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"In the city itself, meanwhile, the German soldiers were dealing with looters. Two 14-year-old boys were arrested and sentenced to be shot by firing squad in public."
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The first couple of pages of chapter six describe next moves planned by Generals Eisenhower, Bradley, Montgomery - with some objections by General Patton noted - and the differences they had; to anyone whos watched A Bridge Too Far, mentioned in this book before, what's coming is anticipated, and so a reader expects more.
"Since 19 September, the 1st Infantry Division, along with the 3rd Armored Division, had been making forays into an area between the cities of Aachen, Düren, and Monschau known as the Hürtgen Forest. Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges had personally authorized and endorsed this action for the purpose of eliminating German resistance there. It wasn’t even debated at the time that entering those densely forested primordial woods of tall fir trees, deep gorges, high ridges, and narrow trails area would eradicate all tactical advantages that the US forces had employed since the battles in Normandy. The canopy of the forest was so thick that when the GIs ventured in, they were in almost pitch darkness after about 30 yards. This also meant that it was nearly impossible to operate at anything above squad strength. The situation was exacerbated by the strong German defenses located deep in the forest and protected by pillboxes from the Siegfried Line.
"American units were furnished with maps that didn’t accurately show the steep contours of this region, and when the attacks bogged down, no one above the rank of captain ever went to see what the problem was. For the unfortunate infantry the forest presented a hellish tableau full of booby traps, mines, tree bursts, and an enemy determined to thwart their every move."
"General Hodges delegated the job of clearing out the forest to Major General Leonard T. Gerow’s V Corps. Gerow, in turn, passed the mission on to Major General Norman D. Cota’s 28th Infantry Division. It cost the 28th Division, whose red keystone shoulder patch became known as the “Bloody Bucket,” almost 80 percent of its number and even then the task wasn’t successfully accomplished."
"While the 28th Infantry Division endured the stalemate in the Hürtgen Forest, US divisions in and around Aachen prepared for a drive to the Rhine River. ... When General Eisenhower met Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley in Brussels on 18 October to discuss future plans, he once again hammered home his idea of the “broad-front” strategy. Eisenhower had first proposed this idea after the St. Lô-Falaise breakout. Patton had disagreed vociferously with the suggestion. General Eisenhower and his advisers suggested that with winter fast approaching, the best policy might be to hold in place, then to launch a final victorious offensive in the early spring.
"The problem for many Allied commanders was Eisenhower’s credibility as a strategist. Although he was a respected and much admired leader, his emphasis was usually more inclined toward maintaining the equilibrium among his commanders rather than initiating bold military strategies. The problem for many Allied commanders was Eisenhower’s credibility as a strategist. The “wait until spring” idea was not received well and eventually three mitigating factors helped dissuade Eisenhower from this course of action. First, due to the attritional nature of the fighting, the German army was incurring casualties of up to 4,000 per day. Second, a winter sojourn would give the new German divisions time to train, prepare these troops for combat, and enable German industrial production to turn out more tanks and guns. Third, a sizeable pause in the fighting might enable the Germans to accelerate their jet production and discover the proximity fuse that would enable them to blast Allied bombers out of the skies.
"Although Bradley and Montgomery’s opinions on how to proceed were diametrically opposed, Montgomery still fervently supported the idea of his Allied spearhead in the north supported by US divisions. Bradley wasn’t particularly enamored with this idea. Supply was an omnipresent problem for the Allies so before he could begin any concerted thrust east, Montgomery had to clear German forces out of the Walcheren peninsula west of Antwerp, which would drastically shorten supply lines. Eisenhower knew that a push to the Ruhr River was an imperative. He had even made plans for this before the Allied invasion of Normandy. The Ruhr valley was the pumping heart of Germany’s industrial might; moreover, the Allies wanted an economic objective that, if achieved, would substantially hinder Germany’s means of continuing the war. If they could capture the Ruhr industrial area this would effectively deprive Germany of 65 percent of its production of crude steel and 56 percent of its coal.
"It was tentatively agreed that the British 21st Army Group would attack east of Eindhoven and head towards the Ruhr to establish bridgeheads over the Rhine and Ijssel Rivers. Hodges’s First Army would make the main thrust in the center for the 12th Army Group. He would be charged with the task of establishing a bridgehead across the Rhine south of Cologne. Lieutenant General William Hood Simpson’s Ninth Army would protect the First Army’s left flank between Sittard and Aachen until the Ruhr was crossed, and then they intended to veer northeastward toward Krefeld. Bradley had repositioned the Ninth between the First Army and the 21st Army Group on 22 October to avoid them from being requisitioned by Montgomery. According to Bradley the motivation for doing this had no tactical basis other than to prevent Montgomery from using the veteran First Army for his own purposes. After weeks of meticulous planning the attack was finally launched toward the Roer River.
"The 30th Division, meanwhile, was given the job of eliminating the German salient that jutted out west toward Aachen. Their flanks would be protected by the 29th Infantry Division in the north and the newly-arrived 104th Infantry Division (“Timberwolves”) in the south. While the 119th Infantry Regiment remained in Würselen, the 117th and 120th Infantry Regiments lined up between Alsdorf and Euchen. Patrols in that vicinity didn’t encounter any serious German opposition, so everything was set for the standard military advance. This reconnaissance established that the German line ran along the line of a railway embankment. The “Work Horse of the Western Front” was going to have to work for it again."
But - having built up the anticipation - Battle of the Bulge precedes Operation Market Garden. This after all is about the 30th, who were at the Battle of the Bulge, but not involved in Market Garden.
One point a reader here might begin to notice unless a professional historian, is that most accounts of the Battle of the Bulge are usually centred around Bastogne, which is well deserved, of course, but here one reads about other just as well deserved battles and encounters, and begins to know of other important points that the Battle of the Bulge was fought around - Stavelot, for example - and most of all, Baugnez and Malmédy. This part is hardly ever spoken about, perhaps as a matter of policy, because immediately after the war and even as Nuremberg trials were proceeding, cold war was on, and any public knowledge about the Malmédy massacre by the S.S., of eighty U.S. soldiers who had fought and surrendered, would turn the U.S. people into far more fiercely anti German than the horror evoked by the exposing of extermination camps.
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"On 21 November, the 30th Division moved out at night, charged with the task of clearing out Ninth Army’s inner wing near the original line of departure and during the initial assault they gained 3-1/2 miles. The 120th Infantry Regiment and its attached 743rd Tank Battalion quickly overran five villages. The 120th Infantry’s most advanced position ended just four miles from the Roer. They had encountered some sporadic resistance but there were no concerted German counterattacks to dissuade them from their trajectory.
" ... Rumors began to circulate that the Germans were massing forces just east of the Rhine, but there was no serious intelligence at the time to substantiate these claims. ... By 30 November, Old Hickory had accomplished its contribution in the historic drive to the Ruhr River and in the process they had incurred 160 men killed and 1,058 wounded."
"On the whole, the drive to the Ruhr had been a disappointing maneuver because although quite a bit of territory was claimed by the Allies, they hadn’t really been able to exploit these minor victories sufficiently. Hemmed in by a checkerboard of villages and towns, it had been a slogging match that hadn’t really enabled the US forces to break out into open ground. They had now set themselves up, moreover, with the daunting task of actually crossing the Ruhr River at a future point in time. Farther south in the Hürtgen Forest, torrential rain and mud had all but brought the advance there to a halt. The whole area was simply not conducive to the Allied way of fighting. To the right of the town of Schmidt in the Hürtgen Forest, the Schwammenauel Dam was still intact as were many of the dams that supplied the Ruhr industrial zone. Between 4 and 11 December, the RAF dropped approximately 2,000 tons of bombs on these dams, but hadn’t managed to breach any of them and had been largely ineffectual. Calling for air support in the Hürtgen was often counterproductive because of the dense canopy, so it was all left to the infantry to do the hard work."
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"General Patton had casually mentioned that the Germans were still capable of mounting a powerful offensive if they wanted to, but nobody at SHAEF suspected that a counterattack would occur in this sector. Patton had positioned his whole Third Army in the Alsace region in northern France because if the attack came he assumed that it would happen there. He based his assumptions on the fact that this area had indeed changed hands on a number of occasions during the previous hundred years. Alsace looked like any other southern German place with its half-timbered houses and cobbled streets. Many there still spoke German and referred to Alsace by its German name, Das Elsass. The Germans knew the terrain there all too well. They had targeted the area in 1940 but whether or not it would be suitable for a new offensive remained to be seen."
"A particular problem for the Allies at this time was the glaring lack of accurate and verifiable intelligence regarding the buildup of German forces in the west. Bletchley Park had intercepted communications that indicated that some German divisions were being moved west from the Russian front, but no one at SHAEF regarded this information as anything more than an indication that they were preparing to defend their homeland when the Allies went on the offensive again in February 1945. Even when two German prisoners were inadvertently captured by the 28th Infantry Division on the Luxembourg/Germany border, no one believed their claims that a massive German counteroffensive was imminent. Some days prior to the attack, the German armies had imposed radio silence on all their units; although some US division commanders suspected that something was afoot, there was still no definitive intelligence to corroborate this.
"At 0530 hours on 16 December, however, their suspicions proved right. Along an 89-mile front that stretched from Monschau on the southwestern edge of the Hürtgen Forest all the way down to Echternach in the south of Luxembourg, a tirade of German wrath was unleashed against unsuspecting GIs as barrages from at least 657 artillery pieces, along with 340 rocket launchers, thundered into the murky pre-dawn skies and crashed among the unsuspecting thin green line of US troops there.
"Over at First Army HQ in Spa, General Omar Bradley received the news with incredulity. He wasn’t the only one who didn’t consider this to be an all-out offensive, but as the day wore on it was evident that these were most definitely not simple probing attacks. As German 88s and Nebelwerfers reaped havoc among front-line US divisions, word reached the 30th that something serious was going on down in the Ardennes. Three German armies had attacked simultaneously along the whole line there. In the northern sector they were primarily SS units, some of which had been specially imported from the eastern front solely for this offensive. These battle-hardened veterans were not afraid of cold temperatures and were spoiling for a fight with the intrusive Americans."
"The 30th was also battle-hardened; most of them had taken on SS troops before and come out on top. ... In addition to being pitted against the SS, there would be an enemy with which they had already had some experience, but not to this extent. The weather would be more debilitating in the Ardennes than anything they had dealt with before. The November rains had caused cases of trench-foot and hypothermia throughout the ranks, but nothing could have prepared them for what was in store when they reached the Ardennes region of Belgium."
"The 30th Reconnaissance Troop and the 119th Infantry Regiment led the way, arriving in the vicinity of the Belgian town of Malmédy by 1630 hours on 17 December. They were closely followed by the 117th and 120th Infantry Regiments, the 120th having turned over their sector to the 29th Infantry Division moments before they hit the road. The long regimental columns interspersed with tanks and tank destroyers meandered south almost unopposed. A couple of stray German fighter planes dropped a few flares on the columns. It was about this time that the ominous tones of Axis Sally could be heard on frequent broadcasts informing the troops mockingly that, “The fanatical 30th Division, Roosevelt’s SS, was going to save First Army.”"
"The 1st SS-Panzer Division “Liebstandarte SS Adolf Hitler” led the advance into the Amblève River valley and collided with the 30th Division. LAH was part of General Josef “Sepp” Dietrich’s 6th Panzer Army. Dietrich was a committed Nazi, and while other German commanders secretly muttered their disapproval of Hitler’s plan, Dietrich supported it wholeheartedly. Such was his enthusiasm for the plan that the Germans called “WACHT AM RHEIN” (Guard on the Rhine) that Hitler gave him the task of leading the “spearhead” toward Antwerp. The unit on point was known as Kampfgruppe (battle group) Peiper. Its leader, Obersturmbannführer (lieutenant colonel) Joachim Peiper, was a handsome 29-year-old veteran with a fearsome reputation for being very thorough when in combat. He had served as an adjutant on Heinrich Himmler’s staff before commanding various panzer units attached to the 1st SS-Panzer Division. Peiper was Himmler’s “blue-eyed boy” and Himmler always maintained a fervent interest in Peiper’s military career.
"On the eastern front, his unit had been known as the “Blowtorch Battalion.” The “blowtorch” reference came from their overly enthusiastic use of flamethrowers. Their method of fighting had been brutal and merciless. They would capture a Russian village, burn everything to cinders, and kill everything with a pulse."
"The following day brought more problems for Kampfgruppe Peiper. Unable to take the route that he had intended, combined with the dogged resistance of the 99th and 2nd Infantry Divisions, his unit was effectively funneled into an area where he didn’t want to be, the Amblève valley. Peiper’s command was used to fighting in the vast open spaces of the Russian plains where it was possible to maneuver. His unit was not designed to be confined to the narrow and constricting roads; small villages and towns; hilly terrain; and the densely-wooded boreal forests of the Amblève valley. Peiper, moreover, harbored a festering dislike for Sepp Dietrich, the butcher’s son from Bavaria. By that stage in the war Dietrich was an alcoholic who rarely exhibited the necessary lucidity required to orchestrate a major offensive. He’d become no more than a Nazi sycophant who acquiesced willingly to his Führer.
"When the 30th Division arrived the following day to take on Kampf-gruppe Peiper in the Amblève area, they discovered that the task force from the 99th had already been involved in a fierce running battle with the SS. Brigadier General Harrison, the 30th’s assistant division commander, instructed the 117th Infantry Regiment to continue on and secure the towns of Malmédy and Stavelot. The 119th Infantry Regiment stopped at Hauset, just inside the Belgian border, and bedded down for the night. A task force from the 99th Infantry Division was also ordered to go to Malmédy. They arrived there at 2130 hours and found that 60 men from the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion had already set up some roadblocks and were laying mines south of Stavelot. Within two hours of arriving on the scene the task force became embroiled in a vicious firefight with leading elements of Kampf-gruppe Peiper.
"The 1st SS-Panzer Division and Kampfgruppe Peiper had been given the instruction by 6th Panzer Army commander, Josef “Sepp” Dietrich, to subjugate all opposition by whatever means. This was a thinly-veiled order to indulge in a killing spree and take no prisoners. Perhaps the most infamous example of these orders being followed to the letter occurred at the Baugnez crossroads on 17 December. On that fateful winter’s day in 1944, the spearhead of Peiper’s Kampfgruppe executed more than 80 American GIs in cold blood, while more than 40 escaped the slaughter. It is generally agreed that at approximately 1300 hours on 17 December 1944, the lead vehicles of Kampfgruppe Peiper’s 15-mile-long column approached the crossroad at Baugnez, a few miles north of the town of Malmédy. They ran into a small American convoy of 26 vehicles belonging to Battery B, 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion (FAOB) that had been sent down from Germany to join the 7th Armored Division near St. Vith. A short but violent firefight ensued, and the men of the FAOB, lacking any heavy weapons to defend themselves and after taking casualties, decided to surrender. They didn’t have the option to retreat back down the road to Malmédy because engineers had felled trees behind them that toppled in a lattice pattern on the road, making it virtually impassable. As the exchange of fire subsided, the GIs were told to lay down their weapons, whereupon they were herded into a nearby field next to a structure known as the Café Bodarwe.
"According to eyewitnesses, half-tracks and tanks from Kampfgruppe Peiper pulled up opposite the field where the surrendered Americans were gathered. The SS were seen loading their weapons, then the SS troops suddenly opened up with pistols and machine guns on the US prisoners standing in what would become known as the “Massacre Field.” GIs crumpled to the ground while terrified US soldiers who were not hit in the initial fusillade suddenly began to run. There was more fire and additional prisoners fell screaming to the ground. Within a matter of a few minutes, pools of blood and writhing bodies littered the field. Then a small group of SS men began to walk among the injured and the dead, with their pistols out. Any bodies that showed signs of life were instantly dispatched by the SS; personal valuables such as watches were taken from the dead Americans. ... Despite what has been written by other historians, there is indisputable proof that many of the casualties at Baugnez suffered close-proximity head wounds, which concurs with reports by survivors that many of the wounded were shot point blank. Escapees who made their way back to the 291st Engineer positions in Malmédy would later tell their stories and those quickly made their way through the American ranks, steeling GI resolve to blunt the German assault, and fueling their abhorrence of the SS."
"General Bradley, meanwhile, had given orders to move First Army’s headquarters south to Luxembourg. Bradley now fully comprehended that this was no minor enemy incursion; it was an all-out counterattack by a determined enemy. Down in Luxembourg Bradley would be in closer proximity to Patton’s Third Army and he understood well that when push came to shove Patton would never evade a potential fight."
"HANK STAIRS, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 117TH INFANTRY REGIMENT"
"Sunday, 18 December 1944. Fast forward. Our battalion captured the town and controlled the Stavelot bridge, cutting off Peiper’s supply line. The Battle of the Bulge continued."
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"Farther west, the 30th Division’s attack was gathering momentum, supported by IX and XXIX Tactical Air Commands, who had joined the fight and were proving their worth. Planes from the 365th Fighter Group, reinforced by the 390th Squadron (366th) and the 506th Squadron (404th), swooped down on German armor wherever they could find it. They even made it over to Stavelot where they tipped the balance in favor of the US forces there. This wasn’t entirely the old pattern of air superiority repeating itself like it had in Normandy because the ground troops still had to deal with the lion’s share of the fighting on the ground."
"By dawn 19 December, the 30th Division’s line extended over 17 miles and there was almost constant fighting along each mile of the front. The SS were as determined to reach the river Meuse as the 30th Division was to prevent them from doing precisely that. Due to the unfavorable terrain Kampf-gruppe Peiper was severely restricted in their ability to maneuver effectively enough to deploy their superior tanks. Those hills and trees were causing increasing claustrophobia for the SS column as 30th Division units and 82nd Airborne Division effectively occupied the high ground and lobbed mortar and bazooka shells onto the winding trails at the base of the valley."
"Horrendous freezing weather conditions didn’t help the situation for either side as temperatures plummeted and blizzards began to blow through the Ardennes, forming snow drifts deep enough to cover a man."
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"In addition to the miserable weather conditions, the GIs began to hear about another potential menace. Rumors abounded that there were German SS troops wearing American uniforms and, according to reports, they were all over the Ardennes. This was a major exaggeration, but there were indeed some German troops who were thus attired. They were known as members of the Panzer Brigade 150 (or Brandenburger Brigade) and had approximately 2000 men in the unit. It was claimed that 150 of these men could speak perfect English. Sometime after the war, Lieutenant Colonel Otto Skorzeny described their mission, called Operation GRIEFF (Griffon), as an unmitigated disaster. He added that most of this specially chosen 150 were incapable of putting three English words together in a sentence. Skorzeny simply hadn’t had the time to train them up to his high standard. They used captured Allied equipment (particularly tanks and jeeps), uniforms, identification papers, that had been hurriedly accumulated at the front and sent to Skorzeny’s headquarters. Although he was personally very dismissive of the effectiveness of these troops, the psychological effect on the Allies was quite profound. Skorzeny was known as “Hitler’s Assassin” and had indeed been quite successful in the past. He had rescued Mussolini from the Italians, conducted various clandestine operations, and when the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Miklós von Nagybánya Horthy began to show signs of questionable loyalty by declaring an end to the war, Skorzeny was dispatched to Budapest to kidnap Horthy’s son. As a direct result of this, Horthy was forced to revoke his declarations and abdicate."
" ... Disguised jeep parties did go into action with varying degrees of success on 16 December, but the Brandenburger Brigade would be engaged as a unit only in a single and abortive skirmish near Malmédy five days later. One particular bazooka man took the initiative on one occasion to fire a direct hit at a jeep carrying four GIs. It was a gamble that worked because all the jeeps occupants were indeed Germans wearing GI uniforms. The bazooka man had taken the shot purely on the premise that regulations restricted the number of passengers to two, and that jeep, driver included was carrying four which, in his opinion made it a justifiable target."
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"Rumors abounded that the SS were massacring civilians as they pushed west. When American soldiers occupied the western perimeter of Stavelot and entered the villages of Ster, Renardmont and Parfondruy, they discovered gruesome confirmation that the German troops, who had occupied these places, had indiscriminately murdered innocent civilians. In the homes and outlying buildings of these localities, the GIs saw the irrefutable evidence of these atrocities with their own eyes. They counted the dead bodies of 117 men, women, and children, all killed by small arms fire."
And yet GÜNTER ADAM, 9TH SS-PANZER DIVISION “HOHENSTAUFEN”, who is quoted quite a bit in this book, when spat at by two young girls in Mortain vicinity, as they saw him captured by U.S. forces, describes them as spiteful for no reason.
"Two young girls of about 17 or 18 years old emerged from a farmhouse nearby. They stood and stared, then spat at us. This spiteful attitude only served to aggravate the already loaded atmosphere as the threatening situation developed into a dangerous one."
Never occurred to him that most of the world did not subscribe to the Nazi ideoĺgy he'd been indoctrinated with, convenient for him and his, which had taught them they could murder and loot and torture anyone for no reason other than the victims being of a different race or nation.
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"At 0300 hours on 24 December Kampfgruppe Peiper, now reduced to approximately 800 men led by Peiper himself, had surreptitiously slipped away from La Gleize under cover of darkness. Major McCowan (commander of a battalion in the 119th Infantry, captured on 21 December while assaulting Stoumont) was the only one of the 171 American prisoners in La Gleize to go with the column. The rest were simply left there in the basement beneath the former Town Hall. At the commencement of his great drive to the Meuse River, Kampfgruppe Peiper consisted of 5,800 men that were later augmented by an additional battalion from the SS-Panzer-Grenadier Regiment 2. Now, there were only 800 left to sneak back through the woods to their own lines. As he moved back east he was forced to abandon 80 wounded in the Château de Froid-Cour and just over 300 in La Gleize.
"The tally in abandoned and destroyed German armor totaled around 87 tanks; 70 half-tracks; at least 14 flak wagons; 25 75mm assault guns and 105mm and 150mm self-propelled howitzers; plus trucks and smaller vehicles."
"Peiper later disclosed to Major McCowan that seven of the prisoners there had been shot while attempting to escape."
"After the Battle of the Bulge, Joachim Peiper spent a while in a German hospital recuperating from this traumatic experience. Behind his unit in the Belgian Ardennes lay a trail of murder and destruction on a scale that had never been experienced in this previously sedate part of Belgium. He would eventually be brought to account for his transgressions, but first the Nazis had to be defeated. Roosevelt’s SS had once again checked the real SS, but their fight wasn’t over yet. They had spent the past few weeks on the defensive, but now they were gearing up to chase the Nazis right back to the German border and beyond."
"A massive pincer movement involving the First and Third Armies had finally squeezed the German forces into submission and forced them well back behind the Siegfried Line from where they started. The two US armies met at the town of Houffalize on 16 January, and by 28 January, the Germans had been pushed back to their original starting line beyond the Belgian and Luxembourg borders. It had been the largest land battle ever fought by US forces; by the time it was over more than 600,000 US troops had reached the Ardennes. Old Hickory’s fight in the Belgian Ardennes was over, but their war was destined to continue, and to a man, they were hoping it would all be over soon."
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"The imposing bridge at Remagen had been taken intact by the 9th Armored Division between 7 and 8 March 1945, enabling US forces to establish a bridgehead on the eastern side of the Rhine. Ninth Army now held the west bank of the Rhine, from the south of Düsseldorf to the mouth of the Lippe River at Wesel."
"Montgomery was a fastidious and meticulous planner who rarely considered any offensive unless the odds were decidedly in his favor, and this time they most definitely were.
"The Germans were now finding themselves the disagreeable target of a massive pincer movement with General Patton’s Third Army attacking from the south; Ninth Army attacking from the east; and British and Canadian Allies bearing down from the north. ... They were, moreover, insufficient to the task of defending the whole northern sector against the inevitable Allied tsunami now coming in from the west.
"The Old Hickorymen were again given a vital role in the planned assault that would cover an area approximately five miles wide, which was roughly the textbook standard for a division front in WWII. First, a massive artillery bombardment lit the skies in one of the most impressive and powerful barrages of WWII. Then zero hour arrived and the GIs quietly made their way down to the riverside with tracer bullets whizzing above their heads. Just to the north of the 30th Division’s position, under cover of darkness, British commandos removed the safety catches on their weapons and at 2200 hours they stealthily boarded the boats that would carry them to the west bank of the Rhine."
"FRANK DENIUS, BATTERY C, 230TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION"
"There were a lot of German soldiers moving west because they wanted to be captured by the Americans, not the Russians."
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"The Old Hickory habit of riding tanks into battle to get to the enemy faster was repeated for one final time, and by 1730 hours, the way ahead had been completely cleared of German troops. Within 24 hours of crossing the Rhine, the 30th Division had advanced over six miles. On top of that, their engineers had stunned division command again and completed a bridge across the Rhine in just nine hours."
"The German response to the Allied assault had been to commit the 116th Panzer Division that had faced the 30th Division on numerous occasions in the past months. ... The 116th had practically welcomed the final opportunity to pitch themselves against their old adversaries in the 30th Division. While other Allied divisions raced ahead, the 30th remained in place to take on the 116th Panzer Division and eradicate them once and for all. The reputation of the 116th with their own army wasn’t quite as illustrious as it was with the Allies. They were frequently accused by German generals of turning up unprepared to fight.
" ... But by 18 April 1945, there was a definite cessation of all resistance in the Ruhr Pocket, and the remnants of the 116th Division, along with their commanding officer, surrendered to the US Ninth Army."
"Despite difficulties encountered while facing off against the 116th Panzer Division and attempting to break out to the east, the ground and amphibious operations proved to be a resounding success and a veritable testament to the iron discipline and expertise of the 30th Division. Unfortunately, the airborne part of the attack, Operation VARSITY, hadn’t fared so well.
"A total of 1,111 Allied soldiers had been killed during the day’s fighting. In comparison, on D-Day, the 101st Airborne Division had lost 182 killed and the 82nd Airborne Division 158. Operation VARSITY, executed on 24 March 1945, was the single worst day for Allied airborne troops in WWII. Much of the damage inflicted on the airborne was due to the well-prepared German AA defenses that protected the Ruhr area. It was a staggering blow, nevertheless, to the final airborne assault of the war in the west."
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"Now that the Rhine had been crossed, Field Marshal Montgomery gave new orders that would guide the Ninth Army across the north German plain toward the Elbe River, deep inside Germany. Four Allied armies had successfully negotiated the last great barrier and now they could begin thrusting into the German heartland. On 1 April, Adolf Hitler responded to the rapid Allied advance by issuing a proclamation calling on all Germans to become “Werewolves” to prey on Allied troops, Jews, and those Germans who cooperated with Allied forces. Despite the late date of this statement, Hitler was serious. Despite the collapsing German defense, 30th blood would continue to be spilled along the rapid advance into the German heartland."
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"The next item on the agenda for the 30th Division was the attack and capture of the city of Magdeburg that occurred in April 1945. This was to be the final action of the 30th Division before they reached the Elbe River. On the morning of 16 April, the 120th Infantry Regiment was ordered to make preparations to attack the city. While those preparations were underway, an attempt was made to obtain an unconditional surrender from the German staff, but at this juncture they were still reluctant to sign. Initial plans to send one regiment to attack Magdeburg were discarded and replaced with new directives to involve two divisions whose assault would be preceded by a massive air strike. Artillery units encircled Magdeburg to provide close support for the attack. Just a few days prior to the attack a horrifying discovery had been made in the forest beside the small town of Farsleben."
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"FRANK TOWERS, COMPANY M, 120TH INFANTRY REGIMENT"
"Upon entering and capturing the village, no German soldiers were found who may have been intent on setting up an ambush when we appeared. The lead elements of the 743rd Recon, however, discovered a long freight train on the railroad track, which had been guarded by several Nazi guards. The engine was standing ready with a full head of steam and awaiting orders. The guards and the train crew fled the area as soon as they realized that they were well outnumbered, although they were rounded up in a short time.
"While the train crew was awaiting orders where to go, many of the occupants of some of the passenger cars had dismounted and were relaxing on the ground near the train.
"This train which contained about 2,500 Jews, had a few days previously left the Bergen-Belsen death camp. Men, women, and children were all loaded into a few available railway cars, some passenger and some freight, but mostly the typical antiquated freight cars, termed as “40 & 8.” WWI terminology, this signified that these cars would accommodate 40 men or 8 horses.
"They were crammed into all available space and the freight cars were packed with about 60–70 of the Jewish Holocaust victims, with standing room only for most of them, so that they were packed in like sardines.
"Why those people had not been exterminated earlier we never did learn. The Nazis, however, were attempting to move them out of Bergen-Belsen so that the advancing Allied army would not see the condition of this mass of frail humanity, if it could be called that. They had been moved eastward from the camp to the Elbe River, where they were informed that it would not be advisable to proceed farther because of the rapidly advancing Russian army. The train then reversed direction and proceeded to Farsleben, where they were then told that they were heading into the advancing American army. The train halted at Farsleben and was awaiting further orders as to where to go next. The engineers had then received their orders: to drive the train onto the bridge over the Elbe River and either blow it up or just drive it off the end of the damaged bridge, with all of the cars of the train crashing into the river, and killing or drowning all of the occupants. The engineers were having some second thoughts about this action, as they would be hurtling themselves to death, too. This is the point at which they were discovered, just shortly after the leading elements of the 743rd Tank Battalion arrived on the scene.
"The men of the 743rd Tank Battalion and the 119th Regiment, who discovered this train, could not believe what they were seeing, nor what they had upon their hands at this moment. Upon speaking to some of those victims, a few of whom could speak a little English, they began to learn what they had uncovered.
"We had heard of the cruel treatment that the Nazis had been handing out to Jews and political opponents of the Nazi regime, whom they had enslaved, but we thought that it was propaganda and slightly exaggerated. As we went along, it became more apparent that this barbaric savagery was actually true. The stories of German inhumanity were being corroborated before our own eyes. The condition of these people had deteriorated to the lowest level imaginable.
"Of primary importance was getting food, water, and medical assistance to these victims. Our 105th Medical Battalion was called upon to survey the group and provide immediate attention to those most in need. The 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion commander, Lt. Col. Dettmer, immediately contacted the Burgomeister of Farsleben, and without any hesitation, ordered the Burgomeister to order his citizens to gather up all of the food, clothing, soap, and sanitary supplies, to help these victims. Second, they were ordered to offer them any housing facilities that were available, particularly for the elderly and those families with children.
"The German people caused these victims to be in the situation in which they were found, so it was felt that it was their responsibility to rectify what they had done to them over the past five years. At first they rebelled at these orders, but upon the threat of execution of the Burgomeister, and with a pistol held to his head, the citizens of Farsleben complied and went about the task that they had been ordered to do.
"At this time the Burgomeister began to cooperate, and told his citizens to take some of these Jews into their homes and give them some comfort, which they did, very grudgingly. This was the first taste of “Home” for many of them after some months or years of inhuman incarceration.
"After loading up these Jewish victims on our trucks and navigating the convoy over a circuitous route, we arrived at the designated site in Hillersleben, where their custody was turned over to the American Military Government for further processing."
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Magdeburg was taken by 30th Division after two days of fight.
"On 18th April 1945, the war in Europe had witnessed it's last battle.
On 25th April the western allied forces met Russians in the vicinity of Torgau, and on 4th May while the two generals sat down together at dinner, word came that Germans had agreed to unconditional surrender.
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