attack would be necessary. In fact, the Allies had not prepared much information on Gallipoli, not even an accurate map of the area.

"By March 22, both General Hamilton and Admiral de Robeck were in agreement that the Gallipoli Campaign would not succeed without military intervention. Unfortunately for the Allied side, the land forces were in no fit state to launch an attack, and the operation had to be delayed until the middle of April. This gave the Turks time to improve their defenses, as well as bring more men to defend the area so they would almost equal the number of Allied soldiers.

"By the time Hamilton was preparing to land on the Gallipoli Peninsula, he had about 75,000 men. The men in his service had not undergone full training and did not have experience in war. Moreover, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force did not have all the equipment they needed. It was evident from the fighting on the Western Front that full artillery support was vital to attack entrenched lines. Still, the Allied side lacked heavy guns and ammunition, particularly high explosives, throughout the Gallipoli Campaign. This shortage of equipment drove Allied troops to improvise, creating their own bombs using empty Tickler’s jam tins, which became known as “Tickler’s Artillery.” Additionally, the senior commanders’ communications system was inadequate to direct units on the beach. They lacked reliable maps and adequate knowledge of the area and had almost no air support.

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"Hamilton’s plan was for the 29th Division to land on the beaches at Cape Helles, located in the southern part of the Gallipoli Peninsula at the mouth of the Dardanelles strait. The French would meanwhile land at Kum Kale on the other side of the strait to distract the Turks and hopefully stop them from sending troops to Gallipoli. A similar plan was set for an area near Bulair. The ANZAC troops were meanwhile ordered to land at Gaba Tepe on the northwestern coast of the peninsula to stop reinforcements from reaching Cape Helles.

"The beaches set to be attacked were S, V, W, and X Beaches at Cape Helles, Y Beach between Cape Helles and Gaba Tepe, and Z Beach north of Gaba Tepe. The key objectives were for the first troops landing at Helles to secure the beaches ahead of the main arrival of soldiers. The main force was then to take the hill of Achi Baba and, eventually, the Kilid Bahr plateau as they advanced north across the peninsula.

"Meanwhile, at Z beach (which became known as Anzac Cove), the first ANZAC troops were to secure parts of the Sari Bair ridge, where the ridge overlooked the beach. The main ANZAC force was then expected to seize the rest of the Sari Bair range at the center of the peninsula, including the hill of Mal Tepe, to block the route to the south. At no point in the eight-month-long campaign would the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force achieve these objectives, despite fierce fighting.

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"On the Turkish side, the Ottoman Minister of War, Enver Pasha, ordered that the defending forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula be consolidated into a single army led by the German General Liman von Sanders. Von Sanders considered Bulair at the northern end of the peninsula to be the most likely point of attack by Allied forces and so sent the Turkish Fifth and Seventh Divisions there. The Ninth Division meanwhile defended the western shore from Suvla Bay to Cape Helles, including Anzac Cove to the north of Gaba Tepe. The Third Division defended the Asiatic shore, while the 19th Division, commanded by future-Turkish President Mustafa Kemal, was the general reserve.

"On April 25, Allied warships assaulted Bulair while Lieutenant Commander Bernard Freyberg swam to the beach and set off flares there, seemingly confirming General von Sanders’ instincts. However, this was merely a diversionary tactic to draw attention away from the actual landings set to take place at Cape Helles and Anzac Cove."

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September 09, 2024 - September 14, 2024.

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Chapter 5. Landing at Cape Helles and Anzac Cove

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"“As we dropped anchor we could hear the continuous rattle of rifle and machine-gun fire on shore, could see the shrapnel bursting along the beach, while above all boomed shots from “Lizzie” [HMS Queen Elizabeth].”

"—Private Robert Steele"

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"Against Navy recommendations, the first landings at Anzac Cove commenced under cover of darkness at 2:35 am on April 25, 1915. The Navy was soon proved right as the current was stronger than expected, leading the navigating officer to mistakenly take the force a mile north of where they were expected to land. Instead of an open beach, the covering force faced cliffs and an extra ridge to overcome. Having landed out of sequence, the soldiers were disoriented and disorganized, with some heading in the wrong direction once they had landed. While Turkish forces were caught by surprise and the covering force suffered few casualties, they were in the wrong place to provide support to the main body that landed at Anzac Cove at 6 am.

"The mistakes had left the entire operation in confusion, causing delays as the troops tried to reorganize themselves. A rendezvous point was set for the Second Brigade, but some companies went further and became lost in the hinterland. Other companies were reallocated to replace them, meaning their original roles went unfulfilled. Commanders were surprised by the number of soldiers who had become separated from their battalions. Once they found their way back to the beach, they had to be reformed into companies and sent back to the battleground.

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"Despite all this, spirits were high—so high that some Australian soldiers, mainly from the First Company, got carried away in their excitement. They left their designated roles to join the infantry, which was rushing to the top of Plugge’s Plateau. This served to highlight the difference in maturity between some of the new, relatively untrained Allied soldiers and the more disciplined Turkish forces.

"Nevertheless, together with Plugge’s Plateau, the ANZACs were able to occupy the 400 Plateau on the right flank. Engineers were also busy on the beach that first day. Under fire from the Turkish guns at Gaba Tepe, they built a makeshift jetty that helped the Allied side to evacuate wounded soldiers. The engineers also found water sources and cleared paths.

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"Communication was a significant issue, one that also hindered the Navy, which otherwise could have provided more support to the military. On that first day, the Navy was only able to assist in one instance. From around noon, Australian troops were under heavy shellfire from two Turkish guns on Kavak Tepe, one of the many hills in the area. It was not until 5 pm that the fleet received a clear message from the troops and the Turkish guns were silenced by the Navy’s gunfire.

"Due to the confusion and the rugged terrain, the opportunity to take Chunuk Bair and other important high grounds slipped from the Allies’ grasp. What the ANZACs had achieved by the end of the 25th was to establish a 6,000-yard (5-kilometer) line of defense at various points around Anzac Cove from the north to the south. However, this had come at a cost. They had incurred roughly 3,000 casualties, of whom 2,000 were evacuated. The Turkish forces suffered in similar numbers.

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"While this was taking place, the British were busy landing at Cape Helles at the southern tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Here, the Navy had stood firm and refused to facilitate a nighttime landing, citing the strong currents and heightened risk of maneuvering ships in darkness. The British were to attack X Beach on the western coast, W Beach between Tekke Burnu and Cape Helles, V Beach between Cape Helles and Sedd el Bahr, and S Beach near Morto Bay. They were to also land at Y beach further north in line with Krithia. Meanwhile, the French were to distract the Turks with an attack on the Asiatic shore on the other side of the strait.

"While the landing was in progress, the Navy was to bombard Turkish positions further inland. Once ashore, Major General Aylmer Hunter-Weston would take charge of the entire 29th Division infantry and lead them to achieve their final objective for the day of the landing: to take the Achi Baba hill and the village of Krithia.

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"The attack began with a naval bombardment by HMS Albion, Swiftsure, Euryalus, and Implacable at 5 am. Half an hour later, the bombardment ceased while troops were sent to the beaches in wooden boats. The plan was for the covering force to have landed by 7 am while the main force would land at 8.30 am, but the landings on some beaches were delayed due to strong currents as well as Turkish fortifications.

"The troops landing at V Beach and W Beach faced the heaviest opposition. Here, barbed wire and land mines obstructed the shores, while the high ground and cliff tops overlooking the beaches were protected by trenches, concealed machine gun positions, and forts. Though there were only two Turkish infantry companies manning these positions, they were perfectly positioned to inflict damage on the British as they landed. At V Beach, for example, out of the first 200 troops disembarking from the SS River Clyde, only 21 reached the shore. One officer serving on the River Clyde noted that the Turkish machine gun fire was “extraordinarily well handled . . . very heavy and accurate.”

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"While troops landing at the other beaches—X Beach, Y Beach, and S Beach—faced relatively little resistance, a lack of clear leadership and organization meant that the Allies failed to take advantage of the opportunity presented to them. Apart from a few small-scale advances inland, the main bulk of the troops remained on the shore.

"Knowing little about what was happening on the ground, General Hamilton signaled Hunter-Weston to ask whether he would like to land more troops at Y Beach, where they could get ashore safely and move inland to relieve the struggling troops at V and W Beaches. Hunter-Weston eventually declined as he felt it would delay the ongoing operations, and he expected the existing troops to overcome the Turks at Helles.

"However, the British commanders had once again failed to appreciate just how challenging the terrain would be, as well as how well-entrenched the Turkish forces were. Since the British lacked reliable aircraft reconnaissance, they were not able to adequately prepare for the environment they found themselves in. The result was that the Allies not only failed to take Achi Baba hill that day, but they also failed to occupy it at any point in the Gallipoli Campaign."

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September 14, 2024 - September 17, 2024.

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Chapter 6. The Land Campaign

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"“One of the biggest curses was the flies. They were all around your mouth and on any cuts or sores that you’d got. It was a curse, really, it really was.”

"—Private Harold Boughton"

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"Landing operations continued the next day, with very little gained by the Allied side. The Turkish made use of their fortifications and machine guns, effectively obstructing any major advance inland. On April 27, they launched a fierce counterattack at Anzac Cove, which killed over 700 Allied troops and forced the remainder to retreat.

"Despite heavy losses and low morale, General Hamilton ordered a renewed attempt to advance inland on April 28. The French were to hold the right flank at Helles while the British moved from the south and west to the village of Krithia and Achi Baba hill. Again, they came up short against the rugged terrain and the staunch defense put up by the Turks. The First Battle of Krithia ended in victory for the Turkish despite them being outnumbered three-to-one, and the British were forced back the very same day.

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"While the land forces struggled, one Allied vessel—the submarine HMAS AE2—actually managed to penetrate the Dardanelles strait and reach the Sea of Marmara, where it attacked Ottoman ships. This success gave renewed hope to the Allies, and shortly after, another submarine made the journey through the strait. This one, HMS E14, managed to sink four ships, including a transport vessel carrying 6,000 troops and supplies to Gallipoli.

"Meanwhile, the Allies prepared for another attempt to capture Krithia and the nearby Achi Baba hill. On May 6, some 20,000 troops were to advance toward the village on a broad front across the peninsula, much like had been the plan for the First Battle of Krithia. And like the first battle, the British quickly ran into fierce resistance. At no point across the line did the Allies advance more than 400 yards (370 meters) during that first day.

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"The attack resumed the following day, producing largely the same results. By this point, ANZAC troops had been brought in to relieve the struggling British battalions, but even that did not speed up the Allied advance. Advancing in broad daylight across open valleys with nothing to protect them from Ottoman machine-gunfire proved deadly, and at every turn, the men were beset with rains of bullets from strong points they could not even see. Finally, after several more failed attacks on May 8, the Allied troops were called back. Over a third of the men had been wounded or killed—losses that General Hammond could ill afford. For now, the Allies would have to dig in and lick their wounds as they waited for reinforcements to arrive from Britain.

"May 19 saw a significant counterattack mounted by the Turkish as some 42,000 troops came together to attack the 17,000 ANZAC forces stationed at Anzac Cove. Fortunately, the ANZACs had been warned the day before of a build-up of forces just opposite their positions. Despite being outnumbered, the troops were easily able to defend their line while inflicting heavy casualties on the Ottomans. By mid-day, the Turks withdrew, having lost about 10,000 men to death or injury compared to the ANZACs 650. The bloodbath was so severe, in fact, that both sides agreed on a temporary truce on May 24 to allow the Turks to bury their dead.

................................................................................................

"Private Victor Laidlaw described the day, writing, “It seems so very different to see each side near each other’s trenches burying their dead. Each man taking part in this ceremony is called a pioneer and wears 2 white bands on his arms. Everybody is taking advantage of the armistice to do anything they want to do out of cover and a large number are down bathing and you would think today was Cup Day down at one of our seaside beaches.”

"On June 4, the Allies renewed their attempts to capture Krithia and Achi Baba in what would become known as the Third Battle of Krithia. In preparation for the attack, the British had secretly and slowly been advancing their front line at night to place themselves within striking distance of the Ottoman trenches. While this was positive compared to the two previous failed attempts to take Krithia, they had barely any naval artillery support this time around. Two British battleships—HMS Triumph and Majestic—had been sunk by an Ottoman submarine just one week earlier, leading the British to withdraw most of their warships out of fear of further losses.

................................................................................................

"Instead, the Allies used what artillery they had to bombard the Ottoman trenches on the morning of June 4. After a short pause to draw the Turks out of hiding, the bombardment began again at 11:30. The infantry then moved in to try to break through the Turkish defenses, but although there were some initial successes, the advance was soon halted, and trench warfare resumed. In a single day, both sides had lost about one-fourth of their troops and were severely weakened. The British were unable to renew the attack the next day, and again, a stalemate was reached, with operations returning to skirmishes and smaller engagements.

"Throughout the rest of June and July, several local attacks and counterattacks were made, but although losses were high for both sides, no signification ground was gained. It was not until August that the Allies tried a different strategy: two new British divisions were to land at Suvla Bay north of Anzac Cove to capture the Sari Bair ridge, while the ANZACs and Gurkhas supported them from the south with attacks at Lone Pine, Chunuk Bair, and the Nek.

................................................................................................

"The offensive opened on August 6 with two diversionary attacks at Lone Pine and an area close to Krithia known as the Vineyard. While the Allies suffered over 2,000 casualties at Lone Pine, they inflicted over 5,000 upon the Turks and managed to capture their trench. The attack at Krithia Vineyard was not as successful, however, and quickly devolved into the same stalemate conditions that characterized most of the fighting on the peninsula.

"Meanwhile, at 10 pm, the British landed their divisions at Suvla Bay. Although they met only light resistance, the landing was disorganized from the outset as some of the ships anchored in the wrong location. The confusion was only amplified by the darkness of the night, which left units mixed and officers unable to locate their position. As had been the case with the original landings on the peninsula, the British were forced to spend precious time getting their troops in order on the beach rather than advancing inland. This delay allowed Turkish reinforcements to mount a counterattack, effectively keeping the British contained and unable to reach any of their objectives.

................................................................................................

"The Allies saw some success on August 8 when ANZAC troops managed to capture Chunuk Bair, one of the hills of the Sari Bair ridge. Unfortunately, this came at a great cost, and with the failures on other fronts, the position quickly proved untenable. Chunuk Bair would be back in Ottoman hands a few days later. Likewise, an attack at the Nek to support the troops at Chunuk Bair proved costly, with more than half of the men losing their lives.

"The last major operation of the offensive happened on August 21, with a British attack at Scimitar Hill and Hill 60. The capture of these two hills would have united the ANZAC and Suvla fronts, but when that was not achieved, the August Offensive was abandoned. The campaign had resulted in yet another stalemate, and with winter looming, the Allies faced a difficult choice: should they stay and continue the fight or accept defeat and withdraw?"

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September 17, 2024 - September 18, 2024.

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Chapter 7. Defeat and Evacuation

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"“We had been sizzled in the heat, tortured by flies and thirst, and later nearly frozen to death. It was hard to be told we must give it up. But it was not our wasted energy and sweat that really grieved us. In our hearts it was to know we were leaving our dead comrades behind.”

"—Trooper Jack Linton Young Martyn"

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"With the failure of the August Offensive, there was little else the Allied forces could do on the Gallipoli Peninsula other than prepare for the harsh weather to come. The oncoming winter was due to bring with it many storms, and local commanders were becoming increasingly worried about how supplies would get through to Gallipoli.

"By this point, a humiliating defeat and unprecedented evacuation of Gallipoli were being contemplated in London. In October, General Hamilton was informed that the Cabinet in London was considering evacuation, and he was instructed to prepare a plan for a potential withdrawal from Gallipoli. Hamilton reacted angrily and estimated the casualties from an evacuation to be as high as 50 percent. When he refused to prepare an evacuation plan, he was dismissed from his post as commander-in-chief of British forces in the Mediterranean and recalled to London, effectively signaling the end of his military career.

"While their troops suffered through squalid conditions at Gallipoli, the British Cabinet would not come to a decision about evacuating the peninsula until December. Before this decision was taken, there was much discussion about how much benefit there would be in reallocating the troops from the peninsula elsewhere. Both the Cabinet and the War Committee debated vociferously, with members of each organization unable to reach a consensus on the next step. This left the troops in Gallipoli stranded for longer than they should have been, facing worsening conditions due to the change in weather. “Day after day . . . no decision has been reached,” wrote Cabinet member and leader of the Conservative Party Bonar Law, as he acknowledged the difference in opinion between the Cabinet and the War Committee.

................................................................................................

"Up to his dismissal, General Hamilton had remained optimistic about the Allies’ chances of securing victory. However, even he had to eventually agree that the campaign would not reach the objectives that had been set out. In November, Hamilton was replaced by Lieutenant General Charles Monro, who was sufficiently shocked by the state of affairs in Gallipoli after touring all three fronts—Cape Helles, Suvla Bay, and Anzac Cove—that he recommended an immediate withdrawal. Lord Kitchener initially rejected any idea of withdrawing, but he finally relented after seeing the deplorable conditions in Gallipoli. On November 17, he gave his consent for the evacuation of 105,000 men from Gallipoli.

"Churchill was livid, deriding Monro and his actions by saying, “He came, he saw, he capitulated.” Churchill’s reputation as a loose cannon made him the obvious scapegoat for the failed Gallipoli Campaign. He had not been the only one to support the plan, nor was he directly responsible for its outcome; nevertheless, the Dardanelles fiasco meant that he was deeply unpopular with the public. Moreover, his political decision to leave the Conservative Party for the Liberal Party, and his subsequent time as home secretary, made him a target for Bonar Law and the rest of the Conservatives.

................................................................................................

"With public confidence in the government waning, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith needed to form a coalition government with the Conservatives. They demanded the removal of Churchill from the Cabinet as a condition of establishing the coalition. Asquith had no choice but to acquiesce and gave Churchill the boot on November 15. He was also expelled from the War Council that same month.

"Dissatisfied with the ceremonial position of chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Churchill decided to resign from the government altogether. In a letter to Asquith, he wrote that he did not feel “able to remain in well-paid inactivity. I therefore ask you to submit my resignation to the King. I am an officer, and I place myself unreservedly at the disposal of the military authorities, observing that my regiment is in France.” Before entering politics, Churchill had been a soldier, and he now became an officer commanding an infantry battalion on the Western Front.

................................................................................................

"Meanwhile, the remaining Cabinet members continued debating the evacuation. Bonar Law wrote passionately in favor of evacuation, claiming, “Every military authority, without a single exception whom we have consulted, has reported in favour of an evacuation.” These military authorities included Lord Kitchener, General William Robertson, and General Archibald Murray. General Robertson wrote in November that “the force in the peninsula has no longer any prospect of contributing directly or indirectly to the defeat of Germany . . . withdrawal from the enterprise is therefore the best course”.

"In the end, it was not until December 6 that a decision was made. Weighing up the loss of British prestige against the cataclysmic failure of the operation, Sir Edward Grey admitted that “there was obviously only one thing to be done” about the troops in Gallipoli. A Cabinet Memo signed on December 7 stated the Cabinet had decided “there was no alternative but to proceed . . . with the evacuation of the positions at SUVLA & ANZAC.”

................................................................................................

"The withdrawal then began on December 15. Compared to the previous eight months of military mismanagement and mistakes, the evacuation was an astonishing success. An unprecedented level of secrecy meant that the Turks had no idea what the next move would be from the Allied side, let alone that they were planning an evacuation. Feint attacks, mines, and ruses, such as self-firing rifles, were used to discourage the Turks from advancing upon Allied positions and realizing that a mass evacuation was underway.

"Supplies, such as food and equipment, could not be allowed to fall into Turkish hands after their evacuation. Food and drink stores that would usually be closed to the men were suddenly thrown open. The men were allowed to fill their bags with whatever they could carry. Anything that would not fit into their bags was consumed then and there. Sergeant Roland Chadwick of the New Zealand Field Ambulance wrote in his diary, “We made beasts of ourselves and crammed them all into us—salmon, fruit salad, oranges, gooseberries, raisins, sardines.” Anything they could not consume was burnt in a bonfire or otherwise made to be inedible. Any equipment they could not take with them was destroyed or rendered useless.

................................................................................................

"As per Lord Kitchener’s recommendations, support troops, equipment, and reserves were moved first. Then the fighting units were gradually moved off the peninsula. All this happened at night under cover of darkness. By December 18, there were only some 20,000 soldiers left.

"The following day, the British cruiser HMS Grafton waited not far from Anzac Cove to take in the men and to open fire on the Turks should they catch wind of the operation and decide to interfere. The last to leave the trenches were ordered to use barbed wire and mines to close the gully. All the men were instructed to wrap their boots with empty sandbags to muffle any sound they may otherwise make in the dark while navigating the trenches. They made their way out in the night in single file and in total silence, using a trail of oats that had been left behind by the leaders to find their way. It was only when they reached the jetty that they would look back to see if anyone had been left behind.

"Sergeant Major Joe Gasparich, who was among the last to evacuate from Anzac Cove, described the scene, “When I brought my feet down they echoed right through the trench, down the gully, right down, and you could hear this echo running ahead . . . Talk about empty, I didn’t see a soul.”

................................................................................................

"On December 20, the evacuation of 105,000 men and 300 guns from Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove was complete. Thirty-five thousand soldiers were then gradually evacuated from Cape Helles from late December until January 9, 1916. There were only a handful of casualties over the course of the withdrawal—nothing like what had been predicted by Hamilton and the other commanders.

"Despite its quiet end, the Gallipoli Campaign had seen bloodshed on an enormous scale. When it was all said and done, the Allies had sustained more than 300,000 casualties from death, injury, disease, or capture. That number was about 250,000 for the Ottoman Empire. British, French, and Turkish troops included men from their respective empires, and the Gallipoli Campaign caused Ottoman Turkey, Australia, and New Zealand in particular to begin developing their own sense of identity as nations. Their soldiers may have gone to war as citizens of their respective empires, but they had returned to their countries with new ideas.

"Turkish Colonel Mustafa Kemal would become Turkey’s first president after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and other Turkish soldiers also went on to take up significant roles in the Turkish government. Meanwhile, Australia and New Zealand began reassessing their connection with the British Empire. Today they view April 25, 1915, the day the land invasion of Gallipoli began, as the day they began establishing their own sense of national consciousness. Both countries still commemorate this day each year as Anzac Day."

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September 18, 2024 - September 20, 2024.

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Chapter 8. Battle Analysis

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"“The first two months it was just a heat wave, and it was almost unbearable . . . the second period, it rained continually . . . then the third period it was snow and ice and blistering winds.”

"—Private Arthur Wagstaff"

................................................................................................

"One of the small successes that the Gallipoli Campaign brought the Allied side was that it allowed them to sneak submarines into the Sea of Marmara to harass Turkish transports and ships. Other than that, the campaign was a failure, and there are numerous reasons for this.

"One of the major reasons for the failure of the Gallipoli Campaign was that it was poorly conceived from the outset. Facing a stalemate on the Western Front, Churchill believed that knocking out one of Germany’s allies would bring an end to the war. However, at the time, Germany was not being propped up by its allies. Even if the Ottoman Turks had capitulated, the Germans would have simply sent troops to support the Austro-Hungarian forces.

"The British believed that control over the Dardanelles would offer an easier route to deliver supplies to Russia. In reality, however, Britain did not have enough ammunition and firepower for its own armies. The harsh reality facing Britain was that France was in deep trouble with German troops having made their way through the country. This meant that the Western Front was always the priority and, therefore, the Gallipoli Campaign could never be allocated the number of men and guns it needed to succeed. In light of this, it is debatable whether the campaign should have gone ahead at all.

................................................................................................

"Another line of thought on the reasons behind the failure of the Gallipoli Campaign is that the British Army simply wasn’t ready. For the Gallipoli Campaign to stand a chance of succeeding, the Allied forces would have needed more guns and shells. Once the Turkish troops were sufficiently dug in and had set up their barbed wire, machine guns, and artillery, the Allied forces stood little chance against them with their meager supplies of munitions. The Allied troops would have needed hundreds more guns, which simply did not exist. Even if the guns were available, the hundreds of thousands of shells needed for the campaign to work had not yet been produced. Even if those things were in place, the gunners needed had not yet been trained. Overcoming the Turks, who had such a huge advantage over the Allied troops, necessitated complex artillery techniques and modern infantry tactics that had not yet been developed.

"Those behind the plan for the Gallipoli Campaign had simply hoped for the best, initially hoping a naval attack would work, then sending poorly-prepared and ill-supplied troops into a situation where there was little chance they would score a victory. One could say that the Gallipoli Campaign was just like every other campaign launched in 1915. The authorities did not have a good grasp of the objectives the campaign was to achieve and were hampered by their lack of reliable maps and intelligence. The plan was unclear and relied upon troops who were inexperienced in battle. For many of them, that campaign would be their first—and last—taste of military combat.

"Furthermore, the British appear to have repeatedly underestimated their targets, particularly at Gallipoli. Their overconfidence in their supposedly superior abilities and weaponry was misplaced and led to the needless loss of many lives.

................................................................................................

"One of the men who had underestimated the Turks was the British commander, General Ian Hamilton. He was an accomplished soldier, but he overcomplicated his military tactics with multiple attacks. The success of each attack presumed the success of the one that had gone before it—a fatal error of judgment and another example of British underestimation of their enemy’s capabilities. When one attack failed, it stranded men carrying out other attacks. With the benefit of hindsight, Hamilton’s plans were unrealistic as they depended on everything going according to plan, with no obstacles or surprises. His plans relied on his untested men instantly behaving like veterans and not only being decisive but making the correct decisions each time.

"More than anything else, Hamilton’s plans relied on the Turks being ill-prepared and lacking fighting spirit. Colonel Mustafa Kemal, who would later become Turkey’s first president as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, displayed the typical Ottoman Turkish grit by famously telling his men, “I don’t order you to attack—I order you to die. In the time which passes until we die, other troops and commanders can take our places.”

"Colonel Mustafa Kemal and his compatriots were used to living in harsh conditions. Moreover, they knew they had to be well-disciplined in order to withstand the invaders and defend their homeland. Unlike the troops they were facing, the Turkish soldiers were experienced and had recently fought in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. The Turks had a mighty spirit, experience, and good leadership on their side, as well as ready supplies.

................................................................................................

"For the Allied soldiers, their nearest dependable base was Alexandria in Egypt, 700 miles (1,100 kilometers) away, while the U.K. was even further, 2,000 miles (3,200 kilometers) away. Mudros, an advanced base on the island of Lemnos, was 60 miles (100 kilometers) away from Cape Helles, but it offered very little. It was not a real military supply base and would have required a huge amount of work to make it into one. Imbros was another advanced supply depot, but between it and the Gallipoli Peninsula, there were 15 miles (25 kilometers) of open sea patrolled by German U-boats. Even if supplies managed to make it across the sea, they would have to be landed and unpacked on open beaches as Turkish shells rained down on them. This made the logistics for the Gallipoli Campaign a nightmare that would confound any military commander.

"When Winston Churchill wrote about the Gallipoli Campaign, he lamented how each step taken by the British and French came at least a month too late to be of any use against the Ottoman troops. It seems the Turks were always ahead of them in their preparations, having been warned of an impending attack by the naval assault, which achieved nothing other than encouraging the enemy to get ready. With so much time passing between the naval assault and the eventual landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula, they were very prepared. Had the naval attack been more effective or the Allied forces been quicker, the Gallipoli Campaign may have turned out very differently."

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September 20, 2024 - September 20, 2024.

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Chapter 9. Legacy and Remembrance

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...............................................................................................

"“Heroes who shed their blood and lost their lives! You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and Mehmets to us where they lie side by side here in this country of ours.”

"—Mustafa Kemal Atatürk"

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"The Australians and New Zealanders believe that the Anzac tradition—the characteristics of courage, endurance, and mateship—was set on the day the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula on April 25, 1915. The term Anzac has passed into the Australian and New Zealander vocabulary, and the legend of the Anzac spirit is now part of their national identity.

"In the 1920s, Anzac Day became a public holiday, with ceremonies to commemorate the day. As the decades and wars went by, later veterans would join in the parades. The relevance of Anzac Day was debated somewhat in the 1960s and 1970s, but the 1990s saw interest surge as younger people began traveling to the Gallipoli Peninsula to attend ceremonies there.

................................................................................................

"There are at least 33 Commonwealth war cemeteries on the peninsula, which is now a national park. There are also two memorials with the names of British and Commonwealth soldiers who died at Gallipoli but whose bodies have never been recovered and have no known graves. In 2005, the construction of a new road uncovered the remains of soldiers from the battle in 1915. Prime Ministers John Howard of Australia, Recep Erdogan of Turkey, and Helen Clark of New Zealand agreed on a preliminary survey, from which the Anzac Gallipoli Archaeology Database was developed.

"Almost a hundred years after the Gallipoli Campaign, the survey revealed roughly 12 miles (20 kilometers) of Turkish trenches. ANZAC and British trenches were also discovered, as were battlefield materials that consisted mainly of used bullets, pieces of shells, and barbed wire, but also glass, stoneware, rum jars, and other objects. Along the shores of the peninsula are plenty of shipwrecks from the conflict, which divers can explore. “It’s like a time machine that takes you back to 1915 and World War I,” said diver and documentary maker Savas Karakas after diving in the area."

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September 20, 2024 - September 21, 2024.

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Conclusion

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"While the British fretted over their next steps, the Turkish wasted no time in reinforcing the Gallipoli Peninsula. When the Allied forces resumed their attack in late April, the Turks were waiting for them and had taken up stronger positions along the length of the peninsula. A deadly stalemate ensued. By the time the Allies gave up on the campaign, the British were humiliated. Their only success had come in their retreat, an operation that was carried out with barely any loss of life.

"Rather than bringing about a swift end to the First World War, the Gallipoli Campaign became known for other outcomes that went beyond wounds and loss of life. The Ottoman Empire had entered the war already weakened, and by 1918, the empire had effectively reached its end as Britain, France, Greece, and Russia took over most of its territories. Turkish nationalism came to the fore as heroes from the Gallipoli Campaign were propelled to high government positions, such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey’s first president.

................................................................................................

"There were many warning signs the British could have heeded. However, military overconfidence and Churchill’s ambition fueled the Gallipoli Campaign, a venture that was doomed from the start."

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September 21, 2024 - September 21, 2024.

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September 03, 2024 - September 21, 2024.

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