Farewell: The Greatest Spy Story of the Twentieth Century, by Sergei Kostin (and 3 more).

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FAREWELL: THE GREATEST SPY STORY

OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY,

by SERGEI KOSTIN

and 3 more.

ERIC RAYNAUD

Author

RICHARD V. ALLEN

Foreword

CATHERINE CAUVIN-HIGGINS

Translator.

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Early on, it's alarming to realise that one has - quite inadvertently - begun a book sponsored by someone who seems to not only think, but assert, that Reagan was not merely somehow elected, but an intelligent, even prescient, man, worthy of association, even bring served, as the guy introducing the book asserts publicly.

What's more, he seems to support and applaud Reagan labelling this spy, according to these guys responsible- single-handedly - for downfall of Soviet Union, as "the greatest spy ever".

This characterisation depends, of course, on issues and results involved; obviously family feuds between members of a clan don't qualify to compete for the title, however great the spies.

So obviously Reagan and his associates - including Richard Allen - label this man, vetrov, as the greatest day, because they hold their engineered crash of Soviet Union more important than, say, WWII.

Sane people must disagree. Especially those who know about nazis - its easy enough to read even just the epic work of William Shirer, but throw in a couple of frozen memoirs by holocaust survivors, and some films and documentaries about Battle of Britain, the London Blitz, and Dunkirk - and yes, for good measure, Nuremberg Trials, and one is there.

Greatest spies remain those who fought that war against navies, whether at Bletchley Park or with French Resistance, or as Virginia Hall, Bill Stephenson and others of his associates did, wherever it took. Ian Fleming was associated with them, as was his brother; therein the germ of 007.

What seems obvious is that neither Reagan nor Richard Allen think much of them, and hold this Russian mole above them all, due to either an ideological flaw of their own, or a complete ignorance, or at the very least, a complacent assurance that their lies will hold because - what? Uttered by men in power? Or is it more? Do they have total faith that public in general is stupid, Ignorant, and shall remain so?

One is reminded in the context of a more recent pronouncement by another president to the effect that US troops leaving Afghanistan was the greatest evacuation in history.

Had they forgotten Dunkirk?

Later his associates publicly clarified that he had meant to say that this was the greatest evacuation in history by air.

They were corrected immediately - that distinction, so far, is held by the airlift that was evacuation by India of citizens of India - and a few also from some other neighbouring countries - out of Kuwait, during the Gulf War, to the tune of close to 175,000 people, perhaps a little more.

That particular president had just shot his mouth off to cover the shameful flight by US, leaving Afghanistan to the nonexistent mercy of terrorists who promptly walked in across the Durand Line, took over and proceeded to execute males and issue orders to females yo limit themselves strictly to slave roles, available for asking; that US equipment worth billions of dollars, from tanks and helicopters to weapons and ammunition for them for taking, was a detail that was glossed over - with that comment about the greatest evacuation in history.

So what were Reagan and Richard Allen glossing over, in commenting about Vetrov bring the greatest spy?

Would it be the Iran-Contra affair, when weapons for a repressive regime were exchanged via US military transport (as per a publication available at US university libraries), for narcotics?

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Strangely enough, authors waste a great deal of space on detailed descriptions and analysis of personal, private and even extramarital parts of the life of the man, whose seeming achievement - as asserted by these authors and their republican friends, anyway - seems to have been the downfall of Soviet Union.

Is that merely to pad the otherwise thin manuscript, or, as publishers seem these days to force on every author, a compromise halfway towards what's required of most authors, namely, unnecessary prurience of explicit and detailed nature? Unclear.

Unclear, that is, until the expected story about state secrets exposed by a spy, turns instead into an attempted murder thriller. At this point one has lost all hopes of a discussion of world politics and security details discussion, anyway, going by the trend of chapters until the murder and a half.

"The most negative remarks about Ludmila were collected in the corridors of the KGB. The Vetrov case sent two shattering jolts to the Soviet intelligence edifice. It was talked about over and over for years. It is surprising that in the male-dominated KGB there was so much reliance on gossip."

Are the authors serious? Did they grow up in a monastery either strict orders of silence?

Whats half this book about, at that, having started as story of a spy but indulging in private details, instead of the secrets the spy unveiled, and exactlyhow West benefits thereby?

What's, for that matter, the much tomtommed ritual of confession in their faith, enforced via constant reminder of guilt and hell?

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Authors attempt to wangle an indictment of Russia and Soviet Union via a last, reportedly sixty page, document left by Vetrov, when he was asked, between the sentence and execution, to write a confession; he wrote, reportedly, scathing of the whole system, and in particular of KGB.

While none of the facts are contested thereby, here's a contradiction evident all along - he not only knew of these flaws since the very beginning, but, over and above working in the very system and in KGB too, had returned more than once to Russia from postings in West, despite not only ample opportunities of escape, but at least one invitation thereof, from the very DST that he later turned to providing documents voluntarily, exposing the moles in West.

He wasn't doing this, moreover, out of fear of reprisals against family, when he returned to Moscow instead of escaping - his family had been with him in both France and Canada.

So the only explanation possible is that, despite the corruption hed seen, he'd still expected to rise in ranks if never returning West, and neither expectation being fulfilled, he then sought revenge.

While that profited US, it's hardly stuff of title of a last chapter of the book, questioning if he was hero or martyr. He's neither, especially if he sought to have an affair just so he could murder the woman in full public view, just so he could escape consequences of betraying his nation, and selected a suitable victim for the said murder to have an affair with, by going after her.

He was,in any discussion of virtue or importance, simply akin to the small screw that, having gone loose or missing at some point, had brought Columbia down in frames in 1986.

No more than that, whatever his personal attributes according to family or friends.

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"First, the White House was to reassert its determination in the military and geostrategic area. This led to the deployment of Pershing missiles in Europe, and to a stronger support of contra-revolutionary movements in Central America, in Angola, and in Afghanistan where the U.S. delivered ground-to-air Stinger missiles to the mujahideens."

Are they still celebrating that, after 2001? Or have they decided that being as myopic and damaged in upper floors as the then president they served is all that's necessary for life, and tomorrow need not be worried about?

"Then, the Americans decided, in close coordination with friendly oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf, to significantly increase the oil production in order to drive the price of the barrel down, thereby reducing the source of hard currencies the Soviet Union derived from oil. This oil policy would soon be reinforced by a very restrictive monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve Bank, leading to a drop in the price of gold, another significant resource of the USSR."

Hence, Kuwait!

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"Respectful of Marcel Chalet’s explicit request, American secret services observed the utmost prudence when using the information from the Farewell file. At this stage of the operation, Vetrov was still active, and nobody wanted to kill the goose that was laying the golden eggs. In fact, mole arrests and expulsions would start much later.

"Gus Weiss had a better idea about using the Farewell dossier in a much more devastating way. The VPK, the organization centralizing technology requests from the military-industrial complex, compiled in what was informally called the Red Book a detailed “shopping list” for each Soviet ministry.

"In January 1982, Weiss proposed to William Casey, director of the CIA and personal friend of Ronald Reagan, to put in place a vast plan for sabotaging the Soviet economy by transferring false information to the KGB Line X spies.8 Reagan approved the plan immediately and enthusiastically."

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"A gas pipeline between Siberia and Western Europe had been in the design phase for many years.9 It was supposed to be commissioned soon. Implementing European technology, this gas pipeline was the source of tensions between the EEC countries and the United States. Europe’s need for energy independence through diversification was in direct conflict with the economic war the Americans had launched against the Soviet Union. Mitterrand and Reagan, just after their honeymoon over the Farewell case, had a serious confrontation on the topic.

"Weiss’s plan allowed everybody to agree. He arranged to have software delivered to Line X through a Canadian company. This software was meant to control gas pipeline valves and turbines, and it was delivered with viruses embedded in the code by one of the contractors. The viruses were designed to have a delayed effect; at first the software seemed to work as per the contract specifications.

"The sudden activation of the viruses in December 1983 led to a huge three-kiloton gas explosion in the Urengoi gas field, precisely in Siberia where, ironically, Vetrov had just started his jail time for a crime of passion. ... "

Was Chernobyl, too, an achievement of this regime?

" ... There was another extraordinary coincidence. The contract for the management software of the Urengoi-Uzhgorod pipeline pumping stations had been awarded to the French company Thomson-CSF, and the Thomson executive who had led the negotiations worked in collaboration with a certain Jacques Prévost."

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"Observed from space by satellite, the explosion was allegedly so powerful that it alarmed NATO analysts, who later described it as the most powerful non-nuclear (man-made) explosion of all times. NORAD, responsible for the air defense of the U.S. territory, even thought that there had been a missile launch from an area where no base was known. Weiss had to reassure, one by one, his NSC colleagues, explaining that “all this was normal.”10

"The American administration thought the pipeline sabotage operation was a new blow for the Soviets. First, it disturbed natural gas exports and, consequently, earned revenue in hard currencies. Since the military-industrial complex was resting, for the most part, on technology stolen in the West, the American side was hoping that this “accident” would create a general climate of paranoia within the KGB regarding Soviet industrial equipment. It was also expected that the KGB would no longer trust its technology espionage, at a time when the Soviet Union needed it most.

"In March 1983, Reagan launched his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The famous “Star Wars” plan was expected to go through Congress and pass with a budget above thirty billion dollars. To use a metaphor, the poker player had just raised the stakes, knowing his adversary’s poor hand.

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"The Americans did not stop there. Under the coordination of William Casey and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, the plan of economic war against the Soviet Union became systematic in all federal organizations. Financially, the plan was to bar Soviet access to credit from Western banks. This effort was conducted by Roger Robinson, a New York banker familiar with the world of international finance. In the Defense Department, Fred Ikle and Richard Perle were in charge of coordinating with their allies to limit, and even prohibit, technology transfers to the Eastern Bloc. This was where the Farewell dossier had its greatest impact. When Richard Perle received the Farewell dossier from the hands of a CIA agent, he was absolutely astonished: “Of course everybody knew the Soviets were stealing whatever they could, but this was beyond everything we imagined. Each request for technology had the corresponding budget necessary to reach the stated objective. It was really like a catalogue de la Redoute [equivalent of the Sears catalog].”11 The Defense Department was also interested in using this catalog to determine exactly which advanced technologies should be off-limit to the Soviets.

"The Farewell dossier was progressively being exploited in Europe as well. The Americans had directly transmitted elements of the dossier to their NATO allies. These pieces of information would, therefore, eventually reach the French secret services, who were very “honored” to be trusted with such “confidential” information…which had actually originated from their services.

"At the DST, on Rue des Saussaies, the new boss, Yves Bonnet, was managing how the Farewell information was to be used. After a briefing in Langley by the CIA on how to use the Farewell dossier (the CIA agents knowing nothing of the French origin of the sources), Bonnet regained control of the situation and personally organized the process of informing his peers in the other fifteen countries concerned by Line X activities. The heads of British and German services came to Paris, in turn, to be briefed by the DST.

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"The French also took part in a deception operation launched by the CIA. This was a particularly vicious campaign, giving a more precise idea of the manipulation techniques used in the world of espionage. The operation, as recounted by one of its masterminds, General Guyaux, had to do with the assumed properties of osmium-187 metal for use in weaponry implementing laser technology. With the launching of the SDI project by Ronald Reagan, this technology had become one of the priorities for Soviet intelligence. Here is what General Guyaux had to say about it: “By the end of the seventies, there was a lot of talk going on about the ‘graser,’ a kind of laser using high energy gamma rays from radioactive elements instead of using optical radiation ranging from infrared to ultraviolet. Even though, in France, Professor Jaéglé had obtained a weak laser effect with X-rays, it was out of the question to rush headlong into the domain of gamma rays. This technology was far from being developed, although it would have been a formidable weapon since gamma rays are highly penetrating.”12

"The Farewell dossier, as a matter of fact, included a document from a Soviet research lab wherein scientists were protesting the decision of Directorate T not to launch any research program devoted to osmium. The letter went on to accuse scientists opposed to the project of betrayal. Convinced that the Soviets had a serious interest in that particular isotope, secret services of the Western alliance decided to encourage, in a subtle way, the Russians to err further.

"The American journal Physical Review and the British magazine Nature published a few articles signed by renowned physicists detailing the number and the diversity of osmium-187 energy levels. Then, technical papers on the subject stopped. When this happens in technical and scientific areas, it signals to all intelligence services that this is of strategic importance. Directorate T immediately ordered its operatives to follow that trail, and more specifically in France, where the KGB had attempted to recruit quite a few scientists. At scientific conventions, where intelligence officers spent a lot of time, renowned researchers from all over the world started discussing with credibility osmium properties, describing the metal as a good candidate for use in a possible “graser.” A few labs went as far as publishing posters claiming successful experiments conducted in highly protected research centers. And last, American labs conspicuously bought significant quantities of natural osmium from the Soviet Union, major provider of this metal on world markets.

"“For a long time, we did not know the results of this maneuver,” explains General Guyaux. “So we thought the Soviets had not risen to the bait. Then came the coup attempt in 1991. The KGB was dissolved. The entire Soviet Union imploded. To our amazement, all of a sudden large quantities of osmium-187 showed up on the Russian market of rare materials, along with the too famous red mercury! It was as if the Russians did not know what to do with osmium anymore! This was the sign that, at the time, they had fallen into the trap.”

"The major DST operation, however, was meant to address the DST’s main concern about the disproportionate presence of the KGB in Paris. This operation resulted in the spectacular expulsion of Soviet “diplomats” identified by Farewell as KGB agents. It was launched soon after Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars speech, causing a rift in French-Soviet relations, thus sealing the fate of Vladimir Vetrov, whose departure for prison camp 272/3, near Irkutsk, was already scheduled."

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"It is also possible that Vetrov thought the French were not likely to let him get out of the game that easily. He himself knew very well how to use the spiral into which he attracted his foreign agents, starting with seemingly innocuous actions. Now he would be the one to experience it. The French had too much proof of his treason and, therefore, too many means of pressure.

"It may have become urgent for Vetrov to find a way to make the DST lose all interest in him. There were not that many possibilities. He had to leave the KGB, which was easier said than done. As with all secret services, the KGB had a lot of entries, but very few exits.

"Vetrov could, in theory, pretend he was sick and needed a prolonged treatment that would prevent him from working. In practice, it was much trickier. The very idea of leaving the KGB on his own initiative was dubious, especially three years from retirement, and taking into account that he would lose 75 percent of his future pension. This is why the candidate for resignation was hospitalized for a period that could last several months, during which time the patient could undergo all the necessary tests. It was impossible to simulate a disease, except for the immeasurable side effects of a head injury, for instance. The general conclusion, however, was that the whole thing was a pretext; the second phase of the hospitalization was then performed even more thoroughly. It was the examination under a microscope of the entire life of the “patient”: friends, relations, adulterous affairs, and contacts with secret holders, and individuals meeting with foreigners. Such an investigation could collect a testimony proving there was something going on. For both reasons, this solution was not an option for Vetrov, a healthy man with forbidden relationships."

"What else could be done to be excluded from the KGB without arousing the suspicion of internal counterintelligence? Vetrov appears to have found a way. Although he might have hesitated at first, an alarming sign identified by him alone, or a strong intuition, prompted him to seek refuge without delay.

"Paradoxical as it may seem, a criminal is nowhere more secure than behind bars. This is a basic rule of the underworld. In case of imminent danger, the first concern of the individual who, for example, committed two rapes and three murders is to get himself arrested for a minor offense like the theft of a suitcase in a railroad station. He would get three years of imprisonment, during which time no one would look for him in jail. By the time of his release, the investigation file for the rapes and the murders would have been closed. In addition to the policemen, magistrates, lawyers, and former convicts interviewed, this was also confirmed by Vladimir Kryuchkov, who thought Vetrov was in a hurry to be tried and sentenced so he could lie low in the Gulag, praying to God for the KGB to forget about his existence."

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"It would have been ludicrous for a KGB officer to snatch purses in the subway or burglarize his neighbors’ apartment. Nobody would have bought the story. The only option left was a crime of passion. ... In this way, he could escape the DST stranglehold, who would have nothing more to expect from him and could not blackmail him since he would be in Siberia, while putting an end to his troubles with Svetlana, whom he clearly did not want to lose. Ludmila Ochikina had the profile of the ideal victim."

"To prove that a murder was perpetrated by someone temporarily irresponsible, witnesses are needed. That is why Vetrov would have chosen a parking area next to a bus stop. After killing Ludmila with the bottle or the pique, all he would have had to do was get out of the car and scream. “Help! Please, somebody help me! What did I do? Oh, my God, it’s awful!” The passersby who would have rushed up to the car would have seen a half-mad man uttering incoherent sentences while trying to resuscitate the woman he had just killed. All the testimonies would be in his favor because the main witness, the victim, would not be there to invalidate his account of the events."

"After his arrest, Vetrov tried to salvage everything he could of his plan. Ludmila the survivor claims the contrary? He put pressure on the investigation by repeating his version a hundred times. ... Vetrov quickly understood the KGB did not want scandal and was more likely to side with him than with a simple translator."

" ... Apparently, his judges had encouraged him to collaborate with the investigation to the point that he was almost sure his sentence would be minimal. Hence, his despondency and disappointment after the sentence was passed."

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Having said and analysed this far, to logically conclude that vetrov planned the crime before he instigated an affair for the purpose of the murder so as to be sentenced and sent to Siberia, just to escape being pressured by his handlers - authors then declare that they no longer believe this version. (Then why retain and publish it? Intention to impress an illiterate reader about their verbosity, apart from pseudo psychology babble?)

They go on to claim that the affair was real, crime sudden, from fear of exposure by Ludmila, because Vetrov inadvertently let slip something that had Ludmila comprehend that he was a spy.

No, the other version fits better.

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" KGB suspected that the murder committed by Vetrov hid an espionage affair. ... "

" ... Probably not due to luck as much as effort, the KGB eventually came across a determining piece of evidence."

" ... It happened sometime between March and September 1983. In March, Vetrov was sent to a camp in Irkutsk. His last letter, among those kept by Svetlana, was dated July 10. He probably wrote more after that date, but in the middle of the summer of 1983 Vetrov was miles away from thinking his espionage affair would be uncovered. Svetlana too hoped this “skeleton” was securely locked up in its closet. By September, Vetrov stopped writing."

"When Svetlana understood that Vladimir had not disappeared, the feeling was not one of relief, because the phone call she got on November 17, 1983, after over two months of silence, came from Lefortovo."

" The investigators found only the letters that were neither destroyed nor hidden. But their tone had changed; espionage within the KGB was no laughing matter.

"Not one of the investigators present that day, however, thought about questioning Vladik, the only person who was familiar with Vetrov’s secret side."

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" ... Two key testimonies, though, Vladimir Kryuchkov’s and Igor Prelin’s,1 allow us today to establish with certainty the source of three exhibits, all equally fatal for Farewell.

"The first was provided by the well-publicized expulsion from France, in April 1983, of forty-seven Soviet citizens, KGB and GRU members operating under various covers, as well as authentic diplomats.

"This exceptional measure was in fact a retaliatory one. In January 1983, during a repair he was performing for the French embassy in Moscow, a French technician discovered a shunt on a teleprinter used to communicate with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris.2 Five more devices—those were the Myosotis systems developed under Xavier Ameil’s management in his earlier Thomson years—were immediately checked. It was horrifying to discover that they had all been tampered with. Those ciphering machines had been in transit for forty-eight hours in Soviet territory in special sealed railroad cars, so-called “suitcase cars,” and were supposedly burglar-proof. They were not, however, KGB-proof. Starting in the winter of 1976–1977, the Russians had been reading in clear the content of every message transmitted to and from the embassy and the Quai d’Orsay.3"

To be fair, when Russia respected sealed diplomatic trains, Kaiser Wilhelm had sent Lenin deep into Russia in one, and that had resulted not only in regime change but the massacre of Romanov clan.

So one can easily see why Russia didn't trust sealed trains from other nations.

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" ... Farewell had given Patrick Ferrant a list of Western agents on the Directorate T payroll. The list was handwritten. As a precaution, Vetrov did not want to use the typewriter at his office, and he did not have one at home. The agents belonged to various countries, and the French, probably in the person of President Mitterrand, had decided to share this information, critical for the NATO alliance, with the affected states, each one receiving the relevant portion of the list. Since this information, in certain cases, could lead to lawsuits, allied governments received original documents, with the names of the moles and comments handwritten in Russian.

"The listed moles were immediately investigated by counterintelligence services in their respective countries. Some were arrested on the spot. Unfortunately for Vetrov, one of those services was penetrated by the intelligence agency of a socialist country. The mole photographed the section of the handwritten list, which then found its way to KGB counterintelligence.

"Since Vetrov was the one under the most serious suspicion, his handwriting was the first to be analyzed by a graphologist. ... "

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"In all truth, the exploitation of the treasures supplied by Farewell had started as early as 1981,13 without necessarily threatening his safety. William Bell, a radar specialist at Hughes Aircraft, was on a list of over seventy foreign KGB informers. He was the first to be arrested. There were certainly other very targeted operations of which we are not aware. Finally, in April 1983, the sudden wealth of information available to French counterintelligence came out in the open.

"In particular, at that time the DST warned West German secret services that a major mole was operating at Messerschmitt, FRG’s main weapon manufacturer. The mole was no small fry. Manfred Rotsch was head of the planning department of the aviation firm Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB). Over seventeen years of collaboration with the KGB, he had transmitted top secret information to the Soviets regarding the Tornado supersonic aircraft, and the Hot and Kormoran missiles. The Germans acted cautiously. Rotsch was arrested only in October 1984.14

"The trap also closed on Pierre Bourdiol. After Vetrov left France, he had been handled by Evgeni Mashkov, Alexander Kamensky, and Valery Tokarev, the Rogatins’ friend. Mashkov was expelled in 1978, and Kamensky in 1983. Despite the DST being hot on Bourdiol’s heels since Farewell had denounced him in March 1981, Tokarev left France on his own in April 1982. Later, the PGU decided to end the Bourdiol operation. The explanation given to the few officers who knew about it was the following. Pending a criminal investigation, Vetrov might talk to other Lefortovo inmates. He would not refrain from telling them about his KGB work, including during his posting in France. It was not impossible that he would mention recruiting and handling Pierre Bourdiol. A few Jewish prisoners were supposed to be released soon. That made them candidates for emigration, since they were, in those years, the only Soviet citizens who had the right to legally leave the communist paradise. So, in order not to blow Bourdiol’s cover, it was decided to leave him dormant. Our witness always thought this explanation was dubious. It seems it was meant only for internal consumption, to feed the rumors in Yasenevo hallways. As was established, the PGU had grounds to suspect Vetrov’s treason. In case of uncertainty, the first measure was to ensure the agent’s safety."

The logic of connection between Jewish emigrants and mole in Paris is unclear.

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"Bourdiol was arrested a year after he had ceased his espionage activity, in November 1983, and imprisoned in Fresnes on December 1. Being concerned with Bourdiol’s family’s well-being while their agent was in jail, the KGB decided to send money. In December 1983, Bourdiol’s last handler, Valery Tokarev, was included in a delegation representing the organization Intercosmos, scheduled to go to Paris; but the DST denied him the visa. Did French counterintelligence suspect that Tokarev’s mission had little to do with the conquest of space?

"As far as Bourdiol was concerned, he had known for a long time the behavior to adopt. In case of his arrest, the KGB had fine-tuned a “legend” he had to stick to during the investigation. He could admit to transmitting documents to Soviet “specialists,” but those documents would be described as reference material and catalogs, stamped “confidential” but not “secret.” Apparently, Bourdiol followed his handlers’ instructions. He was also smart enough to collaborate with the investigators. For those two reasons, the French justice system showed some clemency. Sentenced to five years’ imprisonment (three with suspended sentence) for “intelligence with a foreign power,” Bourdiol was released soon after the trial because he had already served over two years in remand prison.

"Bourdiol’s example is a good illustration of the different approaches adopted respectively by the PGU and the DST regarding their agents. The difference was not only in the precautions taken by the former to spare his sources an arrest or a severe sentence. Even when a source was “burned” and, therefore, was no longer of any use, Soviet intelligence made it its moral duty to assist, if not the agent himself when impossible to do so, at least his family. Here again, this is the difference between a powerful external intelligence service and a small counterintelligence agency like the DST, which had neither the culture nor the means for such practices. Vetrov knew the system inside out. ... "

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"After the expulsion of “the forty-seven” by France, other Western countries that had been informed by the DST of KGB activities on their territories made a clean sweep too, especially considering the fact that the Soviet Union had not retaliated by expelling French diplomats in return. In 1983 alone, a total of 148 Soviet intelligence officers had to pack and go home; eighty-eight of them were expelled from Western Bloc countries.

"It is unlikely that, behind the barbed wire fence of his prison camp in Irkutsk, Vetrov ever got wind of his former colleagues’ true exodus, and of the outcome of his efforts at destroying Soviet technological espionage. Too bad for him: he would have been pleased to learn that his revenge on his service was a done deal, and that 1983 was an annus horribilis for the KGB. For Vetrov, though, each new consequence of his betrayal could only increase the bill.

"On August 30, 1983, the criminal investigation department of the KGB launched a trial procedure based on article 64, paragraph A of the penal code.15 Vetrov was charged with betrayal of the homeland."

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"The Farewell case was doubly paradoxical. This important mole was handled not by an intelligence service, but by counterespionage. Conversely, when his covert activities were discovered, the inquiry was not entrusted to counterespionage, but to an intelligence service. Convinced of Vetrov’s culpability, the PGU had no intentions of letting others stick their noses into its files, and that included the KGB Second Chief Directorate.

"In fact, two services were investigating this unparalleled espionage case. Officially, the KGB investigation department (independent from the PGU and headquartered in Lefortovo) was in charge. Valery Dmitrievich Sergadeev1 led the investigation. He was the very man who waited for Svetlana on that day when she set off again to Lefortovo, a route she had come to loath; he also conducted the search in her apartment. Treason also directly concerned the PGU 5K department, whose mission was to prevent any infiltration of Soviet intelligence services."

" ... The PGU sent the KGB investigation department a letter signed by Vladimir Kryuchkov, requesting an examining magistrate be dispatched to the Irkutsk camp to investigate a new crime. Sergadeev, the appointed magistrate, did not feel like spending months in Siberia, so he persuaded his superiors (and he was right) that having the accused in Moscow would facilitate everyone’s work. The KGB referred the request to the Ministry of the Interior, responsible for transferring the convict from Irkutsk to Moscow. It was now September 1983."

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"Vetrov’s prosecutors within the KGB, less gullible than DST’s “Monsieur Maurice,” had some difficulties understanding his motivations and his relations with his handlers.

"“The French are asking you why a man like you, who had everything in life, could, overnight, gamble his life away. You answered, ‘Because I like France too much.’ And so they concluded at the DST, ‘Hmm? No shadow of a doubt, then, his collaboration is sincere.’ Is that what you want us to believe? Surely they aren’t that stupid?”

"“They’re French,” Vetrov tried to explain. “To French people, it is natural for anyone who visited their country to put France above any other. They won’t believe you if you tell them you don’t admire France.”4

"Sergadeev shook his head doubtfully. He had to consult with PGU colleagues who had lived in France in order to accept Vetrov’s argument. Yet it would have been enough for the examining magistrates to ask themselves about the image the Soviet Union projected abroad. Most Soviet citizens were indeed convinced that foreigners could only be impressed by a country where milkmaids were sent to parliament, veterans visited schools once a month to tell children about their feats of arms, and black people were not persecuted.

"Another significant aspect of Vetrov’s defense strategy was his resentment towards his service. Amidst the general climate of stagnation, he wanted to act. His suggestions were forgotten in a drawer, his analysis declared erroneous by Directorate T. Seeing his efforts treated with contempt, Vetrov would have decided to take revenge on his superiors. He named, in particular, his department head, Vladimir Alexandrovich Dementiev, and the director of scientific and technical intelligence, Leonid Sergeevich Zaitsev.

"It goes without saying that if Vetrov could voice his grievances towards his immediate superiors, it would have been extremely imprudent on his part to extend them to the regime as a whole, the way he used to do with the French. At this point in the investigation, Vetrov must have believed he still had a chance to survive."

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"This second investigation did not spare Ludmila Ochikina either. She had to give new depositions. In the fall of 1983, she was feeling better and was able to go to Lefortovo by herself.

"The hearings with the investigating magistrates were exclusively about Vetrov’s espionage activities. Ludmila had always claimed she knew nothing about it. From the magistrates’ insistence, she understood that her former lover claimed the contrary. The investigation brought them face to face. Vetrov tried to convince her that she had given him such and such documents. “True,” she said. “I am the one who gave them to you, but I was giving them to a man close to my heart, whom I wanted to help in his work. How could I have suspected you would pass them to foreigners?” Ochikina strongly defended herself, and the examining magistrates were forced to declare she was innocent.

"Ludmila realized that the PGU was, above all, eager to protect the honor of their uniform. One day, as she was reading her interrogation report before signing it, she ran into a sentence stating she had threatened Vetrov to tell the Party committee everything. She was outraged. There had been no such question during her deposition. Reluctantly, the magistrate struck out the sentence."

................................................................................................

"Vladik stayed over an hour. He told his father what had happened to their house in the countryside. The episode is characteristic of the climate of the country they lived in.

"After Vetrov’s arrest, a team from the regional KGB directorate searched his house in Kresty, taking with them policemen from Torzhok, the closest county town. The operation yielded no results. Soon after, two men came in a motorboat. Showing no sign of being embarrassed by the presence of the neighborhood women, they undertook to load the boat with objects they thought were the most valuable, including the best pieces of furniture. They forcefully pushed out of the way the two old women who tried to intervene, and then they left in the overloaded boat. Everyone thought, of course, that those were cops from Torzhok, or their friends, acting with complete impunity. Then the house became home to prisoners who had escaped from a nearby penitentiary. Having their own idea of comfort, the criminals built a fire in the center of the izba. In the end, Svetlana was forced to sell the house in which the Vetrovs had planned to retire.

"In Lefortovo, the liberal reign of Ivan Mitrofanovich Petrenko was coming to an end. He paid dearly for his friendly attitude with the Vetrovs and was let go for having bent the internal rules in their favor.

................................................................................................

"Once caught, a traitor could only hope for clemency. To obtain it, though, he had to satisfy two contradictory, even mutually exclusive, demands. On one hand he had to prove that he sincerely repented and was willing to disclose everything to the investigation. On the other hand, the more he confessed, the less chance he had that his life would be spared."

Authors do make it sound like Salem witch hunt, or any other part of inquisition.

Shared later abrahmic creed culture, there, after all!

................................................................................................

"Vetrov had a more tangible hope, though, and staked everything on it. He could prolong his existence and partially redeem himself by participating in an intelligence game. Making the most of Vetrov, the PGU had a chance to deceive the DST and, through it, all of the West.

"“I grant you, the issue presented itself each time a mole was uncovered,” said Igor Prelin.5 “But not to disinform the other side. In this situation, it was extremely difficult to hide the fact that the mole was arrested; in time, the adversary was bound to find out. From a counterintelligence standpoint, the most severe blow dealt to the adversary, after an agent had been identified, was to catch the handler red-handed. The main point, though, I must say, is that the case examining magistrates were never certain the mole had told them everything. So, offering the mole a part in an intelligence game was one of the methods used to squeeze the last bits of information out of him.”

"Examining magistrates know that a spy who has been arrested is ready for anything. After his confession, Oleg Penkovsky, the CIA and MI6 mole within the GRU, offered to go to the West and blow up any city. He even suggested leaving his wife and two children behind as hostages, to be shot if he did not come back. It was learned later that when still working for the West, Penkovsky had volunteered to explode a nuclear device in Moscow, a city where his friends and relatives lived. Utterly shocked, the Americans dissuaded him.

"Vetrov must not have had any illusions. Before him, many captured agents had sincerely cooperated with the KGB. Not only had they confessed everything, but they also went along with all kinds of games aimed at compromising their handlers. Still, they were shot by firing squad."

................................................................................................

"Visits were no longer organized to allow the prisoner to see his wife and son. Vetrov could inquire about Vladik, Svetlana, and other relatives, nothing more. The conversation was about topics of interest to the investigation and the PGU. The only purpose of Vetrov’s presence was to prove to Svetlana that he was going along with the process, was still alive, adequately fed, and of sound mind.

"On this last point, Svetlana had her doubts. During the visits, Vladimir always behaved in a very cheerful way, similar to the high one reaches after drinking with friends all evening. ... Svetlana is convinced that Vladimir was drugged."

" ... As deputy head of PGU internal counterintelligence, Colonel Golubev personally supervised Department 5K’s activities and, consequently, all the investigations of treason by Soviet intelligence officers. He was the Great Inquisitor."

" ... When he learned that Karavashkin, then head of the Ninth Department (Europe) of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence), was working on Vetrov file, he called him several times on the ciphered line, engaging him in long conversations on the psychological phenomenon of treason in secret services. Those conversations would last such a long time that Karavashkin had to lock his door to not be interrupted."

................................................................................................

"It did not take long for Svetlana to be charmed by the man for whom charm was a professional tool. She readily accepted the mission he asked her to fulfill."

"The KGB hoped that Jacques Prévost would respond to his Russian friends’ appeal for help. In which case, Svetlana was supposed to meet him and tell him about the murder. Nothing more, just the crime of passion. She would then say that Vetrov was in Irkutsk for the moment, but not in a prison camp. Certain individuals who committed crimes, but did not belong to the underworld, could serve their sentence under less strict conditions. They worked at plants manufacturing toxic products, such as a chemical industrial complex, and went back to their camp barrack only to sleep. The rest of the time, they were neither convoyed nor guarded. She was supposed to tell the French that this was Vetrov’s case.

"It would be, therefore, easy for her husband to escape. He would take care of everything himself in Soviet territory, but to leave the country he needed a French passport. This is why Svetlana was contacting Jacques. She even had passport photos of Vetrov (taken in Lefortovo prison). She was to give them to Prévost during their first meeting. Then, if the DST agreed, she would receive a passport with a French name but with Vladimir’s picture.

"Naturally, the KGB plan was not resting on the gratitude the DST had toward its agent nor on the explicit promise made to him in President Mitterrand’s name. Objectively, Vetrov’s experience and the information he kept in his head were extremely valuable to any adversarial intelligence service. Therefore, from the DST’s or the CIA’s perspective, this was a fully justified investment. In exchange for only one passport, Western services had the opportunity to get a first-rate source.

"Svetlana did not know the rest of the plan. Of course, the KGB never intended to let Vetrov flee to the West. Did it just want to compromise a French citizen, if not to prove him guilty of espionage? The “special quality” of the relations between the USSR and France did not lend itself to a scandal of international dimensions. One did not exclude the other. Secret services always need bargaining chips. In response to a blunder committed in France by a Russian intelligence officer, the KGB could present its chip and thus hush up the scandal."

"The letter did reach its destination, but, familiar with double dealings, Raymond Nart immediately sensed a trap. Nobody contacted Svetlana, and she was now a suspect in the DST’s eyes."

................................................................................................

" ... Svetlana was summoned to Lefortovo. Sergadeev showed her a few letters from her husband that had been confiscated during the search of their apartment, and he asked her to comment on certain sentences. Those messages contained a fair amount of criticism of Soviet power and imprudent allusions to the great life they could have had in France. The magistrate was surprised that the camp censors let the letters go through.

"Disarmed by his bantering tone, Svetlana answered, “Well, that’s the whole point, they did not go through censorship! Volodia managed to mail them through people who had served their sentence and were released.”

"“Is that so? And what did he pass to you?”

"Asking this question, Sergadeev was bluffing, not expecting anything in return. But Svetlana opened her purse and pulled out a short note her husband had slipped to her during their last rendezvous. It was another call for help to the French, asking them to assist his family financially. It was also much worse than that: to prove he could still be useful to the DST, Vetrov provided a few corrections regarding four Soviet agents.

"Vetrov’s last hope vanished at this very instant. How could they trust a man who, although under the pending threat of capital punishment, continued to pass intelligence secrets to the opposite side? Did Svetlana realize that by remitting the note to the examining magistrates, she had betrayed her husband and, actually, sent him in front of a firing squad? Did the experienced and skilled magistrate Sergadeev allow her to understand that? Apparently not. From that moment on, the KGB abandoned the idea of deceiving the DST with Vetrov’s help.

................................................................................................

"It nevertheless continued its little game with the uncovered mole. One day, Sergadeev asked Svetlana to come to his office in order to brief her, should a Frenchman respond to Farewell’s SOS.

"“But Jacques…Jacques Prévost came to our place a few days ago,” she said. “Surely you know about it.”

"Sergadeev was flabbergasted.

"“You mean, Prévost went to see you at home?” he eventually uttered.

"“You didn’t know?” added Svetlana, even more surprised. “I thought…”

"She thought her apartment was constantly under surveillance.

"“And what happened?” asked Sergadeev.

"“Nothing special. I explained the situation, and he ran away as if the house was on fire.”"

"Nart and Jacques Prévost claimed on the contrary that this visit was absolutely impossible. First, because Nart had forbidden Prévost from going to Moscow; second, because in mid-December 1983, Jacques Prévost had a heart attack which incapacitated him for six months. The Thomson executive was in Moscow last in early December 1983, and did not set foot in that city ever again. In fact, the last time he went through customs at the airport, before flying back to Paris, he was retained for half an hour by two field officers, one being a lieutenant colonel; they eventually let him go, but for Prévost, who knew that Vetrov had been arrested, those thirty minutes were the longest of his life. There was, therefore, every reason to think Svetlana had lied. Was it a petty revenge over her husband’s examining magistrates?

"If such was her intent, it worked wonders, because the KGB, infuriated by the missed opportunity due to the negligence of its surveillance teams, made a last attempt at compromising the DST. Svetlana was dispatched to the French consulate, but the reception was icy. In all likelihood, Golubev had acted out of pique, with no real hope of making up for the missed opportunity. The net result was that Vetrov did not stand a chance to survive.

................................................................................................

"Overnight, several people in Vetrov’s entourage found themselves closely watched by the KGB. A revealing fact is that the dragnet did not aim at Vetrov’s superiors nor at PGU internal counterintelligence officers who were in charge of preventing possible treason in their service. Saving the honor of their uniform once again, the PGU acted as if, having isolated the black sheep, its staff was beyond reproach. Any investigation was bound to expose serious negligence, to say the least.

"Vetrov actually had the perfect profile of the average traitor. General Vadim Alexeevich Kirpichenko, who served twelve years as PGU first deputy head, must have been well-versed in Treason 101 since he formalized it in an article published in 1995.1 He has passed away since then. Among other things, he supervised Directorate K (internal counterintelligence). Sergei Kostin had the opportunity to meet him in August 1996. This seventy-four-year-old man, unquestionably intelligent and stern looking, was still eager to learn. It was not possible to obtain much information from him about Vetrov, for whom he had only one word: “bandit.” According to the general, it was extremely difficult to spot a mole in one’s own ranks. In his article, he referred to the “recruitability model” articulated by the CIA, which on his own admission did not differ that much from the KGB’s. Intelligence officers likely to respond to rival services are characterized by “double loyalty” (loyalty in words only), narcissism, vanity, envy, ruthless ambition, a venal attitude, and an inclination to womanizing and drinking. Two categories of individuals deserve special attention. First, there are those who are not happy at work, thinking their professional accomplishments are not appreciated. Then, there are those going through a crisis, in particular in their family relationships, causing stress and psychological conflicts.

"Summarizing the personality traits of promising recruitment targets, a CIA methodology document describes three types of potential traitors:

"• The adventurer. He aspires to a more important role than the one he has, and more in line with the abilities he attributes to himself; he wants to reach maximum success by any means.

"• The avenger. He tries to respond to humiliations he believes he is subjected to, by punishing isolated individuals or society as a whole.

"• The hero-martyr. He strives to untangle the complex web of his personal problems."

The authors are bungling the last bit. Hero and martyr do not fit "strives to untangle the complex web of his personal problems", but do if "personal problems" are replaced with "world wrongs".

................................................................................................

"Vetrov combined all three types of traitor."

Authors are obviously attempting to wipe the slate clean after having analysed him as having actually engineered an affair after selecting a suitable murder victim for the purpose, to provide a cover for comparatively more major crime!

But, if - they state - they no longer believed all that explicitly written and implied much more beyond analysis, why not edit it out? No, that declaration is a lie, suitable for the family in defense against their having loved someone fitting the far more horrible image of one who traps another woman for explicit purpose of murder to cover up his own betrayal of his nation and ideology thereof.

"The general climate within the PGU was not conducive to showing attentiveness to others, helping a comrade, or simply being vigilant. The main concerns were getting a post abroad, climbing the hierarchical ladder, and being promoted. The competition was too fierce all around to afford the time to take an interest in guys who were finished, sidelined, and were no longer a threat as rivals."

Surely that's not unique to Russia, and far from unknown in US, or other countries?

Who coddles those perceived as failures, in any profession, much less intelligence, for that matter? Any Nobel prizes for the 'almost there'?

................................................................................................

"In the early eighties, department 5K was run by Vitaly Sergeyevich Yurchenko. This former submariner initially served in the KGB Third Chief Directorate (military counterintelligence and security). Transferred to the PGU Directorate K, he was nominated to the post of security officer at the Soviet embassy in Washington DC in the late seventies. Yurchenko had his moment of fame thanks to an unusual gesture, if not a suspicious one. He handed the FBI an envelope containing secret documents that had been thrown over the Soviet embassy’s wall by a former member of American secret services. The “walk-in” was arrested. To show its gratitude, the FBI sent a detective with a flower bouquet to bid farewell to Yurchenko when he left Washington in 1980.2

"Department 5K performances under Yurchenko in Yasenevo were modest. Investigations against officers suspected of being double agents were extremely rare, and none of them led to the unmasking of an agent guilty of sharing intelligence with a foreign power. This was attributed to the department’s lack of training and experience in counterintelligence, and also to the prevailing attitude rejecting the mere idea that an elite organization like the PGU could have traitors in its ranks.3

"There had to be another reason, and the future proved it with an event that was testimony to the decay within the Soviet intelligence services. Yurchenko, this guardian of officers’ loyalty and morality, defected!4 Recently nominated to the post of PGU First Department deputy chief (field of operations: USA and Canada), he disappeared in Rome on August 1, 1985. Shortly thereafter, he emerged in Washington DC, where he underwent intense debriefing by the CIA. He is the one who, along with other information, gave American secret services the details about Farewell’s end and Howard’s treason. Strangely, three months later, he decided to go back to the USSR, and escaping the surveillance of two “guardian angels” from the FBI, he managed to reach the Soviet embassy. He told them a preposterous story. He had been kidnapped by the CIA in the Vatican, locked up in a secret villa, drugged with a psychoactive medication to make him talk, and so forth. Since his defection involved too many high-ranking KGB officials, this version was the one retained for public consumption. The KGB directorate behaved as if Yurchenko’s round trip to the United States was simply a PGU disinformation operation. Yurchenko was even awarded an Honored Chekist badge, presented by Vladimir Kryuchkov in a solemn ceremony, sickening all the intelligence officers present.5

"After having accepted these honors, Yurchenko disappeared. Some even think he was shot by firing squad. This is not the case. Sergei Kostin, with the help of his KGB contacts and through a next-door neighbor of Yurchenko’s in the countryside, was able to establish that Yurchenko was lying low. He refuses to meet journalists, whatever the subject matter."

" ... Golubev was one of the linchpins in the assassination of Bulgarian dissident writer Georgi Markov in London in 1978, an event known as the infamous “poisoned umbrella” stabbing.7 ... "

"Golubev survived, even after his former subordinate Yurchenko defected. Edward Howard’s defection to the Soviet Union in the mid-eighties amply compensated for the prolonged state of lethargy in the PGU security service. Directorate K took credit for the series of arrests in Russia after Howard revealed the names of Soviet CIA agents. This was the long-awaited hour of glory for the PGU counterintelligence service and his boss. Golubev was awarded the Order of Lenin, became a general, and was moved to deputy head of Directorate K. He retired and, like Yurchenko, declined to meet journalists until his death in 2007."

" ... The most severe disciplinary action in the aftermath of the Vetrov case was the demotion of two employees for slacking off in controlling the use of the copy machine."

................................................................................................

He wasn't doing this, moreover, out of fear of reprisals against family, when he returned to Moscow instead of escaping - his family had been with him in both France and Canada.

He was,in any discussion of virtue or importance, simply akin to the small screw that, having gone loose or missing at some point, had brought Columbia down in frames in 1986.

No more than that, whatever his personal attributes accordingto family or friends.

................................................................................................

"A few authors8 mention a confession written by Vetrov shortly before his execution, which was a true indictment of his service. “I am adamant: there was no ‘last letter,’” protested Igor Prelin.9 “I understand that the French and the Americans would like their agents to be their friends out of ideological beliefs, fighting the power of the Soviets. It would embellish their efforts. It’s one thing to recruit an agent through blackmail and corruption, but it’s another to win over a soul mate. There is nothing of the sort in Vetrov’s case.”

"All the same, the existence of such a document seems plausible. It would be totally in line with his French handlers’ testimony regarding Vetrov’s hatred of the regime and of the KGB. Moreover, this confession, which told too many truths to be popular among the PGU readership, might very well have been buried in the safe of the Department 5K chief, Vitaly Yurchenko.

"It would certainly have gone unheeded if Yurchenko had not decided to go for his short-lived defection to the West. An account of his testimony about this famous indictment was supposedly transmitted to the DST by the CIA as early as October 1985. The document appears to remain classified to this day. The DST, who would benefit from making the document public, denied us access to it and kindly invited us to come again, fifty years from now.

"Certainly such a document would make Vetrov sound like a hero from an ancient classical tragedy, accusing his executors from a rostrum for all to be judged by history. The existence of this confession may sound too good to be true. Yet, after a few more weeks of research, repeatedly lodging requests with another fully credible source, we eventually found a copy of Yurchenko’s testimony; a few excerpts are reproduced here ... "

"Upon reading this CIA memo, it becomes clear why the KGB had all the reasons in the world to get rid of Vetrov’s confession.

................................................................................................

"It all began with one of Vetrov’s investigating magistrates asking him to write a letter in which he would express his regrets for having betrayed his country. By way of regrets, they received a last and exceptionally violent salvo. Although Vetrov’s last words are read here through the softening prism of a CIA memo, one can nevertheless sense his anger.

"“[According to our source (Yurchenko)] Subject appeared almost totally committed to his relationship with the French Intelligence Service. […] During the investigation and interrogations he never expressed regret for the damage he had done to the KGB and the Soviet system. […] He was induced by his interrogators in the First Chief Directorate to write a confession of his ‘treason.’ He did so, producing a sixty-page handwritten document entitled ‘Confession of a Traitor.’ At first pleased that Subject had been ‘broken into writing a confession,’ the leadership of the First Chief Directorate upon reading the ‘confession’ became deeply disturbed that the confession, in effect, was a scathing and devastating attack on the corruption, bribery, incompetence, cynicism, and criminality of the First Chief Directorate ... "

"“[…] Our source commented that when he read the confession he found himself fascinated by the accuracy of Subject’s indictments of the KGB and the Soviet system […].

"“[…] Our source commented that Subject went to his death with only one regret, that he could not have done more damage to the KGB in his service for France. […]”

"If, according to the investigation file, Vetrov never stopped prevaricating to reduce his sentence, this letter seems to bear the stamp of sincerity. With no hope left, he had nothing to lose. It is thus reasonable to consider his last cry for revenge as his legacy."

................................................................................................

" ... Considering the extensive damage caused by Vetrov, it was concluded that he could not have possibly acted alone; there must have been a network."

"The Rogatins’ country house was searched skillfully. Their phone was tapped twenty-four hours a day. When they went outside to walk their dog, they could see shadows stamping their feet in the building courtyard. If Galina took the trolley to go to work, a well-dressed man with cropped hair inevitably got on board with her. Alexei could see a black Volga in his back mirror, tailing him at all times.

"In the beginning, the Rogatins tried to take it well. They even started the habit, when leaving for the countryside, to drop their apartment key with the building caretaker, under the pretext that she could have a look and make sure everything was fine and clean up every once in a while. Actually, this was a gesture to prove they had nothing to hide, since the caretaker like all her colleagues was a KGB informant. The KGB must have used this opportunity more than once to search their apartment at will.

"Over time, however, it became irritating. Many of their acquaintances had stopped calling them. Like Svetlana, Galina had the good Soviet reflex not to call their true friends, not wanting to compromise them. Finally, the UPDK told Alexei he could no longer work as a chauffeur for the embassy of a capitalist country. He protested. He wanted to know why they were blaming him, but to no avail. After having driven the Swedish and Luxembourgian ambassadors’ cars, a job he viewed as the high point of his career, Alexei was forced to drive a coach for the Hungarian trade mission.

"Strangely, the Rogatins were placed under surveillance as early as the spring of 1982, although there was no suspicion of espionage at that time. ... "

Authors are hereby prevaricating, even in light of evidence to the contrary right here in their own work, in process of describing the elementary beginning of the investigation of the double murder committed, at least as Vetrov himself thought.

It's hardly likely, moreover, that veyrov was the only intelligent man in Soviet intelligence; if he could figure out that a ghastly murder might help him cover his betrayal of nation, and escape his handlers, surely KGB wasn't incapable of figuring out such possibilities, and proceeding to investigate, however stealthily? Which, according to fragments here and there, they did, with a question here or there - about a painting, a fur coat - escaping until these authors caught it.

................................................................................................

"Yuri Motsak paid a higher price for his friendly relations with Vetrov. His case was more understandable. Motsak had enjoyed a few too many drinks with the traitor he was paid to unmask and, for that reason, counterintelligence did more than keep a close watch on him around the clock.

"One day he was picked up by the police with a colleague, both unconscious. Motsak could hold his liquor. Even after gulping down a liter of vodka, he did not let anything show. Everyone who knew him concluded Motsak had been drugged. His comrade had simply had the bad luck to share the same bottle. Drugged meant interrogated. Apparently the “induced” confession proved Motsak’s innocence in the espionage case. He could be blamed only for his lack of vigilance, but he was transferred to the Tenth Department (currency trafficking, smuggling) of the Second Chief Directorate. He was eventually rehabilitated, nominated department head, and promoted to colonel. Today he is also a businessman."

................................................................................................

" ... If there had been a Vetrov network, Alexei would have been the ideal living mailbox. Under the pretext of car repair, a good half dozen KGB officers would have routinely come to drop their batch of secret information, and Vetrov would have stopped by to take delivery before transmitting the information to the French.

"Did the KGB come to this theory on their own? Vladimir could have, indeed, told Ferrant that he was heading a “network,” so the French would not doubt his ability to single-handedly provide such a large amount of very important documents. Perhaps, in order to woo his silent partners, he also tried to impress them with his organizational skills. It is very likely that Vetrov talked to “Paul” about their common main enemy, Yuri Motsak.

"After the August 1991 coup, Vitaly Karavashkin, though having resigned from the KGB, was willing to do a last favor for his colleagues, pretending to probe a French secret agent whose code name was “Thermometer.” He told him he was willing to accept a job in the Moscow offices of a French company delegation. The Frenchman, naturally, seized the opportunity to regularly “milk” the man who best knew the Moscow French colony, and came from the Soviet counterintelligence service that had been monitoring it closely. In his first round of questions, in order to make sure he did intend to be useful to the French services, “Thermometer” asked Karavashkin about Motsak. How did his career go? What happened to him? Since the Second Chief Directorate had no known traitors in its ranks after Yuri Nosenko, French special services should not even have known Motsak’s name. Karavashkin concluded, therefore, that Motsak’s identity must have been revealed to them by Vetrov."

................................................................................................

"With respect to Vetrov’s motives, the investigation file did not mention any links to politics. There are moles who profess a global vision of the situation and strive to influence its evolution. Collaborating with Soviet intelligence during World War II, the Cambridge Five were convinced they were contributing to the Allies’ common war effort. Klaus Fuchs thought that by passing the atom bomb secrets to the USSR, he contributed to averting the danger of an imbalance between the blocs, which presented a mortal threat to all of humanity. On a less intellectual level, George Pâques, who was handled by the PGU, was certain of playing a crucial role on the international scene. For Vetrov, however, it was more a question of getting emotionally even with the KGB than an elaborate plan to fight the Soviet system.

"His investigation file clearly shows, in conversations with other Gulag inmates, or in letters to Svetlana, his criticism of Soviet life’s downsides, with nepotism, corruption, shortages, and so forth. The investigating magistrates used the phrase “embarked upon the path of treason as a result of ideological degeneration,” which strangely echoes the term “detachment” used by Raymond Nart to explain Vetrov’s behavior. What else would explain that a former young pioneer of the Soviet Union, a Communist Youth and a Communist Party member, could betray his country?

"Was it out of greed? We know this was not a dominant trait in this case. For the KGB members, presenting Vetrov as a corrupt character or a Judas was very tempting. Vladimir Kryuchkov1 considered that if the greed element did not prevail, it was because the traitor, having no legal possibility to spend the money in the Soviet Union, owning significant amounts of money would have been risky. In his opinion, Vetrov intended to enjoy his wealth once in France.

"He cannot be proven wrong. Adolf Tolkachev, for instance, was an American mole who, in those same years in the eighties, passed information on Soviet fighter aircraft to the CIA. On top of the two million dollars he had in his bank account in the United States, he had almost eight hundred thousand rubles in Moscow. This was a huge fortune, enough to buy at least fifty three-room apartments in the heart of Moscow. When he thought he was being watched, Tolkachev burned half a million rubles. As he watched the flames get bigger, he later admitted, he thought to himself, “It is for all this money that I gambled with my life!” He was executed by firing squad in the fall of 1986."

................................................................................................

"Another source, this time from the French DGSE (the General Directorate for External Security, as the SDECE was renamed in 1982), assured us that KGB officers secretly admired Vetrov’s courage and determination to fight nepotism. In 1988, discontent eventually filtered through, with a first incident occurring during the opening of a meeting convened to elect the executives of the PGU Party committee. Three brilliant officers challenged the presence on the stage, next to General Fillip Bobkov,2 of a “well-connected,” competence-and efficiency-deprived individual. Taken off guard, the PGU could only beat a retreat. The breach opened that day would inexorably widen until, during the following year, over two hundred KGB officers in Sverdlovsk signed a petition addressed to their top management.

"The jolt that shook the KGB as an aftershock of the Vetrov “earthquake” was felt all the more painfully because it occurred in a zone of “low seismic activity,” so to speak. The KGB could not have anticipated actions from a service (the DST) it did not suspect of operating in the USSR. Had the captured spy collaborated with the Americans, the British, or the Germans, that would have been one thing, but this? As the joke had it, circulating in the hallways of Soviet counterintelligence services, the last time secrets had been revealed to the French before the Farewell case was during the “Lockhart plot”!3

"To explain the unprecedented success of the Farewell operation, the DST put forward its deliberate intention to act contrary to all rules, but this is only partially true. Two circumstances made this anomaly possible.

"The first one was the belief, put to the test through a long period of checks, that French services had given up agent manipulation. “With an American or a British handler, Vetrov would have been caught red-handed within a month,” claims Igor Prelin.

"The second one is the fact that all the contact terms and conditions were devised by Vetrov in person. “Myself, when I was dealing with a competent foreign agent, I would trust him,” recalls Igor Prelin. “It would have been stupid to impose any elaborate scheme, in Moscow, on an individual operating on his own turf. I always played the innocent with him, pretending I had nothing to do with secret services, that I was only a transmission belt, and I listened. If he had a shrewd plan, I’d say ‘Bravo!’ and the agent was all happy to be so smart. If I realized the risks involved, I tweaked the plan ever so tactfully, asking questions rather than giving instructions."

"It took Karavashkin three months to study all the paperwork. His main conclusion was that the Farewell case did not shed light on the working methods of the French secret services. Had Vetrov accepted the plan suggested by the DST, the operation would have failed in a matter of days. The procedures he imposed on his handlers were those applied by Soviet intelligence. “In the future, though,” said Karavashkin, “if the French are good students, one can assume they will benefit from this experience in agent handling.”"

................................................................................................

"Assuming an intelligence officer in Paris, such as Vetrov, goes to a secret rendezvous with an important agent, Pierre Bourdiol, for instance. On that day the entire residency is on alert. Only two or three men know what is supposed to happen. Others execute diversion and cover maneuvers, not having a clue about the particulars of the operation (names, circumstances, kind of operation). Several hours before the rendezvous, half a dozen officers leave the Soviet embassy, setting in motion one by one the DST’s tailing teams, hot on their heels. Each officer behaves in a manner intended to make the shadow believe the tailed officer is the one on his way to make a drop or take delivery from a dead letter box or to rendezvous with his agent. He runs errands, leaves his car somewhere, and goes down in the subway. In this way, each officer is dragging a maximum number of shadows in his wake.

"It is only after the main body of the DST forces has been diverted onto other surveillance targets that the true “handler of the day” leaves his office or his home. Like all of his colleagues, he follows a long security route through town. He goes by places where another KGB member, sipping a beer at an outside coffee table, checks that he is not being tailed. This is what is referred to as physical countersurveillance.

"The handler then performs unpredictable maneuvers. For instance, at 16:34, as he is driving his car in the right lane, he changes to the left lane at the last moment. If he was followed, the tailers cannot do the same last-minute maneuver. They are thus forced to inform their center, or another car, to take over. During this ploy, an operator listens to radio conversations on the DST frequencies. If at exactly 16:34 he intercepts any message, generally ciphered, it means the officer is under surveillance. If another message is intercepted at the same time as the next unexpected maneuver, scheduled for instance at 16:49, then there is no doubt left: the DST is hot on the officer’s heels. Then, a beeper alerts him that the operation is cancelled.

"If countersurveillance and radio monitoring do not reveal suspicious activity after three hours of acrobatics, the officer arrives at the meeting place. There, he and his agent check once again that the way is clear. Only then do they get in contact.

................................................................................................

"Such are the basics of the trade, adopted by all special services worldwide, because this canonical modus operandi works. No one in the KGB doubted Vetrov had been handled that way in Moscow.

"In particular, Soviet counterintelligence was convinced that during the mandatory three hours of driving around town before meeting with Farewell, Ferrant must have been backed up by the American embassy radio control service. At the time, the French embassy in Moscow was not equipped to perform this kind of technical operation. There was a close collaboration between Western special services in the USSR, particularly in military intelligence. At the time, contacts between American and French officers were very frequent. Therefore, reasoned Karavashkin, the Americans could very well have responded to Ferrant’s request to be covered, or they could have received the express order to do so from the CIA headquarters.

"On a rendezvous day, a CIA operator must have had a sheet of paper in front of him with a column of numbers, like, for instance, 15:38, 16:29, 17:10, 17:51, and 18:07. If at those exact times he intercepted any message on the frequencies used by mobile surveillance, or a ciphered phrase or simply a sound signal, he wrote it down. Then, a CIA station field officer would come by after six p.m. to check on the situation. All he would know himself is that the French were executing a covert operation that day.

"If he observed that there were no events at those exact moments when the French officer was making various moves to shake off potential pursuers, he could call an office colleague of the French military attaché to tell him, for instance, that he is sending the latest American newspapers over by courier. If, on the contrary, he sees that there is every indication that their man is under surveillance, he invites the colleague over to play bridge the next Saturday. Then, depending on the scenario, the Frenchman will simply drive by the Arbat restaurant to alert Ferrant, who is waiting in the parking lot, so that he can take a trolley to go to his rendezvous. If his colleague does not drive by, it means that the operation has been cancelled and Ferrant must go home.

"That’s what Karavashkin thought. But what actually happened?

................................................................................................

"Ferrant’s KGB “guardian angel” was Slava Sidorkin.5 Very often, by an injustice of fate, the secret service’s best officers, the ones who brilliantly executed their missions, die unknown. Conversely, history remembers the names of burned, arrested, and imprisoned agents, of individuals behind colossal blunders and memorable faux pas. In the service’s history, Sidorkin will be remembered as the man who missed Vetrov.

" ... His instructors had no illusions about him. Sidorkin was not cut out to be an operative. They gave him the advice to stay in the school to teach instead, but Slava persisted. Despite the little hope that could be placed in him, the section gave him this “job for the good guy,” as the Russians say. Sidorkin was in charge of overseeing the French military, a post that did not require outstanding talents."

"Foreign delegations and residential buildings reserved for foreigners were guarded by the police round the clock. Actually, the special regiment of the Ministry of Interior was assigned exclusively to the protection of delegations from friendly or neutral countries. The security of NATO members’ embassies and of their largest residential buildings depended on the Diplomatic Representations Guard Department of the KGB Seventh Directorate. The men in police uniforms were counterintelligence officers or NCOs. Having been at the same post for years, they knew every passing face. At the request of their colleagues from the Second Chief Directorate, they often drew psychological profiles of certain foreigners or the list of Soviet people meeting with them. They secretly photographed visitors. Regarding known intelligence officers, like Ferrant, the guards received instructions every once in a while to record all their comings and goings."

" ... it appears that, two years after the fact, Vetrov’s memories were getting fuzzy. Having confessed to the clandestine rendezvous, he had nothing to gain by giving the wrong dates. Those discrepancies question the credibility of Vetrov’s depositions as far as dates are concerned."

................................................................................................

"Taking September 18 as an extreme case, the route was as follows: The Ferrants drove away from the House of France at 18:07. They turned into Bolshaya Polyanka Street and then got on the Garden Ring. To get to the Arbat restaurant in rush-hour traffic, they needed ten to fifteen minutes. By the time they parked the car and crossed Kalinin Avenue through the underground tunnel it was 18:30, in the best-case scenario. The Borodino Battle Museum was twenty minutes or so away by trolley or bus, provided it came within the ten remaining minutes. Ferrant had never been late at the rendezvous; Vetrov was specifically questioned on this point.

"In those conditions, it appears that Ferrant had barely enough time to turn around every so often to check if a shadow was waving at him to signal his presence."

"Despite the inaccuracies, nothing substantiates the assumption that, on his way to meet with his mole, Ferrant was taking even the most elementary precautions. As for the Americans controlling the radio waves, it did not happen. “Paul,” the professional, appears to have behaved with the same nonchalance as the amateurs Xavier Ameil and Madeleine Ferrant.

"The complex scenario imagined by Karavashkin, involving security routes all over town and American radio assistance, resulted from the reflex of a professional. Even when confronted with the evidence, he refused to believe that the handling of Vetrov could have been accomplished with such amateurishness.7

"To French professionals, on the other hand, the situation appears plausible. Admiral Pierre Lacoste, former head of the DGSE (French foreign intelligence service), answering Sergei Kostin’s questions, was of the opinion that if the Farewell operation succeeded, it was precisely because it ran counter to all the rules of the trade, because it was managed by amateurs. Considering the draconian counterintelligence regime that existed in the Soviet Union at the time, true pros would have soon fallen into the KGB’s clutches.8"

................................................................................................

"Regardless of the errors committed by the DST in the Farewell operation, it is still surprising that the KGB did not have a clue. Hubris was the main explanation. The French section of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence) was so convinced that they had dissuaded the French from actively pursuing intelligence work in the USSR, and that they so cleverly maintained the illusion they were controlling each step of each foreigner, it was in a state of blissful contentment, resting on its laurels. Furthermore, the French section was a victim of the system imposed by the PGU (intelligence service), which intended it to be the only one in charge of security within its ranks.

"All the same, Soviet counterintelligence should have reacted at least in two concrete circumstances. They had noticed that there were often French people in the Borodino Battle Museum area.9 If they did not look further into the matter, it was because this was normal. The museum was one of the places in Moscow most closely linked to French history. This proves once more that Vetrov had planned his collaboration with the DST very carefully. His presence there could be easily explained by the proximity of his garage and his wife’s job at the museum, and the presence of a French person would also seem logical, even if a liaison officer."

"The Ferrants had hired a Russian housekeeper to help Madeleine with their five daughters and with the apartment. Patrick had to know that Soviet domestic staff employed by foreigners were in the service of the KGB. Nonetheless, one morning, while Ferrant was at the embassy, the housekeeper allegedly found, on a desk, the photocopy of a document passed by Farewell. There was no doubt: the paper had a KGB logo and was stamped “top secret.”

"When questioned about the incident, Ferrant thought the explanation was simple. The incriminating document could not have come from the Farewell dossier because Ferrant never left those documents out, and he always had them with him when he went to the embassy.

"What he remembers well, though, is having left in full view a book about the KGB written by John Barron in 1975 and entitled KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents.10 Highly visible on the cover page was the KGB emblem.

................................................................................................

"This voluntary “slip” was in line with Ferrant’s general attitude during his posting in Moscow. If he was careful not to lose the agents who occasionally tailed him, it was to not get them in trouble. A reprimanded agent is more zealous than a lazy functionary who quietly goes about his business. Conversely, a foreign resident trying to shake off a shadow is necessarily suspicious. Following the same logic, a housekeeper supposed to report compromising facts about the foreigners she works for, but who never provides anything, runs the risk of being poorly rated. To give her something to work on, “Paul” had told her she could look at everything around, except that book. “I often asked this good woman if she had enough to tell her superiors about; I would even suggest reporting such and such event. It gave her a good laugh,” the officer remembers.11

"Nevertheless, the housekeeper did not touch the book, but she rushed to tell her UPDK superior all about it. Like most of his colleagues, he was a retired Lubyanka employee. He had the good reflex to call counterintelligence, Ninth Department. At the time, Vladimir Nevzorov, the housekeeper’s supervisor in the French section, could not leave his office. The department head sent an operative from the Portuguese section, instead, to the UPDK.

"The man went by the book for this type of situation. He questioned the housekeeper, and then, back at Lubyanka, he informed someone in charge in the French section. Together, they informed the Ninth Department chief. Being a USA specialist, Vadim Toptygin12 did not know the difference between the Quai d’Orsay (Foreign Affairs) and the Quai des Orfèvres (Police headquarters). In his eyes, only the CIA could challenge the KGB. He guffawed.

"“Come on! Ha-ha-ha…the French? Able to get their hands on a KGB document? She suffers from hallucinations, your maid! She needs to be examined by a shrink. And you too!”

"Had they decided to put Ferrant under surveillance, however, he would have been spotted at the next rendezvous with Vetrov, since, evidently, the Frenchman did not follow a security route before going to Year 1812 Street."

................................................................................................

"In France, the sheer volume and quality of the documents passed by Farewell were such that some experts wondered if it might be a huge disinformation operation. Their doubts grew on fertile soil. A question raised at the very beginning of the operation was whether Vetrov was a genuine mole or a KGB “lure.”"

"The Farewell affair happened at the same time as the Socialists came to power in France. In their Common Program of the Left, they had declared that they were resolutely opposed to the existence of secret services.13 The new government was thinking about outright eliminating the DST, considered an outgrowth of the police apparatus. The detractors of French counterintelligence, and their rival DGSE colleagues in particular, were quick to insinuate that the Farewell dossier was a complete survival fabrication by the DST. They had several reasons. The first being the humiliation caused by Vetrov’s preference of the counterintelligence DST over their foreign intelligence service, followed by the fact that the DST did not hand the operation over to the SDECE, although it was the only service officially in charge of operations abroad. Finally, this special dispensation received President Mitterrand’s support. To cap it all off, the credit was given for what was viewed as the most successful operation by French special services to spy hunters who were not even from the military, the DST being similar to the FBI."

"Organizing a campaign four months before presidential elections was risky, to put it mildly. The initial data for an operation targeting a Gaullist technocrat running for a second term in office, or targeting a socialist beginner allied with communists, is drastically different. The KGB would have certainly waited until May 10, 1981, before implementing a deception operation.

"Furthermore, the Soviet Union’s main enemy being the United States, Farewell should have either approached them directly or made sure the deception target was a country that would share the information with Washington. Among the major Western European countries, none was less fit than France to play that role, with its concern about independence and the Gaullists’ declared anti-Americanism, and even more so considering that France might elect a socialist president.

"Finally, how could the KGB have attempted such a dangerous move? The Farewell affair had the immediate, and perfectly predictable, result of an all-out hardening of the West’s attitude toward the Soviet Bloc. Defense was reinforced, and COCOM lists were revised. In other words, this was exactly the opposite of what the KGB, and more specifically the scientific and technical intelligence, was trying to accomplish."

................................................................................................

"Starting with figures, a quantitative analysis is helpful in evaluating the extent of the damage. Farewell transmitted more than three thousand pages of secret and top-secret documents to the DST, most of it coming from the KGB.2 Quantity alone, no matter how impressive, says little about the value of the leaked material. Oleg Penkovsky gave British and American services close to five thousand documents, but the Farewell dossier is considered much more explosive."

" ... Vetrov admitted to giving the names of 422 former colleagues. He communicated basic information to Ferrant—identity, rank, personal address, and private phone number—for 250 Soviet technology intelligence officers operating abroad, 222 of them under diplomatic cover. Vetrov had access to Directorate T files, as well as those for the Third Department, dealing with technology intelligence inside the Soviet Union. Another 170 officers were identified from other KGB divisions; Vetrov knew a lot of them personally."

"The damage was just as disastrous for foreigners selling secrets they had access to at work to the KGB. They were generally the most useful contingent because they were the ones providing elements (a batch of documentation, a sample, a spare part or just a pinch of metal turnings, enough to identify the alloy) that might save years of effort by large teams of scientists and engineers, which would help cut down on huge investments. Being the “backroom boys,” they were also the hardest to unmask. Normal productivity for a counterintelligence service is several individuals, if not dozens of agents, devoting themselves from three to five years, locating a single spy. In some cases, the lead time was much longer. Chasing down the famous MI5 mole in Great Britain took over thirty years…and failed."

................................................................................................

" ... When reflecting upon Vladimir Vetrov’s path, one is reminded of Madame de Staël’s words: “If the Russians do not hit the mark, it is because they overshoot it.”14 Farewell, with his Russian excessiveness, unquestionably overreached his goal, since the KGB was dismantled in 1991."

Surely it was only renamed, reorganised, etc? NKVD?

................................................................................................

"In 1976, five years before the Farewell case, Ronald Reagan nearly unseated President Gerald Ford for the Republican presidential nomination. The major salient of his attack on Ford was on foreign and national security policy. Reagan rejected “détente,” not because he opposed a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union, but because under Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger “détente” had taken on a special, nearly theological meaning—a supposedly ineluctable process of gradually making the Soviets completely dependent on trade and technology from the West, hence causing them to moderate their behavior in terms of global expansion and military procurement. Reagan believed the theory to be defective and dangerous, even intellectually bankrupt.

"Gerald Ford went on to lose to Jimmy Carter in November, and the change in administrations merely resulted in giving the Soviet Union even greater incentive to pursue an aggressive course in its relationship with the United States. Reagan hosted a highly effective daily radio show from 1975 through 1979, regularly launching reasoned critiques of U.S. policies that failed to exact penalties for bad behavior from the other side. His speeches on foreign policy and defense increasingly reflected this tone: U.S. policy was in effect rewarding aggressive international behavior.

"Although his critics repeated the mantra that Reagan was “simplistic,” Reagan believed that simply “managing” the Cold War was a losing proposition. On the contrary, as he said to me in his Los Angeles study in early February 1977, just days after Jimmy Carter was inaugurated president, “There is a difference between being ‘simplistic’ and having simple answers to complex questions.” Then he said, “So, my theory of the Cold War is that we win and they lose. What do you think of that?”"

People have short memories, so short that they've forgotten that chap, which is clear when they lampoon, criticise or worse, Donald Trump. One is exasperated hearing those through the last decade or so, and asking in amazement if anyone thinks there had been a better republican president than Trump - after Ike, that is; in fact, Lincoln, Teddy Roosevelt and Ike, thats the complete list of good guys among all the republican presidents, and Trump makes it to the top after that.

................................................................................................

" ... March 30, 1981, Reagan appealed to Leonid Brezhnev to sit down and negotiate critical issues contributing to tensions. The appeal was summarily rejected by Brezhnev.

"In early May, less than four months into the Reagan administration, France’s François Mitterrand surprised everyone by unseating President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. The French Communist Party had supported Mitterrand, and the winner appointed four communist ministers to his cabinet. The State Department and U.S. press were in a state of shock, and my colleague, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, a close friend of D’Estaing, declined to brief the press. I had studied Mitterrand’s career for years, and thus it fell to me to brief the press as an “anonymous senior White House official.” The theme used in the briefing: Mitterrand would be a canny manager of his cabinet, and there was no need for negative reactions."

" ... July 20–21, 1981 at Chateau Montebello in Quebec, Mitterrand and Reagan met for the first time. Reagan was confident that he and the new French president would get along well; he was not mistaken.

"After the formal meetings, Mitterrand met with Reagan very privately. Accompanying Mitterrand was Jacques Attali, his brilliant adviser whom he treated like a son, and I accompanied Reagan. Mitterrand revealed that France had a private sector company, Thomson-CSF, working on contracts in Moscow, and through it French intelligence had achieved a very deep penetration of the KGB. It had in place a key Soviet source who was voluntarily providing astonishing national security information about Soviet technology acquisition from the West, including massive theft of technological secrets. Thus was revealed the famous “Line X” KGB espionage network by one of the most precious and extraordinary “moles” the West ever had. The “Farewell” case was born.

"Management of the matter in Washington was by Reagan’s close friend and mine, William J. Casey, CIA chief. ... "

Isn't it this very guy she called Bill or Billy, about whom one read an interesting anecdote of Katherine Hepburn having predicted his causing deaths of thousands of people, or was it millions, reading his palm, when he was a friend of - or was courting - her sister?

Or - was that Caspar Weinberger?

................................................................................................

" ... For the past few months, France had had a mole, code name “Farewell,” operating at the heart of one of the most sensitive divisions of the KGB. During a face-to-face meeting, Mitterrand shared this secret with Ronald Reagan and revealed to him the scope of global Soviet industrial pillage. At the time, the American president did not fully understand the impact of the dossier, but he was a fast learner. Soon after, he would refer to it as “the greatest spy story of the twentieth century.”"

Had he forgotten the real people, such as Morris and Lona Cohen, or Virginia Hall, or - especially - Bill Stephenson on whom 007 had been modelled by Ian Fleming who'd known him as a colleague of his brother, or was Ronnie ignorant on those as well as most other matters?

................................................................................................

" ... Located at a strategic node within the system, this officer opened the eyes of the West to the scope, structure, and operations of technological espionage as practiced by the USSR, primarily in the military-industrial complex. The free world suddenly realized the vulnerability of those very defense systems vital to its survival. Furthermore, it became clear that it was impossible to have the upper hand in the arms race against the East because, through the efforts of Soviet intelligence, it did not take long for the West to “share” its most efficient weapons and devices with this formidable adversary. Finally, the scale of this systematic stealing revealed a key strategic weakness of the socialist bloc in the domain of high technology. A window of opportunity to bankrupt the Soviet economy was open for the new American administration, who did not expect the Cold War to remain frozen forever. ... Fear of an apocalypse resurfaced after cascading events, including the downing of a South Korean aircraft, the Euromissile crisis, and Reagan’s joke during a mic check that he had signed legislation outlawing the Soviet Union, and bombing would begin in five minutes."

A favourite English magazine, Punch, had exposed that first one, somewhere in 1988-92, as more than was publicized in West, especially in US. The event had been inexplicable and mind boggling enough; but the article in Punch made complete sense in the context. Or was it Guardian Weekly? One does seem to think it was Punch.

................................................................................................

"A KGB officer, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Ippolitovich Vetrov, decided to betray the system. However, instead of contacting the Americans, he chose to contact the French secret services—the ranking of which, in the world of intelligence, was modest at best, and which had no presence at all in Moscow. Moreover, Farewell had not called upon the French intelligence service SDECE (equivalent to the CIA), but rather upon the DST (equivalent to the FBI), a counterintelligence organization that had neither the spy handling experience nor legal authority to gather information outside French territory.

"In order to handle this agent in Moscow, the DST began with an amateur who agreed to go along for the ride. This volunteer was then replaced by an officer, also with no experience in agent handling, from military intelligence operating under the cover of the French embassy. It is hard to believe that these two “amateurs” managed to meet routinely with their mole over a period of ten months, right under the KGB’s nose, without ever falling into the world’s most powerful police machine’s traps."

Authors - Kostin and Renaud - are forgetting his introduction - "A KGB officer, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Ippolitovich Vetrov".

Presumably he knew his craft. And his own organisation, too.

"Sergei Kostin and Eric Raynaud

"Moscow – Paris, January 2011"

................................................................................................

"Kostin had been introduced to Svetlana through a close friend of the Vetrovs, Alexei Rogatin. ... "

"During the two months to follow, he found himself every week sitting on a luxurious couch, surrounded by paintings and antique furniture. On the first visit, he joked to Svetlana, “I was told that you were working in a museum. I assume this is it, right?” As they became better acquainted with each visit, Kostin realized that this was indeed not so far-fetched. Svetlana, a woman with taste, had surrounded herself with rare and precious objects she had managed to save through the most difficult times of her life. This corresponds to her perception of herself, a rare and precious item needing good care. She certainly was very successful at it: no one could guess her age."

"The reconstruction of the facts could not be comprehensive. There are topics a woman would never address on her own initiative, and there are questions you do not ask. Overall, Svetlana told Kostin much more than could be expected at the time, including things she is reproaching herself about to this day. Sometimes, in the excitement of the interviews, she went so far as to reveal certain points that she later on asked us not to mention in the book, a request which was respected. ... "

................................................................................................

"Vladimir Vetrov was born on October 10, 1932, in Moscow, in the well-known Grauerman maternity ward, where so many generations of native Muscovites came into this world. Visits were not allowed in this sanctuary of hygiene. Vladimir’s father, Ippolit Vasilevich, just stood there, in front of the building, to see his wife holding his son in her arms through a distant window. His first and only child, little Volodia would have no siblings.

"Ippolit Vasilevich Vetrov was no aristocrat, old or new style. He was born in 1906 in a village in the Orel region. During World War II, he was a private first class, then a corporal, and he was among the very few drafted in the summer of 1941 who came back. He served as a cook on the Volkhov front in the middle of the Battle of Leningrad. After months spent in swamps, he developed a chronic chill. But Ippolit Vasilevich was strong and cheerful. He ended his career as a supervisor at a propane plant, filling canisters. He was a brave soldier, a model worker, and a good family man—a straight and honest man.

"Vladimir’s mother, Maria Danilovna, grew up in the Simbirsk region (later renamed Ulyanovsk) in a farming family having a hard time making ends meet. She had the same first name as one of her three older sisters because she too was born on a day dedicated to the Virgin Mary and to Maria Magdalena. To change a first name, the church required a symbolic fee that the family could not afford. So she kept the same first name as her mother and her sister."

Russia had churches post revolution? And they dictated names?

................................................................................................

"The family lived at 26 Kirov Street, in a half-century-old commercial building, next to the post office. ... "

"He devoted all his free time to athletics. Sports were given a high priority in the education of Soviet youth. Sporting events helped promote a positive image of the Soviet Union abroad. Athletes enjoyed many significant benefits. Training sessions, totaling several months a year, often took place in resort towns by the Black Sea and in other sought-after destinations. During the training season, as well as during competitions, athletes were entirely taken care of by their sports club. The rest of the time, they all received food vouchers they could use to pay for meals anywhere they wanted, except in fancy restaurants. In addition, beyond a certain level, athletes received a sports grant from the government. While still in school, Volodia was receiving 120 rubles a month, the salary of an engineer or a physician. Proud not to be a burden for his parents, the boy gave all of that money to his mother. This was more than what she earned."

" It was an elegant neighborhood where quite a few members of the NKVD (the precursor of the KGB) lived, since the headquarters were close by. ... "

"His schoolteacher could not believe that the Vetrov kid had been admitted to the Bauman Moscow Higher Technical School (MVTU). ... Vladimir was admitted in 1951, at a time when the country was still very enthusiastic about industrialization and the design of ever more intelligent and better performing machines. ... "

" ... Getting admitted to that prestigious institution was one thing—graduating from it was another. In order to remain a good student, Vladimir had to give up athletics."

"Here again, Vetrov was faced with the reality of Soviet society where some were more equal than others. In his group, for instance, there was Oleg Golosov. He was a nice guy who liked to party, with no aptitude for such difficult studies. But he happened to be the grandson of one of the last Mensheviks who jumped on the bandwagon of bolshevism as it was on the fast track to power. Teachers were instructed to do everything possible to ensure Golosov received his diploma. He barely made it. Although Vladimir would gladly help his classmate write his term papers and his finals—Oleg was not a bad guy, after all—he could not observe with indifference the staggering career of this perpetual dunce. The string-pulling Oleg benefited from all of his life would propel him all the way to the top of the Central Statistical Administration, where he had the rank of a federal minister."

Equivalent of Groton and Yale in US, or Eton and Oxford for UK, then?

................................................................................................

" ... In the winter of 1957, Vladimir presented his work in front of a State commission and passed the comprehensive exams. By the end of February, he received his diploma of higher education with a degree in mechanical engineering (see Figure 1). He may have been a good student, but he had no patronage, nobody to pull strings for him. So he got a modest engineering job in a secret plant, the SAM plant, manufacturing calculating machines."

" ... Friends of his managed to convince him to join the Dynamo Club. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB sports society was happy to reinforce its athletics team with a former junior USSR champion, especially in a year expected to be full of prestigious competitions. ... "

"Dynamo had a training camp in Leselidze, Abkhazia, by the Black Sea. Every spring, selected athletes spent five to six weeks there before the summer season. At the end of March, Vladimir was invited to the meeting preceding the departure for the camp, organized at the Dynamo stadium, in a room located under the box seats. Among some fifty future comrades who had gathered there, he soon noticed a cute little blonde with a playful expression; she looked like a kid. ... "

................................................................................................

"Vetrov’s future wife was of humble birth, too. Her father, Pavel Nikolaevich Barashkov, was born in 1905 to a family of poor peasants in the prosperous and well known village of Krasnoe Selo (which means “beautiful village” in Russian).

Isn't the name mentioned in Tolstoy's work?

" ... Located on a hill overlooking the Volga River near Kostroma, the village was famous for its handcrafted silver and gold jewelry. This land belonged to the then reigning Romanov family. The Barashkovs’ house was located next to the manor house, and Svetlana’s great-uncle looked like Nicolas II’s double. Of course, people in the village connected those two things."

A first cousin of Nicolas II, the future King George V of England, too, was a lookalike, so much so they were often confused for one another, reportedly. Are there inferences to be drawn there, as well? Or did these authors just not know that about The Royal Mob, as the Grandmother of Europe termed the various royals of the clan connected by intermarriages and cousinship?

................................................................................................

"Svetlana, who had been evacuated to Krasnoe Selo with her mother and brother during the war, met an offspring of the imperial family who had remained in the village. Half crazy, he had not been recruited by the army, and he would come out of his house swearing, insistently showing the passersby his spoons adorned with the Romanov family monogram."

A Romanov had been allowed to survive? Through revolution, to WWII?

................................................................................................

"Vladimir’s parents accepted the de facto situation of their son’s marriage much more easily. Of course, at first, Volodia’s mother was a bit jealous. Svetlana had a hard time calling her “Mother,” the common way to address your mother-in-law in a plain and simple family. She found it artificial, while “Maria Danilovna” sounded way too formal, like addressing an official. To them, Svetlana was a breed apart, but they soon considered her like their daughter and gave her as much affection as they gave Volodia.

"It was very easy to treat Svetlana as another child since she did not look like a married woman. Skinny and frail, she looked fifteen. Even at the salon next door the hairdresser asked Svetlana, “Why did you take your mother’s wedding ring? If she finds out, you’re in for trouble!” The neighbors too thought Volodia was going out with a kid."

................................................................................................

" ... The young engineer had started thinking hard about what else he could do when he received a totally unexpected offer. The KGB had launched a massive campaign to renew its ranks. The Stalinist old guard was sidelined and had to be replaced. In addition, the iron curtain was being lifted a bit more every day, and Soviet secret services urgently needed backup.

"The recruits from those years became the stars of post-war special services. Even their adversaries in the Western Bloc shared this opinion, among them Marcel Chalet, head of the French DST from 1975 through 1982. “In the post-war period,” he writes, “because of the lack of opening of the Soviet world, intelligence officers were not very sophisticated. They had a hard time adjusting to our way of life; they could not speak our language very well and were easy to spot. Later, they made significant efforts to improve the quality of their officers, aiming at making them socially acceptable, able to be introduced just about anywhere. They were more discreet, more skilled, having integrated our culture better, and were much better educated. They created a generation of high-quality intelligence officers. This turning point came at the end of the sixties. Then, we sensed some kind of slacking off, probably due to lower morale and a certain degree of ideological contamination. Little by little the influence of the West was permeating their way of thinking.”1"

"And thus, in the fall of 1959, as the new university year started, Vladimir embarked on a two-year program at the Dzerzhinsky4 School dedicated to the training of operational personnel. At the time, the institution was headquartered in Bolshoi Kiselny Alley, a fifteen-minute walk from the Vetrovs’ home. Vladimir’s classmates remember a fairly gifted but lazy young man who did not distinguish himself from the rest of the trainees."

"The PGU was every KGB member’s dream. Intelligence officers formed an elite caste, the most privileged in Soviet society, because they could go abroad. The difference between those who could “get out” and those who could not was obvious. Not only could they travel, discover how other people live, and broaden their horizons, but one prolonged stay abroad was sufficient to solve all of their everyday life problems. They could buy an apartment, a car, home furnishings, and good clothing for the whole family. A second mission abroad ensured you a comfortable life until you died. And when you worked regularly in the capitalist world, as was the case of intelligence officers and diplomats, you had reached the best possibilities communist society had to offer!"

"The trainees were housed by the school. On Sundays, those who wanted could ask for permission to go to Moscow. The majority of those who came from provincial towns preferred to stay at the school, which did look like a resort. It consisted of attractive multistory wooden cottages in the middle of a pine forest, with paved walkways. It offered bedrooms with twin beds and a cafeteria where food and service were better than in many restaurants of the capital. Likewise, the library was better stocked than most of the major public library branches in Moscow. One could find books there that had been banned because they were considered anti-Soviet or simply “reactionary,” like the works of Nietzsche or Schopenhauer. Foreign journals and newspapers that ordinary Soviet citizens were not allowed to read were also available there.

"Here L’Express, Le Monde, Time, and Spiegel were part of the curriculum, as were undubbed movies shown every week. Vetrov, who had studied English in middle school, high school, and college, kept it as his elective or “second language,” as the expression goes. From that time on, his “main language” as an operational officer would be French."

................................................................................................

"At the end of 1960, Dynamo awarded Svetlana one room in a communal apartment. This prestigious and wealthy sports club had several buildings built in the upscale neighborhoods of the capital. The Vetrovs’ apartment building was located at 37 (currently 33) Kutuzov Avenue, across the street from the building where members of the USSR Communist Party, including Leonid Brezhnev himself, lived. At last, the couple could leave the narrow room they were sharing with Vladimir’s parents."

"Vladimir dreamt of having a little girl, who would be pretty like her mother and would be called Svetlana. They had a boy in 1962, delivered at the Grauerman maternity ward where Vladimir had also been born. This boy became the love of his life and the apple of his eye."

"This was also a time filled with hope. In 1962, Vladimir finished his training as an intelligence officer. There was talk about sending him to the United States or France, since by then he was fluent enough in English and in French. To polish his training, and to wait until he got a KGB residency abroad, Vetrov got a position as an engineer in the foreign relations department of the USSR State Committee of Electronic Technology (GKET). He started working there on September 20, 1962, and stayed until August 15, 1965. This was, of course, a cover, since a Soviet government employee operating abroad had to be able to talk about his previous job. Another advantage of the position was that it provided many opportunities for Vetrov to familiarize himself with contacting foreigners, and some of them could later on testify to the fact that, indeed, he had responsibilities in a civilian organization."

" ... Afraid of staying out of shape, she resumed her athletic activities. She was taken back into the national team in track and field, and athletics occupied a major place in her life again. It was supposedly “amateur” sports, but at her level, it was a full-time job. There were training sessions in the spring and in the fall, with endless competitions in between, and she was well paid at that! Svetlana received an athletic grant for an amount that was higher than an engineer’s salary. However, her new position as the wife of a KGB officer also brought unpleasant surprises. For security reasons linked to her husband’s activities, she was not allowed to take part in competitions organized in capitalist countries. She could not go to the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome. She could not go with her team to England or the United States."

................................................................................................

"The mission they had been expecting for so long became reality in 1965. Vetrov was sent to France, a very sought-after position among the ranks of the First Chief Directorate. But this was not thanks to well-known protectors. It was simply due to Nosenko’s6 betrayal in 1964, which forced the PGU to call back many of his “burnt” operatives worldwide. The staffing of the KGB residency7 in Paris was especially affected by the situation. A gifted and promising candidate, Vladimir was among the young officers nominated to those vacant positions.

"On August 16, 1965, he was officially attached to the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which would be, for the next five years, his official cover. ... "

................................................................................................

"France, and particularly Paris, has a very special place in Russian fantasy where the streets are crowded with poets and painters, men are chivalrous and witty, and women are beautiful and elegant. In this picture, all French people are wealthy and lead a comfortable life. People dance and sing in the streets, and lovers stroll through parks, exchanging passionate kisses every ten meters. “True” France is the country of tolerance where everybody is free to do as they please. ... "

"This romantic view of France dates back to the Age of Enlightenment, widely promoted by Catherine the Great in her illiterate empire. Russian nobility made a point to learn French, and everything coming from France was lauded as being the incarnation of beauty and reason. The war against Napoleon did not change a thing, in spite of the fierce battles and the high number of Russian casualties. Even the fact that the Soviet regime substituted social values for nationalistic ones, and was closer to Germany from an economic strategy point of view, did not succeed in weakening the attraction of French culture to the Russian mind."

................................................................................................

"They were in for a big surprise! What easy life in Paris? They received two rooms in a communal apartment. Their accommodations were even worse than in Moscow! Each floor contained ten rooms or so, for six or seven families. There were two toilets, one at each end of the corridor. There was only one kitchen. The first four floors were assigned to the Soviet citizens working in Paris, and the fifth floor was used like a hotel for those visiting on business; all in all, it was a busy anthill.

"The inhabitants of this posh neighborhood, with wealthy families generally occupying an entire floor and sometimes even the entire building for just one household, referred to the Soviet building as the “miniature Renault factory.” In the morning, the men would walk to their office together. In the evening, they would all come back in a wave.

"The Vetrovs’ life in Paris can be characterized by the contrast of two social systems, two cultures, two lifestyles. Nationals representing their country abroad try to bring with them their customs, and those cultural differences are often enough to lead to awkward situations. In the case of two hostile, irreconcilable ideologies, one can easily imagine the tension."

................................................................................................

"Another example, under Soviet rule the expression “communal kitchen” became the euphemism for more colorful expressions used by people, such as “nest of vipers” or “spiders in a jar.” The communal kitchen was indeed a mix between a bazaar, a neighborhood coffee shop, a place where women competed for beauty and elegance, and a platform for intellectual contests. Vetrov never set foot in the kitchen. But Svetlana had no choice since this was the only place where she could prepare meals for the family and boil water for tea. She tried to use the kitchen at hours when there were fewer people. Otherwise, fights were quick to start. For this reason, Vladimir took his wife out as often as possible.

"It was a big relief for them when, less than a year later, they could move to a two-room apartment located above the offices of the Soviet trade mission, in an elegant building located at 49 Rue de la Faisanderie, still in the sixteenth district. Their immediate neighbor was Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who would become the twentieth president of the Republic of France in 1974. The Vetrovs could not believe that such a highly ranked public servant, then secretary of finance and economic affairs, could live such an unpretentious life. There were no security guards in front of his building. More than once, they saw him drive his family in a tiny Austin Morris, and they often observed him during his walks in the Bois de Boulogne, never under the protection of any security escort. ... "

"From then on, Vladimir’s commute was just two flights of stairs. It was the same thing when he needed to meet with his immediate superior, the deputy resident for scientific and technical intelligence who, under the protection of a diplomatic passport, was officially the deputy trade representative in France. The head of the Soviet trade mission abroad was always a “clean” civil servant."

................................................................................................

"One of the businessmen who helped them discover all the glamour and the glitter of the City of Lights was Albert Gobert. He was a Jew from Odessa, owner of a large chemical company and a perfume plant. He also brokered deals, mainly with the USSR. In particular, he was negotiating with Vetrov for the purchase of Soviet helicopters. Both of his older brothers were also industrialists and businessmen; one lived in the United States, the other in Great Britain. One day, Albert invited the Vetrovs to a family dinner with his brothers, a distinct mark of friendship.

"Gobert was married to an extravagant beauty, Marguerite, a former model for Christian Dior. She owned a Russian restaurant, the Kalinka, where both couples shared memorable meals. Above all, Gobert enjoyed inviting his Russian friends to the most elegant restaurants and cabarets—Maxim’s, Ledoyen, the Lido, the Alcazar. At tables next to theirs dined the Duke of Windsor, the movie star Jean-Paul Belmondo, the fashion designer Nina Ricci, and other celebrities of the time. These evenings were enough to give these Russians memories for the rest of their lives."

................................................................................................

"The Vetrovs led a fairly expensive lifestyle, even when they were away from their French business partners. At their arrival in Paris, Vladimir was provided with a car, a black Peugeot 403, with a French license plate ending with SR 75. As reported by Marcel Chalet,1 this detail greatly amused the DST tailers; SR is the common acronym for “service de renseignement” (intelligence service) in France. Later on, he obtained a dark green, almost-black 404. Vladik Vetrov remembers to this day the plate number: 4048 FG 75. A regular French license plate was a big advantage over diplomatic cars, which had a plate with CD (corps diplomatique), since they could go anywhere without attracting official attention."

"In the summer, civil servants’ families lived in the countryside. The trade mission owned a dacha, much nicer than the embassy’s second home. Actually, it was a castle that used to belong to the finance minister of the Vichy government. At the Liberation, the collaborator fled to Germany, and the communists, who formed the new municipal council of Montsoult, sold his property to the Soviets ... "

" ... Guests would come from other cities, like Marseille. Ambassadors and advisers from “brother countries” were also invited. However, there were never any French guests. Besides, the Soviets, except for higher posts, such as ambassador, military attaché, or adviser for cultural affairs, were not allowed to invite French people to their place, probably because they could not let the outside world see their Soviet-style communal life.

................................................................................................

"As in Montsoult, country life would start in earnest with the return of warm weather. Stanislav Sorokin met with the Vetrovs for the first time on the volleyball field.2 Sorokin belonged to the First Chief Directorate (PGU) and worked in internal counterintelligence. He was in charge of monitoring intelligence officers in particular, and Soviet citizens living abroad in general, to prevent intelligence services of the opposite side from recruiting them. He was operating under the cover of the USSR permanent delegation to UNESCO.

"“They would not go unnoticed, the Vetrovs,” he recalls. “They made such a lovely couple. Svetlana looked like a model—very pretty, slender, with long legs. Most men, including me, could not take their eyes off her. She was, however, above suspicion. She was sociable but kept her distance. She never gave ambiguous looks. Besides, she was always with her husband and her son, Vladik, who was treated, I would say today, like a male Barbie doll. Always dressed up to the nines, he would change clothes twice a day. It was clear that his parents adored him, spoiling him rotten. As for Vladimir, he was tall, handsome, smiling, with an open face. The three of them looked as if they were coming straight from People magazine. As I go back and try to remember him at the time we started socializing, even knowing what kind of man Vetrov was in reality, I cannot find a drop of black paint on the picture they offered together. They were perfect.”

................................................................................................

"It should be noted that by the end of the Vetrovs’ stay in France, the climate had changed significantly within the Soviet colony. In the mid-sixties, it was still fairly rare to get a job abroad thanks to useful connections. However, little by little, the nomenklatura (ruling class) grew more aware of the opportunities offered by living abroad, particularly in Paris. The newcomers were, for the most part, son or son-in-law of Mr. so-and-so. They spent most of their time lazing about, leaving the real work to those who could not claim a high birth or an influential marriage. The latter were often too happy to fill one of those rare positions abroad reserved for the draft horses. They were needed because the KGB residency had to yield some results.

"The new arrivals had a more modest standard of living. They wore Soviet clothes and saved their Paris purchases for later, to impress their Moscow acquaintances back home. They shopped in low-end stores like Monoprix or, not telling anybody, Tati (equivalent to Walmart or Target). They counted every penny. The cheerful Sunday picnics were becoming a thing of the past, and the grocery by the Montsoult castle eventually went out of business.

"Against this backdrop, the Vetrovs were more and more noticeable since their lifestyle was clearly above the average standard of living of their compatriots. Svetlana was shopping on Avenue Victor-Hugo, where she soon became a regular. Vladimir would often go with her. It made him feel good to be able to buy her the clothes and accessories she deserved, and to realize over and over that he was married to a beautiful and elegant woman. Svetlana bought her shoes and her leather goods at Christian Dior; her suits and coats were from the designers Ted Lapidus or Pierre Cardin."

................................................................................................

"Could Vetrov have accepted bribes from French industrialists who were in contact with him because of his position at the trade mission? A large company would have been glad to give a small commission to the Soviet delegate who would arrange a substantial contract to the detriment of a competitor, and still be profitable. More than likely, Vetrov did not play that game. First, as a KGB officer, Vetrov was already enough at risk—he did not need the additional risk of venturing into murky deals with his official French business partners. Second, at the beginning of the Brezhnev era, foreign trade civil servants preferred to receive an expensive gift—a hi-fi system, for instance—over money. The practice of getting a percentage on each transaction became widespread only later, under Gorbachev’s more market-oriented rule.

"The explanation is somewhere else. In Paris, Vetrov was in contact with numerous merchants and was in a position to buy, at a discount, merchandise in very high demand among Soviet citizens (portable radios, TV sets, recorders, hi-fi systems, blue jeans, furniture, and so forth). He could buy the very best Western brands, exactly the same as those sold in the most fashionable stores in Paris. Vladimir, who had a good manner with people, understood right away the benefits he could get from the situation. He had all of the Soviet colony’s major players in his pocket. The KGB resident, his deputies, the deputy chief of the trade mission, and even the ambassador himself knew that all they had to do was to ask Vetrov to obtain a satellite radio for instance (all the rage at the time) for half the price.

"The trade mission store, on the other hand, limited to the Soviet colony, could have greatly benefited from Vetrov’s connections. Besides vodka, caviar, and other Russian treats, the store sold Western merchandise. Those products were purchased wholesale in impressive quantities, duty-free since they were considered exported goods, and qualified for other advantages granted to foreigners. The Soviet colony in Paris included several thousands of people, so French resellers and wholesalers were fighting over these important regular clients. Commissions could be very substantial, too. Compared to industrial companies, the risk was significantly lower with merchants. Striking “deals” with them could be viewed as “clever management” of resources which benefited everybody, rather than corruption. ... "

................................................................................................

" ... generosity was the trait that distinguished Vladimir from the new group of young and ambitious operatives. With him, there was no need to ask who would pay for the drinks. Overall, the Soviets abroad had a modest lifestyle and were panic-stricken when converting the price of an ice-cream cone or a Coca-Cola from francs into rubles. They were all grouped in the same neighborhood. Besides the trade mission, there was the military mission, located at the corner of Rue de la Faisanderie and Rue de Longchamp; a little further, there was the embassy school and two residential buildings, Rue du Général-Appert and Place de Mexico. Stanislav Sorokin’s apartment was located at 52 Rue de la Faisanderie, almost across from the Vetrovs’. In the evenings, Vladimir with Stanislav and a few friends would get together at the brasserie downstairs for a beer (euphemistically speaking) and to play pinball. ... "

" ... little by little, Vetrov acquired the reputation of being a big shot who could do a lot through secret connections and who spent lavishly while remaining a likeable and friendly fellow.

"“Including the fact that Vetrov was part of every party, big or small, and of every sport competition. He did want to play this role of generous factotum. ... We were under the impression that with our salaries, more than comfortable compared to those in the USSR, we could be as hospitable in Paris as we were in Moscow. That’s the way the Vetrovs were living.”

"By 1968, the ground shook under Vetrov’s feet. Whether it was a mistake on his part or a denunciation, Vetrov was accused of trafficking. ... Those who were indebted to Vetrov, and the resident Krokhin in the first place, stood up for him resolutely. The scandal was quickly hushed up, to the extent that Vladimir stayed two more years in France."

" ... Witnesses at the time assume that she was bringing objects from Moscow to sell in Paris, most probably art objects or gems. In Moscow, too, the Vetrovs lived much better than any other Soviet citizen who had spent five years abroad. The trafficking was, allegedly, going on both ways."

................................................................................................

" ... Svetlana, as part of the national team in athletics, often traveled abroad. On each trip, the athletes, whose per diem was ridiculously low, took with them suitcases packed with various items such as caviar, jewelry, and expensive crafts, to sell them on the black market in the country of destination. With the money, they bought basic merchandise such as clothes, shoes, or tape recorders impossible to find in Soviet stores. Once they had sold their inventory at a high price in the USSR, the happy few who had the opportunity to travel outside the country would end up with an amount of money ten, fifteen, or twenty times higher than their initial investment. It is worth pointing out that trips to Western Bloc countries were the most profitable ones. Since Vladimir had been recruited by the KGB, Svetlana could travel only to socialist countries, significantly less interesting from a “business” standpoint. ... "

"As far as caviar and gems trafficking was concerned, it had become a more and more common practice, especially popular among Soviet diplomats. Holders of a green passport, they were exempted from the draconian customs checks at Moscow Sheremetyevo Airport. The Vetrovs, on the other hand, had blue service passports, given to the nondiplomatic staff of Soviet organizations abroad and to the members of important delegations. In many situations, this blue passport was a better deal than the red passports delivered to foreign cooperation specialists, teachers, tourists, and other small-fry individuals, but not to go through customs. If caught smuggling goods, the holder of a blue passport, betraying the higher trust the government had placed in him, was exposed to a harsher punishment, at least in theory. In reality, things were much simpler. Astute people were always carrying a nice-looking pen or cigarette lighter they would hand out, along with their declaration of goods, to the customs officer as a souvenir. If facing a tougher inspector, they would get waved on by leaving behind a carton of American cigarettes or a pair of jeans. The main thing was not to carry any book by Solzhenitsyn or other dissident author in one’s suitcase.

"Even though KGB members and their families appeared to live a freer life, in many respects they were subjected to stricter constraints. The wives of “clean” civil servants, whether diplomats or administrative officers, often bought what they needed through well-placed acquaintances befriended in stores, who sold them items at a discount. This behavior was strictly prohibited among the spouses of intelligence officers. It would have made the wife easy prey for agents from the other side, who could try to get her involved in illegal business. From there, the intelligence service of the opposite side could attempt to recruit her husband or to compromise him in order to expel him from the country.

"Likewise, an intelligence officer living above his means immediately got the counterintelligence thinking. It was even one of the most reliable clues that there was something in the wind. ... "

................................................................................................

"In theory, the Second Chief Directorate, which was represented in each of the KGB residencies abroad, was in charge of both infiltrating enemy services and preventing infiltration of its own ranks and of the Soviet colony as a whole. This effort, far more complex than political or scientific/technological intelligence, required not only well trained but also talented human resources."

" ... One could not expect to find many talented individuals in the most despised service ... The informants recruited in France by the Second Directorate were not government employees working for the USSR section of the DST, who were trying to infiltrate the KGB residency in Paris, but Russian saleswomen working at the embassy store or the guards’ wives who would rush back home to tell their husbands who they saw shopping at Tati’s. Instead of tracking alarming signs, such as the lavish lifestyle of certain KGB members, they were listening to gossip. Naturally, when one was caught in the bickering between neighbors, there was no time left to go after potential moles."

................................................................................................

" ... Vetrov worked with enthusiasm. In those years, he was no exception. This entire group of officers came from a modest social background, and they were all of the same exemplary caliber. Often critical of Brezhnev’s regime, they were, nevertheless, convinced of the superiority of communist ideals. Although open to Western values, they remained good patriots. They would have loved to live well in a free and affluent society, but at home, in the Soviet Union. Well-trained professionally and driven by ambition, they were very motivated to succeed. Success meant doing good work for the Center, putting the GRU and the MID (Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in their place, and outperforming French and American intelligence services—not to mention the expected rewards of decorations, promotions, and career advancement. For most, intelligence was a sport fought against the adversary as a team. Within a team, there were always a few stars, but everybody played in a spirit of mutual aid and respect."

"Officially, Krokhin held the post of minister-adviser, but his real functions were an open secret, as illustrated by the following anecdote. On July 14, 1966, for the Bastille Day celebrations, the whole Diplomatic Corps, all in tuxedoes and bow ties, got in line at the garden party organized at the Elysée Palace. De Gaulle walked toward the Soviet Embassy representatives; he knew them all. He shook hands with Ambassador Zorin: “Your Excellency!” Then, turning to Krokhin: “General!”"

"The best-known agent recruited by Vetrov in Paris was Pierre Bourdiol. We can even reveal his code name within the KGB: “Borde.” This forty-two-year-old engineer from Thomson-CSF was married and had children. He met Vetrov at a trade show of electronic components in 1970.2 A sympathizer with the Soviet Union, he was recruited on “ideological grounds.” He was also paid by the KGB, like all other informants at the time.

"On assignment first to CNES (French National Space Research Center), then to SNIAS (French National Industrial Space Agency), Bourdiol was in charge of the electronic equipment for the French-German Symphonie satellites and, from 1974 to 1979, for the Ariane rockets.3 French technologies in the field of aerospace engineering were assumed to be a dozen years behind Soviet achievements. According to one of Bourdiol’s handlers, the KGB often needed documents he could provide precisely to confirm that it was still the case. Nevertheless, during thirteen years, Bourdiol would be considered, according to KGB terminology, “an agent of especially valuable interest.”"

"According to Marcel Chalet, it did not take long for the DST to spot Vetrov as a KGB member.5 Tailing is not enough to control an intelligence officer. This is when Jacques Prévost arrived on the scene, a character who would play a major role in the Vetrov plot."

................................................................................................

"Prévost had a double interest in establishing good professional and human relations with the congenial Russian. On one hand, the success of Thomson-CSF on the Soviet market depended on its direct contact at the trade mission. On the other hand, since he had been identified as an active intelligence officer, Vetrov had to be closely monitored to determine his frame of mind and to identify any evidence of spying on Thomson.

"At his level, Jacques Prévost did not need to do the DST favors for his own benefit. Besides, the “honorable correspondents” of the French counterintelligence were rarely compensated. The company, however, did have a “military” branch, Thomson-Brandt, at the leading edge of technology. It had developed the traveling-wave tube (TWT) that the Soviets wanted so badly, and it needed to protect itself against theft. This device was included in the COCOM list (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls), and it could not be exported to socialist countries. Eastern Bloc governments were left only with the possibility of stealing it or buying it through illegal channels. In addition, Thomson had expertise in encryption. Every French embassy abroad was equipped with its Myosotis teleprinters for encrypted messages. It is understandable that the company was closely watched, even infiltrated by the DST.

"French counterintelligence services could count on lower-level informants in the various divisions of Thomson-CSF, but with Jacques Prévost they had a contact at the headquarters level. In fact, the relations between Thomson and the DST could be better described as a natural exchange of favors. ... It so happened, for instance, at Thomson’s request, that a Soviet minister received a French visa in less than twenty-four hours instead of the usual twenty days. In return, the company managed to obtain the posting in Paris of a Soviet official who was on the DST red list. French counterintelligence was also capable of looking the other way when technology transfers occurred between the company and KGB correspondents such as Vetrov. This type of activity was for Thomson part of building a commercial network, and for the DST part of building a network to be exploited as circumstances would allow. Jacques Prévost reported to a young DST captain, Raymond Nart, who would play a key role in what had not yet become the Farewell affair."

................................................................................................

"Two more clarifications are needed regarding this car accident.

"First, Vetrov was an ace driver. All intelligence officers were trained as professional drivers. The members of the KGB residency were quite a sight when returning to Paris on Sunday nights, after a day in the countryside. They would race against one another, each trying to prove to the others that he was the best driver of the group. They kept changing lanes, zigzagging between cars in heavy traffic, passing cars by crossing the solid yellow line or driving on the sidewalk.

"Vetrov was way above this crowd of semiprofessionals. One day, Soviet car racers were supposed to take part in a race for regular cars on the Formula 1 track in Monaco. A driver fell ill. Vladimir was offered to replace the sick driver in order not to weaken the team. It is therefore highly improbable that Vetrov had the car accident from lack of driving experience or to show off. Furthermore, the road was dry that day.

"Needless to say that it was not the first time Vladimir drove after a few drinks. The life of a trade delegate is made of cocktail parties, rich meals washed down with plenty of wine, and drinks at virtually every meeting. With his strong build, Vetrov could take alcohol, and drinking without getting drunk was part of his training at the “school in the woods.” Being a KGB member, he had to control himself. And lastly, that evening Vetrov was supposed to drive to Montsoult. It was only twenty-four kilometers away, but it was a bigger deal than going back to Rue de la Faisanderie after a dinner party, not to mention that he could have run into colleagues. The last thing he wanted was to come face to face, under the influence, with the head of the trade mission, with whom he had rather chilly relations."

"Two more clarifications are needed regarding this car accident.

................................................................................................

"One of the golden rules of the profession is never to let the first contact of a target make the recruiting approach. Recruiting can fail, but the relationship must be preserved. For this reason, at some point in time “a friend” would appear who would make the overture and disappear in case the deal fails."

"Later on, when they were by themselves again, Vladimir ended up admitting to Svetlana, with detachment, “Jacques helped me to have the car repaired. In fact, they are offering for me to defect.” Svetlana could not believe her ears. Stunned, she then found out that “Pierre” and Prévost went as far as taking Vetrov to Parly II, a residential suburb west of Paris, to show him around, explaining that was where they could live if they decided to defect instead of going back to Moscow. Vladimir had turned down the offer, but it was not too late to change their mind. Everything he had seen in France for the last five years, all the thinking he had been doing, the comparisons he made between both systems, all of it seemed to bear fruit."

" ... Today, Svetlana believes that had she said yes at the time, the Vetrovs would have “chosen freedom,” as the expression goes. However, she was too attached to her country and her relatives. She said no. This issue never came up again between them. As we will see later, this attachment to their native country was largely shared by Vladimir, but, obviously, the possibility of seeking political asylum crossed his mind. Everything suggests that Vetrov was probably trying to test Svetlana. Had his wife’s reaction been more favorable, the answer to Prévost’s suggestion might have been different, and Vladimir Vetrov’s destiny would have followed quite a different path."

................................................................................................

"If not dazzling, Vladimir’s career at the KGB was quite respectable. Krokhin submitted his name for an important medal because of the recruitings he achieved in France. An order of the Red Star or of the Red Flag often rewarded fruitful services of an intelligence officer abroad.

"Curiously, Vetrov received none. During his stay in Paris he was promoted to lieutenant colonel, as could be expected considering his age and seniority. There was no decoration. Since nominated officers in the list usually automatically receive their medal, Vetrov felt he had been treated unfairly, and he was offended. The PGU might have heard about his overly free behavior and about the Vetrovs’ lavish lifestyle in Paris. In any case, this decision cannot be attributed to the DST’s attempt to approach Vetrov; had the KGB had the faintest suspicion, it would have dismissed Vetrov on the spot.

"More disappointments were awaiting him. When he returned to Moscow, Vetrov left behind numerous advanced targets in addition to the agents he had formally recruited. In short, this meant that many of his French contacts were already conditioned by Vetrov and about to accept collaboration with the KGB. His newly arrived colleagues, who only had to deliver the coup de grâce to targets he had already found, tracked, and brought down, all received prestigious medals while they were still operating in France. Vetrov was sickened by this state of affairs."

" ... Moreover, the benefits of living in Paris, London, or New York were many. After the Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Trade positions, the crowd of privileged sons, sons-in-law, and nephews went after the KGB Intelligence Service. At the PGU, the atmosphere was degrading quickly."

................................................................................................

"In Moscow, as in Paris, the Vetrovs did not blend in the Soviet crowd.3 Their apartment, located in one of the most upscale districts housing the Soviet nomenklatura, was luxuriously furnished and decorated. A Louis XV desk, an eighteenth-century marquetry armoire, and other antique furniture could be seen in the living room. Walls were covered with antique paintings. While the Vetrovs could not afford paintings by old masters, all the canvasses on the walls were of an excellent artistic level and chosen with taste. Having received academic training in the humanities, and an art lover, Svetlana spent a lot of her time in antique shops, looking for valuable objects."

"In 1972–1973, Prévost traveled regularly to Moscow on business, representing Thomson-CSF. One day, Vetrov called him up in his hotel room at the Rossia and asked if they could meet. They met in the lobby a few minutes later and left together in Vetrov’s car. Vetrov was driving when, suddenly, he pulled out his KGB card of lieutenant colonel and showed it to Prévost. “Now you know,” he said. “Do you still want to be my friend?” Prévost, who, without knowing exactly Vetrov’s rank, knew that his partner belonged to the KGB, assured him that it did not change a thing as far as he was concerned. Instantly, Volodia, as Prévost used to call him, invited him for dinner at their place. As a KGB officer, Vetrov could meet with foreigners only for professional reasons and only after having received the official green light from his superiors. Since Prévost was considered to be his “target of study,” it was probably not difficult to obtain such an authorization. Prévost visited the Vetrovs two or three times more.

"The Russians enjoy entertaining at home. Svetlana and Vladimir made it a point of honor to fill Prévost with caviar, salmon roe, smoked sturgeon, and other local delicacies. Everything was presented on silver plates, items that could be found for little money in antique stores. The Frenchman seemed to appreciate the display of luxury. One day, as an intended compliment, he told his hosts that in France only a member of the Rothschild family could afford to own such precious furniture as theirs."

................................................................................................

" ... The return of Vetrov in France would have given the DST a second chance to recruit him. To everyone’s astonishment, however, his visa application was rejected by the French."

" ... Painfully understaffed, the DST did not want too many Soviet diplomats in French territory since it did not have the means to control the comings and goings of those individuals considered to be intelligence agents. In that regard, reducing the number of Soviet residents was a constant concern for the DST until the massive expulsion of diplomats in 1983, closely related to the Farewell dossier ... "

"The fact is that, after his departure from France, Vetrov did not travel outside of the USSR again until 1973. That year, he spent a week in Switzerland, on behalf of the KGB. This neutral country probably did not ask the DST for its permission to deliver a visa to Vetrov."

................................................................................................

" ... when, by the end of 1973, the KGB proposed to post Vetrov in Canada, Vetrov was not optimistic about the outcome. But surprisingly, he obtained a Canadian visa. This mystery remains unresolved. It is not likely that the DST hid from its RCMP colleagues (Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service, the main Canadian counterintelligence agency) the fact that Vetrov belonged to the KGB. While informing them about Vetrov, could it be that the DST minimized the risk represented by this gifted and aggressive officer? Did the French want to continue their study of Vetrov on the territory of their “Quebec cousins” rather than in France? Maybe they considered the possibility of a French-Canadian approach? All the same, the fact is that although informed by the French, the RCMP authorized Vetrov’s stay in Canada."

"The Vetrovs felt the Canadians were friendlier than the French. People in the street spoke to you easily. Drinking a Coke with somebody was enough for him to start calling you “my friend,” even though the next day he might not remember you. Compared to France, the standard of living was significantly higher in Canada, with more cars, bigger cars, and bigger and more elegant homes."

................................................................................................

"Self-made men such as Vetrov were even more rare here than when he was about to leave Paris, in the Brezhnev era at its zenith. The ICAO Soviet delegate, for instance, was the very own son of Georgadze, secretary of the Soviet Parliament, a typical example of the clever and greedy mobsters commonly encountered in the corridors of Soviet power. His wife was the daughter of an admiral. They settled in their two-story luxurious apartment as a normal situation for the new Communist aristocrats. A characteristic trait was the fact that Vladislav Georgadze lived in Canada under an assumed name, not because he was a member of the KGB or the GRU (he was “clean”), but to avoid any “provocation” against him.

"The trade mission had a very small staff. Vetrov was in charge of business relations with several import-export companies, including some in areas very remote from his specialization, such as medicine and cinema. As in Paris, he did everything from A to Z that was part of the trade representative’s job description.

"Operating for the KGB in Canada was a real challenge! Division B (counterintelligence) of the RCMP was “one of the most advanced and the most aggressive of all Western counterintelligence services.” Coming from Peter Wright, one of the toughest officers at MI5 (the British counterintelligence agency), such an opinion was of great weight.4 The Canadians managed, indeed, to monitor virtually every move of every Soviet citizen. This was Svetlana’s interpretation, most likely an exaggeration. However, this was probably a valid observation when it came to the six Soviet intelligence officers, identified as such, who were operating in Montreal.5

"In Paris, the Vetrovs were living in buildings owned by the Soviet embassy. Here they knew their apartment was bugged. One day, a fixture lighting the dining table exploded with a loud noise, sending glass fragments all over the room. Svetlana was convinced that the fixture was hiding some kind of monitoring device. When they needed to discuss a sensitive issue, they went outside, and right away, a man or a woman would start tailing them, not even trying to hide."

Canadians must have believed that prevention was better than cure!

................................................................................................

"Any trip to another city had to be reported to the Canadian authorities forty-eight hours in advance, even for non-diplomats, as was Vetrov’s case. The notification had to indicate the number of individuals traveling in the car and their names. Svetlana made two or three trips to Ottawa. Each time, a police car started passing them, then stayed for a short while at their level, enough time to look at each passenger in the car."

"Faced with such draconian surveillance, the KGB station in Montreal had adopted a low-profile policy, not waving the red flag in front of the Canadian counterintelligence. Leading a quiet life was better than being expelled from the country, considering the nasty consequences an expulsion would have in Moscow. In spite of the reality on the ground, the tone of the messages sent to the Center in Moscow was triumphant. The most ordinary operation, such as a rendezvous with an agent or the reception of a confidential document, was blown out of proportion and presented as a big success."

Authors slip here, next.

"It is certainly true that, in KGB stations abroad, the resident was the only master after God. ... "

"God"?

Whats that?

Aren't they talking about an atheist Communist regime, Russia, the Soviet Union, KGB? Or are they imposing an Abrahmic-II ideology on the faithful believers of the Abrahmic-IV creed, as Koenraad Elst terms the ideologies?

" ... The reputation and promotion of his subordinates were ninety percent dependent on the appreciation he gave them in his review report. As a general rule, he had only to ask for the recall of an operative for the Center to answer his request positively. Naturally, the resident in charge would not go after the “connected” individuals. Officers without useful connections to protect them, on the other hand, were reduced to subservience. They were the ones sent to the front lines, taking all the risks, and in addition, they were subjected to their “lord’s” whims. A typical example is provided by a KGB resident in Helsinki who was building a sauna in his dacha near Moscow. For months, all the officers traveling to the capital had to carry large stones in their luggage to contribute to the project."

"At the beginning of 1975, around February, an executive from the Center came to Montreal on an audit mission. Vetrov spent an entire night talking with him in the “bubble,” a specific soundproof room in which they could talk without the fear of microphones. They mostly discussed the work methods to implement in the face of Canadian counterintelligence. It is not out of the question that the conflict pitting Vetrov against Bolovinov had already leaked beyond the walls of the residency, either indirectly or because Bolovinov had complained about Vladimir in a dispatch. Based on this hypothesis, the inspector could have been asked, among other things, to sort out the situation at the residency.

"Vetrov did not know yet that he had only a few weeks left in Canada."

................................................................................................

"In March 1975, less than a year after his arrival in Canada, Vetrov was recalled to Moscow for reasons not yet explained, even to this day. ... "

"Svetlana owned an old piece of jewelry bought in an antique shop in Moscow. It was a magnificent gold brooch with sapphires and diamonds. The brooch needed repair because two small diamonds had become loose. Svetlana also had an antique ring missing a small diamond. Back then, there were very few goldsmiths in Moscow. ... Soviet citizens were not allowed to take too many precious objects when traveling abroad: Soviet customs officials were very suspicious about this. ... Svetlana waited several months before deciding to take her pieces to a goldsmith.

"In the winter of 1975, she went to a big jewelry store in downtown Montreal. This was a family business with the owner running the store with the help of his wife and his adult son, who had one leg in a cast. ... "

"At the sight of the brooch, the jeweler’s eyes lit up.

"“But those are genuine sapphires! Do you know, madame, that there are virtually none left like these?”"

But the store was robbed by a gang before she returned to take the jewellery back.

"At first, the owners did not even think about the damage done to their store. They knew that a violent gang was operating in Montreal. It was their fourth break-in, and during the three previous ones they had gunned down all the witnesses.

"Strangely, the bandits left without harming the family. It was discovered later that the gang leader was living in the neighborhood and had known the jeweler’s family for years.

"The goldsmith reported all the stolen jewels to the police, including the Vetrovs’ pieces for which he even provided a drawing."

"The gang was captured in a resort town a few weeks later. They had settled in an empty villa. A neighbor, who knew that the owners never stayed in their villa during the winter, saw light at night and called the police. The burglars opened fire and were all killed during the skirmish. The police found a few pieces of stolen jewelry in the villa.

"The Vetrovs read about it in the paper and went back to the jewelry store. Meanwhile, the jeweler had been summoned to the police station, where he identified several items. However, the Vetrovs’ jewels were not in that batch.

"According to Svetlana, only at this point did Vladimir find out that Soviet citizens were not allowed to bring jewelry for repair. They could only buy jewelry. She then told her husband, “Not a word to anybody about this. Too bad, but since we lost the pieces anyway…otherwise we’ll be in trouble.”"

................................................................................................

" ... Based on information gathered by the KGB residency, the Canadian counterintelligence was about to arrest him. Although an intelligence officer, Vetrov was not covered by diplomatic immunity. The source of the information must have been reliable since it had been decided to recall him to Moscow without delay."

"This plan required carrying off a well-organized operation at the Montreal Dorval Airport. Vladimir pretended to accompany an official delegation which was flying back to Moscow. As he often did in similar circumstances, he boarded the plane to make sure the delegates were comfortably seated, but this time he did not reappear. He traveled with only a small bag containing toiletry items and gifts for Vladik and his mother-in-law. According to Svetlana, over a dozen Soviet individuals had been asked to participate in the airport operation to come to the rescue of the KGB members in case of difficulties, and they all heaved a sigh of relief after the Aeroflot plane took off and disappeared in the clouds."

Authors claim doubts, and give another version, two in fact, of the reasons for Vetrov being recalled. The two alternative versions involve a recruiting attempt by Canadian intelligence.

" ... However, nothing confirms any collaboration with the RCMP after Vetrov returned to Moscow.

"Furthermore, why did he forget about the Canadians later on when he decided to offer his services to the West? If he was already on the Canadian counterintelligence payroll, why look for another employer? ... was it because he knew that the RCMP was infiltrated by the KGB?"

................................................................................................

"Quizzed on that point during a conversation, Raymond Nart, who had not said a word about it so far, did confirm that the Canadian agency had attempted to no avail to recruit Vetrov, and in a much more formal way than did the DST when the Russian officer left Paris in 1970.

"In any case, the fact that Vladimir Vetrov was recalled to Moscow while his wife stayed in Canada weakens the hypothesis that their premature departure was directly linked to the jewelry trafficking affair, with or without a subsequent attempt at recruiting Vetrov. If the usual guidelines had been followed, the Vetrovs would have both been urgently exfiltrated from Canada.5 So, the explanation must be somewhere else; the jewelry scandal—which happened at a convenient time—must have been just a smoke screen. This is corroborated by the fact that, instead of staying two or three more days in Montreal—and even this would not have made much sense—Svetlana stayed an entire month longer in Canada.

"She remembers this episode as a nightmare, undoubtedly the longest month of her life. She was all alone at home, with only one Russian neighbor in the apartment complex. Every morning she would teach her class in the makeshift school housed by the trade mission. The Russian neighbor was the GRU resident; ironically, KGB people would refer to their military counterpart as “neighbors” and vice versa. He would generally give her a lift, but sometimes she had to ride the bus. She constantly feared that she could be arrested at any time by Canadian counterintelligence agents. Fear alternated with boredom. Every once in a while, friends would come to visit or invite her to their place.

"It is inconceivable that, without a very good reason, the KGB would have left abroad, on her own and for so long, a Soviet woman convicted or suspected of being involved in illegal activities. This would not have happened either if the KGB had had the faintest doubt about her safety in Canada. So what to make of all this? After discussing this question at length with his contacts at the PGU, Sergei Kostin came to the following conclusion: this entire charade would have been necessary to protect a KGB mole.

................................................................................................

"Let us suppose that the K Line (which was responsible for internal counterintelligence and the safety of the Soviet colony members) was informed that one of the agents handled by Vetrov was in fact a double agent collaborating with the RCMP. It was expected that Canadian counterintelligence would set a trap for Vetrov in order to catch him red-handed and arrest him. Therefore, exfiltrating him from Canada was now urgent. And that is what they did.

"The source of this critical information must have been extremely valuable to be protected with such extraordinary measures. It could have been an RCMP officer recruited by the KGB. Thus, in order to prevent Canadian counterintelligence from unrelentingly trying to discover the source of the leak and tracing that mole, Vetrov had to go back to Moscow alone. This way, his departure would not look like an emergency exfiltration to the eyes of the Canadian spy-hunters."

"Against all expectations, this analysis based entirely on assumptions and deductions was supported by Peter Marwitz. He even revealed the name of a KGB mole within the Canadian secret services: Gilles Germain Brunet.7 Unfortunately, we have no other information about this character."

................................................................................................

"It took several months after his recall, in the summer 1975, for the dust to settle. In the end, the PGU decided to keep Vetrov. But his career as an operative was definitely over. He would have no more cover posts, and he went to work in “The Woods,” as was nicknamed the new headquarters of Soviet intelligence, located beyond the beltway.1

"He lost the main advantage of working for the PGU while suffering at the same time from its major downside. He would not be able to go abroad ever again, neither as an operative nor as a tourist, because he knew too much, and because they did not trust him completely anymore."

" ... Vetrov surely had heard about other “faux pas,” even more serious than his own mistakes, but they were perpetrated by “connected” colleagues. In their case, the scandal was quickly hushed and, in order to forget about it even faster, the rich kid at fault was sent somewhere in Sweden or in New Zealand with strict orders to do nothing but twiddle his thumbs. You would run into the same character a few years later, getting out of a brand-new car, dressed to the nines and talking about this sumptuous dacha he had just bought."

................................................................................................

"The paradox was, from that moment on, Vetrov had to handle and synthesize the scientific and technical intelligence reports from KGB residencies worldwide. It was like giving the key to the safe to a person you would not have entrusted with your coin purse! An unreliable officer operating within a KGB residency abroad could potentially reveal secrets regarding its staff, agents, working methods, and the operating mode of the geographic service at the Center. From this new position Vetrov had the capability, if he decided to betray the system, to deliver crucial information about an entire domain of KGB activities, revealing its philosophy, its operation, its methods, and the names of hundreds of officers and agents posted in Western countries.

"By a strange irony of fate, intelligence services in the Western Bloc had no idea that pursuing their “study” of Vetrov was an undertaking now a hundred times more valuable than when their target was in the West. Yet, according to Vitaly Karavashkin, future head of the French section at the KGB Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence), who had the opportunity to study at length Vetrov’s file, the Western services seemed to be obsessive about doing him harm. After having their revenge against Vetrov by compromising him further in the eyes of Soviet authorities, the RCMP apparently decided to broadcast to the whole world that he was a member of Communist intelligence services. Supposedly, a short while after Vetrov returned to Moscow, a Canadian newspaper published a well-documented article on the KGB activities, naming Vetrov among other known spies. Published information of that nature is not very likely, unless a special service tries deliberately to leak it. Echoed or not by the press in other countries, specialists knew how to use the article. Vetrov’s international career seemed over.2"

................................................................................................

" ... in 1977, on the occasion of the KGB sixtieth anniversary, he received, as one of the best officers, a honorary diploma signed by Andropov, head of the KGB, who was about to reach the top of the pyramid of Soviet power.

"An in-house document written by his superiors, in the usual austere and impersonal tone, gave him a very positive professional evaluation. “In a short period of time, has mastered a new domain of activity. Approaches his professional duties with creativity and initiative. Took an active part in the social life of the community. Has been elected twice member of his department Party committee. During the last year, served as a military examining magistrate.”3 ... "

" ... Suddenly, Vladimir got infected by the virus going around among Muscovites at the time—the need to experience authentic country living, in genuine Russian izbas, far away from paved roads and without electricity. Vetrov became enamored with this different way of life."

" ... Galina lauded the virtues of country life. Because of the drift toward the cities, many houses were for sale in fabulous locations, not too far from the capital. The Rogatins bought, for next to nothing, an izba in excellent condition, located two hundred fifty kilometers from Moscow on the road to Leningrad. The village was in the woods, where mushrooms and berries grew in abundance, overlooking a scenic river, the Tvertsa. Fascinated by Galina’s lyrical description, the Vetrovs wrote down the address and promised to come visit.

................................................................................................

"They drove there the following weekend. A regular car could not go through the track leading to the village, so they walked the last two kilometers. The landscape was indeed gorgeous. The river, winding through the woods, contrasted with solid blue flax flower fields. Birds were singing. There were edible boletuses growing along the trail. Later, the Rogatins took the Vetrovs for a walk to the hamlet of Kresty, another two kilometers away, along a towpath with stone footbridges built across streams, dating back to Catherine the Great.

"The Vetrovs fell in love with the place. Three izbas built on a hill overlooked a bend of the Tvertsa. Old willows and linden trees were mirrored in the water colored orange by the setting sun. It was quiet. Never mind the lack of electricity, in June it is light until midnight, and evenings by candlelight are so romantic.

"The Vetrovs bought a quaint izba, a traditional Russian log house with a cowshed attached, for seventeen hundred rubles (less than four months of Vladimir’s salary). This purchase was a major milestone in their life. Vladimir, who had been brooding over his frustrations with the KGB, became a new man. Vetrov discovered his second nature of farmer–land owner, and he did not miss an opportunity to go to his “country estate.”"

................................................................................................

"The house was surrounded by a big yard, and the first autumn the Vetrovs had a bumper crop of apples. The winter of 1978–1979 was unusually cold, with temperatures down to minus fifty degrees Fahrenheit, and none of the apple trees survived the freeze. Svetlana compensated for the loss by planting strawberry patches and flowerbeds.

"The Muscovites considered it essential to build good relations with the locals. The Vetrovs brought with them, for their neighbors, bags packed with salamis, cheese, canned food, and other food items impossible to find in the countryside. In return, they bought the assurance that nothing would happen to their place, no fire, no break-ins. The village residents who came to visit were greeted with a shot of vodka or a cup of tea with sweets. They were all so different from the people the Vetrovs socialized with in Moscow, and they had such strong personalities! Vladimir, however, kept his distance from the peasants, whose understanding of hygiene was not the same as his, and whom he regarded as boorish folks. Svetlana, for her part, spent most of her summers in the country, and she could not get enough of their storytelling, staying hours in their company.

"In Kresty, there were only two permanent residents, two old women, two babushki (Russian equivalent of “grannies”). Katia, who owned the boat to cross the river, had a cow and goats. The Vetrovs bought milk, sour cream, cottage cheese, and vegetables grown in her garden. Maria Makarovna had worked as a maid for Lev Tolstoi Jr., the son of the great writer. She never ran out of stories to tell about her family and the lifestyles of Russian society at the beginning of the twentieth century. Since there was no television, listening to her stories was one of the main distractions available to summer visitors."

" ... Alexei and Galina Rogatin were the first Muscovites to establish a country home in the area, and both were very hospitable. For all these reasons, their house was a hub for all the Muscovites who had bought a house in the neighboring hamlets. On one stormy day, the Rogatins ran out of dry clothes; one after the other, three drenched families, among them the Vetrovs, had knocked at the door to warm up and change clothes before going on their way."

................................................................................................

"Knowing the Rogatins presented a major advantage for Vladimir. In Moscow, finding a good auto mechanic was a real nightmare. You had to get up at five in the morning if you wanted to be among the first ten lucky ones whose car would be taken in that day. Soviet grease monkeys were usually a rude and greedy lot, exacting a bribe of twice the official price the client had already paid. Furthermore, most of the time you then had to take the car somewhere else to fix their slipshod work. And as if it were not already enough, since the car owner was not allowed to stay to overlook the work, the service technicians could easily substitute a bad part for a good one. Finding a good mechanic, even for whatever amount of money he wanted, was a real challenge.

"Alexei was an ace. All it took was for him to turn on the engine and drive your car a hundred meters to detect everything that was wrong with it. He worked fast, with no fuss, and at a very reasonable price. The Rogatins also presented the advantage of living in the heart of Moscow, on Smolensk Embankment. They lived in a huge Stalinist-style building that housed, on the first floor, the best art and antique gallery in town. The Vetrovs were regulars. Before long, Alexei took over the maintenance of the Vetrovs’ dark blue Lada 2106, bought when they came back from Canada."

"In spite of their frequent get-togethers in the countryside and in Moscow, the two couples were not actually friends. The Rogatins found Vladimir contemptuous sometimes. Alexei even had an altercation with him one day. Vetrov let slip the word “yokels” in the conversation, talking about their country neighbors. Rogatin could not accept people who looked down on those who fed them and were in no way inferior to city dwellers."

................................................................................................

"The Communist regime was in a visible state of slow decomposition. Intelligence officers, directly in contact with the reality of Western culture, had plenty of opportunities to compare the respective values of both systems. The comparison was not in favor of socialism.

"In addition to the external erosion, the inside was rotting away1 since, as already mentioned, the PGU officers recruited in the seventies were vastly inferior to the generation of the sixties.

"Vetrov was not the only one to be appalled at the degradation of the service. One of his colleagues, in the office next to his, was a veteran, a former fighter pilot. He had been awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and he was only short of a second citation by three killings. He too was outraged by what he was observing around him and often would add fuel to the fire which was devouring Vetrov: “Is this what I went to war for?”"

................................................................................................

" ... He had been working at the same post since they came back from Canada. The promise of nominating him as the head of the Analysis Department of the PGU Institute of Intelligence-Gathering Issues had not materialized yet. This institute had now been in existence since July 1979, following the PGU move to Yasenevo, and it had a new mission statement and a new organization chart. Vladimir’s boss, however, was in no hurry to let him go. Adding insult to injury, ten years had gone by since his posting in Paris, and he was still only a lieutenant colonel. Granted, a man with no connections and claiming no spectacular deeds could not become a general. As they say in the army, “Colonel is a rank, general is a stroke of luck!” An officer, however, owed it to himself to end his career with at least the rank of colonel. It was a minimum level below which a military man was considered a failure."

" ... One day, he went to see his boss, Vladimir Alexandrovich Dementiev. ... "

"Dementiev’s reaction was violent and typical of a Communist Party executive: “You have a lot of nerve, Vetrov! You do not ask for a promotion. You work hard, dutifully, and with dedication. Then your superiors notice and can act accordingly. But you’re pushing it! What a lack of humility!”"

" ... This Gogolian incident, trivial at first glance, was nevertheless registered in Vetrov’s investigation file used to try to establish the motivations of his betrayal.2 Besides Vitaly Karavashkin, another man studied Vetrov’s file in depth. ... The analysis of Vetrov’s betrayal, one of the major cataclysms that shook the KGB edifice, was one of his professional tasks. In interviews with Sergei Kostin, Prelin never attempted to fool him, hide facts from him, or brainwash him. Naturally, he would declare here and there, “I cannot tell you his name,” or “We do not care about the date here, do we?” Overall, he was a reliable witness, and, therefore, we often refer to his declarations."

................................................................................................

" ... Vetrov did not give up. He tried a new approach to reverse the situation. Around 1981, he wrote an analytical report proposing a radical overhaul of scientific and technological intelligence. In order to have the means to complete his project, Vetrov asked for permission to study the information produced by thirty-eight foreign agents recruited by the PGU in various countries. Such information, naturally, was top secret and Vetrov first wrote it down in his notebook, which he kept in the safe at the office. The analysis of the data resulted in a twenty-page document explaining what was wrong with the service, and suggesting a whole series of measures to remedy the situation. Vetrov analyzed every step of the process; information research, gathering, processing, exploitation, distribution, and protection. The changes to be made to improve the system’s operation were far-reaching, targeting residencies abroad as well as Yasenevo personnel, and even the beneficiaries of intelligence data within the military-industrial complex."

" ... Vladimir’s report was filed away, coming to nothing. This humiliation occurred soon after the latest severe blow to his pride, and it played a decisive role in the turn his life would take."

................................................................................................

" ... Even today, she holds herself to blame. She believes that had she not rejected Vladimir out of pique, his life might not have taken a fatal turn.

"And so, at a critical moment of his existence, Vetrov was left on his own. He had nothing else to expect from the KGB, which only filled him with hatred and disgust. He was used to off-loading his troubles onto his wife, but now he was not allowed to talk to her any longer. Everybody thought he was finished, a hopeless drunk. Well, he would show them how wrong they all were about him. ... "

................................................................................................

"“The individual who decides to betray never presents the situation in those terms,” explains expert Igor Prelin. “No, he wants to sell his experience, just to make money out of it, or to get revenge on the service he detests. If what mattered most to him was safety, he would contact the British. They would think about everything, he would be extremely well covered during his handling, and would benefit from a first-rate exfiltration operation. Those whose only interest was money would contact the Americans; for them, money was not an issue. And last, those who wanted it all, money, safety, recognition, and revenge, where did they go? Bravo! That’s it—they’d go to the KGB. Except that in Vetrov’s case, that was not possible.”1

"After working twenty years for the KGB, Vetrov knew perfectly well that his knowledge and the information he had access to through his analyst job were beyond price for any foreign intelligence agency. He was mindful of the extreme care and the huge means used by a major intelligence service such as the CIA to handle a source within the KGB or the GRU. For each case, the Americans created a special cell comprising several individuals who had to organize the operation down to the smallest detail. When their mole was traveling to the West, like Penkovsky going to London or Nosenko to Geneva, several agents would go to meet him for debriefing and to ensure the safety of the rendezvous. Furthermore, the Americans were extremely generous, offering a numbered bank account in Switzerland, princely gifts, a high rank in their own military hierarchy, and more."

"In the eyes of the beneficiary, the DST, the decision seemed to stand to reason. First, Vetrov was a Francophile with family origins that nurtured this cultural attraction to everything French. Within the Russian bourgeoisie it was a must to have your children raised by a French governess.2 ... "

................................................................................................

"Actually, three main considerations dictated Vetrov’s choice, a choice which, although seemingly absurd, was the main reason for the success of what would later be called the Farewell operation.

"First, his safety. Vetrov was well positioned to know how extensively major special services in the West were penetrated by the KGB. The CIA was no exception, and neither were the other major players, including the SDECE. Vetrov was not planning a suicide operation, so from this standpoint, the DST had an advantage.

"France was not really considered an enemy of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, France was one of the pillars of détente and had a privileged relationship with the Brezhnevian regime in international affairs. As far as French special services were concerned, the KGB, obsessed with the CIA, did not take them very seriously.

"Furthermore, a counterintelligence service is much more difficult to penetrate because spy hunters are usually more patriotic, more conservative, and less prone to be influenced and lured than intelligence officers. Vetrov, who had access to documents coming from the KGB residency in Paris, would have the assurance, at the time of his betrayal, that the DST was not infiltrated. Finally, since this police service did not operate outside of French territory, the DST would be the last organization to be suspected by the KGB of involvement in the manipulation of an agent. For a counterintelligence entity, identifying the adverse agency is the chief concern.

................................................................................................

"The third reason for Vetrov’s choice was his Paris experience. He certainly had a good knowledge of French qualities and flaws. To implement a plan as risky as the one Vetrov was about to put in place, being familiar with one’s partners’ mindset and being able to anticipate their reactions in any situation was essential. By choosing France, a country not perceived as hostile by the Soviet Union, Vetrov’s feeling of treason may have been less acute than it would have been had he chosen the sworn enemy, the United States.5"

" ... From the Russian standpoint, nothing in Vetrov’s behavior substantiated the assumption that he was a shadow fighter against the communist system or a trailblazer for perestroika. That assumption, which seemed to be a certitude for the DST and the French media, was laughable to the Soviets who had known Vetrov."

" ... In Raymond Nart’s opinion, Vetrov was a defector in the making. “It is a unique case; here is a guy who defects intellectually, but stays in his country because he is too attached to his land.”6 His fatal decision would have, therefore, been made possible by a gradual detachment from his personal environment. “A guy who has lived in the West, then goes back ... is bound to flip out at some point,” concludes Nart. Vetrov was no longer involved ideologically, and he was even more detached professionally and sentimentally. Above all, he felt a passionate hatred toward the KGB, an institution Westerners had difficulty distinguishing from the Soviet regime as a whole. In Nart’s opinion, Farewell, therefore, did not take the plunge in a leap of death, but went simply a step further.

"There is every indication that the motives attributed to Vetrov by the DST and the KGB correspond to the stereotypes prevailing in the collective consciousness of one or the other of these secret services. In the eyes of the DST, it was the rejection of the regime and a thirst for freedom. For the KGB, there was only one explanation: Vetrov was a mercenary.7 Although supposed to have better knowledge of the situation, the KGB, as we can observe, was further from reality than its French counterpart."

................................................................................................

" ... Vetrov seemed to enjoy more and more the benefits of his new status as a paid source. ... the only formal requests Vetrov made to his handlers involved merely a few presents, the nature of which indicated clearly that Ludmila was the recipient."

"His French friend was still working for Thomson-CSF, overseeing contracts between the company and the Soviet Union, and on this account was traveling regularly to Moscow. ... In preparation for the Olympics in Moscow, following an international call for bids, Thomson was awarded a contract for the modernization of Soviet TV. This was a huge deal, involving hundreds of millions of French francs in investments, hundreds of experts, engineers, and technicians shuttling back and forth between the two countries, and a vast construction site in Moscow for the new technical center for Soviet TV.

"In 1979, at the peak of the games preparation, Jacques Prévost traveled to Moscow five times to oversee the advancement of the contract—once a month from February through May, and once more in October. In 1980, the year of the Olympic Games, he did not have much left to do in Moscow. He came back only once, from October 14 through October 18. He had no way of knowing that this was precisely the time when Vetrov was desperately looking for a way to contact him again."

" ... It was not until December 1980 that Vladimir found a way to reconnect with Jacques."

"Vladimir asked his brother-in-law to mail an innocuous postcard, supposedly addressed to a French friend, while in Hungary. It was simply to arrange a rendezvous, implying that Prévost was supposed to come to Moscow to meet Vetrov. The wording of the message was very cautious. Vetrov had to be able to explain himself should the letter be intercepted by the KGB. Barashkov, like most Soviet citizens, viewed the security measures imposed by the KGB as some kind of a paranoia, and censorship as a disgrace. He was thus glad to render this service (see Figure 2).

"The DST did not make a move.8 Actually, Prévost would not have taken a big risk had he traveled to Moscow and called Vetrov the way he used to do it in the past. The DST’s lack of response to this first contact attempt from Vetrov, in a situation where it had nothing to lose and everything to gain, was due only to a procedure. Accustomed to double-dealings, the French service saw traps everywhere. On the other hand, being a counterintelligence service, the DST would have had, in theory, an interest in having a mole within the KGB only if that mole could give them information on the activities of the KGB Paris residency. It had not occurred to the DST yet that they might play a role in gathering intelligence outside of France, which in both cases would have been beyond the legal scope of its responsibilities. The DST was in the situation of a hunter who spends his time shooting sparrows in his field and is suddenly offered a safari. This is probably what Vetrov thought."

................................................................................................

" ... Vetrov decided to try again.

"In February 1981, a trade show had been organized in the Moscow International Trade Center, also known as the Armand Hammer Center, named after an American businessman who actively promoted East-West trade relations. In spite of the interdiction against communicating with foreigners, Vetrov was not taking a huge risk by visiting the exhibits. There is always some margin between rules and their enforcement, and in the USSR the margin was significant. It was a trade show in electronics. There were French companies among the exhibitors, and Vetrov was a specialist in both electronics and French business. He could always argue that this visit was in the context of his professional activities, to see what improvements had been made in devices he had provided to the KGB in the past, and so forth.9

"Once at the trade show, Vetrov soon located just the right man among the French exhibitors. It was Alexandre de Paul, a Schlumberger representative who had come from Paris for the occasion. ... Vetrov gave Alexandre de Paul another message for Jacques Prévost. This second message was much more explicit. It contained the following words: “You must understand that this is for me a matter of life or death.”10"

................................................................................................

"The possibility of a setup by the KGB was of course a consideration. Hence the importance of sending the right individual on reconnaissance.

"This was logically a mission for Prévost. First, he knew Vetrov personally, so nobody else could assume his name to meet with Vladimir. Secondly, since Prévost was intimately acquainted with him, he should have had a better sense of a potential provocation. Last, being a DST honorable correspondent, he would know better how to react in case anything unexpected cropped up."

" ... Jacques Prévost was understandably not keen on carrying out this mission in Russia himself. It was one thing to travel back and forth between Paris and Moscow on business; it was another to respond to an SOS message from a KGB officer! Besides, Prévost’s responsibilities had changed as well since the seventies, and he was not going to Moscow nearly as often as he used to. It was, therefore, in good conscience that Prévost told the DST that, although he still had some business in the Soviet Union and at some point would have to go back, he had no trip scheduled in the immediate future."

"In the end, the DST decided to transmit the answer to Vetrov’s message through somebody uncompromised, entirely innocent in the eyes of the KGB. Prévost is the one who suggested the name of the Thomson-CSF general delegate in Moscow. Furthermore, this individual was scheduled to go back to Moscow a few days later."

................................................................................................

"Born on January 7, 1923, in Paris, Xavier Ameil transcends class and social status categorization. He is a remote descendant of colonel Ameil, who served in the twenty-fourth regiment of cavalry (Regiment de Chasseursa-Cheval) and was made a general and a baron of the Empire by Napoleon after the battle of Wagram. But Xavier Ameil went through his active life without flaunting his peerage, only using his title of baron when retiring in Touraine, a place where belonging to nobility has its importance. Xavier Ameil’s father had studied at HEC (Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales) and worked as a salesman for a large hardware company, Japy, in the Paris area. He died young, when Xavier was only twelve years old. His mother was the granddaughter, daughter, and sister of graduates from Polytechnique, one of the most prestigious French engineering schools. A widow with six children, she taught them to fend for themselves.

"Xavier grew up in Paris. After graduating from high school, he was also admitted to Polytechnique. After two years, he interrupted his studies. It was 1944, and France was being liberated from German occupation. Xavier joined the Leclerc Division and was in Strasbourg when the war ended. A local enterprise, the Société Alsacienne de Constructions Mécaniques (SACM), funded him for two years to study at Ecole des Télécommunications. ... "

"In 1978, in order to manage a big contract involving the modernization of Soviet television for the Moscow Olympics, Thomson-CSF put in place a significant office in the facility of the Soviet-French Chamber of Commerce, located at 4/17 Pokrovsky Boulevard in Moscow. The company already had a representative there, but for this important contract, a new team was needed, headed by an experienced and competent general delegate, so they offered the position to Ameil. Ameil had stayed in the Soviet Union twice before, two weeks in June 1969, and five weeks in November and December of 1978. He liked the country and was not afraid of taking on responsibilities, so he accepted the offer and moved to Moscow with his wife on January 5, 1979."

"The couple did not have much of a social life. Xavier had quite a few British acquaintances, but Claude did not speak English. Every once in a while, the Ameils would invite French people over, especially after Claude started working as a volunteer at the embassy library. They both appreciated Russian culture and never missed a performance at the Bolshoi Theater. They knew very few Soviet citizens, the political climate being unfavorable to relations with foreigners. Being overly cautious, they would see a French-speaking Russian friend with the utmost prudence."

................................................................................................

"Ameil answered yes immediately. When asked, fourteen years later, why he accepted so fast, he recognized that he never had a second thought about it. He explained very simply, with an ingenuous smile, almost embarrassed, “Because I wanted to be helpful.” As he was saying those words, he did not have in mind his boss Prévost, nor the DST, nor his country. He only thought about a man finding himself in difficulty, a friend of Jacques’, a human being in trouble in the Soviet Union, a situation that could happen to so many people.

"With respect to the choice of the messenger, Ameil had given some thought to that question. In his opinion, the DST had a blind belief that it was a call for help, but did not suspect for a minute that something “big” could come out of it. So they preferred to send a lamb rather than a wolf to check out the situation on the ground.

"As it turned out, the DST was certainly right to act that way. “An amateur has the disadvantage of not being trained for the job, but the advantage of not being suspected by counterintelligence services,” explains expert Igor Prelin. “All things considered, it was a net advantage here. Ameil was never monitored nor even suspected of anything.”2 In contrast, we know today that Jacques Prévost had indeed been identified by the KGB as an agent of French counterintelligence as early as 1974. Ameil’s watch file was blank. As far as routine civilian surveillance was concerned, his “guardian angel” at the UPDK sent very flattering reports about him; the Thomson representative used to tell the UPDK staff about the slightest difficulties he was encountering in everyday life. Soviet counterintelligence informants described him as an innocent daydreamer, a nice fellow, well-read and courteous.

"Incidentally, the KGB did not change its mind about Ameil, even after his role in this espionage case had been clearly established. Ameil had not been playing the part of an agent with its inherent deception, always being himself, which earned him the respect of the KGB."

................................................................................................

"By chance, in early 1980, Sergei Kostin met the couple in Moscow. Claude Ameil and Kostin happened to take part in the shooting of a comedy called One Day, Twenty Years Later. Claude was playing a Frenchwoman, a member of a delegation visiting a large Soviet family; Sergei played the interpreter of the delegation. The script called for him to drive the Ameils’ car, a white Renault 20, the very car used in the beginning of this incredible espionage adventure."

"The Ameils never tried to be dominant central characters. When memory failed, they did not make something up. If they thought they should not answer certain questions, such as how to contact the Ferrants, the couple who took over the handling of Vetrov in Moscow, they would say so. There is no evidence that they hid anything. The part they played in this story was such that they certainly had nothing to hide. They gave an account of those events from the perspective of people who considered it their duty to do what they did, who had nothing to reproach themselves with, and nothing to gain from their participation. The authors consider this side of the story as truthful and complete, short of involuntary omissions made by them.3

"Having accepted the DST mission, Xavier Ameil went back to Moscow on March 4, 1981. He did not want to call Vetrov from his apartment, believing their home phone was tapped. So he promptly called Vetrov’s home from a phone booth."

................................................................................................

"“Jacques asked me to tell you that the borders of all the European Community countries are open to you. France is ready to welcome you if you can get out of the USSR.”

"Vetrov’s answer astonished Xavier.

"“I don’t want to leave! I want to work with the DST for three years; I have volumes of information to provide.”"

"When they met again in Paris later on, Prévost told Ameil, “If I had been in your place, I would have stopped right there.” He did not mean by this remark that he thought Ameil was terribly foolish to have agreed to meet again with Vetrov. He was still pretending that he was not part of the DST. Prévost even told his friend that the first letter from Volodia had put him in an awkward position. He also admitted that he was amazed at how valuable Vetrov’s notes were.

"The DST’s initial offer to Vetrov remains nevertheless a troubling puzzle. Was the DST lying when asserting that the borders of all European Community countries were open to him? If the DST was sincere, what measures could it have put in place without endangering its mole? To this day, this remains a mystery."

................................................................................................

"As early as the second rendezvous, Ameil stopped wondering whether he should continue or not. From that moment on, he considered meeting with the Russian spy as his duty. Volodia had mentioned the names of two KGB agents in France. Ameil knew one of them personally, Pierre Bourdiol, a Thomson-CSF engineer.

"The French businessman instantly grasped the scope of the damage one KGB mole could inflict to his country. He knew that Bourdiol was in charge of the spare parts for the European Symphonie satellites to be launched from the Kennedy Space Center in collaboration with the USA. He was traveling often to the USA, and would bring back huge amounts of data—not to mention the kind of information he had access to in France.

"Later, when Vetrov’s colleagues at the PGU learned about the disclosure of Bourdiol, they were even more shocked than Ameil, but for a different reason. To an intelligence officer, the agents he personally recruits are sacred. He can betray his country, transmit confidential documents, and disclose the sources of others. But to betray an individual who put his trust in you is the lowest form of low. After such an act, Vetrov could no longer count on the sympathy of his former colleagues.

"The other agent named by Vetrov was a French national who worked for Texas Instruments. Additionally, Vladimir handed over two brochures to Ameil to photocopy over the weekend. Vetrov had to bring them back to the KGB the following Monday.1

................................................................................................

" ... At the time, he had even been told by Prévost never to go to the embassy except for sending mail in the diplomatic pouch. The primary rule at the multinational company Thomson was to keep its distance. Its representatives had privileged contacts with Soviet ministers, which could make embassy functionaries envious, and the company did not always view things the same way diplomats did. Also, Ameil was convinced that no one at the embassy knew how to keep a secret. Little did he know then how right he was!2"

"On his way to a rendezvous with Vetrov, Ameil took none of the customary precautions. He did not check to see if he was followed by somebody hiding his face behind a newspaper. He was right. The ability to detect a possible surveillance is a skill one acquires with professional training. Without training, it is useless and dangerous to attract the attention of those watching, invisible to the novice.

"So far, the copying issues had been solved. However, at the next meeting, which took place around March 20, Vetrov brought a very thick binder, containing at least two hundred pages. It must have been the famous Smirnov file. Smirnov was the head of the Military Industrial Commission (VPK by its Russian initials). This file made it possible to reconstruct the entire technology intelligence system using documents signed by the highest Soviet functionaries, headed by Andropov, still the chairman of the KGB at the time. To photocopy each paper, one needed to open the binder, take the document out, duplicate it, put it back, get the next document, and so on. Xavier realized that he could not do this by himself."

" ... As soon as they had arrived in Moscow in 1979, Claude felt the atmosphere was laden with suspicion. Like many other French people, she became convinced that they were constantly watched, followed, and tapped. She was especially annoyed that nobody knew what was allowed and what was prohibited, so you never knew if you were committing some offense. “We never felt we were allowed to breathe deeply,” she remembers. For that reason, Claude had made it clear to her husband: “Xavier, I am warning you. If you get involved in some kind of an espionage business, I’ll pack my suitcase and leave.”"

" ... What made her change her mind, most of all, was the list indicating the names of French individuals collaborating with the KGB, with Bourdiol among them. She was appalled by traitors.

"Thus, Claude agreed to spend an entire Sunday afternoon at the Thomson-CSF office to help her husband copy the thick file. They continued into a good part of the evening, but they could not see the end of the cursed documents. Exhausted, the couple reluctantly went home after copying about a hundred and fifty pages out of two hundred. This would be the only delivery Ameil could not complete entirely."

................................................................................................

"“Yes, that’s the way it was,” said Ameil. “This is precisely why it worked so well. We were not taking any precautions.”

"Vetrov gave Ameil the impression of being a frank, sincere, and pleasant man. Contrary to what the KGB would claim later, the Russian never brought up the question of his compensation to his first French liaison agent.

"Very soon, though, Vetrov abruptly asked if Ameil could bring him a bottle of whiskey. In those days, it was already almost impossible to find half a liter of vodka, so whiskey was a challenge! Thus Ameil, who knew about Soviet citizens’ difficult life and was familiar with their custom to offer little gifts to their friends, would bring Vladimir a bottle of hard liquor to almost each rendezvous. Even so, Volodia did not give him the impression of being an alcoholic. Apparently, Vetrov was making every effort not to reveal to his French handler his pressing urgency to drink."

................................................................................................

"As a couple, they had their biggest scare at the end of April 1981. With the upcoming May Day celebrations, a two-day holiday in the USSR, and with the possibility to extend this holiday with a few extra days, the couple decided to travel to Central Asia for a short vacation. Just before the planned date for their trip, Vetrov brought a new file. Ameil had the time to photocopy the documents and return them to Vladimir, but there was no possibility to ship the photocopies to France. On the eve of their departure to Central Asia, Xavier was left with this pile of dynamite on his lap.

"What to do with it? The Thomson-CSF general delegate did not have a safe in his office, only drawers with a lock. Was it advisable to leave the explosive documents in one of those drawers? They had always been left unlocked so far. The mere fact of locking them now would attract the attention of the numerous KGB-penetrated office staff, who were many in the Thomson delegation facility. It was out of the question to leave the documents at the embassy or with a friend. Should they cancel the trip? No way! They deserved some rest after those eventful weeks."

"The pleasure trip turned into an ordeal. From Alma-Ata to Tashkent, visiting the sumptuous monuments in Samarkand or touring the ancient town of Bukhara, Ameil never let go of a briefcase he carried under his arm. When going to the bathroom, he entrusted it only to his wife. At night, he kept the briefcase under his pillow.

"What is even more astonishing, when boarding the plane to Paris in early May, Ameil still had the briefcase under his arm. As he stood in front of the Soviet customs officer checking his things through the X-ray machine, he was congratulating himself for not having placed the documents in his suitcase. He preferred to focus his thoughts on that point rather than trying to anticipate what he would do if asked to open the briefcase. “Reckless” maybe, but he was very aware of the risk he took."

................................................................................................

" ... Nart asked Ameil for a last service. The Thomson representative had no objection to introducing Ferrant to Volodia when he returned to Moscow.

"Ameil was thus replaced, but in the event of the operation failing, his safety could be in jeopardy. Nart offered to give diplomatic passports to Xavier and Claude. This way, in a worst-case scenario, they could only be faced with expulsion from the Soviet Union. After giving it some thought, Ameil turned down the offer. It might attract attention to them, and from them the KGB could trace back to Volodia. Then, bad debts making bad friends, Nart insisted on reimbursing Ameil for the expenses he had in Moscow for Vetrov’s benefit.

"Nart gave his word to Xavier, who was grateful for it, not to exploit the information provided by Vetrov before the Ameils returned to Paris for good. In any case, for the operation to continue, they could not act otherwise. A few measures were taken immediately. For instance, Bourdiol was transferred to another job that he could view as a promotion, although it did not give him the same access to confidential information. The main point, assured Nart, was that there would be no arrests and no expulsions of KGB members, nothing that could arouse suspicion within Soviet counterintelligence."

"As for Volodia, Ameil saw him once more, on May 15, 1981, to brief him about the first contact with Patrick Ferrant, his successor. During their previous rendezvous, at the end of April, Xavier had mentioned that another person would take over, more qualified for this type of operation. Vetrov had understood perfectly, and feeling the operation was about to become more professional, he had used the opportunity to draw up the ideal profile of the person to send for the initial contact. “It should be a woman, if at all possible. The best would be to meet her at the Cheryomushki market, on Fridays. It is a very busy place, but I’ll recognize her without difficulty.”

"Vetrov knew that, in spite of its large staff, Soviet counterintelligence did not have the material means to tail women, not even the wives of known intelligence officers. He knew the place, which was one of the best-stocked kolkhoz markets of the capital; he went there from time to time to buy fresh produce."

................................................................................................

" What could have been Vetrov’s thoughts regarding the DST’s attitude toward him? Viewed from Moscow, it probably looked like the motion of a pendulum.

"When Vetrov was posted to France, the DST through Jacques Prévost surrounded him with attention and, on the eve of his return to Moscow, suggested he could ask for political asylum. Even after his refusal to defect, the DST maintained the contact with him through Prévost. So, from 1965 to about 1973, the Soviet officer was undeniably in favor with French counterintelligence. Then, after Prévost’s last trip to Moscow, the DST seemed to have written him off. It even denied him an entry visa to France, which would have provided a good opportunity to pursue its study of the target for several years longer (as was mentioned earlier, Vetrov had no way to know the visa was denied because of an administrative blunder). At that time Volodia did not present any interest anymore. However, with the pendulum motion going the other way, the DST did not prevent its Canadian allies from opening their borders for him. It eventually forgot him for good, since Prévost never called his friend again in spite of dozens of trips he made to Moscow in those years.

"And here was Vetrov sending his SOS out of the blue. The DST realized that its former study target could become a fruitful source of information on Soviet espionage in France. And yet, the message transmitted by Ameil was clear. It was up to Vetrov to find a way on his own to defect to the West, and he did not want to leave the Soviet Union. The man dispatched by the DST to handle him in Moscow did not seem to be an experienced professional. So, what to make out of all this? As a typical Russian fatalist, Vetrov had resolved on making do with what he had.

................................................................................................

"From the DST standpoint, the situation was more complicated.

"In early 1981, the DST was still a service unfamiliar with fighting espionage by agents from the Eastern Bloc countries. The explanation of such a state of affair has its roots in history. Created in 1945 after the Liberation, the DST focused on tracking down former Nazi collaborators. After that, it had to turn its attention to subversive activities linked to decolonization wars in Indochina, in Algeria against the FLN (the Algerian Liberation Front), and against the OAS, a French anti-independence terrorist organization. During this entire period, it was usually the American secret service who was in charge of intelligence gathering about KGB activities in France, keeping the French authorities informed on a regular basis. It is undoubtedly the good relations between the DST and its American colleagues built at that time that would play a role later in the Farewell affair.

"It was only at the end of the sixties and in the early seventies that the DST started in earnest to develop counterintelligence strategies against Eastern Bloc secret services. The DST, however, was not qualified to handle agents or implement active measures outside of France. It had no presence at all in Moscow, and neither did French intelligence."

" ... Unlike the foreign intelligence service (SDECE), the counterintelligence DST came under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, not the Ministry of Defense. It was staffed by police, not military personnel. Its culture, mindset, and methods were inherited from managing police informants. The “cousins,” as they were called in France, used to move in their own milieu in all independence, making decisions at their own risk, without reporting to anyone—a type of profile that, oddly enough, looked very much like Vladimir Vetrov’s."

................................................................................................

"Two men handled these two challenges, each with his own style and personality. They were Chief Inspector Raymond Nart and his superior Marcel Chalet, director of the DST."

" ... Marcel Chalet projected the image of a subtle and cultivated man, expressing himself in extremely refined French and anxious to never contradict his interlocutor. Passion for secret action could pierce through the veneer of good manners, of course, but moderation was back in full force the minute the conversation moved on to the political dimension of counterintelligence activities. Raynaud was then face to face with a ministry-level official, totally at ease with those in high places. To Raymond Nart, who hardly hid his admiration for his boss, Marcel Chalet was the “classy” type.

"For his part, Raymond Nart had clearly the profile of a true cop on the beat. Crafty, he came across as an expert in operations of all kinds. In the murky world of espionage it seems, however, that Nart’s most important quality was to remain direct and methodical, and always go for the simplest solutions. This inspector was obviously not inclined to speculate for hours about the ins and outs of a case. When Eric Raynaud asked him about one murky point of the operation and suggested some elaborate answer, Nart merely gave him a benevolent smile, saying that the truth is much simpler, and “it is precisely because we kept it simple that it worked.”"

................................................................................................

" ... By operating outside of France, the DST had crossed a line, leapfrogging the SDECE, which had sole authority to deal in foreign countries. As happened many other times during his career, Raymond Nart preferred addressing his responsibilities “and facing up to them in case of failure” in contrast to prevaricating and submitting the matter higher up to cover himself."

" ... The fact that Raymond Nart thought of Patrick Ferrant for the mission, a man he knew personally, cannot appear fortuitous."

" ... With the arrival of the first shipments from Xavier Ameil, Raymond Nart, still on his own, decided to work with a colleague, Jacky Debain, and engage a translator, closeted in an office, to translate the huge volume of information received. For the entire duration of that period, his constant concern was to involve as few individuals as possible. “One is fine, two is borderline, three is a crowd.” The team worked relentlessly; the translator delivered ten pages a day, having no clue about where the documents were coming from. The stack kept growing, and Nart was anticipating with the utmost satisfaction the surprise he was preparing for Marcel Chalet."

" ... Nart had no difficulty, with the pile of documents in front of them, in convincing Chalet that the amount of information received to date ruled out such a possibility. “It would have taken a team of about eighty people doing just that, like an entire network, while sacrificing countless agents that had been patiently recruited. Impossible.”"

" ... Marcel Chalet carried professional ethics to the point of prohibiting Raymond Nart from revealing Vetrov’s identity to him, so he would not be able to tell his superiors about it in case they would ask."

................................................................................................

"First, they needed a code name for their mole. In order to avoid one that might allow the identification of the agent, French secret services had a ready-to-use list of pseudonyms. The first pseudonym available is used, provided it has no link with the real name or biographical details of the person to protect. Soviet counterintelligence personnel had a good laugh when they learned that, during the big hunt launched by the CIA in the sixties and seventies to find the mole named “Sasha,” those named Alexander (the diminutive form of which is Sasha) were under particular scrutiny.3

"Marcel Chalet came up with a more elegant solution. A nationally qualified English teacher, Chalet knew the language of Shakespeare very well. To confuse the issue, he chose an English word. This way, if there were a leak, the KGB would think that it was an American or British operation, and would not necessarily look at the French services. Furthermore, the chosen name “Farewell” could suggest a closed case. The hope was it would slow down the KGB’s zeal to identify the source. And last, there was a humane side in this pseudonym, quite touching on the part of a counterintelligence ace. Written in two words, fare well conveys well-intended wishes for a safe journey. “And that was indeed,” said Chalet, “what we were wishing our man in Moscow, from the bottom of our hearts.”4"

................................................................................................

" ... Nart told Chalet for the first time about a certain Patrick Ferrant, deputy military attaché posted in the French embassy in Moscow, where he lived with his wife and their five daughters. Nart had known Ferrant since the time the young man was appointed to the National Defense Secretariat; he was the liaison between the Ministry of Defense and the DST in a few sensitive cases.5

"Born in 1940 in Pas-de-Calais, northern France, Patrick Ferrant was a Saint-Cyr graduate. He was fluent in English and had some knowledge of Russian and Bulgarian. He was posted in Moscow in August 1980, as he remembers, on the last day of the Olympics ... "

"Summoned by the Ministry of Defense, Ferrant flew back to Paris in April 1981, officially to attend a meeting organized for military attachés posted in Eastern Bloc countries. Ferrant found himself in the office of the newly nominated chief of staff of the French armed forces, General Jeannou Lacaze, at that post since February 1. Ferrant was surprised to see there Raymond Nart and his superior Désiré Parent."

"Nart briefed him on the affair and, without elaborating too much, gave the big picture in all of its importance and implications. “Oh, by the way,” interrupted Lacaze, “the guy would like a woman to be the first contact. So you’ll have to find one at the embassy.” Caught unawares, Ferrant mentioned an acquaintance, a woman working for a humanitarian program, but “chances are,” he said, “it’s going to be delicate.” After a moment’s thought, Lacaze added in his direct style, “Listen, why not send your wife?” Unruffled, Ferrant answered, “You are right, General, it did not occur to me. And indeed, from the standpoint of the operation, it is definitely simpler.”"

" ... Nart had reasons to be pleased. ... replacement definitely presented appreciable advantages to handle Farewell. Most importantly, he had diplomatic cover. Also, he was a disciplined military man, punctual and discreet.

"On the other hand, Ferrant was not without serious shortcomings for the job. A secret agent must go unnoticed, with an ordinary look, medium size, no striking features. Even though in Moscow he was wearing civilian clothes, Patrick Ferrant was a typical cavalry officer: crew cut, close-shaven, military gait. Nart even asked him to let his hair grow a little in order not to trigger a military salute on the part of the Moscow policemen walking by him. To complete the picture, Ferrant was six feet six inches tall. In the middle of a crowd, his head was visible from fifty meters away, extremely convenient for those in charge of tailing him."

................................................................................................

"Ferrant now had to inform the person who would play a predominant role in the operation, and who would not suspect for a moment what would be asked of her. With the Farewell case, a new Marianne joined the gallery of France’s heroic women. The woman who would later become the enigmatic “Marguerite” for the KGB was Madeleine Ferrant.

"Her only link to the intelligence community was her marriage with a Deuxième Bureau officer. Life to her was her family. The couple had five children, all girls, all living with their parents in Moscow. Madeleine Ferrant, born Moretto, had other things to do than rushing to meet with a Russian spy.1"

" ... Her husband explained briefly that “they” had asked him to do this and that, but for the initial contact, the man to meet preferred to deal with a woman. Madeleine was not an adventuress. Like her husband, she was anxious to stay in the background, and she cultivated self-effacement, in line with her religious zeal. Presented with a fait accompli, Madeleine Ferrant did not really have a choice. The mother of five prepared herself, not without apprehension, for her espionage mission."

"Madeleine recognized Vetrov right away, but she did not show it. She shifted the basket to her other arm and disappeared inside the pavilion. Vetrov could verify that, contrary to her fears, the Frenchwoman had not been tailed."

" ... she was afraid of getting in the car. To this day, her anxieties continue to haunt her. “I believed that every foreigner was identified as such. Getting in the car of a Soviet citizen was like signing my crime. Considering what he was doing, this Russian guy might just as well have been a dangerous nutcase.”

"For Vetrov, this did not help matters. Admittedly, the thick file he brought would easily fit in the basket, but anything could happen on the trolley. There could be a pickpocket. Vetrov had to reassure the Frenchwoman at all costs."

"In spite of his efforts at making her more at ease, Marguerite kept turning around nervously, to make sure no police car had suddenly appeared. Her home was fifteen minutes away from the market by car, at the most. Vetrov, however, turned into Lomonosov Avenue and drove to Kutuzov Avenue.4 Then, he turned right and drove all the way to the Moscow River embankments, making his passenger even more worried. “I knew only simple itineraries; I had no idea of the route he took,” Madeleine recalls. “I got to thinking that he could take me God knows where. My heart was in my boots.”"

" ... Madeleine came home with shaken nerves, bringing back the “package.” Another danger was facing her: Natasha, their Russian housekeeper. As any other UPDK employee, she had the duty to report to the KGB about the diplomats she worked for. Madeleine dashed to her husband’s study to hide the file she’d brought back from the market."

" ... Ferrant gave her his word that after she returned the file, he would be the one meeting with Farewell. Besides, upon Vetrov’s request, the DST had mentioned involving a woman only for the first contact."

................................................................................................

"From that moment on, until the bitter end, Farewell would be handled by Patrick Ferrant. Madeleine kept going to the market on Fridays as an emergency backup. Much later in the course of the operation, when he started working with a miniature camera, Vetrov used “Marguerite’s” shopping basket again to drop a few rolls of film in it."

" ... They drove to the new Lomonosov University complex on Lenin Hills. Kosygin Street bordered the university esplanade. At the level of the so-called “Stalinist style” skyscraper, there is an observatory area from which one can admire a panorama of Moscow. Below, sloping steeply to the Moscow River, a wood stretched out, crisscrossed by paths. The area was peaceful and very green. A lot of people came there to jog in the summer and ski in the winter.

"The DST plan rested on this area. “Paul” would come here for his morning exercise. He would leave the car window cracked open so Vetrov could slip his documents inside.

"Vetrov rejected the plan right away, not leaving Ferrant the time to explain the much more complex restitution procedure. Vladimir knew that this part of town was closely monitored by Soviet counterintelligence, who had already made several arrests of people caught red-handed exchanging documents. Independently of those facts, the place was a bad choice. On that same Kosygin Street there was a large piece of property surrounded by a blind wall. Fifteen years earlier or so, they had built dachas for Soviet leaders in this enclosed park. After the Communist bigwigs had moved out to government villages west of the capital, this infrastructure became a place reserved for distinguished guests on an official visit to Moscow. There were such visits almost constantly, and some presidents, prime ministers, or general secretaries of brother parties had reasons to fear an assassination attempt. Also, dozens of pairs of eyes were constantly monitoring any movement in the area, specifically cars with a diplomatic (CD) plate, which could well be used to transport weapons or explosives under the cover of extraterritoriality.

"There were also lovers and old ladies, the “babushki,” walking in the park. According to Farewell, those babushki were the main danger. They could prove themselves to be fearsome informers, reporting on anything that seemed suspicious to them."

" ... “What we must do is stay natural. Your dead drops thing, it works in the West because no one pays attention to what others are doing. Here, a guy shows up and drops a package, it’s not natural, and he would be spotted right away. What we must do is have fun, stand around, pat one another on the back, then walk to a bench while laughing. No one will find that unusual.”"

"As a good professional, Vetrov organized all the clandestine contacts on the route of his everyday comings and goings. The market once a week would be useful to have in his agenda. If he were to be tailed by KGB agents, the tailers should not wonder why he was in such place at such time. Since his wife worked at the Borodino Museum, it was normal for him to go there to pick her up after work, following his excursions in the Lada with his handling officer. Furthermore, he parked his car every evening in a covered parking garage three hundred meters away from the rendezvous spot."

................................................................................................

" ... It was Vetrov who imposed his style of doing things. He essentially favored physical encounters over the use of dead drops, and he refused to go by traditional spying techniques. Ferrant never tried to impose anything on him. Volodia was the professional and, furthermore, he was playing on his turf, “at home.” Whether interacting with Ferrant or Ameil, the operation kept the same profile. It was a “self-operation.”"

"Many weeks later, for instance, the DST was eventually able to correct a serious shortcoming the operation had in its first phase. The use of a Minox, a miniature camera, put an end to the necessity of making photocopies or taking pictures of the documents transmitted by Farewell before returning them to him. This process doubled the number of encounters and, therefore, doubled the risks. The Minox, on the other hand, allowed Vetrov to hand over films instead of documents, which minimized the risks. ... "

"Patrick Ferrant had the ideal psychological profile to handle a character such as Vetrov. In contrast with most Western diplomats posted in Moscow, and American diplomats more specifically, he was not living with an obsessive fear of the KGB. He favored direct contacts with the local population, in a way reminiscent of the colonial tradition of the French military. He viewed living in Moscow as a fascinating experience and a great opportunity. He made conversation with Muscovites every time he could, with the embassy guards, hitchhikers, even policemen. He knew Russian literature well, and he always had questions for the Russians he was talking to, whether about Gogol’s characters or the intrigue of a famous novel, showing his cultural attraction for this “Slavic soul” Russian people are so sensitive to. He also had a genuine affection for the people, admiring their legendary resilience. “I believe that these people deserve respect. They are so tough in the face of adversity and suffering,” he confided."

................................................................................................

"Over the duration of his stay in Moscow, Ferrant never changed his attitude. Combining the natural and the casual, he always tried to establish some kind of a rapport with the person in front of him. “Coming home with my briefcase packed with the Farewell documents, I used to stop to say hello and joke with the guards. I think it was easier for them to monitor me that way. Their reports would have probably been more negative if I had been scornful or constantly suspicious of them.”

"Ferrant also knew how to combine business with pleasure. When he was walking up Kutuzov Avenue, on his way to the rendezvous with Vetrov, he often offered his help to elderly women, carrying their heavy bags. This made a perfect cover in case the KGB was tailing him, and it gave him the opportunity at the same time to get acquainted with those “babushki” Vetrov dreaded so much, famous for their denunciation skills."

"The new element introduced by Ferrant was the compensation of Vetrov. Vladimir never said he wanted to be paid, but the DST insisted. “Seriously, you need to be paid. Any effort should be rewarded,” was Nart’s message relayed by Ferrant."

" ... Ferrant gave Vetrov a thousand rubles.6 Although not negligible, the amount was modest. It was about twice Vladimir’s monthly salary. The KGB would later sneer at the legendary stinginess of the French services. What the DST had in mind, though, was to give Vetrov a reasonable compensation that would not change his standard of living to the point of being noticed by KGB counterintelligence. According to Ferrant, over the entire duration of the operation, the financial side of it seemed secondary to Vetrov compared to the satisfaction of getting revenge on his service and the opportunity to confide for hours, in French. He never made any direct request to Ferrant explicitly asking to be paid. Ferrant gave him the money in a very informal way, a little like friends would help out one another. He then showed the corresponding amounts on his expense reports to Nart. ... "

................................................................................................

"Mitterrand, the new head of state, elected on May 10, 1981, played a major role in this story. ... "

"It is public knowledge that the newly elected president viewed the French special services very unfavorably. In 1953, while he was minister of the interior, he was the victim of a police conspiracy that caused his name to be dragged through the mud as an alleged “traitor” and a “Moscow agent.” Generally speaking, the socialists accused the DST of being “an instrument of the political right wing rather than a tool to defend the Nation.”1 Therefore, from the DST’s perspective, the election of Mitterrand was not exactly good news.

"Moreover, a few recent scandals added to the DST’s bad reputation. There was the case of planted mics discovered in the offices of the weekly satirical newspaper Le Canard enchaîné, which had everybody laughing in France. There was also the Curiel dossier, which owed its name to the Egyptian businessman assassinated in Paris on May 4, 1978, in circumstances that remain mysterious to this day. This affair caused the DST’s chief Marcel Chalet to be summoned to the office of an investigating magistrate."

................................................................................................

"The beginning of the first meeting between Maurice Grimaud and Marcel Chalet was laden with hidden meaning. Grimaud eventually decided to bring up, head-on, allegations such as the ongoing rumors about the DST’s borderline illegal activities against the ETA, a Basque separatist terrorist organization: “And then, you’ll have to put an end to a certain type of operations,” he stated. Marcel Chalet protested vigorously and assured Grimaud that those rumors were pure fantasy and that it was out of the question for the DST to violate its own rules. Chalet realized then, in the course of the conversation, that with serious arguments he was able to convince Grimaud that the accusations against his service were unfounded. Thus, a certain level of trust was established between the two men. “Very rapidly,” Chalet says, “Maurice Grimaud became much more cooperative with me. I could feel that all the reservations he may have had at some point had disappeared, and that it was now possible to have a frank and direct dialogue with him. This gave me the opportunity to pour out the Farewell story, which had been weighing heavily on me, and to explain to him that it was urgent to alert the president, while taking all the necessary precautions.”5"

" ... Gaston Defferre ... The new minister of the interior, a former partisan during WWII, perfectly understood how critical it was not to leak the facts. Chalet would, nevertheless, take the precaution to put him discreetly to the test: Patrick Ferrant, as a military attaché at the French embassy, reported in theory to the Ministry of Defense, where another long-standing fellow traveler of François Mitterrand’s, Charles Hernu, had been appointed. It so happened that Hernu was well known by the DST, which had a file on him indicating that he was an occasional collaborator of the Bulgarian, then the Romanian intelligence services for at least two years, in 1956 and 1957. Chalet also knew that Hernu had been mentioned in a note written by the Securitate in 1962. Ceausescu himself asked, to no avail, that the contact be renewed with Hernu when he became minister of defense.6"

" ... From that moment on, the collaboration between the DST and the Ministry of the Interior rested on mutual trust and survived all the obstacles born of the case. They did not dwell on the presence of communists in the left-wing union government, since it was understood that prudence was required."

................................................................................................

" ... As a matter of principle, and to reassure the French public opinion, the socialists displayed their indignation at what they considered interference in French domestic affairs. However, in reality, they would make every effort to reassure the Americans. All precautions would be taken, they declared, to prevent communist ministers from having access to information regarding the Atlantic security; and this was the case. The French prime minister Pierre Mauroy made France comply with the rules of access to information classified “secret” by NATO, thus denying the four communist ministers any possibility of accreditation or nomination to high-responsibility posts within the apparatus of government.9 Moreover, Charles Fiterman, whose responsibilities were in the most sensitive domain compared to his fellow ministers, lost part of his authority regarding the organization of transport in time of war.10"

"The DST had chosen July 14 to present Mitterrand with a token of its allegiance. At the DST’s express request, Mitterrand hosted a meeting with his old friend Gaston Defferre, accompanied by Maurice Grimaud and Marcel Chalet. The three men were greeted by Pierre Bérégovoy, Secretary General of the Presidency of the Republic, at the Elysée Palace where there was still evidence of the first garden party organized by the newly elected left government for Bastille Day.

"Defferre and Chalet had already analyzed Farewell’s deliveries and knew that this was exceptionally important. Mitterrand understood immediately the scope of this affair for his country, his party, and his personal image in the eyes of the Western Bloc. He was indeed, for now, the only leader of a capitalist country to know about the systematic technological pillage practiced by the Soviet Union, the scope of which was such that it challenged NATO policies regarding defense and security. Chalet also explained to Mitterrand the urgency to inform “our American allies” about the nature of some of the information passed by Farewell, and in particular about the radar system protecting the territory of the United States, now totally documented by the KGB. Moreover, he added, his services were in a position to provide the names of dozens of KGB moles holding the most sensitive posts in the West as well as the names of Soviet intelligence officers operating abroad.

"The president was so satisfied by this report that he gave the DST the green light to continue the Farewell operation, at a time when its mere existence was in jeopardy and in spite of the fact that such a mission was not the role of the DST and against the law! Chalet felt as if he had grown wings. ... "

................................................................................................

" ... Richard Allen, Ronald Reagan’s first national security adviser, had written up the briefing of the meeting. In his opinion, a man who had served in the French Resistance could not possibly warm up to a totalitarian regime like the Soviet Union. Reagan’s mistrust toward Mitterrand was therefore much more muted than was thought at the time.11

"When Mitterrand eventually mentioned the Farewell dossier, probably from notes written by Marcel Chalet, Reagan did not grasp its significance right away.

... "

"The following month, in August, Marcel Chalet traveled to the United States ... "

" ... As Chalet got out of the car, he was greeted by Bush in person, who was both happy and intrigued to see him again and addressed him in French: “Marcel, what’s up?” Chalet realized then, with a certain satisfaction, that in Ottawa Reagan had not grasped totally the importance of the case, and that Bush knew nothing about it.

"For almost three hours, as they walked together in the park of the residence, Marcel Chalet explained to his former colleague the ins and outs of the affair. Before leaving Paris, he had carefully prepared an impressive file treating mostly the American aspects of the intelligence information produced by the Farewell operation and, in particular, the detailed Soviet knowledge of the defense of the U.S. territory. At the end of their stroll through the park, Bush, clearly shaken, said, “I’ll have to make a few phone calls.”

"The next day, a first working session was organized at the CIA with William Casey, the director of the CIA, William Webster, the chief of the FBI, and Admiral Inman, who had just left his post as director of the NSA, directly affected by the radar coverage system for the defense of the U.S. territory. This would mark the effective start of a regular collaboration between the DST and the American secret services. ... "

................................................................................................

"Both presidents and their respective services developed a series of measures designed to make the most, while minimizing the risks, out of the revelations made by the Russian mole in the interests of the West. They were still a long way from the massive exploitation of the information provided by Farewell. Nevertheless, already the West was forced to quietly rethink its battle order starting with the radar coverage system designed to protect the U.S. territory from a surprise attack."

" ... The use of the Farewell dossier “had meaning only if the disclosed intelligence was leading to concrete measures; the arrest of the identified agents, reinforced protection of exposed targets, rethinking of compromised programs, review of security measures which appeared to be ineffective, increased surveillance of designated intelligence officers, implementation of restrictive measures aiming at crippling their activity, etc.”17"

................................................................................................

" ... Vetrov’s worst fear was that his handler might not be able to return the documents on time, and Ferrant remembers that logistics were not always optimum to fulfill that requirement.

"On August 25, for instance, Vetrov brought a cardboard box filled with documents to be returned the next morning at nine without fail. But at that time of the year, the embassy was closed for a couple of weeks, so it was impossible to use the photocopier without attracting the KGB’s attention. “OK, I’ll take it,” said the French officer without flinching. He then went directly to the military mission and gathered all the rolls of film he could find, then bought a few more and went home with the box of documents. “I got everything together and, that evening with my wife in the apartment hallway, using a bedside lamp and my Canon camera, we shot maybe twenty 24x36 rolls of film. My wife turned the pages; she had loud music on because we did not know where the hidden mics were, and you could hear the clicking noise from the camera.”"

................................................................................................

"However, according to Ferrant, happiness for Vetrov was to be found in simple things. Their conversations moved naturally to their respective country houses. The Frenchman had a secondary home in the French Pyrenees. His dacha, the improvements he was planning to make, and how he would quietly retire there were Vetrov’s favorite topics of conversation.

"The many descriptions Vetrov gave of the Russian countryside helped Ferrant understand how deep, if paradoxical, his attachment to the land was, even for a defector of his caliber. “A visceral patriotism I encountered only among the Russian people.” Vetrov might not have had many illusions left about the regime he served, but he showed a deep, passionate attachment to his native soil. As if intertwined, his son Vladik was also a recurring topic. Vetrov enjoyed talking about him, imagining his future or describing his personality."

................................................................................................

"One of the basic procedures of such an operation was to plan for the exfiltration of the mole in case he or she was uncovered. For the reasons mentioned before, the DST was not equipped to operate so far from its home base. Vetrov, who had chosen that agency, had to know its limitations in this regard. Yet, each time Ferrant tried to bring the subject up, Vetrov wanted to postpone the discussion until later and mumbled an answer: “There is no reason for things to go wrong, anyway.” Besides, as he repeated over and over to Ferrant, it was out of the question for him to leave his country, where he had a son, and where he was preparing to have a nice retirement in his country cottage. Vetrov, incidentally, viewed the operation in the long term, envisioning Ferrant’s successor, and even his own, whom he would recruit himself. “We’re not going to stop here; we’ve got to continue until they drop dead,” he insisted, as furious as ever about the KGB.8

"Vetrov could not have ignored that the life expectancy of a mole in the heart of Moscow was short. So, where did he find this self-assurance?

"It came mostly from the certainty that, with the DST, he had chosen in France a service not infiltrated by the KGB and, therefore, above suspicion in Moscow. Vetrov added a checking procedure very specific to Soviet counterintelligence. He asked Ferrant to bring him a significant quantity of renowned brands of cognac or gin, much sought-after products in Moscow in those days. With those precious bottles, Vetrov organized “happy hours” in his service, providing him with the opportunity to regularly sound out the KGB spy hunters.

"“It’s very simple,” Vetrov explained to Ferrant. “I’ll invite counterintelligence executives to stop by the office for a drink. If one day they start suspecting me, the first thing they’ll do, even before reporting higher up, will be to stop coming, not wanting to compromise themselves in my company. If this happens, we’ll stop everything.”"

"Volodia kept giving the impression of controlling everything, as confirmed by Ferrant. What the French officer could not know was that Vetrov had found another way to sound out his colleagues from the Second Chief Directorate."

" ... Vetrov clearly had many opportunities to probe Motsak. Thus, for all the duration of the operation, he knew full well that the KGB remained convinced that French secret services were inactive in Moscow."

"The day “Paul” told Vetrov about “Monsieur Maurice” and his request, he also told him that François Mitterrand knew about his collaboration with the DST. The president of the Republic, they said, had given the order to all French embassies to deliver a French passport or an entry visa immediately to Farewell if he asked for one."

................................................................................................

"In mid-December, at the DST’s request, Ferrant revisited the issue. He mentioned Farewell’s exfiltration through Hungary or another satellite country of the Soviet Union, and also the possibility of asylum at the French embassy in Moscow, where Nart would then send two passports, one in Vetrov’s name, the other in his son’s name.10 But here again “nothing ironclad,” confessed Ferrant, Vetrov being unwilling to dwell on the subject."

" ... As a professional, he knew a rescue plan was mandatory in any agent operation, but he nonchalantly ignored it in the same way he had been systematically ignoring all the other basic rules of espionage. Paradoxically, his attitude was at the core of his successful enterprise."

................................................................................................

"Almost no one ever disturbed them during their drives around Moscow or their strolls through parks. Ferrant remembers only one episode when things could have ended poorly. One day, in order to explain a document to his handling officer, Vetrov had parked the car on a street bordering the Lenin Hills park. He suddenly stopped talking. Behind them, a policeman was slowly approaching the Lada. “Keep talking, keep talking,” said Vetrov very naturally, while watching the policeman in his back mirror."

"On another occasion, so that his handler would be fully “reassured,” Vetrov spelled out what they could expect if caught: “For me, it will be a bullet in the back of the head; for you, a stupid accident, with your wife—a truck perhaps, or an unfortunate fall on the subway track in front of an incoming train.” To Ferrant, who thought he was protected by his diplomatic passport, learning about KGB methods was not good news. But after all, he was on active duty, and “the job had to be done.”

" Vetrov’s nonchalance certainly helped Ferrant relax, but as Madeleine admitted more willingly, tension remained high for her husband until they left Moscow for good.

"Moreover, even if he was aware of the quantitative importance of the affair, Ferrant was far from appreciating the explosive nature of the documents he was shipping to Paris. As seen earlier, unlike Ameil, Ferrant could freely use the diplomatic pouch, which in his case was the Ministry of Defense pouch. All the shipped documents went through General Lacaze’s office, where Raymond Nart came regularly to pick them up. Jacques Prévost was thus no longer in the loop.

"After this mission, Ferrant moved on to other activities and operations in different countries. “That was the job, you know,” as he would simply put it. It was much later, when he reached retirement age, that he truly realized the role the Farewell dossier played in the outcome of the Cold War."

" ... It had been just a few weeks earlier that the American president had joked about bombing the USSR during a mic check before addressing the nation. The joke did not amuse the Kremlin, and the Soviet press had lashed out at the new president’s irresponsibility and amateurism."

US residents of those years recall the US media catching on when he copied a Clint Eastwood line for delivery at a serious occasion as a president. The line and the film are good; the copying for delivery by president of US was universally agreed as inappropriate.

................................................................................................

" ... When Ferrant brought it up, Vetrov simply explained that at the KGB the shooting of the pope was a subject of joking at the expense of the Bulgarians, the main suspects in this affair. On a more serious note, he told Ferrant that there had been a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs way before the assassination attempt. Gromyko himself had confided to the Warsaw Pact member representatives that the problem with the pope would be soon “taken care of.” Later, with the help of a good bottle, Vetrov obtained from one of his colleagues “that without a shadow of a doubt the origin of the assassination plan was in Moscow.”

"In fact, as a good professional, Vetrov was rather reluctant to discuss general topics or current news he could not substantiate with documents. When Ferrant asked a question outside the field covered by a file they were discussing, Vetrov was prompt to refocus the conversation: “You’re asking me questions not in my field of competence. So, whatever I’d have to say, it would be hot air.” If he had no answer to a specific question, Vetrov preferred saying so. “A piece of information is only valuable if the source is reliable,” he would remind Ferrant, who made a mental note of it, as part of his spying crash course. He never had the feeling of being “taken for a ride” by Vetrov on specific topics. At all times, Vetrov’s goal of bringing the KGB down seemed the overriding consideration."

" ... A vast “peace offensive” was planned in response to the deployment of American Pershing missiles in Western Europe. Although not exactly a secret, this confirmed the infiltration and manipulation of peace movements in the Western Bloc, but the mass demonstrations organized in all Western capitals in 1983 to protest the deployment of the euromissiles had no effect in the end."

" ... when the Americans discovered, with the help of the Farewell dossier, the extent of the VPK’s dependency on technological espionage, they used it as a formidable weapon, and the trap closed on the “bad student.”

"This was undoubtedly what Vetrov had in mind from the very start when he embarked on this adventure."

................................................................................................

" ... Vladimir could be especially indiscreet when he indulged his favorite pastime—drinking. He got into the habit of visiting Galina Rogatina, not so much to share a drink or two, but to simply chat because Galina was an intelligent and perceptive woman."

" ... Rather than judging others, she tended to be understanding and forgiving. To her own amazement, those qualities made her Vetrov’s confidant at a time when he was going through great moral solitude."

"As could be expected from a good Soviet citizen, Galina gave him a piece of advice.

"“You are working together, right? Go talk to the Party organization, so they can tell her to leave you alone!”"

" ... The Communist Party, society’s vanguard, was in charge of the morality of its members. Adultery was considered a clear proof of depravity, for men and women alike. For a KGB officer, it was a serious professional mistake. Vetrov’s affair with Ludmila was an open secret in the service, but as long as nobody complained about it, theoretically his superiors ignored the situation. Vetrov was not thrilled by Galina’s advice since officially approaching the Party Committee would have launched a bureaucratic process difficult to hush up. However, the suggestion would turn out to be very useful. Stereotyped behavior made his PGU colleagues and superiors’ reactions predictable, which would play a significant role in what followed."

" ... From a few remarks he made, one was led to believe that the amounts he received from “Paul” were significant.1 What follows is telling."

................................................................................................

"In the heat of the discussion, Vetrov suddenly said, “I can have any car I want.”

"At Alexei’s incredulous expression, he added, “All I have to do is ask the French. They’ll get me the brand I want.”

"The Rogatins did not react to this probable drunkard’s boasting. But why the French? Well, after all, Vetrov was a KGB member. Who knows what type of operation he was involved in.

"Afterwards, Svetlana also remembered something else her husband said to her on a “truce” day: “I’ll buy you a magnificent house not far from Moscow.”"

................................................................................................

"In a matter of a few months, Vetrov went from being a bureaucrat of no significance to being a hero. At least this is the image he must have had of himself. He wanted to be admired, and he needed an audience. In the eyes of others, though, he was still the same man. This is why Vetrov was so eager to meet physically with his handler, who was the only person who understood the significance of his actions and the huge risks he was taking.

"This desire to play the hero in front of his only witness might have been what motivated Vetrov to drive into the yard of a missile manufacturing plant with a French intelligence officer as his passenger; this makes that episode plausible.

"Since he had started using the miniature camera, Vetrov met with Ferrant only once or twice a month, and at the DST’s request the rendezvous became even less frequent starting in early 1982. This was a problem, considering how much Vetrov needed to talk to someone when the tension in his life was becoming unbearable."

................................................................................................

" ... the overall impression given by Vladik is still one of a preppy kid from “a good family,” who knows he is loved dearly and who tries to be a good boy.

"The impression of dealing with a child was reinforced after an evening spent talking about his father. Vladik merely quoted facts, words, and remarks he remembered. Sergei Kostin did not sense any distance on Vladik’s part from what he was recounting. ... "

" ... Vladik was a student in a secondary school specializing in mathematics and physics. A good mathematician himself, Vetrov would get angry when his son came back home with grades that were good instead of excellent."

" ... Before his return from Canada, Vladik thought his dad was employed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Once he learned the truth, he started saying to his schoolmates that his father worked for the Ministry of Radio Industry. Close enough, considering that Vetrov’s field of expertise was in missiles, aerospace, telecommunication, and so forth. He would regularly show his son advertising brochures from major Western weapon manufacturers. He gave him folders with pictures of airplanes or tanks on the cover."

"The Vetrovs tried to have Vladik admitted to the Economics Department of Lomonosov University. Knowledge by itself was already no longer sufficient for acceptance to one of the most prestigious academic institutions in the country. Out of fifty openings, only two or three would go to whiz kids with no sponsors. The rest was up for grabs and had to be fought for through influential people, friends, and money. Having placed too much confidence in a friend of a friend who had a key position in the faculty, the Vetrovs lost the battle. They would later learn that the man hated the KGB.

"Vladik went to work as a lab assistant at the Moscow Institute of Fine Chemical Technology (MITKhT), curiously also named Lomonosov. ... passed the competitive entrance exam and became a student in this modest institute most Muscovites had never heard about."

................................................................................................

"One evening in November 1981, if Vladik’s memory served him correctly, his father came home dead drunk. He started telling him he was back from the French embassy where a small banquet had been organized in his honor. From what Vladik gathered, he had been awarded a French decoration. He is not completely sure; his dad could hardly stand. Vladik is certain, however, that he heard him say, “She is the only one who does not appreciate me; the French think the world of me.”

"“She” being Svetlana, clearly.

"The next day, Vladik asked him questions about the visit to the embassy. His father explained that “Paul” took him in the trunk of his car, going in and going out.

"The story is not believable, and it was never confirmed by any French source. The desire to flatter its mole’s ego, provided there was such a desire on the part of the DST, did not justify taking such a risk. Who else could have been invited to that banquet? It would have resulted in a dramatic increase of the number of individuals informed of the operation; the banquet story could only be pure invention. It was well deserved in Vetrov’s mind that a hero like himself would receive such conspicuous marks of appreciation. For lack of such gratitude, he invented it for his son’s benefit.

"Almost every evening Vladik accompanied his father to park their car on Promyshlenny Passage, a small street located behind the Borodino Battle Museum. ... The Vetrovs left their car in their parking spot and walked back home. This was the moment of the day when father and son could spend forty-five minutes together and discuss their problems. It was during one of those “parking trips,” around November 1981, that Vetrov shared his new plan with his son. He proposed fleeing to the West, just the two of them. His French friends would arrange their passage to the embassy by putting them in the trunk of a car. From there, everything would be easy.

"As fantastic as the story may seem technically, Raymond Nart confirmed that there was a plan along those lines. The DST deputy director was even keeping, “at their disposal,” two false French passports. Unfortunately, like most escape plans devised by the DST, this plan remained just an idea.

"From day to day, Vetrov embellished his plan with new details. They would live in Canada or in the United States; Vladik would go to college. They would not be in need of anything. “I have enough money to buy an island,” declared Vetrov.

"While being aware of the dreaming nature of his father, Vladik believed that the plan was very serious. Maybe he too wanted to believe in it. On the other hand, the young man was hesitant because he did not want to abandon his mother. He had said so to Vetrov. His father nonetheless kept discussing the plan.

"Vladik clarified that this was not an escape plan for when the moment would be right, in six months or a year; this was a plan for an imminent move. Did Vetrov understand that the game had become too dangerous to last much longer? Further, and Vladik is adamant on this point, Vetrov never planned to settle in France. This leads to two conclusions. It validates the assumption that cultural affinities with France were not part of Farewell’s decision to collaborate with the DST. Being in Moscow, he thought he was taking less of a risk with the DST. Once in the West, however, he would be safer, and certainly more pampered, as a Langley resident."

................................................................................................

"In early February 1982, Vetrov mentioned to his son that Ludmila had given him an ultimatum until February 23. His mistress, he said, stole secret documents from his jacket. Having understood he was collaborating with a foreign country, she supposedly was blackmailing him. In Vladik’s opinion, Ludmila did not care about his father anymore. She simply wanted to benefit from the situation to extort money from him. Vetrov was in a panic. If his mistress were to turn into a blackmailer, he would be at her mercy for the rest of his life."

"“We’ll have to be tough, Dad,” repeated Vladik.

"“Yes, fine, we will.”

"Vladik went to bed reassured.

"His dad, however, had his own plan."

................................................................................................

" ... The lights of a car streamed into the Lada where two lovers were drinking champagne in paper cups. The next car passing disclosed a man who, with his eyes wide open, was blindly stabbing a woman."

"Toward the end of the day, Svetlana felt very unwell. As if it were a thick black cloud, an overwhelming anxiety invaded her, making her heart heavy. She left the museum a little earlier than usual and walked home to get some fresh air.

"The doorbell rang at 7:15 p.m. ... "

"“You must have had a serious accident!” said Svetlana on her way to the bathroom to wash the blood off the coat.

"“I killed somebody, I told you,” answered Vladimir. Emotionless, he said, “Those are spatters. I’ll change and go get Vladik.”"

"Later he gave some more thought to his father’s last words. Beyond the words, Vladik realized that his father knew he would be arrested. Yet, Vetrov did not plan to flee to the French embassy nor to an emergency hideaway a mole is supposed to have. Believing Ludmila was dead, he must have thought that her body would soon be found, and the police would have no difficulty tracing her back to him. He thus knew he was done for and decided to go ahead and meet his fate gracefully."

................................................................................................

"They took him to the local police station. Police station #75 was halfway between the Borodino Museum and the Vetrovs’ apartment building, near the overhead bridge. Vetrov readily admitted to the double assault of Ludmila Ochikina and the passerby.

"When a KGB member ended up in the hands of the police, for drunkenness or any other reason, the police were supposed to immediately inform Lubyanka. The phone call was received by the PGU officer on duty. He immediately notified Vetrov’s superior. More than any other KGB division, intelligence services did not want to wash their dirty laundry in public. A flying squad was immediately dispatched to the police station #75, but the policemen were inflexible and refused to remit Vetrov to the KGB.

"It was not until three a.m. that a few detectives went to the Vetrovs’ apartment. Svetlana had not been able to sleep. ... "

" ... Vetrov found himself in Lefortovo, under the jurisdiction of the military prosecutor, but under KGB guard."

................................................................................................

" ... Vetrov’s PGU colleagues, and Ferrant later, did not have a clue either. Vladimir could have a row with somebody, but no one would have suspected he could even slap a woman. In fact, people around Vetrov could not have imagined such a move on his part."

"The magistrates left the apartment, taking many of Vetrov’s personal documents, such as his Communist Party card and all his decorations. Vladimir may not have been deemed worthy of the order of the Red Star or the Red Flag, but he had five medals. Even Svetlana was surprised at these."

"As it became increasingly clear that Svetlana was innocent, the magistrates changed their attitude toward her. Belomestnykh was now acting with understanding, even empathy. He proposed tea. “This is to have my fingerprints, right?” asked Svetlana jokingly. She had to provide a thousand details about Vetrov, the people he was seeing, their life together, and the most minute events of that fateful day. She understood that Vladimir was not hiding anything. The magistrates needed her testimony for cross-checking. Now, who was the passerby killed by Vetrov? He was described in the judicial inquiry file as a fifty-year-old man named Yu. (probably for Yuri) Krivich. He held a modest position as deputy chief of supplies at Mostransgaz.4 Krivich could have been there at the same time out of pure bad luck, and intervened out of a natural masculine reflex to come to Ludmila’s aid. The version that prevailed is different.

"It turned out the victim was a retired policeman. ... although not wearing a uniform, the auxiliary inspectors had the authority to stop passersby and drivers to check their papers. Moscow was—and still is—considered to be a “special-regime city,” where it is mandatory for everyone to carry an ID at all times. Furthermore, those auxiliaries could take offenders of public order to the nearest police station. In short, they could cause as much trouble for an ordinary citizen as a regular policeman in uniform with a gun.

"Krivich is no longer around to speak for himself. His portrait as drawn by the investigation presents striking similarities with the one Vetrov’s colleagues and close relations gave of Ludmila. The man, they say, had abused his position to earn extra money. At dusk, he would regularly go to the deserted parking area where couples stopped, having only a car as a place to be together. A car would show up, Krivich would wait fifteen minutes, and then approach the car and knock at the window."

................................................................................................

" ... Among all the people Sergei Kostin interviewed about Ludmila, no one had really known her. The opinion they had of her, however, was unanimous. ... All in all, no one else in this story has inspired so many negative remarks.

"Ochikina was a translator and interpreter trained in English and Spanish, and she worked in the same department as Vetrov. Her task was to translate various documents from Spanish into Russian. Even though the intended recipient—at the VPK, within the Party Central Committee or in a R&D institution—may have been fluent in English or in Spanish, original documents never left Yasenevo as collected. Once translated, the documents were made anonymous. The position thus required more than linguistic competence; the KGB translators were able to provide information allowing them to establish the origin, even the exact source of a document. Moreover, the translations were typed in two copies, one sent to the intended recipient, the other attached to the original and filed in the department archives. A translator could at any time access all of the classified documents; hence the extreme rigor with which the KGB selected its employees.1"

"According to Svetlana, while she was in the Military Prosecutor’s Office she noticed that generals would stop by to come look at the picture. No one could believe that Vetrov preferred Ludmila to his wife."

"At the time of her husband’s affair with Ludmila, the dominant trait Svetlana attributed to the woman she had never seen was greed. Svetlana was convinced, and still is, that Ludmila seduced her husband with only one goal in mind: to appropriate their assets—paintings, furniture, their country house. She believes that under the pretext of buying a puppy Ludmila attempted to set up a reconnaissance visit to their apartment. She blames her for hounding her husband all the way to his family home. According to Svetlana, Ludmila was constantly calling Vetrov."

" ... Vladik, to this day, detests the woman who, instead of dying, caused his father’s ruin. Vladik, like his mother, saw Ludmila for the first time in court. He too could not understand his father’s attraction for Ludmila."

" ... Vetrov told him that his life was in the hands of that woman, and from that moment there was no one Vladik loathed more than Ludmila."

Are the authors serious? Did they grow up in a monastery either strict orders of silence?

Whats half this book about, at that, having started as story of a spy but indulging in private details, instead of the secrets the spy unveiled, and exactlyhow West benefits thereby?

What's, for that matter, the much tomtommed ritual of confession in their faith, enforced via constant reminder of guilt and hell?

................................................................................................

"According to her colleagues, Ludmila was sleeping around. Aware of her success with men, she became more selective, with a preference for field officers who often traveled abroad and were able to give her expensive presents. But it was impossible to obtain a name that would have validated these allegations. Nobody could confirm the rumors going around the directorate. This would explain why Ochikina was not bothered when it was discovered that the crime of passion was hiding an espionage scandal. Those same field officers did not want it to be known that they had a mistress involved in a high treason case. It is believed that they decided to forget all about what Ludmila might have known regarding Vetrov’s collaboration with the DST, because she was viewed as capable of talking about her affairs with several Directorate T executives.

"The general opinion among those who knew Vetrov well at the KGB can be summarized by Yuri Motsak’s comments. Motsak was the chief of the counterintelligence French section, and he often had a drink with Vladimir: “Volodia was an alcoholic, but deep down, he was a good guy.”3 At the PGU, they were all wondering what on earth Ludmila could have said for a man as gentle as Vetrov to explode and try to kill her."

" ... Later, Ochikina was interrogated several times on the nature of her relationship with Vetrov. She could have been in double jeopardy if she had suspected something without reporting to her superiors. Being a KGB employee, not reporting was considered assistance to a criminal, an offense as per Soviet law. And even more serious a crime when it was proven that she also let Vetrov have certain documents. ... "

................................................................................................

"Kostin had vague hopes that they would talk over a drink on Arbat Street. He put his recorder in his bag, just in case.

"On the appointed day and at the agreed time, he met a slender woman, casually yet elegantly attired; Ludmila was wearing summer pants, a tunic, and a white cotton jacket. Without being a beauty, she was pleasant-looking. She did not look her sixty-one years. She still knew how to be attractive.

"She did not want to sit at a café, and it was clear that, after a few civilities, she was about to send the journalist packing. They sat on a bench across from the Kiev train station. They were driven off the bench by the rain…four hours later."

" ... Ludmila’s version contradicts all the others. That was to be expected. But, above all, what required a detailed commentary was that Ludmila’s testimony appeared more credible than the others on several critical points. ... "

................................................................................................

"There is no evidence to confirm her version of the events. Vetrov is no more, and official conclusions suited all the actors of this drama, on both sides. A logical and coherent account is not necessarily true either. Having gone through two series of tough questioning, Ochikina was well trained.

"Ludmila is a bright woman with a rigorous mind. She would have had no difficulty putting together a flawless story in which her actions would have been all innocent. She did not. She never skated over obvious points, and if she left a lot of questions unanswered, it was because she was, herself, still searching for answers. And because she did not want to lie. She thought lying was a disease. Besides, she couldn’t care less about whether others believed her or not. She saw for herself that human stupidity, meanness, and cowardice had no limits. She believed that she knew the truth. As for others, they were free to believe what made them happy; and this went for the persistent journalist as well. All she asked for was for her real name not to be used, because of her daughter who did not really know the ordeal Ludmila had gone through. This is why she is among the few individuals whose last name has been slightly altered, as was done in Marcel Chalet’s book.

"Lastly, and most importantly, we lean in Ludmila’s favor as far as credibility is concerned because she appeared to be the opposite of the persona described to us. After just a few minutes of conversation, one could understand why, at some point, Vetrov wanted to leave his pretty Svetlana for Ludmila. She has a very appealing personality. She is quick-witted, rigorous, and a tease. She is also very tactful and makes sure not to hurt feelings. Her sincerity and naïveté added to her attractiveness. In spite of all her suffering, she had managed to remain cheerful and lighthearted."

"She told her story without preparation, by spontaneous and painful strides. She paid a high price for her affair with Vetrov. She miraculously survived the murder attempt. For months, Ludmila struggled to recover. She stayed in the KGB hospital for three months. In the fall of 1982 she was declared severely handicapped. For two years, she tried to cope with the help of huge amounts of sedatives. She had nightmares every single night, but those were not necessarily the reenactment of that fatal evening. Then she gradually decreased her pill consumption; ten years later, her nightmares stopped. However, each year on February 22, her subconscious takes over with a vengeance. On that day, Ludmila still experiences an almost unbearable anxiety attack."

"Through her ordeal, Ludmila got great support from her husband. He wanted to accompany his wife to the meeting in order to have a man-to-man talk with that journalist and tell him to leave his wife in peace. Ludmila was quite embarrassed at having spent over four hours talking with the man she had promised she’d dispatch in no time."

" ... Chances are neither Ludmila nor the authors will still be around when the KGB is ready to open its archives. Since it is likely that the disclosed documents will be as biased and flawed as Vetrov’s investigation file, it is a good thing that tomorrow’s historians get both sides of the story."

................................................................................................

"The translators occupied three offices. The one Ludmila shared with two colleagues was two doors from Vetrov’s office.

"Contrary to what is widely believed, the KGB was pretty much like any other Soviet organization. Whether working hard or not, everyone was assured a salary—not a big one, but it was guaranteed. As it was customary to say in those days, “People pretend to work, the State pretends to pay them.” The first order of the day, when arriving at the office in the morning, was to plug in the kettle for tea. Then it was gossip time. There were also the orders for food parcels to take care of, composed of foodstuffs as scarce as butter, cheese, salami, canned food, and chocolate; in short, everything one could not find in regular stores. Coupons were distributed for spa vacations, and excursions were organized. An hour before the end of the work day, there was often a birthday to celebrate, somebody leaving on vacation or coming back, a university competition exam passed by the son or the daughter of a colleague. Those were occasions for parties where even the boss would stop by briefly and everyone had a drink. Work was done in the remaining time.

"Vetrov used to have tea with the translators. Not necessarily with Ludmila. He found women’s company more agreeable. He preferred their company over his colleague’s in the office across from his, a man with whom he often polished off a bottle of Armenian cognac. Every once in a while, Vladimir would bring cookies, chocolate, or a bottle of champagne to celebrate some event."

................................................................................................

" ... Vladimir went on the offensive. He took her to the cafeteria for lunch and waited for the moments when Ludmila was by herself in the office. He waited for her after work and invited her for a drive or for dinner in a restaurant. He told her that he had fallen in love with her the minute he saw her at the GKET in 1962, that it was torture to see her every day at work without being able to declare his love. He had been telling himself that they had both made a life for themselves, and he did not have the right to question the status quo. But, he said, he could not go on that way. He did not care about what could happen to him, and he was ready to leave everything behind. He could not imagine his life without Ludmila."

"Their affair started in June. Moscow was not a friendly town for lovers. It was difficult to find a quiet coffee shop where you could chat for a couple of hours. It was impossible to get a hotel room. Luckily, Vetrov had a car. After office hours, they would go swimming, walk in a park, or have dinner in a restaurant. Summer came and it was time to go on vacation; nothing had been decided, and each went his own way. Vetrov left for the countryside, and Ludmila traveled to the south to relax by the Black Sea.

"They met again in September. Separation had kindled their love. Vetrov even took Ludmila, her daughter, and a translator friend to Kresty. Incidentally, Ludmila does not believe for a minute that he could envision spending his retirement years in the countryside. Vladimir was a city dweller who appreciated comfort. She had a dozen opportunities to see it for herself during that weekend in the village with no electricity.

"Vetrov insisted even more on their living together. He’d had enough of those secret dates, having to hide like teenagers. They would rent an apartment where they would be happy together. Those humiliating situations and the necessary lying were even harder on Ludmila. But she wanted Vladimir to take the initiative—all the more so since he often told her that he detested Svetlana."

................................................................................................

"Vetrov was, however, in no hurry to leave Svetlana. This was disconcerting to Ludmila. If Vladimir was determined to live with her, he had to act accordingly. If he did not have the willpower to break away from his family, why was he urging her to leave her husband? She eventually realized that he probably wanted to keep both women, the one he was used to as the homemaker, and the one he was in love with.

"Ludmila did not appreciate his duplicity at all. The more she thought about it, the more often she observed this trait in Vetrov’s words and deeds. He was running down everyone he knew. He often made unpleasant comments about a person he had just left with a big smile, a hug, or a warm handshake."

"“No, you’ve got to leave your husband first. Can’t you see I’m crazy about you?”

"Then footsteps could be heard in the corridor. Vetrov would immediately stop caressing her, and in one jump would sit at the desk across from hers, and when someone came in, he was there, quietly sitting with his chin in his hand, chatting about this and that. This acrobatic behavior was offensive to Ludmila. She grew increasingly aware that Vladimir had no intention to break up with Svetlana. He simply wanted her to leave her husband so he could come see her when he felt like it."

"Another incident confirmed Ludmila’s suspicions. They had gone out for dinner. Back in the car, Ludmila realized that her wallet was gone. She was certain she did not leave it at the restaurant and did not lose it anywhere. She concluded that Vladimir, most likely, stole it from her. There was very little money in the wallet. However, it contained her passport and, more importantly, her KGB pass. Losing this document inevitably meant endless troubles for the holder. A few days later, the police gave her back her passport. The pass was never found. It was especially strange because, when a thief wanted to get rid of ID papers after taking the money, he would have thrown away both IDs together."

"After these strange events, she lost all desire to live with Vetrov or continue the relationship. She did not want to deal with two different men in one body. She did not know where she stood with him. All she wanted was to be left in peace. Vetrov was aware of the change, which made him even more pressing when alone with Ludmila in her office. She dreaded his appearances, and the word “vampire” came more and more often to her mind when she thought about Vladimir."

................................................................................................

" ... Ludmila categorically denies having had any knowledge of Vetrov’s spying activities. As explained previously, it would have been suicidal on his part to confide in another KGB member, even if it was his mistress, a civilian contract employee.

"Incidentally, as far as she is concerned, Ludmila condemns treason in no ambiguous terms. Whatever the regime, she finds it hard to understand how people can betray their country, unless it is out of strong ideals, which was not Vetrov’s case. When asked if she could in one word explain Vetrov’s actions, she said something often heard during the authors’ investigation: “It was his revenge.”"

"She was not the only one to witness a case of serious professional misconduct on Vetrov’s part. It happened in the fall. Vladimir was in their office and said in front of three or four translators that he was behind writing an analytical memo and was forced to take work home. He was joking about it: “See how some are killing themselves at work! They even have homework to do.”

................................................................................................

"The subject matter is worth a digression. Everybody knew that it was strictly prohibited to leave the office with KGB papers, almost every single document being stamped “secret,” “top secret,” or “especially important.” If needed, taking home foreign press releases, copies of articles published in scientific journals, and other “limited distribution” documents was tolerated.

"For a mole, however, it is essential to be able to smuggle out secret files. In those days, copy machines did not exist in Soviet offices. Since Vetrov shared his office, he could not freely photograph documents, and he had received the miniature camera only by the end of his “career” as a mole. A KGB archivist, Vasily Mitrokhin, had spent years copying documents by hand on extra thin paper, which he then hid rolled in his socks and kept in glass jars hidden in his dacha. He waited patiently for the right moment to safely pass them to the West; that moment happened to be the collapse of the Soviet Union. This was not Farewell’s style.

"He opted for smuggling secret documents out of the PGU headquarters. Knowing in depth the organization of internal security, he was doing it regularly in complete confidence, albeit with a good adrenaline rush. He knew no secret service could function without basic trust, especially trust in its officers. Short of it, employees would have been spending their time monitoring and denouncing one another, organizing audits and traps to test each other, and so forth.

"Furthermore, think of what a PGU checkpoint could be at rush hours, shortly before nine in the morning and just after six in the evening. In a twenty-minute time, thousands of officers and civilian employees walked by the checkpoint. Should every single person be searched, year round? Should they be asked to open their briefcases? There must have been documents in there, probably in a foreign language. Would a security NCO be able to evaluate their content? Or would he have to call an expert each time? Not only would such strict control have offended the personnel, but it was technically impossible. All the moles took advantage of this situation.

"Conversely, Vetrov’s performance in the translators’ office proved to be a good calculation: no one ever suspected anything. It was only after the spying crime was uncovered that the witnesses of the scene remembered it. It was then established that the memo was in fact the synthesis already mentioned, covering scientific and technical intelligence gathered in a Western country, and naming the thirty-eight agents and their respective intelligence production."

................................................................................................

"Indisputably, Vetrov had talked about it in front of several people on purpose. He suspected that one day he would be caught red-handed smuggling secret documents out of KGB facilities. He would then be able to admit to breaking the rules while claiming innocence. Had he needed those documents to communicate their content to a foreign power, he would not have told anyone about it. He would have added that it was not the first time he took documents to work on at home. Several people would be able to testify to it, and if no one had reported it to a superior, it meant all understood that someone might have to finish a task at home that could not be completed at the office due to lack of time. In this way, while exposing himself to some suspicion, he warded off much more serious scrutiny.

"Despite this engineered ploy, Ludmila never made any threats against Vetrov. She could not reasonably take her grievances to the Party committee or share her suspicions with internal counterintelligence because she did not suspect anything. Having no hold on him, she could not have given him an ultimatum for a set date either.

"The version of the facts presented in the investigation file, stating that Ludmila threatened to go to the Party committee to complain if Vetrov did not leave his wife by February 23, is worth examining separately. In Ludmila’s opinion, which we share, this assumption does not hold. Unless she was willing to be subjected to mudslinging while ending up where she started, there is no way Ludmila could have thought of complaining to the Party committee.

"In the Soviet system, the profession of interpreter was considered as auxiliary and belonged to the same category as typist, secretary, driver, restaurant waiter, or flight attendant. Given the status difference between a translator, by definition a woman of easy virtue and a civilian employee, and a KGB officer who had received recognition and decorations for his work, the verdict would not have been in Ludmila’s favor. In spite of his own apprehensions, Vetrov would have gotten off lightly. He would have been reprimanded symbolically. Moreover, to a larger extent than the military investigators, independent from the KGB, the Directorate T Party cell would have irrevocably sided with its officer. Ludmila would have been perceived as hunting married men, and condemned as such, as we saw earlier. This was, therefore, a pure invention on Vetrov’s part that the examining magistrates were quick to believe."

................................................................................................

"Ludmila was cheerful and had a sharp tongue; she enjoyed teasing people. She freely admits that she could have made an innocuous remark, the type she repeated a hundred times before, that was probably interpreted in a totally different light by Vetrov’s feverish mind. Maybe an innocent joke made him believe his mistress knew he was a French mole. Another sentence with no ulterior motive could be perceived as a threat, another harmless word as a blackmail attempt. Ludmila cannot recall anything in particular, precisely because she had no intention to threaten him. Had she said certain things on purpose, she would remember them.

"She considers it natural that Vetrov’s proclivity to daydreaming, coupled with the constant fear of discovery, could end in persecution mania. By constantly being on the lookout for an imprudent word on Ludmila’s part, studying each one under the microscope, and contemplating his apprehensions, he ended up being convinced that she knew, she might report on him, and she was about to do so.

"Incidentally, the hypothesis of Vetrov going through an attack of paranoia is corroborated by other reliable sources."

................................................................................................

"Among them Igor Prelin, who also believes the tension Vetrov was under at the time could have made him misinterpret a word from Ludmila, throwing him into a criminal panic.

"The other source is Jacques Prévost. The Thomson representative assured us that, “according to one of his sources,” Volodia was convinced Ludmila worked for the CIA, and Vetrov believed that the Americans were about to “finger” him to the KGB because the intelligence documents produced by the Farewell operation were so sensational they were becoming an embarrassment for top U.S. officials."

" ... Even though he did not admit to it, because of Nart’s instructions, it is quite possible that Prévost was the person Vetrov confided in about his wild imaginings."

" ... As an example, almost one month was supposed to go by between their last rendezvous on January 26 and the next one, planned for February 23. This is far from the two-month interval requested by Raymond Nart for the sake of security, but nonetheless long enough a period to exacerbate a state of nervous tension into a fit of paranoia."

" ... At the sight of such despair, Ferrant put his arm around Vetrov’s shoulders to comfort him, and Ferrant proposed to go sit in his car, but Vetrov refused. After a few moments, as he was about to leave, Ferrant told Vetrov the date of their next meeting, February 23."

Obviously that's where he got the date fixed in his mind, and in drunken state that he was, transferred it to Ludmila.

................................................................................................

"Yet, he had to give substance to the figment of his imagination. He thus made up a story about documents stolen from his jacket for Vladik’s consumption. He could not do the same in his PGU environment. After the fact, he would have told his colleagues a less convincing but more acceptable story, about Ludmila threatening to appeal to the Party authority. According to Ludmila, there was absolutely no provocation on her part when they were in the car. Vetrov thus bungled a premeditated and cold-blooded murder."

"Ludmila had barely put the cup to her lips, when she saw Vetrov make a sudden move. A split second later, she felt a violent blow to the temple. She found out later that it was the bottle of champagne—certainly not the ideal weapon in a car with a low ceiling. So Vetrov grabbed the pique. He hit Ludmila once more at the temple, and then in the mouth, cutting her lip and knocking out a tooth. Then he stabbed Ludmila over and over. For a few very long seconds, stronger than the pain, Ludmila felt sheer horror.5

"Every move she made after that was an automatic reflex. When Vetrov was distracted by the man knocking at the window, Ludmila’s hand found the door handle, and once outside, her legs carried her in the direction of the bus stop. When Vetrov’s car chased her, she did not change course. Then, when the truck appeared and Vetrov’s Lada roared past her, missing her by a meter, she collapsed.

"She had just enough time to give Vetrov’s name and his car plate number to the woman who found her. Then she lost consciousness. At the emergency ward where she was taken, doctors said that another ten minutes and she would not have survived."

................................................................................................

" ... PGU did not like for its members to stay in the hands of civilian authorities. As soon as Ludmila could be moved, a few weeks later, she was transferred to the KGB hospital. With twenty-something stab wounds and multiple internal injuries she was not given a bed in the surgery department, but in OB-GYN."

" ... Because of the painkillers, Ludmila was barely aware of what was going on around her. She could, nevertheless, remember later on that the woman in the other bed was insistently questioning her about a certain fur coat. It was only after the cross-examinations had started that Ludmila understood she had not been sharing the room with that woman by accident."

"Despite Ludmila’s vigorous denial and the absence of evidence, the “gift-taking” version was largely substantiated not only in the investigation documents, but also in the corridors at the PGU. Disinformation had always been the institution’s strong point. By firmly establishing Ludmila’s greed, they improved Vetrov’s image in the eyes of his colleagues. It came as a surprise to see how easily well-informed and rational men such as intelligence operatives accepted this version, which was a complete fabrication. Was it male solidarity? Rejected men, many of whom had courted Ludmila to no avail? It is plausible."

"Even Vitaly Karavashkin, French section head in KGB counterintelligence and trained as a lawyer, who studied the Vetrov case in depth, claims he would have been ready to be his defense lawyer. ... Apart from holding the rival service in contempt, Karavashkin was ready nonetheless to understand this good chap who was drinking because he was intelligent (a commonly accepted fact in Russia), a man who had a violent fit because he was weak, and who sold his service secrets because he was poorly treated. A very Russian approach, too."

................................................................................................

" ... Considering the repercussions the affair would have later, Rechensky remembers it very well. In fact, Vetrov did not tell the whole story on that first evening. They lived together about a month and a half, and three men in a ten-square-meter cell spend the time mostly talking. Asking questions is a normal thing to do in jail; it was even Vasily’s preferred occupation since he did not care much for reading. One needs to know when to stop, though, even when the questioned individual is trying to make you swallow a blatant lie. ... "

"The monotony of life in prison was broken by a new development in Vetrov’s story. One day, approximately three weeks after his arrival, he came back from a questioning haggard and down. Instead of sitting on his bed, he started pacing the cell.

"“Stop that, you’re making me dizzy,” said Vasily, exasperated.

"Vetrov sat on his bed and said out loud what he had kept turning over in his mind.

"“How could they know about the painting? It has nothing to do with it. It was a gift; I could just as well have bought it myself.”

"“It immediately triggered something in my mind,” recalls counterintelligence officer Rechensky. “Why a painting? What does that have to do with his sexual exploits?”

"So he asked Vetrov with a false naïveté, more out of a professional reflex than curiosity, “It’s your girlfriend who spoiled you rotten, giving you a painting?”

"Just the thought of it made Vetrov loosen up.

"“Not likely! It was a gift from the French. My wife and I, we appreciate antiques, paintings…”

"“It is at this very moment that I understood in a flash,” said Rechensky. “As it happens in the course of an investigation, it was a certitude. After that, gathering evidence was just a matter of time.” Rechensky had almost forgotten that he was a prisoner himself.

"“They claim you collaborated with the French?” he asked.

"“What collaboration? What are you talking about?”"

................................................................................................

" ... For his part, Rechensky was convinced—and still was at the time of the interview in 2007—that Vetrov had been recruited while in France."

" ... He started talking about his mistress, his murderous rage, as if the rest was only a hiccup or an inept suspicion from an overzealous investigator. That’s when Rechensky said to himself that Vetrov wanted to use his crime as a smoke screen to hide another affair which could, this time, cost him his life."

"“Come on,” said Rechensky with a smile. “My job abroad was precisely to keep watch over intelligence operatives; I’ve heard it all before. This was strictly prohibited. A bribe is a bribe, in any shape or form. An officer greedy for material goods is easy prey! By accepting an expensive gift, you become indebted to the giver, who can later blackmail you. Besides, the instructions were clear. If you worked for intelligence services, you could not accept a gift without informing the station chief. Whatever the nature of the gift, large or small, precious or junk, it had to go through a technical control performed at the residency. You never know, it could have been bristling with hidden bugging devices. Furthermore, a painting is not a pen nor a pipe or a cigarette case. It’s a bribe. Clearly, Vetrov accepted this painting without his superiors’ knowing; it tells a lot about the character.”

" ... Marchenko took his former colleague’s suspicion more seriously. And Rechensky swore there was something in the wind; it was not just a hunch, it was a certainty. Due to the difference of their respective situations, Marchenko could not speak frankly with Rechensky, so he listened more than he talked. Years later, however, after Rechensky served his time, they both talked about the case again ... "

" ... Rechensky hesitated; he was not sure he could talk about it. He nevertheless revealed two significant facts and omitted a third one. The first was a remark made by Marchenko himself, who later also got involved in Vetrov’s case. “He was a jerk; Ludmila was head and shoulders above him.” The other opinion expressed by Marchenko about Vetrov, and quoted by Rechensky, was not more flattering: “He was selfish and thought only about amassing wealth. I don’t understand how such a man could be taken into intelligence services.”

"What Rechensky did not say was easy to guess: the KGB was already suspecting Vetrov of treason."

................................................................................................

" ... sentence passed on November 3, 1982.3 Vetrov was convicted on all charges: premeditated murder with unusual cruelty, premeditated murder, and carrying of a knife, which was considered a crime in the Soviet Union. He was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. It was the maximum sentence; after that there was only the death penalty. For that matter, the death penalty was requested by Krivich’s widow and Ludmila Ochikina, lodging a joint appeal4 that was later rejected. When he was authorized to see his family, Vetrov was still in a state of shock from the sentence. This backs up the hypothesis of an arranged trial. Vetrov had followed the instructions given by the investigators, but they did not keep their promise to reduce his sentence."

"By law, the wife of a convict who got a long sentence had the right to regain her freedom. All she had to do was sign a petition for the divorce to be effective, without going to court."

"Since Vladimir had been convicted and sentenced for a crime of passion, there had been no talk about seizing their assets. However, Svetlana thought it prudent to ask for an official document confirming that their property could not be confiscated. She had expenses, though…

"First, she had to pay the fairly high price for the victim’s funeral. Then, she reimbursed Ludmila Ochikina for the clothes she was wearing on the day she was assaulted. There were the parcels to prepare for Vladimir, and the household to run. Svetlana had to sell some of her clothes and two paintings.

"When he learned about it, Vetrov had a fit. Before the trial he had given his fancy sweat suit to a common criminal, who was about to go for questioning, in exchange for a phone call to Svetlana from the office of the investigating magistrate to tell her not to pay a thing to anyone. He was the culprit, the message continued, and it was only for him to compensate the victims, even if it took decades to do so, considering the dismal pay inmates received for work in prison.

"The Military Prosecutor’s Office did not take the same view. Belomestnykh and his deputies insisted Svetlana pay the full living allowance the murderer had to pay to the victim’s underage child. Krivich, the man killed in the parking area, was survived by two children, but only one was a girl under eighteen. Vetrov was obliged to pay her a monthly allowance until her eighteenth birthday."

" ... By law, the criminal had to pay, not his family. Svetlana chose the middle way. She reimbursed expenses, but left Vetrov the responsibility to pay the living allowance."

................................................................................................

"Then, a period of great uncertainty and contained tension started for the Ferrants, who were anxious not to change their habits, to continue living as if nothing had happened, although every day brought new questions about Vetrov’s whereabouts. The couple adopted an attitude close to the one adopted by the DST; kept in the dark, with no means of action, they chose to stay put and wait patiently and calmly, and to stay on the lookout for any providential reappearance of Vetrov at the backup rendezvous."

" ... any message sent through the regular mail, ciphered or not, would have exposed them to a huge risk. The mail addressed to foreigners living in Moscow was systematically opened. Asked about it, Nart explained that in case of a problem cropping up, the signal was to send an anonymous postcard to a specified address, but with a “somber” illustration.2 In fact, considering the logistical shortcomings of the DST in Moscow, it is not difficult to understand that the low profile the service kept during that period was the result of those circumstances."

"The last thing Svetlana wanted was to be dragged into an espionage story. Even if she had been living in poverty and if an intervention by the French had showered her with money, she would not have transmitted the message4 to Prévost. Furthermore, in her opinion, this was totally unrealistic. Svetlana was even wondering whether what Vladik told her was true since in spite of the disappearance of their mole, the French did not make any contact."

"Ameil noticed another alarming sign. When Xavier came back to Moscow on September 2, 1982, after his summer vacation, he wanted to change clothes, but the pants were missing on the hanger of the suit he planned to wear. Xavier called his wife in Paris: “What did you do with my pants?” Claude had no idea. Inspecting the apartment more closely, Ameil realized that five hundred rubles left in a drawer were gone, and that a few objects had been moved. If it had been a break-in, the damage would have been much worse.

"Through friends from the French colony, Xavier knew that instead of making a fuss, it was the usual way to warn a foreigner considered persona non grata: “Leave! Clear out quick, we are tailing you.” In the past, KGB people just left traces of their presence in the apartment, moving objects or changing the combinations of locks. Recently, the rumor was that they had started stealing while “visiting” rooms. When she came back from vacation, the wife of a “diplomat” could not find a single pair of tights in her drawers; her entire stock was gone. Thus, after noticing that his pants and five hundred rubles had disappeared, Xavier concluded it was a warning."

................................................................................................

" Chalet was in the company of the CIA correspondent, a certain Wolf. The three men chatted for a few moments about this and that, and then Chalet turned to the American: “Alright, you may now say the name.”

"As we learned earlier, Chalet did not know Farewell’s real name. Before letting the correspondent reveal anything on a source, he wanted to make sure they were indeed talking about the DST mole.

"“Vladimir Vetrov,” answered the CIA agent.

"Nart nodded to confirm, looking distressed, aware that the secret of the most precious mole the French secret services ever had was now in the open. Then the American told them the details of what happened to Vetrov. Actually, a CIA mole had provided them with a KGB internal log where the tragedy involving two of their colleagues was briefly recorded, one of them being a lieutenant colonel. Informed by the DST of the mole’s disappearance, the CIA had no difficulty putting two and two together."

................................................................................................

"Unfortunately for Vetrov, Marcel Chalet would not be able to remain the guardian of those principles much longer since he was scheduled to retire the following November. The French counterintelligence chief’s leaving was quite untimely. He was forced, at a critical moment for the source, to abandon an affair that provided “the strongest emotions of his career.” All he could do was to urge his young successor, Yves Bonnet, to observe the utmost prudence. Yves Bonnet, formerly prefect in Mayotte, replaced Chalet in December 1982.

"Chalet’s retirement only accentuated the feeling of having lost this “French connection,” already perceptible in the field. Chronologically, it marked the transition of the Farewell dossier from its gathering phase to its exploitation phase. From this perspective, the affair was just starting, and in that sense, Farewell had already accomplished his “Great Work.”"

................................................................................................

" ... Even though the causes of the USSR’s collapse were complex and many, it is tempting to establish a link between the Farewell affair and Ronald Reagan’s election occurring at the same time. The new republican administration did not hesitate to use the information transmitted by Vetrov as a first choice weapon in their arsenal. They had the same objectives as Farewell, but contrary to the modest KGB officer who was then in jail, they had the means to reach those objectives."

" ... Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a German-born American political scientist of European culture, whose mind thrived on this geostrategic chess game with the Russians.

"Kissinger was sincere in his pursuit of détente. That strategy led to the relaxation of trade terms with the Soviet Union. It was assumed that good trade relations could only contribute to international stability and reduce the risks of military escalation. During this period, corresponding to the years of Vetrov’s posting in Paris, the KGB intensified its technological spying."

................................................................................................

"In 1980, this was still a crazy idea. A new global strategy, referred to by a few NSC members as the “take-down strategy,” was about to be put in place, with the goal of winning the Cold War by strangling the Soviet economy. This strategy was articulated in a secret document, NSDD 75 (National Security Decision Directive). It had many facets, but rested mainly on three pillars.5

Hence, Kuwait!

"Finally, Reagan became directly involved in restarting the arms race with the implementation of new, but classic, military programs, including the famous stealth bomber. Above all was the elaboration of the SDI project (the Strategic Defense Initiative; better known under the name of Star Wars). SDI was a formidable technological challenge for the Soviets, since their economy was resting mostly on the military-industrial complex, dependent on stealing Western technology through the KGB Line X. Since Vetrov’s revelations, the Line X network had no secrets anymore for the Reagan Administration.

................................................................................................

"Actually, even before the Farewell dossier, the American government knew about technological spying by the Soviets. With the easing of restrictions on East-West trade under Nixon and Ford, however, the boundary between theft and legal commerce became fuzzy, especially as the KGB could quite legally buy certain technologies that were sold freely during international trade shows. Against this backdrop, the CIA and the FBI preferred to work on purely political or military intelligence cases.

"President Carter was the first to become interested in scientific and technical espionage by the KGB. At his request, the CIA started writing reports such as the Presidential Review Memorandum 31, which treated the topic in fairly general terms. The first embargo measure on advanced U.S. technology was a retaliatory measure against the Soviet Army’s intervention in Afghanistan in 1979."

................................................................................................

"As one of the National Security Council advisers, Gus Weiss was specializing in economic affairs, but his areas of expertise were many. Fascinated by aeronautics since childhood, after graduating from Harvard, he had chosen to focus on the strategic implications of technological innovation. A brilliant mind and an extremely competent specialist, NASA awarded him the Exceptional Public Service Medal for his work. He even received the French Legion of Honor for his collaboration in a joint venture with General Electric and SNECMA, leading to the development of the CFM56 aircraft engines that would equip the first Airbus airplanes.6

"In the mid-sixties, Gus Weiss joined the Hudson Institute, where he met Richard Allen. He worked in collaboration with Professor Hermann Kahn, the thermonuclear war theoretician, also known to have inspired the Dr. Strangelove character in Stanley Kubrick’s movie. At the NSC, this even earned him the nickname of “Dr. Strangeweiss,” which could not bother this man known for his strong sense of humor and for practicing self-derision occasionally."

" ... he owed this reputation of being a bit of an eccentric to his extraordinary intellectual abilities and to his quasi-obsessive research work on neglected topics in industrial espionage.

"Richard Allen, who had become his friend, brought him on board as a NSC staffer in the early seventies, during the Nixon presidency. “He was a pure genius,” Allen says, “he perfectly mastered all subject matters.” Weiss was already very interested in technology spying by the Soviets. He even wrote a first memo on the topic, which later was the inspiration for the 1974 NSC Memorandum 247. This was one of the very first texts responding to technology theft and prohibiting sales of powerful computers to Eastern Bloc countries.7"

"By the end of 1981, when the Farewell dossier landed on his desk, Weiss was both shocked and triumphant, since this information validated all of his previous analyses. With such a treasure in his hands, Dr. “Strangeweiss” started seriously thinking about strategic responses that could be integrated in the global plan of choking the Soviet Union economically.

................................................................................................

Was Chernobyl, too, an achievement of this regime?

................................................................................................

"Everyone viewed Rechensky’s case as an unfortunate situation that could have happened to anybody. Vetrov’s case was different—above all, because of his shocking crime, but also because he was under serious suspicion.

"“Decent” people were usually not sent to camps for common criminals. The mobsters would have needed no time to take care of convicted policemen, magistrates, prosecutors, or KGB members. There were three prison camps (or “zones” as they were called) for those “accidental” criminals: in Perm, in Nizhny Tagil in the Urals, and in Irkutsk, Siberia. The further away Vetrov was from Moscow, the more difficult it would be for him to send or receive secret messages during visits with his family or through food parcels. So they chose Irkutsk.

"By transferring him to this Siberian camp, the KGB was by no means renouncing its intention of digging deeper into Vetrov’s suspected collaboration with a Western secret service. Quite the contrary. The Irkutsk KGB directorate asked its colleagues who were policing the penitentiary to closely study the prisoner. In short, this was now a task for informers."

" ... Svetlana knew Vladimir had truly loved her. She was ready to wait for him and fight for his early release. Vetrov left Moscow with this certitude in his heart. Despite his fifteen-year sentence, he had a chance, with exemplary behavior in the prison camp, to go back home after seven years."

................................................................................................

"Svetlana received the first letter from her husband in April 1983. In the letter, Vetrov told her about the journey to get to the camp, the most terrible ordeal he ever underwent in his entire life. After Lefortovo, considered a paradise by those who had the opportunity to compare it to the rest of the Soviet prison system, it was a descent into hell ... Svetlana even called Petrenko to repeat to him the kind words written about his facility. Ivan Mitrofanovich asked her to give him the letter; he was proud of his smooth running of Lefortovo.

"Irkutsk was five thousand kilometers from Moscow. As far as he was from home, and as horrified as he was in this new reality, Vetrov could still be considered a privileged prisoner. Prison camp #272/3 was indeed reserved for criminals with nothing in common with the underworld. Its residents were corrupt policemen, prosecutors, and magistrates or, on the contrary, people of integrity convicted on false accusations made by powerful enemies, and unit directors who implemented unusual management methods; there was even a deputy minister.

"Vetrov wrote often, at least once a week. Apparently, the camp rules were not that strict. He described the prisoners’ lives, his companions in misfortune, their stories and memories. He asked Svetlana to keep all his letters; after his release, he hoped, he would write a book about his jail experience.

"Penitentiary 272/3 inmates, or “zeki,” were kept busy felling and logging trees. It was hard work, even for men in good physical shape. Vladimir had been growing a beer belly, and drinking had significantly undermined his health. He was assigned to making crates for the transportation of fruit and vegetables. The camp management, as well as the other prisoners, knew he was a former KGB officer. Vetrov was able to make a good reputation for himself. He was put in charge of educational and cultural activities, and he was about to be appointed warehouseman, a promotion that may sound dubious for a KGB lieutenant colonel, but in the camp that was one of the most sought-after jobs."

................................................................................................

"Today, we spent the evening listening to music, like in a club. We listened to memories about Ruslanova.9 Why her? Turns out, she spent six long years in the Irkutsk region, transporting barrels of water on a telega. Can you imagine this beautiful woman, at the peak of her glory and success, living in the forest? Why do I write about her? I just listened to a song about a cattle car or a shack, with those words: “I am far away from you, getting back with you would be difficult, but death is only four steps away.”10 All this is so true. We live like in wartime, and death is right here, nearby! No sniveling. I am alive, I’ll live with you again, I’ll return and will stay at your side. I’ll endure it all, I promise! Even at death’s door, I won’t surrender. I want to take you in my arms, get down on my knees in front of you, kiss your lips, then expire deeply, and come what may. By then, maybe your life will have changed, or circumstances won’t make it possible to see you again. Anything can happen in life. I am not philosophizing, it’s just a fact."

................................................................................................

Authors indulge in analysis of the letters quoted in previous chapter, and of the writer thereof, Vetrov.

" ... Without naming Ludmila, toward whom he is still feeling a ferocious hatred, he mentions he is the one responsible for his actions and must pay the price: “I committed a crime, and this disgrace will be with me for the rest of my life.” In another letter he says, “I am here, nowhere to go to evade punishment and regrets.” Those thoughts assailing him resemble an ordinary feeling of regret. With Vetrov, though, nothing is ever ordinary, and the only regrets he expresses refer to the fact that he is behind bars, and not to the murder."

"It appears right away that Vetrov is no Raskolnikov. Nowhere in his letters or conversations with his family is there any indication that he regretted having taken someone’s life while trying to kill the woman he had loved. Guilt and regret are two concepts that seem totally absent from his thoughts. He has always viewed himself as a perfect man: “an honest man, straight, kind.” And an ultimate irony considering his situation is this excerpt from his service evaluation file: “ideologically constant.”"

"It is because he viewed himself as a martyr that he quotes so many wartime songs. Vetrov likens himself to fighters who flirt with death in trenches, or to Stalinist repression victims when he refers to the singer Ruslanova. From this perspective, the quote “We were idealistic, we were dedicated to the cause, […] we were absolutely honest, and ready to go to a lot of trouble for our homeland” acquires another nuance. He is more reminiscent of an old Bolshevik from the early beginnings who, starving and freezing in a Stalinist camp, would stick to his communist ideals no matter what."

................................................................................................

" ... Vetrov relentlessly bombards his wife with requests to find so-and-so, who might be able to get him out of the camp; the example of Yasnov is the most telling. He keeps building projects for after his release. This is why he is so insistent Svetlana sell nothing of their precious assets. If he can stick to the line of conduct he set for himself, he has a chance to be released on parole after serving seven years."

" ... A psychiatric examination performed during the investigation by the Serbsky Institute of Judicial Psychiatry had attested to Vetrov’s criminal responsibility. However, in the presence of an apparently normal individual, the procedure was often a mere formality, as in the cases of perfectly sane people who filled the KGB psychiatric wards on this institute’s recommendations.

"All things considered, in Vetrov’s case, there was no sign of psychopathology. At the most, there was irrationality, mood swings, and impulses—often unmotivated—being amplified by alcoholism."

"It would be too simplistic, however, to blame it all on the drinking. It appears that many shocking elements in Vetrov’s behavior can be explained by his duplicity. The ability to put oneself in someone else’s shoes or to pretend to be somebody you are not is part of every intelligence officer’s acquired knowledge. Vladimir must have experienced the strange feeling many actors experience, no longer knowing exactly who it is in them who is crying, who is laughing, even when in the presence of close friends. Is it their inner self, or a character they can chase away in an instant? Like them, Vetrov probably knew how to win his audience over, be it only one person, by getting into the part of the character he could have been or wanted to be, with this feigned sincerity that draws on the depth of his imagination where any transformation is possible. Incidentally, there are so many gifted amateurs who spend their lives pretending to be what they are not and whose true identity is nearly impossible to grasp."

................................................................................................

" ... Vetrov’s duplicity is increasingly more reminiscent of a dual personality syndrome. Was he ever aware of it? The fact remains that, for an observant outsider, the duality of his life during the last years was obvious. Double agent working for the KGB and the DST. Double life between Svetlana and Ludmila. Double standards in his actions: Vetrov was generous in public, but pathologically stingy in his private life; he spoke kindly of people in front of them, but unkindly behind their backs. Yet all this is perfectly in line with the psychological norm, including what is called symbolic behavior, aiming at projecting a good image of oneself.

"As a more general rule, the double thinking system inherent in a totalitarian society, described by authors such as Orwell or Zinoviev, creates an environment conducive to schizophrenic behaviors. What to say then about a man who was in a constant double life—

privately, professionally, and politically?"