Sardar Patel : The Best PM India Never Had, by Rajnikant Puranik.

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Sardar Patel : The Best PM India Never Had

by Rajnikant Puranik. 

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"This is an abridged version of the author’s other book: “Sardar Patel : The Iron Man who should have been India’s First PM”" 

Well, it's more than worth reading, and really ought to be part of general education. 

Excellent first chapter, succinctly outlining major points. It gives the biography and lifetime details in short, terse, succinct terms in a table form, which already helps one see the person and his life in proper context. 

Later as one goes through the book, the details that one comes across are revealing, because mostly the history of freedom struggle, as propagated after independence in general education, has been concentrated on two names and one family, others being reduced to names barely mentioned. 

So various details here that are quite public are still a revelation, to anyone who's not a professional historian. 

That the language is an easy, simple, conversation level, helps make it an easy read for a normal reader. 

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After Sardar’s joining freedom movement, as per teaching of Gandhi he'd given everything to Freedom Struggle. Maniben too had been in the movement from a very young age, and later taken care of her father. 

" ... When Sardar Patel expired, he had left nothing for his daughter. With Sardar no more, she had to vacate the house. She was left all alone to fend for herself, with no money and no house. Sardar had instructed her to give a bag and a book to Nehru upon his death. 

"After Sardar’s death—which happened in Mumbai—Maniben dutifully went to Delhi, took an appointment with Nehru and met him. She handed over to him the bag and the book. It seems the book was an account book, and the bag contained rupees 35 lacs. After having done so, she waited for Nehru to express sympathy, enquire as to what she intended doing, where would she stay, her monetary position, whether she wanted anything, and what he could do for her. But, Nehru showed no interest and said nothing. After some time, she left disappointed. 

"She returned to Ahmedabad to stay with a cousin. Neither Nehru, nor the Congress Party bothered about her well-being. ... "

One cannot help contrasting this with story of INA treasure as reported in Anuj Dhar's work on Netaji, two trunks filled with gold and diamond jewellery worth 2 crores and 22 crores respectively, reportedly taken straight from airport in Delhi when brought over from Japan and, as prr instructions, driven to the then PM Jawaharlal Nehru,  and credited to his account, never to be heard of again.  

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"Mountbatten wrote to his mother on 14 June 1947: “I must stress the importance of Patel in the agreements so far reached. He has a rough exterior and an uncompromising manner… he has never wavered and has stood firm against inner voices and neutral indecisions that have sometimes afflicted his colleagues. Patel’s realism has also been a big factor in the acceptance of the Dominion Status formula.”{ACJ/136/L-2430}"

Author might have added a short introduction here - his mother, Princess Victoria of Battenberg, was daughter of Princess Alice, daughter of Queen Victoria. Her first cousins included a king of England and the then deposed Kaiser Wilhelm, apart from other royals; She had lost two sisters due to Russian revolution, Alexandra and Elizabeth, both of whom had married into Romanov family who were their cousins. 

"Patel had himself admitted: “For several years, Gandhi and I were in perfect agreement. Mostly we agreed instinctively; but when the time for a big decision on the question of India’s independence came, we differed. I felt that we had to take independence there and then. We had, therefore, to agree to partition. I came to this conclusion after a great deal of heart-searching and with a great deal of sorrow. But I felt that if we did not accept partition, India would be split into many bits and completely ruined.”{ISS1} {NS/90}"

"Indeed, the Muslim League call for Pakistan and partition could only have been resisted if the Congress was prepared for a strong, sustained retaliatory violence, and a long drawn-out communal strife in cities, towns and villages. However, that was apparently beyond the Congress leadership brought up on Gandhian non-violence. The Congress leadership was incapable of American style civil war. If Netaji Subhas had been there, one could have thought about it.

"It is also worth noting that the Hindus and Sikhs of East Punjab and the Hindus of West Bengal had openly demanded partition. Gandhiji had himself admitted in his prayer meeting on 10 June 1947 that as “non-Muslim India is overwhelmingly in favour of partition”, he “could not coerce public opinion.”"

That this demand was an overwhelming response to the massacre perpetrated in Calcutta, ought to have been mentioned. 

"A senior leader who stood out against partition, and voted against the Pant resolution, was Purshottamdas Tandon. He stated he was prepared to suffer the British rule a little longer than pay the heavy price of partition. He claimed the Nehru government had been intimidated by the Muslim League. He got a huge applause when at the end of his speech he said: “Let us fight both the British and the [Muslim] League.”"

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"The British and the Muslim had started working in tandem to ensure partition and Pakistan, and to make as large a Pakistan as possible—as per the “16 May 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan” groupings, where Group-B (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Baluchistan), combined with Group-C (Assam and Bengal) could form Pakistan; leaving just Group-A (Madras, UP, Central provinces, Bombay, Bihar and Orissa) for India. 

"The achievement of the same required practical proof on the ground that Muslims and Hindus cannot live together, and that Muslims dominated those provinces. That required violence and riots—Jinnah and the Muslim League were willing to invest on that; and the British were willing to look the other way when that happens. Gandhians were for non-violence, and hence for non-retaliation. That suited both the adversaries—the Muslim League and the British—tremendously. The British, of course, had all along been highly grateful to Gandhi for his guiding political principle of non-violence, and had, in gratitude, helped elevate him to the status of ‘Mahatma’. 

"Ghaznafar Ali of the Muslim League had stated: “Mohammad Bin Qasim and Mahmud of Ghazni invaded India with armies composed of only a few thousands, and yet were able to overpower lakhs of Hindus. God willing, a few lakhs of Muslims will yet overwhelm crores of Hindus.”

"On one hand Jinnah had been arguing for and justifying Pakistan on the plea that Hindus and Muslims formed two nations, and that they couldn’t live together; while on the other hand he wanted the whole of Group-B (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Baluchistan) and Group-C (Assam and Bengal) provinces to form Pakistan; leaving just Group-A (Madras, UP, Central provinces, Bombay, Bihar and Orissa) for India. If Hindus and Muslims formed two nations, and they could not live together, as Jinnah argued, why would Hindu-majority Assam go to form Pakistan; and how were Hindus to live with Muslims in undivided Punjab and Bengal? 

"When Mountbatten brought up the issue of partition of Punjab and Bengal, Jinnah advanced the counter-logic that the Hindus of Punjab and Bengal were respectively first Punjabis and Bengalis rather than being Hindus or Congressis, and therefore the provinces could not be divided, and the whole of them should form Pakistan. Mountbatten promptly pointed out the contradictions in Jinnah’s argument, telling him that if his logic were to be accepted there could be no case for Pakistan too! “I am afraid I drove the old gentleman quite mad,” reported Mountbatten jovially, “because whichever was his argument went I always pursued it to a stage beyond which he did not wish it to go.”"

Post independence, the same intentions have been followed, via a two pronged policy deliberately employed - one, illegal migration, especially to Northeast, chiefly from East Bengal, with intentions to populate Assam and then separate it; two, ousting Hindu populations, from any neighborhood across India, wherever muslims number more than a certain percentage, by threats and enacted violence. 

And, of course, deliberately conducted policy of increasing population, in name of religion, while other populations of India control population and aim for education, prosperity and modernising, helps increase numbers, and demand in name of equal treatment while accusing anyone pointing at facts of communal bent helps a fraudulent propaganda of anti-muslim treatment to India in general that cannot be corrected as long as non-muslims exist.

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"Jinnah and Muslim League’s diabolical design behind the Calcutta riots was to somehow make Calcutta a Muslim-majority city, and ensure its inclusion in Pakistan. The idea was to force exodus of Hindus out of Calcutta, trigger counter-riots against Muslims in Bihar, and thus force migration of Muslims out of Bihar, and into Calcutta, increasing its Muslim population. 

"The riots spread to Bihar, UP, Punjab and NWFP. It all suited Jinnah: Hindus and Muslims can’t live together; Pakistan must be granted. The British didn’t bother much to quell the riots. They watched bemused—happy to let the world know what would happen without them. Further, the British had a vested interest in the creation of Pakistan; and they were delighted the ground was being readied for the purpose. 

"Law and order was a provincial matter, and Bengal was under the majority control of the Muslim League, which, rather than quelling riots, was instigating it. Sardar Patel as Home Minister in the Interim Government asked for central takeover of the areas, but the demand was rejected by Viceroy Wavell. Patel wrote to Viceroy Wavell on 25 October 1946: “It would indeed be a tragic paradox if we who have undertaken the responsibility of the Government of India should be powerless to do anything to terminate the reign of terror.”

"The British were blatantly favouring the Muslim League over the Congress. This became further obvious when Viceroy Wavell, who remained blind to the riots in Calcutta and Noakhali in Bengal, promptly sent his Deputy Private Secretary Ian Scott on a mission to enquire into the riots in Bihar, where the Provincial Government was under the Congress. Significantly, Jinnah issued a press-statement on 26 November 1946 in the context of the Bihar riots asking for “Transfer of Population”: transfer of Muslims out of Bihar. Ian Scott conveniently suggested Bengal as the location of the Muslim evacuee camps. The Muslim League and the British administration were working in tandem to ensure Bengal became Pakistan!

"Both the British and the Muslim League wanted the riots and chaos to spread across Bengal, Assam, Punjab, Sind, NWFP, and other areas. More the chaos and riots, more the justification for partition and Pakistan. When Patel insisted with Viceroy Wavell for enforcement of Martial Law in disturbed areas, Wavell refused saying it was not necessary! 

"When the question of partition of Bengal and Punjab rose, Jinnah pleaded with Mountbatten “not to destroy the unity of Bengal and Punjab, which had national characteristics in common: common history, common ways of life, common language, and where Hindus have stronger feelings as Bengalis or Punjabis than they have as members of the Congress.” In saying so, Jinnah apparently missed the irony that his logic also went against the logic of Pakistan!

"Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (1892–1963), the then premier of Bengal, who had been responsible for the Calcutta Killings of 1946, was desperate to avoid any partition of Bengal, for he had ambition to head Group-C, Bengal plus Assam, as a separate nation. He had the backing of the British Governor, and had also secured the backing of the Congress Leaders, Sarat Chandra Bose and Kiran Shankar Ray, who desired an undivided Bengal. Kiran Shankar Ray was from East Bengal, and was leader of the Congress in the Bengal Legislative Assembly. Suhrawardy even proceeded to threaten those who supported division, and stated that “Calcutta will be sacked and burnt in case the partition idea is favoured.”

"Given such a situation, Dr Shyama Prasad Mookerjee and KC Neogy beseeched Sardar Patel: “…all our eyes are turned towards you in the hope that you will not fail to take whatever action is possible to save Bengal and Calcutta from utter ruin and bloodshed.”

"Patel responded: “Bengal cannot be isolated from the Indian Union. Talk of the idea of a sovereign republic of independent Bengal is a trap to induce the unwary and unwise to enter into the parlour of the Muslim League. The Congress Working Committee is fully aware of the situation in Bengal. Bengal has got to be partitioned if the non-Muslim population is to survive.”{DD2/43} 

"Patel thereafter wrote to both Sarat Chandra Bose and Kiran Shankar Ray. It had the desired effect. Jinnah, rattled by the Congress demand for partition of Bengal and Punjab, called it a “sinister move actuated by spite and bitterness.”"

Here's the explanation of the absurd propaganda going on for decades, maligning Nehru and Patel, arguing that they insisted on partition for sake of power; as also the absurd argument repeated over and over, that Punjab cares for its other half, not for Bengal. 

"With indescribable atrocities against Hindus in East Bengal going unabated, the GoI made an appeal to Pakistan to call a halt on the same. But, there was little response. 

"It is worth noting in this connection that Gandhian non-violent principles yielded NOTHING. ... "

Slightly incorrect - it was repeatedly used to shame Hindus every which way, while muslim killers were supposed to be loved, honored, and handed over everything they demanded or took, from millions of extra square miles west of Ganga to millions more of lives of Hindus, because Gandhi said so. 

" ... It was only tit-for-tat that brought Pakistan to the negotiating table. 

"In Rajlakshmi Debi’s Bangla novel Kamal-lata, quoted by Tathagata Roy in his book ‘My People, Uprooted: A Saga of the Hindus of Eastern Bengal’ (Chapter 6), there is a conversation described between a Hindu from Mymensingh town and a Muslim from a Calcutta suburb sometime just after partition. In the process of haggling the Muslim says “Excuse me, but your position and ours are not the same. So long as Mahatma Gandhi is alive we have no fears. But you won’t be able to live here [East Bengal] much longer.”

To a reader not familiar with those names, it's confusing to see those names, belong as they do to major characters of Sharat Chandra Chatterjee's Srikant series. 

"There was a marked difference between Punjab and Bengal in respect of the partition. In Punjab, the carnage was on both sides, East Punjab and West Punjab, although more in the Muslim-dominated West Punjab. In Bengal, the mayhem was mostly in the Muslim-dominated East Bengal. In Punjab, the migration was both ways: Muslims migrating from East Punjab in India to Pakistan, and Hindus migrating from Pakistan to East Punjab in India. In a way, there was a population transfer between West Punjab and East Punjab. In Bengal, the predominant migration was that of Hindus from East Bengal/Pakistan to West Bengal/India. There was a reverse migration of Muslims too, but comparatively far less. 

"However, the continued violence against the Hindus in East Bengal had begun provoking retaliation in West Bengal. For example, the anti-Muslim riots in Howrah turned serious from 26 March 1950 onwards, leading to the beginning of migration of Muslims from West Bengal to East Bengal by March 1950. That is, the population transfer that had happened in Punjab in 1947-48 began to happen in Bengal belatedly by March 1950. It is this which alarmed Pakistan and the Muslim League leaders, who had hitherto been inciting the mobs in East Bengal, and were happy at Hindus being at the receiving end.

"It was only when the anti-Muslim riots in Howrah, in retaliation of the on-going carnage in East Bengal, took a serious turn from 26 March 1950 onwards that the Pakistan PM Liaquat Ali made his first conciliatory gesture in a speech at Karachi on 29 March 1950, and expressed his intention to travel to New Delhi on 2 April 1950 to work out a solution with Nehru. 

"Liaquat Ali  hurried to New Delhi on 2 April 1950, and signed the Nehru–Liaquat Pact, also called the Delhi Pact, on 8 April 1950. It provided for safety of refugees when they returned to dispose of their property; return of abducted women and looted property; derecognition of  forced conversions; complete and equal right of citizenship and security of life and properties to minorities; and setting up of Minority Commission in each country.

"As expected, while India firmly implemented the Pact, not Pakistan. While the anti-Muslim violence in West Bengal was put down with a firm hand, and the migration of Muslims from West Bengal to East Bengal ceased; the violence against the Hindus in East Bengal continued unabated, so also the migration of Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal. That is, the carnage became only one-sided: that of Hindus in East Bengal. Also, the migration became only one way: Pakistan to India.

"Looking to the track-record of the Muslim League leaders, who had themselves been inciting the mobs, Nehru should have known what the result of the pact would be. Sardar Patel was unhappy with the Pact, but being in the cabinet, didn’t oppose it. However, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee and KC Niyogee, the two central ministers from West Bengal, immediately resigned from the Union Cabinet in protest against the Pact. 

"Rather than facilitating transfer of population between West and East Bengal, and removing forever the problem and the poison, Nehru extracted the following “benefits” for India from the Nehru-Liaquat pact: (1)Checked depletion of Muslim population from West Bengal and Assam by stopping their migration to Pakistan. (2)Increased the population of Muslims in West Bengal and Assam by allowing their reverse migration—allowing Muslims to return who had migrated. (3)Allowed fresh migration of Muslims from East Bengal. (5)Condemned the Hindus in East Bengal (a)to violence, (b)to second-class status, and (c)to remain at the mercy of Muslims. (6)Forced subsequent migration of Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal (as the atrocities did not subside in Pakistan)."

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"What was noteworthy was that on 20 April 1946, that is, nine days before the last date of nominations of 29 April 1946, Gandhi had indicated his preference for Nehru. Yet, not a single PCC nominated Nehru!"

" ... Gandhi prodded Kriplani to convince a few CWC members to propose Nehru’s name for the party president. Kriplani promptly and unquestioningly complied: He got a few to propose Nehru’s name. Finding this queer development, Sardar Patel enquired with Gandhi, and sought his advice. Gandhi counselled him to withdraw his name. Patel complied promptly, and didn’t raise any question. That cleared the way for Nehru. The “democratic” Nehru didn’t feel embarrassed at this blatant hijacking of the election."

" ... What Gandhi and Nehru manoeuvred was not only illegal,  immoral and unethical, but also against the interest of the nation. ... "

Author lists fourteen. 

Author quotes various other leaders of Congress of the time, from Kriplani to Maulana Azad, about how this was not good for India, and how, if they'd not seen it then, they regretted it later. 

He goes on to quote more. 

"This is what Rajaji, who had then been pro-Nehru, had to say two decades after the death of Patel in Swarajya of 27.11.1971:  

"“When the independence of India was coming close upon us and Gandhiji was the silent master of our affairs, he had come to the decision that Jawaharlal, who among all the Congress leaders was the most familiar with foreign affairs [although the Nehruvian years proved Nehru had made a mess of the foreign policy and external security], should be the Prime Minister of India, although he knew Vallabhbhai would be the best administrator among them all… Undoubtedly it would have been better… if Nehru had been asked to be the Foreign Minister and Patel made the Prime Minister. I too fell into the error of believing that Jawaharlal was the more enlightened person of the two... A myth had grown about Patel that he would be harsh towards Muslims. That was a wrong notion but it was the prevailing prejudice.”

"Rajaji took over from Mountbatten as the Governor-General (GG) of India on 21 June 1948. When Nehru had suggested Rajaji’s name as the GG, Rajaji had, in fact, written to Nehru that he (Nehru) should himself take over as the Governor-General (GG), and make Sardar Patel the Prime Minister. However, Nehru, vide his letter of 21 May 1948 to Rajaji, had politely turned down the suggestion: “Please forgive me for the delay in answering your telegram No.26-S dated 12th May 1948 in which you suggested that I [Nehru] might be GG [Governor General]. Any suggestion from you is worthy of thought, but I am afraid the present one is completely impracticable from various points of view…”

"Jayaprakash Narayan(JP) stated in 1972: “Rajaji once unburdened his heart by publicly confessing to a wrong he had done to Sardar Patel. I find myself in a similar situation: the dominant feeling within me today is one of self-reproach, because during his lifetime, I was not merely a critic, but an opponent of the Great Sardar.”

"The same JP, a socialist, used to be in Nehru’s camp. After independence the socialists had been plotting to unseat Patel from his post as Home Minister. JP had commented : “A man of 74 [Sardar Patel] has the department of which even a man of 30 would find it difficult to bear the burden.” Mridula Sarabhai, who was close to Nehru, had launched a whisper campaign for Sardar’s resignation. It is difficult to believe that the campaigns of both JP and Mridula did not have the blessings of Nehru, both being close to him."

"Gandhi had remarked: "Jawaharlal cannot be replaced today whilst the charge is being taken from the British. He, a Harrow boy, a Cambridge graduate, and a barrister, is wanted to carry on the negotiations with the Englishmen."{RG/370} {RG5/545} 

"But, what were the facts? Who was more competent to negotiate with the British? Nehru or Patel? Subsequent history showed that the critical negotiations and discussions with the British, and the decisions that affected the nation, were principally taken by Patel, and not Nehru—Nehru being too timid, confused, and indecisive."

Which amounted to the Harrow and Cambridge weighing in negatively, having prepared him not as a leader f an independent nation with great living tradition of cultural treasure of antiquity,  but as a subservient admirer of taller prefects who was mounded to despise that treasure. 

"Gandhi had once written of Nehru: “He [Nehru] is a friend of the English people. Indeed, he is more English than Indian in his thought and make-up. He is often more at home with Englishmen than with his own countrymen.” Gandhi had also commented about Nehru: “He is the only Englishman we have!” Less said about this remark the better—Did Gandhi think Englishmen were the only competent people?" 

In fact, both Subhash Chandra Bose and Sardar Patel were better equipped to deal with European and western, even oriental, non Indians, as evident by the respect they earned. 

"Another reasoning attributed to Gandhi’s preference was that he felt Nehru was better known abroad and could help India play a role in the international affairs.{RG/370} But, if that were the reason, he could have been made foreign minister under Sardar. It is another matter that Nehru made a mess of the foreign policy, as obvious from the adverse results of his policies post-independence. In fact, Sardar's views were far more realistic on foreign policy matters, and he would have done a much better job of it. ... "

" ... Reportedly, Gandhi’s reason was he wanted both Nehru and Patel together to lead the nation, but while Nehru would not work under Sardar Patel, he knew that in the national interest he could persuade Sardar Patel to work under Nehru, as Sardar would not defy him. ... "

"What Gandhi did in 1946 should not have come as a surprise to Patel. The bias of Gandhi was clear since 1929. Sardar Patel should have factored in Gandhi’s unjust bias and favouritism, and devised his own strategy. Patel should not have given-in to Gandhi’s undemocratic whims. Not because of personal ambition, but for the sake of the nation. Sardar knew well the weaknesses of Nehru, and his unsuitability as the PM. He knew Nehru was capable of huge blunders, as he had amply demonstrated in practice. He knew that giving power and PM post to Nehru was putting the nation to grave risk. Yet, he meekly caved-in. That was not Sardar-like. He should have shown his iron then."

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"Sir Stafford Cripps had estimated it would take India 10 to 15 years, if not more, to liquidate the Indian Princely States and merge them with India. It was a surprise to all, and a tribute to the Sardar’s abilities, that he took, not 10 to 15 years, but less than 10 to 15 months to merge all the 548 Princely States with India, extending India’s geographical area by a whopping 40%."

"The Hindu-Muslim majority considerations as they applied to British India did not apply to the Princely States, because the British policy on the Princely States as per the ‘Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy’ of 12 May 1946, which forms the constitutional and legal base, only talked of reverting of power back to the Princely States from the British. Therefore, what rajas or maharajas did with their states was their own business. In fact, even Jinnah had categorically stated that his plans for Pakistan—on the basis of Muslim majority areas—did not extend to the Princely States. What is more, Sheikh Abdullah had ridiculed Jinnah that his Pakistan halted at the customs barrier between British India and J&K!"

"Although the efforts for accession of the Princely States had been going on earlier too; between 25 July 1947 and 15 August 1947 there were mere 20 days; and Sardar Patel had assumed charge of the States department only on 5 July 1947; yet, thanks to an effective mix of techniques—persuasion, call to patriotism, privy purses, titles, palaces, arm-twisting, threats—used by Sardar Patel, ably assisted by VP Menon, all of the 548 States, except 3, acceded to India by 15 August 1947, and the rest 3 later."

"This is what Alex Von Tunzelmann says in Indian Summer: 

"“...Whatever may be said about Mountbatten’s tactics or the machinations of Patel, their achievement remains remarkable. Between them, and in less than a year, it may be argued that these two men achieved a larger India, more closely integrated, than had 90 years of British raj, 180 years of the Mughal Empire, or 130 years of Asoka and the Maurya rulers.{Tunz/226} 

"“...He [Sardar Patel] was impervious to Mountbatten’s famous charm, describing the new Viceroy as ‘a toy for Jawaharlalji to play with—while we arrange the revolution’... {Tunz/169} 

"“...For Patel’s part, he realised immediately that Mountbatten, with his own semi-royal status and personal friendship with many of the princes, was uniquely suited to help India achieve its aim of leaving no state behind.”"

"Wrote Karan Singh, son of Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K:  “...As far as the Sardar is concerned, he achieved a task the like of which had never before been attempted in world history. He succeeded in integrating over 500 Indian states and principalities into a united India with the consent and cooperation of the princes themselves, except in the cases of Hyderabad and Junagadh. The peaceful transition from feudalism to democracy laid the solid foundation of Indian unity, and this is an achievement for which the entire nation, regardless of party affiliation, will remain eternally indebted to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, rightly called the Iron Man of India.”"

"Not even Samrat Ashoka in the 2nd century BCE, or Emperor Chandragupta Maurya in the 3rd century BCE ‘Golden Age of India’, or Akbar in the 15th century CE could integrate the whole of India into one nation with one central authority as did the Sardar within so short a time. 

"By ceding Pakistan, India lost an area of about 3,65,000 square miles and a population of about 82 million. By the integration of the Princely States, India gained an area of nearly 5,00,000 square miles and a population of about 90 million."

"It can be unhesitatingly said that the most important factor that has contributed to the stability of India has been the integration of the Princely States; and that without Sardar the score would not have been 548 out of 548—there would have been several States less, and they would have, like Kashmir, created huge problems."

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"While Mountbatten and the British had nothing to say on the grossly unethical, illegal and even barbarous acts of Pakistan in J&K, and of states like Hyderabad; it is significant that Mountbatten, thanks to the elevated position accorded to him by Nehru and Gandhi, was liberal in his moral lectures to India, and wanted India “to adopt ethical and correct behaviour towards Hyderabad, and to act in such a way as could be defended before the bar of world opinion.”{BK2/129} However, moral lectures to Pakistan were out of his ambit. Pakistan or Muslims could behave or misbehave however they chose: that’s how not just the British, but even the great, liberal Mahatmas and seculars—Gandhi and Nehru—indulged them."

"Nehru never showed similar indulgence towards the Maharaja of Kashmir. Indeed, he was unreasonably hostile to the Maharaja of Kashmir, unnecessarily friendly and brotherly towards Sheikh Abdullah; but indulgent towards the Nizam under whose regime the innocent Hindus were being terrorised by the Razakars and Muslim militias."

"Mountbatten, also Chairman of the Defence Committee, had recorded: 

"“Pandit Nehru said openly at the meeting, and subsequently assured me privately, that he would not allow any orders to be given for operations to start unless there really was an event, such as a wholesale massacre of Hindus within the State, which would patently justify, in the eyes of the world, action by the Government of India.”"

But there was! Did it have to be 100%?

"What would the world think? What Mountbatten thought? What about his own image? These seemed to weigh more with Nehru. Why couldn’t he also think the opposite: that the world would consider India a sissy and a fool to ignore its own national interests. But, apparently Nehru found arguments for only those courses of action where he didn’t have to act! Or, where he could avoid decisions and difficulties.

" ... DN Panigrahi writes in ‘Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West’: 

"“Even more sensational disclosures were made by Nehru. Based on intelligence reports, it was mentioned that one William Barton, formerly of the Indian Civil Service, went to Lisbon on behalf of the Nizam of Hyderabad to enter into a treaty with Portugal for the use of Goa as a port in case of need. ‘We are informed,’ Nehru continued, ‘that the British Secret Service men have been loaned to Hyderabad government. They are working in the London office of the Pakistan Embassy...’”"

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"During the initial period of independence, the Commander-in-Chiefs of both the Indian and the Pakistani Army were British—Lockhart, followed by Bucher for India; and Messervey, followed by Gracey for Pakistan—with another British, Sir Claude Auchinleck, as the Supreme Commander, to whom the chiefs of the army, the air force and the navy of both India and Pakistan reported. There were also many British officers in both the armies: many more in the Pakistani Army, than the Indian, as the British were mostly pro-Pakistan and anti-India."

That explains, more than anything else, the "tribals" drama, pretending it wasn't Pakistan attacking Kashmir, all the while it being soldiers dressed in salwar instead of uniform - a stunt repeated in 1965 and in Kargil by Pakistan. 

"Mountbatten attempted to refer both the Junagadh and the Hyderabad cases to the UN. Fortunately, they were firmly rejected by Sardar Patel. British did all that was possible to prevent Indian army action in Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir.

"Mountbatten visited Kashmir between June 18 and June 23, 1947 and reportedly lobbied with Maharaja Hari Singh to accede to Pakistan. He even assured the Maharaja that India would not take it otherwise if he did so{VPM1/271}—blatantly advancing the British and the Pakistani interests to the detriment of India! Why was such a person made the first Governor General of free India? Why was Nehru so sold out on Mountbatten? ... "

"Writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48’:  

"“The role of Mountbatten and the British service chiefs made it virtually impossible for India to meet this requirement [of secrecy and surprise of military operations in J&K] in 1947-48. Not only were brakes applied on plans to strike at the invaders at their bases across the border but the British government was kept informed at every stage and was thus enabled to take diplomatic steps to close India’s military options.”"

"Earlier, “the decision that arms should be supplied to Kashmir [in early October 1947] on top-priority basis was simply derailed by the [British] Commander-in-Chief [of India], General Lockhart, acting in collusion with Field Marshal Auchinleck.”{DG/42} 

"Nehru discovered that India’s British Commander-in-Chief had known of Pakistani-led tribal invasion of Kashmir in advance, but had withheld that vital information from India. He had to subsequently resign.{DG/133} 

"Writes Dasgupta: “The strategic solution envisioned by Nehru as early as in December 1947 could not be implemented in practice so long as a British general held the post of Commander-in-Chief.”"

"Writes B Krishna: 

"“Nehru’s bias in favour of Abdullah was evident from what he said in August 1945 at the annual session of the National Conference at Sopore in the Valley, ‘If non-Muslims want to live in Kashmir, they should join the National Conference or bid goodbye to the country...If Pandits do not join it, no safeguards and weightages will protect them.’”{BK/374} 

"Half a million Kashmiri Pandits would, some forty-five years later, pay for Nehru’s sins, and be ethnically cleansed out of Kashmir—their home for thousands of years."

" ... Sheikh Abdullah launched the Quit Kashmir agitation against the Maharajah in May 1946 leading to his arrest. Quit Kashmir, fashioned after Quit India was obviously misleading, for Maharaja Hari Singh, unlike the English, was not an outsider. Sheikh Abdullah would have indulged in such acts knowing he would receive tacit support from Nehru.{SB2} Kripalani, who visited Kashmir in May 1946, stated that he was convinced that the Quit Kashmir movement was ‘abusive and mischievous’{BK/375}. Sheikh Abdullah was sentenced to three years imprisonment. In June 1946, Nehru decided to go to the Valley to free Abdullah. Though prohibited to enter the State, Nehru decided to defy the ban. He proclaimed that he wanted to take on the autocratic and the feudal rule that prevailed in Kashmir."

"Even Gandhi, when he went for his only visit to Kashmir in 1947, pointedly rejected the hospitality of the Maharaja, and remained the guest of the National Conference of Sheikh Abdullah. 

"Rebuffed thus by Gandhi, having been consistently rubbed the wrong way, experiencing the hostility of Nehru towards him over the last many months, and watching the commitment being shown to his arch enemy, Sheikh Abdullah, why Hari Singh, anybody in his place—Nehru himself, were he in Maharaja's shoes—would have hesitated to accede to India. Hari Singh calculated that he only stood to lose by joining India, and that he would have no future with Nehru and Gandhi at the helm. Pakistan he surely did not wish to join. But the Maharaja certainly did not relish the insistence from Nehru to hand over power to Sheikh Abdullah—as if he [the Maharaja] were some foreign power who should hand over power to a native. So, Hari Singh started considering his option for independence, which was legally permissible."

"Mountbatten was reported to have remarked about Nehru: 

""I thought he [Nehru] wanted to make the Maharaja lick his boots...""

"BN Mullik, who was the then Deputy Director of the IB—the Intelligence Bureau—with charge of Kashmir, and later head of the IB, wrote in his book, ‘My Years with Nehru: Kashmir’ that his report of Kashmir of 1949 stating, inter alia, intense local anti-Pak feelings and no weakening in Sheikh Abdulla’s ideological commitment to India so pleased Nehru that he had copies of the report circulated to all embassies and ministries. However, the realist and wise Sardar Patel, with a gifted for making right judgements, was not amused. Here are extracts from the book:

" ... The Sardar then gave me his own views about Sheikh Abdullah. He apprehended that Sheikh Abdullah would ultimately let down India and Jawaharlal Nehru and would come out in his real colours; his antipathy to the Maharaja was not really an antipathy to a ruler as such, but to the Dogras in general and with the Dogras he identified the rest of the majority community in India. In his slow voice, he firmly told me that my assessment of Sheikh Abdullah was wrong, though my assessment of public opinion in Kashmir valley about accession was probably correct. After having pointed out what he considered to be my error in judgment, he was, however, good enough to say that he agreed with my views that I should submit only independent assessments to the Government and not tailor them to suit the known or anticipated views of particular leaders. He said that I would soon discover my error but, at the same time, he complimented me on the way the report had been written and the pains I had taken over it. This was the greatness of the Sardar. Whilst disagreeing with my views, he recognised my right to express them… 

"That day I came back to my office wondering whether I had really made a mistake in my assessment of Kashmir and whether what the Sardar had said was not right after all. Events, as they turned out subsequently, proved that the Sardar was right and I was not. Within three years we found ourselves fighting against Sheikh Abdullah. Sardar Patel was dead by then. Yet, I feel that possibly events might have turned out differently and the subsequent pain, turmoil, and embarrassments could have been avoided if the special difficulties of Kashmir had been understood by all concerned and they had guided their talks and modified their actions on the basis of this understanding. Probably, things would not have come to this pass at all if the Sardar was still living, because Sheikh Abdullah had a very wholesome respect and fear for him.”

"Looking to the precarious situation, Sardar Patel proposed sending the Indian Army to J&K. However, Mountbatten insisted that unless the Instrument of Accession was signed by J&K in favour of India, India should not send army to Kashmir. This, notwithstanding the fact that Pakistani raiders, backed by their army had invaded J&K, and were engaged in killing and looting and raping! About half the Maharaja's forces were Muslim, the rest being Dogra. The Muslim elements had deserted and had joined the Pakistani forces. 

"It had been claimed by Pakistan and also conveyed to Mountbatten that the tribesmen were acting independently and Pakistani army was not involved. Suffice it to say that much later, during negotiations, when Mountbatten had queried Jinnah on “How the tribesmen were to be called off?” Jinnah had promptly responded that all he had to do was to give them the orders to come out!"

"On Friday, 24 October 1947, the raiders, backed by the Pakistani army, attacked the Mohore Power House causing black out in Srinagar. On the same day, the Maharaja of J&K sought military help from India. The Defence Committee of India, headed by Mountbatten, met on the morning of Saturday, 25 October 1947. However, rather than ordering action to save Srinagar, it directed VP Menon, Sam Manekshaw and a few senior military officers to fly to Srinagar the same day to check the position first hand.  This was actually a deliberate ploy of Mountbatten to pass time and not allow counter-action by India, and let Pakistan gain an upper hand by force, as the British desired—because Mountbatten would have known through the British C-in-C of the Pakistan army as to what Pakistan was up to. VP Menon and company flew to Srinagar and found the state of affairs to be worse than what was reported. They advised Hari Singh to hurry to the safety of Jammu, along with his family and valuables—which he did. Hari Singh drove the same night to Jammu, 200 kilometres away."

"Notwithstanding the desperate situation, and knowing that unless help was sent immediately, both the Muslims and the Pandits of Srinagar would be butchered by the Pakistani raiders, and the Valley of Kashmir would be lost to Pakistan, Mountbatten, to buy time, still insisted that unless the Instrument of Accession was signed by J&K in favour of India, India should not send army to Kashmir, and Nehru went along with it. 

"VP Menon flew to Jammu the same day—Sunday, 26 October 1947—with the Instrument of Accession to have it signed by Hari Singh, which he did."

"Mountbatten—serving the pro-Pakistani British interests—tried to stall, saying it was too late. Even though J&K had satisfied Mountbatten’s condition of accession for sending in the Indian army, Mountbatten tried his best to stall the Indian military help to J&K on the pretext that it was too late, raiders being already at the door of Srinagar. But, who made it late in the first place—Mountbatten himself. Sardar Patel then took the necessary action, ignoring both Mountbatten and Nehru."

" ... Writes Dasgupta “...the service chiefs [all British], supported by Mountbatten, sought to dissuade the ministers from an airlift on the grounds that it involved great risks and dangers.”"

" ... Sending troops later or leaving the matter to the UN would have meant allowing Pakistan to occupy Kashmir by force, and Kashmir becoming part of Pakistan as a fait accompli, which Pakistan wanted, and to which Britain was more than willing to turn a blind eye. But for Sardar Patel, it is doubtful—because the British didn’t want it and Nehru had hang-ups and was reluctant—if the prompt action of airlifting troops to Srinagar would have been taken, as corroborated by the following words of Sam Manekshaw."

" ... As usual Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, ‘Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it away.’ He (Nehru) said, ‘Of course, I want Kashmir.’ Then he (Patel) said ‘Please give your orders.’ And before he could say anything Sardar Patel turned to me and said, ‘You have got your orders.’ I walked out, and we started flying in troops...”"

"It is worth factoring-in the fact that had the Indian army not reached Srinagar in time, there would have been a large scale massacre and mayhem by the Pakistani raiders in Srinagar and surrounding areas, which in turn would have had repercussions all over India. But, Mountbatten and the British didn’t seem to value Indian lives."

"Through a separate letter, Mountbatten advised Maharaja Hari Singh that the accession was subject to reference to the people of J&K: 

"“In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government [so, Mountbatten regarded independent India’s government as his government!] have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistent with their policy that, in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government’s wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people...”"

"Notably, Maharaja Hari Singh had stipulated NO condition when he signed the Instrument of Accession. Even Sheikh Abdullah, who had favoured accession to India, never insisted on any condition—rather, he wanted accession to be unconditional, lest any uncertainty should remain."

" ... Who gave Mountbatten the authority to write such a letter? Who was he to make the accession conditional? Did he obtain the Cabinet approval? [No!] As Governor General of India, appointed by Indians, was he serving the Indian interests, or the Pakistani and the British interests? He was no more the Viceroy of the British India to be taking independent decisions on his own."

" ... But, for the party being favoured with accession to stipulate conditions—that’s absurd! Why should India have put conditions upon J&K for its accession? Was India doing a favour to J&K for allowing it to accede to India?"

"The Indian Independence Act 1947 enacted by the British Parliament also incorporated the Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy of 12 May 1946 as per which the princely states were to regain full sovereignty with the creation of the two dominions of India and Pakistan from the British India on 15 August 1947, with the ruler of the Princely State being the ONLY authority to offer accession to India or Pakistan, or to remain independent, regardless of the religious composition of the people of that state, there being NO provision for ‘reference to the people’ or plebiscite."

"In fact, Mountbatten’s action of writing the above letter was unconstitutional and illegal. Even Nehru had NO legal authority to approve of such a letter. What is more, there was NO cabinet sanction for it!"

"Writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48’: “The fundamental difference between the American and British positions lay in the fact that the United States was prepared in 1947-48 to recognise India’s sovereign rights in Kashmir.”{DG/121} However, Nehru failed to leverage on that."

"Writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48’: 

"“The Supreme Commander’s [Field Marshal Auchinleck] days in India were, however, numbered. He had incurred the wrath of Sardar Patel for what the latter perceived as partiality towards Pakistan in the matter of division of military stores. His role in Junagadh affair added fuel to the fire. Patel justifiably concluded that in the final analysis the British officers at the helm of the armed forces took their orders from the Supreme Commander, not the Indian government. He charged the Field Marshall with ‘throttling the initiative of the Headquarters Indian Army and acting as the advanced outpost of Pakistan’. Mountbatten tried his best to defend Auchinleck, but to no avail.”{DG/51} 

"Nehru discovered that India’s British Commander-in-Chief had known of Pakistani-led tribal invasion of Kashmir in advance, but had withheld that vital information from India. He had to subsequently resign.{DG/133} 

"Expectedly, Pakistanis wanted him [Auchinleck—to whom both Indian and Pakistani army heads reported] and his Supreme Headquarters, comprising all British officers, to continue, but they had to wind up by 30 November 1947 in view of India’s stand, thanks to Sardar Patel’s uncompromising position, even though they were originally scheduled to remain for a year after independence, that is, up to 15 August 1948."

"Sardar Patel and Defence Minister Baldev Singh visited Srinagar on 3 November 1947, and took a decision to set up the Divisional HQ of the Army there. This indicated that India meant to stay put for a long haul in Kashmir. This utterly frustrated Pakistan and all its grand designs."

"“Major General Kulwant Singh and several hundred soldiers were flown to Srinagar the next day. Taking over from Sen, Kulwant Singh freed Baramula on November 8..."

................................................................................................

"Unlike Nehru, Sardar Patel was very firm in his dealings. Writes Rajmohan Gandhi: “Returning from London on the night of May 30 [1948], Mountbatten, in his own words, ‘sent V.P.Menon to see Patel to obtain his agreement to six months joint control [with Pakistan] of Calcutta’, which is what Jinnah had been pressing for. The Viceroy recorded Patel’s reply: ‘Not even for six hours!’ Earlier...Jinnah had demanded an 800-mile ‘corridor’ to link  West and East Pakistan. Patel called the claim ‘such fantastic nonsense as not to be taken seriously’. It died a quick and unremembered death.”"

"On 13 August 1948 the UN Security Council (a)called for ceasefire; (b)agreed that India could retain part of its troops in J&K; (c)asked aggressor Pakistan to withdraw all its regular and irregular forces from J&K; and (d)said that the status of J&K would be determined by reference to the people, after (a), (b) and (c) were complied with. Pakistan refused implementation of (a) and (c). 

"Pakistan later realised it was not able to force a military solution, and agreed for ceasefire effective 1 January 1949."

"Pakistani raiders’ determined bid to occupy Ladakh was frustrated by the superior Indian strategy of airlifting troops to Leh. Air Commodore Mehar Chand flew his plane amazingly to 23,000 feet above sea-level—without oxygen—on an unchartered course to land his plane, with troops, at Leh at the height of about 12000 feet! 

"Another daring feat was that of Major-General Thimayya. He took his tanks to a height of about 12000 feet on the snow-capped Zojila Pass—something unique in history, as nobody had taken tanks to such heights and in such hazardous conditions before—and routed the enemy, destroying all their bunkers. Incidentally, it was this brave and competent Thimayya who was humiliated by Krishna Menon, when he was Defence Minister in Nehru’s cabinet, forcing Thimayya to resign! Later, after Thimayya withdrew his resignation at the instance of Nehru, even Nehru behaved with him in a way that amounted to his double humiliation!!"

................................................................................................

"As per the biography of late Field Marshal KM Cariappa, they both requested Nehru in December 1948 for a little  more time to clear J&K of Pakistani raiders completely, but Nehru did not heed them. Thimayya had told Nehru that the Army needed two weeks more to regain lost territory but Nehru was adamant. It is said that Thimayya found Nehru’s attitude inexplicable, and left Teen Murti Bhavan, the official residence of the PM, in disgust.

"The capture of Muzzafarabad, now the capital of PoK, was imminent. The Army, however, was ordered to suspend all offensive operations with effect from 1 January 1949, even though the enemy did not cease fighting. The Indian Army was very disappointed by the decision, but orders were orders. Thanks to ordering of ceasefire with immediate effect by Nehru, PoK—Pakistan Occupied Kashmir—came into existence; else the whole of Kashmir would have been with India. And, now it is this PoK which is used by Pakistan to send terrorists into J&K.

"When Cariappa asked Nehru about the decision a few years later, Nehru conceded that the ceasefire order ought to have been delayed! 

"Shakespeare had rightly articulated: 

"There is a tide in the affairs of men, 

"Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune; 

"Omitted, all the voyage of their life 

"Is bound in shallows and in miseries; 

"And we must take the current when it serves, 

"Or lose our ventures." 

"As per a report, the ceasefire decision was remote-controlled by Mountbatten, who was by then back in England—such influence Mountbatten still exercised over Nehru. 

"Commented General SPP Thorat: “Our forces might have succeeded in evicting the invaders, if the Prime Minister had not held them in check, and later ordered the ceasefire… Obviously great pressure must have been brought to bear on him by the [former Governor-General]… Panditji was a great personal and family friend of Lord Mountbatten.”{BK2/160} 

"Wrote NV Gadgil, the then Cabinet Minister for Works and Mines in the Nehru’s Cabinet, in his autobiography ‘Government from Inside’: 

"“In truth, Nehru did not show much enthusiasm for Kashmir’s accession at the time… Both the Maharaja and [Meherchand] Mahajan [Premier of Kashmir] pressed for the acceptance of Kashmir’s accession, but Nehru would not move. [Nehru then was being guided by Sheikh Abdullah]… If our army had not received instructions to stop fighting before that date [1 January 1949], it would have cleared the raiders from whole of Kashmir… The restrain imposed upon our army was motivated by the hope that Pakistan would be satisfied with a bit of Kashmir occupied by it. Of course, some of us opposed this view… Sheikh Abdullah was an ordinary person elevated to an extraordinary position by the Government of India… I am afraid that Nehru is responsible for the prolongation of the problem through his willingness to compromise at every stage... Had Vallabhbhai [Patel] been the man to handle the Kashmir question, he would have settled it long ago. At least, he would never have settled with a partial control of Jammu & Kashmir. He would have occupied the whole of the State and would never have allowed it to be elevated to international importance.”"

"Wrote BM Kaul in ‘Confrontation with Pakistan’: “We were politically unwise in accepting the ceasefire in view of our successes at the time in Uri, Tithwal, and Kargil.”"

"As per the article “Nehru’s Pacifism and the Failed Recapture of Kashmir” by Sandeep Bamzai in ORF: “...To keep abreast with the developments in Kashmir, Nehru had dispatched his private secretary and ‘eyes and ears’ Dwarka Nath Kachru to the frontline... Some of Kachru's correspondence is extremely damaging, the prism far too revealing of how the Indian Army first pushed back the raiders and then vanquished the Pakistan Army regulars, even having them on the run... Previously unpublished correspondence [Nehru-Kachru] reveal that Nehru's pacifism—guided by the principles of fair play [?!] and the fact that India had referred the Kashmir matter to the United Nations erroneously on Lord Mountbatten's insistence—meant that the Indian Army was refused permission to go all the way and reclaim what eventually became PoK and the Northern Areas…”"

................................................................................................

"It seems that Nehru, the claimed expert on international affairs, was innocent about the functioning of the UNSC—UN Security Council. He was apparently under the impression that UNSC functioned on the basis of the high ideals enshrined in the UN Charter and looked to the merits of the cases referred to it. That the member-nations of the UNSC acted in their own selfish national interests and engaged in power-game was apparently not known to the foreign-affairs expert Nehru. 

"Reference to the UN was something Sardar Patel, Dr Ambedkar and others were against, however, Nehru again went ahead with it publicly in his radio broadcast on 2 November 1947. Incidentally, plebiscite was held in Junagadh also, but it was conducted by India itself on 20 February 1948, as arranged by Sardar Patel. 

"With the reference to the UN not yet a reality, being only a stated Indian intention, and with the Indian troops landing in J&K to spoil the British plan, the British cooked up an alternate plan to ensure that their selfish purpose (most of J&K adjoining Russia and China remaining under their influence by being part of Pakistan) was served without even reference to the UN (where it could take indeterminate time), or by resorting to the democratic option of a plebiscite, where the results could go the Indian way. A top-secret note dated 6 November 1947 of Noel Baker, UK Secretary of State of Commonwealth Relations, proposed partition of J&K whereby only Jammu was to be allocated to India.{Pani/34-36} That there had been such a proposal was confirmed when Nehru wrote to the then Indian High Commissioner in the UK, Krishna Menon, on 20 February 1948 informing that Mountbatten had similarly hinted at the partition of Kashmir with only Jammu going to India.{Sar/338} 

"What was galling was that unlike the wise Sardar Patel, Dr Ambedkar and others, Gandhi was in favour of reference to the UN. Mountbatten had met Gandhi in November 1947, and found that Gandhi was favourably inclined to invocate the UN."

"Rather than retrieving himself from his radio-broadcasts in which he had talked of ‘Reference to the UN’ on J&K, Nehru made the follow-up blunder of making a statement about “reference to the people” of J&K in the Parliament on 25 November 1947. He also reiterated the possibility of UN-overseen plebiscite."

"Finding that the things had begun to go in India’s favour (thanks to Sardar Patel’s actions), despite all the mischief of the Pakistanis and the unjust support of the British, Mountbatten persuaded Nehru to refer the matter to the UN, thus internationalising the issue, to the detriment of India."

" ... purpose of Mountbatten to suggest such a reference to the UN was to allow for further consideration from the Pakistani angle. That was to please the British establishment back in London, where almost all favoured Pakistan over India. And, in some cases, like J&K, get the big powers like the UK and the US manipulate the outcome at the UN in their favour. 

"While Sardar Patel was against internationalising the issue by making such a reference to the UN, Nehru ultimately agreed. That was a huge error on the part of Nehru, for it converted a domestic issue into an international issue. J&K had signed the Instrument of Accession, and was thus part of India, and hence anything concerning J&K was an internal, domestic issue."

"Wrote Durga Das: “...Patel added that Nehru was unduly amenable to Mountbatten’s influence. Nehru had ‘always leaned on someone’. He was under Bapu’s protective wing and ‘now he leans on Mountbatten’.”"

Flattered by association with a Brit, that too a royalty relative, a direct descendant of Queen Victoria? Likely,  subconsciously.

"Quipped Chaudhry Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan (1893-1985), the Pakistani representative in the UN, when he came to know about Gopalaswami Aiyangar as India’s representative: “You are offering me Kashmir on a platter.”"

"Sardar Patel was opposed to Gopalaswami Aiyangar leading the Indian team in the UN. He considered him to be not competent enough. Patel had instead suggested the name of CP Ramaswami Iyer, who had been the Diwan of Travancore ... "

"But, Nehru ignored Patel’s advice, and stuck to Gopalaswami Aiyangar. 

"Here is a tell-tale description of what happened in the UN, as told by Shakunthala Jagannathan, CP’s granddaughter: 

"“I was a student living in New York, when the question of Kashmir came up in the U.N. Accompanied by several Indian and American friends, I attended the Security council session, oozing with confidence on India’s stand. First came Sir Zafrullah Khan’s impassioned and brilliant speech on behalf of Pakistan which was powerful enough to shake up our confidence. When he sat down, we Indians breathed a sigh of relief. The Indian delegation was then asked to present their case. The delegate concerned put up his hand, stood up, and said, “I protest!”… We had expected that our case, so much stronger, would shake up the U.N.! Instead our presentation on that day resulted in a debacle, right before our eyes...”"

"Britain lobbied in the UN that J&K should go to Pakistan as 77% of its population was Muslim. This was despite The Indian Independence Act 1947 enacted by them and  their own Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy of 12 May 1946 which did not provide for religious majority–minority consideration, or reference to the people, and unambiguously stipulated that the ruler of a Princely State was the sole legal authority to decide on accession. Hence, Britain was lobbying for something that was ILLEGAL and UNCONSTITUTIONAL as per the laws they had themselves enacted. 

"Further, if Hindu or Muslim majority was a factor, why was it that the British advanced no similar arguments of Hindu majority when the issues of Hyderabad and Junagadh came up? 

"Looking to what transpired in the UN, Nehru realised his folly of referring the matter to the UN. The UK, the US and their allies, led by the UK, began playing politics of favouring Pakistan over India, ignoring the fact of Pakistani aggression in J&K."

"Patel later told the British Under Secretary of State, Arthur Henderson: 

"“Unfortunately, it is my experience that the attitude of an average Englishman in India is instinctively against us… We should never have gone to the UNO… at the UNO, not only has the dispute been prolonged but the merits of our case have been completely lost in the interaction of power politics… we were so terribly disappointed at the attitude of your delegation… it was, we maintain, the attitude of Noel Baker that tilted the balance against us. But for his lead, I doubt if the USA and some other powers would have gone against us.”

"Significantly, the US demonstrated an honest appreciation of India’s stand during 1947-48. The US admitted the unchallengeable legality of J&K’s accession into India. The US further elaborated that the accession could be reversed only if India lost the plebiscite, which India had itself offered."

................................................................................................

"In the UN Security Council the British delegation took the position that there was no case of aggression by Pakistan, as Pakistan was in no way involved in sending the tribal raiders to J&K, despite enough proof to the contrary. The British had to tell those lies because they were themselves a party to it, having connived with the Pakistani army. And, not just connived, the British army officers, including General Gracey, actively helped the Pakistani forces and tribal-raiders both in the planning and in the execution of aggression against India, and in the illegal occupation of India’s territory.{Pani/59} 

"All through the British acted anti-India. It is amazing that these brutal British who looted India, became rich at its cost, humiliated and exploited its people, misbehaved and acted arrogant, insulted its culture and religion and used grossly intemperate, crude and abusive language while they lorded here, used Indians in its armed forces to subjugate other nations and were even abusive towards them despite using their services; acted even more uncivilised when in the process of leaving India and after having left India. You won’t find another example of such thankless, uncivilised people in the history of civilisation. Just one quote of Winston Churchill should suffice to illustrate their unabashed thanklessness, utter crudeness, uncivilised behaviour, lack of culture and their being out and out racist: “I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly religion.”"

"Judging from the angle of the UK, the US and the West, Britain’s Partition Strategy was very successful, and yielded excellent results for them: they secured their oil-interests; Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, then CENTO, then entered into a bilateral pact with the US, provided air bases to them, helped spy against Soviet Union, and so on, followed by active involvement in driving away the Russians from Afghanistan—which ultimately led to the collapse of the USSR."

................................................................................................

" ... Although many in the Constituent Assembly were not in favour of it, they consented, keeping in view Nehru’s wish, who was then the main person steering the J&K policy. Those not in favour included Ambedkar, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, Sardar Patel, and many others. 

"India, which was a Dominion, became a Republic on 26 January 1950, and Article 370 came into force for J&K. 

"Having achieved what he wanted through the Article 370, having got rid of the Maharaja, and with Nehru having surrendered all leverages by putting all eggs in one basket (that of Sheikh Abdullah), Sheikh Abdullah gradually began to act difficult. By this stage, ambassadors of the US and other countries began to meet him. This made Abdullah feel powerful enough to start unfolding his actual agenda—of independent Sheikhdom. The British were supportive. Said Clement Attlee in London on 11 November 1953: “Kashmir should belong neither to India nor to Pakistan but be independent.”{Jag/98} Nehru now began to feel the heat. To his colleagues he could not say, as he had gone against their advice. However, in his letter to his sister, Vijaylakhmi Pandit, he expressed his bitterness.

" ... The Article itself is labelled "Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir". J&K State Constitution came into effect on 26 January 1957, comprising 158 Sections, of which Section 3 says, “The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India.”"

"Nehru had brought in Gopalaswami Ayyangar as a Minister without Portfolio to look after the J&K affairs. Before his visit to Europe, Nehru had finalised the draft provisions relating to J&K with Sheikh Abdullah, which later became Article 370. He had entrusted to Gopalaswami Ayyangar the task of piloting these provisions through the Constituent Assembly. Ayyangar did the needful. His presentation provoked angry protests from all sides. Most were opposed to any discriminatory treatment for J&K. The proposal of Article 370 was torn to pieces by the Constituent Assembly. Ayyangar was the lone defender, and Maulana Azad was not able to effectively support him. In the debate, Maulana Hasrat Mohani of UP stated that while he was not opposed to all the concessions that were being granted to his friend Sheikh Abdullah, why make such discrimination; if all those concessions were to be granted to the Kashmir, why not to the Baroda ruler too.

"Even Ambedkar was opposed to it. Nehru had sent Abdullah to Dr Ambedkar to explain to him the position and to draft an appropriate Article for the Constitution. Ambedkar had remarked:  

"“Mr Abdullah, you want that India should defend Kashmir, India should develop Kashmir and Kashmiris should have equal rights as the citizens of India, but you don’t want India and any citizen of India to have any rights in Kashmir. I am the Law minister of India. I cannot betray the interest of my country.”

"Nehru, who was then abroad, rang up Patel and requested him to get the Article 370 through, and it was for that reason alone that Patel relented, as Sardar did not wish to embarrass Nehru in his absence. But Sardar commented, “Jawaharlal royega [Nehru will rue this].”"

"Strangely, Nehru made a statement on Kashmir in 1952, when Sardar Patel was no more, “Sardar Patel was all the time dealing with these matters.” 

"Wrote V Shankar: 

"“When I was working as his [Gopalaswami Ayyangar] joint secretary the self-same Article [370] came in for criticism in the Lok Sabha. In defence, Pandit Nehru took the stand that the Article was dealt with by Sardar in his absence and he was not responsible for it. I met Gopalaswami the same day evening as he was walking on the lawn of his residence. I questioned the bonafides of Pandit Nehru’s stand.  Gopalaswami’s reaction was one of anger and he said, ‘It is an ill return to the Sardar for the magnanimity he had shown in accepting Panditji’s point of view against his better judgment.’ He added, ‘I have told Jawaharlal this already.’”

................................................................................................

"Notably, even the Deputy Prime Minister of J&K between 1947-53, Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad of the National Conference, had become so disturbed and alarmed at the way the J&K issue was being messed up that he met Sardar Patel and requested: 

"“Why do you [Sardar Patel] not take over the problem and finish it like Hyderabad? Patel replied cryptically: You go to your friend [Nehru] and tell him to keep his hands off Kashmir problem for two months and I will undertake to solve it.”"

"Sardar Patel had reportedly remarked to HV Kamath that had Nehru and Gopalaswami Aiyangar not made Kashmir their close preserve, separating it from his portfolio of Home and States, he would have tackled the problem as purposefully as he had already done for Hyderabad. 

"Sardar Patel had told Air Marshal Thomas Elmhirst: 

"“If all the decisions rested on me, I think that I would be in favour of extending this little affair in Kashmir to a full-scale war with Pakistan… Let us get it over once and for all, and settle down as a united continent.”"

................................................................................................

"While Patel looked upon socialists as immature and misguided romantics, and hence didn’t consider them as foes; he intensely disliked communists, and had a contempt for them. He considered communists to be trouble creators spreading disaffection and violence, having extraterritorial loyalties, being dictated by people outside India, and betraying the interests of the country, and working at cross-purposes with whatever was in the interest of the Indian people, their freedom, and prosperity.

"On 11 November 1949, addressing a conference of businessmen, industrialists and labour leaders, Sardar Patel offered a practical solution to the country's economic problems saying that “the key to our economic situation lies in increased production”. Said Patel: “Spend less, save more and invest as much as possible, should hence-forward be the motto of every citizen in the country and all of you must see that it becomes the guiding principle of your life. You can select for yourself any suitable means of investment which are open to you, but only make sure that all the money that you save is spent for national cause.”

"“…What mainly derailed businessmen politically was the action the government took against firms suspected of evading taxes. Liaquat Ali [then Finance Minister in the joint Congress-League government under Nehru as the PM in 1946-47] had proposed a commission of inquiry and drawn up a list of about 150 business houses under suspicion. [This Liaquat Ali of the Muslim League had done deliberately to hit at the financiers of the Congress; but Nehru was too full of himself to understand the implications]. This action paralysed business leaders and most of them never recovered from the shock. 

"“Sardar Patel told me that businessmen offered to settle their dues collectively by depositing Rs500 million [a big amount then] in the exchequer. This would have enabled them to bring out their black money and use it legitimately.  

"“Patel favoured the deal because he wanted business to play its full role in activating the country’s economy [a very sensible suggestion]. But Nehru, for reasons of ideology [which later took India to dogs], would not listen to him. The result was that not only did black market money not come out but it kept multiplying. [That’s what happens: socialist policies always result in the opposite of what they claim to intend.]”

"The idea of co-operatives for milk industry was the brainchild of Patel. He was instrumental in motivating farmers to join the co-operative movement so as to break the monopoly of middlemen in milk collection and distribution, and place the power in the hands of the farmers and milk-producers. 

"Once when a delegation of Gujarati farmers came to him citing their inability to send their milk production to the markets without being fleeced by middlemen, Sardar Patel advised them to organize the processing and sale of milk by themselves, and guided them to create the Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers’ Union Limited, that came to be known as AMUL. He further advised that the co-operative should have its own pasteurization plant. In fact, Sardar Patel had advocated farmers’ co-operatives as early as 1942. 

"Once the villagers agreed to Sardar’s proposal, Sardar sent Morarji Desai, his trusted deputy, to Kaira District to organize milk cooperative. Desai held a meeting in Samarkha village on 4 January 1946, and resolved that milk producers’ co-operative societies would be organized in each village of Kaira District to collect milk from their member-farmers. All the milk societies would federate into a Union which would own milk processing facilities. This marked the beginning of Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers’ Union Limited, later popularly known as Amul."

................................................................................................

"Secular doctrine mandates separation of the state from religion. It is the principle of the separation of government institutions and government functionaries mandated to represent the state from religious institutions, religious authorities, and religious functionaries. It’s a belief that religion should not play a role in the government. A secular state is neutral in the matters of different religious beliefs. 

"A secular state can’t impose religious beliefs and practices upon people. The decisions and acts of a secular state should not be influenced by religious beliefs and/or practices. Secularism is not anti-religion, it is religion-neutral. 

"Nehru blatantly misused “secularism” for minority-appeasement and vote-bank politics.

"Curiously, both the Muslim League and the Jamait-ul-Ulema could team with, and even fight elections on the Congress tickets—that wasn’t communal, as per Nehru’s self-serving definition of ‘secularism’. Were communal and ‘non-secular’ only those who dared to safeguard Hindu interests? Nehru took care not to define the terms like ‘secularism’ and ‘communalism’ and clarify what was meant by a secular state, for that would have robbed him of the flexibility in exploiting them politically. As his tenure hurtled towards disaster, these terms became more and more useful in his vote-bank politics, and as a diversionary discourse.

"Wrote Durga Das: “But [Maulana] Azad [who was close to Nehru] revised his opinion of Nehru in the last two years of his life. Indeed, he went to the extent of expressing regret for being unfair to Patel and asserting that he was sure that the country would have been better off if Patel had been Prime Minister. What motivated this change? Towards the end of his life, Azad realised that the best protection for the Muslims was the goodwill of the Hindus and a strong government. He told me he had come to the conclusion that Nehru’s policies had weakened the administration and that his economic theories had failed to improve the living conditions of the people, especially the Muslims.”

"In the Ajmer communal riots soon after independence, notwithstanding the mischief of the Muslims, Nehru intervened through his private secretary HVR Iyengar to mollycoddle violent Muslims, and ensured that as many Hindus (even if innocent) as Muslims were arrested. On the other hand, Patel stood firmly with the Chief Secretary of the State, Shankar Prasad, and opposed Nehru’s unjust intervention.

"Nehru turned a blind eye to illegal and rampant proselytization by the Christian missionaries that adversely affected national interests. This was particularly so in the Northeast where Nehru went by the advice of the Christian missionaries. The net effect was the secessionist movements in the North-eastern states. 

"Nehru insisted that Urdu was the language of the people of Delhi, and should accordingly be given official recognition. When the Home Minister Pant told him that the statistics showed only 6% of the Delhiwalas had claimed Urdu as their language, Nehru tried to rubbish the statistics, though he didn’t press further with his crazy idea. 

"Nehru was also in favour of Persian-Arabic script in which Urdu is written, rather than Devanagari script in which Hindi and Sanskrit are written. The 

"Constituent Assembly’s pledge of building one nation with one citizenship became a victim of Nehru’s minority-majority syndrome. All those who opposed him were disparaged, labelled non-secular and communal, and weeded out. Gradually, a coterie around Nehru vigorously spread his defective pseudo-secular, anti-Hindu, poverty-perpetuating and misery-multiplying socialistic claptrap, and discredited and sidelined all those who refused to toe Nehru’s line. Leaders who differed exited, and leaders who remained became parrots, bereft of individuality and fresh ideas. Commented DP Mishra: “Gandhiji made heroes out of clay, but under Pundit Nehru’s leadership they are being turned into corpses.”"

................................................................................................

"Wrote Ambedkar{Amb3}: 

"“…He [Gandhi] has never called the Muslims to account even when they have been guilty of gross crimes against Hindus… 

"“It is a notorious fact that many prominent Hindus who had offended the religious susceptibilities of the Muslims either by their writings or by their part in the Shuddhi movement have been murdered by some fanatic Musalmans. First to suffer was Swami Shraddhanand, who was shot by Abdul Rashid on 23rd December 1926 when he was lying in his sick bed. This was followed by the murder of Lala Nanakchand, a prominent Arya Samajist of Delhi… Nathuramal Sharma was murdered by Abdul Qayum in September 1934. It was an act of great daring. For Sharma was stabbed to death in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind where he was seated awaiting the hearing of his appeal against his conviction under Section 195, I. P. C., for the publication of a pamphlet on the history of Islam. Khanna, the Secretary of the Hindu Sabha, was severely assaulted in 1938 by the Mahomedans after the Session of the Hindu Maha Sabha held in Ahmedabad and very narrowly escaped death… 

"“This is, of course, a very short list and could be easily expanded. But whether the number of prominent Hindus killed by fanatic Muslims is large or small matters little. What matters is the attitude of those who count, towards these murderers. The murderers paid the penalty of law where law is enforced. The leading Moslems, however, never condemned these criminals. On the contrary, they were hailed as religious martyrs and agitation was carried on for clemency being shown to them. As an illustration of this attitude, one may refer to Mr. Barkat Alli, a Barrister of Lahore, who argued the appeal of Abdul Qayum. He went to the length of saying that Qayum was not guilty of murder of Nathuramal because his act was justifiable by the law of the Koran. This attitude of the Moslems is quite understandable. What is not understandable is the attitude of Mr. Gandhi… 

"“Mr. Gandhi has been very punctilious in the matter of condemning any and every act of violence and has forced the Congress, much against its will to condemn it. But Mr. Gandhi has never protested against such murders. Not only have the Musalmans not condemned these outrages but even Mr. Gandhi has never called upon the leading Muslims to condemn them. He has kept silent over them. Such an attitude can be explained only on the ground that Mr. Gandhi was anxious to preserve Hindu-Moslem unity and did not mind the murders of a few Hindus, if it could be achieved by sacrificing their lives… 

"“This attitude to excuse the Muslims any wrong, lest it should injure the cause of unity, is well illustrated by what Mr. Gandhi had to say in the matter of the Mopla [Moplah] riots. 

"“The following instances of Muslim intransigence, over which Mr. Gandhi kept mum are recorded by Swami Shraddhanand…: ‘As regards the removal of untouchability it has been authoritatively ruled several times that it is the duty of Hindus to expiate for their past sins and non-Hindus should have nothing to do with it. But the Mahomedan and the Christian Congressmen have openly revolted against the dictum of Mr. Gandhi at Vaikorn and other places. Even such an unbiased leader as Mr. Yakub Hassan, presiding over a meeting called to present an address to me at Madras, openly enjoined upon Musalmans the duty of converting all the untouchables in India to Islam.’ But Mr. Gandhi said nothing by way of remonstrance either to the Muslims or to the Christians…”"

................................................................................................

"Patel was against the Muslim Minority, represented by Jinnah, the Muslim League, and others, deviously and unjustly trying to extract in a democratic setup a position for itself equal to or higher than the Hindu Majority, with the active support and encouragement of the British, who had their own vested interest. It amounted to placing a veto in their hands. 

"Although Patel was among the closest colleagues of Gandhi, he drastically differed from Gandhi on the Muslim question. Patel was most certainly not communal, but he was against unjustified appeasement of Muslims. He also felt that Gandhi-Nehru appeasement of Muslims would adversely affect freedom struggle, rather than taking it forward—and, it indeed turned out that way."

"Thanks to the poison spread by Jinnah, the Muslim League and other Muslim leaders, many Muslims who had stayed back in India still looked up to Pakistan as their real home and nation, continued with or adopted a hostile attitude towards the majority community, supported Pakistan on Kashmir rather than India, kept up demands similar to what had brought about the partition by the Muslim League (reservation of seats), and indulged in activities not expected of a citizen of democratic India."

"Even though Patel differed from Gandhi, Nehru, Maulana Azad and others in his approach to the question of Minorities, he was totally non-communal. Patel’s approach was that of a no-nonsense, fair, judicious, and unbiased administrator, who didn’t believe in favouring either Hindus or Muslims just to get popular, or be regarded as a “great secular” or a “Mahatma”. 

"The true test of that is what a person actually does. And Patel’s actions speak for themselves. Patel was Home Minister, and his favourite IG of Police was a Muslim. Despite what Nizam of Hyderabad and Nawab of Bhopal did against India, once they came around, Patel didn’t treat them as enemies, and took revenge, but was, instead, most fair to them, and both of them effusively praised Patel for his generosity and excellent treatment. Similarly, in the matter of partition of assets between India and Pakistan, the Pakistani team was full of praise for him ... "

" ... socialists and seculars like Jayaprakash Narayan, who used to be pro-Nehru and anti-Patel, started saying things similar to what Patel had been saying, albeit a decade or two after independence when they began to get disenchanted with Nehruvian politics."

"There had been unsettling rabble-rousing and provocative speeches during the Mussalman-e-Hind Lucknow Conference attended by thousands of Muslims (and by Maulana Azad too) in December 1947—so soon after the ordeal of partition. Could Hindus have called such a conference in Pakistan, and spoken thus? Certainly not. But, in Gandhi-Nehru era of appeasement, even after the blow of partition, Muslim leaders could take liberties! 

"Patel didn’t believe in remaining a mute spectator to such things, like Gandhi and Nehru, and soon after the above Conference, he spoke thus in Lucknow ... "

" ... Those who want to go to Pakistan can go there and live in peace. Let us live here in peace to work for ourselves… .... "

................................................................................................

"“The Mahatma was the most respected, Jawaharlal Nehru the most loved and Subhas Bose the most longed-for. But in terms of the iron control he exercised over the largest political apparatus in the country and the grip he had on political currents and cross-currents in virtually every province in India, the power wielded by the Patidar from Karamsad [Sardar Patel], Gujarat, had no match. No near-match, either. Not by far…”{URL3} 

"—Gopalkrishna Gandhi"

Gopalkrishna Gandhi is being a tad short in recognition of Netaji, who wasn't merely "longed for", but really the reason why British were forced to leave, due to effect of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose and his INA. And the fierce loyalty he inspired transcends far and beyond the sycophancy that Dynasty promoted, even if not deliberately but only as a result of their policies and behaviour, or the blind obedience Gandhi demanded despite his myriad mistakes, and disastrous effects thereof on millions of lives. Also, his successes in face of tremendous adversities aren't valued yet properly, but those in whom he inspired respect included Japan, and that's highly non-trivial. 

................................................................................................

"Sardar once affirmed: “My Secretary can write a note opposed to my views. I have given that freedom to all my secretaries. I have told them, ‘If you do not give your honest opinion for the fear that it will displease your Minister, then, please, you had better go. I will bring another Secretary.’”"

"Once a bureaucrat, who had an unpleasant experience with another very senior politician, asked Patel in some context if he really wanted his honest opinion. Patel erupted: “Does Government pay you Rs 4000 a month for your dishonest opinions? It is for you to give an honest opinion; and it is for me to accept it or not.”

"Such remarks, conversations and episodes involving the Sardar quickly spread among the bureaucracy, who loved it. It motivated them to work honestly, diligently, and without fear. That bureaucrats like VP Menon, V Shankar and HM Patel achieved such wonderful results ... was thanks to their association with Patel. 

"Wrote MKK Nair: “On April 27, 1948, Sardar Patel wrote to Nehru, ‘I need hardly emphasize that an efficient, disciplined and contended Service, assured of its prospects as a result of diligent and honest work, is a sine qua non of sound administration under a democratic regime even more than under an authoritarian rule. The Service must be above the party and we should ensure that political considerations, either in recruitment or in discipline and control are reduced to the minimum, if not eliminated altogether.’

"Patel’s enormous success as a great administrator was thanks to his qualities of head and heart. He was sharp, was quick to grasp essentials, and had an iron-will to achieve what he wanted. He had a tremendous capacity to listen patiently and attentively. He was witty and humorous, free and frank, and didn’t mince words. He knew when to say “No!” But, he was discreet in his use of words. He excelled in his unerring judgement. He was just, polite, considerate, communicative, and accommodating. He gave respect, and received respect from all. He was a stern realist, meant business, and was decisive. His decisions never brooked delay. He used to be cool, composed, in control, and alert even in crisis."

"Wrote MKK Nair: 

"“VP called an attender and told him, ‘Take this man outside.’ Neshamani [Diwan of a Princely State] went out immediately. Neshamani then wrote a long letter of complaint to Sardar Patel saying that V P Menon was a useless fellow and drunkard who in an inebriated state had insulted him and sent him out of his room. When this reached Sardar Patel, VP had not reached back in Delhi. Patel called his Private Secretary, V Shankar, ICS and asked him, ‘Does VP have a habit of consuming liquor?’  ‘Yes’ Shankar told him.  ‘What does he usually drink?’ was what Patel wanted to know and Shankar told him, ‘He drinks only Scotch Whisky.’ ‘Then please advise all Secretaries to drink Scotch Whisky’ Patel told him. This became an amusing topic of discussion at high-level comradeship meetings in Delhi.”"

................................................................................................

"Durga Das writes in his book that in 1957 in his weekly column in Hindustan Times he wrote Nehru was building up his daughter for succession. He says he had checked with Maulana Azad before writing the column, and Azad had said he too had independently reached the same conclusion. Even Govind Ballabh Pant had the same opinion. Later, when Nehru remonstrated with Durga Das on the column, to mollify Nehru, Durga Das assured him that what he had written would bring good publicity to Indira and would stand her in good stead—at which Nehru felt happy and smiled."

"Wrote Rajmohan Gandhi: “Suddenly, at this juncture, Indira Gandhi, Jawaharlal’s daughter, was named party president. Her talents were yet a secret, and she had no experience of party work. Several of Nehru’s colleagues were offended by the choice but said nothing. C.R. [Rajaji] was outraged.”"

"Wrote Kuldip Nayar: 

"“This was where I first heard that Congress President V.N. Dhebar was resigning and Indira Gandhi was taking over. Pant had supported Nehru at Vinoba’s ashram but not at the CWC when Indira Gandhi was nominated as the party president. He was careful not to oppose Nehru’s daughter directly but argued that her frail health would come in the way of the extensive travels the Congress president was required to undertake. Raising his voice, Nehru told Pant that ‘she was healthier than both of us’ and could put in longer hours of work. The subsequent discussions, as I noted, were to fix the date on which she would assume charge. This was the first time that dynastic politics came to the fore, and the Congress since then has been following the practice of invariably having a member of Nehru family at the helm of affairs...Left to Nehru, he would have liked Indira to succeed him as prime minister, but too many Congress leaders, with a long stint of sacrifice and struggle for the country’s freedom, were still on the scene at the time.”"

"Writes Kuldip Nayar: 

"“I ventured to ask Shastri one day: ‘Who do you think Nehru has in mind as his successor?’ ‘Unke dil main to unki saputri hai [In his heart is his daughter],’ said Shastri... Nijalingappa said he was pretty sure that Nehru had his daughter in mind as his successor. In his diary, he wrote on 15 July 1969 that Nehru ‘was always grooming her for the prime-ministership obviously and patently’.”"

"Apart from the above dynastic streak vis-à-vis Indira, Nehru had a nepotistic streak. During the Nehruvian era of 1947–64 there were many Pandits, Saprus, Kauls, Katjus, Dhars, Nehrus, and their kins in various government posts. Wrote Neville Maxwell: “An official (non-Kashmiri, non-Brahmin) who worked closely with Nehru for a time wrote that enemies of the Prime minister used to say that his search for talent and gift for talent spotting was limited to those around him and particularly to Kashmiris, and amongst them, those who were in one way or another connected with the Nehru family…”"

................................................................................................

"Bharat Ratna was awarded to Sardar Patel in 1991 and to Dr Ambedkar in 1990! And, that too because there were non-Dynasty governments since December 1989—VP Singh, then Chandra Shekhar, followed by Narsimha Rao."

"Bose was awarded Bharat Ratna posthumously in 1992, which was later withdrawn on a legal technicality, in response to a Supreme Court directive: Government was asked to submit conclusive evidence of Netaji's death—which it could not—on a PIL as to how the award could be posthumous. However, the intriguing point is how come they thought of the award to Netaji only in 1992—even though the amendment to give awards posthumously was made in 1955 itself?"

"Radhakrishnan was awarded Bharat Ratna in 1954, Rajaji in 1954, Nehru in 1955—when he was himself the PM, Govind Ballabh Pant in1957, BC Roy in 1961, Zakir Hussain in 1963, Indira Gandhi in 1971—when she was herself the PM, VV Giri in 1975, Kamaraj in 1976, Vinoba Bhave in 1983, MGR in 1988, and Rajiv Gandhi in 1991! 

"But, Sardar Patel, Subhas Chandra Bose and Dr Ambedkar, being not as great as these worthies(!!), got it later! The Dynasty did not like them!! It has been that personal in our feudal democracy. Of course, the only unjust thing that the Dynasty did was to have left out poor Sanjay Gandhi!"

................................................................................................

"When Sardar died in Mumbai, Nehru, who himself attended the funeral, advised the then President, Rajendra Prasad, to not attend the funeral{DD/305}—the reason given by him was that as per the protocol, President need not attend funerals of ministers! So he treated Sardar Patel as a mere minister—what arrogance! A disgraceful attitude, particularly when Sardar Patel had so selflessly supported him in the interest of the nation, even though Nehru had usurped the PM’s post from him most undemocratically."

" ... But, of course, Rajendra Prasad went. Sardar was not just the Deputy PM, but was Rajendra Prasad's colleague of many, many years in the Independence Struggle. 

"MKK Nair, an IAS officer who was close to both Sardar Patel and VP Menon, states in his book ‘The Story of an Era Told Without Ill-will’: 

"“Incessant differences of opinion between Nehru and Patel caused Nehru to treat Patel with personal animosity. If the great Nehru was not above harbouring personal hatred, he would not have done two things he did on the day Patel died. He sent two orders to the Home Ministry and they arrived at V P Menon’s desk. The first was that the Cadillac car that Patel used should be returned the very next morning to the Foreign Ministry. Patel died in Bombay. Nehru’s second memo asked officers who wished to attend his funeral to travel at their own expense. V P Menon called officers of his Ministry and, without divulging Nehru’s order, asked who all were interested to attend the funeral. About a dozen officers wanted to. He bought their air tickets at his expense. When Nehru learnt about it, he was annoyed even more.”

"The above was confirmed when KM Munshi wrote: “When Sardar died in Bombay, Jawaharlal issued a direction to the Ministers and Secretaries not to go to Bombay to attend the funeral. Among the Ministers, I was in Matheran (Bombay) at the time. Sri NV Gadgil, Sri Satyanarayan Sinha and Sri VP Menon disregarded the direction and attended the funeral. Jawaharlal also requested [President Dr] Rajendra Prasad not to go to Bombay; it was a strange request, to which Rajendra Prasad did not accede.”"

................................................................................................

"This is from the foreword of S Nijalingappa to the book, ‘Inside Story of Sardar Patel—The Diary of Maniben Patel: 1936-50’: “Strangely, however, while the collected works of many other leaders [notably, Nehru and Gandhi] have been published by the government since Independence, the collected or selected works of two foremost leaders, namely Sardar Patel and Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, were never taken up by any official agency. It is for this reason that we constituted the Sardar Patel Society, had it registered, collected funds and published the Collected works of Sardar Patel in fifteen volumes...”"

"In the capital, in the prime area, you have Rajghat for Gandhiji, Shanti Van for Nehru, Shakti Sthal for Indira Gandhi, Veer Bhumi for Rajiv Gandhi, Vijay Ghat for Shastri, Kishan Ghat for Charan Singh, besides many museums or memorials for the Nehru-Gandhis, but no memorial to either Subhas Bose or to Sardar Patel in the capital, when next to Gandhiji the latter two deserve the highest respect!

"The residence in Delhi where Sardar lived when he was the Deputy Prime Minister of the country has been razed and there is no sign that he had ever lived there. Nehru’s house, on the other hand, has been turned into a museum.

"Nehru’s meanness and small-mindedness can be gauged from the fact that he made NO arrangements to have a portrait of Sardar Patel put up in the Central Hall of Parliament, like it was done for other prominent leaders. Apparently, he saw to it that such a portrait was not put up, like he had similarly done in case of Netaji Subhas Bose.

"It was Maharaja Jivaji Rao Scindia of Gwalior, who had since become the first Rajpramukh of Madhya Bharat, who felt much irked by that glaring (and, apparently, deliberate) omission, and presented a Sardar Patel’s portrait to be put up in the Central Hall of Parliament in 1954. The unveiling ceremony was performed by President Dr Rajendra Prasad."

Author ends by describing the then upcoming, now unveiled, project of a memorial of Sardar, the Statue of Unity. 

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Table of Contents 

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{ 1 } Summarised Chronology 

{ 2 } Biographical Outline 

{ 3 } Freedom Struggle & Sardar, 1917–43 

{ 4 } Sardar & Run-up to Freedom, 1944-47 

{ 5 } Patel, Partition & Pakistan, 1947 

{ 6 } How India was Deprived of the Best First PM 

{ 7 } Sardar & the Integration of the Princely States 

{ 8 } Kashmir, Sardar & Botch-up by Nehru 

{ 9 } Sardar vs. Nehru on China & Tibet 

{ 10 } Foreign Policy & External Security : Nehru vs. Sardar 

{ 11 } Sardar vs. Nehru’s Socialistic Nightmare 

{ 12 } Sardar vs. Nehruvian “Secularism” 

{ 13 } Sardar’s Functioning 

{ 14 } Injustice to Sardar

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Detailed Table of Contents 

{ 1 } Summarised Chronology 

{ 2 } Biographical Outline 

Childhood Anecdotes 

Education Career 

Elder Brother Vithalbhai 

Wife Jhaverba 

Daughter Maniben 

Son Dahyabhai Patel 

To Heavenly Abode 

{ 3 } Freedom Struggle & Sardar, 1917–43 

Start of Patel’s Association with Gandhi, 1917 

Sardar’s Public Service Landmarks, 1917-19 

Patel’s Kheda Agitation 1918 

Khilafat & Non-Cooperation Movement (KNCM) 1920-22 

Patel & Nagpur Satyagraha 1923 

Patel’s Borsad Satyagraha 1923 

Patel’s Commendable Work for Ahmedabad Municipality 

Patel’s Work during Ahmedabad Floods 1927 

Patel’s Bardoli Satyagraha 1928 

Congress Call for “Purna Swaraj”, 1930 

Dandi March, Salt Satyagraha, Sardar’s Preparation, 1930 

Sardar as Congress President, March 1931 

Sardar & Elections 1934-37 

Patel, Bose & Haripura Session 1938 

Resignation of Ministries, 1939: Sardar’s Opposition 

Pearl Harbor (Dec-1941) & its Aftermath 

Quit India Movement 1942 

{ 4 } Sardar & Run-up to Freedom, 1944-47 

Sidelining of Gandhi & Emergence of Patel-Nehru 

Bose, INA Trials & Mutiny 

Elections 1945-46 

Cabinet Mission, March 1946 

Interim Government, Sep-1946 

Patel’s New Home & Colleagues, Oct-1946 

V Shankar & HM Patel VP Menon 

{ 5 } Patel, Partition & Pakistan, 1947 

Freedom, Partition & Pakistan, 1947 

Diabolical League–British Design 

Patel & the Partition of Assets 

55 crores to Pakistan: Patel vs. Nehru-Gandhi 

{ 6 } How India was Deprived of the Best First PM 

{ 7 } Sardar & the Integration of the Princely States 

Princely States: An Overview 

Dividing India into Hundreds of Pieces 

How Sardar Patel Turned the Tables 

Sardar, Junagadh and the Crazy Nawab Hyderabad: How Sardar Prevented Pakistan-II 

{ 8 } Kashmir, Sardar & Botch-up by Nehru 

J&K Problem thanks to Nehru usurping Patel’s Role 

Nehru’s Blunders, ignoring Sardar’s Sane Advice 

Reference to the UN Article-370, thanks to Nehru, and despite Sardar 

Sardar’s 547 Successes & Nehru’s Kashmir Failure 

Sardar, VP Menon & Kashmir 

{ 9 } Sardar vs. Nehru on China & Tibet 

Sardar Patel’s Approach 

Nehru, China & Tibet 

{ 10 } Foreign Policy & External Security : Nehru vs. Sardar 

Nehru: Foreign to Foreign Policy? 

Sardar Patel & Foreign Policy 

Patel, Goa & Nehru 

{ 11 } Sardar vs. Nehru’s Socialistic Nightmare 

Theory of Non-Affluent Society 

Democracy and Socialism: Are they compatible? 

Nehruvian Socialistic Suicide 

What They Said of Nehru & Socialism 

Sardar Patel vs. Socialists 

{ 12 } Sardar vs. Nehruvian “Secularism” 

Nehru’s Pseudo-Secular Position 

Ambedkar on Appeasement 

Patel’s Just and Correct Position 

{ 13 } Sardar’s Functioning 

Sardar’s Distinguishing Qualities 

Patel & IAS Patel’s Administration 

Sardar, Constitution and Minorities 

Sardar: Non-Dynastic & Non-Nepotistic, unlike Nehru 

No Hypocrisy in Money Matters 

Democrat Patel vs. Autocrat Nehru 

{ 14 } Injustice to Sardar

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REVIEWS 

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{ 1 } Summarised Chronology 

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This opening chapter is in form of a table with short, terse, succinct descriptions of important events, some not very often mentioned in official concise histories as taught or generally propagated at non professional levels, even after independence, and even though Patel was not opposed to Gandhi. 

Some parts really worth noting are, for example - 

1905 - Sardar saved enough money from his law-practice to go for higher studies to England; but gave it to his elder brother, Vithalbhai (1873–1933), who wished to first go there.

1908 - Vithalbhai, Vallabhbhai’s elder brother, completed his 36-month course at the Middle Temple Inn, London in 30 months, topping his class, something his younger brother Vallabhbhai repeated later.

11 January 1909 - Sardar’s wife Jhaverba expired from cancer at Cama Hospital in Mumbai, devastating Sardar.

Earlier part of table makes us realise that she, born in 1880, died very young, and that he was effectively celibate by choice for rest of his life, with only two children as his private life if any. 

June 1912 - Sardar passed in First Class in London. Topped. Completed 3-year course in about 2 years.

1913 - The Raj offered him the post of judge upon return from London, which he declined.

1913 onwards - Sardar began Law practice in Ahmedabad. Excelled as barrister. Became the highest paid lawyer in Ahmedabad.

1915 - 1917 - Armenian genocide (about 1.5 million killed) perpetrate by Khalifa/Ottoman Empire. Gandhi’s Khilafat Movement of 1920-22 was to save Khalifa—whom the Turks (Ataturk) themselves later deposed!

This, one is rarely told, and only connects dots accidentally if at all, unless one is professionally historian - in which case either one tows the line in India or is shunted out. And the line amounts to ignoring the genocide perpetrated against Armenians in Turkey beforeand during WWI. 

1917 - Sardar fought against veth, and finally got it abolished. Veth was forced servitude of a class of Indians to Europeans.

If this is taught in Gujarat,  good, but isn't elsewhere generally. 

1917 - Sardar mounted a massive relief operation for plague, with considerable risk to himself.

Nor is this commonly taught. 

1919 - Influenced by Gandhi, Sardar’s daughter Maniben switched to khadi (ahead of Sardar himself) at a tender age of 16, and started working regularly at the Gandhi Ashram in Ahmedabad.

13 April 1919 - Jallianwala Bagh Massacre of 1200 unarmed, peaceful men, women and children in Amritsar. 3,600 wounded.

Rarely are these numbers mentioned. 

1919 - Sardar led successful Kheda Agitation against taxes levied on farmers.

1920 - Sardar won all open seats in the Ahmedabad Municipal elections. Collected one million rupees for the Tilak Swaraj Fund. Enrolled 3 lakh members for the Congress from Gujarat. Gandhi and Patel decided on the establishment of Gujarat Vidyapeeth.

1921 - Sardar’s daughter Maniben put all her gold wrist-watch, gold bangles, earrings, jewels, and other ornaments in a bundle of cloth and, after obtaining her father’s nod, deposited them in the cause of freedom at the Gandhi Ashram.

Again, this isn't mentioned commonly, while Nehru family donating everything, is tom-tommed. 

August-September 1921 - Terrible Moplah Anti-Hindu Attacks.

Never mentioned, and one comes to hear of it only post 2014, if one isn't a professional historian. 

4th February 1922 - Chauri Chaura incident.

12th February 1922 - Gandhi unilaterally called off KNCM without consulting any stake-holder, on the excuse of Chauri Chaura incident.

1922 - Vithalbhai, Vallabhbhai’s elder brother, left the Congress after Gandhi suddenly called off the KNCM; and co-founded the Swaraj Party along with CR Das and Motilal Nehru. 

1922 - KNCM, Gandhi’s first main movement, miserably failed, achieving none of its 3 aims: (1)Protection of Khalifa and Khilafat; (2)Swaraj (Self-rule) within 12 months; (3)Hindu-Muslim amity and unity (it became worse, with spate of anti-Hindu attacks and riots).

1924 - Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, leader of the Turkish National Movement, overthrew the Ottoman rule and abolished the Caliphate, exposing the thoughtlessness, hollowness, and the regressive nature of Gandhi-led Khilafat Movement.

9-11 Sep 1924 - Major anti-Hindu riots in Kohat, NWFP.

That's yet another fact never generally mentioned. 

1928 - Following the success of the Bardoli Satyagraha led by Sardar—first successful non-violent agitation involving rural masses—the women of Bardoli bestowed the title Sardar (Chief or Leader) on Patel.

26 Jan 1930 - Purna Swaraj Declaration was promulgated by the Indian National Congress—so late!

Wish the author had mentioned Surat Congress session, where a faction in favour of placate British was conspiring to throw out those for independence. 

Here on there are details of Sardar getting repeatedly arrested, his elder brothers death, and more. 

1938 - Sardar  organised Haripura (on the banks of Tapti in Bardoli taluka in Gujarat) Session of the Congress on a grand scale, with Netaji Bose as President.

29 Jan 1939 - Sardar supported Gandhi, and opposed re-election of Subhas Bose as Congress president. However, Bose won.

Nov 1939 - As a protest against the Raj for not consulting the Congress before declaring war on India’s behalf, the Congress ministries in the provinces resigned (an unwise move) under pressure from Nehru and the leftists. Sardar Patel was against this.

22 Dec 1939 - Jinnah and the Muslim League celebrated the “Deliverance Day”—deliverance from the “misrule” of the Congress (resignations of Congress ministries).

26 Mar 1940 - Muslim League’s Lahore Resolution indirectly hinting about Pakistan.

Apr 1942 - Jinnah termed the secession clause in the Cripps offer as an implicit recognition of Pakistan; but rejected the proposal, as what he wanted was an explicit recognition of the right of the “Muslim nation” to separate. Both Gandhi and Patel rejected the proposal, mainly on account of the secession clause.

Jul 1942 - With the British having been routed in SE-Asia, the Japanese next door in Rangoon, and Axis powers doing relatively well, Gandhi misread that the tide was in favour of the Axis Powers. Getting irrelevant, not having led a mass movement for a decade,  and with leaders like Netaji Bose getting popular, Gandhi insisted in CWC at Wardha for “Quit India”. Sardar was among the first top leader to back “Quit India”.

7-8 Aug1942 - Quit India resolution was passed by the AICC at its meeting at Gowalia Tank in Mumbai, and the Movement was launched by Gandhi on 8 August. It was controlled by the British within 2 months.

But it's mentioned hugely in commonly propagated history, while INA gets barely a mention, if that. 

Sep 1944 - Spurned by the Raj, Gandhi turned to Jinnah, visiting his home 14 times, and making a fresh offer on the lines similar to what Rajaji had suggested in 1942. Jinnah rejected the offer.

Nov 1945–May 1946 -  INA Red-Fort Trials: Members of the INA (Indian National Army) were tried for “waging war against the King-Emperor”. The trials unleashed massive patriotic fervour. Immense public pressure forced the then Army Chief  to commute the sentences.

By accounts commonly taught for six decades after independence, it's almost as if it never happened. 

Feb 1946 -  Mutiny in the Indian Army. Mutiny in the Royal Indian Navy at Bombay began on 19 February 1946. It was followed by a mutiny at Jabalpur. Both were precipitated by the INA trials.

Again, this has hardly ever been mentioned as far as general education goes. Until the internet era, that is. 

29 Apr 1946 - Even though 12 of the 15 PCCs (80%) voted in favour of Patel, Gandhi dictatorially, undemocratically, and unethically made Nehru the president of the Congress, and therefore the first Prime Minister.

Another secret kept from youth for six decades. 

12 May 1946 - British Government’s Cabinet Mission published ‘Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy’ that envisaged bringing the political arrangements between the Princely States and the British Crown to an end, and for the rights surrendered by the States—defence, foreign policy and communications—to the British to revert to the States when the Dominions of India and Pakistan come be created. Thus, with the withdrawal of paramountcy, all the 562 Princely States were to become independent. Thankfully, Sardar Patel frustrated the British design.

Not commonly taught as part of general education. 

25 Jun 1946 - Patel risked his all and took a private, personal initiative to negotiate the matter with the British. He ultimately persuaded the CWC, against Gandhi’s advice, to accept the 16-May-1946 Plan, while rejecting the 16-June-1946 Plan, to thwart the Muslim League from forming the government.

20 Feb 1947 - The British PM Clement Attlee announced Britain would quit India by June 1948. 

8 Mar 1947 - To nip the problem in the bud, without prior consultation with or approval by Gandhi (as Patel had his doubts), Sardar Patel took up the groupings (of Cabinet Mission Plan) challenge head on by promptly agreeing (at his level) to the demands of the Sikh and Hindu leaders for the division of Punjab (and, by implication, Bengal) without wasting any time, and had a  resolution for the purpose passed by the CWC on 8 March 1947. It was not meant as an endorsement for Pakistan, but a forewarning to the Muslims as to what would happen (partition of Punjab and Bengal) if they insisted on Pakistan.

1 Apr 1947 - To explore the possibility of averting partition, Gandhi made a proposal to Mountbatten: Dissolution of Interim Govt then headed by Nehru; and inviting Jinnah to take over. On the evening of 10 April 1947. Nehru, Patel and many members of the CWC met Gandhi and told him they were opposed to his plan. On 11 April 1947 Gandhi advised Mountbatten of his defeat vis-à-vis the plan, and left Delhi.

Didn't this include giving in to Jinnah about complete rule to Muslim League? 

May 1947 - Mountbatten Plan: Mountbatten came up with a plan to quit India, duly revised and approved by London. The outline of the plan was to transfer power to the provinces or groups of provinces for an interim period, who would then decide whether to join India or Pakistan or remain  independent. There were no takers for the plan.

June 1947 - VP Menon–Mountbatten Partition Plan: VP Menon, the Constitutional Adviser and Political Reforms Commissioner to the Viceroy, envisaged transfer of power by the British to two Central Governments on Dominion basis, and separation of the Muslim-majority areas from India. Menon had opined that a unitary India under the Cabinet Mission Plan was an illusion; and it was better for the country to be divided than gravitate towards civil war.

12 Jun 1947 - Nizam declared that Hyderabad would neither join India nor Pakistan, but would remain independent. 

25 - Jun 1947 GoI established the Department of [Princely] States under Sardar Patel. 

25 Jul 1947 - The draft of the Instrument of Accession (IoA) prepared by the States Department headed by Sardar Patel was circulated, which was subsequently approved.

15 Aug 1947 - Sardar joined Independent India's Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister for Home, States, and Information & Broadcasting.

Sep 1947 - Maharaja Hari Singh offered Kashmir's accession to India. But it was refused by Nehru, who first wanted Sheikh Abdullah to be freed and installed as the PM of the State! Patel was angry and frustrated with Nehru for this. Had Nehru done what Patel wanted, Kashmir problem would not have arisen at all. 

13 Sep 1947 - On 13 September 1947 India was informed by Pakistan that it had accepted Junagadh’s accession. 

Oct 1947 - Kashmir was invaded by over 5,000 Pathan tribesmen in October 1947, backed by the Pakistani army men. 

24 Oct 1947 - Pakistani raiders attacked the Mohore Power House causing black out in Srinagar. 

26 Oct 1947 - Sardar planned and executed the Junagadh operation so well that the Nawab of Junagadh fled to Pakistan. 

27 Oct 1947 - Mountbatten accepted the Instrument of Accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh on 26 October 1947. With the above formality done, J&K legally became a part of India, and it became incumbent upon India to defend its territory, send in its army and throw out the raiders. 

28 Oct 1947 - In a radio broadcast, Nehru committed that the J&K accession would be subject to a plebiscite under the UN auspices. This Nehru did at the persuasion of Mountbatten, without taking the Indian cabinet or Sardar Patel into confidence!

2 Nov 1947 - Reference to the UN was something Sardar Patel, Dr Ambedkar and others were against, however, Nehru again went ahead with it publicly in his radio broadcast on 2 November 1947.

Dec 1947 - The Indian Cabinet at the instance of Sardar Patel pushed for a very strong military action to fully clear J&K of the raiders. Further, it wanted creation of a demilitarized zone beyond the borders, and proper monitoring, lest any raiders camp be reactivated. This would have ensured there was never a so-called Azad Kashmir or a PoK (Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir). But, Nehru failed to rise to the occasion.

13 Nov 1947 - Sardar visited Somnath and decided to renovate the Somnath Mahadev Temple. 

23 Dec 1947 - Sardar Patel resigned on Kashmir and other issues—which he later did not press, at the advice of Gandhi.

1 Jan 1948 - India scored a self-goal, with Nehru formally referring the J&K matter to the UN, under pressure from Mountbatten. 

12 Jan 1948 - Patel stated in a Press Conference that the issue of giving rupees 55 crores to Pakistan could not be dissociated from the related issues like Pakistani aggression in J&K. 

13 Jan 1948 - Gandhi conveyed to Patel that withholding 55 crores from Pakistan was what Mountbatten had opined to him as “a dishonourable act… unstatesman-like and unwise”, and what he [Gandhi] thought was immoral. Why didn’t Gandhi and Mountbatten consider the immorality of Pakistan in attacking Kashmir which had already acceded to India? If Pakistan had agreed to desist from its illegal action in Kashmir, it would have got the money anyway. Much against Patel’s wishes, 55 crores were given to Pakistan.

Did British behave as per this sentiment, about not giving other fairly being “a dishonourable act… unstatesman-like and unwise”, when keeping a piece of Ireland?

20 Feb 1948 - A plebiscite was held in Junagadh by India. It was conducted not by the UN, but by an Indian ICS officer, CB Nagarkar, in which 99%—all but 91 persons—voted to join India. Sardar was not gullible like Nehru to allow himself to be made a fool of by letting Mountbatten have his way, refer the matter to the UN—which Mountbatten had suggested for Junagadh too—and allow domestic matters to be internationalised, like that of J&K, and be exploited by Pakistan and the UK.

11 Sep 1948 - Muhammad Ali Jinnah expired.

What author doesn't mention is, how disillusioned and sad, how lonely he was, after a short elation period that included attacking Kashmir and Baluchistan, but soon enough he was sending piteous messages to Nehru to forget partition, as quoted by Kuldip Nayar, and had no medical attention or even that by politicians of his country, when dying. 

13-18 Sep 1948 - Operation Polo: Integration of Hyderabad through Armed Intervention forced by Sardar, despite reluctance of Nehru and Rajaji.

1947-50 - Sardar’s exemplary work of integration of Princely States, expanding India’s geographical area by 40%.

7 Nov 1950 - Sardar wrote a detailed letter (reproduced in this book) to Nehru on the policy to be adopted on China and Tibet. The wise advice was ignored by Nehru, landing India into a soup.

1991 - Sardar conferred ‘Bharat Ratna’—so late, when the Nehru Dynasty was not in power.

Nehru,  on the other hand, had signed conferring his own. 

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April 23, 2022 - April 24, 2022. 

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{ 2 } Biographical Outline 

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“Work is undoubtedly worship but laughter is life. Anyone who takes life too seriously must prepare himself for a miserable existence. Anyone who greets joys and sorrows with equal facility can really get the best of life.” 

"—Sardar Patel{Sag}"

"Sardar Vallabhbhai Jhaverbhai Patel was born on 31 October 1875 at Nadiad in a family of Patidars (Patels). 1875 was also the year ‘Vande Mataram’, which later became the national song, was written by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, which he included in his novel ‘Anandmath’ published in 1882. The term patidar signified people who had obtained clear title to land. 

"Nadiad is a town halfway between Ahmedabad and Baroda, a distance of 75 miles or 121 kilometres, in Kheda (Kaira) district in Gujarat. The town is named after “nats”, the rope dancers. Its historical name is Natapadra or Natpur. The town has close association with number 9. It has 9 villages, 9 lakes, 9 routes/roads exiting out, and 9 step-wells, one on each exit-road. 

"The Patidars of Nadiad had played a notable role in India's First War for Independence of 1857. Jhaverbhai Galabhai Patel, father of Vallabhbhai, a Leva (warrior class) Patidar, belonged to that group, and had participated in that War of Independence. He had joined Rani of Jhansi. After the war, Jhaverbhai was held prisoner by Malharrao Holkar at Indore. One day, playing chess within the sight of his prisoner Jhaverbhai, Holkar was so pleasantly surprised and impressed by Jhaverbhai correcting him whenever he made wrong moves that he granted him freedom."

"Vallabhbhai married Jhaverba, and set up his household in Godhra, where he practised law. ... "

Is that why Hindu pilgrims filled train was attacked in 2002 at Godhra, and pilgrims burnt alive, women, children and old people included? The possible conspiracy angle has never been discussed, nor has the possibility that this was basically covert jihadist war perpetrated and instigated from across border. 

" ... They were blessed with a daughter, Maniben, in April 1903, and a son, Dahyabhai, in November 1906. Jhaverba was hospitalised in Mumbai for cancer in 1909, but despite successful emergency surgery, she passed away in the hospital. Sardar did not remarry."

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Childhood Anecdotes 

Very interesting anecdotes demonstrating his flair for quest of justice. 

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Education 

Very impressive, how he financed his own education, and his brother's too, both doing extremely well qualifying as barristers in London. 

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Career 

"Working as an assistant to an advocate at Nadiad after matriculation was highly educative for Sardar, for he keenly watched all court proceedings, and became thoroughly familiar with the workings of the courts. Sardar Patel minutely observed the tricks the police adopted to trap the innocent, and the way they framed charges. Patel’s sharp mind would discover the hidden loopholes, and help innocents get justice. 

"After passing the District Pleaders' Examination, Vallabhbhai followed his elder brother, Vithalbhai, to the bar at Godhra in 1900. In 1902, he shifted to Borsad (Balsad), a taluka headquarter, where he practised as a criminal lawyer for nearly eight years, and built a formidable practice as a most successful criminal lawyer. Patel’s hallmark was extraordinary thoroughness in preparation of his cases, and supreme confidence in courts verging on audacity. 

"Patel practised law in Godhra, Borsad and Anand. 

"After returning from England, and reaching Bombay on 13 February 1913, Patel contacted the Chief Justice of the High Court Sir Basil Scott, who, after examining Patel’s proficiency, offered him the post of a judge. However, Vallabhbhai politely declined, as he wanted to set up his own law practise. 

"Soon after, Patel settled in Ahmedabad—a smartly-dressed person donning a felt-hat, he impressed everyone at the bar, not just by his turn-out, but by his through professionalism, his skills as a lawyer, and his penetrating cross-examination. His gift of sizing-up persons, correct judgement of people, and quick assessment of adversaries and witnesses, ... "

"Nehru was unsuccessful in the profession he was trained in (a lawyer), and could hardly earn any money, despite the strong support and good practice of his father. Both he and his family were dependent upon his father for support. This was in sharp contrast to his adversary like Jinnah who had a roaring legal practice, and was essentially a self-made man. This was also in sharp contrast to his colleagues, Sardar Patel, Dr Rajendra Prasad, Rajaji, and host of others, who were very successful lawyers earning fat income, and who willingly gave up their practice on the call of Gandhi."

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Elder Brother Vithalbhai 

"Apart from financing his elder brother’s education in England (please see above), Sardar supported Vithalbhai’s entry into politics in the Bombay Presidency by taking care of his family in Ahmedabad. 

"During Sardar’s absence from India for studies in England, his elder brother Vithalbhai had taken care of Sardar’s two children, Maniben and Dahya. After Sardar returned from England, the two brothers reached a pact: “one of us should serve the country and the other the family”. Thereafter, it was Sardar’s responsibility to take care of Vithalbhai’s family and their expenses. Commented Sardar Patel later: “My brother gave up his flourishing practice and started on a career of public service, while I bore the burden of maintaining the household. I had thus to commit all the sins and he performed all the good deeds; but I reconciled myself with the thought that I could claim at least a share of his good work!"

Both brothers had much in common, apart from being lawyers, topping the exam in England and being good at practice in India, and giving it up for freedom struggle to join Gandhi. Both also lost their wives when young, and never married again. 

" ... Vithalbhai left the Congress after the end of the Salt Satyagraha, and became a fierce critic of Gandhi. He became a strong ally of Subhas Chandra Bose. Both Bose and Vithalbhai happened to be in Vienna in 1933 for medical treatment, and came close, their political views being similar. Among other things, they jointly stated: “...as a political leader Mahatma Gandhi has failed.... and a change of leadership is necessary...” Subhas Bose and Vithalbhai travelled together across Europe mobilising funds. They also met the President of Ireland.

"Even as Subhas Bose’s health improved, unfortunately, Vithalbhai’s health took a turn for the worse. When he came to know of the condition, Vallabhbhai wrote several anxious letters to Vithalbhai, but apparently none reached him: Vithalbhai felt neglected. Subhas Bose and colleagues took much care of Vithalbhai. However, he expired in Geneva, Switzerland, on 22 October 1933. His body was flown to India. As Vallabhbhai was then in jail, Vallabhbhai’s son, Dahyabhai, performed the last rites. 

"Before his death, Vithalbhai willed three-fourths of his estate amounting to (at that time) rupees 1,20,000 on 2 October 1933 to Subhas Bose for carrying forward the political work they had jointly embarked upon. A portion of the will read: “The balance of my assets after disposal of the above-mentioned four gifts is to be handed over to Subhas Chandra Bose (son of Janaki Nath Bose) of 1, Woodburn Park, Calcutta, to be spent by the said Subhas Chandra Bose or by his nominee or nominees according to his instructions for the political upliftment of India and preferably for publicity work on behalf of India’s cause in other countries.”"

But there were disputes and disagreements resolved legally in favour of Vallabhbhai Patel, who used the money for charity. 

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Wife Jhaverba 

" ... Like his three brothers who too had lost their wives at an early age, Vallabhbhai decided not to remarry."

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Daughter Maniben 

" ... Maniben studied in Mumbai at St. Joseph’s Convent until 1917. She graduated from Gujarat Vidyapith at Ahmedabad in 1924."

" ... Most of the garments that Sardar Patel wore after 1921 were woven out of the yarn made by Maniben."

"Unlike Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, Maniben was a freedom fighter, who actively participated in the non-cooperation movements. During the Bardoli Satyagraha in 1928, she along with many other ladies helped out in the camps. For her active role in the Salt Satyagraha of 1930  and thereafter she was arrested and imprisoned on several occasions."

"In January 1932, she was arrested along with Kasturba Gandhi for defying a ban on meetings in Bardoli. She was released in May 1932, but was re-arrested in July 1932 for defying a ban in Kheda, and was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment, which she spent in Belgaum jail. 

"For her role in arousing people in the villages in Rajkot she was arrested in December 1938. Gandhi was much impressed with her work, and had remarked that Maniben was showing her mettle; and that he [Gandhi] had not seen another daughter like her."

"Later, Maniben underwent prolonged imprisonment during the Quit India Movement of 1942. She was arrested along with Kasturba Gandhi in August 1942, and was in detention at the Aga Khan's Palace in Pune, where Gandhi was lodged. Maniben was released in March 1944. But, she was rearrested in May 1944 in Bardoli in Gujarat, and was sent to Surat jail. From Surat she was sent to Yerwada jail. 

"She didn’t get married, and served her father till his death in 1950. After Sardar Patel passed away, she worked for various charities, and for the Sardar Patel Memorial Trust till her death in 1990.

"She was elected to Lok Sabha as an MP (1952-57) from South Kaira in 1952, and as an MP (1957-62) from Anand in 1957. She was a Rajya Sabha member during 1964-70. She also served as the Secretary of the Gujarat State Congress during 1953-56, and as its Vice-President during 1957-64. She had left Congress(I) to join Congress(O), and had opposed Emergency. She was elected to Lok Sabha from Mehsana on the Janata Party ticket in 1977."

After Sardar’s joining freedom movement, as per teaching of Gandhi he'd given everything to Freedom Struggle. Maniben too had been in the movement from a very young age, and later taken care of her father. 

" ... When Sardar Patel expired, he had left nothing for his daughter. With Sardar no more, she had to vacate the house. She was left all alone to fend for herself, with no money and no house. Sardar had instructed her to give a bag and a book to Nehru upon his death. 

"After Sardar’s death—which happened in Mumbai—Maniben dutifully went to Delhi, took an appointment with Nehru and met him. She handed over to him the bag and the book. It seems the book was an account book, and the bag contained rupees 35 lacs. After having done so, she waited for Nehru to express sympathy, enquire as to what she intended doing, where would she stay, her monetary position, whether she wanted anything, and what he could do for her. But, Nehru showed no interest and said nothing. After some time, she left disappointed. 

"She returned to Ahmedabad to stay with a cousin. Neither Nehru, nor the Congress Party bothered about her well-being. ... "

One cannot help contrasting this with story of INA treasure as reported in Anuj Dhar's work on Netaji, two trunks filled with gold and diamond jewellery worth 2 crores and 22 crores respectively, reportedly taken straight from airport in Delhi when brought over from Japan and, as prr instructions, driven to the then PM Jawaharlal Nehru,  and credited to his account, never to be heard of again. 

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Son Dahyabhai Patel 

"Unlike Nehru, Sardar Patel was totally non-nepotistic. He had told Dahyabhai and Dahyabhai’s son, when they visited him [Sardar Patel] after he suffered a heart-attack in Delhi after independence : “As long as I am in this chair, don’t visit Delhi, unless I am unwell and you have to see me...All sorts of people will contact you. Take care.”"

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To Heavenly Abode 

"A little before 3am on Friday, 15 December 1950 he suffered a heart attack, and lost consciousness. Revived after several hours, he sipped some water, but again lost consciousness. He breathed his last at 9.37am."

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April 24, 2022 - April 24, 2022. 

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{ 3 } Freedom Struggle & Sardar, 1917–43 

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Start of Patel’s Association with Gandhi, 1917 

"Patel entered politics towards the end of 1917 when he attended the Gujarat Sabha’s Provincial Political Conference at Godhra presided by Gandhi, and attended, among others, by Tilak and Jinnah. ... "

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Sardar’s Public Service Landmarks, 1917-19 

"In his new capacity in Gujarat Sabha, Patel vigorously fought against veth (begar: getting services without payment) in 1917. Though not immediately, he ultimately succeeded in getting it abolished. Veth was the forced servitude of Indians to Europeans: It was customary for an official visiting a village to command the services of carpenters, barbers, bullock-cart-wallas, kulis, sweepers and potters for various odd jobs without payment, and make them wait on the officials."

Author mentions hus services during plague years, refusing to move out of Ahmedabad and instead seeing to city bring cleaned. 

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Patel’s Kheda Agitation 1918 

"The peasants of Kheda had been agitating for exemption from taxation in the wake of plague and famine, but their plea had been turned down by the British authorities. Gandhiji was supportive of their demand, but was busy elsewhere. Gandhiji was delighted when Patel readily volunteered for the assignment. It was a full time job, and it meant abandonment of his law-practice which he had built up with considerable efforts, the obvious consequence of which was to give up all material ambitions. Patel took a conscious, considered decision, and jumped into the peasant struggle, sacrificing everything. 

"Patel toured Kheda villages in 1918, mobilising villagers for state-wide refusal for payment of taxes—emphasising potential hardships, need for complete unity and non-violence despite any provocation—while also documenting their grievances. ... "

" ... The revolt was astounding: even when all their personal property, land and livestock were seized, Kheda's farmers remained firmly united. Those who sought to buy the confiscated property were ostracized. The mobilisation was so effective, and the agitation was so successful that the government was ultimately forced to negotiate with Patel. Revenue was suspended for that year and the next, the revenue-rate was scaled back, and the seized property was returned."

"Sardar Patel had commented thus on the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy : “When the war was over we were given the Rowlatt Act which deprived us of freedom of action. When the people protested against such a tyrannical piece of legislation, the Government decided on a policy of suppressing all resistance by force… And finally the Government appointed a committee ostensibly to investigate the happenings in Jallianwala Bagh and Lahore but actually, as it has turned out, to hush up everything. In the House of Lords, the lords verily showed their nobility! The murder of so many innocent men and women was to them nothing as compared with the honour of one callous Englishman [Brigadier General Reginald Dyer]. That officer they regarded as brave, and those innocent persons who were killed as rebels!”

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Khilafat & Non-Cooperation Movement (KNCM) 1920-22 

"Gandhi supported the movement and worked out an alliance of the Congress with the Khilafat leaders in 1920. Together they launched a nationwide non-cooperation movement, and a campaign of mass, peaceful civil disobedience. However, Jinnah had advised against supporting fundamentalist elements, and the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha had opposed the Khilafat Movement. 

"The Apostle of Non-violence had apparently ignored the fact that the Khalifa and the Ottoman Empire had perpetrated the dastardly Armenian Genocide, also known as the Armenian Holocaust, during 1915-17 involving the systematic extermination of about 15 lakhs (1.5 million) of its minority Armenian subjects inside their historic homeland, which lies within the present-day Republic of Turkey."

" ... Chittaranjan Das, Motilal Nehru, Bipin Chandra Pal, Lala Lajpat Rai were initially cool towards the proposal. However, Annie Besant, Madan Mohan Malaviya and Jinnah refused to endorse Gandhi on the proposal."

"Gandhi suddenly suspended the non-cooperation movement on 12 February 1922, without consulting any of the stakeholders, including the Muslim leaders of the Khilafat Movement. The reason, or the excuse, was the perishing of 23 policemen when the Chauri Chaura Police Station in the Gorakhpur district of UP was set on fire in a retaliatory violence on 4 February 1922. Police had arrested leaders of a group picketing a liquor shop in the market place. In protest, a crowd gathered in front of the police station shouting slogans. The police opened fire into the crowd killing three and wounding several. Angered by the unprovoked firing, the protestors set fire to the police station, killing the policeman as a result.

"At the time Gandhi was over 800 miles away in Bardoli in Gujarat. So, linking his agitation to the incident was far-fetched. Further, in a big country like India where the British freely resorted to unjust acts, exploitation, violence, firing, and humiliation of the natives, such incidents were bound to occur. Yet, Gandhi declared that his followers had sinned against God; and to continue the campaign would be to follow Satan. Satanic acts of the British didn’t matter. But, stray violence, and that too only retaliatory violence, of some groups—that was bound to occur in a country as big as India—did seem to matter for Gandhi. 

"Even if one grants Gandhi his indefensible logic of calling off the agitation on account of the violence, the question is why didn’t he do so earlier in the face of far more ghastly violence? Reference is to the terrible Moplah Anti-Hindu Attacks of August-September 1921 in the Malabar region of Kerala. Chauri Chaura violence of February 1922 was not even 1% of Moplah Anti-Hindu Attacks earlier of August-September 1921, while both were in the context of the “Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movement”."

"Sardar Patel was sceptical about Gandhi’s Khilafat move. He considered it absurd Indians fighting for those in faraway land when they needed to first free themselves from the British slavery; although the opportunity it provided for a joint Hindu-Muslim struggle to wrest power from the British did appeal to him, and to many other Hindu leaders. ... Sardar was unhappy and disagreed with Gandhi’s decision of suspension of the movement on account of the Chauri Chaura incident, though he didn’t voice an open disagreement."

"Khalifa was kicked out and Khilafat terminated forever, not by the British, but by the Muslims of Turkey themselves, ushering-in a democratic and modern system of government under Kemal Mustafa. Swaraj remained a mirage, and was as far away as it had ever been. 

"Hindu-Muslim relationships, instead of improving, became worse. Many Muslim leaders who were with Gandhi in the Khilafat Movement turned anti, and joined Muslim League. In a way, the movement laid the foundation of future Pakistan. The sidelined Jinnah became rabidly anti-Gandhi, anti-Congress, and anti-Hindu. ... "

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Patel & Nagpur Satyagraha 1923 

"The first anniversary of Lokmanya Tilak’s death was inaugurated with bonfires of foreign cloth on 1 August 1921. ... "

"In March 1923, the Jabalpur municipality passed a resolution to hoist the national flag over the Town Hall. ... a procession carrying the national flag aloft was carried out led by, among others, Pandit Sunderlal and Subhadra Kumari Chauhan, the renowned poetess of the popular song on “Rani Laxmibai of Jhansi”."

" ... On 13 April 1923, the anniversary of the Jallianwala Bagh Tragedy, the Central Provinces (C.P.) Government prohibited a peaceful procession with the national flag from entering Civil Lines in Nagpur, its capital. When the participants attempted to go forward with the flag into Civil Lines, the police beat them up and even flung many into open drains."

" ... beginning 1 May 1923, volunteers walked with the flag towards Civil Lines each working day. They were arrested. Each day a fresh group of volunteers courted arrest.

"The struggle appealed to Sardar Patel, and from June 1923 onwards he began sending batches of volunteers from Gujarat to Nagpur. The volunteers began pouring in from other states too. Tamil and Karnataka groups also joined in.

"The struggle and arrests went right through May, June and July, and into August. The volunteers were dumped into Nagpur jail, and when that overflowed, into Akola jail. Those arrested included teachers, lawyers, businessmen, zamindars, and people like Vinoba Bhave and Ravishankar Maharaj. While Vinoba Bhave was made to crush stones under the hot sun in jail; Ravishankar Maharaj had to grind kilos of grain on the chakki each day. ... "

" ... With Sardar at the helm, the struggle became much more organised and intense. Sardar’s brother Vithalbhai also came over to help in the struggle. 

"Finally, the CP Governor Sir Frank Sly reached an agreement with the Patel brothers: Vithalbhai and Vallabhbhai. The national flag was allowed to be carried through the Civil Lines on 18 August 1923. The struggle was then called off, and all the prisoners were released."

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Patel’s Borsad Satyagraha 1923 

"In September 1923 the government announced a levy of Rs 2.4 lakhs on the residents of Borsad taluka as its expense on special anti-dacoity police posted there: each person over 16 years of age was to pay two rupees and seven annas towards the sum.{BK/89} 

"Sardar Patel and his colleagues uncovered evidence of the police being in cahoots with the dacoits; and that the villagers who had shown exemplary courage in resisting the dacoits or in informing the police were severely victimised. 

"Sardar Patel and his team organised the villagers for agitation against the levied tax. After a protracted struggle, which Sardar had organized superbly, the government was forced to give in. ... "

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Patel’s Commendable Work for Ahmedabad Municipality 

"Sardar Patel accepted an additional burden as the president of the Ahmedabad municipality from February 1924. Denied power at the national or provincial level, many Congress leaders chose civic leadership. Vallabhbhai’s elder brother Vithalbhai, Jawaharlal Nehru, Dr Rajendra Prasad, Chitta Ranjan Das headed municipal bodies in Bombay, Allahabad, Patna, and Calcutta respectively. The Bose brothers had also headed the Calcutta municipality."

"Before leaving active participation in the Ahmedabad municipality in 1927, Sardar had ensured that the drainage, that covered only one-third of Ahmedabad when he took over, covered the whole city; and over half the city had access to piped drinking water. He acquired 21 acres for the city along Sabarmati, which were later used for hospital and other utilities. He arranged for setting up of a third public health laboratory at Ahmedabad, after the only two at Pune and Karachi.

"Sardar initiated removal of sexual disqualification in the district municipal act that barred women from contesting elections. He had the section removed in 1926 in Ahmedabad. Sardar also commissioned the first Gujarati typewriter in 1924 through a tie-up with Remington."

"In sharp contrast to Sardar, Jawaharlal Nehru, as head of the Allahabad municipality, couldn’t really deliver, and chose to resign. Although enthusiastic, he was more of a pen-pusher, and didn’t have the tact to practically achieve his goals. Allahabad and Ahmedabad municipality had similar problems and issues, but while Sardar succeeded in Ahmedabad, Nehru failed in Allahabad. The ability and the position didn’t seem to have changed after independence: whatever Sardar took responsibility of succeeded, while Nehru floundered from one blunder to another."

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Patel’s Work during Ahmedabad Floods 1927 

"Commencing 23 July 1927, Ahmedabad experienced heavy downpour that ceased only by 29 July 1927. In mere six consecutive days Ahmedabad received massive 52 inches (1320.8 mm) of rain against an average of just 30 inches (762 mm) of rain for the whole year. Compare this with Mumbai’s worst rains on 26 July 2005 of 944 mm on a single day (in 24 hours)! Chennai had received 345 mm rains in 24 hours on 1 December 2015, and a total of 1197 mm of rains during the whole of November 2015. Over 4000 villages around Ahmedabad were marooned in five feet deep water. The grim picture stretched for miles. Many houses had collapsed. As the water rose many took shelter on tree-tops. 

"Vallabhbhai went around with his colleagues even during nights to monitor the status and to ensure whatever could be done was done by the municipal staff and volunteers. He organised a large contingent of volunteers. Thanks to Patel’s efforts, the staggering problem was contained. Hugh Garrett, an ICS officer, worked closely with Patel for flood-relief for many months. He was all praise for Patel’s organising abilities, decisiveness, honesty and frankness. Sardar’s humanitarian efforts for months on end were widely appreciated. It was realised that the government despite its vast resources could not have done what Patel and his team accomplished. To see for themselves the much-acclaimed achievement, Lady Irwin and Viceroy Irwin visited Gujarat in December 1927.{BK/195} 

"The British administrators were so impressed they sought Sardar Patel’s permission to recommend him for suitable honours. Sardar, of course, declined the offer.

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Patel’s Bardoli Satyagraha 1928 

"The government of the Bombay Presidency, rather than providing succour to the people of Bardoli in Gujarat severely affected by floods and famine since 1925, raised land revenue by 30% in 1927. Petitions from civic groups had no effect. What is noteworthy is that the arbitrary enhancement of 30%, as a part of periodic revision, was recommended not by an Englishman, but by an Indian member of the Provincial Civil Service (PCS), MS Jayakar, who then was Deputy Collector of Surat."

"When farmers, along with the Gujarati activists Narhari Parikh, Ravi Shankar Vyas, and Mohanlal Pandya, approached Patel, who had earlier led the Kheda struggle, to lead an agitation to bring relief to people, Patel minced no words in frankly advising them the tremendous hardships they would be subjected to if they refused payment of taxes, as it was likely to lead to strong-arm tactics, confiscation of their property, and jail."

"Patel organised villages under a set of leaders and volunteers, and also planted informers within the government departments to know in advance their various moves. Villages were grouped into 18 sectors, each under a sector-commander. Under each sector-commander were sets of volunteers designated as ‘sainiks’ (soldiers). It was all on a military pattern. ... Peasants of all castes and religions participated in the satyagraha.{BK/118-20} 

"Patel started by first writing to the Governor of Bombay to reduce the taxes for the year. The Governor responded by announcing the date of collection of taxes. Patel then promptly gave a call to the villagers to refuse payment of taxes. He instructed them to remain completely non-violent. Before the Government had time to assess what was happening and what lay in store, over 80,000 people had been organised into various units in a disciplined manner. The Raj later tried desperately to break them up, but in vain.

"At the advice of Patel, and aided by his group of leaders and volunteers, the farmers had prepared themselves for all eventualities, hiding their precious belongings with their relatives staying in other unaffected parts of Gujarat; and had also arranged for supplies and logistics from supporters and sympathisers outside. In other words, it was a well-planned, well thought-out, and well-organised agitation. 

"A “war”-bulletin, Larat-ki-Patrika, was published and circulated on a daily basis to keep everyone informed and geared up, and it was eagerly lapped up by the villagers. To keep up the morale, Sardar Patel had also arranged for Bhajan Mandalis (groups of musicians) to go around villages each night to sing national and religious songs. The Bhajan Mandalis also included story-tellers to regale the audience with interesting and inspiring anecdotes and short-stories. To keep track on what was happening on the ground, and to boost morale of the villagers, Sardar Patel used to visit villages in the night, returning to his headquarters only at daybreak.{MD2/36-40}{BK/118-9} 

"The way Sardar Patel had organised about 87,000 villagers into a robust and fearless non-cooperation movement made an English correspondent comment in ‘The Times of India’ of 4 July 1928 that Sardar Patel had “instituted there [Bardoli] a Bolshevik regime in which he plays the role of Lenin.”{BK2/39} An Indian member of the Bombay Legislative Council remarked: “If Bardoli stands firm until the last, this fight will be the first nail in the British coffin.”

"Notable in the struggle was the participation of women, which Patel encouraged. Their bravery inspired their men to be even more committed."

" ... Bands of Pathans mobilised by the government from India’s northwest terrorised the farmers, and aided the Tax inspectors in forcibly seizing property, including cattle. Auctions of confiscated properties began to be organised. But, hardly anyone from Gujarat came forward to buy. Some greedy ones who showed up faced social boycott.

"To break the morale, the administration locked up about 17,000 agitators with some 40,000 seized buffaloes in a disease-prone, smelly, small, insanitary hell of a place for over three months. 

"There was heavy criticism of the government action all over. Ultimately, in 1928, the government had no alternative but to offer certain terms of settlement to Sardar: terms included cancellation of revenue for the year, scale-back of the 30% rise in taxes, and return of confiscated lands and properties. However, Sardar Patel rebuffed the same, considering them inadequate. But, Gandhi agreed to government’s terms, and therefore Sardar acquiesced. As we would see later too for all his major agitations, Gandhi was always game for compromise, even if his demands were not fulfilled. Why?"

"Wired Subhas Chandra Bose to Patel: “All India rejoices with you on glorious victory. All honour to satyagrahis and their leader.”"

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Congress Call for “Purna Swaraj”, 1930 

" ... The flag of India was hoisted at midnight on 31 December 1929 on the banks of the Ravi river at Lahore by Jawaharlal Nehru, who, overriding the much-deserving Sardar Patel (considering Sardar’s suitability, seniority and the Bardoli triumph), had been unjustly anointed the Congress President by Gandhi, “inheriting” that post from his father Motilal!"

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Dandi March, Salt Satyagraha, 

Sardar’s Preparation, 1930 

" ... Dandi and the Salt Route were Patel’s choice. Sardar did a fine job, delivering fiery speeches along the route, and mobilising and inspiring people. Remarked Pattabhi Sitaramayya: “While yet Gandhi was making preparations, Vallabhbhai went before his master to prime up the villagers for the coming ordeals…”{BK2/45} That resulted in his arrest before he could reach the destination. Gandhi commented that Patel was arrested because the government “feared that if he were free, he and not the government would rule over the district.”{BK2/45}"

" ... Despite the treatment Patel told his visitors in the presence of jail officials: “Don't worry about me. I am happy as a bird. There is only one thing which bothers me.” After a pause, he added in the presence of his Indian jailers: “What worries me is that all the people in charge of the jail here are Indians! It is through us Indians that they work this inhuman system.”"

"The Satyagraha continued for about a year at various places in India. Gandhi was released from jail unconditionally on 26 January 1931. He later met with Lord Irwin (1881-1959), the Viceroy of India, and agreed to call off the Satyagraha in exchange for an equal negotiating role at the Second Round Table Conference at London on India’s future. However, the negotiations failed to yield any major concession from the British!"

Gandhi could have refused to sign unless Bhagat Singh and others had sentences commuted, at least, but didn't. 

"Gandhi-Irwin Pact was signed off on 5 March 1931. Under the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, the British acceded to NO major demand of the Congress. It was effectively a failure of Gandhi’s Salt Satyagraha: his second major movement. Salt Laws remained intact. There was NO provision in it for clemency to Bhagat Singh, Rajguru and Sukhdev. Gandhi, Nehru (President of the Congress then) and the Congress did little to save them. 

"Vallabhbhai Patel was heartbroken at Gandhi’s failure to obtain the restoration of sold lands of the peasants by the British. The Patidars of Kheda considered the Pact a betrayal—it was the Pact, and not the Police lathis, that broke their backs! However, Patel pacified them by telling: “Don’t worry about your land. It will come back to you knocking at your door.” And, sure enough, after the 1937-elections when the Congress came into power in the Bombay Presidency (that included Gujarat), the land was restored.{BK2/53}"

"Several newspapers in London gloated on the victory of the Viceroy. Wrote ‘The Times’, London: “Such a victory has seldom been vouchsafed to any Viceroy.” It was said that only Gandhi could have made such an agreement (being such a huge come-down), and only he could have got away with it!{Gill/59} 

"Lord Willingdon, who succeeded Lord Irwin as the Viceroy of India in 1931, was very rigid, and ignored many provisions of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact."

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Sardar as Congress President, March 1931 

"The AICC session at Karachi was held in March 1931, at which Sardar Patel was appointed the President of the Congress (a tenure of one year) for the first (and only) time. 

"Gandhi faced a hostile climate at the Karachi Congress on account of his failure to save Shahid Bhagat Singh and associates. Notable at the Karachi Congress was the presence of Abdul Ghaffar Khan (who came to be known as the Frontier Gandhi) from NWFP, and his Khudai Khidmatgars (God’s Servants), popularly called Redshirts, on account of the brick-red colour of their shirt."

" ... Wrote William Shirer, a US journalist who covered the session: “There was one figure in Karachi, little known in the West but a power in India… Next to Gandhi, it was Vallabhbhai Patel, India’s nearest thing to an old Tammany Hall boss, who ran the convention… it had been Patel, a bald-headed, walrus-moustached, tough-minded, pragmatic, peasant lawyer, who built up the Congress to a formidable national political party, the only one there was in India. He was the boss of the machine.”"

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Sardar & Elections 1934-37 

"Described Ayesha Jalal: 

"“But for Jinnah the results of the 1937 elections proved another setback in a career marked more by snakes than by ladders. In the Punjab, the Unionists swept the board; in Bengal, Jinnah and the League had to accept a coalition led by Hug who did not acknowledge their writ; in Sind they faced an independent ministry; and in the N.W.F.P., where almost the entire population was Muslim, the worst humiliation of all, a Congress ministry. In each of the [Muslim] majority provinces, Jinnah’s strategy had been repudiated by the voters’ choice. In the Muslim-minority provinces, where the League did best, the Congress did much better than anyone had expected, and did not need the League’s help to form stable ministries.”{"

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Patel, Bose & Haripura Session 1938 

"The 1938 session of the Congress was held at Haripura, on the banks of Tapti, in Bardoli taluka in Gujarat. It was a grand and massive affair, and was meticulously planned and managed by Sardar Patel. Villagers in Haripura had temporarily lent about 500 acres for the purpose. Tractors were used to level ground. Lodging for about 75,000 persons was arranged in tents and bamboo structures. Roads were readied. A pontoon bridge was laid over Tapti. A temporary arrangement was done for the following: a post office, a telephone exchange, a bank, a hospital, and a bus stand.  Hundreds of cows were brought in advance for milk and ghee. About 2,000 volunteers were deployed for the kitchen, and for other services. 

"Sardar Patel gave the magnificent temporary town the name Vithal Nagar in the memory of his elder brother Vithalbhai. Prominent artists from Gujarat and Nandalal Bose from Shantiniketan adorned the place with their creations and paintings. A special, beautiful cottage with a grand view of the river and greenery around was made for the president of the Congress, Subhas Bose. Thousands of villagers visited the place. They were provided food at a tenth of a rupee."

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Resignation of Ministries, 1939: Sardar’s Opposition 

" ... Congress ministers set an example in plain living. They reduced their own salaries. They made themselves easily accessible to the common people. In a very short time, a very large number of ameliorative legislations were pushed through in an attempt to fulfil many of the promises made in the Congress election manifesto. 

"Emergency powers acquired by the provincial governments through the Public Safety Acts and the like were repealed. Bans on illegal political organizations such as the Hindustan Seva Dal and Youth Leagues and on political books and journals were lifted. All restrictions on the press were removed. Securities taken from newspapers and presses were refunded and pending prosecutions were withdrawn. The blacklisting of newspapers for purposes of government advertising was given up. Confiscated arms were returned and forfeited arms licenses were restored. In the Congress provinces, police powers were curbed and the reporting of public speeches and the shadowing of political workers by CID agents stopped."

" ... 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland (Soviet Union did so on 17 September 1939). In response, Britain declared war against Germany two days later—on 3 September 1939. On the same day, the Viceroy of India, Linlithgow, also announced that India, along with Britain, had joined the war (WW-II)."

" ... The Congress felt rebuffed and enraged. It also demonstrated that the British considered the Gandhian ‘threat’ as no threat. They knew that the Gandhian non-violence was an insurance against any real problem for the Raj."

" ... Patel and Gandhi were not in favour of non-cooperation with the British in the war, and of the ministries resigning. However, Under pressure from Nehru&Co, the Congress Ministries resigned in November 1939—a mega-blunder."

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Pearl Harbor (Dec-1941) & its Aftermath 

"Both the scale and the unexpectedness of the unprovoked attack profoundly shocked the Americans. The attack happened without a declaration of war by Japan or without explicit warning. 

"What was Japan’s rationale? Japan was planning attack in Southeast Asia against the overseas territories of the US, the UK, and the Netherlands. The attack was meant to deter the US from interfering in its plans. The Pearl Harbor attack was followed by Japanese attacks on the UK-held Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong, and the US-held Philippines, Guam and Wake Island."

" ... Congress Working Committee (CWC) meeting at the end of December 1941 at Bardoli in Gujarat recognised India could not be defended non-violently against a Japanese invasion. (—A profound realisation! As if against an invader other than Japan non-violent means would have worked!) At the persuasion of Rajaji, subject to the declaration of freedom for India, the CWC offered cooperation with the Allies. Gandhi did not oppose, but made it clear that he would not lead a Congress ready to join a war. In other words, the CWC yielded on non-violence."

" ... Japanese blitzkrieg triumphantly rolled through the Wake Island (then under the US), the Philippines (then under the US), Malaysia (then under the British), Indonesia, Singapore (then under the British), and then Burma (Myanmar, then under the British). Rangoon fell on 7 March 1942. With that, the attack on India seemed imminent."

"Cripps announced his proposals in the form of Draft Declaration on 30 March 1942:{BKM} 

"(1)Right away, India could have a national government composed of representatives of the leading political parties. 

"(2)Formation of a post-war Constituent Assembly whose members would be chosen by provincial legislatures or nominated by the princes.  

"(3)India to be granted full Dominion Status after the war, with the right of secession from the Commonwealth. 

"(4)Secession clause: Once India became a Dominion after the war, every province would have the right to secede and obtain a status equal to that of the Indian Dominion.{BKM} 

"Both Gandhi and Patel rejected the proposal, mainly on account of the secession clause. Rajaji, Nehru and Maulana Azad, however, desired continuance of talks with Cripps. Though Patel was of the opinion “no more mischievous scheme had been conceived” {RG/306} about the Cripps Plan, he didn’t mind continuance of talks, something Gandhi felt was pointless, and was annoyed about."

"Rather than considering the offer seriously and negotiating on the secession-clause; driven by hubris thanks to Japan’s military success, and over-confident they had an upper hand, and that the British were in dire need of their co-operation, they acted difficult and unreasonable. Had they made sensible negotiation on the secession-clause India could have got the self-government five years earlier, and there would perhaps have been no partition and Pakistan. Attlee had commented: “It was a great pity that eventually the Indians turned this down, as full self-government might have been ante-dated by some years.”"

" ... In short, among the main leaders responsible for the failure of the Cripps Mission was Nehru. Unsuccessful, Cripps left India on 12 April 1942. 

"Another view is that the Cripps Mission was forced on the British by the US to get the Indian cooperation during the war. Forced into it, Churchill and Viceroy Linlithgow deliberately introduced the secession clause to ensure the Mission was aborted. In any case the terms could have been better and reasonably negotiated by Nehru and Azad who were entrusted with the responsibility; because it was not as if India got better terms in 1947—the secession did happen!"

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Quit India Movement 1942 

"Gandhi sent Miss Madeleine Slade (Miraben) to the Viceroy to personally explain the resolution. Gandhi did not expect any immediate action from either side, or any confrontation. He wanted to use the resolution as a bargaining counter, and expected talks and negotiations. However, being war-time, and having noted the threat of Gandhi’s rebellion, the Viceroy was in no mood to play soft and patient. He refused an interview to Slade, and let it be known that the government would neither stand any rebellion, violent or non-violent, nor would it discuss with anyone who talks in such terms."

" ... The Raj had made elaborate plans for arrests. It promptly acted to nip “Quit India” in the bud by promptly arresting all the Congress leaders. The Congress organisation was outlawed. Gandhi and the AICC hadn’t anticipated such a strong and prompt reaction from the Raj. Why? Did they expect the Raj to be as laid back as they were? The Raj was better organized for crushing the revolt than Congress was for executing it—despite crushing the revolt being only one of the many responsibilities (governance, preparations for war, etc.) being shouldered by the Raj, while organising the revolt was the only responsibility of the Congress. It exposed the huge gulf in relative competence."

" ... Although a warship was kept ready at Bombay harbour to deport them all outside India, the Raj finally chose to confine them in India. Rajaji was not arrested as he had resigned from the Congress in July 1942, and had kept aloof from Quit India. Sardar Patel’s son and daughter, Dahyabhai and Maniben, were also jailed."

" ... Patel felt the steps taken by Gandhi were necessary, and not doing what he did might have meant gradual irrelevance of the Congress. 

"Yet, the inadequate preparation for the struggle by Gandhi rankled Patel. Also, he realised that Gandhian methods were too idealistic, and took excruciatingly long; and rather than surrendering to Gandhi’s instincts and methods, it might be wiser to be prudent and practical, and to independently evaluate the options, and, if necessary in the interest of the nation, even go against the Gandhian way."

" ... In November 1943, Maulana Azad, with Nehru’s concurrence, suggested a letter from the CWC to the Viceroy intimating suspension of the Movement in view of the Bengal Famine, and growing threats from Japan. PC Ghosh’s response to Azad-Nehru’s proposal was: “I would rather take potassium cyanide and advise all of you to do the same rather than agree to any such humiliating course of action.”"

" ... Kasturba had been ill for many months. She expired on 22 February 1944 on the Mahashivaratri day, aged 74. 

"The Raj, not wanting to take any chances, released Gandhi, who had been seriously ill, on 6 May 1944, about 10 weeks after Kasturba’s death."

" ... Patel remained adamant on “Quit India”. Said he: “Not a word of the Quit India resolution could be obliterated or altered. Indeed, if anything is to come next, it will be Quit Asia.” Responded Sarat Bose, thrilled with Sardar’s words: “The Sardar has always been a man of action. He has never been a coiner of phrases. True, he coined one phrase and that was Quit Asia.""

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April 24, 2022 - April 24, 2022. 

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{ 4 } Sardar & Run-up to Freedom, 1944-47 

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Sidelining of Gandhi & Emergence of Patel-Nehru 

"Sardar Patel had internally (although he was not explicit about it) realised that Gandhian methods had ultimately fetched little for India; and if he [Sardar Patel] had to contribute something worthwhile for the country in its critical hours after his release from jail in 1945, he had to ignore Gandhi and Gandhism, and chart out a course on his own. Without doubt, Sardar was far more capable a person, but by being subservient to Gandhi, his  vast potential had remained untapped. The British also found Patel to be a frank and forthright person capable of taking decisions, convincing others, and standing by those decisions. They therefore began doing business with Patel, ignoring Gandhi. 

"In response to Gandhi’s announcement in Calcutta on 9 August 1947 that he would spend the rest of his life in Pakistan, Mountbatten reported to London: 

"“This will infuriate Jinnah, but will be great relief to Congress for, as I have said before, his [Gandhi’s] influence is largely negative or even destructive.”{Tunz/236} 

"Gandhi had said in a prayer meeting on 1 April 1947: 

"“No one listens to me anymore. I am a small man. True, there was a time when mine was a big voice. Then everyone obeyed what I said; now neither the Congress nor the Hindus nor the Muslims listen to me... I am crying in the wilderness.”"

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Bose, INA Trials & Mutiny 

"It was claimed that Netaji Subhas had perished in a plane crash in Taipei. Sarat Chandra Bose, the elder brother of Netaji, had stated in 1947: “Subhash is alive and Jawaharlal knows it.” What is surprising is that neither Nehru, nor Patel nor Rajaji nor Gandhi or any other top Congress leader endeavoured to find out the facts on Netaji’s death, or made an effort to trace him! Why?"

"INA trials triggered unrest in the Indian armed forces. Mutiny broke out in the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) covering ships and shore establishments throughout India from Karachi to Bombay and from Vishakhapatnam to Calcutta. 

"Rebellion among the naval ratings in RIN (Royal Indian Navy) started at Bombay on 19 February 1946. Thrilled by the INA fight and trials, they wanted to contribute their strength towards India’s freedom. The insulting behaviour of the senior British military officers had also contributed to the disenchantment of the Indian military staff. The British commanding officer of the HMIS Talwar used to call his Indian men ‘black niggers’ and ‘coolie bastards’. The naval ratings took over HMIS Talwar and signal school, and hauled down the Union Jack. The NCSC (Naval Central Strike Committee) was set up, and several ships which were seized began flying the flags of the Congress and the Muslim League. The mutiny quickly spread to other ships, and over 7000 sailors joined in. Some of the warships seized threatened to fire at the British barracks, and at British community bastions on the seafront. On 21 February 1946 there was an exchange of fire between the loyal troops and the naval ratings on mutiny. At some places, Indian army men began ignoring orders from the British superiors. In Madras and Pune, the British garrisons had to face revolts.

"In the second half of February 1946 members of the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) went on a hunger strike for their grievances. RAIF personnel at Allahabad, Delhi, Karachi, Madras, and Pune also revolted. Another Army mutiny took place at Jabalpur during the last week of February 1946. It lasted about two weeks. It was suppressed by force. Later, many were court-martialled and sentenced. A number of them were dismissed.

" ... The mutineers began to receive significant militant support from the general public. By 19 February 1946 over 3,00,000 mill-workers  and dockers of the naval dockyard went on strike. ... "

"The British Commander-in-Chief Field Marshall Claude Auchinleck recorded: “It is no use shutting one’s eye to the fact that any Indian worth his salt is a nationalist… Wholesale defections and disintegration of the Indian Army was possible.”"

" ... Bose, INA, and the above mutinies contributed far more to gaining independence for India than the Gandhian movement of over three decades."

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Elections 1945-46 

" ... The Muslim League decidedly commanded the Muslim vote, except in NWFP, thanks to the Seemant Gandhi Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The Muslim League got all the 30 Muslim seats (100%) in the Central Assembly, and 427 of the 507 Muslim seats (84%) in the 11 provinces."

"In Sind, out of a total of 60, the Congress had won 22, and the Muslim League 27 seats. In Punjab, out of a total of 175, Muslim League won 75, Unionists 21, Congress 51, Sikhs 21, and independents 7. In Bengal, out of a total of 250, Muslim League won 115, Other Muslims 3, Congress 62, Other Hindu Parties and Scheduled Castes 31, Krishak Praja Party 5, Communists 3, Christians and Anglo-Indians 6, and Europeans 25."

"Azad, however, was involved in his own pointless exercise in Sind of aligning with the Muslim League to form a ministry, against the advice of Patel, and without the approval of the CWC. He undid the work of Patel; and ultimately it was the Muslim League which formed the ministry in a coalition that excluded the Congress.

"Similarly, Azad messed up both Punjab and Bengal. ... "

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Cabinet Mission, March 1946 

"Maulana Azad, the then President of the Congress, finding the proposed Groupings overall favoured the Muslims, wrote secretly to Viceroy Wavell, and to the Cabinet Mission, without consulting the CWC, on the possibility of bringing the Congress around on Groupings. He was also willing to have no Muslim representative from the Congress side in the government, as Jinnah had been demanding. Such acts of Azad were like stabs in the back. Gandhi was so hugely disturbed that he compelled Azad to resign."

"However, Patel was determined to thwart the Muslim League and Jinnah. He was determined he won’t let Jinnah walk away with the trophy. Given Gandhi’s hang-ups and muddle-headedness, and the confusion and uncertainty prevailing among the other members of the CWC, including Nehru, Rajaji, Kriplani, Azad, and others, Patel risked his all and took a private, personal initiative to negotiate the matter with the British."

" ... Patel manoeuvred to ensure the Congress was invited to form an interim government, so that the situation descending into a chaos could be controlled, and the Muslim League shown its place. When Jinnah realised he would be left out in the cold, he hurried to ensure the Muslim League too joined the Interim Government."

"At a press conference in Mumbai 3 days later on 10 July 1946, he declared that the Congress would be “completely unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they arise”{Azad/164}, and that “the central government was likely to be much stronger than what the Cabinet Mission envisaged.” 

"Nehru also emphasised that the Congress regarded itself free to change or modify the cabinet Mission Plan as it thought best. ... "

"Nehru’s indiscretion (remarks quoted above) put paid to the scheme of united India, precipitated Jinnah’s call for Pakistan, and resulted in the AIML’s ghastly Direct Action Day call for 16 August 1946 that led to the Calcutta Carnage, the Great Calcutta Killings— the worst communal riot instigated by the Muslim League, that left 5,000 to 10,000 dead, 15,000 injured, and about one lakh homeless! Maulana Azad called Nehru’s act “one of those unfortunate events which change the course of history.”{Azad/164}"

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Interim Government, Sep-1946 

"Nehru, who had since [most undemocratically] become the Congress President [thanks to Gandhi’s grossly unethical partiality], was invited by Viceroy Wavell on 12 August 1946 to form an Interim Government. It was formed on 2 September 1946. ... "

"Sardar Patel had prophetically remarked to Wavell as early as on 12 June 1946: “Jinnah would only use his position in the Interim Government for purely communal and disruptive purposes and to break up India”."

" ... The aim of the Muslim League, encouraged and aided by the British, was to achieve Pakistan by sabotaging the government from inside, and by Direct Action (riots), disorder, and chaos outside. They succeeded. Nehru, Patel, and other Congress Ministers realised it was not possible to run a government with the Muslim League, and the sooner they got rid of them the better. Perhaps the only way to do so was Partition and Pakistan, which is what the Muslim League and the British had conspired for."

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Patel’s New Home & Colleagues, Oct-1946 

V Shankar & HM Patel 

VP Menon 

"When Viceroy Wavell asked VP Menon his views on the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, he commented presciently: “Truth is always bitter. None of the recommendations of the Mission will be agreed to by Indian political leaders. A quarrelsome India is the secret purpose of the recommendations.”

"Vappala Pangunni (VP) Menon (1893–1965) was the Constitutional Adviser and Political Reforms Commissioner to the last three Viceroys during the British rule in India. He had an in-depth understanding of the British and Indian politics."

"VP Menon had frankly predicted to Mountbatten that neither the Congress nor the AIML would accept his May-1947. When that happened Mountbatten told VP Menon: “VP, you were right. I should have consulted you earlier. Now help me with a new draft.” Sitting there that night, VP Menon dictated to Mountbatten’s PA what became the British Parliament Resolution granting Dominion Status to India and Pakistan in 1947!{MKN} It was VP Menon’s scheme for partition and creation of the two dominions of India and Pakistan that was ultimately adopted, after modifications. 

"After independence, Menon was appointed secretary of the Ministry of the States headed by Sardar Patel. Menon impressed Patel with his political genius and work ethic, and became his trusted colleague, and a right-hand man. Menon played a major role both in negotiating the “Transfer of Power” from the British, and in the “Integration of the Princely States”. It was VP Menon who had drafted the “Instrument of Accession” and insisted upon the necessity of accession of the Princely States into India before the date of independence of 15 August 1947, and tactfully implemented it along with Sardar Patel.

"VP Menon had flown to Srinagar along with Sam Manekshaw and MC Mahajan (J&K Premier) on 25 October 1947{VPM1/273} to assess the situation in Kashmir; returned on 26 October 1947, and recommended immediate air-lifting of Indian troops to Srinagar to save Kashmir from Pakistan-backed raiders; and then flew to Jammu the same day and got the “Instrument of Accession” signed by Maharaja Hari Singh in India’s favour."

"For his unmatched contribution for the integration of the Indian Princely States that enhanced India’s geographical area by a whopping 40%, and for his critical positive role in the transfer of power from the British to India, VP Menon certainly deserved a Bharat Ratna. But, when Nehru and Indira (Rajiv too) refused to recognise even Sardar Patel for Bharat Ratna, and shamelessly pinned the award on themselves when they were the ones deciding upon the same as prime ministers, where was the question of recognising Sardar Patel’s deputy?"

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April 24, 2022 - April 25, 2022. 

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{ 5 } Patel, Partition & Pakistan, 1947 

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Freedom, Partition & Pakistan, 1947 

"To explore the possibility of averting partition, Gandhi had made the following proposal to Mountbatten on 1 April 1947: Dissolution of Interim Government then headed by Nehru. Inviting Jinnah to take over. Allowing Jinnah to form a cabinet of his choice. If Jinnah ran the government in India’s interest, the Congress would continue to cooperate with him, and not use its majority to thwart him. Who would decide if Jinnah was running the government in India’s interest? Not Congress or Gandhi, but Mountbatten! Further, Jinnah could continue to advocate Pakistan—but peacefully!! 

"Absurd proposal! But, that was Mahatma. Who gave authority to Gandhi to condemn the majority to the mercy of the minority, and the Muslim League. What were the credentials of Jinnah and the Muslim League that they could be entrusted with the fate of the majority? Why would Mountbatten decide whether or not Jinnah was running the government in India’s interest? Was Mountbatten an impartial observer? Didn’t he represent India’s tormentors of two centuries? Wasn’t Gandhi aware that Mountbatten was there to safeguard and advance the interests of Britain, and not of India? Even assuming Mountbatten was an impartial observer, was he competent to determine what really was in the interest of India? Even if he were both impartial and competent, how long was he to remain in India to act as a referee? What sort of self-respect was it if those “fighting” for India’s freedom were to depend upon a representative of the power from whom they were seeking freedom to act as a referee and adjudicate what was in India’s interest? Taken aback by Gandhi’s extraordinary proposal, Mountbatten sought Gandhi’s permission to discuss the proposal with Nehru and Maulana Azad in confidence. Gandhi agreed. Mountbatten didn’t include Patel with Nehru and Azad. He knew Patel would dismiss it as a fantastic nonsense.

"Gandhi repeated his proposal to Mountbatten the next day on 2 April 1947. Mountbatten told him he was interested in the proposal when Gandhi asked him specifically if he supported it. Gandhi advised Mountbatten he would try to persuade the Congress to accept it, and would tour India for support. 

"Shortly after the above meeting, Mountbatten met Maulana Azad, who not only expressed his approval for Gandhi’s proposal, but was enthusiastic about it, and encouraged Mountbatten to get Jinnah to accept it.  Maulana Azad generally used to be in favour of anything that gave more weightage and power to Muslims.

"Having favoured Nehru undemocratically—overriding the 80% support of the PCCs for Patel—with the post of PM, Gandhi had expected to bring Nehru to his side. Gandhi should have known that a person like Nehru who unabashedly demanded to be anointed PM most undemocratically—not a single PCC had voted in his favour—for the sake of power could not be expected to yield his position to Jinnah. Although Mountbatten deployed people to talk to Nehru to dissuade him from accepting Gandhi’s plan should he be so persuaded, the same was really not necessary. 

"Curiously, Mountbatten never discussed Gandhi’s plan with the person Gandhi wanted to hand over power to: Jinnah.  In a meeting, Mountbatten had only indirectly mentioned his wish of seeing Jinnah as PM, something about which Jinnah showed keen eagerness; but Mountbatten did not deliberate on the matter further. Gandhi & Co failed to appreciate the simple fact that Mountbatten was no do-gooder for India, he was HMG’s representative, and HMG had a vested interest in the partition of India. No wonder Mountbatten would have exerted his all to ensure Gandhi’s scheme never succeeded."

"On the evening of 10 April 1947. Nehru, Patel and many members of the CWC met Gandhi and told him they were opposed to his plan. Only Badshah Ghaffar Khan supported Gandhi. ... "

"Just over a month into his job, Mountbatten prepared a plan for Britain to quit India, and sent it to London with Ismay and Abell on 2 May 1947. ... "

" ... VP Menon had expressed his disapproval for the plan. Menon was against giving initial independence to the provinces or to their groups. A patriot, he had even stated that if the plan was accepted, he would resign. 

"Nehru’s reaction to the plan was fortunately negative. Nehru opined the plan would adversely affect Central Authority, provoke civil conflict and unrest, and would give a fillip to the Balkanisation of India, resulting in multiple Ulsters. Having assured London he would bring Nehru over to his side on the plan (What was the source of his confidence?), Mountbatten faced deep embarrassment. With his buoyancy punctured, Mountbatten desperately looked for a way out."

"Patel had stated to Sir Richard Stafford Cripps on 15 December 1946: 

"“If strong action had been taken or allowed to be taken, when Direct Action Day was fixed by the Muslim League, all this colossal loss of life and property and the blood-curling events would not have happened. The Viceroy took the contrary view and every action of his since the Great Calcutta Killing has been in the direction of encouraging the Muslim League and putting pressure on us towards appeasement.”"

"VP Menon had outlined to Patel in late December 1946 a scheme of partition, transfer of power and Dominion Status to which Patel had responded positively. Partition was to save India from civil war; while the  Dominion Status would ensure the British cooperation in smooth transfer of power, particularly with the military under their command.

"Concluding there would not be peace in united Punjab, and no place for them, Hindus and Sikhs demanded East Punjab. Seizing the opportunity, and as a rebuff to the League, Patel promptly agreed to the demand for partition of Punjab, and of Bengal, by implication. ... "

" ... Patel had firmed up his resolve to get as much territory for India as possible, and to totally frustrate Jinnah’s grand design of a large Pakistan with full Punjab, full Bengal and Assam—Jinnah ultimately got what he himself admitted: “moth-eaten Pakistan”.{RG3/248} Patel had also hoped that confronted with the crumbs of “truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan”, Jinnah might still desist from demanding partition. It was like catching the bull by the horns. 

"Patel got the above resolution passed also to checkmate Gandhi lest he came up with some harmful appeasement move, or a move of some ‘large-hearted’ surrender."

"Patel Refuses East-West Corridor to Jinnah, 30 May 1947 

"Unlike Nehru, Sardar Patel was very firm in his dealings. Writes Rajmohan Gandhi in his book ‘Patel–A Life’: “Returning from London on the night of May 30, Mountbatten, in his own words, ‘sent V.P.Menon to see Patel to obtain his agreement to six months joint control [with Pakistan] of Calcutta’, which is what Jinnah had been pressing for. The Viceroy recorded Patel’s reply: ‘Not even for six hours!’ Earlier...Jinnah had demanded an 800-mile ‘corridor’ to link  West and East Pakistan. Patel called the claim ‘such fantastic nonsense as not to be taken seriously’. It died a quick and unremembered death.”"

"Mountbatten and Nehru broadly agreed with Menon’s outline of the scheme, and asked him to prepare a draft plan. Knowing that without Patel’s backing the plan would be a non-starter, Menon sent an advance copy of the plan to Patel. Patel’s response was expectedly positive, for the plan had his pre-approval. On Nehru’s hang-ups on membership of the Commonwealth as a condition in the plan, Patel assured Nehru that he would take care that the plan was approved by the Congress, provided the other conditions were met. Patel knew the Commonwealth-condition was put to satisfy conservatives like Churchill, and obtain their approval for the passage of the Indian Independence Bill. All that Patel wanted assurance for was that the British parliament pass a bill to grant independence to India, and that the British actually quit  within two months; and importantly, while they let the paramountcy for the Indian Princely States lapse, they don’t interfere or take sides on their merger with India."

"Mountbatten wrote to his mother on 14 June 1947: “I must stress the importance of Patel in the agreements so far reached. He has a rough exterior and an uncompromising manner… he has never wavered and has stood firm against inner voices and neutral indecisions that have sometimes afflicted his colleagues. Patel’s realism has also been a big factor in the acceptance of the Dominion Status formula.”{ACJ/136/L-2430}"

Author might have added a short introduction here - his mother, Princess Victoria of Battenberg, was daughter of Princess Alice, daughter of Queen Victoria. Her first cousins included a king of England and the then deposed Kaiser Wilhelm, apart from other royals; She had lost two sisters due to Russian revolution, Alexandra and Elizabeth, both of whom had married into Romanov family who were their cousins. 

"Patel had himself admitted: “For several years, Gandhi and I were in perfect agreement. Mostly we agreed instinctively; but when the time for a big decision on the question of India’s independence came, we differed. I felt that we had to take independence there and then. We had, therefore, to agree to partition. I came to this conclusion after a great deal of heart-searching and with a great deal of sorrow. But I felt that if we did not accept partition, India would be split into many bits and completely ruined.”{ISS1} {NS/90}"

"Indeed, the Muslim League call for Pakistan and partition could only have been resisted if the Congress was prepared for a strong, sustained retaliatory violence, and a long drawn-out communal strife in cities, towns and villages. However, that was apparently beyond the Congress leadership brought up on Gandhian non-violence. The Congress leadership was incapable of American style civil war. If Netaji Subhas had been there, one could have thought about it.

"It is also worth noting that the Hindus and Sikhs of East Punjab and the Hindus of West Bengal had openly demanded partition. Gandhiji had himself admitted in his prayer meeting on 10 June 1947 that as “non-Muslim India is overwhelmingly in favour of partition”, he “could not coerce public opinion.”"

That this demand was an overwhelming response to the massacre perpetrated in Calcutta, ought to have been mentioned. 

"A senior leader who stood out against partition, and voted against the Pant resolution, was Purshottamdas Tandon. He stated he was prepared to suffer the British rule a little longer than pay the heavy price of partition. He claimed the Nehru government had been intimidated by the Muslim League. He got a huge applause when at the end of his speech he said: “Let us fight both the British and the [Muslim] League.”"

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Diabolical League–British Design 

"The British and the Muslim had started working in tandem to ensure partition and Pakistan, and to make as large a Pakistan as possible—as per the “16 May 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan” groupings, where Group-B (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Baluchistan), combined with Group-C (Assam and Bengal) could form Pakistan; leaving just Group-A (Madras, UP, Central provinces, Bombay, Bihar and Orissa) for India. 

"The achievement of the same required practical proof on the ground that Muslims and Hindus cannot live together, and that Muslims dominated those provinces. That required violence and riots—Jinnah and the Muslim League were willing to invest on that; and the British were willing to look the other way when that happens. Gandhians were for non-violence, and hence for non-retaliation. That suited both the adversaries—the Muslim League and the British—tremendously. The British, of course, had all along been highly grateful to Gandhi for his guiding political principle of non-violence, and had, in gratitude, helped elevate him to the status of ‘Mahatma’. 

"Ghaznafar Ali of the Muslim League had stated: “Mohammad Bin Qasim and Mahmud of Ghazni invaded India with armies composed of only a few thousands, and yet were able to overpower lakhs of Hindus. God willing, a few lakhs of Muslims will yet overwhelm crores of Hindus.”

"On one hand Jinnah had been arguing for and justifying Pakistan on the plea that Hindus and Muslims formed two nations, and that they couldn’t live together; while on the other hand he wanted the whole of Group-B (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Baluchistan) and Group-C (Assam and Bengal) provinces to form Pakistan; leaving just Group-A (Madras, UP, Central provinces, Bombay, Bihar and Orissa) for India. If Hindus and Muslims formed two nations, and they could not live together, as Jinnah argued, why would Hindu-majority Assam go to form Pakistan; and how were Hindus to live with Muslims in undivided Punjab and Bengal? 

"When Mountbatten brought up the issue of partition of Punjab and Bengal, Jinnah advanced the counter-logic that the Hindus of Punjab and Bengal were respectively first Punjabis and Bengalis rather than being Hindus or Congressis, and therefore the provinces could not be divided, and the whole of them should form Pakistan. Mountbatten promptly pointed out the contradictions in Jinnah’s argument, telling him that if his logic were to be accepted there could be no case for Pakistan too! “I am afraid I drove the old gentleman quite mad,” reported Mountbatten jovially, “because whichever was his argument went I always pursued it to a stage beyond which he did not wish it to go.”"

Post independence, the same intentions have been followed, via a two pronged policy deliberately employed - one, illegal migration, especially to Northeast, chiefly from East Bengal, with intentions to populate Assam and then separate it; two, ousting Hindu populations, from any neighborhood across India, wherever muslims number more than a certain percentage, by threats and enacted violence. 

And, of course, deliberately conducted policy of increasing population, in name of religion, while other populations of India control population and aim for education, prosperity and modernising, helps increase numbers, and demand in name of equal treatment while accusing anyone pointing at facts of communal bent helps a fraudulent propaganda of anti-muslim treatment to India in general that cannot be corrected as long as non-muslims exist.

"Jinnah and Muslim League’s diabolical design behind the Calcutta riots was to somehow make Calcutta a Muslim-majority city, and ensure its inclusion in Pakistan. The idea was to force exodus of Hindus out of Calcutta, trigger counter-riots against Muslims in Bihar, and thus force migration of Muslims out of Bihar, and into Calcutta, increasing its Muslim population. 

"The riots spread to Bihar, UP, Punjab and NWFP. It all suited Jinnah: Hindus and Muslims can’t live together; Pakistan must be granted. The British didn’t bother much to quell the riots. They watched bemused—happy to let the world know what would happen without them. Further, the British had a vested interest in the creation of Pakistan; and they were delighted the ground was being readied for the purpose. 

"Law and order was a provincial matter, and Bengal was under the majority control of the Muslim League, which, rather than quelling riots, was instigating it. Sardar Patel as Home Minister in the Interim Government asked for central takeover of the areas, but the demand was rejected by Viceroy Wavell. Patel wrote to Viceroy Wavell on 25 October 1946: “It would indeed be a tragic paradox if we who have undertaken the responsibility of the Government of India should be powerless to do anything to terminate the reign of terror.”

"The British were blatantly favouring the Muslim League over the Congress. This became further obvious when Viceroy Wavell, who remained blind to the riots in Calcutta and Noakhali in Bengal, promptly sent his Deputy Private Secretary Ian Scott on a mission to enquire into the riots in Bihar, where the Provincial Government was under the Congress. Significantly, Jinnah issued a press-statement on 26 November 1946 in the context of the Bihar riots asking for “Transfer of Population”: transfer of Muslims out of Bihar. Ian Scott conveniently suggested Bengal as the location of the Muslim evacuee camps. The Muslim League and the British administration were working in tandem to ensure Bengal became Pakistan!

"Both the British and the Muslim League wanted the riots and chaos to spread across Bengal, Assam, Punjab, Sind, NWFP, and other areas. More the chaos and riots, more the justification for partition and Pakistan. When Patel insisted with Viceroy Wavell for enforcement of Martial Law in disturbed areas, Wavell refused saying it was not necessary! 

"When the question of partition of Bengal and Punjab rose, Jinnah pleaded with Mountbatten “not to destroy the unity of Bengal and Punjab, which had national characteristics in common: common history, common ways of life, common language, and where Hindus have stronger feelings as Bengalis or Punjabis than they have as members of the Congress.” In saying so, Jinnah apparently missed the irony that his logic also went against the logic of Pakistan!

"Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (1892–1963), the then premier of Bengal, who had been responsible for the Calcutta Killings of 1946, was desperate to avoid any partition of Bengal, for he had ambition to head Group-C, Bengal plus Assam, as a separate nation. He had the backing of the British Governor, and had also secured the backing of the Congress Leaders, Sarat Chandra Bose and Kiran Shankar Ray, who desired an undivided Bengal. Kiran Shankar Ray was from East Bengal, and was leader of the Congress in the Bengal Legislative Assembly. Suhrawardy even proceeded to threaten those who supported division, and stated that “Calcutta will be sacked and burnt in case the partition idea is favoured.”

"Given such a situation, Dr Shyama Prasad Mookerjee and KC Neogy beseeched Sardar Patel: “…all our eyes are turned towards you in the hope that you will not fail to take whatever action is possible to save Bengal and Calcutta from utter ruin and bloodshed.”

"Patel responded: “Bengal cannot be isolated from the Indian Union. Talk of the idea of a sovereign republic of independent Bengal is a trap to induce the unwary and unwise to enter into the parlour of the Muslim League. The Congress Working Committee is fully aware of the situation in Bengal. Bengal has got to be partitioned if the non-Muslim population is to survive.”{DD2/43} 

"Patel thereafter wrote to both Sarat Chandra Bose and Kiran Shankar Ray. It had the desired effect. Jinnah, rattled by the Congress demand for partition of Bengal and Punjab, called it a “sinister move actuated by spite and bitterness.”"

Here's the explanation of the absurd propaganda going on for decades, maligning Nehru and Patel, arguing that they insisted on partition for sake of power; as also the absurd argument repeated over and over, that Punjab cares for its other half, not for Bengal. 

"With indescribable atrocities against Hindus in East Bengal going unabated, the GoI made an appeal to Pakistan to call a halt on the same. But, there was little response. 

"It is worth noting in this connection that Gandhian non-violent principles yielded NOTHING. ... "

Slightly incorrect - it was repeatedly used to shame Hindus every which way, while muslim killers were supposed to be loved, honored, and handed over everything they demanded or took, from millions of extra square miles west of Ganga to millions more of lives of Hindus, because Gandhi said so. 

" ... It was only tit-for-tat that brought Pakistan to the negotiating table. 

"In Rajlakshmi Debi’s Bangla novel Kamal-lata, quoted by Tathagata Roy in his book ‘My People, Uprooted: A Saga of the Hindus of Eastern Bengal’ (Chapter 6), there is a conversation described between a Hindu from Mymensingh town and a Muslim from a Calcutta suburb sometime just after partition. In the process of haggling the Muslim says “Excuse me, but your position and ours are not the same. So long as Mahatma Gandhi is alive we have no fears. But you won’t be able to live here [East Bengal] much longer.”

To a reader not familiar with those names, it's confusing to see those names, belong as they do to major characters of Sharat Chandra Chatterjee's Srikant series. 

"There was a marked difference between Punjab and Bengal in respect of the partition. In Punjab, the carnage was on both sides, East Punjab and West Punjab, although more in the Muslim-dominated West Punjab. In Bengal, the mayhem was mostly in the Muslim-dominated East Bengal. In Punjab, the migration was both ways: Muslims migrating from East Punjab in India to Pakistan, and Hindus migrating from Pakistan to East Punjab in India. In a way, there was a population transfer between West Punjab and East Punjab. In Bengal, the predominant migration was that of Hindus from East Bengal/Pakistan to West Bengal/India. There was a reverse migration of Muslims too, but comparatively far less. 

"However, the continued violence against the Hindus in East Bengal had begun provoking retaliation in West Bengal. For example, the anti-Muslim riots in Howrah turned serious from 26 March 1950 onwards, leading to the beginning of migration of Muslims from West Bengal to East Bengal by March 1950. That is, the population transfer that had happened in Punjab in 1947-48 began to happen in Bengal belatedly by March 1950. It is this which alarmed Pakistan and the Muslim League leaders, who had hitherto been inciting the mobs in East Bengal, and were happy at Hindus being at the receiving end.

"It was only when the anti-Muslim riots in Howrah, in retaliation of the on-going carnage in East Bengal, took a serious turn from 26 March 1950 onwards that the Pakistan PM Liaquat Ali made his first conciliatory gesture in a speech at Karachi on 29 March 1950, and expressed his intention to travel to New Delhi on 2 April 1950 to work out a solution with Nehru. 

"Liaquat Ali  hurried to New Delhi on 2 April 1950, and signed the Nehru–Liaquat Pact, also called the Delhi Pact, on 8 April 1950. It provided for safety of refugees when they returned to dispose of their property; return of abducted women and looted property; derecognition of  forced conversions; complete and equal right of citizenship and security of life and properties to minorities; and setting up of Minority Commission in each country.

"As expected, while India firmly implemented the Pact, not Pakistan. While the anti-Muslim violence in West Bengal was put down with a firm hand, and the migration of Muslims from West Bengal to East Bengal ceased; the violence against the Hindus in East Bengal continued unabated, so also the migration of Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal. That is, the carnage became only one-sided: that of Hindus in East Bengal. Also, the migration became only one way: Pakistan to India.

"Looking to the track-record of the Muslim League leaders, who had themselves been inciting the mobs, Nehru should have known what the result of the pact would be. Sardar Patel was unhappy with the Pact, but being in the cabinet, didn’t oppose it. However, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee and KC Niyogee, the two central ministers from West Bengal, immediately resigned from the Union Cabinet in protest against the Pact. 

"Rather than facilitating transfer of population between West and East Bengal, and removing forever the problem and the poison, Nehru extracted the following “benefits” for India from the Nehru-Liaquat pact: (1)Checked depletion of Muslim population from West Bengal and Assam by stopping their migration to Pakistan. (2)Increased the population of Muslims in West Bengal and Assam by allowing their reverse migration—allowing Muslims to return who had migrated. (3)Allowed fresh migration of Muslims from East Bengal. (5)Condemned the Hindus in East Bengal (a)to violence, (b)to second-class status, and (c)to remain at the mercy of Muslims. (6)Forced subsequent migration of Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal (as the atrocities did not subside in Pakistan)."

"The Muslim League unleashed Calcutta-type Direct Action in several cities in Punjab. Riots started. Markets in Lahore and Amritsar were set ablaze. League-provoked mobs of several thousand equipped with guns, and led by demobilised (after the World War-II) Muslim soldiers, attacked defenceless Hindus and Sikhs in cities, towns and villages, particularly in West Punjab, and perpetrated unspeakable atrocities on men, women and children. Thousands were killed. Significantly, while little action was taken against the Muslim mobs, and the Muslim League agitators, who had been spreading chaos and indulging in riots, rapes, killings and mayhem for over a month, the police fired upon the Hindu-Sikh mobs demonstrating in protest. 

"Patel’s appeal to Viceroy Wavell to act against the rioters fell on deaf ears. Even though Patel was the Home Minister, he lacked jurisdiction to act in Punjab or Bengal, as the law and order was a state subject. 

"Eventually, Sikhs and Hindus also formed their private armies for self-defence. Mountbatten soon had a taste of Patel’s forthrightness when he told him what he had earlier told Wavell, and was deliberately ignored: “If you will not act yourself, then turn over the full authority to the Central Government and let us stop the Muslim League war in Punjab and the NWFP; let us stop the Muslim League army being mobilised in Bengal to attack Assam; let us govern.”"

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Patel & the Partition of Assets 

:The Partition Council held a number of meetings till 15 August 1947 to divide the assets. However, the work was so massive it continued till December 1947. 

"Despite Sardar Patel’s other critical engagements, particularly related to integration of the Princely States, and massive work relating to law and order and refugees, he was a regular at each meeting, and kept a hawk’s eye on its working and decisions. The reports of the Partition Council, including those of its expert committees, fill thirteen volumes!"

"The Pakistan side was much impressed by Patel, his positive attitude, and his decisiveness. At the concluding session of the Partition Council, Abdur Rab Nishtar voiced his admiration for the constructive approach and statesmanship of Patel, and went to the extent of saying that the Pakistani Ministers would continue to look upon him as their elder brother!"

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55 crores to Pakistan: Patel vs. Nehru-Gandhi 

"India and Pakistan had agreed in November 1947 that Rupees 55 crores remained to be transferred to Pakistan, as its share of the assets of undivided India. 

"However, at the insistence of Patel, India informed Pakistan, within two hours of the agreement, that the actual implementation of the agreement would hinge on a settlement on Kashmir. Said Patel: “In the division of assets we treated Pakistan generously. But we cannot tolerate even a pie being spent for making bullets to be shot at us. The settlement of assets is like a consent decree. The decree will be executed when all the outstanding points are satisfactorily settled.”"

" ... Dr Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, NV Gadgil and Dr BR Ambedkar backed Patel. Nehru too expressed his total agreement. The Cabinet therefore decided to  withhold the money. Patel told in a Press Conference on 12 January 1948 that the issue of 55 crores could not be dissociated from the other related issues.{RG/462} 

"Gandhi conveyed to Patel the next day (13 January 1948) that withholding 55 crores from Pakistan was what Mountbatten had opined to him as “a dishonourable act… unstatesman-like and unwise”{RG/462}, and what he [Gandhi] thought was immoral. Patel was furious and asked of Mountbatten: “How can you as a constitutional Governor-General do this behind my back? Do you know the facts?...”{RG/462} 

"Gandhi was apparently innocent of the fact that Mountbatten and the British were bent upon favouring Pakistan—even on Kashmir, despite Pakistan’s aggression. How could a top leader be so blind to the realities? Unfortunately, Nehru, rather than supporting Patel, and sticking to what he had himself fully agreed to, and had got passed in the Cabinet, went back on his commitment, and commented to Gandhi: “Yes, it was passed but we don’t have a case. It is legal quibbling.”"

"Gandhi and Nehru, rather than being prudent about what was in the best interest of the nation, went by what the British colonial representative Mountbatten, having his own axe to grind, had to say, and the Cabinet decision was reversed to let Pakistan have the money, and trouble India further in J&K!  

"Why didn’t Gandhi and Mountbatten consider the immorality of Pakistan in attacking Kashmir which had already acceded to India? If Pakistan had agreed to desist from its illegal action in Kashmir, it would have got the money anyway. And for Nehru, kowtowing to Mountbatten and Gandhi was a priority, rather than standing up for the Cabinet decision, of which he was a part. People like Sardar Patel were out of place in such a scenario."

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April 24, 2022 - April 25, 2022. 

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{ 6 } How India was Deprived of the Best First PM 

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" ... Patel’s achievements were far in excess of Nehru’s, and all Congress persons and the country knew it. 

"Sardar was far better academically, and much more intelligent than Nehru. Like Nehru, Sardar Patel too had studied in England. But, while Nehru’s father financed all his education, Sardar financed his own education in England, through his own earnings! While Nehru could manage to scrape through in only a poor lower second-division in England, Sardar Patel topped in the first division!"

"The Congress Working Committee (CWC) met on 29 April 1946 to consider the nominations sent by the PCCs. 12 of the 15 (80%) PCCs nominated Sardar Patel{RG/370}; and 3 PCCs out of the 15 (20%) did not nominate anyone. It therefore turned out to be a non-contest. Sardar Patel was the only choice, and an undisputed choice, with not a single opposition. 

"What was noteworthy was that on 20 April 1946, that is, nine days before the last date of nominations of 29 April 1946, Gandhi had indicated his preference for Nehru. Yet, not a single PCC nominated Nehru!"

" ... Gandhi prodded Kriplani to convince a few CWC members to propose Nehru’s name for the party president. Kriplani promptly and unquestioningly complied: He got a few to propose Nehru’s name. Finding this queer development, Sardar Patel enquired with Gandhi, and sought his advice. Gandhi counselled him to withdraw his name. Patel complied promptly, and didn’t raise any question. That cleared the way for Nehru. The “democratic” Nehru didn’t feel embarrassed at this blatant hijacking of the election."

" ... What Gandhi and Nehru manoeuvred was not only illegal,  immoral and unethical, but also against the interest of the nation.Here are the reasons for the same: 

"(1) Illegality-1: PCCs alone were authorised to elect the president. There was nothing in the Congress constitution to permit that rule to be overturned. How could Gandhi overrule what 15 PCCs had recommended? On what legal basis? Gandhi’s action was totally illegal. 

"(2) Illegality-2: Gandhi had resigned from the primary membership of the Congress back in 1934 to devote himself to “constructive work” (Were political work and fighting for freedom “destructive”?). Thereafter, he had never rejoined the Congress. How could a non-member of the Congress like Gandhi dictate who should be the president of the Congress, or even participate in CWC meetings? 

"(3) Unreasonable-1: Did Gandhi put on record his reasons for overruling the recommendations of the PCCs? No. 

"(4) Unreasonable-2: Did Gandhi put on record why Patel was not suitable as the president, and hence the first PM, and why Nehru was a better choice? No. 

"(5) Unreasonable-3: Was there a proper, detailed, and threadbare discussion in the CWC on why Patel was not suited for the post, and therefore why the recommendations of the PCCs should be ignored? No. 

"(6) Unreasonable-4: If CWC was not convinced of the recommendations of the PCCs, why didn’t it refer back the matter to the PCCs, and ask them to re-submit their recommendations, with detailed reasoning? The decision could have been postponed. 

"(7) Against National Interest-1: How could responsibility of such critical nature be assigned to a person without doubly ensuring that person’s relative suitability through fair and democratic discussions among all CWC members, and, of course, finally through voting. 

"(8) Against National Interest-2: National interests demanded that the choice of person was dictated not by personal biases, and diktats, but by suitability, and mutual consensus, and the reasons should have been put on record. 

"(9) Dictatorial & Undemocratic-1: How could an individual like Gandhi dictate who should or should not be the president, and hence the first PM? And, if that was fine for the Congress, then why the sham of elections, and votes of the PCCs? 

"(10) Dictatorial & Undemocratic-2: What kind of freedom “fighters” we had in the Gandhian Congress that they didn’t even assert their freedom within the CWC, or show their guts against the slavery of Gandhi, and voice their opinions? Was an individual Gandhi correct, and were the 15 PCCs wrong? 

"(11) Unethical-1: Leave apart the legal and other aspects, was it ethical and moral and truthful for Gandhi to do what he did? If indeed he thought he was correct, and all others were wrong, the least that was expected from him was to explain his logic and reasoning. Or, was he above all that? Do what you want—no questions asked! 

"(12) Unethical-2: How could a person being nominated for president, and therefore as the first Indian PM, be so devoid of integrity, fair-play and ethics as to blatantly be a party to the  illegality of  throwing the recommendations of the PCCs into a dustbin,  and allowing oneself to be nominated? 

"(13) Unembarrassed: Did it not embarrass Nehru that he was usurping a position undemocratically through blatantly unfair means? Did it behove a future PM? 

"(14) Blunder: Overall, it was a blot on the working of the CWC, and on the CWC members, and particularly Gandhi and Nehru, that they could so brazenly and irresponsibly commit such a blunder, which ultimately cost the nation heavy."

Author quotes various other leaders of Congress of the time, from Kriplani to Maulana Azad, about how this was not good for India, and how, if they'd not seen it then, they regretted it later. 

He goes on to quote more. 

"This is what Rajaji, who had then been pro-Nehru, had to say two decades after the death of Patel in Swarajya of 27.11.1971:  

"“When the independence of India was coming close upon us and Gandhiji was the silent master of our affairs, he had come to the decision that Jawaharlal, who among all the Congress leaders was the most familiar with foreign affairs [although the Nehruvian years proved Nehru had made a mess of the foreign policy and external security], should be the Prime Minister of India, although he knew Vallabhbhai would be the best administrator among them all… Undoubtedly it would have been better… if Nehru had been asked to be the Foreign Minister and Patel made the Prime Minister. I too fell into the error of believing that Jawaharlal was the more enlightened person of the two... A myth had grown about Patel that he would be harsh towards Muslims. That was a wrong notion but it was the prevailing prejudice.”

"Rajaji took over from Mountbatten as the Governor-General (GG) of India on 21 June 1948. When Nehru had suggested Rajaji’s name as the GG, Rajaji had, in fact, written to Nehru that he (Nehru) should himself take over as the Governor-General (GG), and make Sardar Patel the Prime Minister. However, Nehru, vide his letter of 21 May 1948 to Rajaji, had politely turned down the suggestion: “Please forgive me for the delay in answering your telegram No.26-S dated 12th May 1948 in which you suggested that I [Nehru] might be GG [Governor General]. Any suggestion from you is worthy of thought, but I am afraid the present one is completely impracticable from various points of view…”

"Jayaprakash Narayan(JP) stated in 1972: “Rajaji once unburdened his heart by publicly confessing to a wrong he had done to Sardar Patel. I find myself in a similar situation: the dominant feeling within me today is one of self-reproach, because during his lifetime, I was not merely a critic, but an opponent of the Great Sardar.”

"The same JP, a socialist, used to be in Nehru’s camp. After independence the socialists had been plotting to unseat Patel from his post as Home Minister. JP had commented : “A man of 74 [Sardar Patel] has the department of which even a man of 30 would find it difficult to bear the burden.” Mridula Sarabhai, who was close to Nehru, had launched a whisper campaign for Sardar’s resignation. It is difficult to believe that the campaigns of both JP and Mridula did not have the blessings of Nehru, both being close to him."

"Wrote Stanley Wolpert: 

"“The Sardar, as Congress’s strongman was called, was determined to stay and solve whatever problems remained, rather than running away from them. He had long viewed Nehru as a weak sister and often wondered why Gandhi thought so highly of him.”{Wolp2/377-8} 

"Wrote Minoo Masani in his book ‘Against the Tide’: 

"“My own understanding is that if Sardar Patel had been Prime Minister during that time and not Nehru, India would have gone further and faster.”"

"Gandhi had remarked: "Jawaharlal cannot be replaced today whilst the charge is being taken from the British. He, a Harrow boy, a Cambridge graduate, and a barrister, is wanted to carry on the negotiations with the Englishmen."{RG/370} {RG5/545} 

"But, what were the facts? Who was more competent to negotiate with the British? Nehru or Patel? Subsequent history showed that the critical negotiations and discussions with the British, and the decisions that affected the nation, were principally taken by Patel, and not Nehru—Nehru being too timid, confused, and indecisive."

Which amounted to the Harrow and Cambridge weighing in negatively, having prepared him not as a leader f an independent nation with great living tradition of cultural treasure of antiquity,  but as a subservient admirer of taller prefects who was mounded to despise that treasure. 

"Gandhi had once written of Nehru: “He [Nehru] is a friend of the English people. Indeed, he is more English than Indian in his thought and make-up. He is often more at home with Englishmen than with his own countrymen.” Gandhi had also commented about Nehru: “He is the only Englishman we have!” Less said about this remark the better—Did Gandhi think Englishmen were the only competent people?" 

In fact, both Subhash Chandra Bose and Sardar Patel were better equipped to deal with European and western, even oriental, non Indians, as evident by the respect they earned. 

"Another reasoning attributed to Gandhi’s preference was that he felt Nehru was better known abroad and could help India play a role in the international affairs.{RG/370} But, if that were the reason, he could have been made foreign minister under Sardar. It is another matter that Nehru made a mess of the foreign policy, as obvious from the adverse results of his policies post-independence. In fact, Sardar's views were far more realistic on foreign policy matters, and he would have done a much better job of it. ... "

" ... Reportedly, Gandhi’s reason was he wanted both Nehru and Patel together to lead the nation, but while Nehru would not work under Sardar Patel, he knew that in the national interest he could persuade Sardar Patel to work under Nehru, as Sardar would not defy him. ... "

" ... Acharya Kriplani had remarked that Gandhi’s reasons for preferring Jawaharlal “were personal rather than political”{RG2/L-3142}. 

"Gandhi had called Jawaharlal his “spiritual son”. How Jawaharlal managed to become the “spiritual son” of Gandhi is a mystery. ... "

Not if one has seen the very revealing "Gandhi, My Father". He'd lost a living first son, about the same age as Jawaharlal Nehru, by stopping him from every advantage possible to a son of another man of similar background, including education, independent business, share In inheritance, all for sake of his own image. It was only natural that he gave undue preferences to a much coddled son of a far more successful and sophisticated Father, Motilal Nehru. This way he'd pushed the senior Nehru back into a forgotten corner, and promise of a future for the son was why the man who financed congress kept mum. 

"It was not the first time Gandhi had been unfair to Patel—twice before he had unjustly promoted Nehru over Patel for the post of Congress president, first in 1929 and then in 1937. 

"Jawaharlal Nehru was given a leg up on Sardar Patel in 1929, his case being even more undeserving at the time. Sardar Patel had led the Bardoli Satyagraha of 1928 whose resounding success had made him a national hero, and had earned him the title Sardar. ... Nehru lacked such credentials. He didn’t have any significant practical achievements to his credit—he was more of a talker. ... "

"Netaji Subhas Bose had subsequently written: “The general feeling in Congress circles was that the honour should go to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.”

"Subsequent to Patel’s Bardoli win, Motilal wrote to Gandhi on 11 July 1928: “I am quite clear that the hero of the hour is Vallabhbhai, and the least we can do is to offer him the crown [make him President of the Congress]. Failing him, I think that under all the circumstances Jawahar would be the best choice.”{DD/128} 

"Motilal actively canvassed for Jawaharlal with Gandhi, and Gandhi ultimately succumbed to the pressure, saying Sardar Patel would anyway be with him. Nepotism and “fight” for freedom went together: Nehrus from Motilal downwards ensured their family was well taken care of; and that it came first, ahead of the nation! In the long run, the nation paid heavily for Motilal’s brazen nepotism, and Gandhi’s unwise step, and indefensible indiscretion."

" ... When Gandhi announced his preference for Jawaharlal, the general body of Congressmen, especially the senior leaders who felt they had been superseded, were astonished. For one thing, it was considered odd that a son should succeed his father [Motilal] to the Congress throne, and for another there was regret that Sardar Patel’s outstanding services had been overlooked. Having learnt from private inquiries  that Gandhi had succumbed to pressure from Motilal, I sought Gandhi’s version. The Mahatma pointed out that Motilal had repeated with greater emphasis the argument put forth in his letter of July 1928 that Jawaharlal represented youth and dynamism… It is certain that Gandhi’s decision marked a turning point in the history of modern India…”"

Author quotes S. Nijaligappa on the topic of nehrus promoting within family, beginning 1929 Congress president position being handed from father to son. 

"Congress presidentship used to be for one year, and rarely was anyone given two terms. However, Jawaharlal was granted a second consecutive term in 1930, thanks to Gandhi! And, Jawaharlal became president again in 1936 and 1937. In sharp contrast, Sardar Patel became Congress President only once in 1931, even though his contribution to building up the Congress organisation was the highest."

This would be an appropriate place to remind the reader  of Gandhi pushing out Subhash Chandra Bose, who was elected president second time running, by making statements, declining yo cooperate, and after he resigned, having congress bar him from contesting again, even at state level. 

"What Gandhi did in 1946 should not have come as a surprise to Patel. The bias of Gandhi was clear since 1929. Sardar Patel should have factored in Gandhi’s unjust bias and favouritism, and devised his own strategy. Patel should not have given-in to Gandhi’s undemocratic whims. Not because of personal ambition, but for the sake of the nation. Sardar knew well the weaknesses of Nehru, and his unsuitability as the PM. He knew Nehru was capable of huge blunders, as he had amply demonstrated in practice. He knew that giving power and PM post to Nehru was putting the nation to grave risk. Yet, he meekly caved-in. That was not Sardar-like. He should have shown his iron then."

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April 25, 2022 - April 25, 2022. 

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{ 7 } Sardar & the Integration of the Princely States 

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Princely States: An Overview 

" ... Under the terms of the paramountcy the troops of the British Army were permanently stationed within their territories, and their maintenance was heavily subsidised by the Princely States! That is, the Princely States paid the British for keeping the Princely States under the British military control!! ... "

Nazis did the same to France and most of Europe, but not as long as British did to India. 

" ... Such terms led to disbandment of the soldiers of the Princely States, depriving them of their hereditary livelihood, spreading unemployment, poverty and misery. ... " 

 Just as it was done to any other caste whose business could be outsourced by British to Manchester et al. 

"There were 562 such Princely States. The largest of these was J&K—Jammu & Kashmir—followed by Hyderabad, each of which was almost as big as the mainland Britain. 

"327 or 58% of these 562 Princely States were very small states, with an average area of about 20 square miles, average population of about 3000, and average annual revenue of about 22,000 rupees. 222 or about 40% of the 562 states, covering an area of about 22,000 square miles, were in just one region in Saurashtra in Gujarat state—Kathiawar, a peninsular region bounded on the north by the wetland of the Rann of Kutch, on the northwest by the Gulf of Kutch, on the west and south by the Arabian Sea, and on the southeast and east by the Gulf of Khambhat. There were 27 princely states in Orissa and 14 in Chhattisgarh, the biggest being Mayurbhanj and Bastar respectively. 

"Roughly a quarter of the total had the status of a ‘salute state’. Salute state was one whose ruler was honoured by receiving 9 to 21 gun salutes, depending upon its status, on ceremonial occasions. Rulers entitled to 11 gun salutes and above received the style of Highness. Being the ‘Faithful Ally of the British Empire’ (a title bestowed on him by the Raj for being most dog-like), the Nizam of Hyderabad was honoured with an exalted style by the British: ‘Exalted Highness’. The premier 21-gun salute states were Hyderabad and Jammu & Kashmir."

" ... The British Resident could always have his way—if he so chose."

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Dividing India into Hundreds of Pieces 

" ... The seeds of that (British + Muslims) were sown through the Act of 1892. The same was actively promoted by the Governor General and the Viceroy of India Lord Curzon from 1899 to 1905 (division of Bengal), and after him by Lord Minto (foundation of the Muslim League) between 1905 and 1910. 

"Among other major divisions manipulated by the British were (a)attempt to unhinge the untouchables or dalits from the Hindu mainstream; and (b)promotion of   the Aryan-Dravidian fiction to divide the North from South, and give impetus to the Christian Missionaries for proselytization leveraging on the false propaganda."

" ... Their culture, it was claimed on the basis of zealous research on the part of a Christian missionary, were distinct and apart; Tamil was an older language than Sanskrit and its literature far richer.”"

"562 independent States! That would have meant ominous prospects of civil wars, military takeovers, and total chaos—more terrible than what happened during the partition! 

"That may well have been the objective of the British. Else, why could they not have so arranged that the Princely States too had to either go to India or to Pakistan depending upon their contiguity and other factors. The Paramountcy could have been inherited by the succeeding dominions. But, British wanted it to lapse, and create difficulties for India. They wanted India to remain divided into as many parts as possible. In fact, Sir Conrad Corfield, the pro-princes and anti-India head of the powerful Political Department of British-India, had lobbied in London and had left no stones unturned to ensure that the “lapse of paramountcy” was incorporated in The Indian Independence Act 1947, so that the Princely States had the third option—that of independence."

" ... Jinnah lapped it up for several reasons: 

"(1)He wanted as many pieces of India as possible. 

"(2)Not many states were contiguous with Pakistan to have joined it, so it didn’t affect Pakistan as much as it affected India. Ultimately 548 States joined India, while only 14 States went to Pakistan. 

"(3)Thanks to “Lapse of Paramountcy”, and the option to the States to join India or Pakistan or remain independent, Jinnah could play his games of expanding Pakistan or contracting India. He tried to grab Kashmir; he schemed to let Hyderabad remain independent; he tried his level best to get several Rajasthan states and Bhopal to come over to his side."

"The transfer of paramountcy to India would have meant India honouring the provisions of those treaties, including non-interference in the internal affairs of the states, that were totally unsuited to a democratic nation. Implementation of uniform and democratic policies across the nation would have met with severe confrontation with the princely states who were inclined to continue their exploitive, autocratic rule. It would have also resulted in the massively complex task of managing relationships with 562 states!"

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How Sardar Patel Turned the Tables 

"Sir Stafford Cripps had estimated it would take India 10 to 15 years, if not more, to liquidate the Indian Princely States and merge them with India. It was a surprise to all, and a tribute to the Sardar’s abilities, that he took, not 10 to 15 years, but less than 10 to 15 months to merge all the 548 Princely States with India, extending India’s geographical area by a whopping 40%."

"The Hindu-Muslim majority considerations as they applied to British India did not apply to the Princely States, because the British policy on the Princely States as per the ‘Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy’ of 12 May 1946, which forms the constitutional and legal base, only talked of reverting of power back to the Princely States from the British. Therefore, what rajas or maharajas did with their states was their own business. In fact, even Jinnah had categorically stated that his plans for Pakistan—on the basis of Muslim majority areas—did not extend to the Princely States. What is more, Sheikh Abdullah had ridiculed Jinnah that his Pakistan halted at the customs barrier between British India and J&K!"

"Although the efforts for accession of the Princely States had been going on earlier too; between 25 July 1947 and 15 August 1947 there were mere 20 days; and Sardar Patel had assumed charge of the States department only on 5 July 1947; yet, thanks to an effective mix of techniques—persuasion, call to patriotism, privy purses, titles, palaces, arm-twisting, threats—used by Sardar Patel, ably assisted by VP Menon, all of the 548 States, except 3, acceded to India by 15 August 1947, and the rest 3 later."

"This is what Alex Von Tunzelmann says in Indian Summer: 

"“...Whatever may be said about Mountbatten’s tactics or the machinations of Patel, their achievement remains remarkable. Between them, and in less than a year, it may be argued that these two men achieved a larger India, more closely integrated, than had 90 years of British raj, 180 years of the Mughal Empire, or 130 years of Asoka and the Maurya rulers.{Tunz/226} 

"“...He [Sardar Patel] was impervious to Mountbatten’s famous charm, describing the new Viceroy as ‘a toy for Jawaharlalji to play with—while we arrange the revolution’... {Tunz/169} 

"“...For Patel’s part, he realised immediately that Mountbatten, with his own semi-royal status and personal friendship with many of the princes, was uniquely suited to help India achieve its aim of leaving no state behind.”"

"Wrote Karan Singh, son of Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K:  “...As far as the Sardar is concerned, he achieved a task the like of which had never before been attempted in world history. He succeeded in integrating over 500 Indian states and principalities into a united India with the consent and cooperation of the princes themselves, except in the cases of Hyderabad and Junagadh. The peaceful transition from feudalism to democracy laid the solid foundation of Indian unity, and this is an achievement for which the entire nation, regardless of party affiliation, will remain eternally indebted to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, rightly called the Iron Man of India.”"

"Not even Samrat Ashoka in the 2nd century BCE, or Emperor Chandragupta Maurya in the 3rd century BCE ‘Golden Age of India’, or Akbar in the 15th century CE could integrate the whole of India into one nation with one central authority as did the Sardar within so short a time. 

"By ceding Pakistan, India lost an area of about 3,65,000 square miles and a population of about 82 million. By the integration of the Princely States, India gained an area of nearly 5,00,000 square miles and a population of about 90 million."

"It can be unhesitatingly said that the most important factor that has contributed to the stability of India has been the integration of the Princely States; and that without Sardar the score would not have been 548 out of 548—there would have been several States less, and they would have, like Kashmir, created huge problems."

"Non-settlement of the Kashmir issue by Nehru has caused India such a huge permanent headache through the decades. Imagine the situation if Nehru had a free hand in creating several more Kashmirs and Pakistans! Travancore, Hyderabad, Bhopal, Junagadh, Border States of Rajasthan, and several more were already on their way to becoming a Pakistan or a Kashmir!!   With several countries around, and in-between, India would have had a tough time taking care of its defence. 

"This is what Mountbatten conveyed to Patel on 19 June 1948, just prior to his departure from India: 

"“There is no doubt that by far the most important achievement of the present government is the unification of the [Princely] States into the Dominion of India. Had you [Patel] failed in this, the results would have been disastrous. But since you succeeded, no one can see the disastrous results that have been avoided. I feel no one has given you adequate recognition of the miracle which you and your faithful VP [VP Menon] have produced. Nothing has so added to the prestige of the present Government than the brilliant policy you have followed with the States.”"

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Sardar, Junagadh and the Crazy Nawab 

"The area of Junagadh state was about 3,337 square miles. It is to the south-west of Kathiawar. Its neighbours were all Indian States, and to its south and south-west is the Arabian Sea. Junagadh had no geographical contiguity with Pakistan. Its distance by sea, from Port Veraval to Karachi, is about 300 miles. Its railways and posts and telegraphs were an integral part of the British India; and were administered by the Government of India. Out of its population of about 6.7 lacs, 82% were Hindu. The people of the state desired merger with India. 

"Its provisional government, Arzi Hakumat, headed by Samaldas Gandhi, also desired the same. However, the Nawab of Junagadh signed the Instrument of Accession in favour of Pakistan on 15 August 1947. He was aided by his diwan, Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto—father of the late prime minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—who was close to Jinnah. The Dewan of Junagadh, Abdul Kadir Mohammed Hussain, had invited Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, a Muslim League politician of Karachi, to come to Junagadh and join the State Council of Ministers in early 1947. When the Dewan went abroad for medical treatment, Sir Shah Nawaz took over. 

"The accession was kept a closely guarded secret by Pakistan. Jinnah had reckoned that if sufficient time passed before the matter became known, India would accept the accession as a fait accompli. There were only some rumours; and India made an enquiry with the Pakistan High Commissioner to India in the matter. There was no response. A reminder on 6 September 1947 also elicited no response. It was only on 13 September 1947—about a month after the accession—that India was informed that Pakistan had accepted Junagadh’s accession and had also signed the Standstill Agreement."

"The British too knew of the accession earlier, but had kept quiet. Mountbatten promptly recognised Junagadh as Pakistani territory, and advised so to the King in his report. He even stated in his report: 

"“My chief concern as Governor-General was to prevent the Government of India from committing itself on the Junagadh issue to an act of war against what was now Pakistan territory.”(BK2/119} 

"Mountbatten revealed: “Pakistan is in no position even to declare war, since I happen to know that their military commanders [British, at the top level, at that time] have put it to them in writing that a declaration of war with India can only end in the inevitable and ultimate defeat of Pakistan.”{BK2/120} 

"Pakistan was the British creation in their own selfish strategic interest to control the middle-east oil, and they certainly did not want Pakistan to disappear before taking roots. 

"Mountbatten was least concerned that Junagadh, a Hindu-majority state, had acceded to Pakistan. In sharp contrast, he was much concerned that J&K had acceded to India, and played all his dirty games to ensure that the accession became disputed by fooling the gullible Nehru. After Junagadh had acceded to Pakistan Mountbatten wanted to make sure India did not use its armed forces to occupy Junagadh. He played his tricks on Nehru and Gandhi to ensure the same."

"Nehru, the PM, remained silent! Jinnah had correctly assessed that an ever indecisive and vacillating Nehru would only indulge in his usual “international situation and international reaction” high-talk, but would, again as usual, soft-pedal the whole matter in order to avoid taking any decision or action. As for Lord Mountbatten, the cunning Jinnah knew Mountbatten would not allow India to take any precipitate action. All that Jinnah wanted was that there should be no physical action from India’s side. Gandhi, being a pacifist, and more concerned about his “Mahatma” label and its associated brand of “non-violence”, never considered appropriate action to gain back Junagadh. Given Nehru-Gandhi inaction, only Sardar Patel could have been the rescuer. 

"“He [Sardar Patel] rejected Nehru’s soft-pedalling in the suggestion that ‘it would be desirable for us to send a message to the British Government about the Junagadh affair’ with a polite comment: ‘I am not quite sure whether we need say anything to the British Government at this stage.’ Patel was not willing to let India revert to the pre-Independence years and allow the British to play their earlier partisan role which was pro-Muslim and pro-Jinnah.”"

"All of Mountbatten’s diversionary tactics failed to work on Sardar Patel. Mountbatten tried his options one after the other, as each failed. He counselled Patel on one premise after another: Adverse world opinion! Needless war! War when so many urgent tasks demanded attention! Why not refer the matter to the UNO? If at all necessary, use only the Central Reserve Police, not the Indian Army! 

"Sardar Patel rejected all of Mountbatten’s options and suggestions, and went in for military operations to settle the issue once and for all. That required guts—something that Nehru and Gandhi lacked. Patel did not let the matter linger, like in cases of Kashmir or Hyderabad.  Patel tactfully kept Mountbatten in the dark, and moved troops before Mountbatten came to know. 

"Kathiawar Defence Force, a newly created command of Indian troops, was first deployed in the territory adjoining Junagadh, and then occupied Babariawad and Mangrol, which Junagadh had claimed as its territory. 

"Sardar planned and executed the Junagadh operation so well that the Nawab of Junagadh fled to Pakistan on 26 October 1947 leaving the state to Shahnawaz Bhutto, who, facing collapse of the administration, invited India on 7 November 1947 to intervene, and left for Pakistan on 8 November 1947. The Indian army moved in on 9 November 1947, and Sardar Patel arrived to a grand reception on the Diwali day of 13 November 1947."

"Sardar was really a Sardar—he lived up to his title! Without Sardar, one does not know what other Kashmir-like states or additional Pakistans would have been created—especially, if Mountbatten and Nehru had a free run. If Sardar Patel had not taken the action that he did in Junagadh, and allowed the status quo—its accession to Pakistan on 15 August 1947—to continue, India would have faced difficult situation in Hyderabad. Indeed Kasim Rizvi, the leader of Hyderabad’s Razakar, had questioned: “Why is the Sardar thundering about Hyderabad when he cannot control even little Junagadh?”"

"The Nawab fled with his dogs, emptying the treasury of cash and valuables. Leonard Mosley recounts in ‘The Last Days of the British Raj’: “The Nawab had already fled to Pakistan in his private plane. He crammed aboard as many of his dogs as he could, plus his four wives. One of them discovered, at the last moment, that she had left her child behind in the palace and asked the Nawab to wait while she fetched her. The moment she left the airfield, the Nawab loaded in two more dogs and took off without his wife...”"

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Hyderabad: How Sardar Prevented Pakistan-II 

" ... Nizam allied himself with Hyder Ali of Mysore in 1767. Their joint forces were defeated by the British in 1768, and Hyderabad State again came under the paramountcy of the British. In 1799 the Nizam helped East India Company defeat Tipu Sultan. Nizam Mir Usman Ali Khan, the seventh Nizam, ruled the State at the time of Independence. He was granted the title ‘Faithful Ally of the British Government’."

"At the time of Independence, Hyderabad was a premier State, with an area of about 2,14,000 square kilometres, population of 16 million, and an annual revenue of 26 crores. It had its own coinage, paper currency and stamps. 85% of its population of 1.6 crores was Hindu. However, the Police, the Army, and the Civil Services were almost completely the preserve of the Muslims. Even in its Legislative Assembly set up in 1946 the Muslims were in majority, despite forming a mere 15% of the population. 

"There is  a gulf of difference between AP[Andhra Pradesh] of today and the Hyderabad State of that time. The old Hyderabad State comprised Telangana, four current Kannada districts in the Gulberga division, and four Maharashtra districts in the Aurangabad division. Upon linguistic reorganisation in 1956, while the Telangana region of the old Hyderabad State remained in Andhra, the other districts went to Maharashtra and Karnataka. Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema belonging to the Madras Presidency were added to AP. Hyderabad city is part of Telangana."

"A fanatical Muslim organisation, Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, headed by one Kasim Razvi had been fomenting trouble. They came to be known as the Razakars. At the instance of Kasim Razvi, Nizam appointed Mir Laik Ali as Prime Minister and president of his Executive Council. Laik Ali was a Hyderabadi businessman, who had also been a representative of Pakistan at the UN till September 1947. With this the Hyderabad Government came virtually under Razvi. 

"Razvi met Sardar and Menon in Delhi to tell that Hyderabad would never surrender its independence, and that Hindus were happy under Nizam; but if India insisted on a plebiscite, it is the sword which would decide the final result. Razvi further told Sardar Patel, “We shall fight and die to the last men,” to which Patel responded, “How can I stop you from committing suicide?”

"In his speeches in March 1948 and later, Kasim Razvi exhorted the Muslims “to march forward with Koran in one hand and a sword in the other to hound out the enemy.” He declared that “the 45 million Muslims in India would be our fifth columnists in any showdown”{BK2/138}. 

"Razvi challenged that “if the Indian Union attempted to enter Hyderabad, it would find nothing but the bones and ashes of 15 million Hindus residing in the State.”{BK/408}. 

"He boasted on 12 April 1948 that “the day is not far off when the waves of bay of Bengal would be washing the feet of our Sovereign”{BK/409}; and that he would “hoist the Asaf Jahi flag on the Red Fort in India.” Razakars continued their criminal anti-Hindu activities.{BK/409} 

"At the suggestion of his British and Muslim advisers, the Nizam had planned out several ways to strengthen his position: acquiring port facilities at Goa from Portugal; getting approval for a rail-corridor from Hyderabad to Goa; taking mine-leases in mineral-rich Bastar; readying more air-fields; acquiring  weapons; recruiting more Muslims in the army; recruiting British soldiers; getting Muslims from other states to move into Hyderabad state; converting Dalits to Islam; unleashing militia comprising local Muslims, Pathans and Arabs to intimidate non-Muslims; scaring away Hindus out of Hyderabad state; and so on. 

"Mir Laik Ali had bluffed and boasted: “If the Union Government takes any action against Hyderabad, a hundred thousand men are ready to join our army. We also have a hundred bombers in Saudi Arabia ready to bomb Bombay.”"

"Soon after the announcement of the 3-June-1947 Plan or the Mountbatten Plan of the partition of India, Nizam declared on 12 June 1947 that he would neither join India nor Pakistan, but would remain independent. He wanted to secure the Dominion Status for his State from the British, like the one proposed for partitioned India and Pakistan, although the same was not allowed for any Princely State.

"After much haggling, Sir Walter Monckton, Constitutional Advisor to Nizam, suggested to Mountbatten that Hyderabad could offer a treaty to India surrendering Defence, External Affairs and Communications as required in the Instrument of Accession, but would not sign the Instrument of Accession. Interestingly, Monckton was a friend of Mountbatten, and it was Mountbatten who had secured Monckton’s services for the Nizam to negotiate with India.{BK/399} The British, Mountbatten and Monckton were indeed working in co-ordination to fool India, and get independent or autonomous status for Hyderabad—by talking about ‘association’ rather than ‘accession’ with India—so that it remained under the British influence and control.

"Sardar Patel rejected the above proposal point blank, for it would have affected the position with the other States, who were ready to sign the Instrument of Accession. Sardar also told that if it was not acceptable to Nizam, referendum should be held and the mandate of the people should be treated as final. Mountbatten accordingly advised Nizam of the offer of holding referendum supervised by the British officials. This Nizam rejected."

"Like their pro-Pakistan attitude, many in the Press in Britain and many prominent British leaders were pro-Hyderabad and anti-India. Hyderabad had been their most faithful ally, and they wanted it to be independent and pro-Britain. They did not care if it was a cancer right in the heart of India and had predominant Hindu population of over 85%. Their stand and support, and that of Pakistan, emboldened the Razakars and the Nizam. 

"While Mountbatten and the British had nothing to say on the grossly unethical, illegal and even barbarous acts of Pakistan in J&K, and of states like Hyderabad; it is significant that Mountbatten, thanks to the elevated position accorded to him by Nehru and Gandhi, was liberal in his moral lectures to India, and wanted India “to adopt ethical and correct behaviour towards Hyderabad, and to act in such a way as could be defended before the bar of world opinion.”{BK2/129} However, moral lectures to Pakistan were out of his ambit. Pakistan or Muslims could behave or misbehave however they chose: that’s how not just the British, but even the great, liberal Mahatmas and seculars—Gandhi and Nehru—indulged them."

"Nehru never showed similar indulgence towards the Maharaja of Kashmir. Indeed, he was unreasonably hostile to the Maharaja of Kashmir, unnecessarily friendly and brotherly towards Sheikh Abdullah; but indulgent towards the Nizam under whose regime the innocent Hindus were being terrorised by the Razakars and Muslim militias."

"Mountbatten, also Chairman of the Defence Committee, had recorded: 

"“Pandit Nehru said openly at the meeting, and subsequently assured me privately, that he would not allow any orders to be given for operations to start unless there really was an event, such as a wholesale massacre of Hindus within the State, which would patently justify, in the eyes of the world, action by the Government of India.”"

But there was! Did it have to be 100%?

"What would the world think? What Mountbatten thought? What about his own image? These seemed to weigh more with Nehru. Why couldn’t he also think the opposite: that the world would consider India a sissy and a fool to ignore its own national interests. But, apparently Nehru found arguments for only those courses of action where he didn’t have to act! Or, where he could avoid decisions and difficulties.

" ... DN Panigrahi writes in ‘Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West’: 

"“Even more sensational disclosures were made by Nehru. Based on intelligence reports, it was mentioned that one William Barton, formerly of the Indian Civil Service, went to Lisbon on behalf of the Nizam of Hyderabad to enter into a treaty with Portugal for the use of Goa as a port in case of need. ‘We are informed,’ Nehru continued, ‘that the British Secret Service men have been loaned to Hyderabad government. They are working in the London office of the Pakistan Embassy...’”"

"By October 1947 Sardar Patel had got sick of negotiations with the Nizam’s representatives, and wanted to break off the negotiations. However, Mountbatten pleaded for more time. Why? The British didn’t wish to displease their faithful ally. Patel was not the only person deciding. There were Gandhi, Nehru, Mountbatten and others. Despite Sardar’s objections, a Standstill (status quo) Agreement was signed between India and Hyderabad in November 1947 for a year. In the subsequent months, Hyderabad loaned rupees twenty crores to Pakistan, placed orders for arms elsewhere, and stepped up its nefarious, anti-Hindu activities through Razakars."

"Multiple delegations had discussed numerous proposals with Hyderabad, all to no avail. Mountbatten too tried, but failed. Finally, his tenure over, he left India on 21 June 1948. But, before leaving, he tried once more to get very favourable terms for the Nizam by getting Sardar Patel to sign a document as a farewell gift to him. Sardar signed knowing the stubborn Nizam would reject those terms. And, Nizam did reject the document! The moment that happened Sardar declared that thenceforth Hyderabad would be treated on par with other states, and not as a special state. 

"KM Munshi recalled that a day after Mountbatten had left he had called up Patel, who had responded cheerfully: “Well Munshi, how are you? Is everything all right? What about your Nizam?” KM Munshi was then the Agent-General of India in Hyderabad State. When Munshi asked Patel about a query he had received on behalf of the Nizam on the “Mountbatten Settlement”, Patel shot back, laughing: 

"“Tell him [Nizam] that the Settlement has gone to England. The terms and the talks which Lord Mountbatten had have gone with him. Now the settlement with the Nizam will have to be on the lines of settlements with the other states.”

"One JV Joshi, in his letter of resignation from the Nizam’s Executive Council, wrote that law and order had completely broken down in many districts and that the Nizam’s Police—comprising almost exclusively of Muslims—was colluding with the Razakars in loot, arson and murder of Hindus, and molestation and rape of their females. He stated having himself witnessed such scenes and even scenes where Brahmins were killed and their eyes gouged out. It was estimated that besides the Hyderabad State forces of over 40,000, there were about 2,00,000 Razakars with small arms, and a number of Pathans lately imported. It became morally difficult for India to remain a mute witness to the mayhem, that turned worse by August 1948."

"Wrote MKK Nayar: “Indian Army’s C-in-C was an Englishman named Bucher and the Southern Command was headed by Lieutenant General Rajendra Singhji. Patel knew that Nehru would not agree to military intervention, but anyway sent an instruction through V P Menon to Rajendra Singhji to be ready to act if the need arose. Major General Chaudhry commanded the First Armored Division which was stationed in the South and Rajendra Singhji decided to keep it ready for war.”"

" ... “Patel believed that the army should be sent to put an end to the Nizam’s highhandedness. At about that time, the Nizam sent an emissary to Pakistan and transferred a large sum of money from his Government’s account in London to Pakistan. At a cabinet meeting, Patel described these happenings and advised that the army may be sent to end the terror-regime in Hyderabad. Nehru who was usually calm, peaceful and good mannered, lost his self-control and said, ‘You are a total communalist and I shall not accept your advice.’ Patel remained unfazed and left the room with his papers. He stopped attending cabinet meetings and even speaking with Nehru after that.”"

"Nehru was so opposed to the use of force against Hyderabad that after Patel got the same approved by the cabinet Nehru called his cabinet colleague Dr Shyama Prasad Mukherjee and remonstrated with him for supporting Patel on the issue, and warned him [being a Bengali] that India’s action would lead to retaliation by Pakistan, which was likely to invade West Bengal, and bomb Calcutta. Unexpected by Nehru, Mukherjee nonchalantly responded that the people of Bengal and Calcutta had enough patriotism to suffer and sacrifice for the national cause, and would be overjoyed when they learn that General JN Chaudhuri, a Bengali, had conquered Hyderabad!"

"Jinnah died two days before—on 11 September 1948. In view of the same, the British C-in-C General Bucher had requested for postponement of the operations, but Patel had overruled him: British were looking for ways to save and support Hyderabad. General Bucher had even rung up early morning at 3am HM Patel and others on the D-day of 13 September 1948 to have the operations cancelled or postponed. General Bucher had even contacted his Pakistani counterpart on the Hyderabad action, against the code of secrecy, as detailed by MKK Nair in his book ‘The Story of an Era Told Without Ill-will’:

"“V P Menon returned to his office after the meeting and quickly planned things to do next. The Commander in-Chief of Pakistan was also an Englishman who nursed feelings of enmity for Indian leaders. When Bucher took over from General Lockhart as Commander in-Chief, he had sworn allegiance to India in God’s name. Soon after Bucher heard from V P Menon, he instructed Rajendra Singh who in turn asked General Chaudhry to begin military action at three next morning. At seven that evening, Bucher contacted Karachi and spoke with his counterpart there. The conversation was in French.  Next morning at ten, V P Menon walked into Bucher’s room. Assuming that he had come for details of the Hyderabad action, Bucher brought him up to date with its progress. VP then said, ‘I know all that. I have come for something else. Did you speak with Pakistan’s Commander in-Chief yesterday evening?’ Hearing this, Bucher’s face went pale.  ‘VP, are you saying that we friends cannot speak with each other?’  ‘Was that a friendly conversation?’  ‘Do you doubt it?’  ‘Why did you speak in French?’  ‘Have you started tapping telephones?’  “Shouldn’t we if circumstance warrant? Was it really a friendly chat?’  ‘Of course!’  V P Menon took out a document and gave to Bucher. It was the transcript of the previous evening’s conversation and an English translation which read:  Bucher: Attack on Hyderabad begins tonight. Will not last many days. If you have to do anything, do it right away.  Pakistan C-in-C: Thanks. Shall inform Liaqat Ali. Jinnah is on his deathbed.  Bucher: After I do my duty, I shall be in your hands.’ Bucher who had pretended to be offended by telephone-tapping was sweating now. He looked sorrowfully at V P Menon and said, ‘What should I do, VP? I have made a mistake. I am sorry.’ V P Menon asked him, ‘Did you not swear allegiance to India in the name of God, with your hand on the Bible?’ Bucher: ‘VP, please save me. I am willing to atone for what I have done. Don’t humiliate me. Help me for our old friendship.’ V P Menon obtained a letter from Bucher that read, ‘I resign on personal and health grounds. Please accept it immediately’ and left. General Cariappa was then given charge of the Indian Army.”"

"Sardar Patel had fixed the zero hour for the Army to move into Hyderabad twice, and twice he had to postpone it under intense political pressure from Nehru and Rajaji [C.R.]. When the zero hour was fixed the third time by Patel, again it was sought to be cancelled in response to the appeal of the Nizam to Rajaji. Nehru and Rajaji instead directed VP Menon and HM Patel to draft suitable reply to Nizam on his appeal. Nehru and Rajaji didn’t realise that the Nizam was all along buying time to strengthen himself, and not to reach any amicable settlement. By then Sardar had had enough of Hamlet Nehru. 

"While the reply to Nizam was being readied, Sardar Patel, summarily announced that the Army had already moved in, and nothing could be done to halt it. This he did after taking the Defence Minister, Baldev Singh, into confidence!{DD/285} 

"The operations commenced on 13 September 1948, and after about four days of operations lasting 108 hours{VPM1/256}, the Hyderabad Army surrendered, with Major-General El Edroos, commander of the Hyderabad Army, asking his troops to yield; and Major-General JN Chaudhuri entered Hyderabad city on 18 September 1948, taking charge as Military Governor. His administration continued till December 1949. Kasim Razvi was arrested on 19 September 1948."

"Wrote MKK Nayar: “The Indian Army set out on fourteenth of August and reached the outskirts of Hyderabad on sixteenth morning. The Nizam’s commander advised him to surrender. The Nizam was an escapist and he was also not averse to sacrificing others to save himself. He secretly contacted Munshi in Delhi and agreed to sign the Instrument of Accession. He had quickly come to this decision because of some sad tidings from Karachi. Jinnah had died and the news had stunned Ali and Razvi who were leading the bloodshed in Hyderabad. Razvi had in fact disappeared.  Within a few hours of receiving Nizam’s message in Delhi, V P Menon flew into Hyderabad. He was not satisfied with obtaining a mere signature of the Nizam on the Agreement. He made him issue a proclamation declaring unconditional surrender to the Indian Government. VP also secured from Nizam an authorization to his London banker to transfer to the Government of India the money in his account there. VP oversaw the establishment of military rule in Hyderabad under General Chaudhry and went back to Delhi.”"

"Nizam’s Come-Down - Nizam had not only appealed to the President of the USA to intervene; but had also sent a delegation to the UN Security Council to present his case. He finally withdrew his case from the UN on 23 September 1948. On 23 November 1949, the Nizam issued a firman accepting the Constitution of India that was being framed then."

"Post Liberation, the Nizam personally received Sardar Patel at the airport when he visited Hyderabad. True to his nature of never walking over his fallen enemies, Sardar Patel was most courteous with the Nizam. That won the Nizam over, and both remained good friends thereafter. The Nizam subsequently wrote to Sardar: “Your great personality is a valuable asset to India at this critical period when the whole world is in turmoil.” The Nizam wrote to Sardar several times enquiring about his health."

"On his visit to Hyderabad in October 1950, addressing a public rally at Fateh Maidan, Patel said: 

"“…We are prepared to forget and forgive, but if anyone wishes to be a martyr and gets his name registered in God’s book as such, how can we help it?... I do wish to say to the Muslims that they are equals, that they have equal rights as Indian citizens, and that they are entitled to live in peace and in complete protection of the law and the Government. At the same time, every Indian citizen, whether he is a Hindu or a Muslim, will have to behave as an Indian, feel as an Indian and act as an Indian, and sooner he realises this the better. Some think that Pakistan is a place of pilgrimage for them. If they really believe that is so, it is their duty to leave without delay. We shall place no difficulty in their path… Such a departure would be in the interests not only of the man who feels this way, but also in the interests of the Muslims of India.”"

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April 25, 2022 - April 25, 2022. 

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{ 8 } Kashmir, Sardar & Botch-up by Nehru 

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J&K Problem thanks to Nehru usurping Patel’s Role 

"As described in detail in earlier chapters, the matter of Princely States was under the States Ministry, which was under the charge of Sardar Patel. Patel had ably dealt with the complexity of over 500 Princely States. As such J&K should also have been left to Patel. However, Nehru intervened and interfered, and without formally consulting Sardar Patel, or, as a matter of courtesy, informing him, sought to take the matter of J&K away from the States Ministry under Sardar, and decided to handle it himself. 

"Without the concurrence of Sardar, and without even the courtesy of informing him, Nehru appointed N Gopalaswami Ayyangar as a Cabinet Minister without portfolio to assist him (Nehru) in handling Kashmir. It was this Gopalaswami who had very badly messed up India’s case in the UN later."

"Nehru wrote a long note to Gandhi on 6 January 1948 seeking his arbitration for his differences with Patel. Gandhi referred the letter to Patel. Patel responded to Gandhi: 

"“I have tried my best to appreciate what he [Nehru] says on the subject [Hindu-Muslim relations], but howsoever much I have tried to understand it on the twin basis of democracy and Cabinet responsibility, I have found myself unable to agree with his conception of the Prime Minister’s duties and functions. That conception, if accepted, would raise the Prime Minister to the position of a virtual dictator, for he claims ‘full freedom to act when and how he chooses’. This in my opinion is wholly opposed to democratic and Cabinet system of government. The Prime Minister’s position, according to my conception, is certainly pre-eminent; he is first among equals. However, he has no overriding powers over his colleagues; if he had any, a Cabinet and Cabinet responsibility would be superfluous…”"

"It would have been good for India had Patel not given way to sentimentality upon Gandhi’s death, and fought out Nehru to its logical end: that is, he should have marshalled all his forces, unseated Nehru, saved India from the depths to which Nehru had ultimately condemned it to, and taken India towards the heights like only he could have."

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Nehru’s Blunders, ignoring Sardar’s Sane Advice 

"The J&K issue got stretched and complicated thanks to the vested interests of the UK. In fact, both the Partition and the J&K imbroglio are interlinked.  

"The West wanted to check the expansionist ambitions of communist Russia and China towards the Middle-East and the Indian Ocean. Also, the largest oil reserves happened to be in the Middle-East, and therefore the Middle-East had to be secured for the UK, and the West.  How to do that? The regions adjoining Russia and China had to be under their influence: that is, northern India bordering Russia and J&K.

"The British found to their dismay that the Indian leaders, with their socialist and pro-Soviet bend, were unlikely to cooperate with Britain on foreign policy, military matters, cold war against the communists and in securing Middle-East oil.  

"The Muslim League, on the other hand, gladly ticked the dhobi-list of the British requirements. In fact, if Jinnah had not been co-operative, the British would have picked up some other Muslim leader and made a Jinnah of him. The British military establishment had become a strong proponent of Pakistan, and of J&K as part of Pakistan, on account of its promise of cooperation in the military matters. Once the British establishment firmed up that their national and foreign policy interests were best served by having the regions that  ultimately formed West-Pakistan and J&K under their influence, they became even more rabidly pro-Muslim League, pro-Pakistan, and in favour of J&K going to Pakistan."

"During the initial period of independence, the Commander-in-Chiefs of both the Indian and the Pakistani Army were British—Lockhart, followed by Bucher for India; and Messervey, followed by Gracey for Pakistan—with another British, Sir Claude Auchinleck, as the Supreme Commander, to whom the chiefs of the army, the air force and the navy of both India and Pakistan reported. There were also many British officers in both the armies: many more in the Pakistani Army, than the Indian, as the British were mostly pro-Pakistan and anti-India."

That explains, more than anything else, the "tribals" drama, pretending it wasn't Pakistan attacking Kashmir, all the while it being soldiers dressed in salwar instead of uniform - a stunt repeated in 1965 and in Kargil by Pakistan. 

"The role of Mountbatten in the integration of the three states that created problems—Junagadh, Hyderabad and J&K—was dubious. Where the British interests were not affected—in respect of the other Princely States—he did try to help India. But, where the British interests clashed with the Indian interests, he helped the British interests. 

"Mountbatten attempted to refer both the Junagadh and the Hyderabad cases to the UN. Fortunately, they were firmly rejected by Sardar Patel. British did all that was possible to prevent Indian army action in Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir.

"Mountbatten visited Kashmir between June 18 and June 23, 1947 and reportedly lobbied with Maharaja Hari Singh to accede to Pakistan. He even assured the Maharaja that India would not take it otherwise if he did so{VPM1/271}—blatantly advancing the British and the Pakistani interests to the detriment of India! Why was such a person made the first Governor General of free India? Why was Nehru so sold out on Mountbatten? ... "

" ... Mountbatten ensured that as governor-general he did not remain just a titular head. He manipulated to get himself appointed as head of the Defence Committee of India ensuring that C-in-C of both the Indian and the Pakistani Army and the Supreme Commander, Auchinleck, reported to him. In that capacity, Mountbatten  secretively co-ordinated with the transitional British Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army; had private strategy sessions with the transitional British C-in-C of the Indian Army, without the knowledge of the Indian leaders; and manipulated to the extent feasible, decisions and actions in the direction the British Government wanted. 

"Sarila points out: “Another factor that distinctly influenced the situation was Nehru’s offer to Mountbatten to chair the Defence Committee of the Indian Cabinet. It was this committee and not the Indian Cabinet as a whole that made decisions on Kashmir war policy. This power gave the governor-general enormous power to influence the course of fighting.”{Sar/357} 

"Nehru, by allowing the critical decisions on Kashmir to be taken by the Defence Committee headed/chaired by Mountbatten between August 1947 to June 1948, rather than by the Cabinet (which was the right and legitimate forum), allowed the matters to be controlled by the British and Mountbatten, having their own vested interests, that were in conflict with those of India. Ultimately, through these machinations, the clever British managed to dupe India into referring the J&K affair to the UN."

"Writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48’:  

"“The role of Mountbatten and the British service chiefs made it virtually impossible for India to meet this requirement [of secrecy and surprise of military operations in J&K] in 1947-48. Not only were brakes applied on plans to strike at the invaders at their bases across the border but the British government was kept informed at every stage and was thus enabled to take diplomatic steps to close India’s military options.”"

"Height of the matter was that General Cariappa, who lead successful operations in Kashmir, including ‘Operation Kipper’ and ‘Operation Vijay’, in order to succeed, had to not only fight the enemy headed by the British Army Chief for Pakistan, Messervey, but had to keep his own British Army Chief for India, Roy Bucher, in the dark, lest he leak or abort the plans."

"Earlier, “the decision that arms should be supplied to Kashmir [in early October 1947] on top-priority basis was simply derailed by the [British] Commander-in-Chief [of India], General Lockhart, acting in collusion with Field Marshal Auchinleck.”{DG/42} 

"Nehru discovered that India’s British Commander-in-Chief had known of Pakistani-led tribal invasion of Kashmir in advance, but had withheld that vital information from India. He had to subsequently resign.{DG/133} 

"Writes Dasgupta: “The strategic solution envisioned by Nehru as early as in December 1947 could not be implemented in practice so long as a British general held the post of Commander-in-Chief.”"

"Sheikh Abdullah had endeared himself to Nehru—who had called him my blood-brother—and others by projecting an anti-feudal, democratic, leftist, pro-India, pro-Congress, and above all, a secular image: perhaps to get Hari Singh out of the way, and then to sit in his place; for his later actions belied that image, and disappointed and shocked Nehru."

"“Nehru himself came round to Patel's view later in 1962, when he told Mullik of Abdullah's ‘communal activities throughout the period he had acted as the National Conference leader. It was the Pakistani aggression which had mellowed him a little for a short time, because the tribals had committed gruesome atrocities on the Muslim population in the Valley. But, as soon as he became Prime Minister, he came out in his true colours once again and started his anti-Hindu activities... his entire outlook and behaviour was based on the fact that the Kashmir Valley had a Muslim majority.'”"

"...Sardar did not trust Sheikh nor did he share Pandit Nehru's assessment of his influence in the State. He felt that our case in Jammu and Kashmir had to be met on the basis of the Maharaja executing the Instrument of Accession, the thought of antagonising the one on whose signature on that document alone we could justify our legal case in Jammu and Kashmir was distressing to him..."

"“Sardar Patel also came into conflict with Pt Nehru and Gopalaswami Ayyangar owing to the personal rift between the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah. It can scarcely be denied that the latter wanted the Maharaja’s head on a charger and taking advantage of the wrong assessment by Pandit Nehru and Gopalaswami Ayyangar of the extent of his influence in the Valley he literally wanted to dictate his own terms. Sardar Patel had shrewdly come to the conclusion that Sheikh Abdullah would not be able to deliver the goods in the event of a plebiscite which, thanks to Lord Mountbatten, was the ruling consideration of the time. Consequently, he did not want to put all eggs in the Abdullah basket.”"

"Writes B Krishna: 

"“Nehru’s bias in favour of Abdullah was evident from what he said in August 1945 at the annual session of the National Conference at Sopore in the Valley, ‘If non-Muslims want to live in Kashmir, they should join the National Conference or bid goodbye to the country...If Pandits do not join it, no safeguards and weightages will protect them.’”{BK/374} 

"Half a million Kashmiri Pandits would, some forty-five years later, pay for Nehru’s sins, and be ethnically cleansed out of Kashmir—their home for thousands of years."

" ... Sheikh Abdullah launched the Quit Kashmir agitation against the Maharajah in May 1946 leading to his arrest. Quit Kashmir, fashioned after Quit India was obviously misleading, for Maharaja Hari Singh, unlike the English, was not an outsider. Sheikh Abdullah would have indulged in such acts knowing he would receive tacit support from Nehru.{SB2} Kripalani, who visited Kashmir in May 1946, stated that he was convinced that the Quit Kashmir movement was ‘abusive and mischievous’{BK/375}. Sheikh Abdullah was sentenced to three years imprisonment. In June 1946, Nehru decided to go to the Valley to free Abdullah. Though prohibited to enter the State, Nehru decided to defy the ban. He proclaimed that he wanted to take on the autocratic and the feudal rule that prevailed in Kashmir."

"Even Gandhi, when he went for his only visit to Kashmir in 1947, pointedly rejected the hospitality of the Maharaja, and remained the guest of the National Conference of Sheikh Abdullah. 

"Rebuffed thus by Gandhi, having been consistently rubbed the wrong way, experiencing the hostility of Nehru towards him over the last many months, and watching the commitment being shown to his arch enemy, Sheikh Abdullah, why Hari Singh, anybody in his place—Nehru himself, were he in Maharaja's shoes—would have hesitated to accede to India. Hari Singh calculated that he only stood to lose by joining India, and that he would have no future with Nehru and Gandhi at the helm. Pakistan he surely did not wish to join. But the Maharaja certainly did not relish the insistence from Nehru to hand over power to Sheikh Abdullah—as if he [the Maharaja] were some foreign power who should hand over power to a native. So, Hari Singh started considering his option for independence, which was legally permissible."

"Mountbatten was reported to have remarked about Nehru: 

""I thought he [Nehru] wanted to make the Maharaja lick his boots...""

"BN Mullik, who was the then Deputy Director of the IB—the Intelligence Bureau—with charge of Kashmir, and later head of the IB, wrote in his book, ‘My Years with Nehru: Kashmir’ that his report of Kashmir of 1949 stating, inter alia, intense local anti-Pak feelings and no weakening in Sheikh Abdulla’s ideological commitment to India so pleased Nehru that he had copies of the report circulated to all embassies and ministries. However, the realist and wise Sardar Patel, with a gifted for making right judgements, was not amused. Here are extracts from the book:

" ... The Sardar then gave me his own views about Sheikh Abdullah. He apprehended that Sheikh Abdullah would ultimately let down India and Jawaharlal Nehru and would come out in his real colours; his antipathy to the Maharaja was not really an antipathy to a ruler as such, but to the Dogras in general and with the Dogras he identified the rest of the majority community in India. In his slow voice, he firmly told me that my assessment of Sheikh Abdullah was wrong, though my assessment of public opinion in Kashmir valley about accession was probably correct. After having pointed out what he considered to be my error in judgment, he was, however, good enough to say that he agreed with my views that I should submit only independent assessments to the Government and not tailor them to suit the known or anticipated views of particular leaders. He said that I would soon discover my error but, at the same time, he complimented me on the way the report had been written and the pains I had taken over it. This was the greatness of the Sardar. Whilst disagreeing with my views, he recognised my right to express them… 

"That day I came back to my office wondering whether I had really made a mistake in my assessment of Kashmir and whether what the Sardar had said was not right after all. Events, as they turned out subsequently, proved that the Sardar was right and I was not. Within three years we found ourselves fighting against Sheikh Abdullah. Sardar Patel was dead by then. Yet, I feel that possibly events might have turned out differently and the subsequent pain, turmoil, and embarrassments could have been avoided if the special difficulties of Kashmir had been understood by all concerned and they had guided their talks and modified their actions on the basis of this understanding. Probably, things would not have come to this pass at all if the Sardar was still living, because Sheikh Abdullah had a very wholesome respect and fear for him.”

"Writes Howard Schaffer: “The Indians had made Abdullah a member of their UN delegation, no doubt in the expectation that he would be an effective spokesman for India’s cause. They could not have calculated that he would undercut their position by calling for Kashmir’s independence in a private conversation with Austin. Apparently caught by surprise, the ambassador gave Abdullah no encouragement...”{Sch} Incidentally, Warren R. Austin was the US permanent representative—their ambassador—to the UN."

"By June-July 1947 Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K had begun to take steps towards final accession with India. For example he dismissed his Prime Minister Ram Chandra Kak, a Kashmiri Pandit, who had been advising him on aligning with Pakistan! And, later, replaced him with Mehr Chand Mahajan, a lawyer, who had been a Congress nominee on the Boundary Commission, and, after independence, became the third Chief Justice of India on 4 January 1954. Looking to all this, Nehru should have been tactical in creating a conducive atmosphere, and in taking Hari Singh into confidence, so that Maharaja’s decision to accede with India would have been expedited, and all the subsequent troubles on account of his late accession would have been avoided. Instead, Nehru acted adversarial with the Maharaja, putting forth conditions for accession (as if Nehru was doing the Maharaja a favour by allowing him to accede to India, rather than the other way round!) that were repugnant to the Maharaja."

"By August–September 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh had decided to offer Kashmir's accession to India; but, most unbelievably, it was refused by Nehru, who first wanted Sheikh Abdullah to be freed and installed as the prime minister of the State—something not acceptable to the Maharaja. Was it not queer? The nation being favoured with accession laying down conditions, rather than the state agreeing to merge! But, that was Nehru!!"

"Looking to the precarious situation, Sardar Patel proposed sending the Indian Army to J&K. However, Mountbatten insisted that unless the Instrument of Accession was signed by J&K in favour of India, India should not send army to Kashmir. This, notwithstanding the fact that Pakistani raiders, backed by their army had invaded J&K, and were engaged in killing and looting and raping! About half the Maharaja's forces were Muslim, the rest being Dogra. The Muslim elements had deserted and had joined the Pakistani forces. 

"It had been claimed by Pakistan and also conveyed to Mountbatten that the tribesmen were acting independently and Pakistani army was not involved. Suffice it to say that much later, during negotiations, when Mountbatten had queried Jinnah on “How the tribesmen were to be called off?” Jinnah had promptly responded that all he had to do was to give them the orders to come out!"

"On Friday, 24 October 1947, the raiders, backed by the Pakistani army, attacked the Mohore Power House causing black out in Srinagar. On the same day, the Maharaja of J&K sought military help from India. The Defence Committee of India, headed by Mountbatten, met on the morning of Saturday, 25 October 1947. However, rather than ordering action to save Srinagar, it directed VP Menon, Sam Manekshaw and a few senior military officers to fly to Srinagar the same day to check the position first hand.  This was actually a deliberate ploy of Mountbatten to pass time and not allow counter-action by India, and let Pakistan gain an upper hand by force, as the British desired—because Mountbatten would have known through the British C-in-C of the Pakistan army as to what Pakistan was up to. VP Menon and company flew to Srinagar and found the state of affairs to be worse than what was reported. They advised Hari Singh to hurry to the safety of Jammu, along with his family and valuables—which he did. Hari Singh drove the same night to Jammu, 200 kilometres away."

"Notwithstanding the desperate situation, and knowing that unless help was sent immediately, both the Muslims and the Pandits of Srinagar would be butchered by the Pakistani raiders, and the Valley of Kashmir would be lost to Pakistan, Mountbatten, to buy time, still insisted that unless the Instrument of Accession was signed by J&K in favour of India, India should not send army to Kashmir, and Nehru went along with it. 

"VP Menon flew to Jammu the same day—Sunday, 26 October 1947—with the Instrument of Accession to have it signed by Hari Singh, which he did."

"Mountbatten—serving the pro-Pakistani British interests—tried to stall, saying it was too late. Even though J&K had satisfied Mountbatten’s condition of accession for sending in the Indian army, Mountbatten tried his best to stall the Indian military help to J&K on the pretext that it was too late, raiders being already at the door of Srinagar. But, who made it late in the first place—Mountbatten himself. Sardar Patel then took the necessary action, ignoring both Mountbatten and Nehru."

" ... Writes Dasgupta “...the service chiefs [all British], supported by Mountbatten, sought to dissuade the ministers from an airlift on the grounds that it involved great risks and dangers.”"

" ... Sending troops later or leaving the matter to the UN would have meant allowing Pakistan to occupy Kashmir by force, and Kashmir becoming part of Pakistan as a fait accompli, which Pakistan wanted, and to which Britain was more than willing to turn a blind eye. But for Sardar Patel, it is doubtful—because the British didn’t want it and Nehru had hang-ups and was reluctant—if the prompt action of airlifting troops to Srinagar would have been taken, as corroborated by the following words of Sam Manekshaw."

" ... As usual Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, ‘Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it away.’ He (Nehru) said, ‘Of course, I want Kashmir.’ Then he (Patel) said ‘Please give your orders.’ And before he could say anything Sardar Patel turned to me and said, ‘You have got your orders.’ I walked out, and we started flying in troops...”"

"It is worth factoring-in the fact that had the Indian army not reached Srinagar in time, there would have been a large scale massacre and mayhem by the Pakistani raiders in Srinagar and surrounding areas, which in turn would have had repercussions all over India. But, Mountbatten and the British didn’t seem to value Indian lives."

"Through a separate letter, Mountbatten advised Maharaja Hari Singh that the accession was subject to reference to the people of J&K: 

"“In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government [so, Mountbatten regarded independent India’s government as his government!] have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistent with their policy that, in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government’s wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people...”"

"Notably, Maharaja Hari Singh had stipulated NO condition when he signed the Instrument of Accession. Even Sheikh Abdullah, who had favoured accession to India, never insisted on any condition—rather, he wanted accession to be unconditional, lest any uncertainty should remain."

" ... Who gave Mountbatten the authority to write such a letter? Who was he to make the accession conditional? Did he obtain the Cabinet approval? [No!] As Governor General of India, appointed by Indians, was he serving the Indian interests, or the Pakistani and the British interests? He was no more the Viceroy of the British India to be taking independent decisions on his own."

" ... But, for the party being favoured with accession to stipulate conditions—that’s absurd! Why should India have put conditions upon J&K for its accession? Was India doing a favour to J&K for allowing it to accede to India?"

"The Indian Independence Act 1947 enacted by the British Parliament also incorporated the Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy of 12 May 1946 as per which the princely states were to regain full sovereignty with the creation of the two dominions of India and Pakistan from the British India on 15 August 1947, with the ruler of the Princely State being the ONLY authority to offer accession to India or Pakistan, or to remain independent, regardless of the religious composition of the people of that state, there being NO provision for ‘reference to the people’ or plebiscite."

"In fact, Mountbatten’s action of writing the above letter was unconstitutional and illegal. Even Nehru had NO legal authority to approve of such a letter. What is more, there was NO cabinet sanction for it!"

"Writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48’: “The fundamental difference between the American and British positions lay in the fact that the United States was prepared in 1947-48 to recognise India’s sovereign rights in Kashmir.”{DG/121} However, Nehru failed to leverage on that."

"Writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48’: 

"“The Supreme Commander’s [Field Marshal Auchinleck] days in India were, however, numbered. He had incurred the wrath of Sardar Patel for what the latter perceived as partiality towards Pakistan in the matter of division of military stores. His role in Junagadh affair added fuel to the fire. Patel justifiably concluded that in the final analysis the British officers at the helm of the armed forces took their orders from the Supreme Commander, not the Indian government. He charged the Field Marshall with ‘throttling the initiative of the Headquarters Indian Army and acting as the advanced outpost of Pakistan’. Mountbatten tried his best to defend Auchinleck, but to no avail.”{DG/51} 

"Nehru discovered that India’s British Commander-in-Chief had known of Pakistani-led tribal invasion of Kashmir in advance, but had withheld that vital information from India. He had to subsequently resign.{DG/133} 

"Expectedly, Pakistanis wanted him [Auchinleck—to whom both Indian and Pakistani army heads reported] and his Supreme Headquarters, comprising all British officers, to continue, but they had to wind up by 30 November 1947 in view of India’s stand, thanks to Sardar Patel’s uncompromising position, even though they were originally scheduled to remain for a year after independence, that is, up to 15 August 1948."

"Sardar Patel and Defence Minister Baldev Singh visited Srinagar on 3 November 1947, and took a decision to set up the Divisional HQ of the Army there. This indicated that India meant to stay put for a long haul in Kashmir. This utterly frustrated Pakistan and all its grand designs."

"“Major General Kulwant Singh and several hundred soldiers were flown to Srinagar the next day. Taking over from Sen, Kulwant Singh freed Baramula on November 8..."

"Unlike Nehru, Sardar Patel was very firm in his dealings. Writes Rajmohan Gandhi: “Returning from London on the night of May 30 [1948], Mountbatten, in his own words, ‘sent V.P.Menon to see Patel to obtain his agreement to six months joint control [with Pakistan] of Calcutta’, which is what Jinnah had been pressing for. The Viceroy recorded Patel’s reply: ‘Not even for six hours!’ Earlier...Jinnah had demanded an 800-mile ‘corridor’ to link  West and East Pakistan. Patel called the claim ‘such fantastic nonsense as not to be taken seriously’. It died a quick and unremembered death.”"

"On 13 August 1948 the UN Security Council (a)called for ceasefire; (b)agreed that India could retain part of its troops in J&K; (c)asked aggressor Pakistan to withdraw all its regular and irregular forces from J&K; and (d)said that the status of J&K would be determined by reference to the people, after (a), (b) and (c) were complied with. Pakistan refused implementation of (a) and (c). 

"Pakistan later realised it was not able to force a military solution, and agreed for ceasefire effective 1 January 1949."

"Pakistani raiders’ determined bid to occupy Ladakh was frustrated by the superior Indian strategy of airlifting troops to Leh. Air Commodore Mehar Chand flew his plane amazingly to 23,000 feet above sea-level—without oxygen—on an unchartered course to land his plane, with troops, at Leh at the height of about 12000 feet! 

"Another daring feat was that of Major-General Thimayya. He took his tanks to a height of about 12000 feet on the snow-capped Zojila Pass—something unique in history, as nobody had taken tanks to such heights and in such hazardous conditions before—and routed the enemy, destroying all their bunkers. Incidentally, it was this brave and competent Thimayya who was humiliated by Krishna Menon, when he was Defence Minister in Nehru’s cabinet, forcing Thimayya to resign! Later, after Thimayya withdrew his resignation at the instance of Nehru, even Nehru behaved with him in a way that amounted to his double humiliation!!"

"As per the biography of late Field Marshal KM Cariappa, they both requested Nehru in December 1948 for a little  more time to clear J&K of Pakistani raiders completely, but Nehru did not heed them. Thimayya had told Nehru that the Army needed two weeks more to regain lost territory but Nehru was adamant. It is said that Thimayya found Nehru’s attitude inexplicable, and left Teen Murti Bhavan, the official residence of the PM, in disgust.

"The capture of Muzzafarabad, now the capital of PoK, was imminent. The Army, however, was ordered to suspend all offensive operations with effect from 1 January 1949, even though the enemy did not cease fighting. The Indian Army was very disappointed by the decision, but orders were orders. Thanks to ordering of ceasefire with immediate effect by Nehru, PoK—Pakistan Occupied Kashmir—came into existence; else the whole of Kashmir would have been with India. And, now it is this PoK which is used by Pakistan to send terrorists into J&K.

"When Cariappa asked Nehru about the decision a few years later, Nehru conceded that the ceasefire order ought to have been delayed! 

"Shakespeare had rightly articulated: 

"There is a tide in the affairs of men, 

"Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune; 

"Omitted, all the voyage of their life 

"Is bound in shallows and in miseries; 

"And we must take the current when it serves, 

"Or lose our ventures." 

"As per a report, the ceasefire decision was remote-controlled by Mountbatten, who was by then back in England—such influence Mountbatten still exercised over Nehru. 

"Commented General SPP Thorat: “Our forces might have succeeded in evicting the invaders, if the Prime Minister had not held them in check, and later ordered the ceasefire… Obviously great pressure must have been brought to bear on him by the [former Governor-General]… Panditji was a great personal and family friend of Lord Mountbatten.”{BK2/160} 

"Wrote NV Gadgil, the then Cabinet Minister for Works and Mines in the Nehru’s Cabinet, in his autobiography ‘Government from Inside’: 

"“In truth, Nehru did not show much enthusiasm for Kashmir’s accession at the time… Both the Maharaja and [Meherchand] Mahajan [Premier of Kashmir] pressed for the acceptance of Kashmir’s accession, but Nehru would not move. [Nehru then was being guided by Sheikh Abdullah]… If our army had not received instructions to stop fighting before that date [1 January 1949], it would have cleared the raiders from whole of Kashmir… The restrain imposed upon our army was motivated by the hope that Pakistan would be satisfied with a bit of Kashmir occupied by it. Of course, some of us opposed this view… Sheikh Abdullah was an ordinary person elevated to an extraordinary position by the Government of India… I am afraid that Nehru is responsible for the prolongation of the problem through his willingness to compromise at every stage... Had Vallabhbhai [Patel] been the man to handle the Kashmir question, he would have settled it long ago. At least, he would never have settled with a partial control of Jammu & Kashmir. He would have occupied the whole of the State and would never have allowed it to be elevated to international importance.”"

"Wrote BM Kaul in ‘Confrontation with Pakistan’: “We were politically unwise in accepting the ceasefire in view of our successes at the time in Uri, Tithwal, and Kargil.”"

"As per the article “Nehru’s Pacifism and the Failed Recapture of Kashmir” by Sandeep Bamzai in ORF: “...To keep abreast with the developments in Kashmir, Nehru had dispatched his private secretary and ‘eyes and ears’ Dwarka Nath Kachru to the frontline... Some of Kachru's correspondence is extremely damaging, the prism far too revealing of how the Indian Army first pushed back the raiders and then vanquished the Pakistan Army regulars, even having them on the run... Previously unpublished correspondence [Nehru-Kachru] reveal that Nehru's pacifism—guided by the principles of fair play [?!] and the fact that India had referred the Kashmir matter to the United Nations erroneously on Lord Mountbatten's insistence—meant that the Indian Army was refused permission to go all the way and reclaim what eventually became PoK and the Northern Areas…”"

................................................................................................

Reference to the UN 

"It seems that Nehru, the claimed expert on international affairs, was innocent about the functioning of the UNSC—UN Security Council. He was apparently under the impression that UNSC functioned on the basis of the high ideals enshrined in the UN Charter and looked to the merits of the cases referred to it. That the member-nations of the UNSC acted in their own selfish national interests and engaged in power-game was apparently not known to the foreign-affairs expert Nehru. 

"Reference to the UN was something Sardar Patel, Dr Ambedkar and others were against, however, Nehru again went ahead with it publicly in his radio broadcast on 2 November 1947. Incidentally, plebiscite was held in Junagadh also, but it was conducted by India itself on 20 February 1948, as arranged by Sardar Patel. 

"With the reference to the UN not yet a reality, being only a stated Indian intention, and with the Indian troops landing in J&K to spoil the British plan, the British cooked up an alternate plan to ensure that their selfish purpose (most of J&K adjoining Russia and China remaining under their influence by being part of Pakistan) was served without even reference to the UN (where it could take indeterminate time), or by resorting to the democratic option of a plebiscite, where the results could go the Indian way. A top-secret note dated 6 November 1947 of Noel Baker, UK Secretary of State of Commonwealth Relations, proposed partition of J&K whereby only Jammu was to be allocated to India.{Pani/34-36} That there had been such a proposal was confirmed when Nehru wrote to the then Indian High Commissioner in the UK, Krishna Menon, on 20 February 1948 informing that Mountbatten had similarly hinted at the partition of Kashmir with only Jammu going to India.{Sar/338} 

"What was galling was that unlike the wise Sardar Patel, Dr Ambedkar and others, Gandhi was in favour of reference to the UN. Mountbatten had met Gandhi in November 1947, and found that Gandhi was favourably inclined to invocate the UN."

"Rather than retrieving himself from his radio-broadcasts in which he had talked of ‘Reference to the UN’ on J&K, Nehru made the follow-up blunder of making a statement about “reference to the people” of J&K in the Parliament on 25 November 1947. He also reiterated the possibility of UN-overseen plebiscite."

"Finding that the things had begun to go in India’s favour (thanks to Sardar Patel’s actions), despite all the mischief of the Pakistanis and the unjust support of the British, Mountbatten persuaded Nehru to refer the matter to the UN, thus internationalising the issue, to the detriment of India."

" ... purpose of Mountbatten to suggest such a reference to the UN was to allow for further consideration from the Pakistani angle. That was to please the British establishment back in London, where almost all favoured Pakistan over India. And, in some cases, like J&K, get the big powers like the UK and the US manipulate the outcome at the UN in their favour. 

"While Sardar Patel was against internationalising the issue by making such a reference to the UN, Nehru ultimately agreed. That was a huge error on the part of Nehru, for it converted a domestic issue into an international issue. J&K had signed the Instrument of Accession, and was thus part of India, and hence anything concerning J&K was an internal, domestic issue."

"Wrote Durga Das: “...Patel added that Nehru was unduly amenable to Mountbatten’s influence. Nehru had ‘always leaned on someone’. He was under Bapu’s protective wing and ‘now he leans on Mountbatten’.”"

Flattered by association with a brit, that too a royalty relative, a direct descendant of Queen Victoria? Likely,  subconsciously.

"Nehru himself regretted his decision: “Kashmir issue has given us a great deal of trouble… the attitude of the great powers has been astonishing. Some of them have shown active partisanship for Pakistan… We feel we have not been given a square deal.”{BK2/159} 

"It is indeed strange that Nehru, who claimed to be an expert in international affairs, and who had therefore also kept charge of the External Affairs, didn’t know the basics of international dealings: every country advances its own self-interest; that UN was a forum for power game; and no country is bothered about what is just and what is unjust. Further, he didn’t take the practical lesson from what Sardar Patel did in the case of Junagadh: Patel ignored Mountbatten’s advice to refer the Junagadh case to the UN. If one had to talk of "reference to the people", why "reference to the people overseen by UN". It could have been "reference to the people conducted by India itself, as for Junagadh”."

"Quipped Chaudhry Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan (1893-1985), the Pakistani representative in the UN, when he came to know about Gopalaswami Aiyangar as India’s representative: “You are offering me Kashmir on a platter.”"

"Sardar Patel was opposed to Gopalaswami Aiyangar leading the Indian team in the UN. He considered him to be not competent enough. Patel had instead suggested the name of CP Ramaswami Iyer, who had been the Diwan of Travancore ... "

"But, Nehru ignored Patel’s advice, and stuck to Gopalaswami Aiyangar. 

"Here is a tell-tale description of what happened in the UN, as told by Shakunthala Jagannathan, CP’s granddaughter: 

"“I was a student living in New York, when the question of Kashmir came up in the U.N. Accompanied by several Indian and American friends, I attended the Security council session, oozing with confidence on India’s stand. First came Sir Zafrullah Khan’s impassioned and brilliant speech on behalf of Pakistan which was powerful enough to shake up our confidence. When he sat down, we Indians breathed a sigh of relief. The Indian delegation was then asked to present their case. The delegate concerned put up his hand, stood up, and said, “I protest!”… We had expected that our case, so much stronger, would shake up the U.N.! Instead our presentation on that day resulted in a debacle, right before our eyes...”"

"Britain lobbied in the UN that J&K should go to Pakistan as 77% of its population was Muslim. This was despite The Indian Independence Act 1947 enacted by them and  their own Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy of 12 May 1946 which did not provide for religious majority–minority consideration, or reference to the people, and unambiguously stipulated that the ruler of a Princely State was the sole legal authority to decide on accession. Hence, Britain was lobbying for something that was ILLEGAL and UNCONSTITUTIONAL as per the laws they had themselves enacted. 

"Further, if Hindu or Muslim majority was a factor, why was it that the British advanced no similar arguments of Hindu majority when the issues of Hyderabad and Junagadh came up? 

"Looking to what transpired in the UN, Nehru realised his folly of referring the matter to the UN. The UK, the US and their allies, led by the UK, began playing politics of favouring Pakistan over India, ignoring the fact of Pakistani aggression in J&K."

"Patel later told the British Under Secretary of State, Arthur Henderson: 

"“Unfortunately, it is my experience that the attitude of an average Englishman in India is instinctively against us… We should never have gone to the UNO… at the UNO, not only has the dispute been prolonged but the merits of our case have been completely lost in the interaction of power politics… we were so terribly disappointed at the attitude of your delegation… it was, we maintain, the attitude of Noel Baker that tilted the balance against us. But for his lead, I doubt if the USA and some other powers would have gone against us.”

"Significantly, the US demonstrated an honest appreciation of India’s stand during 1947-48. The US admitted the unchallengeable legality of J&K’s accession into India. The US further elaborated that the accession could be reversed only if India lost the plebiscite, which India had itself offered."

"In the UN Security Council the British delegation took the position that there was no case of aggression by Pakistan, as Pakistan was in no way involved in sending the tribal raiders to J&K, despite enough proof to the contrary. The British had to tell those lies because they were themselves a party to it, having connived with the Pakistani army. And, not just connived, the British army officers, including General Gracey, actively helped the Pakistani forces and tribal-raiders both in the planning and in the execution of aggression against India, and in the illegal occupation of India’s territory.{Pani/59} 

"All through the British acted anti-India. It is amazing that these brutal British who looted India, became rich at its cost, humiliated and exploited its people, misbehaved and acted arrogant, insulted its culture and religion and used grossly intemperate, crude and abusive language while they lorded here, used Indians in its armed forces to subjugate other nations and were even abusive towards them despite using their services; acted even more uncivilised when in the process of leaving India and after having left India. You won’t find another example of such thankless, uncivilised people in the history of civilisation. Just one quote of Winston Churchill should suffice to illustrate their unabashed thanklessness, utter crudeness, uncivilised behaviour, lack of culture and their being out and out racist: “I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly religion.”"

"Judging from the angle of the UK, the US and the West, Britain’s Partition Strategy was very successful, and yielded excellent results for them: they secured their oil-interests; Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, then CENTO, then entered into a bilateral pact with the US, provided air bases to them, helped spy against Soviet Union, and so on, followed by active involvement in driving away the Russians from Afghanistan—which ultimately led to the collapse of the USSR."

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Article-370, thanks to Nehru, and despite Sardar 

" ... Although many in the Constituent Assembly were not in favour of it, they consented, keeping in view Nehru’s wish, who was then the main person steering the J&K policy. Those not in favour included Ambedkar, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, Sardar Patel, and many others. 

"India, which was a Dominion, became a Republic on 26 January 1950, and Article 370 came into force for J&K. 

"Having achieved what he wanted through the Article 370, having got rid of the Maharaja, and with Nehru having surrendered all leverages by putting all eggs in one basket (that of Sheikh Abdullah), Sheikh Abdullah gradually began to act difficult. By this stage, ambassadors of the US and other countries began to meet him. This made Abdullah feel powerful enough to start unfolding his actual agenda—of independent Sheikhdom. The British were supportive. Said Clement Attlee in London on 11 November 1953: “Kashmir should belong neither to India nor to Pakistan but be independent.”{Jag/98} Nehru now began to feel the heat. To his colleagues he could not say, as he had gone against their advice. However, in his letter to his sister, Vijaylakhmi Pandit, he expressed his bitterness.

" ... The Article itself is labelled "Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir". J&K State Constitution came into effect on 26 January 1957, comprising 158 Sections, of which Section 3 says, “The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India.”"

"Nehru had brought in Gopalaswami Ayyangar as a Minister without Portfolio to look after the J&K affairs. Before his visit to Europe, Nehru had finalised the draft provisions relating to J&K with Sheikh Abdullah, which later became Article 370. He had entrusted to Gopalaswami Ayyangar the task of piloting these provisions through the Constituent Assembly. Ayyangar did the needful. His presentation provoked angry protests from all sides. Most were opposed to any discriminatory treatment for J&K. The proposal of Article 370 was torn to pieces by the Constituent Assembly. Ayyangar was the lone defender, and Maulana Azad was not able to effectively support him. In the debate, Maulana Hasrat Mohani of UP stated that while he was not opposed to all the concessions that were being granted to his friend Sheikh Abdullah, why make such discrimination; if all those concessions were to be granted to the Kashmir, why not to the Baroda ruler too.

"Even Ambedkar was opposed to it. Nehru had sent Abdullah to Dr Ambedkar to explain to him the position and to draft an appropriate Article for the Constitution. Ambedkar had remarked:  

"“Mr Abdullah, you want that India should defend Kashmir, India should develop Kashmir and Kashmiris should have equal rights as the citizens of India, but you don’t want India and any citizen of India to have any rights in Kashmir. I am the Law minister of India. I cannot betray the interest of my country.”

"Nehru, who was then abroad, rang up Patel and requested him to get the Article 370 through, and it was for that reason alone that Patel relented, as Sardar did not wish to embarrass Nehru in his absence. But Sardar commented, “Jawaharlal royega [Nehru will rue this].”"

"Strangely, Nehru made a statement on Kashmir in 1952, when Sardar Patel was no more, “Sardar Patel was all the time dealing with these matters.” 

"Wrote V Shankar: 

"“When I was working as his [Gopalaswami Ayyangar] joint secretary the self-same Article [370] came in for criticism in the Lok Sabha. In defence, Pandit Nehru took the stand that the Article was dealt with by Sardar in his absence and he was not responsible for it. I met Gopalaswami the same day evening as he was walking on the lawn of his residence. I questioned the bonafides of Pandit Nehru’s stand.  Gopalaswami’s reaction was one of anger and he said, ‘It is an ill return to the Sardar for the magnanimity he had shown in accepting Panditji’s point of view against his better judgment.’ He added, ‘I have told Jawaharlal this already.’”

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Sardar’s 547 Successes & Nehru’s Kashmir Failure 

"Expansion of India’s geography by about 40% and consolidation of its post-independence stability through the integration of the Princely States demanded great foresight, sharp mind, deep wisdom, high-level diplomacy, sagacity, boldness, guts, readiness to act and timely action—thankfully for India, Sardar Patel answered to that rare combination of qualities and requirements. Nehru just did not have it in him to accomplish all that; he would have flinched from even attempting it; and had he taken the plunge, he would have made a royal mess of it. 

"Like Durga Das wrote: 

"“VP Menon gave me details of these prolonged talks. Mountbatten was just flattering the old man[Gandhi], he said. He is doing business with Sardar and has Nehru in his pocket. Sardar is playing a deep game. He, in turn, is flattering Mountbatten and using him to net the Princes...”"

"Nehru’s over-activism and blind support for Muslims and Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir during 1946-47 at the expense of the Kashmiri Pandits, and his rancour and hostility towards the Maharaja made the Maharaja apprehensive and distrustful of Nehru and India, and he therefore delayed the state’s integration with India till forced by the Pakistani aggression of October 1947. Curiously, the woolly-headed ‘secular’ Nehru did not show similar enthusiasm and activism in the states ruled by Muslims like Junagadh or Hyderabad, despite the widely-known cruelties of Razakars against Hyderabad state’s Hindu subjects!"

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Sardar, VP Menon & Kashmir 

"Notably, even the Deputy Prime Minister of J&K between 1947-53, Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad of the National Conference, had become so disturbed and alarmed at the way the J&K issue was being messed up that he met Sardar Patel and requested: 

"“Why do you [Sardar Patel] not take over the problem and finish it like Hyderabad? Patel replied cryptically: You go to your friend [Nehru] and tell him to keep his hands off Kashmir problem for two months and I will undertake to solve it.”"

"Sardar Patel had reportedly remarked to HV Kamath that had Nehru and Gopalaswami Aiyangar not made Kashmir their close preserve, separating it from his portfolio of Home and States, he would have tackled the problem as purposefully as he had already done for Hyderabad. 

"Sardar Patel had told Air Marshal Thomas Elmhirst: 

"“If all the decisions rested on me, I think that I would be in favour of extending this little affair in Kashmir to a full-scale war with Pakistan… Let us get it over once and for all, and settle down as a united continent.”"

"These are the remarks of Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, a close friend and a confidant of Nehru,  from Durga Das’s book: 

"“You know, I never go to Nehru to seek advice or guidance. I take a decision and just present it to him as a fait accompli. Nehru’s mind is too complex to wrestle with the intricacies of a problem. Those who go to him for advice rarely get a lead—and that only serves to delay matters...Nehru does not understand economics, and is led by the nose by ‘professors’ and ‘experts’ who pander to his whims and fancies...We should have absorbed Kashmir for good and all...I do not know where we are going. The country needs a man like Patel.”

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April 25, 2022 - April 25, 2022. 

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{ 9 } Sardar vs. Nehru on China & Tibet 

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Sardar Patel’s Approach 

Author quotes a letter from Sardar Patel to Jawaharlal Nehru. 

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"D.O. No. 821-DPM/50 

New Delhi 

7 November 1950 

My Dear Jawaharlal, Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the cabinet meeting the same day which I had to attend at practically fifteen minutes' notice and for which I regret I was not able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of Tibet and I thought I should share with you what is passing through my mind. 

"I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the External Affairs Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the Chinese Government. I have tried to peruse this correspondence as favourably to our Ambassador and the Chinese Government as possible, but I regret to say that neither of them comes out well as a result of this study. The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they managed to instill into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. 

"There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. 

"Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our behalf. 

"It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. Therefore, if the Chinese put faith in this, they must have distrusted us so completely as to have taken us as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them, indicates that even though we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the Communist mentality of “whoever is not with them being against them”, this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take due note. 

"During the last several months, outside the Russian camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into UN and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and in the UN. In spite of this, China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism perhaps mixed with a little hostility.

"I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have an Ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.

"In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had their own domestic problems and never bothered us about frontiers.

"In 1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship. Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during the last half a century.

"China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have on our side of the frontier a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans and Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of the potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that the communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other.

"Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous.

"In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist. While our western and north-western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east.

"Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with communist China in the north and in the north-east, a communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us.

"Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam. From the point of view of communication, there are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is by no means close and intimate.

"The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, but their influence was in no way friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smouldering there.

"Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force: it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy.

"I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Union, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgement the situation is one which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policies to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident.

"Side by side with these external dangers, we shall now have to face serious internal problems as well. I have already asked [HVR] Iyengar to send to the External Affairs Ministry a copy of the Intelligence Bureau's appreciation of these matters. Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found some difficulty in contacting communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature, etc., from them. They had to contend with the difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontiers on the east or with the long seaboard. They shall now have a comparatively easy means of access to Chinese communists and through them to other foreign communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and communists would now be easier. 

"Instead of having to deal with isolated communist pockets in Telangana and Warangal we may have to deal with communist threats to our security along our northern and north-eastern frontiers, where, for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely depend on communist arsenals in China.

"The whole situation thus raises a number of problems on which we must come to an early decision so that we can, as I said earlier, formulate the objectives of our policy and decide the method by which those objectives are to be attained. It is also clear that the action will have to be fairly comprehensive, involving not only our defence strategy and state of preparations but also problem of internal security to deal with which we have not a moment to lose. We shall also have to deal with administrative and political problems in the weak spots along the frontier to which I have already referred. 

"It is of course, impossible to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problems which, in my opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our administrative or military policies and measures to implement them.

"a) A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and to internal security. 

"b) An examination of military position and such redisposition of our forces as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute. 

"c) An appraisement of the strength of our forces and, if necessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of the new threat. 

"d) A long-term consideration of our defence needs. My own feeling is that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we would be making our defence perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to the double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-west and north and north-east. 

"e) The question of China's entry into the UN. In view of the rebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claim any longer. There would probably be a threat in the UN virtually to outlaw China, in view of its active participation in the Korean war. We must determine our attitude on this question also. 

"f) The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontier. This would include the whole of the border, ie. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal territory in Assam. 

"g) Measures of internal security in the border areas as well as the states flanking those areas such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal and Assam. 

"h) Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless, in these areas and with the frontier outposts. 

"i) The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyangtse and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade routes. 

"j) The policy in regard to the McMahon Line. 

"These are some of the questions which occur to my mind. 

"It is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into wider question of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma. This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be basically very important, e.g., we might have to consider whether we should not enter into closer association with Burma in order to strengthen the latter in its dealings with China. I do not rule out the possibility that, before applying pressure on us, China might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial. In its present position, Burma might offer an easier problem to China, and therefore, might claim its first attention. 

"I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct, quick examination of other problems with a view to taking early measures to deal with them.

"Yours, 

"Vallabhbhai Patel."

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"Reportedly, there is nothing on record to show that Nehru acknowledged the above letter, and took up follow-up action as suggested by Patel. He perhaps thought that given his foreign-affairs “expertise” he didn’t need any advice!! 

"In fact, like other documents inconvenient to the Dynasty, this letter of Sardar too was kept a secret and came to light only 18 years after it was written."

"Wrote Durga Das: 

"“Not long afterwards, the situation across the northern border took a turn for the worse [1950], resulting in what was perhaps the last clash between Patel and Nehru in the Cabinet. Red China invaded Tibet and Nepal was in the grip of internal turmoil. It was well known that Patel and Prasad differed from Nehru on Tibet. They had urged him to ensure that Tibet continued as an independent buffer between China and India. Now their fears proved correct. Nehru felt upset because Peking had disregarded his counsel…”"

"Wrote Durga Das further: 

"“At the last talk I had with him [Sardar Patel], a few days before his death in Bombay on 15th December 1950, Patel showed me a letter dated 7th November 1950 he had written to Nehru [above letter]. (The letter was published by K.M. Munshi in Bhavan’s Journal in its issue of 26th February 1967; because of its historic importance its text is given in Appendix II.) After I finished reading it he [Patel] said: ‘I have loved Nehru but he has not reciprocated. I have been eating my heart out because I have not been able to make him see the dangers ahead. China wants to establish its hegemony over South-East Asia. We cannot shut our eyes to this because imperialism is appearing in a new garb. He does not realise that people work only when they have the employment motive or the profit motive [that must have been in the context of Nehru’s socialism]. He is being misled by his courtiers. I have grave apprehensions about the future.’”"

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Nehru, China & Tibet 

Author quotes a note on Tibetand China related issues by Jawaharlal Nehru, dated 18th November 1950. 

After quoting two more, short but similar, notes by Jawaharlal Nehru, author says - 

"Contrast the above two delusional notes of Nehru with what Dalvi wrote in his book ‘Himalayan Blunder’: 

"“In October 1950 I was a student at the Defence services Staff College in Wellington, South India.  Soon after the news of the Chinese entry in into Tibet reached us, the Commandant, General WDA (Joe) Lentaigne, strode into the main lecture hall, interrupted the lecturer and proceeded to denounce our leaders for their short-sightedness and inaction, in the face of Chinese action...he said that India’s back door had been opened...He predicted that India would have to pay dearly for failure to act... His last prophetic remark was that some of the students present in the hall would be fighting the Chinese before retirement.”

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April 25, 2022 - April 26, 2022. 

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{ 10 } Foreign Policy & External Security : 

Nehru vs. Sardar 

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"“The second [the first being Netaji Bose] Chanakyan figure contributing to the evolution of India’s foreign policy was Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel...[his] bringing about the accession of the Princely States to the new dominion of India was primarily an exercise in foreign relations...” 

"—JN Dixit, ‘Makers of India's Foreign Policy’"

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Nehru: Foreign to Foreign Policy? 

"Nehru used to show himself off as an “internationalist”, and an expert in international affairs. Not only that, he used to be condescending towards those not up to the mark in world affairs, in his opinion, and was downright contemptuous towards them. His hubris knew no bounds. On Sardar Patel he had commented: “…Also it is difficult for him [Sardar Patel] to think internationally. In this he represents our people far more than I do.”{RG2/L-5725} What airs! As if he [Nehru] himself had great knowledge, depth and clarity of thinking on international affairs and India’s foreign policy!

"Proof of pudding is in the eating. Empty verbiage can’t substitute for actual results. Nehru’s foreign policy was a monumental failure. While being the prime minister, Nehru also held the portfolio of foreign affairs, regarding himself as a great, irreplaceable expert in the area. One wishes he had chosen a competent person for the job, for in practically all areas of foreign policies India grievously suffered."

"Nehru allowed Tibet, our peaceful neighbour and a buffer between us and China, to be erased as a nation, without even recording a protest in the UN, thereby making our northern borders insecure, and putting a question mark on the future of the water resources that originate in Tibet. Nehru focussed on the Korean conflict happening far away from India, while soft-peddling the Tibet invasion next door, even though Tibet was so critical to our national security interests. Wasn’t it ironic that Nehru internationalised a matter he should not have, while he refused to internationalise a matter that he should have. He referred J&K, an internal, domestic matter, to the UN, which he should not have internationalised; while he refused to refer Tibet, a serious, external security matter, to the UN, which he should have. 

"Despite what China did to Tibet, India signed ‘The Panchsheel Agreement’ with China on 29 April 1954. The agreement itself was titled “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India” thus acknowledging Tibet as a part of China. India gained nothing through the Agreement, and all benefits accrued to China. Nehru did not even insist on prior settlement of borders, ignoring the sane advice of Girija Shankar Bajpai of the External Affairs Ministry. Panchsheel is actually a most eloquent example of the naivety of the Indian diplomacy and a shining example of what an international agreement should not be! Acharya Kriplani had rightly commented: “This great doctrine was born in sin, because it was enunciated to put the seal of our approval upon the destruction of an ancient nation which was associated with us spiritually and culturally... It was a nation which wanted to live its own life and it sought to have been allowed to live its own life...”

"Both the US and the USSR were willing to accommodate India as a Permanent Member of the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) in 1955, in lieu of Taiwan, or as a sixth member, after amending the UN charter. This Nehru refused! Nehru wanted the seat to be given to PRC (Peoples Republic of China), as Nehru did not want China to be marginalised! It was almost as if Nehru, for reasons one cannot fathom, totally ignored India’s own strategic interests!

"The then US president John F Kennedy was an admirer of Indian democracy, and when he learnt that China was on its way to detonate a nuclear device, he wanted that it ought to be a democratic country like India, and not communist China, which should have nuclear capability. The Kennedy administration was ready to help India out with nuclear deterrence. But, Nehru rejected the offer. Currently, India has been canvassing support from various countries to become a member of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—in vain, so far. Had Nehru gone along with Kennedy’s advice, India would have detonated a nuclear device well before China. Had that happened, not only would India have been a member of the NSG long, long ago, but China would not have dared to attack India, nor would Pakistan have taken liberties to attack India in 1965."

"If ours was a good foreign policy, how come all our major neighbours became our enemies? And, a friendly neighbour, Tibet, disappeared as an independent nation? How come all our borders turned insecure during the Nehruvian era, costing us a fortune to defend them? How come no nation came to India’s rescue (including Nehru’s non-aligned friends) in its war with China, except the nation Nehru and Krishna Menon always panned—the United States; or the nation Nehru refused to recognise—Israel? You evaluate a policy by its results, not by its verbosity and pompousness."

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Sardar Patel & Foreign Policy 

"Basically, while Nehru followed the Marxist line in the economic, social, historical, religious, cultural  and academic affairs, that perpetuated poverty and misery, made India forever a developing, third-rate, third-world country, and an international beggar, and distorted and belittled India’s heritage; Sardar Patel favoured a sensible capitalist, free-market economy, and Gandhian values. Further, while Nehru followed a pacifist, self-defeating, spineless Gandhian policy in foreign affairs and external security, including that on the integration of the Princely States, particularly Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh; Sardar Patel favoured an aggressive, non-Gandhian, Curzonian (like that of Lord Curzon) policy."

"Writes JN Dixit in his book ‘Makers of India's Foreign Policy’: 

"“The second [the first being SC Bose] Chanakyan figure contributing to the evolution of India’s foreign policy was Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel...[his] bringing about the accession of the Princely States to the new dominion of India was primarily an exercise in foreign relations... To compound these uncertainties, Jawaharlal Nehru and some other like-minded Congress leaders wanted to let the people’s movement in each of these [there were 562!] Princely States decide the political status of their respective territories. Sardar Patel realized that the princes, as well as the people’s movements in these Princely States, would be subject to the cross-currents of princely pleasures, feudal loyalties and blandishments from interested British officials and Pakistani leaders. He, therefore, embarked on a systematic and vigorous campaign to persuade the princes and the peoples of their states to join India... Patel showed a capacity to exercise decisive political will to negotiate in accordance with India’s interests and to resort to the calibrated use of coercive force to meet India’s interests... Even more significant, however, were Patel’s profoundly prescient views and assessments on India’s relations with Pakistan and China...”"

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Patel, Goa & Nehru 

"During a long discussion on Goa in the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1950, Sardar Patel kept to himself listening to the various tame alternatives, then suddenly said at the end, “Shall we go in? It is two hours’ work!”{RG/508} ‘Nehru resisted this suggestion vehemently…’{RG/508} Patel was very keen to fulfil the assurance given to the Goa Congress in his letter of 14 May 1946 promising freedom from foreign domination. Patel was all for using force to settle the matter quickly. But, Nehru was too lacking-in-action to take any effective steps. Patel felt exasperated."

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April 26, 2022 - April 26, 2022. 

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{ 11 } Sardar vs. Nehru’s Socialistic Nightmare 

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Theory of Non-Affluent Society 

"For anything to be scientifically correct, it has to be proved truly and convincingly in practice, without a shadow of doubt. Till the same is done, it remains merely a conjecture, a hypothesis, a theory. Has the so-called scientific socialism or Marxism proved successful anywhere in the world in practice? No."

" ... One guided tour in 1920s, and Nehru returned fully sold out, like school-boys taken on guided tours! Subsequent guided-tours of both Nehru and his daughter post-independence to the USSR, and both were re-sold!! ... "

"Nehru wrote in ‘Discovery of India’: 

"“…I had no doubt that the Soviet Revolution had advanced human society by a great leap and had lit a bright flame which could not be smothered, and that it had laid the foundations for that new civilization towards which the world could advance.”{JN} 

"Contrast this with what Bertrand Russel had to say after his visit to Russia: 

"“…the time I spent in Russia was one of continually increasing nightmare. I have said in print what, on reflection, appeared to me to be the truth, but I have not expressed the sense of utter horror which overwhelmed me while I was there. Cruelty, poverty, suspicion, prosecution formed the very air we breathed. Our conversations were continually spied upon… There was a hypocritical pretence of equality… I felt that everything that I valued in human life was being destroyed in the interest of a glib and narrow philosophy, and that in the process untold misery was being inflicted upon many millions of people…”"

" ... Millions died from hunger and famine in Soviet Russia, yet the communist leadership did not have the heart to save them by seeking help from outside, lest the outside world became aware of the pathetic conditions. Same with China under Mao—about 40 million perished in famines!

"Country-wise unofficial estimates of the total number of persons who perished thanks to communism, through man-made famines and state-terror, as per The Black Book of Communism are: USSR–20 million, China–65 million, Cambodia–2 million, North Korea–2 million; the world-total being around 100 million! Compare this with the estimate of Holocaust victims at about 6 million, and total World War II military deaths of all countries put together at about 25 million."

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Democracy and Socialism: Are they compatible? 

" ... Competitive capitalism needs democracy to thrive. Vice versa, democracy can thrive where competitive capitalism exists. Of course, vitiated forms of capitalism, like crony capitalism, can go along with dictatorships and oligarchies. 

"However, socialism and communism, where the state dominates and predominantly controls the means of production, can’t have real democracy, because true democracy is unsuited to those systems. ... "

"It’s not as if there is a menu of systems, and one can choose which to adopt. Constructivism does not work in the field of economics. A set of complex economic, mercantile, industrial, societal, survival, cultural, psychological and organisational factors have led to the evolution of free enterprise and capitalism. Free enterprise and capitalism were not something that were first theorised, then planned, and then implemented or rammed down. They evolved as a sequence of civilisational growth, were taken cognizance of, and then theorised after the fact. Facts and practice led to the theory, and then the theory enhanced the practice. Thereafter, it was a beneficial evolving cycle, each helping enhance the other. Democracy, in turn, evolved out of free enterprise and capitalism; and again there was a cyclical effect between the two, each helping enhance the other. 

"In comparison, there is nothing natural, organic or evolutionary about Socialism, Communism or Gandhiism. They are all artificial constructs. You first theorise. Then you plan how the theory could be implemented in practice. And, when you implement you find there are just too many variables, too many unknowns, and too many practical difficulties and unforeseen human factors and frailties to contend with. Russians tried it for over 70 years, failed, reverted, and have since been struggling to implement capitalism. Same with the East European countries that went communist thanks to Russia. China wisely junked its Maoism before it was too late, and steered itself capably into a version of capitalism. 

"Gandhiism! Nehru, Gandhi’s chosen disciple, shuddered even to try it, despite Gandhi’s persuasion. It is another matter that Nehru tried another bad artificial prescription—imitating the Soviets. In fact, Gandhi could not implement his own prescriptions satisfactorily even in the restricted environment of his own ashrams."

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Nehruvian Socialistic Suicide 

" ... Nehru just went by what was popular and fashionable among the upper classes in Britain, without any deep study of economics (despite many years in jail where he had all the time in the world, and access to books), or even a reasonable or understanding of its basics, although economics is a most vital subject for any political leader. Economics is a serious subject for its affects the lives of millions, and for Nehru to take up a firm position on one trend of economics without critical appraisal of the alternatives was not only unwise in the academic sense, it proved disastrous to the nation in practice. 

"Further, even if Nehru mistakenly believed that communism was doing good for one country, the USSR, how was it that he did not notice the many countries prospering under capitalism, like the US, the Western-European and the South-East Asian countries. Was Nehru, the “scientifically-minded” person, going more by personal bias, whims and fancies, rather than by facts!"

"Post-independence industrialisation was also helped by the very significant second world war sterling debt repayments by the UK, and aid by other countries like the US, the USSR and Germany. However, when the repayment of the sterling debt by the UK tapered off, and not much further foreign aid was forthcoming, and the public sector into which Nehru had sunk the investment was either in loss or not able to generate adequate surplus, the industrialisation momentum began to taper off, as there were no funds; and given Nehru’s socialistic approach, the private sector was anyway shackled! 

Further, not learning anything from Japan and others, who had dramatically prospered with their outward-looking, export-led growth, India under Nehru went in for inward-looking, import-substitution model, denying itself a world-class, competitive culture, incentive for production of quality products, share in the world-trade, and the consequent prosperity.

"Instead, India invested heavily in the inefficient public sector, over-regulated and strangulated private enterprise, shunned foreign capital, and ignored better technology. India under Nehru also neglected the two vital sectors—agriculture and education."

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What They Said of Nehru & Socialism 

"This permit-licence-raj is not a bee in my bonnet but a great boa-constrictor that has coiled itself around the economy. 

"—Rajaji in Swarajya of 15.1.1966"

"If you put the federal government in charge of the Sahara Desert, in 5 years there'd be a shortage of sand. 

"—Milton Friedman

"A young man who isn't a socialist hasn't got a heart; an old man who is a socialist hasn't got a head. 

"—David Lloyd George, the British PM in 1920

"People who believe in evolution in biology often believe in creationism in government. In other words, they believe that the universe and all the creatures in it could have evolved spontaneously, but that the economy is too complicated to operate without being directed by politicians. 

"—Thomas Sowell"

"Mr Jawaharlal Nehru returned from Cambridge with notions of how an all-governing interventionist state can force people into happiness and prosperity through socialism...He sticks to this bias in spite of the demonstration of world experience against it... I hate the present folly and arrogance as much as I hated the foreign arrogance of those [British] days.” 

—Rajaji{RG3/378} 

"Nehru’s inability to rise above his deep-rooted Marxist equation of Western capitalism with imperialism, and his almost paranoid, partly aristocratic, distrust of free enterprise in its most successful form as ‘vulgar’, cost India dearly in retarding its overall development for the remaining years of his rule, as well as for the even longer reign of his more narrowly doctrinaire daughter. 

"—Stanley Wolpert, ‘Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny’"

"He [Nehru] had no idea of economics. He talked of Socialism, but he did not know how to define it. He talked of social justice, but I told him he could have this only when there was an increase in production. He did not grasp that. So you need a leader who understands economic issues and will invigorate your economy. 

"—Chester Bowles, the then US Ambassador to India

"While I usually came back from meeting Gandhiji elated and inspired but always a bit sceptical, and from talks with Jawaharlal fired with emotional zeal but often confused and unconvinced, meetings with Vallabhbhai were a joy from which I returned with renewed confidence in the future of our country. I have often thought that if fate had decreed that he, instead of Jawaharlal, would be younger of the two, India would have followed a very different path and would be in better economic shape than it is today.{BK2/v} {Lala/174} 

"— JRD Tata"

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Sardar Patel vs. Socialists 

"The socialist-communist bug had started bugging several Indian leaders since the 1920s. Many fell for it out of a fashion. It was “progressive”, “forward-looking”, “scientific-minded”, “pro-poor”, “on the right side of evolving history” to be so. Nehru, who knew or understood next to nothing on economics, also fell for it: it made him look intellectual and pro-poor, even as he lived like an aristocrat (on his father’s money)—imitating British upper class leftists! How the failed idea of the 19th century became so appealing is a mystery. Illiterates in economics fell for it, and even now fall for it!"

" ... Patel objected to Nehru championing a creed of socialism which the Congress had not even accepted. Sardar chastised a group of Congress politicians for “claptrap, catchwords and mere learned talk”{Grov/373} when they initiated the Congress Socialist Party as a faction within the Congress in 1934. Sardar frankly told Acharya Narendra Dev what he thought of the Socialists. Patel described the Congress Socialists as mere ‘sappers and miners’ of the Communist Party. Socialists Minoo Masani, Jayaprakash Narain and others who used to be with Nehru later realised the truth of Patel’s statements. Socialists controlled about a third of the delegates in AICC, and along with communists, they had planned to capture Congress. But, Patel stood like a rock, and frustrated their efforts."

"Sardar Patel never believed socialism was a panacea like Nehru and many other socialists, including Jayaprakash Narayan and Rammanohar Lohia, believed. Sardar was liberal enough to even offer a deal to the socialists on these lines: “Select a province and run it on socialist principles. If they did better than others, he would gladly hand over the country to them.”{RG/491} The offer was not taken, as JP and Lohia later recalled."

"Said Sardar: “Unlike many who indulge in the parrot-cry of socialism, I have no property of my own. Before you talk of socialism you must ask yourself how much wealth you have created by your labour… By experience, I am convinced that what is necessary for us is to learn how to produce more wealth and then to produce wealth and thereafter to think what to do with it.”"

"It is also worth noting that unlike Nehru, who grew up enjoying an aristocratic life; who even later “was completely out of touch with the Indian life even of his time, except with the life of the self-segregating Anglicised set of upper India who lived in the so-called Civil Lines”{NC2} as Nirad Chaudhuri describes in his ‘Autobiography of an Unknown Indian, Part-II’; and for whom Socialism, Communism, Fabianism were more of academics, and devices to appear learned and empathetic towards the poor, and were, in realty, tools to become popular and garner votes; Sardar Patel came from poor, peasant background; was a rooted peasant leader thoroughly familiar with the lives and problems of farmers and peasants; had successfully led several notable peasant agitations against the British; and was among the very first Congress leaders to get associated with Ahmadabad’s Textile Labour Association back in 1917, much before Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement commenced. He was the Chairman of BB&CI Railway Workers Union in 1920. Patel was too rooted to get into the airy nonsense of socialism that ultimately condemned India to remain a poor, hungry, third-rate, third-world country, even as socialists and their dynasties enjoyed a good lifestyle."

"While Patel looked upon socialists as immature and misguided romantics, and hence didn’t consider them as foes; he intensely disliked communists, and had a contempt for them. He considered communists to be trouble creators spreading disaffection and violence, having extraterritorial loyalties, being dictated by people outside India, and betraying the interests of the country, and working at cross-purposes with whatever was in the interest of the Indian people, their freedom, and prosperity.

"On 11 November 1949, addressing a conference of businessmen, industrialists and labour leaders, Sardar Patel offered a practical solution to the country's economic problems saying that “the key to our economic situation lies in increased production”. Said Patel: “Spend less, save more and invest as much as possible, should hence-forward be the motto of every citizen in the country and all of you must see that it becomes the guiding principle of your life. You can select for yourself any suitable means of investment which are open to you, but only make sure that all the money that you save is spent for national cause.”

"“…What mainly derailed businessmen politically was the action the government took against firms suspected of evading taxes. Liaquat Ali [then Finance Minister in the joint Congress-League government under Nehru as the PM in 1946-47] had proposed a commission of inquiry and drawn up a list of about 150 business houses under suspicion. [This Liaquat Ali of the Muslim League had done deliberately to hit at the financiers of the Congress; but Nehru was too full of himself to understand the implications]. This action paralysed business leaders and most of them never recovered from the shock. 

"“Sardar Patel told me that businessmen offered to settle their dues collectively by depositing Rs500 million [a big amount then] in the exchequer. This would have enabled them to bring out their black money and use it legitimately.  

"“Patel favoured the deal because he wanted business to play its full role in activating the country’s economy [a very sensible suggestion]. But Nehru, for reasons of ideology [which later took India to dogs], would not listen to him. The result was that not only did black market money not come out but it kept multiplying. [That’s what happens: socialist policies always result in the opposite of what they claim to intend.]”

"The idea of co-operatives for milk industry was the brainchild of Patel. He was instrumental in motivating farmers to join the co-operative movement so as to break the monopoly of middlemen in milk collection and distribution, and place the power in the hands of the farmers and milk-producers. 

"Once when a delegation of Gujarati farmers came to him citing their inability to send their milk production to the markets without being fleeced by middlemen, Sardar Patel advised them to organize the processing and sale of milk by themselves, and guided them to create the Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers’ Union Limited, that came to be known as AMUL. He further advised that the co-operative should have its own pasteurization plant. In fact, Sardar Patel had advocated farmers’ co-operatives as early as 1942. 

"Once the villagers agreed to Sardar’s proposal, Sardar sent Morarji Desai, his trusted deputy, to Kaira District to organize milk cooperative. Desai held a meeting in Samarkha village on 4 January 1946, and resolved that milk producers’ co-operative societies would be organized in each village of Kaira District to collect milk from their member-farmers. All the milk societies would federate into a Union which would own milk processing facilities. This marked the beginning of Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers’ Union Limited, later popularly known as Amul."

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April 26, 2022 - April 26, 2022. 

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{ 12 } Sardar vs. Nehruvian “Secularism” 

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Nehru’s Pseudo-Secular Position 

"Secular doctrine mandates separation of the state from religion. It is the principle of the separation of government institutions and government functionaries mandated to represent the state from religious institutions, religious authorities, and religious functionaries. It’s a belief that religion should not play a role in the government. A secular state is neutral in the matters of different religious beliefs. 

"A secular state can’t impose religious beliefs and practices upon people. The decisions and acts of a secular state should not be influenced by religious beliefs and/or practices. Secularism is not anti-religion, it is religion-neutral. 

"Nehru blatantly misused “secularism” for minority-appeasement and vote-bank politics.

"Curiously, both the Muslim League and the Jamait-ul-Ulema could team with, and even fight elections on the Congress tickets—that wasn’t communal, as per Nehru’s self-serving definition of ‘secularism’. Were communal and ‘non-secular’ only those who dared to safeguard Hindu interests? Nehru took care not to define the terms like ‘secularism’ and ‘communalism’ and clarify what was meant by a secular state, for that would have robbed him of the flexibility in exploiting them politically. As his tenure hurtled towards disaster, these terms became more and more useful in his vote-bank politics, and as a diversionary discourse.

"Wrote Durga Das: “But [Maulana] Azad [who was close to Nehru] revised his opinion of Nehru in the last two years of his life. Indeed, he went to the extent of expressing regret for being unfair to Patel and asserting that he was sure that the country would have been better off if Patel had been Prime Minister. What motivated this change? Towards the end of his life, Azad realised that the best protection for the Muslims was the goodwill of the Hindus and a strong government. He told me he had come to the conclusion that Nehru’s policies had weakened the administration and that his economic theories had failed to improve the living conditions of the people, especially the Muslims.”

"In the Ajmer communal riots soon after independence, notwithstanding the mischief of the Muslims, Nehru intervened through his private secretary HVR Iyengar to mollycoddle violent Muslims, and ensured that as many Hindus (even if innocent) as Muslims were arrested. On the other hand, Patel stood firmly with the Chief Secretary of the State, Shankar Prasad, and opposed Nehru’s unjust intervention.

"Nehru turned a blind eye to illegal and rampant proselytization by the Christian missionaries that adversely affected national interests. This was particularly so in the Northeast where Nehru went by the advice of the Christian missionaries. The net effect was the secessionist movements in the North-eastern states. 

"Nehru insisted that Urdu was the language of the people of Delhi, and should accordingly be given official recognition. When the Home Minister Pant told him that the statistics showed only 6% of the Delhiwalas had claimed Urdu as their language, Nehru tried to rubbish the statistics, though he didn’t press further with his crazy idea. 

"Nehru was also in favour of Persian-Arabic script in which Urdu is written, rather than Devanagari script in which Hindi and Sanskrit are written. The 

"Constituent Assembly’s pledge of building one nation with one citizenship became a victim of Nehru’s minority-majority syndrome. All those who opposed him were disparaged, labelled non-secular and communal, and weeded out. Gradually, a coterie around Nehru vigorously spread his defective pseudo-secular, anti-Hindu, poverty-perpetuating and misery-multiplying socialistic claptrap, and discredited and sidelined all those who refused to toe Nehru’s line. Leaders who differed exited, and leaders who remained became parrots, bereft of individuality and fresh ideas. Commented DP Mishra: “Gandhiji made heroes out of clay, but under Pundit Nehru’s leadership they are being turned into corpses.”"

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Ambedkar on Appeasement 

"Wrote Ambedkar{Amb3}: 

"“…He [Gandhi] has never called the Muslims to account even when they have been guilty of gross crimes against Hindus… 

"“It is a notorious fact that many prominent Hindus who had offended the religious susceptibilities of the Muslims either by their writings or by their part in the Shuddhi movement have been murdered by some fanatic Musalmans. First to suffer was Swami Shraddhanand, who was shot by Abdul Rashid on 23rd December 1926 when he was lying in his sick bed. This was followed by the murder of Lala Nanakchand, a prominent Arya Samajist of Delhi… Nathuramal Sharma was murdered by Abdul Qayum in September 1934. It was an act of great daring. For Sharma was stabbed to death in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind where he was seated awaiting the hearing of his appeal against his conviction under Section 195, I. P. C., for the publication of a pamphlet on the history of Islam. Khanna, the Secretary of the Hindu Sabha, was severely assaulted in 1938 by the Mahomedans after the Session of the Hindu Maha Sabha held in Ahmedabad and very narrowly escaped death… 

"“This is, of course, a very short list and could be easily expanded. But whether the number of prominent Hindus killed by fanatic Muslims is large or small matters little. What matters is the attitude of those who count, towards these murderers. The murderers paid the penalty of law where law is enforced. The leading Moslems, however, never condemned these criminals. On the contrary, they were hailed as religious martyrs and agitation was carried on for clemency being shown to them. As an illustration of this attitude, one may refer to Mr. Barkat Alli, a Barrister of Lahore, who argued the appeal of Abdul Qayum. He went to the length of saying that Qayum was not guilty of murder of Nathuramal because his act was justifiable by the law of the Koran. This attitude of the Moslems is quite understandable. What is not understandable is the attitude of Mr. Gandhi… 

"“Mr. Gandhi has been very punctilious in the matter of condemning any and every act of violence and has forced the Congress, much against its will to condemn it. But Mr. Gandhi has never protested against such murders. Not only have the Musalmans not condemned these outrages but even Mr. Gandhi has never called upon the leading Muslims to condemn them. He has kept silent over them. Such an attitude can be explained only on the ground that Mr. Gandhi was anxious to preserve Hindu-Moslem unity and did not mind the murders of a few Hindus, if it could be achieved by sacrificing their lives… 

"“This attitude to excuse the Muslims any wrong, lest it should injure the cause of unity, is well illustrated by what Mr. Gandhi had to say in the matter of the Mopla [Moplah] riots. 

"“The following instances of Muslim intransigence, over which Mr. Gandhi kept mum are recorded by Swami Shraddhanand…: ‘As regards the removal of untouchability it has been authoritatively ruled several times that it is the duty of Hindus to expiate for their past sins and non-Hindus should have nothing to do with it. But the Mahomedan and the Christian Congressmen have openly revolted against the dictum of Mr. Gandhi at Vaikorn and other places. Even such an unbiased leader as Mr. Yakub Hassan, presiding over a meeting called to present an address to me at Madras, openly enjoined upon Musalmans the duty of converting all the untouchables in India to Islam.’ But Mr. Gandhi said nothing by way of remonstrance either to the Muslims or to the Christians…”"

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Patel’s Just and Correct Position 

"Patel was against the Muslim Minority, represented by Jinnah, the Muslim League, and others, deviously and unjustly trying to extract in a democratic setup a position for itself equal to or higher than the Hindu Majority, with the active support and encouragement of the British, who had their own vested interest. It amounted to placing a veto in their hands. 

"Although Patel was among the closest colleagues of Gandhi, he drastically differed from Gandhi on the Muslim question. Patel was most certainly not communal, but he was against unjustified appeasement of Muslims. He also felt that Gandhi-Nehru appeasement of Muslims would adversely affect freedom struggle, rather than taking it forward—and, it indeed turned out that way."

"Thanks to the poison spread by Jinnah, the Muslim League and other Muslim leaders, many Muslims who had stayed back in India still looked up to Pakistan as their real home and nation, continued with or adopted a hostile attitude towards the majority community, supported Pakistan on Kashmir rather than India, kept up demands similar to what had brought about the partition by the Muslim League (reservation of seats), and indulged in activities not expected of a citizen of democratic India."

"Even though Patel differed from Gandhi, Nehru, Maulana Azad and others in his approach to the question of Minorities, he was totally non-communal. Patel’s approach was that of a no-nonsense, fair, judicious, and unbiased administrator, who didn’t believe in favouring either Hindus or Muslims just to get popular, or be regarded as a “great secular” or a “Mahatma”. 

"The true test of that is what a person actually does. And Patel’s actions speak for themselves. Patel was Home Minister, and his favourite IG of Police was a Muslim. Despite what Nizam of Hyderabad and Nawab of Bhopal did against India, once they came around, Patel didn’t treat them as enemies, and took revenge, but was, instead, most fair to them, and both of them effusively praised Patel for his generosity and excellent treatment. Similarly, in the matter of partition of assets between India and Pakistan, the Pakistani team was full of praise for him ... "

" ... socialists and seculars like Jayaprakash Narayan, who used to be pro-Nehru and anti-Patel, started saying things similar to what Patel had been saying, albeit a decade or two after independence when they began to get disenchanted with Nehruvian politics."

"There had been unsettling rabble-rousing and provocative speeches during the Mussalman-e-Hind Lucknow Conference attended by thousands of Muslims (and by Maulana Azad too) in December 1947—so soon after the ordeal of partition. Could Hindus have called such a conference in Pakistan, and spoken thus? Certainly not. But, in Gandhi-Nehru era of appeasement, even after the blow of partition, Muslim leaders could take liberties! 

"Patel didn’t believe in remaining a mute spectator to such things, like Gandhi and Nehru, and soon after the above Conference, he spoke thus in Lucknow ... "

" ... Those who want to go to Pakistan can go there and live in peace. Let us live here in peace to work for ourselves… .... "

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April 26, 2022 - April 26, 2022. 

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{ 13 } Sardar’s Functioning 

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"“The Mahatma was the most respected, Jawaharlal Nehru the most loved and Subhas Bose the most longed-for. But in terms of the iron control he exercised over the largest political apparatus in the country and the grip he had on political currents and cross-currents in virtually every province in India, the power wielded by the Patidar from Karamsad [Sardar Patel], Gujarat, had no match. No near-match, either. Not by far…”{URL3} 

"—Gopalkrishna Gandhi"

Gopalkrishna Gandhi is being a tad short in recognition of Netaji, who wasn't merely "longed for", but really the reason why British were forced to leave, due to effect of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose and his INA. And the fierce loyalty he inspired transcends far and beyond the sycophancy that Dynasty promoted, even if not deliberately but only as a result of their policies and behaviour, or the blind obedience Gandhi demanded despite his myriad mistakes, and disastrous effects thereof on millions of lives. Also, his successes in face of tremendous adversities aren't valued yet properly, but those in whom he inspired respect included Japan, and that's highly non-trivial. 

"“Dressed in his Dhoti, Patel conjures up the vision of a Roman Emperor in his toga. There are, in fact, Roman qualities about this man—administrative talent, the capacity to take and sustain strong decisions, and a certain serenity which invariably accompanies real strength of character… In spite of all these preoccupations, Patel has a shrewd grasp of India's strategic position in the world at large… Off duty…he is indeed the embodiment of the gentle Hindu, full of benevolence and smiles.”{ACJ/174} 

"—Allan Campbell-Johnson:"

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Sardar’s Distinguishing Qualities 

"Sardar Patel was blessed with rare qualities of fortitude, integrity and iron determination. His exceptional success in handling of the integration of 548 Princely States practically demonstrated his far-sightedness, his acumen, his tactful and innovative diplomacy, his skill in conflict resolution, and his quick decision-taking ability. 

"Patel never loaded or overloaded himself with files and paperwork and notings. What mattered for him were results and efficiency. 

"Patel was a very good judge of people, and he generally managed to select very competent people to work with him. He was a gifted team builder. Under his guidance, his various teams showed excellent results in the integration of the Princely States, in partition of assets between India and Pakistan, and in handling the difficult period of partition and after. Among the Indian leaders he was undoubtedly the greatest administrator, and showed his trend-setting ability, among other things, in quickly setting up an all-India Indian Administrative Services. ... "

" ... Patel’s enormous success as a great administrator was thanks to his qualities of head and heart. He was sharp, was quick to grasp essentials, and had an iron-will to achieve what he wanted. He had a tremendous capacity to listen patiently and attentively. He was free and frank, and didn’t mince words. 

"Patel was quick-witted, and had a great sense of humour. He used to regale Gandhi with his cracks when both were together in Yerwada Jail in 1932. Gandhi had written in a letter from Yerwada : “Sardar Vallabhbhai is with me. His jokes make me laugh until I can laugh no more—not once, but several times every day.”{BK/159} Indulging in sardonic humour, Sardar had commented to Gandhi in Yerwada on the Gandhi-Irwin Pact: “You can compromise with anyone. How does that matter to you? After all a bania has no pride in his moustache and let's it hang down!”{BK/163} Again in Yerwada, when a British doctor who had come to examine Gandhi ridiculed Indians for spending lakhs on feeding beggars, Sardar retorted: “Yes. But a larger sum is spent on dacoits.”{BK/164} With the doctor unable to catch the drift, Patel helpfully clarified: “There are so many dacoits who have come from Britain! They are no better than looters.”{"

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Patel & IAS 

"It was generally believed that the ICS officers, who were regarded as protégés of the British, would be fittingly booted out after Independence, and would be replaced by patriotic persons. Nehru had himself once remarked of the Indian Civil Service (ICS): “I think it was Voltaire who defined the ‘Holy Roman Empire’ as something which was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.  Just as someone else once defined the Indian Civil Service, with which we are unfortunately still afflicted in this country, as neither Indian, nor civil, nor a service.”{KSMC/215} 

"Rather than adding another difficulty to the already difficult situation after partition, and lest there be further chaos, Patel accommodated Indian ICS officers, after obtaining from them a commitment to serve Free India with loyalty. However, Sardar did not go beyond a point in accommodation them. Mountbatten had sought compensation from India for loss of careers for ICS and IPS officers who chose or were asked to leave on transfer of power. Despite pressure, Patel put his foot down, and rejected the request outright! He was a tough man to deal with."

"Sardar decided that the ICS would help manage the transfer of power, there being no alternative; and that Indian Administrative Service (IAS), a new civil service, would succeed the ICS. Convincing others about IAS was not easy. Provincial Chief Ministers were against all-India officers. They preferred provincial services officers, because being under them, they could have full control. That precisely Patel was against. He wanted all-India service officers who could take unbiased, independent decisions, without coming under the local provincial pressure. Realising that it were the British Civil Servants/ICS who had helped found and then run the British Empire, Patel wanted the new IAS to be partners in administering the country."

" ... thanks to the Congress not having worked out a large number of critical issues prior to independence when they had all the time in the world to do so, Sardar Patel had to perforce resort to ad hoc measures on administration of such a vast and complex country, and do what he thought was best with regard to the ICS, IAS, IPS, and the like."

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Patel’s Administration 

"Other qualities apart, Patel was a superb administrator. Realising that he would have to depend upon the administrators, and not politicians, to ensure the country runs properly, particularly in the chaotic times, he called a large group of senior civil servants in early 1947, had detailed discussions with them, and appealing to their patriotism, called upon them to dedicate themselves in the service of the nation. He let them know that they were all together as partners in efficient and just administration. It had a very positive effect. This and his subsequent interactions with the civil servants, his manner of administration and decision-taking, his standing by them enthused the civil servants to give their best. They also developed a high regard and respect for Patel. 

"Patel was a very good judge of people, and he generally managed to select very competent people to work with him. He then put full faith in people working under him, encouraged them, supported them, and exhorted them to always give their honest and considered opinion, without bothering whether or not Patel and others would like those opinions. This kept Patel supplied with correct information, palatable or otherwise; and provided him with honest opinions, options, and solutions."

"Patel never loaded or overloaded himself with files and paperwork and notings. What mattered for him were results and efficiency. He didn’t bury himself in files, and gave his notings. Secretaries came to him after thoroughly reading the files and preparing themselves, gave him oral briefings, and on that basis, after discussions, he gave his oral decisions that the secretaries noted. No paperwork for him. He had too much work to do, and too many decisions to take to indulge in files and papers. But, he had a photographic memory. He remembered all his oral decisions, and stood by his decisions, and backed up his secretaries when required. 

"Nehru, on the other hand, rather than taking quick decisions, or in lieu of taking decisions, loved paper-work and writing unnecessarily long and laborious notes and letters, more as a show-off, and less to get the work done. Nehru went to the ridiculous extent of even dictating telegraphic and mail replies, correcting and re-correcting their grammar and composition—something that a busy, competent leader ought to delegate to the army of babus reporting to them. 

"A very senior bureaucrat described an episode when he went to Patel for a very critical and major decision. The bureaucrat briefed him on all aspects. The Sardar gave his decision. Incredulous, the bureaucrat asked him if he wouldn’t look at the papers. Sardar asked him matter-of-factly if the bureaucrat had missed out explaining or highlighting something that was in the files and papers. The bureaucrat replied in the negative. The Sardar then said there was no need for him to do what the bureaucrat was supposed to do. The bureaucrat was impressed by the Sardar’s prompt, clear, and unambiguous decision, and what was more he was bold-out by the confidence reposed in him by the Sardar. Who wouldn’t die to work for such a leader!"

"Sardar once affirmed: “My Secretary can write a note opposed to my views. I have given that freedom to all my secretaries. I have told them, ‘If you do not give your honest opinion for the fear that it will displease your Minister, then, please, you had better go. I will bring another Secretary.’”"

"Once a bureaucrat, who had an unpleasant experience with another very senior politician, asked Patel in some context if he really wanted his honest opinion. Patel erupted: “Does Government pay you Rs 4000 a month for your dishonest opinions? It is for you to give an honest opinion; and it is for me to accept it or not.”

"Such remarks, conversations and episodes involving the Sardar quickly spread among the bureaucracy, who loved it. It motivated them to work honestly, diligently, and without fear. That bureaucrats like VP Menon, V Shankar and HM Patel achieved such wonderful results ... was thanks to their association with Patel. 

"Wrote MKK Nair: “On April 27, 1948, Sardar Patel wrote to Nehru, ‘I need hardly emphasize that an efficient, disciplined and contended Service, assured of its prospects as a result of diligent and honest work, is a sine qua non of sound administration under a democratic regime even more than under an authoritarian rule. The Service must be above the party and we should ensure that political considerations, either in recruitment or in discipline and control are reduced to the minimum, if not eliminated altogether.’

"Patel’s enormous success as a great administrator was thanks to his qualities of head and heart. He was sharp, was quick to grasp essentials, and had an iron-will to achieve what he wanted. He had a tremendous capacity to listen patiently and attentively. He was witty and humorous, free and frank, and didn’t mince words. He knew when to say “No!” But, he was discreet in his use of words. He excelled in his unerring judgement. He was just, polite, considerate, communicative, and accommodating. He gave respect, and received respect from all. He was a stern realist, meant business, and was decisive. His decisions never brooked delay. He used to be cool, composed, in control, and alert even in crisis."

"Wrote MKK Nair: 

"“VP called an attender and told him, ‘Take this man outside.’ Neshamani [Diwan of a Princely State] went out immediately. Neshamani then wrote a long letter of complaint to Sardar Patel saying that V P Menon was a useless fellow and drunkard who in an inebriated state had insulted him and sent him out of his room. When this reached Sardar Patel, VP had not reached back in Delhi. Patel called his Private Secretary, V Shankar, ICS and asked him, ‘Does VP have a habit of consuming liquor?’  ‘Yes’ Shankar told him.  ‘What does he usually drink?’ was what Patel wanted to know and Shankar told him, ‘He drinks only Scotch Whisky.’ ‘Then please advise all Secretaries to drink Scotch Whisky’ Patel told him. This became an amusing topic of discussion at high-level comradeship meetings in Delhi.”"

"A few instances are already given above, including that on paper-work. This is what KF Rustamji, who had worked with Nehru, had to say: 

"“No big decision could be taken in India by anyone, except Nehru. He kept about and below him men who would always turn to him for decisions, or who, if they took decisions would soon be told that they were wrong… How did this work in practice? It meant that on every major problem when there was a doubt about government policy, that doubt would be removed by the PM… There were good, clever men, advisers in the government, who were able to read the PM’s mind, or make an accurate forecast of the way he would think. But these men did not exercise their own critical judgement. They merely anticipated a decision which could be easily done. If it could not be easily anticipated, they awaited the Oracle’s pronouncement… Modern government is such a complex affair that if a policy is uncertain, those who function at a distance (like ambassadors and delegates to the UN) or lower below (like Under Secretaries) are constantly kept guessing.”{Rust/72} 

"Rustamji also wrote: 

"“The one test which Nehru applied to men whom he took into the inner circle was loyalty to him. It did not matter if a man had no mind of his own. He must, however, have enough intelligence to avoid irritation. He should be able to understand what the PM said, and if he asked questions, he should do so intelligently so that an opening may be provided for JN to amplify his points for another half an hour or so… He must put all his faith in Nehru, believe in Nehru, admire and adore Nehru, and say worshipful things now and again which could be brushed aside with gratified indifference…”

"Rajaji wrote in Swarajya of 21.10.1961: 

"“Does [Nehru] not realise that a fine cadre of officials have now been made into spineless flatterers and partisans?... I see Chief Ministers, finance and food ministers going about extorting money for the party without fear or shame… I happen to remember a time when such things could not be thought of…”"

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Sardar, Constitution and Minorities 

"As Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Minorities set up by the Constituent Assembly, Sardar Patel tactfully outmanoeuvred left-out-in-India Muslim Leaguers and Jinnah’s agents, and even Maulana Azad, who were trying to ensure separate electorates and reservation of seats for the Muslims. Patel was determined to ensure that the seeds of separation that had been sown by the British by way of separate Muslim electorates and seats were not re-sown in the new Constitution being made. Patel’s triumph in this respect was hailed by Nehru as a “historic turn in our destiny”. 

"Patel set in motion the critical policies in the Constituent Assembly through his confidants like GB Pant and KM Munshi. He was discreet and diplomatic, and avoided imposing his will. Yet, he ensured through his deft manoeuvres that nothing harmful, like the separate Minority electorates, became part of the Constitution. Several leading Muslim leaders had even demanded provision in the Constitution for appointment of Muslim Qazis to administer Sharia Laws!"

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Sardar: Non-Dynastic & Non-Nepotistic, 

unlike Nehru 

"Sardar Patel had gone to the extent of telling his son and grandson, when they visited him [Sardar] after he suffered a heart-attack in Delhi: “As long as I am in this chair, don’t visit Delhi, unless I am unwell and you have to see me...All sorts of people will contact you. Take care.”

"Unlike Indira Gandhi, Maniben Patel, Sardar’s daughter, was a freedom fighter, and underwent several jail terms. Yet Sardar Patel never promoted her post-independence. Even Sardar’s son Dahyabhai was a freedom fighter and was jailed for two years during the Quit India Movement, but Sardar never promoted him.

"“Very few know that Iron Man's youngest grandson is still alive and settled in Vadodara after a stint in academia at the US. Sardar's family consisted of wife Zaverba, son Dahyabhai and daughter Maniben. While Maniben remained unmarried till her death in 1993, Dahyabhai had two sons Bipin and Gautam. Bipin, who had no children, passed away in January 2004, and the only one to carry forward Sardar's bloodline is 69-year-old Gautam, whose son Kedar is settled in the US. 

"“‘We have abstained from sharing any views on Sardar Patel or his life, as we would fall into the trap of politics of one or the other party,’ Gautam's wife Nandini told TOI. Her husband preferred to join Stanford University, as they were nourished with an ideology, which asked them not to misuse Sardar's name and his fame of being the most powerful man in independent India…"

"Durga Das writes in his book that in 1957 in his weekly column in Hindustan Times he wrote Nehru was building up his daughter for succession. He says he had checked with Maulana Azad before writing the column, and Azad had said he too had independently reached the same conclusion. Even Govind Ballabh Pant had the same opinion. Later, when Nehru remonstrated with Durga Das on the column, to mollify Nehru, Durga Das assured him that what he had written would bring good publicity to Indira and would stand her in good stead—at which Nehru felt happy and smiled."

"Wrote Rajmohan Gandhi: “Suddenly, at this juncture, Indira Gandhi, Jawaharlal’s daughter, was named party president. Her talents were yet a secret, and she had no experience of party work. Several of Nehru’s colleagues were offended by the choice but said nothing. C.R. [Rajaji] was outraged.”"

"Wrote Kuldip Nayar: 

"“This was where I first heard that Congress President V.N. Dhebar was resigning and Indira Gandhi was taking over. Pant had supported Nehru at Vinoba’s ashram but not at the CWC when Indira Gandhi was nominated as the party president. He was careful not to oppose Nehru’s daughter directly but argued that her frail health would come in the way of the extensive travels the Congress president was required to undertake. Raising his voice, Nehru told Pant that ‘she was healthier than both of us’ and could put in longer hours of work. The subsequent discussions, as I noted, were to fix the date on which she would assume charge. This was the first time that dynastic politics came to the fore, and the Congress since then has been following the practice of invariably having a member of Nehru family at the helm of affairs...Left to Nehru, he would have liked Indira to succeed him as prime minister, but too many Congress leaders, with a long stint of sacrifice and struggle for the country’s freedom, were still on the scene at the time.”"

"Writes Kuldip Nayar: 

"“I ventured to ask Shastri one day: ‘Who do you think Nehru has in mind as his successor?’ ‘Unke dil main to unki saputri hai [In his heart is his daughter],’ said Shastri... Nijalingappa said he was pretty sure that Nehru had his daughter in mind as his successor. In his diary, he wrote on 15 July 1969 that Nehru ‘was always grooming her for the prime-ministership obviously and patently’.”"

"Apart from the above dynastic streak vis-à-vis Indira, Nehru had a nepotistic streak. During the Nehruvian era of 1947–64 there were many Pandits, Saprus, Kauls, Katjus, Dhars, Nehrus, and their kins in various government posts. Wrote Neville Maxwell: “An official (non-Kashmiri, non-Brahmin) who worked closely with Nehru for a time wrote that enemies of the Prime minister used to say that his search for talent and gift for talent spotting was limited to those around him and particularly to Kashmiris, and amongst them, those who were in one way or another connected with the Nehru family…”"

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No Hypocrisy in Money Matters 

" ... from a blog-post of Swapan Dasgupta: ‘“I have heard”, Nehru told Ghosh [Atulya Ghosh: West Bengal Congress supremo in the early 1960s] accusingly, “that you are a bit too friendly with Calcutta’s Marwari businessmen.” Never inclined to kowtow to someone he regarded as a poseur, Ghosh’s reply was characteristically blunt: “What you have heard is right. Our party needs money, not merely for Bengal but for UP and Bihar too. Who do you think funds us? Without that money you wouldn’t be wearing that rose on your lapel.” Nehru was taken aback by this insolence and complained to his old friend Dr BC Roy who was chief minister of West Bengal. Dr Roy laughed it off but delighted in repeating the story to others.’"

"Here is a description of Sardar Patel’s attitude, in sharp contrast. Gandhi had hang-ups on collection of money for the 1946 elections. However, realising the critical importance of funds, Vallabhbhai Patel took on the responsibility, and did the needful. He wrote to Gandhi later: “I did the work as I felt it was unavoidable. We would have all been blamed if it had not been done.”{RG2/L-5987} GD Birla was told by Gandhi: “I do not like Sardar collecting money from businessmen.” When Birla conveyed those remarks to Patel, he retorted: “That is not his [Gandhi’s] concern. Gandhi is a Mahatma. I am not. I have to do the job.”"

But there always have been stories about Gandhi’s relationships with businessmen, apart from his charging five rupees for autograph, which was huge in pre-Independence decades. 

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Democrat Patel vs. Autocrat Nehru 

"It was unfortunate that Nehru used to be autocratic and wanted all power to himself, even though he generally made poor decisions, as the results of his decisions showed, and as the history proved. 

"In sharp contrast, even though Patel generally made prompt, timely and correct decisions, he tended to be democratic. Patel could afford to be autocratic and dictatorial, and the nation could afford it, given the correctness and quality of his decisions, yet he remained democratic;  while the nation could not really afford the generally wrong decisions that Nehru took, yet Nehru remained autocratic. 

"Had Nehru been democratic, open, and transparent, hopefully many of his potential mistakes would have been corrected through democratic discussions in the Cabinet. ... "

"Nehru unilaterally declared the socialist JB Kripalani as the candidate. Patel gave full support to Purushottam Das Tandon for the presidentship. Nehru, the pseudo-secular, had his objections to the selection of Tandon. The objections didn’t really make sense, like Tandon attending  a Refugees’ Conference, and so on. Nehru threatened to resign if Tandon was elected President. Despite the threat, Tandon won with 1306 votes against Kripalani’s 1092. Nehru, the power-hungry person, of course, didn’t resign. On the next day of the election results, when Rajaji came to meet Patel, Patel asked him jocularly: “Have you brought Jawaharlal’s resignation?”"

" ... Nehru gradually outmanoeuvred Tandon, and forced his resignation from the presidentship of the party. 

"Although already having critical responsibilities to fulfil as a Prime Minister, with the additional charge of the External Affairs, “democratic” Nehru took on the additional job as president of the party in 1951, by manipulating his elevation, so as to become all powerful. The normal practice in the Congress was to elect a new president each year, but ignoring it, Nehru kept getting himself re-elected, and remained president for a continuous term of four years."

"John Mathai (1886–1959) was an economist who served as India's first Railway Minister and subsequently as India's Finance Minister between 1949 and 1951. Incidentally, Verghese Kurien of Amul fame was his nephew; while his son, Ravi Mathai, was the Founder Director of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. 

"Mathai was made to resign by Nehru following his objection to the increasing power of the Planning Commission. In a press statement upon his resignation, Mathai said, inter alia: “I consider the Planning Commission not merely ill-timed but in its working and general set-up ill-conceived. The Planning Commission was tending to become a parallel cabinet… it would weaken the authority of the Finance Ministry and gradually reduce the Cabinet to practically a registering authority… The Planning Commission was totally unnecessary and in fact hardly qualified for its work… there was a general tendency amongst the various Ministries to disregard the authority of the Standing Finance Committee and that some of the greatest offenders were the Ministers directly under the control of the Prime Minister. When departures from accepted practice were approved by the Prime Minister, it has a demoralizing effect on other departments of Government.”

"Initially prejudiced against Sardar Patel, and being pro-Nehru, Mathai soon discovered Nehru’s “feet of clay” and remarked: 

"“…Under Nehru the Cabinet had never functioned, and all decisions were taken privately by the Prime Minister and the individual Minister concerned. Even when a decision was endorsed in the Cabinet, the Prime Minister went back on it and reversed the decision… The only time when the Indian Cabinet really functioned was when Nehru was away in Washington for a few weeks towards the end of October 1948 and when Sardar Patel was acting as Prime Minister. For the first time the cabinet functioned with joint responsibility; and the acting Prime Minister conducted meetings as the British Prime Minister would have.”"

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April 26, 2022 - April 26, 2022. 

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{ 14 } Injustice to Sardar

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"Many of the injustices heaped on the Sardar have already been covered above. But, just to list a few: Gandhi-Motilal Nehru manoeuvre to bypass him from the Congress Presidentship in 1929, and thereby artificially pushing-up Nehru in the Congress hierarchy; Gandhi undemocratically anointing Nehru as the President (and hence the first PM) in 1946, ignoring the fact that 80% had voted for Sardar, and none for Nehru; Nehru and his socialist group missing no opportunity to defame or brand Patel as pro-capitalist; projecting Nehru as highly educated and knowledgeable, an intellectual and an ‘internationalist’, and as someone well-versed in foreign-policy, while implying Patel’s weaknesses in these areas, when the facts were actually reverse; projecting Nehru as non-communal and secular, and Patel as communal, which was untrue; Nehru taking away the responsibility of Sardar on Kashmir without even the courtesy to inform him, and behaving in such a crude and bossy way with him that Sardar was forced to tender his resignation.

"After independence too the efforts of Nehru, socialists, communists, and ‘seculars’ continued to tar Patel. 

"Jayaprakash Narayan(JP), a socialist, used to be in Nehru’s camp. After independence the socialists had been plotting to unseat Patel from his post as Home Minister. JP had commented: “A man of 74 [Sardar Patel] has the department of which even a man of 30 would find it difficult to bear the burden.” Mridula Sarabhai, who was close to Nehru, had launched a whisper campaign for Sardar’s resignation. It is difficult to believe that the campaigns of both JP and Mridula did not have the blessings of Nehru, both being close to him.

"JP stated in 1972: “Rajaji once unburdened his heart by publicly confessing to a wrong he had done to Sardar Patel. I find myself in a similar situation: the dominant feeling within me today is one of self-reproach, because during his lifetime, I was not merely a critic, but an opponent of the Great Sardar.”

"Wrote Brig. BN Sharma: 

"“…he [Nehru] could be down-right petty to others. His silent encouragement of a whispering campaign branding Patel as fascist is too well known.”{BNS/402} 

"Wrote historian Makkhan Lal: 

"“Deep inside his heart, Nehru always was a dictator and first rate politician and manipulator. He feared only Gandhi and Patel—Gandhi because of his moral authority and complete grip on the masses and Patel because of his firmness, unwillingness to be emotionally blackmailed and the writ in the party.”"

"Bharat Ratna was awarded to Sardar Patel in 1991 and to Dr Ambedkar in 1990! And, that too because there were non-Dynasty governments since December 1989—VP Singh, then Chandra Shekhar, followed by Narsimha Rao."

"Bose was awarded Bharat Ratna posthumously in 1992, which was later withdrawn on a legal technicality, in response to a Supreme Court directive: Government was asked to submit conclusive evidence of Netaji's death—which it could not—on a PIL as to how the award could be posthumous. However, the intriguing point is how come they thought of the award to Netaji only in 1992—even though the amendment to give awards posthumously was made in 1955 itself?"

"Radhakrishnan was awarded Bharat Ratna in 1954, Rajaji in 1954, Nehru in 1955—when he was himself the PM, Govind Ballabh Pant in1957, BC Roy in 1961, Zakir Hussain in 1963, Indira Gandhi in 1971—when she was herself the PM, VV Giri in 1975, Kamaraj in 1976, Vinoba Bhave in 1983, MGR in 1988, and Rajiv Gandhi in 1991! 

"But, Sardar Patel, Subhas Chandra Bose and Dr Ambedkar, being not as great as these worthies(!!), got it later! The Dynasty did not like them!! It has been that personal in our feudal democracy. Of course, the only unjust thing that the Dynasty did was to have left out poor Sanjay Gandhi!"

"When Sardar died in Mumbai, Nehru, who himself attended the funeral, advised the then President, Rajendra Prasad, to not attend the funeral{DD/305}—the reason given by him was that as per the protocol, President need not attend funerals of ministers! So he treated Sardar Patel as a mere minister—what arrogance! A disgraceful attitude, particularly when Sardar Patel had so selflessly supported him in the interest of the nation, even though Nehru had usurped the PM’s post from him most undemocratically."

" ... But, of course, Rajendra Prasad went. Sardar was not just the Deputy PM, but was Rajendra Prasad's colleague of many, many years in the Independence Struggle. 

"MKK Nair, an IAS officer who was close to both Sardar Patel and VP Menon, states in his book ‘The Story of an Era Told Without Ill-will’: 

"“Incessant differences of opinion between Nehru and Patel caused Nehru to treat Patel with personal animosity. If the great Nehru was not above harbouring personal hatred, he would not have done two things he did on the day Patel died. He sent two orders to the Home Ministry and they arrived at V P Menon’s desk. The first was that the Cadillac car that Patel used should be returned the very next morning to the Foreign Ministry. Patel died in Bombay. Nehru’s second memo asked officers who wished to attend his funeral to travel at their own expense. V P Menon called officers of his Ministry and, without divulging Nehru’s order, asked who all were interested to attend the funeral. About a dozen officers wanted to. He bought their air tickets at his expense. When Nehru learnt about it, he was annoyed even more.”

"The above was confirmed when KM Munshi wrote: “When Sardar died in Bombay, Jawaharlal issued a direction to the Ministers and Secretaries not to go to Bombay to attend the funeral. Among the Ministers, I was in Matheran (Bombay) at the time. Sri NV Gadgil, Sri Satyanarayan Sinha and Sri VP Menon disregarded the direction and attended the funeral. Jawaharlal also requested [President Dr] Rajendra Prasad not to go to Bombay; it was a strange request, to which Rajendra Prasad did not accede.”"

"This is from the preface of ‘Patel–A Life’ by Rajmohan Gandhi {RG/ix}: 

"“The establishment of independent India derived legitimacy and power, broadly speaking, from the exertions of three men, Gandhi, Nehru and Patel. But while its acknowledgements are fulsome in the case of Nehru and dutiful in case of Gandhi, they are niggardly in the case of Patel. 

"“‘That there is today an India to think and talk about,’ President Rajendra Prasad wrote in his diary on May 13, 1959, ‘is very largely due to Sardar Patel’s statesmanship and firm administration.’ ‘Yet,’ added Prasad, ‘we are apt to ignore him.’ 

"“Falling in 1989, the centenary of Jawaharlal’s birth found expression on a thousand billboards, in commemorative TV serials, in festivals and on numerous other platforms. Occurring on October 31, 1975 … the Patel centenary was, by contrast, wholly neglected by official India and by the rest of the Establishment, and since then the curtain drawn on the life of one of modern India’s most remarkable sons has been occasionally and partially lifted…”"

"This is from the foreword of S Nijalingappa to the book, ‘Inside Story of Sardar Patel—The Diary of Maniben Patel: 1936-50’: “Strangely, however, while the collected works of many other leaders [notably, Nehru and Gandhi] have been published by the government since Independence, the collected or selected works of two foremost leaders, namely Sardar Patel and Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, were never taken up by any official agency. It is for this reason that we constituted the Sardar Patel Society, had it registered, collected funds and published the Collected works of Sardar Patel in fifteen volumes...”"

"In the capital, in the prime area, you have Rajghat for Gandhiji, Shanti Van for Nehru, Shakti Sthal for Indira Gandhi, Veer Bhumi for Rajiv Gandhi, Vijay Ghat for Shastri, Kishan Ghat for Charan Singh, besides many museums or memorials for the Nehru-Gandhis, but no memorial to either Subhas Bose or to Sardar Patel in the capital, when next to Gandhiji the latter two deserve the highest respect!

"The residence in Delhi where Sardar lived when he was the Deputy Prime Minister of the country has been razed and there is no sign that he had ever lived there. Nehru’s house, on the other hand, has been turned into a museum.

"Nehru’s meanness and small-mindedness can be gauged from the fact that he made NO arrangements to have a portrait of Sardar Patel put up in the Central Hall of Parliament, like it was done for other prominent leaders. Apparently, he saw to it that such a portrait was not put up, like he had similarly done in case of Netaji Subhas Bose.

"It was Maharaja Jivaji Rao Scindia of Gwalior, who had since become the first Rajpramukh of Madhya Bharat, who felt much irked by that glaring (and, apparently, deliberate) omission, and presented a Sardar Patel’s portrait to be put up in the Central Hall of Parliament in 1954. The unveiling ceremony was performed by President Dr Rajendra Prasad."

Author ends by describing the then upcoming, now unveiled, project of a memorial of Sardar, the Statue of Unity. 

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April 26, 2022 - April 26, 2022. 

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SARDAR PATEL: 

The Best PM India Never Had 

by Rajnikant Puranik. 

(Author) 

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January 04, 2022 - 

April 23, 2022 - April , 2022.  

Purchased August 15, 2021. 

Kindle Edition, 297 pages

Published September 26th 2018

ASIN:- B07HQXLLVS

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Format: Kindle Edition

Kindle Edition

Kindle Edition, 297 pages

Published September 26th 2018

ASIN:- B07HQXLLVS

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SARDAR PATEL : The Best PM India Never Had 

by Rajnikant Puranik 

This is an abridged version of the author’s other book: “Sardar Patel : The Iron Man who should have been India’s First PM” 

Copyright ©  2018 Rajnikant Puranik www.rkpbooks.com 

Categories: Non-fiction, History 

Edition: October 2018

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https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/4690318773

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Detailed Table of Contents 

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{ 1 } Summarised Chronology 

{ 2 } Biographical Outline 

Childhood Anecdotes 

Education Career 

Elder Brother Vithalbhai 

Wife Jhaverba 

Daughter Maniben 

Son Dahyabhai Patel 

To Heavenly Abode 

{ 3 } Freedom Struggle & Sardar, 1917–43 

Start of Patel’s Association with Gandhi, 1917 

Sardar’s Public Service Landmarks, 1917-19 

Patel’s Kheda Agitation 1918 

Khilafat & Non-Cooperation Movement (KNCM) 1920-22 

Patel & Nagpur Satyagraha 1923 

Patel’s Borsad Satyagraha 1923 

Patel’s Commendable Work for Ahmedabad Municipality 

Patel’s Work during Ahmedabad Floods 1927 

Patel’s Bardoli Satyagraha 1928 

Congress Call for “Purna Swaraj”, 1930 

Dandi March, Salt Satyagraha, Sardar’s Preparation, 1930 

Sardar as Congress President, March 1931 

Sardar & Elections 1934-37 

Patel, Bose & Haripura Session 1938 

Resignation of Ministries, 1939: Sardar’s Opposition 

Pearl Harbor (Dec-1941) & its Aftermath 

Quit India Movement 1942 

{ 4 } Sardar & Run-up to Freedom, 1944-47 

Sidelining of Gandhi & Emergence of Patel-Nehru 

Bose, INA Trials & Mutiny 

Elections 1945-46 

Cabinet Mission, March 1946 

Interim Government, Sep-1946 

Patel’s New Home & Colleagues, Oct-1946 

V Shankar & HM Patel VP Menon 

{ 5 } Patel, Partition & Pakistan, 1947 

Freedom, Partition & Pakistan, 1947 

Diabolical League–British Design 

Patel & the Partition of Assets 

55 crores to Pakistan: Patel vs. Nehru-Gandhi 

{ 6 } How India was Deprived of the Best First PM 

{ 7 } Sardar & the Integration of the Princely States 

Princely States: An Overview 

Dividing India into Hundreds of Pieces 

How Sardar Patel Turned the Tables 

Sardar, Junagadh and the Crazy Nawab Hyderabad: How Sardar Prevented Pakistan-II 

{ 8 } Kashmir, Sardar & Botch-up by Nehru 

J&K Problem thanks to Nehru usurping Patel’s Role 

Nehru’s Blunders, ignoring Sardar’s Sane Advice 

Reference to the UN Article-370, thanks to Nehru, and despite Sardar 

Sardar’s 547 Successes & Nehru’s Kashmir Failure 

Sardar, VP Menon & Kashmir 

{ 9 } Sardar vs. Nehru on China & Tibet 

Sardar Patel’s Approach 

Nehru, China & Tibet 

{ 10 } Foreign Policy & External Security : Nehru vs. Sardar 

Nehru: Foreign to Foreign Policy? 

Sardar Patel & Foreign Policy 

Patel, Goa & Nehru 

{ 11 } Sardar vs. Nehru’s Socialistic Nightmare 

Theory of Non-Affluent Society 

Democracy and Socialism: Are they compatible? 

Nehruvian Socialistic Suicide 

What They Said of Nehru & Socialism 

Sardar Patel vs. Socialists 

{ 12 } Sardar vs. Nehruvian “Secularism” 

Nehru’s Pseudo-Secular Position 

Ambedkar on Appeasement 

Patel’s Just and Correct Position 

{ 13 } Sardar’s Functioning 

Sardar’s Distinguishing Qualities 

Patel & IAS Patel’s Administration 

Sardar, Constitution and Minorities 

Sardar: Non-Dynastic & Non-Nepotistic, unlike Nehru 

No Hypocrisy in Money Matters 

Democrat Patel vs. Autocrat Nehru 

{ 14 } Injustice to Sardar

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