71 Dash to Dhaka, by GD Bakshi.

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71 Dash to Dhaka 

by GD Bakshi. 

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This part of the history is not exactly beginning of personal memories, which already happened with the 1962 war, but of a greater awareness. 

In 1962, one recalls vividly, our primary school headmaster had students assembled on the side terrace on first floor, where he told us about the betrayal by a nation that spoke of brotherhood until that point. Neighbour's went off in the two military trucks that arrived in the square, in this quiet colony where small children were safe walking on roads throughout the suburbs. How many returned alive, or safe, one doesn't know. One came to know of brides from not exactly wealthy homes who took off their wedding jewelleries to donate it to help the then PM finance the soldiers. 

1971, awareness had been dawning since the storm that took several hundred thousands in East Bengal. When it came to war, there was blood donation drive on campuses. I recall objecting to a lesser quantity having been taken from females, and was informed by a neighbour who'd donated too, that if one gave too much and needed blood transfusion it was of less than useful to the military. 

So reading this, written by someone who was actively involved, is as close to the then action as it can get, and personal - after all, one gave blood, and do all those who fought in the war are blood relatives! They just don't know every one of us, but are equally aware of the nation behind them. 

Reading this by General Bakshi with his superb analysis and behind the curtain drama descriptions, a treat! - Especially so when he describes precision bombing of Dhaka HQ of General Niazi. 

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" ... The climactic scenes of jubilation in Dacca were so cathartic and so strongly reminiscent of the scenes of the liberation of Paris in World War II. It was a heady experience to see a nation win its freedom from fear and genocide."

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"Richard Nixon – before becoming the President had traveled extensively. He had been to Pakistan and been received right royally by the Pakistani Generals. He liked their bluff, straight-forward and genial military ways. He had taken a particular liking to Gen Yahya Khan. Nixon had acquired an equal dislike for the more complex Indians who were non-aligned. Nixon found non-alignment morally repugnant. He had taken a particularly strong dislike to the imperious Indian Prime Minister – Mrs. Indira Gandhi – who seemed to arouse all his latent insecurities. Yahya Khan was now helping the American establishment effect direct communication with the Mao Zedong Government in China."

Wonder why most people fail to notice the explicitly abusive misogyny that was not veiled in persona of Nixon, although it's common to most US, most culture of Abrahamic-II and, of course, Abrahamic-III. 

Also of course, they refrain from mentioning the obvious - there's the common cultural roots shared between Abrahamic-II and Abrahamic-III, which ironically include not only doctrinal condemnation of Hindus to hellfire, but a hatred of Abrahamic-I, the Jewish! The USA had moved the UN Security Council to announce a ceasefire and force India to pull its troops from East Pakistan. This had been vetoed by the Soviets a total of three times. In its desperation Pakistan had appealed to allies like Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia for arms and spares. The US Congress had passed a law prohibiting sale of arms to both India and Pakistan.

"Yet the Americans continued to supply Pakistan with critical spares on the sly. As against this, they stopped shipment of radars to India that were to cover the Himalayan borders and actually passed this information on to the Chinese in a desperate bid to encourage them to intervene. It did not work. Either the Chinese internal situation or dissensions in the PLA prevented China from acting. Or they felt they were being conned and prodded into being pushed into a war they were not ready for. Bangladesh, as a free nation was now almost a fait accompli and why should China support a lost cause and thus queer the pitch with the new nation state emerging in South Asia?

"Meanwhile, Jordan had received a request from Yahya Khan for transfer of 8-10 sophisticated Frontline F-104 Starfighters. This was American equipment and as such came under the Congressional ban. It was a violation of the US Law. Pakistan was still legally under a US Arms embargo then and this move was opposed by the State Department. Harold Saunders, Kissinger’s staffer at the White House also opposed this. Henry Kissinger now went up to President Nixon. 

"Despite his fears and apprehensions of running foul of US Law – Nixon gave the go ahead for this transfer but insisted that it be kept strictly confidential. This was done very covertly to avoid an uproar in the media and Congress and on 8 December the Presidential clearance was officially sent for this vital arms transfer despite the Congressional ban. Crucial points of the meeting of the US Attorney General with the President in the White House on this issue were intentionally bleeped out. Jordan ultimately dispatched 17 x F-104 Starfighters via Saudi Arabia. Turkey was also going to transfer some 22 such war planes to Pakistan.

"The USA also now began to give dire warnings to the USSR to restrain India or risk derailing relations. President Nixon had deliberately risked an India-China border war, a confrontation with the Soviet Union, a domestic firestorm and getting the US Administration dragged to the courts and cleaners. (And all because he liked that tinpot – Pakistani dictator so much.) What was equally evident was the malice and hatred he personally harboured for the Indians. It was indeed disconcerting. America was, after all ostensibly fighting a war in Vietnam to save democracy."

Nixon obviously didn't give two hoots fir either democracy or law, which is clearer in hindsight. 

Why, with that example and three other following Chiefs of the same stripe, was Trump abused quite so much by media? Media couldn't possibly have forgotten Nixon, Watergate, Reagan and Iran-contra affair, or a guy continuing reading in nursery after being informed his country was under attack! 

Did they? 

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"Both Nixon and Kissinger had a great penchant for swinging around troop deployments around the world (without really meaning to go to war) .These deployments were designed to scare the Soviets – give them the impression that Nixon- the madman could go to any lengths. So, the meeting now decided the following:- 

"• The US 7th Fleet to be moved into the Bay of Bengal for a coercive show of force. Its ostensible purpose would be to evacuate US and British citizens (these had already been evacuated by air mostly). 

"• Encourage China to intervene militarily and spark off a border war with India. Information of US Naval manoeuvres and transfer of US war planes via Jordan and Turkey to Pakistan was to be told to the Chinese. Also they would be told that the US was not supplying radars for the Himalayan border with China and if China did intervene in this conflict, the US would do nothing. 

"• The US President authorised Jordan and Turkey to send their Starfighters to Pakistan. The State Department would be told to shut up about the legalities of this decision."

"Based on these deliberations in the Situation Room, the mighty US 7th Fleet, which had already been warned earlier, was now ordered to move via the Malacca Straits and make a threatening move into the Bay of Bengal. This was a mighty Armada. At its core was the 90,000 tons giant American Air Craft Carrier – the USS Enterprise that had Phantom fighter- bombers on board. These could deliver nuclear weapons if required. It had the second aircraft carrier – the Commando Helicopter carrier – USS Tripoli. There were 6 Destroyers and one oiler ship. It was a massive armada. Tailing it under sea however, were a couple of Soviet nuclear submarines. The US columnist Anderson speculates that the tasks given to the 7th Fleet were:- 

"• To compel India to divert both ships and planes to shadow the Task Force 

"• To weaken India’s Blockade against Pakistan 

"• Possibly divert India’s sole aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, from its military mission 

"• To force India to keep planes on defensive alert – thus reducing their availability and operations against Pakistan’s ground troops who were taking hell of a beating from the air.

"India saw through this charade. It was evident that this Task Force was only designed to intimidate and coerce and not launch kinetic operations. However, it did create nervousness in some quarters in New Delhi initially. It was insane for the USA to fight a war now to save Pakistan. The East had almost fallen. Contacts were established with the Soviets who quietly assured India that their nuclear submarines were tailing this armada. Just so the message went home, once the Task Force was deployed in the Bay of Bengal, a Soviet nuclear submarine deliberately came to the surface in full view of the American fleet. It was apparent that no kinetic action was intended. However, under the terms of the Indo-Soviet treaty the Soviets were clearly signaling the Americans and were trying to deter them from any adventurism. The clear signal was that it could have unimaginable consequences.

"Meanwhile Gen Yahya Khan was desperately clutching at straws in Rawalpindi. Governor AM Malik’s signal asking for permission to negotiate a ceasefire had reached his table. Just then he got the news of the US armada. Overjoyed he brusquely rejected the Governor’s proposal and asked him to shelve it. 

"Reality sank in a day later. This was only a token show of force. Despite many secret meetings in New York between Henry Kissinger and other top US officials with the Chinese Ambassador to the UN- Huang Hua – the Chinese did not move. The Americans gushed that they had sent their mighty Task Force; had supplied Starfighters to Pakistan via Jordan and Turkey and should China intervene militarily, the USA would not interfere. The Chinese listened politely but they did not bite the bullet. ... "

" ... The American establishment’s sympathy and support for Pakistan was so evident, it was painful. It was support for a military cabal that had just carried out the worst genocide and ethnic cleansing in recent history."

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"The decade of the 1960s had been a tumultuous decade for South Asia. In 1962, the Chinese had shocked India with a sudden and massive attack across the Himalayas. This had shattered Pandit Nehru. His soft power oriented world view had collapsed suddenly like a deflated balloon. He had laid a somewhat misplaced and highly exaggerated emphasis on peace, neutrality and non-violence. Perhaps he was fighting the Ghost of Bose and his Indian National Army (INA), which had suddenly forced the British to leave in a hurry after they had just won the Second World War. Keen to gain political legitimacy, Nehru claimed that the British had left solely because of the soul force of Ahimsa (Non-violence). The British PM Lord Clement Atlee, who had signed the Independence of India Act – felt otherwise and had squarely blamed Bose and the INA for the precipitate British withdrawal."

General Bakshi is tempering facts and veiling reality, which is, it wasn't "feeling"! If "The British PM Lord Clement Atlee, who had signed the Independence of India Act – felt otherwise", it could only be because it was so; There was no reason for him to sign the independence of India and let go of a most prized colony, termed 'Jewel In The Crown', and be seen himself in the light of a lower, if it was in any way possible to keep India. 

Besides, not only Clement Atlee know the reality, but responded frankly to questions while on a visit to India subsequently, stating that congress and Gandhi were in no way responsible for British being forced to leave India in 1947; they were handled easily enough, was the gist of his response. 

What's more, General Bakshi has published a book to prove this fact, citing official documents of British government of the time. 

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"Nehru tried to lay the Ghost of Bose to rest by emphasising non-violence and soft power. He hated the Army and was keen to do away with it. When his British Army Chief of Staff Gen Sir Roy Bucher came to his office to present plans for the future of the Indian Army – he told him contemptuously, “General – we don’t need an army. We only need the Police.” It was only the realist Sardar Patel who saved the Indian Army from disbandment and used it to good effect to force the princely states to merge with India without a whimper. He thus made India a viable and governable entity. He sent in the Army to liberate Hyderabad and then to save Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). He was a great check on Nehru’s flights of liberal fancy. Unfortunately, he died very early.

"After Sardar Patel, Nehru’s antipathy to the armed forces found full play. In 1956, the military coup happened in Pakistan and Nehru turned paranoid about what his Army would do. He went out of his way to deny resources to the Armed Forces. He brought them down in the warrant of precedence and set the wily bureaucrats to tame them. Starved of resources they became neglected and embittered. BN Mullick, the boss of the Intelligence Bureau now stepped in to fill the breach. He usurped the Strategic Policy Planning space entirely and cut off the armed Forces from the political masters and decision making. Unfortunately, Mallik, a Police officer, had no experience of matters military. India became a pacifist state that strangely and thoroughly neglected its armed forces and marginalised them from all higher level decision making – quite unlike the British and American democracies which had very robust military traditions and where the military had a pride of place."

It needs to be said that it was also in flagrant deviation from traditions of India, right ip to times of Shivaji and subsequent Peshawas, where in fact a monarch (or an effective head of state, as Peshawas were, while descendents of Shivaji ruled nominally) was expected to - and most often did - personally lead armies in vital battles of state. 

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" ... The buildup continued and by October 1971, East Pakistan had four divisions plus (around 42 Infantry battalions). Some 40,000 West Punjab Rangers had been inducted to replace the East Pakistan Rifles (Border Security Force). The East Pakistan Rifles had a strength of some 20,000 men (Bengalis mixed with West Punjabis, but all commanded by Punjabi officers mostly). The Infantry Divisions were the 9th, 14th and 16th Infantry Divisions. Niazi had tried to give an impression of strength by raising two additional divisions (the 36th and 39th). However, in actual fact these were skeleton divisions with just over a brigade in each. 

"The fact to remember is that the Indian Army was entirely oriented to fighting battles against China and West Pakistan. East Pakistan was an entirely new front that had really not been catered for. There were two divisions sent to operate against the Naxals in West Bengal. However, these had come without their heavy weapons and could only be used for counter insurgency or defensive roles. India’s entire bridging equipment and armour was in the West."

And, presumably, also spread from North to Northeast, along the Himalayan border with Tibet, facing Chinese army?

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"The highly charismatic, flamboyant and competent Gen Sam Manekshaw was the Army Chief. Lt Gen JS Aurora – a sterling Sikh gentleman was the Eastern Army Commander. Sam had been the Eastern Army Commander before Gen Aurora and knew that Command inside out. He had brought in Maj Gen JFR Jacob as his Chief of Staff. Gen Jacob, an Armenian Jew, was a brilliant intellectual. He was mercurial and short tempered but brilliant and an unconventional thinker. Sam and he had been instructors at the Staff College and had a strange love-hate relationship. Sam was a great judge of people and trusted JFR Jacob implicitly. He had brought him to Eastern Command and the two men had a famous relationship. Sam often bypassed Gen Aurora, the Army Commander and interacted directly with the Chief of Staff – Gen Jacob. Quite incidentally, destiny has a strange way of putting the right man at the right job – at the right time. Jacob had been a student of a College in Dacca and knew East Pakistan like the palm of his hand. His intimate knowledge of the terrain was to stand the Indian Army in very good stead."

"In fact, the Chief of the Border Security Force (BSF) was then another flamboyant Parsi officer – DG Rusotmji. Apprehensive of a coup – sections of the civilian establishment had been trying to build up the BSF as a counterweight to the Army. Hence it had been permitted to raise its own artillery and air wings. Rustomji now promised the political brass that the BSF would now do what the Indian Army had failed to do. It would move in. It was braggadocio. But perhaps Rustomji actually believed he could do it. In fact, it is said that he met Gen Jacob in HQ Eastern Command to inform him that he was going in and that the Army should keep a contingent ready for the victory parade in Dacca. The BSF did make some forays and attempts on the border and suffered severe casualties in the bargain. Much chastised, they gave up these quixotic attempts to do the job of the Army. They were now told to focus on receiving the fleeing elements of the EBR and EPR Bengali personnel and help them organise themselves to take on the Pakistani army."

"Sam’s professional advice had been well thought through and sagacious. He knew his own Army very well. The Indian army was a huge leviathan. Like an elephant it needed time to get its act together. Once it gained momentum it was unstoppable. However, it was not capable of cold starts and sudden operations with zero warning. With such speed it tended to blank out. That was what the intelligence agencies had been suggesting, However, It is a cardinal maxim of war – “Prepare slowly – execute fast.” The counterpoint was – a professional Army should be prepared to take to the field at very short notice. It cannot ask for an eight months preparation period. That was the theory. Sam knew that in practice it wouldn’t work out that way. In fact, Sam had stated bluntly, “I don’t like fancy stuff. My formations are not the German Panzer divisions. They take their time to move.” It was a most realistic and accurate assessment of his own forces."

But German panzer divisions hadn't moved at a moment's notice, even in WWII! They had had years to prepare while their leader bluffed the international scenes with his tantrums and promises, all the while having fixed exactly when the military machine of Germany shall roll forth. The German military had known several months in advance about their marching into Poland, with ultimately to be attempted takeover of all of East Europe upto Urals! 

" ... In Sri Lanka in 1987, it had been a pure cold start. Rajiv Gandhi had hustled and pushed Gen K. Sundarji and forced him to rush into Sri Lanka unprepared and with zero warning. It had almost turned out to be a disaster. The troops landed in without maps and heavy equipment initially and had suffered uncalled for losses and reverses. The Indian Army however is a big Army. It increased force levels subsequently and ultimately turned the situation around in Sri Lanka. By then the Sinhalese and Tamils both wanted the Indian Army out and it was something of a fiasco as the IPKF came back with some 1100 casualties and all the gains that it had made were undone."

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"Sam’s refusal rankled for long with the civilian establishment. They could not refute his logic or arguments but they did not like the idea that the soldier could decide when the nation should to go to war. Post-independence, the civilian bureaucracy and intelligence had completely cut the Armed Forces out of higher decision making loop. Post the coup in Pakistan, it was more of a “let us show the army its place” attitude. India, therefore, was the only big democracy where the soldiers had no say in higher defence decision-making. ... "

This shows the completely copycat reactionary Lutyen's character of the said bureaucracy that had been trained under colonial masters and was used for most part to looking up to ex-colonial rulers, and saw pakis in role of inheritors of mughals - as indeed pakis claim, to this day, delusionally. 

" ... The Commander in Chief (C-in-C) in India was next only to the Viceroy in the colonial era.

"The civilian establishment was wrestling with the threat of an imagined coup by the Indian Army. ... "

Which, if they had roots in India not replaced by colonial slave mindset, they wouldn't have had such fears. Such a coup belongs to the islamic mindset that accepts heritage of a Khilji, a Babar and cousins et al, but not to the nation that reverse Ramayana and Mahabharata, and unanimously postpones an assembly session to watch a not too sophisticated serial on television because it's one of those beloved epics. 

" ... They were shaken by the coup in Pakistan and the Nehruvian response was to completely marginalise the armed forces. ... "

India paid dearly for the severed roots of the young boy who had been transplanted by his wealthy father in Harrow and Cambridge, and enthroned by Gandhi on congress, three times by ignoring the supposedly democratic party's general vote and unseating another, properly elected, president. 

" ... India paid a very heavy price for this in 1962. Thereafter the Defence Chiefs had to be brought back into the decision making loop. The intelligence agencies could set the stage for war but they were in no position to fight it. Lack of experience in this realm had led BN Mullick to overreach himself before the 1962 border war. The civilian leadership had learnt a bitter lesson. Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri placed implicit trust in the Armed Forces leadership and let them take the professional decisions. This paid off handsomely in the 1965 War. Based on the chief’s advice – Shastri gave the momentous decision to attack across the International Border (IB). Mrs. Gandhi was a very strong leader. RN Kao, the then Chief of R&AW was her most trusted confidante. However, she was realist enough to listen to her Chairman Chiefs of Staff and had the sagacity to heed his professional advice."

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"Gram Parishads 

"The Mukti Bahini now began to accelerate the formation of Gram Parishads – village insurgency cells – throughout the country. Though most of these did not take an active part in the insurgency operations, they provided excellent sanctuaries in the rural area from where the guerillas could operate. The fact is that the Bengali resistance movement was not so penetrated or ever so terrorised by Pakistan that it would lead to acts of betrayal or treachery. None have been recorded.

"By the end of April 1971 however, the initial operations of the Mukti Bahini had abated greatly. It was a mistake to seek pitched engagements with the better armed Pakistan military. It was quite an emotive and spontaneous revolt – an outburst of resentment. These conventional pitched engagements had cost them heavily. However, they were far more effective when they confined themselves to hit and run guerilla tactics and attacked the transport infrastructure and destroyed the roads and bridges.

"Many of these groups had crossed over to India to seek better arms and training. The Refugee Camps provided a huge pool of recruitable male manpower and they fully tapped this to enlarge their organisation. They established camps and recruited many Muslim and some Hindu youth – especially the better educated ones to recreate a fresh cadre to carry on the struggle. The recruitment and training periods were now shortened. Every six weeks some 2,000 new guerillas would join the Mukti Bahini ranks. The aim was now to flood the Pakistani rear with armed guerillas, who would harry them, draw them out and stretch them to the ulitimate – before the main Indian attacks started. The Pakistan Army in the East was tired out and a spent force by the time the Indian offensive commenced. A number of former East Bengal Regiment and East Pakistan Rifles units were now reorganised and infused with fresh manpower to serve along with the Indian Army units in regular combat operations. There was a large number of Bengali personnel from the Pakistan Air Force and Navy. All of them who were in the East joined the Mukti Bahini. Some of them undertook very bold riverine commando attacks using frogmen to target the Pakistani shipping in the riverine waterways. They also started estuarine operations to target coastal ships.

"In August 1971, Mukti Bahini frogmen operating in the Chalna and Chittagong harbours sank two British vessels – the 16,000 ton tanker Teviot Bank and the 10,000 ton freighter Chakdina using limpet mines. A number of other vessels were also sunk or damaged by the frogmen and on 12 October 1971, a Mukti Bahini gunboat attacked a British cargo boat – the 7,000 ton City of Albans out in the high seas. All these exorbitantly raised the freight rates and maintenance costs for Pakistan.

"Till July 1971 – the guerrilla raids were usually in groups of section and platoon strength (10-20) operating 5-10 miles within the Bangladesh borders. Beyond July-August 1971, these were stepped up to Company-sized raids that penetrated deep into enemy territory and fought pitched battles with the Pakistan Army units.

"At Belonia some 450 Pakistani troops were killed in a battle in which the Mukti Bahini lost 20 men. Eventually, Pakistan had to deploy a whole brigade to clear this area. 

"At Satkhira, Pakistan lost 300 soldiers in a pitched battle in which the guerrillas suffered 20 dead.

"Many other well-guarded targets were attacked. Over a 100 important rail and road bridges and nearly a thousand minor bridges and culverts were blown up.

"The Mukti Bahini thus played a stellar and highly significant role in the Liberation of their own country. Prior to the Indian offensive in December 1971, they served to spread out the Pakistani Army thinly all over the countryside. They tired them out with incessant pinprick attacks and destruction of rail/road bridges and ferries. Their most significant contribution came when the actual offensive commenced. They provided invaluable military and terrain intelligence and organised logistical support in terms of country boats and ferries to facilitate river crossings. They took part in the regular conventional operations and helped the para-drop and heli-landing operations."

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"The global outcry against the genocide in East Pakistan had earned Lt Gen Tikka Khan the sobriquet of ‘The Butcher of Bengal’. This rather dense and obtuse general had not batted an eyelid before ordering his men to slaughter unarmed civilians in their hundreds. 

"The global outcry had however made him a huge liability in Dacca. Hence on 4 April 1971, Lt Gen Tikka Khan was flown out and Lt Gen AAK Niazi moved in on promotion from GOC 4 Corps in Lahore to take charge of the Pakistani Eastern Command at Dacca. It is noteworthy that three Pakistani Generals (including the well known Lt Gen Bahadur Sher Khan) had refused to move to this appointment. Gen AAK Niazi was a flamboyant officer and a diehard optimist. He was also inordinately ambitious. He saw a lucrative opportunity in accepting this rather unpopular assignment into a professional backwater, which would soon propel him into the international limelight. What he had not bargained for was the shame and ignominy."

" ... He had a withering contempt for the Bengalis and was confident that he would get the better of them.

"Amir Abdullah Khan (AAK) Niazi was born in the Balo Khel village on the banks of the Indus river in Mianwali, Pakistan. On 18 March 1941 he was commissioned as an Emergency Commissioned Officer from the Officers’ Training School (OTS) in Bangalore (now called Bengaluru). He had joined the 4/7 Rajput Regiment and had been pitch-forked into the operations against the Japanese Army in Manipur in which he had exhibited great dash and courage. ... "

This amounts to his having fought against INA. 

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"“Our Intelligence inputs indicate that the Indian Army will attempt shallow penetrations inside East Pakistan, to seize border enclaves where the refugees can be resettled. We do not think they will attempt any deep thrusts to occupy the whole of East Pakistan. At best they will seize the border enclaves, resettle the refugees here and set up a Government of Bangladesh. They will declare this as victory and step back. We feel this is all that the Indians are capable of doing or will attempt."

"Gen Niazi had sneered contemptuously, 

"“Gentlemen – the Indians do not know Lt Gen Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi. I had stopped the tank attacks of their Armoured Division at Zafarwal in the Sialkot sector. I will not let them take an inch of our territory in East Pakistan. We have three divisions in situ already and I plan to raise two more ad hoc divisions. Push all our troops to the borders. I don’t want people hanging out in the rear.”

"“I’m not going to sit back and take it. The Forward Posture means hit back at the Mukti Bahini camps in Indian Territory. You have my permission, engage them with artillery, launch raids across the border. Don’t wait to be hit – Hit them across the border. ... "

"“Aur yeh haramkhor Bangali (and these traitor Bengalis),” he continued, “be ruthless with them. Use air support, tanks and artillery. Teach these cowards a bloody lesson. Slaughter them remorselessly. That is the only language they understand. Don’t let them mount our heads.”"

And yet, only Bengal had voted clearly for partition, unlike Northwestern provinces, and Sindh vote had been divided evenly, resolved by speaker's vote. It had been Calcutta Direct Action Day massacre, ordered by Jinnah and executed by Suhrawardy, that broke Gandhi’s resolve against the Partition, while the Noakhali massacre of over 150,000 Hindus executed during a session of month long Hindu festivals preceded the subsequent massacres in North West across the border. And yet, the then newly independent Pakistan had not allowed Suhrawardy, who had assumed he'd be the PM since he headed the majority province, to even travel to attend the celebrations in Karachi! 

"“Exterminate these Hindus – drive them all across the borders. Let the Indians take care of them,” he sneered. He was really warming up to his theme. He harangued his commanders about his Forward Posture, his ‘not an inch will be lost’ philosophy and his totally offensive and proactive methods for dealing with the Bengali revolt."

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"“Toh kaisa raha? How was it?” queried Niazi, quite obviously fishing for compliments. His psycophantic staff went out of their way to please him ... "

" ... What he did not know was that the comments of some of his Generals after the conference had dispersed were most unflattering. The plan to attack across the borders was sheer folly. It would provide India just the excuse it needed to retaliate massively."

" ... Communications with GHQ Rawalpindi were difficult and mostly confined to cipher signals. Little could be said on the phone for fear of interception. Gen Niazi was more or less left to his own devices. Over the next few months, he crystallised his Forward Posture and formed a series of redoubts close to the border. His mantra was minimal loss of territory. Units were to fight doggedly to the last man, last round and prevent any Indian incursions. In fact, they were ordered to be offensive and attack Mukti Bahini camps even across the border. ... "

"Strategically Niazi had two broad options:- 

"He could either plan to hold a forward defence and hope to delay the Indian offensive long enough for international intervention – especially from China and the USA to become effective. 

"Alternatively, he could hold the Dacca triangle formed by the Jamuna-Padma-Meghna rivers very strongly and fight delaying actions on the border.

"There was a remarkable historical parallel. This was the precise decision dilemma that Poland had encountered in the Second World War. Either they could hold the border strongly ab initio or defend the Warsaw triangle formed by three rivers. They adopted a forward posture which the German Panzer columns completely bypassed and headed for the Warsaw core. This had collapsed the Polish defences."

" ... Niazi studied the communications and logistics infrastructure of the Indian Army opposite him and concluded that the main threat would come from the West from the direction of Calcutta and the northwest. All road approaches are in this direction and conformed to the grain of the country along the flow of the major rivers. The Indian logistics infrastructure opposite the Western and North Western quadrant was the most developed for supporting a major offensive. This included not just the road network but the stocks of ammunition, petrol and supplies. Hence he put his strongest division (the 9th) in this sector."

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" ... Pakistan had some 42 infantry battalions deployed in some 28 major strong points covering the available road axes coming from India. Each of these infantry battalions was equipped with two Light Machine Guns (LMGs) per section (compared to the Indian Army’s just one per section). The artillery component of the Pakistani divisions was less than the standard norm for the Pakistani Army – yet it was still superior to that of the Indian Mountain Divisions and the Counter Insurgency (CI) tasked divisions of Indian Eastern Command. Besides, Pakistan had four to five squadrons of the light M-24 Chaffee tanks."

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"The worst was that Niazi had diverted a lot of American aid and money sent for the cyclone relief and refugee relief towards meeting the costs of these intensive fortification construction programs. The American money sent to alleviate the misery of the refugees was used by Pakistan instead to build massive fortresses and pill boxes and bunker complexes to delay for months any Indian advance into Bangladesh."

Did US know? 

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" ... It was the deadly combination of Panzer tanks and Stuka dive bombers that had enabled the restoration of mobility on the battlefields. In the Bangladesh War the Indian Army made a very decisive shift from an attrition-oriented form of war to a Manoeuvre orientation. Surprise and speed were now to be of the essence. Complete air supremacy – a total control of the skies above Bangladesh, was to enable the Indian Army to actualise the expanding torrent concept of attack."

" ... This concerted attempt at ensuring staff work and synergy was a prime benefit and spin off of the eight month pause gained by the decision to postpone operations from March-November 1971. This enabled systematic and sustained preparations and a methodical buildup and detailed staff work and coordination. The staffs of the three services were able to sit together and closely mesh in their plans and facilitate synergistic tri-service operations. From the Intelligence model-highly compartmentalised way of functioning and strategic planning only on the need to know principle – India’s higher management of war now shifted to a mode characterised by close coordination and synergy between the three services and various organs of the state. This could only come about due to sharing of information across organisational boundaries."

"Bridging Equipment: Bridging resources in East Pakistan were now built up from a scratch – from zero to a level where at any given point of time, the Army in the East could lay 10,000 feet of bridges. Frankly, it was the largest bridging effort in military history."

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" ... Surprisingly, well before the Information warfare concepts had really come into vogue with the First Gulf War, India had blazed a path in the domain of Information Warfare. R&AW was tasked with psychological operations to support the Bangladesh war. It did an excellent job. The Indian media surpassed itself by shaping the global, regional and local information environments. It was able to very effectively propagate the Indian narrative about this war. It was able to tell the whole world about Pakistan’s vicious crackdown and their terrible atrocities amounting to genocide and ethnic cleansing of the Hindus and slaughter of unarmed civilians. This shaped opinions and attitudes in the whole world and generated a great deal of sympathy for the suffering people of East Pakistan. The Pakistani Military Junta was exposed as a brutal cabal which cared very little for human rights. A very strong wave of support and sympathy was generated in the whole world. Mrs. Gandhi’s government was brilliant in launching and sustaining this information warfare offensive to shape opinions, attitudes and emotions – not just in the country but also regionally and globally. Even though President Richard Nixon’s administration was leaning so hard towards Pakistan, India was able to completely sway American public opinion, largely via the mediums of print and radio, as well as the antiquated Films Division documentaries. It was a massive media mobilisation effort and it yielded excellent dividends in shaping perceptions across the globe. The greatest tool was opening up our country and frontlines to the western media correspondents and providing them access. Apart from the political authorities’ excellent handling of the media – even the Army shed its cacoon of secrecy and made very effective use of the media. Both Generals – Sam Manekshaw and JFR Jacob proved excellent at handling the global and national media. Sam almost became a cult figure during the war and had perhaps the best media profile of any Army or Service Chief in the history of India."

................................................................................................

"Signals Intelligence 

"While husbanding resources for the Eastern Theatre of operations, Gen Jacob made a special bid for additional Wireless Signal Experimental Units which could eavesdrop on every single radio communication emanating from East Pakistan. Ultimately he managed to get seven such wireless interception units deployed to the Eastern theatre. He had them deployed all around the borders of East Pakistan so that they would get complete 360° coverage of the area virtually and cover each emitter in East Pakistan. This provided highly accurate and timely intelligence of enemy plans and operations, his order of battle (ORBAT), personalities, commanders and state of morale."

" ... Mukti Bahini was another major source of human and terrain intelligence that made a massive contribution to the outcome of operations."

"Gen Jacob writes that he had requested the Army HQ for its reserve division – the Sixth Mountain Division for the dash to Dacca from the North. This was refused by Gen Manekshaw, who was not sure how the situation would pan out in the western theatre or if the Chinese would intervene. He did not want to let go of his Army HQ reserve. So an ad hoc force was created under the command of Maj Gen Gill and designated as 101 communication zone."

................................................................................................

" ... The Indian armed forces would adopt a ‘holding’ posture in the west and along the Himalayan border. Only this would enable the sizeable husbanding of resources needed for a decisive campaign in the East. This force level had perforce to be milked from the Western and Himalayan theatres."

"Gen Jacob based his operational plan for this offensive in East Pakistan on the following key parameters:- 

"• The final objective was to be Dacca – the geopolitical and geo-strategic heart of East Pakistan. 

"• It was the national capital and the key command & control centre of the Pakistani Army in the East. It was a key communication hub and all radial communications in East Pakistan converged on to the capital city. It was a critical prestige objective and its fall would bring about the psychological collapse of the Pakistani military forces in the East as it was the key command and control hub. Besides the advance to Dacca from multiple directions would conform to the grain of the country. 

"• The essence of this plan therefore was to bypass the key Pakistani fortresses/strong points on the borders and make a dash to the capital Dacca. Towards this end, thrust-lines were to be selected to isolate and bypass Pakistani forces enroute to reach the final objective earliest. 

"• This would actualise the concept of the Expanding Torrent that simply bypasses and goes around opposition/impediments and relentlessly moves forward at great speed. It dashes forward – not along lines of ‘least resistance’ but ‘least expectation’. It uses surprise and speed to paralyse the opponent and collapse his will to fight (Liddle Hart called it dislocating the mind of the enemy commander).

"• Subsidiary objectives were to be selected with the aim of securing communication centres and the destruction of the enemy’s command & control (C2) capabilities. Fortified centres of resistance were to be bypassed and dealt with later. Gen Jacob had been the GOC of the 12 Infantry Division in the desert sector and had perfected the techniques of bypassing nodes and strong points then. He simply applied the tenets of desert warfare to a highly mobile campaign in riverine terrain.

"• Preliminary operations were aimed at drawing out the Paksitani forces to the borders, thus leaving key areas in the rear/interior lightly defended. Thus Gen Jacob’s design attacked the enemy’s plan of a Forward Posture and fully exploited the vulnerabilities it had generated by an all out campaign to seize Dacca and collapse the enemy forces in the East.

"• Most attrition-oriented armies have an obsessive concern for the security of the flanks of an advance. This vulnerability of the flanks is merely an optical illusion. A blitzkrieg secures the safety of its advancing columns simply by the speed and unpredictability of its path of advance. Jacob repeatedly stressed this to the field commanders with mixed results. Another innovation Gen Jacob introduced from his days in the desert was the concept that it was not essential to choose an axis of maintenance as the axis of advance. This made plans so predictable. He exhorted his formations to use subsidiary and unexpected routes of advance to reduce/contain enemy strong points. Once this was done, the route of maintenance could be opened subsequently. The enemy could clearly see the map and guarded all the metalled roads as these would open the axes of maintenance. To conform to the enemy expectancy set was dangerous, as it robbed the offensive plans of the basic element of surprise. It is doing the unexpected that psychologically shocks and benumbs the minds of the enemy commander. Rommell had used this tactic fairly often in the North African campaign."

BRILLIANT! 

................................................................................................

" ... August 1971 when the Army HQ Directive was issued. As we will see, there were some surprising changes – especially in the designation of Dacca as their key centre of gravity. However, Gen Jacob had not waited for Army HQ’s approval. He had right away set in motion the process of putting in place the massive logistical infrastructure to support the Eastern Command Plan. This was a momentous decision and a great personal initiative. Had Jacob waited for official approval, this buildup could have never been completed in time. It was a massive and Herculean effort to put in place the new infrastructure to support a war in the formidable riverine terrain of Bangladesh. ... "

"• In Tripura, a new road network was created to cater for dumps and jump off points for which, two task forces of the General Reserve of Engineer Forces (GREF) were utilised. For 23 Mountain Division operations, 43 km of new road had to be constructed.

"• Railway Augmentation: The capacity of the meter gauge railway line in Tripura was more than doubled to support 23 Mountain Division’s operations.

"• Signal Communications: Brand new signal communications infrastructure had to be created in Tripura to support IV Corps operations. This was done even before the Corps moved there. Communications for a divisional HQ were created at Tura in Meghalaya, as also in Cooch Behar. An airstrip was constructed at Teliamura. 

"• Shortages in transport were made up. A 100 truck chassis were available with the Army HQ. These were driven to vehicle depot at Panagarh and the old vehicle bodies were grafted on to them. These were ingenuous and innovative solutions. Large amounts of civil-hired transport (CHT) were pressed into service."

BRILLIANT!

................................................................................................

"Rationalisation of Equipment 

"There was a whole range of artillery gun calibres to include 75/24 mm, 76 mm, 3.7 inch howitzers; 120 mm Brandt and Tempella mortars. To ease problems of ammunition and spares supply, guns of a particular calibre were all grouped with one formation. Each division now had the same type of gun and this reduced the staff’s nightmare of supporting several different calibres of artillery at multiple locations." 

Seems obvious doesn't It! 

But there was not just bureaucracy - there was also corruption that stopped future improvements. Until Kargil. 

"That is why post the Kargil War - the Indian Army has decided to standardise its artillery around the 155 mm/52 calibre of medium guns. This would enable massing of effects and establishing fire supremacy in the area of operations. Unfortunately, this artillery rationalisation plan was derailed and delayed by 30 years by the Ghost of the Bofors scandal.

"The logistical nightmare experienced by HQ Eastern Command Staff in 1971 to support multifarious gun calibres, only highlights this need for rationalisation of our gun calibre around one standard calibre. Mediumisation of the Indian artillery is a major and dangerously delayed operational necessity today.

"Artillery was thinned down from the Himalayan borders facing China. A great calculated risk was taken to move down these guns. Later the Army HQ allotted a 5.5-inch and a 130 mm Medium gun regiment. Fortunately,the shortage of artillery was compensated for by the very liberal availability of Ground Attack aircrafts from the IAF. 

"There was a shortage of Air Observation Post aircrafts/helicopters. Six Pushpak aircrafts were hired from the local flying clubs."

................................................................................................

" ... The key staff involved were the Brigadier General Staff (BGS), Brigadier (later Lt Gen) Adi Sethna, Brigadier-in-Charge Administration (Brig Adm) Brig Chhaju Ram and the Chief Engineer Baba Bhide. 

"In all this while, Gen Sam Manekshaw put heavy pressure on the Army Commander Gen Aurora to closely monitor the Mukti Bahini operations and furnish him daily reports. This totally occupied Gen Aurora and fortunately left Gen Jacob totally free to focus on the conventional operations to come and put in place the meticulous staff work needed to actualise a multi-corps offensive operation in East Pakistan. Whether this was deliberately intended by Sam to give a freehand to his trusted Gen Jacob or happened by accident is difficult to say. However – as the Mukti Bahini had initially taken a beating, it had to be supported to stand up to the brutal operations of the Pakistan Army – and hence Sam’s emphasis on energising the Mukti Bahani operations and preventing this fledging force from being battered completely by the enemy. Sam’s basic intention will however always remain a matter of conjecture.

"The Mukti Bahini slowly gained tremendous strength. As stated, towards the commencement of conflict – it had grown to an impressive strength of a 100,000 men. Some 30,000 were trained and organised for regular conventional war, the rest for guerrilla operations to harass and tie down the Pakistani Army in the East. The refugee camps had no dearth of recruitable male populations(RMP)."

................................................................................................

"0700 hours, 12 August 1971: Fort Williams – HQ Eastern Command Calcutta

" Gen Manekshaw asked his DMO to give out the gist of the Army HQ Draft Operational Directive. By and large it conformed to the plans sent earlier by Gen Jacob. However, there was one glaring difference. There was no mention whatsoever of Dacca. 

"Gen KK Singh explained that as per the Army HQ assessment – the key centre of gravity in East Pakistan was not the capital city Dacca, but the key “entry ports” of Khulna and Chittagong. These were the logistical lifelines of the Pakistan Army in the East and their primary source of connectivity with West Pakistan. Hence these were the key centres of gravity whose fall could lead to a collapse of the Pakistani Eastern Command. Dacca, he felt was not critical or important."

"Gen KK Singh continued. The aim of the offensive was to capture maximum territory in East Pakistan with Khulna and Chittagong as the primary objectives. Dacca was left out entirely from the draft directive. This implied liberating large enough areas for setting up a Free Bangladesh Government – a partial and half-hearted objective stemming from the fear of failure to do more. If Dacca was put down as an objective – it would simply have to be captured. Army HQ was then not sure if this could be done Gen Jacob was left flabbergasted and speechless. He had noted that though the draft directive instructions had duly incorporated the sectors identified and largely the troop allocations, the essentials of basic strategy and objectives that he had spelt out had been left out altogether. They had been replaced by a somewhat ambiguous aim – “to capture maximum territory in East Pakistan.”"

"Gen Jacob stood his ground, 

"“The fall of Khulna and Chittagong in no way hastens or facilitates the fall of Dacca. Dacca, Sir, is the key-stone. It is the political capital and its fall will have a tremendous psychological impact. Besides, it is the key communications hub. All roads lead to Dacca and are along the grain of the country. It would be easy to progress operations towards this key city. It would be very difficult to progress operations southwards of it. The closer you go to the sea, the wider the river estuaries become. It would be impossible to bridge them. As you go southwards of Dacca, you are entering the tidal estuaries.” 

"“Jakes, ease of capture does not determine the criticality of the objective. East and West Pakistan are separated by a 1,000 miles of Indian territory. The Pakistani Army there has almost entirely to be supplied by the sea. Hence the criticality of the entry ports of Khulna and Chittagong,” said Gen KK Singh."

"“Gen KK Singh,” Gen Jacob’s voice had risen to a high pitch, “in the event of a war – what will our Navy and Air Force do? They will blockade East Pakistan and completely isolate the two wings. What then would be the strategic or tactical significance of Khulna and Chittagong? Sweet Fanny Adams,” he almost shouted. “Dacca is the HQ of the Pakistani Eastern Command. It is the key Command & Control node. Its fall alone will lead to a systemic collapse of the Pakistani Army in the east!”"

"Gen Jacob had been desperately pleading for the release of 6 Mountain Division – the Army HQ reserve, precisely for this task. Sam was deep down worried about the Chinese reaction. This division then was earmarked to go into Bhutan in case of a sudden Chinese attack. It was a tremendous risk and gamble and Sam was not sure if it would be prudent to release his AHQ reserve, even before the war had commenced. 

"Higher commanders jealously husband their reserves. It means their ability to influence events and outcomes in the face of the unexpected and unforeseen. Meteorological Department was forecasting that the snow would come late in December 1971. So did that leave a window of opportunity to China for a sudden intervention before the passes closed for the winter? Should that happen, what was his reserve to retrieve the situation?

"Already they had taken a huge risk by thinning out the troops from the Himalayan borders. He was worried deep down. Would the Chinese intervene? Such are the decision dilemmas of war and the ultimate responsibility was that of Sam Manekshaw. Gen Jacob, he felt was only seeing the Eastern Command perspective.

"Gen Jacob made one last attempt to retrieve the situation, 

"“Sir, Dacca is the key command & control node. It lies in a very defensible triangle of rivers. As we put pressure on the border – the Pakistani troops will fall back on Dacca. It will go stronger with each day. It will not fall by itself like some ripe plum. The fall of Khulna and Chittagong will do absolutely nothing to hasten its fall. Besides, even as a port, Khulna is unimportant. Where is its criticality?”"

"By 30 November 1971 however, the Army Commander Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora had reason to change his opinion about Dacca. Maj Gen KK Singh was promoted and moved out as the GOC I Corps – India’s Strike Corps in the west. Maj Gen (later Lt Gen) Inder Gill, a flamboyant, blunt and plain speaking paratrooper took over as the DMO; he was one of the few men in the Indian Army who could stand up to the formidable Sam. Gen Inder Gill was convinced about the correctness of Dacca as the key centre of gravity in East Pakistan. In him, Gen Jacob found a friend and a critical ally. Both men kept going hammer and tongs about Dacca till the bitter end. They had the courage of their convictions."

................................................................................................

"The Chinese rhetoric was highly critical of India and supportive of Pakistan. However, unlike in 1962 and 1965, this time no dire threats of military action/chastisement or teaching another bitter lesson were held out. From an analysis of the language in the Chinese news papers, the China experts concluded that Beijing would make highly critical noises but not intervene physically.

"Perhaps it was the turbulent situation caused by the Cultural Revolution in China, which would prevent China from taking any military action. Few knew then that in September 1971 Marshal Lin Biao had attempted a coup to assassinate Mao Zedong. He had failed and tried to flee to Russia. His plane was shot down over Mangolia. This episode had generated a lot of internal turbulence in China and possibly left it in no shape to undertake any military misadventure. The counterpoint was that whenever there was inner turmoil in China- she had turned aggressive on her borders to distract the attention of the masses. This had happened in 1962 after the Failure of the Great Leap Forward. So China was the key question agonising Indian decision makers all through the months leading up to the war in Bangladesh.

"However, on ground , there were no indications so far about any military buildup in Tibet or accretion in force levels. A number of Indian units and formations had been pulled out of the Himalayan front and diverted for the operations in Bangladesh. It was a very high risk decision and Sam could be forgiven for being apprehensive. What added to his apprehension were the inputs provided by the Soviets. The Soviets felt that the Chinese would intervene. The fact on the ground however, was that the Chinese had made no concrete military moves or forward movement of troops and stocks to indicate hostile intent. The terrain in Tibet was highly difficult and no sudden move forward of troops was feasible without extensive logistical preparations. None of these were visible on the ground in fall 1971. That is why India’s Eastern Command was emboldened to take the risks it did.

"In actual fact, snow had come late in 1971 and the Indian Higher Command had to exhibit nerves of steel in denuding the Himalayan Sector of substantial number of troops. The 4 and 33 Corps HQ Commanders and staff had moved down to the launch pads opposite Bangladesh – leaving their Chiefs of Staff with skeleton staffs behind to man the Himalayan front. A number of formations and artillery units had been thinned out to create force levels for the projected offensive in Bangladesh. It was a high profile risk.

"Sam was not the only one to be nervous. Apart from the Chinese, the American Administration’s response to the crisis was becoming a serious cause of concern in New Delhi. Richard Nixon had been highly supportive of the military dictator Yahya Khan. Despite a Congressional ban on sale of weapons to both India and Pakistan, these were being continued for Pakistan in a clandestine fashion. There was not a single word of condemnation about the genocide and no concern about the very heavy burden of refugees on India."

There was, however, personal abuse of uncouth level from Nixon who railled against the then PM of India, of an explicitly misogynistic nature. 

"Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her personal advisors were now also becoming concerned about the possibility of any Chinese or American intervention in this crisis. There was a palpable need to seek insurance against American intervention in this crisis. There was a highly prudent need to seek insurance against such a hostile stance being adopted by these two powers. It would be essential to deter such a hostile posture. The only way was to seek the support of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to counterveil these two hostile powers. This could only be assured by entering into a treaty relationship with the Soviet Union. That obviously had serious ramifications about India’s professed Non-Alignment policy and her autarky in decision making. However, realistic appraisal indicated that Non-Alignment was not an end in itself and could not override vital national security interests.

"Henry Kissinger had summoned LK Jha, the Indian Ambassador in Washington and warned that in the event of an India-Pakistan War breaking out and the Chinese supporting Pakistan, the United States of America (USA) would not come to the aid of India. On 6 July 1971, Kissinger visited Delhi enroute to Islamabad. There he was later to feign sickness and undertake a highly clandestine visit to China to meet the top Chinese leadership. Mercifully India did not know that then (it would have greatly added to the sense of unease in Delhi).

"Mrs. Gandhi now asked her Foreign Ministry to send feelers to the USSR. These feelers were sent through Mr. DP Dhar, the then Head of the Policy Planning Division in the Ministry of External Affairs. The Foreign Ministry was largely ignored and all Policy Planning was done by DP Dhar, TN Kaul (the Foreign Secretary), PN Haksar (PM’s Personal Advisor) and PN Dhar (Principal Secretary to PM). This powerful group was uncharitably referred to as the Kashmiri mafia. DP Dhar had been Ambassador to the USSR in 1969 and had then proposed a Friendship Treaty with the USSR. On Mrs. Gandhi’s prompting he revived the idea and broached it with the Soviets. 

"Their response was very quick and positive.

"In the first week of August 1971, this treaty was hastily concluded with the Soviets. Article IX of this treaty read, “In the event of either being subject to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultation in order to remove any threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.” This was a very major diplomatic breakthrough and acted as a massive deterrent to any chances of Chinese or American intervention in this conflict. 

"In fact, subsequently the Soviets had massed some 40 Divisions opposite Xinjiang and posed such a clear military threat that the Chinese wisely refrained from any hostile military moves against India. The Soviets offered to provide whatever military equipment India needed including the Backfire Tupolev bombers."

................................................................................................

" ... Gen Jacob was quite clear that the Chinese clearly had no intention of intervening militarily on the side of Pakistan. Perhaps they had concluded that Bangladesh was a lost cause already and were hedging their bets. In a very bold move Gen Jacob now decided to pull down three more brigades from the Chinese front. These were the 5 Mountain Brigade, 123 Mountain Brigade and 187 Mountain Brigade. These were to be allocated to 101 Communication Zone for the rapid dash to Dacca from the Northern sector of the Khasi-Garo Hills in Meghalaya. The stage was now being set for the attack on Dacca.

"Gen Jacob had informed the DMO Lt Gen Gill. He had quietly gone along with his assessment and plans and did not inform Gen Sam Manekshaw. Gen Gill was fully convinced about the need to attack and capture the capital city of Dacca. He was keen that the Para Brigade play a major role in the capture of the capital city and even set in motion contingency planning for the Para-drop at Tangail, which was to occur on D+7. Some preliminary work was commenced.

"Meanwhile Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora felt uneasy that Sam had not been kept in the loop. He sent him a signal to inform him of the move down of the three brigades from the Himalayan front. 

"Sam was apparently still tense about the threat of Chinese intervention and exploded.

"“I have nursed you better than a woman! Send them right back,” he ordered. Once again in an act of great courage and constructive disobedience, Gen Jacob spoke to the DMO Gen Inder Gill. He requested that the formations brought down for the dash to Dacca not be sent back as it would take far too much time to get them back again when needed. He pleaded that there were no indications of a Chinese military threat so far. Campaign season in the Himalayas lasts from September to November. This window was rapidly closing. He was certain they would be able to convince Sam that the risk of moving these formations was acceptable and worthwhile. Gen Jacob thus tenaciously clung to his vision of a dash to Dacca in the face of the very obvious reluctance of the Army Chief to discount the Chinese military threat.

"Between Gen Jacob and Gen Gill, they exhibited great tenacity of purpose. Both had put their careers and personal advancement on the line. They had intense courage of conviction and commitment to the cause of India’s ultimate victory. In the face of doubts and second thoughts, both these generals clung to their vision with an amazing tenacity of purpose and resolve. Those who have been in combat would be familiar with this syndrome. You are initially clearheaded and form a good plan of operations. As time proceeds however, the commanders tire and are overcome by self doubt and second thoughts. Sometimes in the face of these doubts – they hesitate and dilute their original plans. They have second thoughts and start taking the counsel of their fears. This had happened in the First World War. The Germans had an excellent Schliffen plan of attack on France that had been worked out very meticulously over the years. Just before the war the German Commanders hesitated and had second thoughts. They fatally diluted the original plans of attack and the war turned out to be a costly stalemate. Ultimately they lost

"India owes a great debt of gratitude to both these highly courageous and competent combat leaders, who did not waver in times of great ambiguity and stress – and trusted their gut instincts and took huge but calculated risks. War is the province of risk and ultimately the risks taken paid off in a spectacular fashion.

................................................................................................

"The initial and spontaneous revolt of the Mukti Bahini had been brutally crushed by the Pakistanis with heavy and indiscriminate usage of firepower. The Mukti Bahini made the cardinal error of engaging in pitched battles like a regular force. In the bargain they took heavy casualties from the enemy airpower and artillery. Most of them had to flee across the border for self-preservation of their forces. Those who remained, now switched to guerrilla warfare and sporadic attacks. Once on the Indian side however, the Mukti Bahini was rebuilt in the month of June-July 1971. In the refugee camps it had a huge reservoir of recruitable manpower. Angry young Bengali men were keen to take up arms to avenge the honour of their women and pay back the Pakistani Army for its atrocities. According to various reports, the strength of the Mukti Bahini steadily rose to 100,000 men in arms. The sage Indian counsel to them then, was to focus on guerrilla warfare and not engage in pitched battles with the Pakistan Army that had the advantage of recourse to airpower and firepower.

"Col MAG Osmani, the Commander of the Mukti Bahini however, was keen to raise regular units and formations of the East Bengal Regiment for participating in the conventional military campaign that was to follow. Perhaps, he was thinking more in terms of creating a nucleus around which the Army of a Free Bangladesh would be formed. Ultimately three out of five regular battalions were withdrawn from guerrilla operations to form them into a brigade. Later three more battalions and two more brigade HQs were raised. They carried out operations in Sylhet and were part of the force designated to capture Chittagong. Gen Jacob felt that the guerrilla mode of operations would have yielded greater dividends. Osmani however, was looking to the future. Ultimately some 30,000 Mukti Bahini troops fought in a conventional manner.

"Col MAG Osmani, the Commander of the Mukti Bahini however, was keen to raise regular units and formations of the East Bengal Regiment for participating in the conventional military campaign that was to follow. Perhaps, he was thinking more in terms of creating a nucleus around which the Army of a Free Bangladesh would be formed. Ultimately three out of five regular battalions were withdrawn from guerrilla operations to form them into a brigade. Later three more battalions and two more brigade HQs were raised. They carried out operations in Sylhet and were part of the force designated to capture Chittagong. Gen Jacob felt that the guerrilla mode of operations would have yielded greater dividends. Osmani however, was looking to the future. Ultimately some 30,000 Mukti Bahini troops fought in a conventional manner. From the months of September to October 1971, the Mukti Bahini began to push back. Initially raids and forays were launched to a shallow depth of some 10 km from the border. Some unoccupied stretches of territory were secured and declared as a liberated zone. A concerted attack was launched against the communication infrastructure – and a number of bridges and culverts were attacked. This harried and stretched out the Pakistani Army and forced them to stop all movement at night, except in big and organised convoys. The Mukti Bahini now gained tremendous experience and became bolder. From section and platoon-sized pinpricks they graduated to company sized operations in the depth areas.

"The Bengali personnel who had deserted from the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan Navy proved most useful and effective. Some 400 naval frogmen and commandos formed a highly effective group for attacking the port facilities in East Pakistan. The Mukti Bahini Naval wing now acquired a gunboat mounting a 40 mm Bofors gun. They captured and sank or damaged some 15 Pakistani ships, 11 coasters, 7 gunboats, 11 barges, 2 tankers and 19 river crafts. These were in fact, the most significant successes of the Mukti Bahini. Later during the war, Mukti Bahini gunboats even attacked the Khulna harbour. Unfortunately, the IAF sank them by mistake in a tragic instance of friendly fire. By end October 1971, Mukti Bahini guerrillas began to claim liberation of strips of territory both adjacent to the Indian border and in the rear in Mymensingh, Dinajpur, Rangpur, Rajshahi, Kushtia, Jessore, Khulna and Noakhali districts. In some of the liberated areas the Bangladesh Government-in exile sent administrators to reorganise the administration at village and Tahsil levels."

" ... Mukti Bahini was highly successful in guerrilla operations. It blew up 122 railway lines, 90 Electric stations and 231 bridges. Overall it claimed to have killed approximately 237 Pakistani Officers, 136 JCOs and 3559 ORs. For eight months it severely harassed and stretched out the Pakistani Army in the East and deprived it of sleep and rest. It induced combat fatigue and severe demoralisation. It set up the Pakistani Eastern command for defeat in detail. ... "

" ... Guerrillas provided invaluable intelligence on enemy forces and terrain and gave major logistics support to advancing formations of the Indian Army. They facilitated the Paradrop at Tangail, the heliborne operations across the Meghana and the Amphibious landing at Chittagong (Coxes Bazar). They marshalled 100s of local boats and crafts to help our forces cross the wide rivers of Bangladesh. Without their invaluable support this victory would not have been possible.

"In the East, Gen Niazi’s response amounted to arrogance and hubris. As the Military Governor of East Pakistan, he sought the GHQ’s permission to enter Indian territory in pursuit of Mukti Bahini guerrillas. Speaking at a gathering in Saidpur in the third week of October 1971, he declared, “the War would be fought on Indian territory.” He now began to order reprisals against India by shelling Indian territory and even launched local raids to set fire to Indian villages, kidnap village leaders and even carry out sabotage activities in terms of blowing up bridges and railway tracks. Large bands of Razakars were employed for this.

"India was therefore compelled to stage its Army forward to the East Pakistan border and respond to these pinpricks. The Indian artillery retaliated effectively and the stage was set for major escalation growing out of these incidents."

As a matter of fact, he merely succeeded in providing India the necessary diplomatic cover for a war - paki military attacking India in East was perfect reason enough for India to threaten pak in West! 

................................................................................................

"Kamalpur Incident: 

"The first such incident occurred in Kamalpur village in Tripura in end October 1971. This village is 8 km inside the Indian territory. The Pakistanis claimed it was a Mukti Bahini camp. Pakistani artillery shelled it indiscriminately and killed some 22 civilians. The Border Security Force (BSF) and a battalion of the East Bengal Regiment supported by the Indian Army, launched raids to silence these guns. In November 1971, the PAF increased its activity and began recce sorties across the border.

"Bogra Incident: 

"On 21 November 1971, Pakistani troops supported by tanks launched a major offensive against the “liberated” territory around Bogra on the western Calcutta front. Pakistani artillery shelled Indian positions and caused casualties. The Indian Army was forced to launch a major counter attack in which 13 Pakistani tanks were destroyed. The PAF jumped into the fray. The IAF now shot down three F-86 Sabre jet fighters with its diminutive Gnats. Two of the Pakistani pilots were captured as they parachuted into Indian territory. Alarmed by the scale of the Pakistani provocations, the Indian Government now gave permission to the Armed Forces to cross the border in self defence and counter attack to repel any such Pakistani aggression.

"The Hilli Incident: 

"The Hilli village spreads along both sides of the border. The Hilli bugle was strategically important because from here the Bangladesh border turns steeply northwards to the Siliguri Corridor. Meanwhile, Gen Yahya Khan had spoken on Pakistan Radio and vaguely hinted that within 10 days he would be off fighting a war. There were chances that Pakistan may contemplate a surprise foray into the vital Siliguri Corridor and communications bottleneck. Despite its overall inferiority in numbers, Pakistan was turning increasingly adventurous.

"In the last week of November 1971, Pakistani artillery heavily shelled Balurghat town (east of Hilli) and then launched a determined attack on Indian positions near Hilli with tanks and infantry. Gen Niazi was now putting into practice his threat of an offensive defence designed to minimise any loss of territory. The first attack was beaten off with heavy losses. The Pakistanis lost six tanks and suffered 80 killed. 

"A second assault was launched on 27 November 1971, in which another three Pakistani tanks were destroyed. The Indian forces too suffered fairly heavy casualties in these attacks. They now retaliated strongly and advanced 5 to 7 km into Bangladesh. The Pakistanis seemed determined to escalate the conflict to full scale war. Their radio made highly exaggerated and false claims of attacks by some 12 Indian divisions. The PAF now magnificently upped the ante by sending in its F-86 Sabre fighter bombers to attack the Agartala airfield. The ominous lurch towards full scale war had started."

................................................................................................

"India’s Final Efforts for Peace 

"Despite these grave provocations, Mrs. Indira Gandhi made a final last ditch effort to obtain peace somehow. She had made a whirlwind tour of all western capitals to impress upon them to rein in Pakistan, to make it accept the democratic verdict of the elections and persuade it to take back the 10 million refugees. It all proved futile.

"In the US, Senator Edward Kennedy had openly spoken against the Nixon administration. “The US,” he said, “was trying to purportedly prop up democracy in Vietnam while just 2000 miles from Saigon – it ignored the results of a free and fair election only to help a bunch of generals suppress an electoral mandate and in the process, subvert all principles for which we have sacrificed for so long.”

"Worried about a highly adverse media climate building up in favour of India, Henry Kissinger and Nixon got the US Congress to clear about US$ 100 million for relief in East Pakistan and a US$ 150 million for the refugees in India. Pakistan cynically purloined this relief aid to construct fortresses and pillboxes in East Pakistan. Nixon was highly irritated. He said, “American public opinion has been duped by India. There is a huge public relations campaign here … some of the nuts in our own party, soft heads, have jumped on, have completely bought the Indian line. And India has a very good propaganda line.”

"It was not a propaganda stance. India had stood for the principles of democracy and decency. It was the American and western positions that were so crassly hypocritical. Senator Kennedy and Congressional investigators found out that despite the Nixon Administration’s public stance of stopping arms shipments to both India and Pakistan, some US$ 2 million worth of arms shipments had been dispatched from Pentagon depots to Pakistan. The US Air Force had supplied some US$ 2.4 million worth of spares to the PAF till July 1971. The US Army and US Navy had also released spares to their Pakistani counterparts. “America’s heavy support of Islamabad,” said Senator Kennedy, “is nothing short of complicity in the human and political tragedy of East Bengal.”

"In fact in October 1971, Henry Kissinger made his second trip to Beijing. The city was in the grip of the worst leadership crisis in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). China was under Martial Law with armed troops in the streets and banners at the airport “denouncing” running dog capitalists. Marshal Lin Biao had tried to stage a coup against Mao Zedong. It had been a close shave and possibly explains why China could not intervene. Kissinger told his Chinese hosts that America had a free press and opposition which were not letting them act against India. Communist China he felt, had no such impediments and he exhorted them to act against India.

"Meanwhile a “Crush India” hysteria was being built up in Pakistan and the CIA warned that Pakistan might launch a preemptive attack against India in a few weeks. America was worried not about whether war would break out, but how and when.

"Mrs. Indira Gandhi had visited the Soviet Union in late September 1971. On 24 October 1971, she undertook a three weeks tour of the western capitals. As stated, she went to Great Britain, France, West Germany and finally came to Washington on 4 and 5 November 1971. She told the world it was genocide but few listened. Mrs. Gandhi was expecting a frosty summit in Washington. It was a disaster. Both Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi were anti-pathic to each other. There was tension and mutual loathing and Nixon had his trademark scowl.

"At the summit meeting (with only Kissinger and Haksar in attendance) there was virtually a shouting match. Nixon thought she was a war monger. Mrs. Gandhi told him he was helping genocide. Nixon warned that if India launched a war it would be unacceptable. He hinted at a possible Chinese intervention and said the war might not be confined only to India and Pakistan. Nixon ended with a steely warning that the disintegration of Pakistan would do no good for anyone. He would not countenance initiation of hostilities by India. It could have incalculable repercussions. He hinted not just at the reaction of the USA but also of China.

"Nixon and Kissinger were shaken by the showdown. Mrs. Gandhi had been forthright in her views. The next day when they met in Nixon’s office, Kissinger called her a bitch and the President called Indians bastards and said they were starting a war there. Kissinger praised his boss and said he had warned her from trying to break up or mess with West Pakistan.

"In the true Indian tradition of the Mahabharata – which underlines that war must be a last resort option, Mrs Gandhi had done her utmost to give peace a chance. For a war to be just (Nyay Yuddh or Dharma Yuddh – just and ethical), it has to be a last resort option. It had to be ethical in its aims and conduct. All attempts to make peace must be exhausted before we make the final resort to war. ... "

"Mrs. Gandhi had gone round all the major world capitals in a last minute bid to avert war. She could now sit back and rely on the inordinately high levels of subjectivity in the Pakistani military establishment. The Pakistanis had an inherent narrative of martial superiority over the Indians – that one Pakistani is equal to 10 Indians syndrome. It led them to treat India’s massive military superiority with contempt. They saw themselves as the Spartans or Israelis of the East. In a strange way they identified themselves with conquerors from the Middle East, Central Asia and Afghanistan. Their military narrative of superiority was so deeply ingrained that it made any rational military analysis impossible. Besides, Yahya Khan felt that he could bank on unprecedented levels of support from the US and Chinese military. After all he had just mid-wifed their new found alliance by his great support for setting up a secret channel of communication with Beijing and finally arranging Kissinger’s trip to China. Yahya Khan could be forgiven for being on cloud nine. Gen Niazi however, was showing signs of total hubris with his provocations across the East Pakistan border."

................................................................................................

"25th November 1971 

"It was a bright, clear winter morning. The Siliguri Railway Station was simply swarming with troops. They were all wearing steel helmets and gleaming bayonets were fixed on their rifles. There was an air of urgency. A whole lot of my batch mates were on that train to Siliguri. We embraced and hugged each other.

" ... They handed us our steel helmets and Sten machine carbines with bayonets duly fixed. We went different ways to our units. 2/Lt (later Brig) DK Mohan, myself and 2/Lt Rane went off to Sikkim to the Chinese front. Most of the others drove down straight to the Bangladesh border. ... "

................................................................................................

"Young 2/Lt MPS Choudhary of our batch was a great sportsman and athlete. He had been a Junior Under Officer (JUO). Towards the end of his training he was elevated to Battalion Cadet Adjutant (BCA) and then became Academy Cadet Adjutant (ACA). Naturally, he was on cloud nine. He was tall and fair and perhaps one of the handsomest boys of the39th course. He wanted to join the Armoured Corps or the Guards. He was allocated the Bihar Regiment (a Sterling Infantry Regiment). For some reason however, he was deeply disappointed because he did not get his first choice. He reached the unit. All new youngsters joining a unit are ribbed and ragged, “You were an ACA, is it? Let’s see what you are made of,” 

"The Adjutant sent him on a recce patrol into Bangladesh with two boys. They were dressed in lungis as the Mukti Bahini to avoid alerting the enemy. His patrol was ambushed. There was a firefight in which all three were wounded and captured by the Baloch Regiment of the Pakistan Army. 

"These wounded boys were horribly tortured by the Pakistanis. Their bodies were battered and bruised with rifle butts and burnt with cigarette stubs. Their eyes were gouged out with bayonets. MPS was such a handsome young man. Not after the Pakistanis had finished with him. One of his eyes was hanging on his cheek, dangling on the edge of his optic nerve. A Pakistani soldier saw it and smashed it with his Rifle butt. The fluid spread over his face.

"The next day the Pakistani Army – the ghouls of the Baluch Regiment – proudly displayed the battered dead bodies to an American correspondent of The Times magazine. He dutifully photographed the corpses and they figured on the cover of the magazine that week. MPS had lost his father in his childhood. He only had his mother and a sister. His mother was teaching in a school in Dehradun and had toiled hard to send her son to the NDA and IMA. He was the focus of all her dreams – a beautiful bride to match her handsome son. 

"Now it was all over. 

"“How did he die?” She asked the unit boy who brought his belongings back home as per the drill. 

"“Very bravely Madam,” the soldier stammered. “But where is his body?” 

"The soldier turned pale. 

"“We couldn’t recover it,” he mumbled.

"A few days later MPS Choudhary’s mother was in the school library. The Times magazine issue had come. She saw the Indian corpses displayed on its cover. Suddenly beyond the torture and disfigurement, she recognised the battered face of her son. She got up and began to scream. People rushed to her as she fainted. She went into depression. She could not continue anymore with her teaching profession. All her life and dreams had revolved around her handsome son, who would pull them out of the tough days they had seen after his father’s demise. Some years later a course mate married the sister of 2/Lt MPS Choudhary and the family saw better days. 

"In the end we soldiers are left alone to stand by our own."

................................................................................................

"2/Lt Arun Khetarpal had joined the Poona Horse – a legendary Regiment whose Commandant, Lt Col Tarapore had earned a Param Vir Chakra (PVC) in the 1965 War and the unit earned the title of Fakhr-e-Hind (The Pride of India) from the Pakistanis. ... "

"The unit went into battle in the Shakargarh salient in Sialkot sector. The Infantry had formed a bridgehead across the Basantar River. A hundred enemy tanks were being lined up to counter attack the salient. The Brigade Commander requested tank support urgently. The minefield had still not been cleared. 

"Col Hanut Singh decided to simply bash through the minefield with his tanks. By first light the Regiment HQ and a squadron were inside the bridgehead. Arun Khetarpal and his troop reached the flank. The heaviest enemy attack by a brigade of Pakistani Patton tanks came here. The other two tanks of the troop were hit and disabled. Only 2/Lt Arun Khetarpal’s tank was left now. He fired again and again and destroyed three enemy Pattons. His own tank was hit and caught fire. It had some 30 rounds still inside. 

"“Abandon tank,” he was ordered. 

"“I will not,” he said grimly as the blood streamed into his eyes, “My gun is still firing.” 

"He wiped the blood with the back of his hand and engaged the next tank and blew it up. Then he turned on to the fifth tank and sent it in flames. The last enemy tank was now just 50 metres from his. They both fired, unluckily Arun missed. The shell exploded on the turret and Arun fell down on the spot. His driver took his bleeding body out and tried to revive him with a hot cup of tea. He had been moaning softly in pain. When the tank driver came back with the tea, Arun was gone."

................................................................................................

"2/Lt Arun Khetarpal was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra. He was all of 21 years and was the youngest PVC of our Army. That smiling visage has become the iconic face of the Indian Army in the 1971 War. 

"38th Course set a record benchmark of sorts. This one batch earned one PVC (Arun Khetarpal – posthumous) and one Ashok Chakra (again posthumous). This was Col NJC Nair AC, KC. He is one of the most highly decorated soldiers of the Indian Army."

................................................................................................

" ... Capt PK Ghosh VrC of the 2 PARA – the unit that had carried out the Paradrop at Tangail. It is very poignant story but absolutely unknown to the rest of the world outside that closely knit fraternity of paratroopers – the boys with the floppy Maroon Berets. Ghosh was the second member of Band of Borthers. Somewhere in the third week of November 1971 Capt Ghosh was called by the Commanding Officer of 2 PARA – Col (later to be Maj Gen) Kulwant Singh Pannu MVC, 

"“Ghosh, I have a rather daunting assignment for you son. Are you up to it? It would be a very dangerous and hazardous mission.” 

"“What is it Sir?” asked Ghosh.

"“As you are aware – around D plus 7 our unit will be paradropped at Tangail to cut off the enemy forces’ retreat towards Dacca. The Tiger Siddiqui group is operating in that area. It is their largest group. You would be required to infiltrate inside East Pakistan with two boys. Radio communications equipment will be sent with you. You will have to proceed about a 100 km deep in East Pakistan in plain clothes. You will establish contact with the Tiger Siddiqui group and be our liaison with him. This group will secure the Drop Zone on the day of the paradrop. Once you inform us – the Fly-in will commence. It is a very hazardous but vital task. You have the requisite language skills and the ethnic identity to be able to pull it off. Can you do this for 2 PARA?” asked Gen Pannu.

"“Sir, I will not let 2 PARA down. Consider me a volunteer for this assignment,” replied Capt Ghosh."

"Border Out Post Meghalaya on India – Bangladesh Border, 25 November 1971 – 0130 hrs

"Bong – (Capt. Gosh), the second hero of our Band of Brothers was at the BSF outpost in Meghalaya. Accompanying him were two Paratroopers from his unit – one a Sniper and the other a code and signals specialist with an HF radio set. Rahim a guide from the Mukti Bahini was with them and all were dressed in Lungis and Kurtas. ... "

" ... They marched the whole night and before dawn got into a safe house just outside a small village hamlet. Thus they moved by night for three days. On the fourth day they had reached a village on the outskirts of Tangail. Tiered and spent they caught up on the their lost sleep. In the Afternoon the Mukti Bahini guide came and woke up Capt Gosh."

He met Tahira, before he could see her father, if she approved. 

"Just then one of her Mukti Jodha’s rushed up and said to Tahira. 

"“That SSG Captain Anwar and his Team are headed this way. We must get the hell out of here.”"

"“Just one Second.” Bong said, “Shekhawat, please scan the SSG, Frequencies locally.” 

"“Yes Sir”. Shekhawat did so. “Listen Sir”. they intercepted the SSG frequency." 

"“Anwar to Khalid. That bitch is in the village. I’m coming from the south. She will try and get out Northward to Barisal. Ambush her there. Get that slut alive. Let a whole company gang rape her publically. She has a lot to answer for.” 

"“Khalid to Anwar, the first turn will be mine. Then the company can take turns. Death by rape it will be.”

Bong planned an ambush and explained it to her. 

" ... Tahira nodded grimly. She set off with her men on the main track. Prashanta moved in the opposite direction – then wheeled to the night and sped off on a long circuitous route to get behind the Pakistani ambush. They reached short of the Barisal village, left their truck and moved forward tactically. They took position as they saw a Pakistani truck ahead. His sniper put on his silencer and neatly shot the driver who was lounging next to the truck. They moved ahead crawling on their bellies.

"They could see the Pakistani soldiers in position on a bund with their backs towards them. Prashanta gave three beeps on the walkie talkie. Tahira’s group now speeded up. The sound of her approaching vehicles kept the Pakistani parties attention riveted to the front. Prashanta closed in with his men. He raised his fist and brought it down. His team opened up a withering barrage of fire that mowed the Pakistani ambushers down in a hail of bullets. It was all over in seconds - some 20 Pakistani soldiers lay dead. Prashanta and his men walked up. Maj Khalid’s body was lying in the centre of the bunch. There was a radio set next to him. Prashanta switched it on. 

"“Anwar come quickly, we got the bitch”, he mimicked the dead Major’s voice on the set. “Mubaraq ho! Main aa rahan hun. I also want my turn on her . Marna mat Haramzadi ko. Keep her alive . She must pay.”

"Prashanta clicked off the set. He sent the Mukti Jodhas to get Tahira and her team to the site. She joined them and they waited patiently to welcome Anwar’s SSG Team. Some half an hour later they sighted, the SSG convoy. Capt Anwar was leading in an open jeep fitted with a 50 Cal machine gun. He was wearing a Maroon beret, a scarf and a Para Jacket. He had a smirk on his face. Tahira was renowned for her beauty and courage. He was looking forward to sweet revenge. That was what wars were all about Zar, Zan, Zameen – Gold, women, Land. Rape had now became the primary weapon in the war against the treacherous Bengalis. Their women were paying for their treachery. He was quite looking forward to dealing with Tahira the Mukti Bahini area commander. The smirk vanished from Anwar’s face as his column was greeted by a hail of automatic fire. It was a burst from Tahira’s AK that bloodied Anwar’s chest and face. He slumped and fell half out of the jeep. It was an intense barrage of fire that wiped out the SSG Party in a matter of two minutes. It was all over. Prashanta and his men got up to search the dead for documents and maps."

There were two alive, abused her and one tried to kill her. Bong finished the last one. 

"Village 15 km North East of Tangail 30 November 1971

Bong met her father and they helped him recce, and he radioed coordinates to a suitable spot. 

"Finally on 10 December 1971, Prashanta got the codeword Mashaal. The para drop was due the next day. Prashanta now briefed Tiger Siddiqui. They planned the deployments to secure the Drop Zone. The drop was scheduled for last light on 11th December 1971. There was intense debate between Gen Jacob and the Para Brigade Deputy commander Col Scudder. Gen Jacob said that the DZ was secure and free of enemy troops. Hence they could go in after first light by 0900 hrs. There was a lot of debate and discussion on the timing of the paradrop. Finally, the drop was scheduled for 1600 hrs on 11 December 1971. A 12 knot wind spread the drop much beyond the designated drop zone and dispersed the unit. The CO himself landed in a pond and had to swim out. Some RCL Guns and equipment also landed in the ponds. Nevertheless the unit rapidly assembled in two hours and went into action."

................................................................................................

"Peshawar Air Base: 3 December 1971, 1745 hrs 

"3 December 1971 had been chosen as the D-day because it was a moonlit night that would facilitate the attack. The Pakistani F-86 Sabre jets trundled on to the runway one by one. The roar of the jet engines became deafening. Then they screamed off and into the sky one by one on their Hi-Lo-High mission. They climbed up to some 5,000 feet and formed into four vics of three each, as they sped towards their targets in Srinagar.

"Sargodha Air Field 

"8 x Mirage-III French fighter bombers and two F-104 Starfighters roared on to the runway one after another and took off. They headed for their target in India. This was the Amritsar Radar and the Pathankot Air Field.

"Muridke Air Field 

"8 x F-86 Sabre jet fighters emerged from their blast pens and took off with deafening roars as they sped eastwards. They were to attack the Pathankot Air Field, while the two gleaming F-104 Starfighters were to hit the radar at Faridkot. Thus out of a total fighter strength of some 278 Pakistani combat aircrafts, only 32 were employed in the first wave. As a surgical strike it was somewhat of a damp squib.

"The Pakistani aircrafts attacked the six Forward Indian Airbases after last light. The 1971 War had begun. 

"Fortunately, as stated, the Indian Intelligence had penetrated the Pakistani GHQ successfully and had warned the Indian forces of this air attack. Therefore, when the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) struck, India was fully prepared. The entire fleet of our fighter aircrafts was concealed in steel-reinforced concrete blast pens. As a result, India suffered minimal losses. Their AD Gunners were waiting quietly for the enemy intruders. One Pakistani B-57 bomber and one F-104 Starfighter were shot down by AD Guns over Amritsar. The PAF attack on Amritsar airfield was rendered absolutely ineffective. As a pre-emptive strike, the Pakistani air attack was a damp squib. Pakistan had same 273 combat aircraft and could easily have generated 400 sorties for the initial attack. It generated just 30 sorties. Apparently, four squadrons were held back to support the Army counter-offensive (which never came). The PAF thought it would provoke the Indians to retaliate against its bases and take them on over its own territory.

"Air Mshl PC Lal summoned a meeting at the Air HQ at 2000 hrs that very night. Damage assessment reports indicated minimal damage. All our aircrafts were in steel reinforced cement concrete (RCC) bomb shelters and emerged unscathed. Contingency plans were ready and were activated right away. Counter attack plans had been prepared in thorough details and were actualised with great urgency and dispatch.

"The IAF hit back hard the same night. Indian B-58A Canberra bombers flew with 8,000 pound bomb loads. It is noteworthy that it takes up to 4 hours to fully load up a Canberra bomber. They rose to 40,000 ft. altitude and penetrated deep into Pakistan. They unleashed a wave of destruction on the nine Pakistani Airfields of Muridke, Mianwali, Chander, Sargodha, Sherkot, Rasoolwak and even as far as Karachi in West Pakistan. In East Pakistan, they hit Tezgaon and Kurmitola. Overall 23 missions were launched to flatten 9 Pakistani airfields in an immediate response. 

"The next morning on 4 December 1971, the Indian fighter aircrafts took off in swarms. Indian fighters, the Hunters, MiG-21s and SU-7s attacked the Pakistani airfields in the west. They destroyed 13 Pakistani aircrafts in these attacks. Pakistan lost 7 x F-86 Sabres, 2 x MiG-19s, 1 x Mirage III C, 2 x B-57s bombers and one C-130 Transport aircraft on the ground. They were shaken. On 4 December itself 4 Hunters of the IAF hit the Karachi Oil Storage depot and set it ablaze. It was struck the same night by the Indian Navy and set on fire for a second time. The air war had begun in earnest and Pakistan was left shaken by the sheer fury and speed of the Indian response."

................................................................................................

"The Decision for War 

"Thus the final decision to go to war had come not from India but from Pakistan. By any cold, empirical analysis of relative strengths it made no sense. The Pakistani forces were outgunned and outnumbered in a ratio of 1.7:1. The imbalance was most pronounced in the realm of airpower and naval power. Considering that the two wings of Pakistan were separated by a 1,000 miles of Indian territory, this was a glaring vulnerability. Pakistan’s decision to go to war seemed highly irrational. Yet it was Pakistan which had clearly initiated an all out conflict.

"Gen Yahya Khan was stung by the constant pinpricks of the Mukti Bahini and now the escalating border clashes and incursions on the East Pakistan border. In the end it was a matter of the Pakistani Punjabi military’s elite self-image. They saw themselves as the Spartans of the East – a highly macho race of superior warriors – as conquerors who held the wily Indians in sheer contempt. What galled them was that the Indians had seized the initiative and were dictating the pace of unfolding events. Gen Yahya Khan was furious about this. Bhutto added to his discomfiture by his constant taunts and insults. The first to press the escalatory pedal had been Lt Gen AAK Niazi, the Eastern Army Commander. It was sheer hubris on his part and it exhibited a most dangerous level of subjectivity. His artillery fires and raids across the border gave India a clear justification to effect a graduated level of escalation in successive quantum jumps of force usage. This in turn provoked Gen Yahya Khan to act irrationally and opt for all out war.

"On 2 December 1971, Gen Yahya Khan apparently had a meeting with the Air Chief Air Marshal Rahim Khan and his Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) at GHQ Rawalpindi. Yahya Khan expressed his exasperation with the escalating levels of Indian provocations. It galled him immensely and he shouted he would not take it lying down. Deep down he was convinced that when push came to shove – the USA and China would bail him out. They would not let Pakistan go down under. Yahya was only partially correct. An empirical analysis indicated that Bangladesh was now more or less a reality. Its birth could just not be stopped. So psychologically, perhaps both USA and China had accepted this ground reality. They would at best not let West Pakistan get dismembered.

"Mrs. Gandhi also knew that the emergence of Bangladesh was now inevitable, but she wanted it to happen in a way that would underline India’s primacy in South Asia. India had gained this primacy by a very methodical military buildup lasting a decade since the shock of 1962. This buildup had been heavily subsidised and supported by the Soviet Union. While Pakistan had gone into a complete self-congratulatory mode after the 1965 War, India had ingested its lessons and forged ahead to complete its military modernisation and expansion plans. The rise in its military power profile had a clear influence on the outcomes in the South Asian region."

" ... Air Marshal Rahim Khan was torn between the imperatives of launching an overwhelming first strike and preserving his force to last the full war. In the bargain, he diluted his preemptive strike. In any case, the Indians already had pinpoint intelligence about this air strike and had dispersed their aircrafts to blast pens and concrete shelters. They emerged unscathed and within an hour, the Canberra bombers of the IAF retaliated massively. The numbers alone were now heavily tilted against Pakistan. Irrational or otherwise, Yahya had taken the desperate plunge towards war. It was now truly a just war and India had all the right to respond to this unacceptable level of escalation that was a clear act of war. The US had lost its sole excuse for military intervention. India had conformed to the essence of the concept of a Just War – it should be just in its cause and aim and equally just in its conduct. It was what the Russian call a virtuous defense (or war). India had patiently waited for the aggressor to strike first and then and only then, retaliated with great vigour and vengeance.

"Nevertheless, the State Department (under immense pressure from President Nixon), still blamed India for the situation and took the case to the United Nations (UN) Security Council to enforce an immediate ceasefire and pull back of troops. The Soviets came to India’s rescue and vetoed three such resolutions. Why did the Chinese not intervene in 1971? They had expressed their hatred and contempt for the Indians to Henry Kissinger. Constrained as he was by the Congress and public opinion in the US, Kissinger had put considerable pressure on the Chinese to act against India and stage a diversion that would pull back Indian forces to the Himalayan border and weaken the assault on East Pakistan. ... "

"• In September 1971, Marshal Lin Biao had staged a coup to assassinate Mao Zedong and seize power. Apparently he was against the tilt towards America. The coup failed and he tried to escape to the USSR. His plane was shot down over Mongolia. As it is the Cultural Revolution of Mao had created chaos and instability. China was hardly in a position to act militarily against India.

"• Even if China had wanted to, it now had, at that stage, the Indo-Soviet treaty staring it in the face. Above all was the harsh military logic of 40 Soviet Divisions that had been deployed against Xinjiang. The militaristic Chinese leaders clearly understood that cold military logic and refrained from intervention. The Indo-Soviet Treaty had worked and had clearly deterred China.

"• A third factor is perhaps the Chinese suspicion that the Americans were being over clever and pushing them to fight this war even as they stayed aloof. Kissinger’s constant proddings to China to do something could easily have raised their suspicions about motives."

................................................................................................

"II Corps Operations"

"II Corps had rigidly adhered to the plan initially outlined by the Army HQ Operational Instructions of August 1971. As stated, Gen Jacob had been keen that the thrust towards Khulna be aborted and troops diverted towards Faridpur from where they could threaten Dacca directly. An inland waterways transport (IWT) Flotilla had been planned for to help speed up this corps advance to Dacca with a brigade group moving in the river in the IWT Flotilla. However, Gen Raina rigidly went by the original Army HQ instructions. It is noteworthy that by 30 November 1971, the Army Commander Gen Aurora was convinced that the Chinese would not intervene and had veered round to the view that Dacca should now be the primary objective.

"The problem was that the snows on the Himalayas had been unusually late in 1971. Generally they come in November but in 1971, they could came only around 8 December 1971. It was this that gave great relief to Sam on whose shoulders lay the overall operational responsibility. It was a heavy burden. The threat from China was real and could not easily be shrugged off. Perhaps Sam was right in erring on the side of caution. However, by 8 December 1971, he too had given the go ahead for the dash to Dacca from the North. II Corps however, rigidly stuck to the somewhat outdated op directives of Army HQ and lost a golden opportunity to go for Dacca in the bargain.

"As per plans that had been war gamed in detail earlier, II Corps bypassed the formidable brigade-sized fortress of Jessore. The Mukti Bahini had already gained a foothold in enemy territory at Chaugacha salient. One brigade silently moved cross country across the paddy fields, lugging all its equipment and stores with liberal help from the locals. Actually the preliminary Bogra incursions and battle had set the stage for operations in this sector."

" ... On the 7th itself, the Jessore Garrison became unnerved by the speed of the advance which was completely bypassing them. They now vacated their formidable strong point without literally a shot being fired. This was indicative of the psychological state of the harried Pakistani Army in the East. The prolonged operations against the Mukti Bahini had tiered out the Pakistani troops. Thus, though there were 5,000 men in Jessore – supported by tanks and artillery – they vacated that formidable fortress without a whimper. They fell back in panic to Nagina on the Madhumati. They had directly disobeyed Gen Niazi’s diktat that no unit would retreat unless it had suffered 75 percent casualties. This now lay in tatters. Philip Jacobsons of The Sunday Times reported, “They ran in less than 24 hours.”

"Gen Jacob now wanted 9 Infantry Division to divert a Brigade northwards towards Magura to reinforce the 4 Mountain Division’s thrust to Faridpur on the Padma River. Sadly, 9 Infantry Division began to regroup at Jessore and hidebound with its original orders – turned South and diverted its thrust towards the Khulna entry port with its 32 Infantry Brigade ex 9 Infantry Division leading. On 11 December 1971 they contacted enemy defences at Daulatpur. This was an extension of Khulna and the two together formed a long narrow belt of built up area extending some two miles. It was very difficult to bypass this as it was flanked by marshes on the west and Bhairab River on the east. It now became a senseless and bitterly fought series of battles of attrition in which the entire 9 Infantry Division got bogged down. By 16 December 1971 they had captured only three forward company localities after suffering heavy casualties. History may well have been different if 9 Div had moved on the Maghura-Faridpur axis. 42 Infantry Brigade now tried to bypass by crossing the Bhairab River on boats provided by the Mukti Bahini on night 13/14 December 1971. They encountered stiff opposition. Attacks had to be halted due to the ceasefire.

"4 Infantry Division: had captured Darsana and Kotchandpur on 5 December 1971. They advanced to Jhendia along the main road axis. A Battalion and a squadron group laid a road block between Chaugacha and Jehndia. Pakistanis made several attempts to break through the block but failed. 141 Brigade attacked Jhendia from another direction and it fell by 7 December 1971. Maghura fell on 8 December 1971 and the two company para drop planned here was no longer needed.

"By 8 December itself, the Madhumati ferry was contacted. After capture of Maghura 62 Mountain Brigade commenced the advance on Faridpur. The Pakistanis demolished the bridge on Madhumati. While preparations were on to cross the river, 7 Mountain Brigade which was advancing onto Kushtia was shaken by an enemy counter attack by a depleted brigade with a squadron of armour. We lost 5 tanks and the Vanguard company suffered heavy losses, the 4 Mountain Division however reacted and threw all its strength towards Kushtia – instead of focusing on the Madhumati crossing. In the bargain the advance to Faridpur was delayed by three days and the enemy blew up the Hardinge Bridge. This would not have happened had the original plan of crossing the Padma at Goalunao Ghat to Dacca been put into effect. The IWT Flotilla had in fact reached near the Hardinge Bridge on 05 December 1971 itself but was not utilised. All chances of taking Dacca from this direction now evaporated due to the rather hidebound and attrition-oriented mindset of II Corps and its divisions. Despite reaching Faridpur they could not cross the Padma and threaten Dacca from this direction."

................................................................................................

"IV Corps Operations 

If the operations of II Corps were characterised by rigidity, attrition and over caution – those of IV Corps represented a high point of mobility of mind and innovation along with unorthodox ways of speeding up the advance. This Corps had taken Gen Jacob’s advice on bypassing and rapid manoeuvre to heart. Its Commander was the very tall and imposing Gen Sagat Singh. Sagat Singh proved to be India’s Guderian – one of its best Field Commanders of this war – in fact of all of India’s wars. His corps made the most innovative use of some 14 x Mi-4 Russian helicopters allocated to bounce the Meghna River and mount a rapid advance to Dacca from the east."

"Gen Sagat was a strong personality. He had started service as a trooper in the Bikaner State Forces. This Rathore Rajput had risen from the ranks to become one of India’s best field commanders. At just six years of service, he had done the prestigious Staff College course at Calcutta. He had commanded the Crack 50(I) Para Brigade and led it for the Liberation of Goa in December 1961. He had then commanded the 17 Mountain Division in Sikkim. In his tenure, a major skirmish had erupted on the Nathu La and Cho La passes on the Himalayan watershed. Sagat Singh had retaliated very strongly and used medium artillery to inflict heavy punishment on the Chinese. Reports of Chinese casualties in these skirmishes range from 350 to 800 killed and wounded. It had a salutary impact. From then on the Chinese have not dared to open fire on the India-China border and there has been no kinetic incident on this front since 1967.

"Sagat’s resolute and courageous response to the Chinese had set a benchmark in professional competence and given the PLA bloody nose. Thereafter, Gen Sagat had led Counter Insurgency (CI) operations in the dense jungles of Mizoram. It was here that he pioneered the concepts of Special Heliborne Operations (SHBO). This was to prove providential and enabled him to mount heliborne assaults across the Meghna – one of the widest rivers in Bangladesh.

"Massive infrastructural and logistics investments were made to initiate operations from the side of Tripura. Both the Army HQ and Eastern Command operational instructions had made no mention of Dacca (though that had been the anchor premise of this plan when it was formulated by Gen Jacob in May 1971). Apart from the uncertainty of Chinese intervention, one of the primary reasons why Dacca was not put down in black and white as the primary objective – was the fear of failure. There were serious doubts whether it was not a bridge too far and whether the Indian Army would indeed be able to deliver Dacca? No one was sure. The Indian Army so far had not attempted such a daring feat of mobility (the only exception was Op Polo (Hyderabad) but the Nizam’s forces were hardly a credible opposition).

"Gen Sagat Singh could not deviate from the Operational Instructions issued in writing by the Army HQ and HQ Eastern Command. However, the more he thought about his impending task the more he was convinced that Dacca was the key objective. Thus, even though the Corps operational instructions made no mention of Dacca, Gen Sagat Singh was crystal clear that this was the final aim of his Corps operations. He was driven by this mission of the Dash to Dacca and it became a monumental obsession that consumed him in the days ahead. He infected his divisional, brigade and battalion commanders with that overwhelming enthusiasm for Dacca and constantly led operations from the front, helicoptering from one lead column to another and in many cases flying ahead of our leading advance guards on the multiple axes of advance to the Meghna River."

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"Plans 

"The Corps plan was to attack along three divisional thrust lines over a 250 km front between Meghalaya in the north and the Feni salient in the extreme south of Tripura. This was the strongest Corps in Eastern Command and implied that the Command Schwerpunkt had been designated not in the west (where it was most anticipated by Pakistan and its defences were the strongest) – but in the East.

"Pakistan’s 14 Infantry Division was deployed in the Sylhet sector under Maj Gen MM Kazi. To its south were the two newly created ad hoc divisions – the 36th and 39th. These were largely skeleton formations. The Corps operational instructions specified capture of maximum territory and also cutting off the vital rail-road link from Chittagong Port to seal off East Pakistan from any supplies and succor from the seas. Gen Sagat Singh however, had his eyes set on the Meghna river. He would seek crossings on this wide river, bounce this obstacle and advance as rapidly as possible on Dacca. The ace up his sleeves were 14 x Mi-4 helicopters under Group Captain Chandan Singh of the IAF. Each of these choppers could take up to 1,500 kg of stores or more. IV Corps now advanced along these thrust lines ... "

"8 Mountain Division: This was commanded by Maj Gen KV Krishna Rao – a highly professional officer who later became the Chief. His division advanced on the Silchar-Karimganj axis towards Sylhet. Sylhet was held by the Pakistani 202 Infantry Brigade as a formidable fortress and as per Niazi’s orders, the Pakistanis were prepared to fight to the bitter end here. 59 Mountain Brigade ex 8 Mountain division advanced on Kalaura and captured it on 7 December 1971 after heavy fighting. They isolated the Maulvi Bazaar defences where Pakistan’s 313 Infantry Brigade was deployed. The Pakistani Divisional Commander now ordered 313 Brigade ex Maulvi Bazaar to fall back on Sylhet. On 10 December 1971, 81 Mountain Brigade captured the Saidpur and Sherpur ferries, thus blocking the only road link southwest of Sylhet. Instead of now battering his head against Sylhet – Sagat Singh decided to bypass and isolate this garrison. Under no condition would this be allowed to fall back into the Dacca triangle. To do this he used the tried but spirited Battalion 4/5 Gukha Rifles (4/5 GR).

"The First Heliborne Operation: 303 Infantry Brigade of Pakistan at Maulvi Bazar was expected to fall back to Coronation Bridge and block the way to Meghna crossings. Very foolishly the Pakistanis diverted it to fall back on the bypassed strong point of Sylhet The Sylhet Garrison now had some 6 Battalions of the 202 and 313 Infantry Brigades bottled up here. These were supported by a battery each of 105 mm guns and 120 mm mortars. Very foolishly Pakistan had bottled up both brigades so far north at Sylhet. It was now a most formidable two brigade sized fortress. India’s response was simple. Bottle them all up here and dash onwards to the Meghna. The IAF and the armed helicopters bombed Sylhet. The entire garrison was bottled up in this fortress by the heliborne manoeuvres executed 4/5 GR .This battalion was airlifted in 22 sorties of Mi-4 helicopters and put behind Sylhet strong point – thus completely cutting off the retreat of this massive Pakistani force back towards the Dacca Triangle. This garrison later surrendered on 17 December 1971.

"57 Mountain Division: This was led by Maj Gen Kenneth Gonsalves. The division advanced along the central axis from Agartala towards Akhaura. The Mukti Bahini had already made a base here and was in contact with the defences of Akhaura. This sector was the 4 Corps Schwerpunkt and it was here that Gen Sagat Singh actually planned to bounce the Meghna and dash for Dacca. The Meghna River was more than a mile wide here. 57 Mountain Division was originally to advance to Daudkandi. However, this division had captured Ashuganj by 5 December 1971. They now discovered that the Brahmanbaria – Akhaura rail line had been converted into a road by the Pakistanis by removing the rails. They secured the railway bridge over the Teesta river. It was now decided to switch the axis of advance of 57 Mountain Division to Akhaura-Ashuganj-Brahmanbaria instead of south towards Daudkandi. It was a superb example of flexibility and agility of mind. It enabled IV Corps formations to exploit all fleeting opportunities and further the objective of speeding to Dacca. Commanders at all levels had been briefed about Gen Sagat Singh’s intent and did their best to further this intention of the Corps Commander. Elements of the Maulvi Bazaar Brigade (313 Brigade of Pakistan) were supported to withdraw to Brahmanbaria and bar the path to Dacca. However, very foolishly they went north on a total limb to reinforce Sylhet. The 4/5 GR’s heliborne operations completely sealed off and bottled up this garrison.

"Meanwhile, on the Ashuganj axis, the Pakistanis had blown up the bridge across the Meghna. The leading Indian Brigades began recce for a crossing place. The PT-76 tanks plunged in. But their engines could only work for 30 minutes in water. After that they overheated. Crossing the fast flowing Meghna would take three to four hours. Fortunately, the Mukti Bahini organised a whole host of country boats and fishing boats to help push the PT-76 tanks across to the other bank. Our troops moved ahead and invested Bhairab Bazaar. We needed to push far greater force levels across the Meghna and soon. The enemy brigade at Ashuganj was also subsequently invested by flying the 4 Guards battalion behind them and stopping their withdrawal to Dacca."

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"Bouncing the Meghna (Heliborne operations) 

"The 14 x Mi-4 helicopters of Chandan Singh were pressed into action a second time on 9 December 1971. They were tasked to bounce the Meghna at Bhairab Bazaar and land behind this enemy strong point. 4 Guards was heli-lifted and dropped behind this point. This operation was done by night. As per Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) evolved in Mizoram, the Mukti Bahini marked the heli-landing zone with 80 torches. In just one night some 650 troops of 4 Guards were inserted behind Bhairab Bazaar. For the next 36 hours, the helicopters shuttled relentlessly (without the pilots even stopping to eat their food). They just subsisted on coffee and biscuits and delivered some 5,000 troops and 51 tons of stores across the Meghna river. The entire Bhairab Bazaar garrison was now truly bottled up and could not fall back on to Dacca.

"In the next three days IV Corps rapidly advanced on Dacca. By the time of the ceasefire, they had brought Dacca within the range of their artillery guns. In addition to the heliborne operations a large force of the Indian Army was ferried across the Meghna river in the country boats and ferries marshaled by the Mukti Bahini.

"Thus by 9 December, IV Corps had reached the three key points along the line of the Meghna river – Ashuganj – Daudkandi and Chandpur. The approaches to Dacca from the east now lay wide open. Enemy troops from Comilla, Laksham and Chaudagram (around 4,000 strong) had fallen back on Mayamati. Gen Sagat Singh now bypassed this strong point and invested it. It finally surrendered on 16 December 1971 (some 86 officers, 175 JCOs and 4,000 men became prisoners of war). 

"Since Army HQ had mandated capture of the Chittagong Port, a Kilo Force was created to dash south and secure it (this had 2 battalions from Mizo hills, one BSF and one CRPF battalions along with two East Bengal Rifles Regiments). 

"Due to Indian operations in Laksham the enemy vacated Feni. This fell to Kilo Force on 6 December 1971. Kilo Force now advanced on Chittagong. Sagat Singh sought to speed up this advance and allocated the 83 Mountain Brigade to this sector. By 13/14 December, this force had reached the outskirts of Chittagong. The Special Frontier Force under Maj Gen Uban was pushed from Mizoram into the Chittagong Hill tracts, capture Rangmati and pose a threat to Chittagong."

"Gen Sagat Singh had relentlessly moved up and down his entire front, helicoptering down to push his leading units to move even faster; coming back to issue orders at the Corps HQ and moving out again. In the true tradition of Rommel and Guderian he led from the very front and took enormous risks. Many times his helicopter came under fire but he pushed ahead regardless. He was a dynamo of relentless energy. Meanwhile 2 Para (of 101 Communication Zone) was the first unit to enter Dacca from the North. Sagat was given overall charge of Dacca and had to organise the Surrender ceremony very hastily in a highly confused and charged atmosphere. Millions of excited and jubilant Bengalis lined the roads shouting Joy Bangla and showering flowers on the Indian Army. It was the heady wine of victory. The rapid advance to Dacca had totally unhinged the enemy plans and caused the collapse of the Pakistani Armed Forces in the East. It was extremely sad, however, that there were strong clashes of personality between Lt Gen Sagat Singh and his Army Commander (Lt Gen JS Aurora) and the Army Chief (Gen Sam Manekshaw). Despite his stellar performance as the Corps Commander, India’s best field commander was passed over for promotion. He never became an Army Commander. However a grateful civil government gave him the Padma Bhushan for his inspiring leadership in the race for Dacca."

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"The writing on the wall had been evident in Dacca almost after the first four days of war. India had bypassed all the forward deployed fortresses and strong points on the border and its leading columns had advanced deep inside Bangladesh. Most strong points had been contained and bypassed. Many however had simply fallen after they were bypassed and surrendered. Niazi’s rhetoric that no unit would retreat unless it had suffered 75 percent casualties had proved to be so much hot air. India’s total air supremacy was “massing effects” and was having a palpable effect on Pakistani troops’ morale. 80 air sorties per day in support of ground operations were having a be-numbing impact on the Pakistani forces. It was the massing of effects.

"From around 7th December 1971, Gen Niazi and Governor Abdul Motaleb Malik had started bleating for a ceasefire and withdrawal of Indian troops. The extended period of Mukti Bahini guerrilla operations had clearly worn out the Pakistani Army. The sudden shock of massed air attacks and the speed of the Indian Army’s advance were now taking a severe toll of their nerves. Morale was crumbling at a dramatic pace. After the war, a Pakistani Divisional Commander said, “Our minds were clogged by an incomprehensible conflict.” On the eve of war (3 December itself) a Brigade Commander had recorded, “My men were already near exhaustion and burdened by terrible fatigue and sleeplessness.” Eight months of the Mukti Bahini’s relentless guerrilla operations had taken their toll. The defeat in East Pakistan was inevitable.

"As part of psychological warfare operations Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw now began to issue daily appeals for surrender on All India Radio. Most officers and soldiers those days had their small transistor radios that were normally carried in the ammunition pouches. Each evening we used to listen to these electrifying broadcasts from the Indian Army Chief. It was as electrifying as when we had heard him at our NDA passing out parade. His sentences came like rapid fire staccato bursts of machine gun fire.

"“Officers and men of the Pakistan Army. I know you are trying to escape via the ports of Khulna and Chittagong. You cannot escape. Our Navy has cut off all routes of exit. I want to spare military lives. I do not needlessly want to shed the blood of soldiers. Surrender to me – lay down your arms and I will protect you. Your lives will be spared. You will be treated with dignity as per the Geneva Convention.” 

"That commanding voice still causes goose bumps. There was a heady feeling of victory in the air. After a 1000 years of invasions and humiliation – the Indian Armed Forces were at last winning and winning gloriously."

Again, he's not counting Shivaji and subsequent Peshawas, the Maratha empire. 

"The stage was now set for the final Dash to Dacca. By 8 December 1971, it had snowed in the mountains and the Himalayan Passes were finally closed. The precipitation had been light but the chances of Chinese operations had become virtually zero. No battle indications in the form of any concentrations of Chinese troops and material in Tibet were available. There was no unusual military activity worth the name in Tibet. At the 16,000 ft high Cho La Pass – where my own unit was later deployed on the Himalayan watershed, there was a pyramidal peak named Pt 4,752 (its height in meters) that formed the right shoulder of the Pass. From there a spur extended out along the knife-like edge of the McMahon Line that ran along this watershed. At the farthest point where it took a sharp turn was the independent platoon post of Garh. It was India’s forward most post on the Himalayan watershed in the Chola Pass complex. Normally it was commanded by an experienced captain."

"Had the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intervened it would have dangerously and dramatically altered the situation. The Himalayan front would have become the main theatre of operations. That is why, with the burden of responsibility on his shoulders, Sam had hesitated. It was an enormous risk but his trusted lieutenants (Gen Inder Gill and Gen Jacob) virtually goaded him to take the plunge. In hindsight it also indicated Sam’s deep faith in the abilities of these two upright and highly professional soldiers."

"On 12 December 1971, three Royal Air Force C-130s and one United Nations C-130 aircrafts had sought permission to land at Dacca to evacuate British and American nationals. India ordered a pause in the air attacks to facilitate this evacuation. The previous day also a number of UN aircrafts had touched down at Calcutta’s Dum Dum Airport carrying foreign evacuees from Dacca. They had seen a whole host of AN-12, C-119 Packets and Dakotas milling around. They thought that the entire 50(I) Para Brigade was mounting a major airborne operation. Meanwhile the situation on the Western Theatre was not going as well. The DMO had therefore asked Gen Jacob to revert two Medium Regiments of artillery, one Regiment of T-55 tanks and the 123 Infantry Brigade to the Western Theatre. This brigade had started emplaning at Barrackpore airport in the Boeing 737s of the Indian Airlines. This East to West movement of troops was picked up by satellites and caused panic attacks in Washington. Having virtually conquered the East, was Mrs. Gandhi planning to dismember West Pakistan also? The CIA reportedly had a mole in her cabinet (presumably a senior minister), who had informed that this was perhaps the case. The East to West movement of troops panicked Washington and made President Richard Nixon furious. As will be covered in detail later, he asked the Seventh Fleet to steam into the Bay of Bengal to browbeat India into apparently calling off any such plans. The air movement at Barrackpore also alerted Pakistani spies. They also reported to Niazi and convinced him that the whole Para Brigade was about to descend on Dacca or near-abouts. It added to the panic and hysteria mainly in the capital city of East Pakistan."

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"101 Communication Zone Operations 

"The 101 Communication Zone under Maj Gen Gill started operations with two brigade sized forces – the 95 Infantry Brigade and the FJ Sector (with an assortment of Army EBR and BSF units). The 95 Infantry Brigade crossed the Brahmaputra and invested the enemy position at Jamalpur. It put a road block behind it and cutoff its retreat to Mymensingh Garrison. There was only one Pakistani Infantry Brigade (93 Brigade) deployed in the north at Mymensingh. This was to fall back to Tangail and then to Dacca. Dacca initially had no regular formations but some 5,000 assorted troops. It was expected that the brigades from Ashuganj in the east, Mymensingh in the north and Daudkandi in the south were supposed to ultimately fall back on it. That would have made Dacca a formidable defensive triangle that could have held out for months.

"The 95 Infantry Brigade was advancing on the Jamalpur-Tangail-Kaliakair-Dacca axes. The FJ Sector was advancing on the Nasirabad-Tangail axis. On 8 December 1971, Army HQ had finally released the 167 and 5 Mountain Brigades to be employed in the Dash to Dacca. It was vital that the Mymensingh Garrison be prevented from falling back to Dacca at all costs. From the outset Gen Jacob had planned for an airdrop at Tangail which would prevent the Mymensingh Garrison from falling back on to Dacca. In fact, as described in the personal narratives, Capt PK Ghosh of 2 PARA had already been infiltrated over a 100 km deep into East Pakistan to contact the Tiger Siddiqui Force in the jungles north of Dacca and take their help to secure a 2 x 1 sq. km Drop Zone near Tangail.

"It was now time to put this para drop into effect. Gen Jacob wanted them to be dropped in the morning at 0900 hrs. We had total air supremacy and the drop zone was being secured by the Mukti Bahini. However the Deputy of the 50(I) Para Brigade Col Skudder wanted to do it in the more classical fashion at last light, so that the paras could regroup under cover of darkness and thus avoid enemy interference. Jacob insisted, there was no enemy interference around. The DZ had been secured by the Mukti Bahini. Considering the various types of aircrafts being employed – the drop was likely to get highly dispersed. It would be better to mount the paradrop operation early in the morning itself. It would also reduce the time needed by the enemy to fall back. Even the Army Commander joined the deliberations and ultimately a compromise solution of drop at 1600 hrs on 4 December 1971 was accepted."

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"1700 hrs, 10 December 1971: 2 PARA Battalion HQ at Dum Dum

"Dum Dum airport was a bustle of hectic activity. UN C-130 planes were landing with the evacuated civilians of different countries. As they got down they gaped. They could see so many assorted transport aircrafts lined up on the tarmac and the paratroopers mounting them with their battle loads. The buzz spread to the press – a massive paradrop operation was afoot. The whole Para Brigade was perhaps being dropped. The Transfer of troops to the west from Bagdogra was also picked up by the Pakistanis. Niazi was nervous that the whole Para Brigade was about to land near Dacca.

"1600 hrs, 11 December 1971: In the Sky over Tangail"

"It was a massive air train. The sky reverberated with the roar of some 48 turbo-prop aircrafts. Leading were the Dakotas, followed by the Packets at an altitude interval and lastly the huge lumbering 4-engined AN-12 Antonovs. Two MiG-21s flew fighter escorts overhead."

Amongst all the rest of superb photographs provided by General Bakshi to illustrate the story, including portraits and maps, here's an instantly thrilling set, depicting paratroopers dropping! It's captioned 'Trump Card at Tangail: Paradrop'.

"“Bolo Chhatri Mata ki Jai” (Hail to the Mother Parachute) shouted the boys as per the unit tradition in each aircraft. 2/Lt Lali Gill jumped for the first time in his life as he leapt out of a Fairchild Packet. He felt the butterflies in the pit of his stomach. Down, down, his breath got caught in his throat. Suddenly he felt a jerk of the cord and his parachute opened. It blossomed and he began to sail down gently. 

"What a sight it was! The sky seemed filled with hundreds of white parachutes blossoming like flowers and lazily floating down to the earth. Over 700 paratroopers were descending to a Drop Zone (DZ) some 70 km north of Tangail. They had jumped from the height of a 1,000-1,200 feet in a keen 12 knot breeze. There had been one hang up but he survived miraculously. The drop got spread much beyond the 2 x 1 sq. km DZ that had been secured by the Mukti Bahini. The countryside was flat and dotted with clusters of villages, each with its customary pond. The CO landed in the middle of one and had to cut the cords and swim his way ashore. A few mountain guns and anti-tank guns landed in the ponds and had to be fished out with great effort. Other paratroopers landed on rooftops and trees.

"In true Para Brigade style, the Battalion took it in its stride. Within 2 hours the men and equipment had been re-formed into platoons and companies. There was panic and consternation in the enemy ranks. Initially they reacted with idiotic euphoria. Were these the Chinese paratroopers who were coming to their rescue? Was it the Americans? The famed “Yellows” from the North and whites from the south who had come to deliver their beleaguered allies as Gen Yahya had promised? Some patrols were sent to probe. They drew fire and retreated hastily. Slowly the truth sank in. It was the Indian Para Brigade. Some 5,000 Indian paratroopers they said had landed. There was no sight of the Chinese or Americans. For the first time Gen Niazi felt a deep despair. He felt bitterly let down by his higher command.

"Col Pannu pulled himself out of the Pond he had fallen in. He then helped the boys pull his jeep out of the same pond. ... "

He met Bong and Tahira. 

"“Ok Bong you can do a quick rig change and join us. The enemy is almost here. Well done both of you.” 

"The Para battalion regrouped rapidly and very soon it had secured the Poongli Bridge on the Turag river. It was just in time. The first column of the Pakistani Brigade had already crossed this bridge in the late afternoon. Well after last light – the Paras saw the sidelights of the Pakistani 93 Infantry Brigade’s convoy of leading vehicles. Troops were alerted. When the convoy neared the bridge, it was met by a murderous barrage of anti-tank guns, rocket launchers and mortar fire. Machine guns raked the trucks. There were loud explosions, screams and shouts. The Pakistani troops quickly disembarked. They sited their mortars and began to engage 2 PARA positions. Then they launched one desperate counterattack after another to clear the bridge. Fierce fighting broke out. The enemy tried desperately to eject the Paras from the bridge but failed dismally. In all the enemy launched four attacks. The carnage was fierce and complete. The attacks petered out. After first light when the last attack had happened a sudden silence fell on the battlefield.

"In the morning the Paras counted some 344 Pakistani dead bodies littered around the bridge. The enemy Brigade Commander Brig Qadir surrendered the next day. Maj Gen Gill was with his leading columns. His jeep went over a mine and he was badly wounded. He was quickly evacuated by helicopter. Maj Gen Gandharva Nagra of the Gurkhas now took charge of 101 Communication Zone. Link up was established with the Paras. On night 12/13 December – the 95 Brigade of 101 Communication Zone charged ahead and captured the township of Tangail. On 13 December, 6 Sikh Light Infantry resumed the advance and had a fierce encounter with enemy tanks.

"2 PARA was now grouped with the FJ Sector column. This had 2 PARA, 3 Guards and one Mountain Battery. They now advanced on to Dacca via the Mirpur bridge route. Gen Nagra was with the leading columns. They were met by the Mukti Bahini who told them of a newly constructed highway that went via Manikganj and bypassed the main road along the Tungi-Dacca axis, along which the enemy expected the advance to come. Gen Gandharva Nagra now decided to take this open and undefended route and pushed 2 PARA down this road. The local people were now thronging the route in their thousands. They were besides themselves with joy and euphoria. Shouts of Joy Bangla rent the air. Men and women came forth spontaneously to greet the Indian soldiers and offer them food and refreshments. It was heady and euphoric to see a new nation reveling in its new found freedom. The Indian soldiers had literally dropped from heaven to free them from an unspeakable tyranny."

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"The cipher clerk got up excitedly from his table. The Indians had cracked the Pakistani cipher code. Havildar Bipin Trivedi of the 17th Wireless Experimental Unit held in his hand a decrypted signal from Governor Abdul Motaleb Malik, calling all senior officials in Dacca to an urgent conference in the Governor’s House at 1200 hrs on 14 December 1971. Attending this conference were the Eastern Army Commander – Lt Gen AAK Niazi, Maj Gen Farman Ali, the military advisor to the Governor and some of Niazi’s senior staff officers. In fact the entire Command & Control (C&C) apparatus in Dacca was to get together under one roof at the Governor’s House.

"Lt Col Bhalla who was in charge Signals Intelligence, ran to his jeep excitedly and brought this message by hand to Gen Jacob at around 0930 hrs on 14 December 1971. Without batting an eyelid Gen Jacob rang up Air Vice Marhsal Daveshar, the very competent Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO) at HQ Eastern Air Command Shillong. This was a golden chance to put into practice what the famous US Airpower theorist John Warden (the mastermind behind the planning of the First Gulf War) called the “Inside Out Attack” theory. Generally, armies carry out a serial process of attack through various layers and rings of the fielded enemy forces to get to the core of his Command &Control set up in the enemy capital. However, directly striking the core itself could benumb and completely paralyse the whole enemy organisation. Warden felt it was stupid to attack this core serially through successive layers of defences – one by one from the outside (the border) to the core inside the national capital. Warden advocated the use of airpower to reverse the whole process and carry out an inside out attack that strikes the core right at the outset of fighting. Airpower was the best instrument to do this.

"Daveshar agreed readily. Apparently this information had also filtered down another channel. The Mukti Bahini had got the information of this meeting from its humanint sources and had alerted the R&AW. They had passed it on to Mrs. Gandhi, who told the Air Chief Air Mshl PC Lal. HQ Eastern Command received this input from both the Air HQ as well as Eastern Command HQ and hence, reacted with great speed and alacrity."

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"14 December Operations Room 28 Squadron (First Supersonics) 1055 hrs’

"Group Captain Wollen of the Air Force Intelligence rushed into the operations room of 28 Squadron (First Supersonics). He was breathless with excitement. There was an emergency message from Air HQ. A very important meeting had been called by the Governor of East Pakistan at the Circuit House in Dacca. This had to be attacked while the meeting was on! 

"What time is the meeting? Wing Commander(later Air Vice Marshal) Bishnoi queried urgently. 

"“Will commence around 1100 hrs as I’m told.” 

"“Wing Cdr Bishnoi looked at his watch and gasped. It is 21 minutes flying time to Dacca. We have to load armaments. He spoke urgently on the phone to the COO(Chief Operating Officer). Get four – MiG 21s loaded with 32 High Explosive (HE) rockets each. Move it. We take off as soon as those are loaded. Step on the gas!” 

"“Now where the hell is this circuit House?” Bishnoi turned to Wollen. 

"Wollen took out a tourist map of Dacca. They located the Circuit House and Wollen tapped it.

"“This should be it”, he said. 

"Bishnoi urgently briefed his pilots. Young Flt Lt Vinod Bhatia (of the band of brothers fame), Flt Lt Raghvachari and Flt Lt Mallhi heard his terse briefing with rapt attention. 

"“The Governor of East Pakistan has called all top officials for a meeting in Circuit House Dacca, let’s blow them to smithereens. Now let’s rush before the bloody conference ends.”"

Another thrilling set of photographs, titled "Pinpoint Air Attack on Governor’s House Dacca, 14 December 1971", here!

"The pilots charged to their planes. The ground crew had effected a miracle. All four MiGs were loaded with 32 HE rockets each and ready. 

"The pilots jumped into their cockpits. Wing Cdr Bishnoi had just closed his canopy when an officer rushed to his aircraft and clambered up the ladder and flashed up a handwritten card. It read: 

"“Target not Circuit House but Government House – repeat Government House.” 

"“Shit!” Wing Cdr Bishnoi – expostulated.

"He quickly checked his tourist map and located the Govt House. He was now in a quandry. Should he tell the other pilots on radio? He decided against it. It would be heard all over the region and perhaps alert the enemy. He decided he would only tell them once they were over Dacca. There was no time to lose. He opened the throttle and the MiG-21’s engine roared to life. It sped off in a blur of speed and the other three MiGs followed up close. 

"They got into Diamond formation and sped off for Dacca. 21 minutes later the four MiGs were circling Dacca like hawks. Bishnoi looked down and located the govt house on his map. He informed his pilots of the changed target and asked them to locate it on ground. Vinod spotted the target. 

"“Target” 11’Clock, 500 mtrs – building with high dome. 

"“Tiger Three Contact.” They descended rapidly to tree top height and formed up with the building broad side. Bishnoi was now flying over the main road in Dacca – so low that people in the high rise apartments could look down upon them as they flew beneath. He aligned himself with the huge bay windows."

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"1215 hrs, 14 December 1971: Government House, Dacca

"The Government House was a majestic building. Huge and glittering crystal chandeliers hung in the Conference Hall. There was a dark brown polished mahogany table with high-back plush chairs. His Excellency, the Governor Abdul Motaleb Malik had very refined tastes and his wife had just redone the interior décor at an exorbitant cost. There were stately and caparisoned curtains. The atmosphere however was one of intense gloom and irritability. The pall of gloom was so visible and palpable that it could be cut with a knife. 

"His Excellency, the Governor walked in and the Pakistani national anthem bars were played by the band. Gen Niazi deliberately entered a minute later to show everyone who was the boss. Governor Malik looked at him balefully, 

"“Janaab Qayamat aa gayi hai (The end of the world is upon us). I had contacted the American Counsel General Paul Mark here in Dacca and requested him to organise a ceasefire. He had passed it on to the US Embassy in Pakistan. However, when Gen Yahya Khan got to know of it, he rejected it.” He said dejectedly, ... "

"The sparks between the civil and military officials were now flying openly. The soldiers had messed it up thoroughly, felt the civilians, and rightly so. 

"“Target 11’clock, 300 meters. Engage Bay windows, follow me over.” Wing Commander Bishnoi said on RT. He could see a whole host of White and Green Sedan Staff cars parked in the vicinity of the building and realized the conference was still going on here.

"“Panther Leader going in now. Follow me.” Bishnoi pressed the trigger and felt his plane lurch as the rockets crackled and wooshed off towards the target. 

"The thunderous roar of the diving jets reverberated through the plush building. Gen Niazi sprang up. Through the huge bay window, he could see the lead jet fighter. A flash of flame erupted under its wings as it discharged a volley of rockets … zzzzraaatt …!

"Gen Niazi’s eyes rounded with horror. 

"“Air Attack! Air Attack!” he screamed as he dived under the table. He had been in combat often enough to know this. 

"All present in the room followed his example and dived with alacrity. The 32 rockets slammed into the room in flashes of Phat! Phat! Phat! Loud explosions rent the air. The chandelier came crashing down on to the table and the whole room was now littered with glass. Huge explosions filled the air and choked their lungs. Their ears began to ring. The second, third and then the fourth jet dived one after another and pumped a fusillade of rockets into the room. Tentatively, Gen Niazi raised his head over the table. 

"Then he heard the MiG-21s returning for a second run. They roared down and the reverberations of their engines made the window panes rattle. The sounds of the jet reached a deafening crescendo of power. …zzzzrrraaat…! The rippling sounds of multiple rockets being fired could be heard over the infernal din of the jet engines. It was terrible. The rockets smashed into the room and exploded into huge fireballs that singed the hair of Niazi and his commanders under the table. For an instant Niazi could not breathe. He felt the concussions of the explosions and almost blanked out. There was a sharp ringing sound in his ears. He felt great fear. How long would these planes keep attacking this target? Generally they made just one pass and fled. Where were the Sabres? They had all been grounded, the Indians had completely cratered the runway and the sheepish pilots of the Fiza Ya were focused more on preserving the force."

" ... Another set of explosions tore his breath away, then another and then another. The four MiG-21s had now emptied all their 32 rockets into the Conference Hall of the Old Governor’s House 128 rockets in that enclosed hall! Fortunately most rockets had hit the far end of the room, a portion of the wall and part of the roof had caved in."

"Tears ran down Niazi’s cheeks. The stress was mounting steadily and these days he used to burst in tears very often. But this near miss had been terrible. Experts on combat stress tell us that a near miss leaves us shaken. It is this that fatally erodes the morale. A near miss – a very close brush with death.

"Col Salik now heard Niazi sobbing loudly, 

"“Pindi men baithe haramzaadon ne marva diya (the bastards in Pindi have done us in),” he was now wailing loudly."

"“Niazi Sahab, here’s my resignation. I’m moving out with my family right now to the neutral zone in Intercontinental Hotel Dacca.” 

"The all clear air-raid siren sounded in the distance. People came out with very obvious relief from below the table. 

"“Please sit down,” Niazi though badly shaken tried to restore a semblance of order. The Conference Hall was a holy mess. Broken chandeliers, shards of glass, pieces of cement and plaster and the strong acrid stench of cordite!"

"This was the moment of total collapse of the Pakistani High Command in the East. Their will to fight had been pulverised with a barrage of 118 rockets of the Indian Air Force, delivered with great precision through the huge Bay windows of the Conference Hall. The high grandees in the Conference hall had a very narrow and very providential escape. But it had left them totally shaken and pale. It had blasted something inside them – that critical will to fight and hold on. It had been completely shattered. The way Niazi had sobbed inconsolably that day in Governor’s House Dacca showed that the cumulative stress of the last eight months had taken a heavy toll. This airstrike and the near miss had blasted whatever remained of his resolve as it were. Niazi was a psychologically defeated man already.

"On 15 December, to avoid incessant Indian air attacks, Niazi shifted his HQ to the Dacca University. This was detected by the Mukti Bahini and again attacked by the Indian Air force. This time 28 Squadron (First Supersonics) sent in two missions of four MiG-21s each. They slammed a total of 256 rockets into the newly shifted HQ. The blasts and inferno was terrible. This was pin point, inside-out attack at its best and it specifically targeted the command and control centre of the Pakistan Army in the East. The morale of the top military leadership in Dacca suffered a complete and total collapse. Their nerves were shot to pieces. Their brains were benumbed. Their will to fight had simply collapsed."

................................................................................................

"Even as the key Command and Control (C&C) target in East Pakistan (The Governor’s House Dacca) was hit and left completely devastated, Sam Manekshaw’s radio broadcasts calling upon the rank and file of the Pakistan Army to surrender were also having a palpable impact. The Pakistan Army in the field had now been fighting non-stop for eight months. It was tired, dispirited and harried. Worse was that sense of isolation in a far away land where the local people hated your guts and would rise up to slaughter you even if they got half a chance. Events were moving at a very swift pace now to a final denoument.

"Initially, Gen Manekshaw addressed these calls to Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali – the military advisor to the Governor of East Pakistan. The Governor was the key constitutional authority and on paper the highest ranking Pakistani functionary then in East Pakistan. He would have the locus standi to negotiate a surrender. 

"On 14 December 1971, the Governor again sent a signal to Gen Yahya Khan advocating an immediate ceasefire. Initially Yahya said he would leave the decision to him. He passed instructions accordingly to Gen Niazi. The Governor (with the help of his military advisor) now made a five point proposal incorporating inter alia the following conditions:- 

"• Immediate Cease Fire 

"• Repatriation of the armed forces of West Pakistan 

"• Repatriation of other West Pakistanis desirous of returning, safety of persons settled in East Pakistan since 1947 

"• Guarantees that there would be no reprisals"

"These proposals were dusted up and handed over to Marc Henri, the US Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations (UN). Yahya Khan was about to give his assent when fate intervened."

................................................................................................

"US satellites had picked up the staging of 2 PARA for the Tangail operations. They had also picked up the movement of Indian units and formations from the East to the West. The brigade move from Bagdogra to the West worried them inordinately. The war in the west was not going as planned. As it is, overall India had decided to maintain an offensive-defence posture in the West. Pakistan had taken the initiative and launched major offensives in the Poonch sector and then in Chhamb. The Chhamb offensive had caught the Indian Army imbalanced as it was planning to launch a limited counter offensive here. The Pakistani attack was contained with great difficulty.

"India hit back in the Shakargarh salient, in the Shyok valley in Ladakh and in the desert sector. Without the overwhelming superiority needed – the Shakargarh salient operation was proceeding in a slow, brutal slog- hamstrung by excessive caution and a highly exaggerated concern for the safety of the flanks. This was such a marked contrast to the way the Indian Army was pursuing operations in the East. That is why the Army HQ had sought to bring in reinforcements from the East. This movement had been picked up by the Americans and it had generated alarm in Washington. The USA had moved the UN Security Council to announce a ceasefire and force India to pull its troops from East Pakistan. This had been vetoed by the Soviets a total of three times. In its desperation Pakistan had appealed to allies like Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia for arms and spares. The US Congress had passed a law prohibiting sale of arms to both India and Pakistan.

"Yet the Americans continued to supply Pakistan with critical spares on the sly. As against this, they stopped shipment of radars to India that were to cover the Himalayan borders and actually passed this information on to the Chinese in a desperate bid to encourage them to intervene. It did not work. Either the Chinese internal situation or dissensions in the PLA prevented China from acting. Or they felt they were being conned and prodded into being pushed into a war they were not ready for. Bangladesh, as a free nation was now almost a fait accompli and why should China support a lost cause and thus queer the pitch with the new nation state emerging in South Asia?

"Meanwhile, Jordan had received a request from Yahya Khan for transfer of 8-10 sophisticated Frontline F-104 Starfighters. This was American equipment and as such came under the Congressional ban. It was a violation of the US Law. Pakistan was still legally under a US Arms embargo then and this move was opposed by the State Department. Harold Saunders, Kissinger’s staffer at the White House also opposed this. Henry Kissinger now went up to President Nixon. 

"Despite his fears and apprehensions of running foul of US Law – Nixon gave the go ahead for this transfer but insisted that it be kept strictly confidential. This was done very covertly to avoid an uproar in the media and Congress and on 8 December the Presidential clearance was officially sent for this vital arms transfer despite the Congressional ban. Crucial points of the meeting of the US Attorney General with the President in the White House on this issue were intentionally bleeped out. Jordan ultimately dispatched 17 x F-104 Starfighters via Saudi Arabia. Turkey was also going to transfer some 22 such war planes to Pakistan.

"The USA also now began to give dire warnings to the USSR to restrain India or risk derailing relations. President Nixon had deliberately risked an India-China border war, a confrontation with the Soviet Union, a domestic firestorm and getting the US Administration dragged to the courts and cleaners. (And all because he liked that tinpot – Pakistani dictator so much.) What was equally evident was the malice and hatred he personally harboured for the Indians. It was indeed disconcerting. America was, after all ostensibly fighting a war in Vietnam to save democracy."

Nixon obviously didn't give two hoots fir either democracy or law, which is clearer in hindsight. 

Why, with that example and three other following Chiefs of the same stripe, was Trump abused quite so much by media? Media couldn't possibly have forgotten Nixon, Watergate, Reagan and Iran-contra affair, or a guy continuing reading in nursery after being informed his country was under attack! 

Did they? 

................................................................................................

"10 December 1971 – Washington: White House Situation Room 

"On 7 December the UN General Assembly had passed a resolution by 104 to 11 votes calling for a ceasefire and immediate withdrawal of troops by both sides. This had been orchestrated by the pressure brought to bear by America on the smaller states of the Third World. America and China had supported this, UK and France had abstained and the Soviets had opposed this. President Nixon was now ratcheting up the diplomatic pressure on India. The previous day the Indian Government had granted recognition to the Bangladesh government in exile.

"President Nixon called for a meeting in the Situation Room (excerpts of this had emerged in the Anderson Tapes). It was clear that he was now having second thoughts. With the Indian Army closing in on Dacca Nixon had privately written off East Pakistan. He was now fully focused on safeguarding West Pakistan. He started the meeting by observing – 

"“The East is down the drain. The major problem now is how to protect West Pakistan. Their Army is going down. Two more weeks of war and they are finished in the west as much as they are in the east.”

"Nixon turned to Henry Kissinger, 

"“You see those people are welcoming Indian troops when they come in. So the point then is, Henry, why are we going through all this agony?”"

"Both Nixon and Kissinger had a great penchant for swinging around troop deployments around the world (without really meaning to go to war) .These deployments were designed to scare the Soviets – give them the impression that Nixon- the madman could go to any lengths. So, the meeting now decided the following:- 

"• The US 7th Fleet to be moved into the Bay of Bengal for a coercive show of force. Its ostensible purpose would be to evacuate US and British citizens (these had already been evacuated by air mostly). 

"• Encourage China to intervene militarily and spark off a border war with India. Information of US Naval manoeuvres and transfer of US war planes via Jordan and Turkey to Pakistan was to be told to the Chinese. Also they would be told that the US was not supplying radars for the Himalayan border with China and if China did intervene in this conflict, the US would do nothing. 

"• The US President authorised Jordan and Turkey to send their Starfighters to Pakistan. The State Department would be told to shut up about the legalities of this decision."

................................................................................................

"Based on these deliberations in the Situation Room, the mighty US 7th Fleet, which had already been warned earlier, was now ordered to move via the Malacca Straits and make a threatening move into the Bay of Bengal. This was a mighty Armada. At its core was the 90,000 tons giant American Air Craft Carrier – the USS Enterprise that had Phantom fighter- bombers on board. These could deliver nuclear weapons if required. It had the second aircraft carrier – the Commando Helicopter carrier – USS Tripoli. There were 6 Destroyers and one oiler ship. It was a massive armada. Tailing it under sea however, were a couple of Soviet nuclear submarines. The US columnist Anderson speculates that the tasks given to the 7th Fleet were:- 

"• To compel India to divert both ships and planes to shadow the Task Force 

"• To weaken India’s Blockade against Pakistan 

"• Possibly divert India’s sole aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, from its military mission 

"• To force India to keep planes on defensive alert – thus reducing their availability and operations against Pakistan’s ground troops who were taking hell of a beating from the air.

"India saw through this charade. It was evident that this Task Force was only designed to intimidate and coerce and not launch kinetic operations. However, it did create nervousness in some quarters in New Delhi initially. It was insane for the USA to fight a war now to save Pakistan. The East had almost fallen. Contacts were established with the Soviets who quietly assured India that their nuclear submarines were tailing this armada. Just so the message went home, once the Task Force was deployed in the Bay of Bengal, a Soviet nuclear submarine deliberately came to the surface in full view of the American fleet. It was apparent that no kinetic action was intended. However, under the terms of the Indo-Soviet treaty the Soviets were clearly signaling the Americans and were trying to deter them from any adventurism. The clear signal was that it could have unimaginable consequences.

"Meanwhile Gen Yahya Khan was desperately clutching at straws in Rawalpindi. Governor AM Malik’s signal asking for permission to negotiate a ceasefire had reached his table. Just then he got the news of the US armada. Overjoyed he brusquely rejected the Governor’s proposal and asked him to shelve it. 

"Reality sank in a day later. This was only a token show of force. Despite many secret meetings in New York between Henry Kissinger and other top US officials with the Chinese Ambassador to the UN- Huang Hua – the Chinese did not move. The Americans gushed that they had sent their mighty Task Force; had supplied Starfighters to Pakistan via Jordan and Turkey and should China intervene militarily, the USA would not interfere. The Chinese listened politely but they did not bite the bullet. ... "

................................................................................................

"The stage was now set for the end game in Dacca. The entire command hierarchy in East Pakistan was badly shaken by the pinpoint air strike on the Governor’s House at Dacca. Gavin Young (who later wrote a book entitled ‘World Apart’) had gone to meet John Kelly of the United Nations. Kelly had been to the Governor’s House immediately after the air strike. The shaken Governor Dr. AM Malik’s hands were still trembling. He was very upset that Gen Yahya Khan had trash-canned his ceasefire proposal because of the arrival of the 7th Fleet. That had not materially altered the situation one bit. In fact with this pin point air strike, it had only worsened. 

"The frightened Governor stammered as he asked Kelly, “Do you think we should give up now?” 

"Kelly was embarrassed. He did not want to commit the UN to such a monumental decision. ... "

"Just then the second air raid had started and Malik wrote out his letter of resignation to Yahya Khan. ... That was the collapse of the Pakistani Government in the East.

"Meanwhile, the tension was building up in New Delhi too. So far India had waged a war of manoeuvre. Most frontline fortresses had simply been bypassed as the columns raced towards Dacca. By 13 December 1971, only two fortresses had surrendered to Indian forces; rest were simply contained and bypassed. A lot of pressure was building up in the UN. The Soviets had vetoed some three resolutions for a Ceasefire in the UN Security Council. The matter had been taken to the UN General Assembly, where the US pressure on third world countries had prevailed. The Soviets were now rather worried. They asked India to wind up its operations in the East as quickly as possible. It was becoming very difficult for them to continue vetoing the resolutions. The Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Veisily Kuznetsov, himself now flew down to Delhi. He was worried. He asked the Indian’s, “to confine their objectives to East Pakistan.”

"Sam was worried too. What if a ceasefire were enforced tomorrow? How many towns did we hold in East Pakistan? Just two. This was unacceptable. He was irritated and annoyed and ordered the Eastern Command to send troops back and retake all these by-passed towns. Glaringly omitted in that list of towns was Dacca. The pressure was beginning to tell even on the formidable Field Marshal.

"Gen Jacob was horrified. He remonstrated with Sam and the DMO. This would be a disaster. The entire plan was not based on attrition but collapsing the organisational structure of Pakistan Army in the East. The plan would be completely unhinged with this highly retrograde step. It was now vital to take Dacca as quickly as possible and get the Pakistani Eastern Command to surrender. We could not afford to let up pressure on Dacca at this crucial stage. The DMO Gen Inder Gill managed to finally get him around and pacified the agitated Sam. The operations towards Dacca proceeded apace.

"On night 13/14 December Gen Niazi spoke to the Pakistani Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Gen Hamid. He requested him to ask Yahya Khan to expedite the ceasefire. Finally Yahya relented. His fantasies of US or Chinese military intervention had by now evaporated in thin air. The reality check was painful. On 14 December 1971, Gen Yahya Khan sent a signal to Niazi telling him to take necessary measures to stop the fighting; and preserve the lives of the armed forces personnel. Technically Yahya had thrown in the towel. His signal to Niazi read:- 

"“You have now reached a stage where further resistance is no longer humanly possible nor will it serve any useful purpose. It will only lead to a further loss of life and destruction. You should now take all necessary measures to stop the fighting.”"

"This signal was received by Niazi at 1500 hrs IST. Gen Niazi and Rao Farman Ali went to see the US Consul General Herbert Spirack in Dacca (who had replaced the feisty Archer Blood). Niazi now asked Spirack to negotiate a ceasefire with the Indians ensuring the guarantees requested earlier. Spirack was somewhat taken aback. He stated that he was not in a position to do so, but however would send the message. Thereupon Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali drafted a message similar to the one they had sent earlier. ... "

................................................................................................

"The message, however, was not sent by the US Consul General to India. It was sent to Washington to chew over. At around 1400 hrs a diplomat in the US Consular office in Calcutta apprised Gen Jacob of Niazi’s meeting with Spirack in Dacca and the ceasefire/surrender proposals. Jacob immediately telephoned Herbert Gordon, the US Consul General at Calcutta. He denied any knowledge of this.

"Gen Jacob then rang up Sam Manekshaw and apprised him of the latest developments. In the interest of saving time he requested if Sam could contact the US Ambassador. Sam did and the ambassador truthfully said he had no knowledge whatsoever of any request to Spirack.

"In actual fact, Spirack had sent this message to his boss, Joseph Farland the US Ambassador in Islamabad. He in turn had passed it on to the US State Department. Instead of taking any action, the department decided to hold on to it for one more day – in order to give the Pakistanis more time to take territory in the West before a ceasefire came into effect. For some reason Gen Yaha Kahn had lost the appetite to continue this fight. The fabled major Pakistani counter-offensive in the west never materialised The American establishment’s sympathy and support for Pakistan was so evident, it was painful. It was support for a military cabal that had just carried out the worst genocide and ethnic cleansing in recent history.

"General Sam Manekshaw finally received this message on 15 December 1971. He gave assurances that the safety of Pakistani personnel would be guaranteed provided they surrendered."

................................................................................................

"The Pakistani Eastern Command was now directed to contact the Indian Eastern Command at Fort Williams. The Pakistani C-in-C, Gen Hamid signaled to Niazi to accept. A ceasefire was agreed upon from 1700 hrs on 15 December 1971 until 0900 hrs the next day. This was later extended to 1500 hrs. As far as can be made out, Gen Yahya Khan had largely left it to Gen Niazi to decide the fate of his Army and carry the can for eternity. Hasan Zaheer however states that the Pakistanis did try their best to avoid the use of the word surrender. Niazi thought the negotiations would proceed on the lines of his ceasefire proposal.

"At 0915 hrs on 16 December 1971, Gen Manekshaw spoke on the phone to Gen Jacob. He asked him to go to Dacca immediately and organise the surrender so that it took place the same evening. ... "

"Gen Jacob had just received a message from Gen Niazi inviting him for lunch. ... "

"He now took Air Commodore Purushottam (of the Advance Air HQ) and Col Khara (the Intelligence Officer) with him and flew to Dacca with a copy of the draft Instrument of Surrender. Before leaving he had briefed Brig Sethna to organise the airlift of the Indian and foreign correspondents as also the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force in the East. Also he should ensure that Col MAG Osmani and Wing Commander Khondkar of the Mukti Bahini Command attended this event. All our formations were informed of the ceasefire negotiations.

"Meanwhile 101 Communication Zone was rapidly closing in on to Dacca. The 95 Infantry Brigade of this formation was advancing on Kaliakair-Tungi-Dacca axis while FJ Sector was closing in from the Jaydebpur-Tungi axis. These were the expected routes of advance. Suddenly, Maj Gen Nagra was informed by the Mukti Bahini and locals about the newly constructed bypass to Dacca from Kaliakair to Manikganj. This was not marked on the maps. Gen Nagra now diverted 2 PARA to this route. This was not held at all and the unit had a free run towards Dacca. There was no opposition worth the name on this axis. The Pakistanis had not updated their maps. The leading troops of IV Corps on the other hand, had reached Narsingdi on the Ashuganj-Tungi railway on the evening of 14 December itself and were pressing forward to Tungi. Dacca had been brought under Medium Artillery guns range from this axis also. 

"Meanwhile 2 PARA was racing ahead. By the dawn of 16th December the unit was on the outskirts of Dacca – just two miles from the city. The clean and plush Dacca cantonment was visible from here. Gen Nagra moved forward and joined the paratroopers. There was great elation all around. Some years earlier Gen Nagra had been Military Advisor to the Indian High Commission at Karachi. Niazi was then a Brigade commander in Sindh and the two knew each other well. Nagra now decided to do his bit of softening up of the Pakistani General.

"Gen Nagra sent his young ADC Captain Hitesh Mehta, along with the Adjutant of 2 PARA, Captain Nirbhay Sharma (later as Lt Gen he would command the prestigious 15 Corps in Srinagar; post retirement he became the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh and then Mizoram). The two young officers got into a jeep with a large white flag of truce tied to it. They were carrying a message for Gen Niazi. This was a message that would soon echo around the world. It simply read: 

"“My dear Abdulla, I am here. The game is up. I suggest you give yourself up to me and I’ll look after you.” 

"This really softened Niazi. It put a known face on the relentlessly advancing enemy. Niazi also sent one of his senior most officers present – a Major General to receive Nagra and escort him to his HQ in Dacca cantonment. By 1500 hrs Gen Nagra had entered the HQ Eastern Command of the Pakistani Army in Dacca. News came in that Maj Gen Jamshed GOC of the ad hoc 36 Infantry Division had surrendered to the Indian Army with a large body of troops. Then news also came in that Maj Gen Ansari GOC 9 Pak Division had also surrendered with his forces."

................................................................................................

"The Niazi-Jacob Dialogue 

"That was the time Gen Jacob’s helicopter landed at the recently captured town of Jessore to refuel. There he got Sam’s message that the Government had directed that he accept Niazi’s lunch invitation. They took off. As they were landing they saw an enemy helicopter take off and fly away. Pakistani air defence guns were following them. The Air Commodore wanted to abort the landing and turn back. Gen Jacob ordered that they land forthwith. The BGS of the Pakistani Eastern Command Brig Baqar Siddiqui (who had been elevated to Chief of Staff) was there to receive him. The UN Representative was also there to welcome him and to offer his good offices to negotiate with Pakistan. That was the last thing India needed just then. There were bitter memories of J&K still rankling. Jacob asked his Air Force colleague to tie up with the Pakistani Air Force personnel to ensure safe landing of Gen Aurora’s helicopter. Gen Jacob and Col Khara along with Brig Siddiqui drove down to the HQs of the Pakistani Eastern Command.

"Gen Niazi received Jacob in his office. Present for the discussion were Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali – the Military advisor to the Governor; Maj Gen Jamshed; Rear Admiral Sharif (the Pakistani Naval Chief in the East) and Air Cmde Inamul Haq (the highest ranking officer of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in the east) along with the ubiquitous Brig Baqar Siddiqui. 

"The GOC 101 Communication Zone had just come in a little earlier and he and Niazi had met with great gusto and were exchanging bawdy jokes in Punjabi. A distinct chill came over the room when Gen Jacob arrived there. Jacob asked Niazi to ensure that the ceasefire was rigorously ensured. There was still sporadic firing going in many areas including Tungi and he should issue orders to the concerned troops to cease firing.

"Jacob then took Gen Nagra outside and instructed him to move in sufficient troops to ensure law and order. Then he was to organise the surrender. Jacob wanted it done in full public view at the Race Course Maidan. This would have to be secured. Jacob asked Gen Nagra to organise a Guard of Honour with 2 Para and a Pakistani unit for the Army Commander when he landed. At the Race Course he was to arrange a table with just two chairs. He was also to ensure protection of the Intercontinental Hotel where the UN personnel, Red Cross representatives and members of the East Pakistan Government had sought shelter. Jacob just had two to three hours now to negotiate surrender. 

"Jacob then came back to Niazi’s office. He asked Col Khara to read out the terms of surrender. A stunned silence fell over the room. Silent tears ran down Gen Niazi’s face. Other Pakistani officers in the room began to fidget. They had expected the document to be on the lines of the proposals they had handed over on 14 December to Spirack. These envisioned a ceasefire and evacuation under UN arrangements. Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali objected to surrendering to the Joint Indian and Bangaldesh Command.

"Gen Niazi said, 

"“Jacob Sahib you are asking for an unconditional surrender.” 

"Jacob replied patiently, “In our earlier telephonic conversation we had duly informed you that you would be treated as soldiers with dignity and the Geneva Convention would be strictly honoured.”

"Gen Niazi fidgeted uncomfortably in his chair, 

"“Look Gen Jacob, you had come only to discuss the Ceasefire Proposals we had sent through Mr. Spirack, the US Consul General here. You are instead asking me for an unconditional surrender.” 

"Gen Jacob now said sternly, 

"“Gen Niazi if you do not accept the terms spelt out, we cannot be held responsible for your safety. And may I add, we will have no alternative but to immediately resume full scale offensive operations – starting with air attacks.” 

"Gen Niazis face blanched as the painful memory of yesterday’s air attack flashed through his mind. There was pin drop silence in that office. 

"Gen Jacob got up imperiously, 

"“Gen Niazi I am giving you 30 minutes to make up your mind.” 

"He walked out of the room, lit an enormous cigar and began to pace nonchalantly in the corridor outside."

"Precisely at that very time, the UN was in session. A Polish resolution for a ceasefire had been tabled. Bhutto came to India’s rescue. He gave an angry harangue to the UN General Assembly (UNGA), worked himself into a rage. The resolution was unacceptable. The Resolution did not name India as the aggressor. Bhutto then got up for dramatic effect and tore that draft resolution into pieces and staged a walk out from the august hall. The Americans were miffed. They asked the British/French to table another draft resolution. Bhutto had gained India another few valuable hours."

"Meanwhile Gen Jacob continued to pace restlessly in the corridor. Niazi had told him he had 30,000 troops and could fight on. 

"“For how much longer General?” he had shot back. ... The air attacks will resume within minutes. Think about it!”"

"Gen Jacob looked at his watch. The 30 minutes were over. He took a final drag at his cigar and tossed it into a waste paper basket. Then he strode into Niazi’s office with the air of a conqueror. 

"Quietly he asked Gen Niazi, 

"“General, do you accept the terms of the draft document now on your table?” 

"Gen Niazi was silent. His laboured breathing was almost audible in the room. He said nothing but there were tears rolling down his cheeks. 

"“General, I hope you understand, the Mukti Bahini are already all over this town. They are baying for your blood. If you do not surrender we can do nothing to protect you.” 

"Gen Niazi remained silent. He continued breathing heavily. 

"“General your officers have their families here. Have you thought of them? You know what your men have been doing to the Bengali women? The Muktis will slaughter you mercilessly. They are baying for your blood,” he hissed. 

"“I ask you again – do you accept the terms spelt out in this document?” 

"Gen Niazi continued to glare at him. Tears were streaming copiously down his face. 

"Gen Jacob noisily pulled the chair and sat down in front of Niazi. He looked deep into his eyes. 

"“General, from your silence I see that you have understood,” he said quietly. Suddenly with a flourish he picked up the draft document and got up, 

"“I take this document as signed. General you will surrender to Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora today at 1630 hrs at the Race Course.” 

"Niazi spluttered, “At the Race Course – that would not be appropriate.”

"“General – a combined Guard of Honour will be given to Gen Aurora by Indian and Pakistani detachments. You will surrender your sword to him,” Gen Jacob said. “I do not have a sword here,” Niazi was desperately clutching at straws. 

"“Then you will surrender your pistol,” Jacob said with an air of finality."

"Gavin Young of The Observer was outside. “Can I have lunch too?” he queried. “Come in,” said Jacob quietly. 

"He could hardly swallow that roast chicken. It had been a harrowing two hours for him. So much was at stake. It was, as he said later, rather modestly, “a close run thing.”"

................................................................................................

"The Power of Personality in War 

"Here was Gen Jacob unarmed in the midst of some 26,480 officers and soldiers of the Pakistan Army. Others would have been fearful of their lives and the ability to get out unscathed. Gen Jacob showed tremendous physical courage and a confidence bordering on arrogance. Through those very tense negotiations, he kept a poker face that just did not betray the tumult that was churning his belly. That is the power of personality in war. It was also illustrative of the complete psychological collapse of the Pakistani Army in the East. The war of manoeuvre was not aimed at killing masses of enemy soldiers. It was aimed at the minds of the enemy commanders. As Liddle Hart has described – the dislocation of the minds of the enemy commanders here was complete and total. “For to fight and win all your battles, is not the acme of excellence. Supreme excellence,” said Sun Tzu “lies in subduing your enemy without fighting.”

"Gen Jacob had subdued not just the shaken Niazi who the previous day only had a very close encounter with death – a near miss that had left his nerves shattered. Jack Farj Rafael Jacob had not just domineered the shaken Niazi but the entire Pakistani Tri-Service High Command in the East. It was not just one man called Niazi who had crumbled – it was the entire Pakistani High Command in the East."

" ... The Indian Army had come of age. In 13 action packed days, they had advanced over 400 miles in the worst, the most defensible terrain in the world. It had been the Engineers’ War. Indian combat engineers had laid over 10,000 feet of bridging. The Indian Air Force massed effects in a decisive way. The shock and concussion of air ordnance had left the Pakistanis dazed and shaken.

"The Indian Army had marched on an enemy capital, enforced a mass surrender of some 93,000 men (the biggest after the Second World War) and created a new nation state with the force of arms. 

"That magnificent surrender was about to take place – the final denouement of that 13 days war! Lunch over Jacob queried again about the time of arrival of the Army Commander. There was no news. The General was coming along with his wife. This had left Jacob a bit nonplussed. Dacca was still dangerous.

"At 1500 hrs he asked Niazi to accompany him to the helipad. They went in his car with a pilot, jeep upfront. Out there, there was a veritable tumult – a sea of excited hysterical Bengali faces – yelling “Joy Bangla.” The Mukti Bahini tried to prevent them from moving forward. Some of them threw themselves on the bonnet of the car. It was looking ugly. It was fortunate that Col Khara was a Sikh. He stuck his turbaned head out and yelled that Gen Niazi was now a prisoner of the Indian Army and that they should not impede them. The teeming crowds were now pressing down on the car. 

"The Pakistani Military Police escorts were armed only with pistols and could have done nothing to stop the mobs or the armed Mukti Bahini. The situation was turning decidedly ugly. 

"Suddenly Jacob spotted a jeep with two Indian paratroopers near the airfield. He quickly took them under command and ordered them to accompany Niazi’s car. It was most fortunate and perhaps saved Niazi from a lynching that he perhaps justly deserved. No Indian troops had reached as yet to secure the airfield.

"Jacob told Khara to quickly summon up some troops and tanks. IV Corps had tried to swim some tanks across the Meghna on 15 December evening and Jacob wanted them in Dacca urgently. 

"Suddenly he saw a tall bearded Mukti Bahini Commander come with a truck load of soldiers. He was wearing the badges of Maj Gen. This was Tiger Siddiqui. Jacob recognised him. They menacingly approached Niazi. Gen Jacob panicked. It was imperative that Niazi live till he signed the Instrument of Surrender. He asked the paratroopers to shield Niazi – while he went and gave a tongue lashing to Tiger Siddiqui. He was supposed to have accompanied our troops with his 20,000 men for the advance to Dacca. He had not done so. Now he was here, intent upon bayoneting quislings.

"Jacob shouted at him to move that damned truck off the tarmac. Just then Col Khara returned with a PT 76 tank. Siddiqui hesitated, saw the tank and to Gen Jacob’s immense relief – he left suddenly. 

"A few days later he would call the International media with camera crews to witness the public bayoneting of people he called traitors. These pictures received the widest possible circulation in the international media to India’s great chagrin."

................................................................................................

"16 December 1971, 1630 hrs: Dacca Airfield 

"The Army Commander Lt Gen JS Aurora landed with his entourage in a magnificent fleet of five Mi-4 and four Alouette helicopters. The helicopters clattered down with an infernal din. Niazi and Jacob went to receive him. The Army Commander alighted with his wife beside him. With them were Air Mshl Dewan VrC, Adm Krishnan, Lt Gen Sagat Singh and his three Divisional Commanders. The chief of the Mukti Bahini Col Osmani could not be seen anywhere. Niazi, Gen Aurora and Air Mshl Dewan proceeded to the car. Jacob was to travel with them but had to make way for Mrs. Aurora who took her place by the side of her husband. Her arrival in the war zone was rather incongruous and uncalled for. It was decidedly risky. Poor Gen Jacob had to hitch a ride in the Paratroopers jeep. One can imagine his chagrin. Peace had truly returned and the ladies would take precedence once more! A mass of humanity was surging down at the Dacca Race Course, where the Surrender Ceremony was to be held.

"Gen Aurora and Niazi jointly inspected the Guard of Honour. The poor boys of the 2 PARA were encrusted with mud and dirt. They had been on the march for the better part of the last week. They had hardly slept. Yet these dead tired troops put up an excellent display. The Pakistani Military Police contingent was shining by contrast in their smart peacetime uniforms. On their faces however, was the grim imprint of defeat.

"Gen Aurora and Niazi proceeded to the table and sat down. The Surrender document was placed on the table. Niazi glanced curiously at the Instrument of Surrender. Then he fumbled for a pen. Gen Aurora gave him his Sheaffer pen. Niazi signed. Then he got up slowly to his feet. Tears were streaming down his face. There were dark rings under his eyes. He undid his epaulette and took off his lanyard. He had borrowed a pistol from a Pakistani Military Police Soldier. He now handed over his pistol to Gen Aurora. The Pakistani Guards laid down their rifles on the ground.

"Shouts of Joy Bangla reverberated in the sky. Now they began to hear slogans against Gen Niazi and the Pakistan Army. There were hardly any Indian troops at the Race Course. The crowd surged towards Gen Niazi – almost wanting to tear him limb by limb. The Indian officers formed a protective ring around him and escorted him to the Indian jeep. 

"Gen Jacob quickly briefed Gen Sagat Singh regarding disarming the Pakistanis, maintenance of law and order and movement of the prisoners of war (POWs) to India. Then he rushed to the Mi-4 helicopter whose rotors were already whirring. Once on his seat he let out a deep breath in a whistle. 

"By God! It had been one hell of a day!

"The strain had been enormous but he had managed to pull it off. The Surrender Ceremony had been near flawless. The only hitch had been Col Osmani – the Chief of the Mukti Bahini. The helicopter sent for him had came under hostile fire and been considerably damaged. It could not be repaired in time and thus the Chief of the Mukti Bahini was missing from the Surrender Ceremony. This was to rankle for a long time as the surrender was supposed to be to the Joint Command of India and Bangladesh."

................................................................................................

"The greatest threat during the Bangladesh War of 1971 was the spectre of Chinese intervention. It was the greatest conundrum of that war. To husband resources for a decisive military campaign in the East, the Indian top brass had to take great risk and denude troops from the Himalayan front against China. That was the only way a force superiority could be generated for the operations against the Pakistani Eastern Command. 

"It was to minimise the risk of the Chinese intervention that Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw had recommended postponement of the offensive from March 1971, as asked for by the political leadership and intelligence agencies, to November-December 1971. It took great political courage to take that highly unpopular decision. The entire Indian public was virtually clamouring for war that year. The people wanted India to hit back hard at Pakistan for its genocide and demographic aggression of pushing in some 10 million hapless Bengali refugees into India.

"Mrs. Gandhi’s administration had very sensibly withheld the information that some 80 percent of these were hapless Hindu refugees who had been singled out for systematic genocide and ethnic cleansing on a massive scale. It was one of the biggest population transfers of the century that exceeded the scale of refugee movement even in the holocaust of Partition in 1947. That time the refugee flows had been caused by hysterical lynch mobs and massive communal riots. This holocaust like pogrom had been done as a planned military operation by the Pakistani Army. The sheer scale of the killings, mass rape and ethnic cleansing was reminiscent of the Nazi holocaust against Jews during World War-II. To prevent communal rioting and arson in the country, the Indian government had very prudently hidden these brutal facts from its own people. Had these become public knowledge, the public pressure to act against Pakistan would have been so intense that no government worth the name could have withstood it.

"The Americans had coincidentally reached out to China in that very year. To cement their new found alliance with China against the Soviets – they had encouraged China to start a border war against India. All sorts of inducements were given. They pointed out to the move of the 7th Fleet into the Bay of Bengal; the Transfer of F-104 Starfighters from Jordan and Turkey to Pakistan and the fact that they were withholding critically needed Radars asked by India for the Himalayan front. They were in fact telling China of India’s radar coverage gaps to induce them to strike. When the Chinese hesitated, in secret meetings with the Chinese Ambassador to the UN, the Americans assured them that should they attack India, the United States would stay out of the fight. Even this failed to convince the Chinese to intervene militarily.

" ... It is noteworthy that in the previous conflict of September 1965, the Chinese had at least issued an ultimatum to dismantle certain structures on the Sikkim Border. Though no kinetic moves were made, China had at least put some psychological pressure. ... "

"• China’s Internal Dynamics: The key determinant of Chinese state behaviour in this conflict lay in the internal dynamics of China – in the great chaos unleashed deliberately by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It was China gone mad. Even more crucial was Marshal Lin Biao’s attempted coup against Mao Zedong – (precisely because of Mao’s outreach to the USA) and was the perhaps the primary reason for China not undertaking any military adventure. This will be covered in detail subsequently.

"• The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace & Friendship: the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace & friendship signed in August 1971 was a great deterrent for any military misadventure by China. The simple fact is that the Soviets had just given a drubbing to the PLA in the border clashes of the Armur-Ussuri River in 1969. In 1971, they had, as per Gen Jacob, massed 40 Soviet Divisions opposite the key and highly vulnerable province of Xinjiang. The Chinese were clear-headed realists. They clearly realised that any attack on India could result in serious, unintended consequences. The Soviet Union was eagerly looking for an opportunity to cut the Chinese down to size. After the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet split, they had cut off all weapons/equipment supplies. Even for the massive arms aid given in Stalin’s time for the Korean War, the Chinese had been made to pay through their nose in hard cash. The two powers simply did not trust one another.

"• Chinese Suspicion about being Pushed into a War: The Chinese have always been very pragmatic and realist. It is possible that their suspicions may have been aroused by the strident US advocacy for pushing China into a war with India. In fact, the American prodding had been most direct and unsubtle. They had said that because of the US Congress, their media and public opinion, they could not wage war against India. Hence they wanted China to do it. This was bound to raise Chinese suspicions that they were being suckered into a war for which they were not ready and in which (because of the Indo-Soviet Treaty), there were very major chances of escalation which could well involve China itself in a two front war. The Sino-American détente was far too recent and untested and it is possible that Chinese hackles were raised by the strident advocacy of the USA that China involve itself in the Indo-Pakistan conflict."

................................................................................................

"The Internal Dimension 

"The most likely reason for China’s non-intervention, however, was the internal dynamics within China. Little inside information had emerged then from behind the bamboo curtain. Because of obsessive Chinese secrecy – the world was not aware that China was almost on the verge of a civil war, Much greater details of the attempted coup by Marshal Lin Biao, (Mao’s number two and anointed successor) have now emerged and serve to give an insight into the reason for the Chinese hesitation for waging war against India in 1971. It is noteworthy that in their initial parleys with Henry Kissinger, the Chinese leaders – both Zhou en Lai and Mao Zedong had expressed hatred and contempt for India. They called it an over-aggressive nation like Japan and felt it had to be curbed. This had spurred Henry Kissinger into his charm offensive to induce China to intervene in the Bangladesh War. However, when push came to shove – the Chinese backed out completely and did nothing. They did not (a la 1965) even issue an ultimatum.

"Here could be the reason why. Marshal Lin Biao was regarded as China’s Rommel. He was one of the greatest Field Commanders to emerge from the Chinese Civil War. Such was his stature – that when Mao wanted him to head the intervention force in Korea, he had declined and Marshal Peng de Huai had led these massive attrition oriented operations. Every one considered Lin Biao as Mao’s heir apparent. His standing in the PLA was formidable. Obviously Lin Biao was getting a wee bit impatient. Mao showed no signs of retiring or even dying a natural death and Lin Biao was himself getting on in years. The great Cultural Revolution had seeded utter chaos in China and set back her consolidation and progress by a decade or more. Mao had created a personality cult that put him above the party, the state- everything. Mao was the great Helmsman and the media was filled with nothing but his hagiographies. I had heard some of the Chinese Foreign Ministries propaganda tapes while deployed in Cho La. They went to amazing lengths of inanity. One tape spoke of a farmer in Helulang (Yunnan province) who had a cow that gave a yield of 6.8 litres per day. The tape claimed that when The Thoughts of Mao Zedong were read out to that same cow – its yield of milk had jumped to 8.3 litres per day.

"Havaldar Balkar Singh, my Education NCO was tasked to record each of the Chinese broadcasts to send them to higher HQ and intelligence for analysis. This poor man almost had a psychological breakdown hearing such asinine nonsense for months on end. I pitied him. The propaganda tapes in highly Sanskritised Hindi had no impact on my Dogra boys who spoke mostly Dogri or Punjabi. However poor Balkar Singh had to record each word and it almost drove him insane.

"This personality cult of Mao and the unending hagiography was also beginning to rile Marshal Lin Biao. He was getting impatient to take charge. He was looking for a cause that would arouse the ire of the Chinese people against Mao. When Mao and Zhou made the outreach to America, Lin Biao had the cause he was looking for. This was a sell out to the imperialist, war-mongers. Mao had lost his judgment and his mind. The great Cultural Revolution was haunting China – but you dare not say it to those crazed youngsters in the streets – who were denouncing their elders as capitalist roaders, stooges of imperialists and plain dunces. Wasn’t Mao now turning into an imperialist stooge himself? Marshal Lin Biao thought he had the perfect provocation now to go hammer and tongs to destroy Mao and his personality cult.

"In February 1971, Lin Biao realised that Mao suspected him of Bonapartist tendencies. In fact after the 9th Chinese Communist Party’s National Congress, where Lin Biao had been critical of Mao over the outreach to the USA, the Party President for life had decided to purge him. In February 1971 Lin and his wife Ye Quin (a Politburo Member) now called a meeting of their closest followers to plan Mao’s assassination. In March that year a second meeting was held at a Shanghai air base of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) commanded by Lin Liguo (a very senior Air Force Officer). At this meeting Lin and his supporters drafted a plan to organise a coup to overthrow Mao. This was codenamed Project 571 and was focused on an armed uprising. In the end of March this group met again to formalise the command structure.

"August 1971: Mao had now received intelligence about this coup. He scheduled a conference for September 1971 to determine the political fate of Lin Biao. 

"15 August 1971: Mao left Beijing to discuss issues with senior political and military leaders in Southern China. Marshal Lin Biao was a highly popular leader and it was not easy to get rid of him just like that. 

"5 September 1971: Lin Biao received reports from his supporters that Mao was planning to purge him on 8 September. Lin now gave his followers the go ahead to actuate the coup plans. Lin’s men made a plan to sabotage the train in which Mao was returning to Beijing. 

"11 September 1971: Mao got wind of this assassination plan and at the very last minute on 11 September he changed the route and foiled this plot. Mao’s loyal bodyguards now foiled several other attempts to assassinate him. On 12 September Mao safely returned to his Zhongnanhai bunker in Beijing.

"Lin Biao was now in complete panic. His plot to assassinate Mao had failed dismally. A vengeful Mao would now hit back. He was fully alerted to their plans. The cabal had been penetrated. Lin Biao now considered fleeing south to his power base in Guangzhou. From there they would establish an alternative Party HQ and attack the forces still loyal to Mao. They would do this with the support of the USSR. Marshal Lin Biao now learnt that Zhou en Lai was investigating the recent incidents. Marshal Lin Biao panicked completely.

"13 September 1971: On the 13th morning Lin Biao and his cohorts decided to flee to the USSR. They boarded a pre-arranged Trident IE, a plane of the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC). The plane was being piloted by Pan jing Yin, the deputy Commander of the PLAAF’s 34th Division. Chinese official records state that the plane did not have adequate fuel to get to Russia. As a result it ran out of fuel over Ander Khan in Mongolia and all people onboard were killed. 

"Counter Assassination: Other sources suggest that this escaping Trident aircraft was shot down over Mongolia by Chinese fighter jets. Surprisingly Hua Guofeng later destroyed all records pertaining to this incident. These included telephone call records, records of meetings, telephone diaries and the alleged confessions of the supporters of Marshal Lin Biao obtained under gruesome torture. There are many grey areas of the official Chinese account. Vis-a-vis South China, USA and Taiwan would have been safer destinations to flee to. However Marshal Lin Biao was using the opening to America to now denounce Mao as a capitalist roader. He could hardly flee there. Lin Biao definitely seemed to be in close touch with the Soviet KGB and GRU, etc. It is this factor that possibly made the Chinese agonise over commencing hostilities against India. The Soviets had signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India in August 1971 – precisely when this unfolding of the coup drama in China was now entering a critical phase. The American prodding got them suspicious and cagey – were they being set up for a Soviet attack? The Russians had now amassed 40 Divisions opposite Xinjiang. The Chinese were not at all sure about the extent of the subversion of the PLA. Prisoners were still being tortured to get to the roots of this plot. Mao was not at all keen that this news should filter out of China. It was hardly the time to risk a major two front war with India in the south and the USSR in the west.

"Were the Americans playing games? Were they trying to instigate a military clash between China and the Soviet Union? Mao decided to hedge his bets. The best strategy was to do nothing but wait and watch. That is precisely what the Chinese Army did in 1971. They let down their most trusted friend and ally – Pakistan. It was supposed to be a friendship higher than the mountains and deeper than the seas. And so, at Cho La, Nathu La, Jelep La and all the other Himalayan Passes on the watershed, we kept waiting tensely for a Chinese attack that never came. We saw no troop movements and all that we heard were Chinese propaganda tapes telling us how reading the thoughts of Mao Zedong to a cow could dramatically increase its yield of milk from 6.8 to 8.3 litres per day."

................................................................................................

"The Chinese philosopher on war and strategist Sun Tzu (Sun Zi) is world renowned. His pithy aphorisms are quoted not just by military leaders all over the world, but also by business leaders in the corporate sector. It is only now that the world is becoming aware of an Indian strategic genius called Chanakya (or Kautilya). Each nation has its own unique way of war fighting that is an expression of its innate genius, culture, historical experience and geography. Just as each culture has its own unique styles of art, its dance forms and its architecture – so does each nation state have its own, unique and distinctive form of war fighting – its own Art of War for that matter."

"A number of western military writers like Stephen Peter Rosen have opined that India lacks a Strategic Culture. He says in his book Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies. There is no primordial strategic culture in this country. In fact, George Tanham in his book India’s Strategic Culture felt that ancient India lacked a culture of strategic military thought and analysis. There was, he said, no coherent military tradition that had come down from the ancient past."

That's utter nonsense. This culture not only in existence but is well known to any Indian familiar with the epics, even if only due to teleserials What's more, it's also the reason of a millennium of struggle against barbaric invading colonizers who weren't as civilized. 

"In recent times this view of a total absence of a strategic culture in India has been challenged. The primary issue is that our political elite who won independence for our country, traditionally focused on the soft power of Ahimsa and non-violence and Satyagraha and soul force. In many ways it was like mobilising the general population in the form of Pink or Orange Revolutions that overthrow tyrannical regimes by using mass civil disobedience and psychological pressure – mostly through the media. Today flash mobs are created by texting on mobile phones and messaging on the internet."

Gandhi’s policy was a matter of political tool under circumstances, subsequently misused as spiritual and absolute diktat regardless of circumstances. Obviously it's of no use when facing a predatory beast, and even Gandhi did  write to say he admired bold muslims over the Hindus who were massacred by them, calling the latter cowardly. That he was viciously denouncing in the reverse case was a matter of a self image gone too far at cost of others who followed him. 

................................................................................................

"In those days, Mahatma Gandhi realised the lack of unity of the Indian people and their unpreparedness to wage an Armed Struggle. Post the last revolt in 1857 – the British had exploited every faultline in Indian society to divide and splinter the people along the fissures of caste, creed, language, ethnicity and above all religion. They had succeeded brilliantly and virtually destroyed the Idea of India. ... "

In fact the campaign by British to that effect, while it took root and flourished as a poisonous ivy will, was fraudulent, pretending that virtue was opposite of everything Indian, that good societies have no division of caste or creed. 

Facts are as opposite of this as is truth. 

" ... Gandhi and the Congress started a civil disobedience movement – a boycott of foreign goods and non-violent, non-cooperation to pressurise the British to Quit India. The British were very keen to prevent a resurgence of a violent armed revolution like 1857 and they tacitly encouraged Mahatma Gandhi to keep the freedom struggle peaceful. They felt they could contain this non-violent protest for decades if required and it was perhaps a good safety valve to release pent up emotions.

"The fact is India has always had a vibrant military tradition. It was only India’s disunity that had opened her to 10 centuries of defeat, loot and humiliation. By the 16th century, however, a process of an indigenous Indian military renaissance had started. The British success in India was premised on Nativisation. They recruited in India (manpower was dirt cheap), trained these armies on European lines and used that very Indian Army to conquer and subjugate the people."

General Bakshi is refraining from mentioning specifics. 

"The only Indian leader who could challenge Mahatma Gandhi’s moral authority in the Congress was Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose. He correctly identified that the centre of gravity of the British rule in India was the loyalty of its Armed Forces to the British. If that could be broken the British could not stay. India was a huge military manpower pool for the British. In the First World War India had fielded an Army of 1.3 million men and in the Second, a record all volunteer Army of 2.5 million men (without conscription). How could this come about without an extant military tradition of soldiering, courage and fidelity to one’s own salt? It was this militarised segment that Bose focused on. He escaped first to Germany and then Japan and raised the Indische Legion (A Brigade sized force from Indian Prisoners of War (POWs) from Germany) and then the, Indian National Army (INA) mainly from the POWs with the Japanese and local recruitment from the Indian diaspora in South-East Asia. With this three division sized force, Bose joined the Japanese invasion of India in 1944. Had this invasion come in 1943, it would have easily succeeded. By 1944, it was too little, too late and the tide of war had turned. The INA was defeated but yet it won the war for India’s freedom."

As admitted, openly and publicly, by the then PM of Britain, Clement Atlee, when subsequently on a visit to India. 

"Gandhi’s Quit India Movement of 1942 had literally failed. It had been easily crushed by the British. Post the Second World War the British, in a very foolish gesture of triumphalism, had put three INA officers on trial in the Red Fort. They had kept the INA a closely guarded secret during the war. Now they gave it very wide publicity to malign it. It backfired badly. Violent protests broke out all over India. The INA inspired uprising shook them. In February 1946, there were mutinies in the Royal Indian Navy, Royal Indian Air Force and then in some units of the British Indian Army. 2.5 million Indians in arms were being demobilised. What if they rose in massive revolt? How could less than 40,000 British soldiers then in India have stopped them? The British panicked and left in a tearing hurry the next year in August 1947."

And that's obviously the truth, unlike the rosy spun sugar candyfloss fed by congress governments for decades post independence. "

General Bakshi sums up here the facts and conclusions he published in his work on Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose. 

................................................................................................

"The Cult of Pacifism 

"However they ensured that power was handed over to the anglophile Nehruvian dispensation. Nehru agreed to a British Governor General (Pakistan did not) and retained British Chiefs for the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Indian Intelligence Bureau kept reporting to MI-5 in London about Bose and his INA.

"The INA men were not taken back in the Indian Army and were treated as traitors by Independent India. Nehru had to exorcise the Ghost of Bose and his militaristic INA persona. To gain legitimacy he crafted a narrative of soft power and pacifism which said that India had achieved her independence only and only through Ahimsa and non-violence. To buttress that claim he now began to lay inordinate amounts of emphasis on the Buddhist legacy of peace and non-violence. In fact he even shocked the First British Army Chief of Independent India by bluntly stating that India was a peaceful and non-violent country and did not need an Army. It only needed the Police. Mercifully the realist, Sardar Patel-Nehru’s Deputy, saved the armed forces from disbandment and utilised them effectively. Post Patel’s death however, Nehru had his way. He starved the armed forces of funding and prestige and completely marginalised them from all higher level decision making. This had led to the uncalled for disaster of 1962.

"Most western military historians tend to focus very hard on the last 200 years of Indian history to claim that India simply did not have a tradition of war fighting and no strategic culture. India’s history however did not start with the advent of the British. The Indian civilisation goes back unbroken to over 5,000 years (in fact 7,000 years as per carbon dating). ... "

Much longer, going by astronomical and geological observations in the epics. 

" ... Indian history is full of the accounts of major wars and eulogises bravery and sacrifice in battle. The Cult of Pacifism belongs to one isolated period of the rein of Emperor Ashoka. That too had contributed to India’s decline in military power then. Post independence India had its second enforced Cult of Pacifism. Like Japan this Cult of Pacifism neutered India’s power potential. 1962 awoke us to reality and led to the onset of a realist mindset in India’s civilian elite. It led to a reconstruction and expansion of India’s Armed Forces. The decade from 1961 to 1971 saw three wars in quick succession that thoroughly blooded the Indian Armed Forces and gave their senior leadership hands on combat experience. India had fielded enormous forces in the First and Second World Wars but only at the soldier and the Junior Officer level (platoon, company and battalion mostly). Now India’s Military Power began to bloom. Its military leadership had come to age.

"The 1971 War of Bangladesh marked the zenith of India’s revived Military Power and Glory. India had created a new nation state with the force of arms. It had marched on an enemy capital, enforced regime change and brought about a large scale surrender of troops by a brilliant war of manoeuvre. It was a Blitzkrieg in the very difficult riverine terrain of Bangladesh. In13 days flat our forces had raced for Dacca – the capital and created a new nation state with the force of arms. After a thousand years of defeat and humiliation, the Indian Armed Forces had at last come into their own once again."

Again, he's not counting Maratha empire and Sikhs, a mistake. 

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"Reassertion of an Ancient Strategic Culture 

"Very curiously and unconsciously, India’s ancient strategic culture had reasserted itself in the way it fought the Bangladesh War. The strategy emerged as a pattern in a stream of decisions. The ancient Kautilyan Paradigm of war fighting had reasserted itself unconsciously in a way that was remarkable. 

"India is a civilisational entity. Political Unity has been rare. Only three empires have united India in the past for periods of 200-300 years each. These were:-

"• The Mauryan Empire 

"• The Mughal Empire 

"• The British Empire"

Again, he's not counting Maratha empire, and forgetting another that spread through a large swath, that of Lalitaditya Muktapida. 

"The present Republic is a successor entity of the British Empire and the peaceful transfer of power enabled it to inherit intact the institutions of state power crystallised in the colonial era. 

"Indian Strategic Culture however can be traced back to the Imperial Mauryan Army which first unified India in the wake of Alexander – the Greek’s most brutal invasion. For the first time invading (non-local armies) had targeted and slaughtered the civilian population. This had never been touched in the local wars. It was the collision with the Greek non-self that crystallised India’s nascent sense of self. Chanakya (kautilya) recruited the Mauryan Army from the Indus Valley tract along which the Greek Armies had gone looting, burning and raping. With this Mauryan Army he unified the whole of India in just 25 years. India is a sub-continent – the size of Europe and this must rank as a terrific feat of arms.

"Kautilya had a genius for strategy. He crystallised an Indian form of war fighting that had the following salient characteristics:-

"Information Dominance and Psychological Operations: Kautilya was a master of intelligence. He relied on a vast army of spies for humint. In fact the spies were so many that the Greek Ambassador Megasthenes felt that they constituted a separate caste. Kautilya divided the enemy state into 6 key components and carried out a thorough net assessment of each component. This included:-

"• The King: his personality, traits, character, will power and intelligence, vulnerability/weaknesses. 

"• The Ministers: Their calibre, their relations with the king and inter se rivalries and equations with one another. 

"• The Army: size, structure, morale, quality of leadership. 

"• The Forts: Key strong points in the kingdom, their strengths and weaknesses. 

"• The Treasury: The economic power of the state and its natural resources. 

"• Allies: The allies it could call to its aid in times of war; their capabilities.

"Covert Warfare – Destablisation: No conventional or kinetic operations were launched in the Mauryan era without an extended period of destablisation and covert warfare. The balance of a state must be broken or destabilised before it is attacked. This destabilisation included:- 

"• Assassinations: of key commanders or command and control targets like ministers, etc. 

"• Suspicion Virus: The coherence of the state apparatus was destroyed by inducing mutual suspicion (planted letters to the enemy by key ministers, etc.), exploiting inter-personal personality clashes and dissonance. 

"• Subversion/Compromise: Compromise of key personnel by honey traps etc. or subvert loyalties by financial/other inducements. 

"• Strive to Demoralise Armed Forces: Usually by instigating covert war (Kuta Yuddha) at his rear. Encouraging border people or disaffected citizens to rebel. An extended period of destabilisation was the most essential pre-requisite to any major invasion in the Mauryan era.

"The Main Assault 

"• Mobility: Before Kautilya, Indian Armies had a fourfold organisation of Chariots, Elephants, Cavalry and Infantry. Chariots used to be the Prize Arm. In the war against the Greeks, Kautilya found the chariots were unfit for mobile operations of the type that the Greeks undertook. Till then the Indian penchant was on set piece battles of attrition in vast open battle plains – more or less in a tournament format.

"• Shock Action: Kautilya relegated chariots to ceremonial purposes. He increased the strength of war elephants from 3,000 to 9,000 and made it the primary shock arm. Elephants had excellent mobility over all terrains and when used in the mass they could induce shock and awe.

"• Manoeuvre Warfare: The aim was to prepare slowly, break the enemy’s geo-political and military balance by an extended covert warfare campaign and then strike fast – advance rapidly using elephants in the mass to paralyse the enemy. The enemy state was treated as an information system whose key nodes had to be neutralised or soft killed prior to launching the main kinetic operations. Suspicion and mistrust had to be sown into his information architecture. Speed and shock action was then used to paralyse the opposing king and his commanders. This implied slow preparation – rapid execution. 

"Thus, it was that in just 25 years, Kautilya unified the whole of South Asia from Afghanistan-Baluchistan to Assam and down to Karnataka into one tightly knit state – where the state controlled all economic activity and generated a huge surplus to raise massive armies. The Mauryan Army was 6,50,000 strong as per the testimony of Megasthenes. Kautilya had unified a civilisational state into a strong, centralised political entity that could defend its civilisational borders and its people. Kautilya had monetised the Indian economy on the silver standard. He had ended the period of warring states in India where 16 Mahajanapadas (major states) were constantly at war with one another for many centuries. This was analogous to the period of warring states in China – which had produced Sun Tzu classic The Art of War.

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"The 1971 Renaissance

"If we study how events and outcomes unfolded in the 1971 War, we will notice a curious, unintended revival of the Kautilyan Paradigm in the 1971 War in Bangladesh.

"• Long preparation: The political authority wanted to attack in March 1971. The military insisted on eight months of preparation time. 

"• Covert Warfare: The Mukti Bahini thoroughly destabilised East Pakistan. For eight months it harried and tired out the Pakistani Army in the east. 

"• Mobility and shock action: Like war elephants, air power was used for mobility and shock action. Air power massed effects and compensated for shortage of troops. It helped to overcome terrain friction by providing helicopters for air bridges and transport aircrafts for para drops. Above all fighter bombers compensated for a paucity of wheeled artillery. Like massed elephants – Air power induced shock and awe.

"• Information Dominance: signal Intelligence resources were focused in the East to gain accurate and reliable intelligence of the enemy dispositions and plans. The Mukti Bahini’s strength was raised to a 100,000 and they provided invaluable humint about the enemy, terrain and local resources.

"• Media and Psychological Operations: Media was used in a very skilful way to act as a local, force multiplier and shape the local, regional and even the global information environment. The atrocities of the Pakistan Army in the east were highlighted to the world at large – the genocide and ethnic cleansing aspects were driven home to all nations. Fear and Guilt were induced in the Pakistani High command and down to the rank and file. Radio broadcasts to surrender and assurances of humane treatment as per Geneva Convention finally induced the Pakistani Army to Surrender.

"• Pinpoint Attacks on Key Command & Control Nodes: The Governor’s Conference of all key decision makers in the east, was specifically targeted by a pinpoint air strike that collapsed their morale and will to fight and induced them to lay down its arms.

"• The Primary Target was not the troops fielded by Pakistan but the minds of the enemy commanders. These were paralysed by speed and manoeuvre and the shock action of air power."

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"The Just War Syndrome 

Above all the Bangladesh War conformed to the ancient Indian concepts of Nyaya Yuddha (Just War) or Dharma Yuddha (Ethical War). War to be just, has to be the last resort option. It must be just not merely in its causes and origins but also in the way it is conducted. It should seek to paralyse the minds of the opposing commanders and not merely seek a slaughter of his men. Such a campaign results in fewer casualties/fatalities, but generates a large number of Prisoners who have lost the will to fight. It attacks the mind of the opposing commander and erodes the will to fight.

"Reassertion of the Kautilyan Paradigm 

"Thus we see that rather unconsciously, events so shaped themselves that the Indians were able to revive the Indian Art of War-fighting in the Kautilyan tradition of extended preparation, covert destabilisation and rapid execution, using speed and shock action to benumb the enemy. The key domain of war is the psychological or mind dimension. Defeat or victory is ultimately a state of the mind. It is the higher commander’s business to induce a collapse of morale and complete paralysis of the will to fight. This is achieved by mobility of mind, manoeuvre and shock action. Whenever Indian armies have fallen back to attrition mindset and set piece battles for the sake of fighting – they have suffered. Whenever they have adopted the manoeuvre mindset they have done very well. Kautilya’s paradigm epitomised this mobility model of speed, surprise and shock action. Its liet motif was extensive and slow preparations – rapid execution. With Bangladesh, Indian Military History has come a full circle to actualise once again the Kautilyan paradigm of war. It is Indian in essence and outlook and suits our genius. It must become the Indian Way of War. Bangladesh therefore was not a one off. It represented the essence of the Indian Art of War – its revival and renaissance after almost 2,000 years.

"With Bangladesh, India had arrived as a Great Power and reached the acme of her skill in war fighting. The Indian Armed Forces had come of age and had displayed the skill and competence to conduct a well coordinated Tri-Service operation of great complexity. The Bangladesh Blitzkrieg was brilliant in conception and execution. India had to pay a price of course. We lost 105 officers, 159 JCOs and 3,468 men killed in action in the Eastern theatre alone. The Mukti Bahini of Bangladesh had made a stellar contribution to this war and played a heroic role in the liberation of their country."

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" ... The bravery and courage of the Indian soldiers had been amply seen in both the World Wars. British Commanders preferred to have Indian troops rather than British units. The Indian troops had tremendous resilience in the face of combat stress and adversity. Bangladesh amply displayed the skills and competence of Indian Commanders in the Higher Direction of War. It was a brilliant campaign by global standards and Fd Mshl Sam Manekshaw, Lt Gen JFR Jacob and Lt Gen Sagat Singh deserve to be counted amongst the Great Commanders of the World’s Military History. So do the Indian Navy Chief, the aggressive Chief, Admiral Nanda and the highly competent Air Mshl P C Lal qualify as great commanders of the worlds history. The nation owes its immense gratitude to the over 3,800 officers, JCOs and men who laid down their lives so that Bangladesh should be free. The world must equally recognise the tremendous grit and sacrifices made by the fighters (the Jodhas) of the Mukti Bahini."

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Contents 

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Preface 

Prologue: The Bangladesh War: Revival of an Indian Paradigm of War Fighting 

1.​Years of the Vulture 

2.​Operation Searchlight: The Blood Telegram 

3.​The Cynical View from Washington 

4.​Crisis Management: The Sage Counsel of Sam 

5.​Operations of the Mukti Bahini: Stretching the Pakistani Eastern Command 

6.​Niazi’s Plans of A Forward Defence 

7.​A Band of Brothers 

8.​Generating Synergy and Setting the Stage 

9.​Formulation of War Plans: The Centre of Gravity Controversy 

10.​Safeguarding the Flanks: Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union 

11.​The Lurch Towards War 

12.​Personal Narratives: The Intersection of Collective and Personal Destinies 

13.​War Breaks Out: The Preemptive Strike of the ‘Fiza Ya’ 

14.​Air Bridge to Dacca: A Guderian in 4 Corps 

15.​Trump Card at Tangail 

16.​Striking the Core: Inside Out Attack on the Governor’s House 

17.​Negotiations for Surrender 

18.​The Jacob-Niazi Dialogue: A Historic Surrender 

19.​The Conundrum: Chinese Non-Intervention 

20.​The Just War Paradigm: Return to an Indian Way of War Fighting 

Bibliography

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REVIEW 

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Preface 

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"The 1971 War for the liberation of Bangladesh was India’s greatest Military victory since Chandra Gupta Maurya(and his mentor Kautilya) defeated Selukes Niketor (Alexander’s Satrap in Kabul) and made him cede the provinces of Afghanistan and Baluchistan. India had now acquired a scientific frontier along the Hindu Kush. Some 2000 years later, the 1971 war broke Pakistan in two, saw the march on an enemy capital and its capitulation. India ushered in a regime change with the force of arms - 93,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered in Bangladesh. It was the largest mass surrender of troops since the Second World War. It was a civilisational conflict of epic proportions and marked the revival of the Indian State as a major Military Power. It was our greatest military victory in the past 2000 years. In 2021 Dec we will be celebrating the 50th Anniversary of this great war and magnificent victory."

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June 30, 2022 - June 30, 2022. 

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Prologue: The Bangladesh War: 

Revival of an Indian Paradigm of War Fighting 

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"The 1971 War for the Liberation of Bangladesh was a historic and epochal conflict that decisively changed the map of South Asia and created a new nation-state with the force of arms. It was a classic tri-service campaign that exhibited dramatic levels of synergy and coordination. It witnessed the march upon an enemy capital, enforced regime change and the mass surrender of armies. These are the hallmarks of a decisive military campaign. The Bangladesh War was a landmark conflict of that era because it broke the Cold War-era pattern of stalemated conflicts, where no victor or vanquished was allowed to emerge for fear of escalation and the involvement of the two nuclear armed super-powers of that era. The super powers would simply not let their client states get defeated or militarily overwhelmed. India broke this pattern by winning an outright military victory – a first in that era of stalemated and limited conflicts. What is even more creditable was the fact that this was achieved in the teeth of fierce opposition by the United States, militarily the strongest super power of the world.

"In purely historical and civilisational terms alone, it was India’s greatest military victory since Chandragupta Maurya (who, under the mentorship of the legendary Chankya/Kautilya) had defeated the Greek Satrap Selukos Niketor and forced him to cede Afghanistan and Baluchistan in 305 BCE. Thus India had acquired a scientific frontier that controlled the key invasion routes via the Khyber and Bolan passes and had put a stop to the entry of marauding armies like the Greek Phalanxes of Alexander, who had mounted a brutal invasion of the Indus Valley tracts in the 3rd century BC. For the first time in India we saw foreign armies slaughtering civilians in the towns and villages who were in no way involved in the hostilities. Such genocide and depredations had to be checked, hence the need for such a scientific frontier that controlled the key passes. This was something that the British Empire had sighed for in vain many centuries later. In civilisational terms this historic campaign had marked the acme of Indian military power. It had unified the whole of India for the very first time as a highly centralised and powerful state whose economy could generate the huge surplus needed to raise a mighty standing army of 650,000 infantry, 9000 war elephants, 20,000 cavalry and some 3000 war chariots. Just as in the Chinese period of the Warring Kingdoms (where six major states had fought incessantly for over 300 years) – there were then 16 major states (or Mahajanapadas) in the India of that period. Just like Emperor Shi Huang Ti had “unified all under heaven “by defeating the six warring states, Kautilya had brought about the creation of a pan-India empire that had equally unified “all under heaven.” India was transformed from a loosely knit civilisational entity into a highly centralised empire that had politically unified the whole land mass of the Indian sub- continent under one Chakravartin (all conquering) Ruler. That was indeed the acme of Indian military power- a benchmark that could rarely be equaled and never surpassed. The national emblem of India – the Lions of Ashoka that today form the seal of government and adorn the rank badges of our armed forces and police, date back to the Mauryan Era."

This last bit is never taught, and yet it resonates as true. 

"In the 1971 War for the liberation of Bangladesh, however, the Indian civilisational state had touched a new peak of military glory. It marked a Renaissance of Indian military arms – in fact an Indian Military Revival of epic proportions. In military terms it was the rise of the Indian Phoenix from the ashes of a thousand years of military defeats and humiliations. It was as if the wave of India’s civilisational history had touched its very nadir and then risen once more to a magnificent apogee – a maxima in a sine curve of military power. ... "

Curious! Does General Bakshi not count Shivaji and Peshawas, the Maratha empire? 

" ... Curiously enough, just in the manner the 1971 war was fought, we saw a wholly unintended resurrection of the Indian paradigm of war-fighting that had been crystallised by the redoubtable Kautilya some 2300 years ago. This war fighting paradigm had been crystallised in the multipolar environs of an Indian period of the “warring kingdoms” that had lasted almost for 1000 years and spanned the epic periods of the Ramayana and Mahabharata. At the culmination of this historic period had come the legendary Chanakya who had penned Sun Tzu’s equivalent of The Indian Art of War. This manuscript is now famous as the Artha Shastra. Chinese military writers claim that Sun Tzu’s classic The Art of War was written in a period of multi-polarity in China. Today, we have the same multi-polar power equation emerging at the global level. Hence the lessons of the warring states era are highly relevant in today’s context of multi-polarity. The same can be said of Kautilya’s Artha Shastra. It was written in an era of multi-polarity in India, wherein 16 Mahajanapadas were constantly fighting with one another for supremacy. The lessons of this multi-polar environment therefore are highly relevant to the modern era. The Bangladesh War highlighted the fact that the Indian paradigm of war fighting that had crystallised in the Mauryan epoch unconsciously emerged in the way that India fought the 1971 War. It put the spotlight on the fact that India did indeed have a strategic culture that has remained constant overtime."

"The Just War Paradigm. The Indian epics of the Ramayana and Mahabharta that emerged from a similar context of multi-polarity had also enunciated the very Indian concept of Just War or Nyaya Yuddha (better known as Dharma Yuddha). Dharma here stands not for religion but for righteousness. This concept saw war as a last resort option, to be undertaken only when all means to resolve the conflict peacefully or by dialogue had been exhausted. Such a war was just not only in its causes but also in its conduct. Such a concept of war stemmed from the ancient Neeti Shastra or the treatise on ethics and has been dwelt at in length in our epics. ... "

Very true. 

" ... Few other campaigns in the world so greatly qualify for the title of a Just War as the war for the Liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. Pakistan had committed genocide upon the people of Bangladesh on an appalling scale, totally unprecedented in recent history. ... "

Unless General Bakshi has numbers that differ, or is speaking strictly of post WWII era, one has to differ. Nazi atrocities in East - Belarus and Russia, specifically, not counting extermination in concentration camps - alone compares very well with paki atrocities in East Bengal, two million civilians burnt alive in former vs three million butchered in latter. 

" ... In sheer scale of savagery, killing and use of rape as a weapon of war, it surpasses the holocaust of Partition. ... "

Again, one must differ; the numbers from one source, Koenraad Elst, are - eleven million Hindus massacred in partition, half a million muslims, and Sikhs more than muslims but not more than one and half a million. 

" ... It drove 10 million refugees into India and almost succeeded in derailing the tottering Indian economy by the very scale of the demographic aggression. Pakistan had just foisted its internal problem on to its hapless neighbour India. This appalling genocidal crackdown had started in the month of March 1971. India took a full eight months to respond militarily and that too when Pakistan initiated large scale hostilities by a major pre-emptive air-strike in the western theatre. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had personally toured all the major capitals of the world in a last ditch attempt to stave off conflict. India struck only after Pakistan had delivered the first major blow that was like a declaration of war. Then the Indian sword plunged in like greased lightning and the world saw a classic blitzkrieg waged with astounding speed in the most defensible terrain of the world."

" ... A civilian leadership (thoroughly chastised by the 1962 humiliation) now developed a ruthless and single-minded approach toward the furtherance of National interests by using the tools of hard power. The unnatural over-reliance of the Nehruvian dispensation on the soft power of Ahimsa (non-violence) was mercifully consigned to the dustbin of history."

" ... As per the testimony of Field Marshal Manekshaw, the political leadership had asked him to undertake operations against East Pakistan in April 1971 itself (when refugees had begun to pour in as a result of Pakistan’s military crackdown). The military advice was to postpone operations till after the Monsoon season and when the Himalayan passes had closed (to prevent Chinese intervention).

"The military advice was accepted (albeit with some reluctance). This gave the Armed Forces 7-8 months to prepare and coordinate plans, stage-manage forces and logistics and generate inter-services synergy of an unprecedented order. General (later Field Marshal) Manekshaw had served as DMO (Director Military Operations) and was then Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee. He emerged as the virtual CDS (Chief of Defense Staff) and had the full faith and backing of the political elite. The civilian-military interface in this war therefore was unprecedented in its effectiveness. The Indo-Soviet treaty of Peace and Friendship provided insurance against American or Chinese intervention in the impending conflict and speeded up delivery of weapons and spares. This was the first time in the entire history of the Cold War where - despite America’s full and unqualified support – Pakistan was dismembered and broken in two. Decisive military objectives were achieved in a short and swift campaign.

"Strategic Leadership. The leadership provided by all three service chiefs was inspiring and highly professional. A decade of professionalism and active combat experience had thrown up these elite. The Armed Forces had well internalised the lessons of 1962 and 1965. The 1965 War in particular had provided invaluable operational experience at the Theatre, Corps and Divisional level. It had honed skills at the level of Operational Art. The Services had adequate time to integrate and synergise their plans. It was the peak of inter-services cooperation and jointmanship, (facilitated by the excellent chemistry between the three Chiefs). The military leadership’s professional advice to defer operations till after the Monsoon and when Himalayan passes were closed was accepted. Though initially criticised darkly, the advice proved to be very sound in hindsight. It postponed operations for the right metrological window, gave adequate time to marshal resources and re-orient the deployments and virtually ruled out any chances of Chinese intervention. Above all it avoided getting bogged down in the monsoons of Bangladesh."

"Air Supremacy in the East. The Indian Air Force (IAF) put in a superb performance. It foiled the Pakistani pre-emptive air attacks in the West and neutralised the Pakistani Air Force in the East. Disclosures made in BN Raman’s book The Kao Boys of R&AW, suggests that Indian intelligence had precise information of the D-Day of this air strike and the IAF was fully alert and prepared when the long awaited Pakistani air attack came. It was a classic case of too little too late. The IAF mounted very energetic operations in the Eastern theatre that paralysed the sole Pakistani squadron of Sabers. The IAF used runway penetration retarder bombs and put the Pakistani air field at Tejagon out of commission. It thereby attained complete air supremacy over Bangladesh. This enabled a very high tempo of operations by the ground forces. Indian convoys could move bumper-to-bumper whereas all Pakistani troop movements were subjected to relentless and highly responsive air attacks. Statistically out of a total of 1978 sorties generated over East Pakistan, 1,178 sorties were to support ground operations. This amounted to over 80 sorties per day for ground support. India had deployed 11 fighter and one bomber squadron to neutralise the sole Pakistani Sabre squadron in the East.

"Mental Mobility. Traditionally the Indian Army has been heavily primed for attrition operations. For the first time, its higher planners and field commanders exhibited a great flair for manoeuvre and that too in such a nightmarish terrain full of rivers almost five miles in width. Desert terrain permits fast and fluid mobile operations. Riverine terrain inhibits use of tanks. In most cases the rivers were so wide that the amphibious tanks would overheat and shut down while attempting the crossings of these very wide rivers. Hence the Indian commanders based reliance instead on air-mobility. Air supremacy enabled the para drop of a Battalion group at Tangail. This hastened the fall of Dacca. Could we have dropped a Para Brigade to execute a turning manoeuvre and hasten the fall of Dacca even further? Air supremacy also enabled launch of heliborne operations to secure assault crossings over the Meghna River to threaten Dacca from the South and East. Psychological Operations played a major role. Pinpoint air strikes were launched to target the meeting of General Niazi and the Governor in Dacca. This psychologically shattered Niazi and his command element and hastened the surrender. Striking the key command and control node of Dacca was a remarkable actualisation of the concept of Information Operations (well before Gulf War One made this term popular) and John Wardens inside – out concept of attack became fashionable in military circles. It induced total paralysis in the Pakistani Armed Forces in the East and was one of the key factors in inducing Niazi to surrender even though he had the wherewithal to fight on in the Dacca triangle for at least another two weeks if not more.

"The Navy enforced a blockade of Bangladesh and severed the connection between the two wings of Pakistan. It launched a brilliant attack on the Pakistani Navy’s home base of Karachi. It sank capital ships and in concert with the Air Force set fire to oil storage tanks. Its Aircraft Carrier Battle Group provided close air support for ground operations in Bangladesh and prevented escape of Pakistani forces via the sea. Naval Commandos sabotaged Pakistani naval and steamer crafts operating in the inland waters. The Army mounted a classic Blitzkrieg. Three corps offensives (2 Corps, 33 Corps and 4 Corps) converged on to Dacca. They contained and bypassed strong centers of resistance on the periphery and raced for the core objective of the capital city of Dacca. Dacca is located within a triangle of rivers (Padma, Meghna and Brahmaputra). Pakistani forces could easily have fallen back and defended the capital for weeks.

"The enemy commander’s mind, however, was totally dislocated by the speed and tempo of Indian operations. Indian forces followed Liddell Hart’s concept of the expanding torrent. The 4 Corps operations were high speed and brilliant. In just 12 days they advanced some 400 km and brought Dacca within artillery range. Lt Gen Sagat Singh proved to be India’s best field commander. A Battalion Group was para-dropped at Tangail. The 101 Comn Zone operations were launched from the North to exploit the exposed flank. Three brigades were removed at great risk from the Chinese front and deployed to support operations towards Dacca. Dacca fell in just 13 days. The Pakistani armed forces in the East were shaken to the core but largely intact. Islamabad, even at this stage had hoped for a ceasefire that would enable them to extricate their troops and save face somehow. However nerves were totally frayed in Dacca. Gen Jacob has described how he had flown into Dacca and hectored Niazi with threats of a resumption of air attacks to induce him to surrender. It was a brilliant psychological warfare exercise that succeeded eminently and highlights the climate of collapse that had been created in Bangladesh. The most unnerving factor for the Pakistanis was the swarming groups of vengeful Mukti Bahini fighters and the severe pangs of guilt in the Pakistani rank and file. The atrocities they had committed had divested them of their moral underpinnings and professional élan. The rape of almost a million women and the murder of innocent civilians now came back to haunt them. The disciplined Indian Army seemed their only refuge from the bands of Mukti Bahini fighters baying for revenge. The surrender and the Indian Army’s promise of protection came as a huge and very obvious relief."

"The Mukti Bahini operations had destroyed the politico-military balance of the Pakistani forces in the East. Air supremacy totally demoralised the Pakistan Forces and enabled a very high tempo of operations. It acted as a most significant force multiplier and enabled a classic air-land campaign. The Naval blockade induced a sense of isolation and hopelessness in the Pakistani garrison. Naval air support speeded up operations and sealed off routes of escape. The Navy’s successful attack on Pakistan’s home port of Karachi was a bold and most spectacular operation in the annals of Naval warfare. It was highly innovative in design and execution. Osa missile boats were towed for the attack. India’s only “amphibious operation” so far was launched in Cox’s Bazaar (towards the end of the war). This unopposed landing prevented the escape of Pakistani forces towards Burma by sea.

"The 1971 campaign therefore, provides an Indian Paradigm of war-fighting based on information dominance, covert action to destabilise the adversary and a rapid and high tempo tri service campaign based on maneuver and simultaneity to exploit the situation created in the enemies depth areas. This model was premised on careful and methodical preparation of minimum 6-8 months (for the military phase) and rapid execution (two weeks). It mirrored the Kautilyan war paradigm based on information dominance, covert action and high mobility shock action. Psychological Operations and shaping the regional and global information environment played a major role. R&AW was the lead agency for these. Covert action to destroy the politico-military balance of the adversary was a key component. Air power and Naval power projection ashore were the most critical force multipliers. The political direction was par excellence and inter-services plans superbly synthesised. Defeat is an orphan but victory has many fathers. After the war controversies arose about who was really responsible for this historic victory – India’s biggest since Kautilya’s defeat of the Greeks of Selukos Niketor in 305 BC. Such questions are largely academic and irrelevant. It was a very well synergised operation that saw all the organs of the state acting in concert with superb finesse and smooth coordination. ... "

"The three Service Chiefs of the 1971 war will go down in history for the excellent strategic guidance and leadership they provided. They deserve to be counted amongst the great commanders of the world’s military history. The redoubtable Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw stands out for his charismatic leadership as the Chairman Chiefs of Staff and his professional soundness and moral courage in asking for postponement of operations. The Air Chief, Air Marshal PC Lal, made possible the air supremacy in the East and the Indian Navy under the aggressive Admiral Nanda, surprised the world with its daring attacks on the Pakistani home base of Karachi. It isolated the two wings of Pakistan and did not flinch when the American 7th fleet came into the Indian Ocean. Bangladesh was the national Schwerpunkt or main centre of gravity and an offensive – defensive strategy was adopted in the West. Within this overall framework, however, the military performance in the West was somewhat subdued and hesitant. The dash and flair displayed at the level of Operational Art in Bangladesh was missing in the West. The limited offensive in Shakargarh was once again hamstrung by needless caution and an obsessive concern or the safety of the flanks of the advance. It was only Col Hanut’s decimation of the Pakistani Armoured Brigade’s balaclava charges at Basantar that earned the Indian Army some credits. The operations in Kargil and Shyok valley were tactically brilliant. The Pakistani offensive at Longewala was decimated with the help of air power and fairly deep penetrations were made in Sindh. The performance in the East however was superlative in all respects. It had a sense of deja vu. Once an overall success-oriented situation was created, the war almost “fought itself.” There was an overall climate of collapse in Dacca that led the Pakistani high command in the East to make one mistake after another. The Indian operational level commanders displayed great boldness, high risk taking orientation and tremendous flair. The Indian military leadership had come of age at the level of operational art. Notable amongst the Corps Commanders was Gen Sagat Singh who personally led operations from the front. India also produced a brilliant crop of Divisional Commanders – like Gen KV Krishna Rao, Lachman Singh Lehel, Rocky Hira, Ken Gonsalves and so many others.

"Lt Gen Aurora, the Eastern Army Commander was sagacious and low key but provided highly competent leadership in the East. His Chief of Staff Gen Jacob however, proved to be an inspirational planner with an uncanny insight into the nature of operations in the East. The credit for the selection of Dacca as the key centre of gravity and therefore the ultimate objective of the campaign must go to him. He doggedly and tenaciously held on to this vision and took great personal risk in relentlessly husbanding resources for the push to Dacca. He had a close personal equation with the Chief (who often spoke to him direct- bypassing his Army Commander). Gen Jacob was responsible for the superb planning of the campaign. He was closely supported by an equally brilliant and bold DMO – Maj (later Lt) Gen Inder Gill, a paratrooper (and one of the few people who could stand up to Sam). The Indian Army then had a crop of very young and energetic commanding officers (with just 12-13 years of service). They were in their prime of service and led from the front. They were in fact, the key to our overall victory. And in the end, it was the cutting edge leadership of the young Lieutenants, Captains and Majors who actualised the concept of the “recon-pull” and led from the front. The 38th and 39th courses of the NDA paid a very steep price in blood. The 39th course in fact was commissioned a month before the war, got off the trains and went straight into combat. 2/Lt Arun Kehtrapal of the 38th course of the NDA became the iconic face of the Indian combat leader in this war and won the Param Vir Chakra posthumously. No one man can be singled out for this victory. It was simply India’s finest hour. It saw the release of a tremendous national synergy. It was a historic turning point in the destinies of the sub continent."

" ... The climactic scenes of jubilation in Dacca were so cathartic and so strongly reminiscent of the scenes of the liberation of Paris in World War II. It was a heady experience to see a nation win its freedom from fear and genocide."

" ... Ours was the generation that was pitch-forked directly into the war as freshly minted subalterns just out of our training academies. We (the 39th course NDA) were termed the canon- fodder batch. The 38th course calls itself the “Born to Battle batch.” This book is dedicated to all those brave men who gave their today for our tomorrow in that most historic conflict of recent times which enabled India to emerge as a great power not just in South Asia but in the world per se. Let it be noted that India today is one of the nine nuclear armed countries in the world and has a deliverable triad of nuclear weapons and ICBM capability. The Bangladesh War conclusively established that it was a great conventional military power with the demonstrated capability to influence outcomes regionally and even alter the geography of the sub- continent with the force of arms. ... "

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June 30, 2022 - July 01, 2022. 

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1. YEARS OF THE VULTURE 

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" ... In November 1970, a massive cyclone had hit the coast of East Pakistan. It had started forming over the Bay of Bengal around 3rd November 1970 and hit the coast with full fury on 12th November. With wind speeds at 240 kmph it spread utter devastation in its path. It killed about 500,000 Bengalis and destroyed property worth US$ 86 million, according to the prevailing exchange rates. ... "

"As the storm made landfall it caused a 33-feet high storm surge on the Ganges delta. The unfettered fury of Nature was terrifying to behold. The destruction was complete and mind numbing. It was one of the deadliest tropical cyclones on record and remains one of the deadliest natural disasters in recent history. Yet, sadly enough, the terror and the mayhem left behind by Cylone Bhola left Pakistan’s military dictator General Yahya Khan (sitting in the comfort of Islamabad, a world away) completely unmoved. The Pakistan military junta failed to send any helicopters to East Pakistan to evacuate the victims. There was a complete lack of understanding of the magnitude of the disaster and Pakistan’s military seemed indifferent to the calamity that had struck the citizens of East Pakistan. Over 3.6 million people were directly affected by the cyclone, 85 percent of the houses in its pathway were destroyed, 90 percent of the marine fishermen suffered huge losses and 85 percent of the houses in the area were destroyed. About 90 percent of the marine fishermen community suffered heavy losses and 9,000 offshore fishing vessels were lost. Of the onshore fishermen – some 46,000 were killed by the cyclone and 85 percent of East Pakistan’s fishing capacity was destroyed."

"Ten days later however, only one military transport aircraft and three crop dusting aircrafts had been assigned to relief work. This callous unconcern left the people of East Pakistan enraged. Their feelings of being treated as second class citizens of a virtual colony were now fully borne out. The birth of Bangladesh was, in fact, mid-wifed by this terrible cyclone and the ghastly tragedy of criminal neglect that came in its wake. Gen Yahya Khan himself was to concede later that his Martial Law Administration had totally failed to realise the very magnitude of the tragedy and the response had been tardy and inadequate. “There have been delays. Many mistakes had been committed,” he said limply."

"Despite the cyclone, Gen Yahya Khan was adamant that the elections scheduled for 7 December 1970 would be held on schedule. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the ambitious Foreign Minister of Pakistan was chafing at the bit and was impatient to assume charge as Pakistan’s Prime Minister. He could brook no delay. Yahaya Khan had hoped that it would be a split verdict that would enable the Army to play prima donna in the political process. That is why he had agreed to the elections. 

"The Bengali politicians were now enraged. They charged the Pakistani Government with gross neglect, callousness and utter indifference. There were huge rallies and student protests in Dacca. Some 10 days after the disaster only one Pakistani helicopter had been deployed for relief operations. Maulana Bhashani called for the resignation of Gen Yahya Khan for his sheer incompetence. The Elections took place nevertheless and fuelled by that wave of anger – Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League bagged a landslide victory. The Awami League won 167 seats in East Pakistan. Bhutto had just won 85 seats in the West Pakistan. By all norms, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman would now be the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

"Unfortunately that was not how the Pakistani Military Dictator saw it. A Bengali as the Prime Minister of Pakistan? Over his dead body! Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was equally enraged. That Bengali actually had pretensions to Prime Ministership? Not if he could help it. Bhutto plotted hard with the Generals to scuttle the results of these elections."

Meanwhile the Bengalis of East Pakistan had sensed the racial slur. It only enraged them further. As tensions increased in March 1971, foreign personnel began to evacuate Dacca in droves because of a fear of violence. The situation deteriorated further. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman had contested the elections on the planks of the Six Point Programme designed to redress the flagrant imbalance between the two wings of Pakistan. Consider this:-

"The Eastern Wing, responsible for 75 percent of the exports and foreign exchange earnings, consumed barely 20-30 percent of the imported goods. 

"The burgeoning industries of the West representing 40 percent of the population received 77.60 percent of the imports. 

"The disparity between the per capita income of the West and East was 62 percent and steadily increasing every year. 

"The price of rice, the staple food of East Pakistan was four times as high in East Pakistan as in West Pakistan. 

"The prestige services echoed this imbalance in their selection policies even more blatantly. West Pakistan claimed:- 

"94 percent of Civil Services 

"85 percent of Foreign Services, and 

"95 percent of the Army employment."

" ... The acceptance of election results would have meant an end to the junta’s veto and thereby an end to military rule. Yahya Khan had been banking on a probably fractured mandate that would have enabled him to call the shots. The election results came as a great shock to him."

"He started putting pressure on Sheikh Mujibur Rehman to dilute his Six Point charter of demands. Mujib was adamant. There could be no compromise on this. Bhutto, the adventurous runners-up now sensed his opportunity – he announced his party’s intentions of boycotting the upcoming Assembly. This gave Yahya the pretext to postpone the convening of the Assembly indefinitely. He announced this on 1 March 1971, leaving the people stunned. It was for them the supreme act of treachery. There were violent demonstrations in Dacca and other cities of East Pakistan. Now nothing but independence would do. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman demanded self-determination. 

"Bangladesh was actually born that day."

" ... In February 1971, there were consultations with all senior officers to ensure that the Army was solidly behind him. The few dissenters were discreetly removed. Taking advantage of the 30 January 1971 hijacking (which seemed to have been staged) he began military mobilisation in East Pakistan on the pretext of a threat from India. A battalion of the Baluch Regiment and a large consignment of ammunition was sent to East Pakistan by sea. It arrived on 3 March 1971. Other units now began to be shuttled from the West to the East in C-130 transport aircrafts. They replaced the Bengali units being transferred to the West. Tanks were brought to Dacca from the Indian borders and their tracks converted to soft track for urban use. Large scale violence and rioting started in Dacca and other cities. A curfew ordered by Pakistani Eastern Command was ignored and Army Patrols firing into the crowds were simply overwhelmed. ... "

"Lt Gen Tikka Khan (who would soon become the infamous Butcher of Bengal) arrived in East Pakistan as the newly appointed Martial Law Administrator to find a paralysed province. He had replaced Admiral Ehsan, who incidentally had disagreed with Gen Yahya Khan in the February conclaves. ... "

"Tikka Khan now urged an ‘overkill’, “Give me enough forces, and I’ll crush them in 48 hours,” he told his Army Chief. Staff checks indicated that the Army needed a minimum 19 days to fly in enough troops. Yahya Khan had to somehow play for time. In a radio broadcast on 3 March 1971, Yahya announced a new date for the opening of the Assembly – 25 March. Time could be brought only by a ruse of a sincere attempt at negotiations. Yahya succeeded in this entirely – whether by his own skill or Sheikh Mujib’s naivete or a combination of both, was hard to tell."

" ... Yahya in the meantime, was also in the process of planning to break up the support base of Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League. By his reckoning it was simply the intellectuals and the elite and of course, the Hindu minority. For such a complex problem, the sheer simplicity of this insane solution was astonishing. ... "

"Tikka Khan however had risen from the ranks as an illiterate soldier. He largely remained that. He was convinced that if he could wipe out the Dacca University and its intellectual clique – the centre for the spread of intellectual and liberal ideas, by killing a few thousands intellectuals and professionals of the middle class and allow his solders to go on a rampage in the urban areas, he would be able to scare them into abject submission. It was the supreme confidence and sangfroid of a village idiot. Being a man of limited intellect, he did not perhaps comprehend the enormity of what he was about to do – unleash an orgy of slaughter and mass murder on an unarmed population. It was sheer ethnic arrogance – that the Pakistani army could cow down the “coward Bengalis” into meek submission by this ham-handed approach."

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July 01, 2022 - July 01, 2022. 

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2.​ OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT: THE BLOOD TELEGRAM 

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"25 March 1971: US Consulate Dacca

"Archer Blood, the US Charge de Affairs in Dacca was typing furiously at his Remington typewriter. An experienced career diplomat, he had watched with mounting concern, the situation unfolding in Dacca. He was appalled by the attitude of the Pakistan Military Junta and its apparent determination to crush a democratic upsurge of unarmed people. He was equally appalled by the cynical attitude of the Richard Nixon administration in Washington towards this impending human catastrophe. Time and again he had sent frantic telegrams outlining the holocaust that was in the making. 

"“For Christ’s sake, we must put pressure on Yahya Khan to desist. We must prevail upon him not to unleash such a crackdown.” 

"His appeals however, fell on deaf ears. Though his immediate superiors in the State Department seemed to agree with him beyond them there was a blank wall."

................................................................................................

"“Sir, the M-24 Chaffee tanks are moving on the roads. There is sound of firing all over.” 

"Blood sighed intensely. “Shit,” was all he could mutter. 

"McBride walked up to his table, “I have been on the roof. I could see many parts of the city burning. We could hear many loud explosions from the direction of the University. It looks like they are using Artillery,” she said. 

"“Artillery?” Blood echoed, “Are these guys crazy?” He passed his hands over his face in an agonised gesture. “So, instead of talking to Mujibur who won their damned elections, they have started this crackdown.” 

"Jane looked at him quietly, “My maid’s husband said that the Army is killing the Awami League leaders, professors and students. All Hindu houses are being marked with an ‘H’.” 

"Blood whistled soundlessly. “Reminds me of Nazi Germany,” he said."

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"The confidential cable, with the blunt subject line of “Dissent from U.S. policy towards East Pakistan,” was probably the most blistering denunciation of U.S. foreign policy ever sent by its own diplomats: It went like this:-

"“With the conviction that U.S. policy related to recent developments in East Pakistan serves neither our moral interests broadly defined nor our national interests narrowly defined, numerous officers of American Consulate General Dacca ... consider it their duty to register strong dissent with fundamental aspects of this policy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pak dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public relations impact against them. Our government has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy, ironically at a time when the USSR sent President Yahya a message defending democracy, condemning arrest of leader of democratically elected majority party (incidentally pro-West) and calling for end to repressive measures and bloodshed …. We have chosen not to intervene, even morally on the grounds that the Awami conflict, in which, unfortunately the overworked term genocide is applicable, is purely [an] internal matter of a sovereign state. Private Americans have expressed disgust. We, as professional public servants express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our politics redirected in order to salvage our nation’s position as a moral leader of the free world." 

"— Archer Blood"

" ... The telegram detonated in all directions, to diplomats in Washington, Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore."

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"Gen Yahya Khan had kept up the pretense of negotiations till 24 March when the Pakistan Army HQ Eastern Command signaled its readiness. Yahya had come down to Dacca on the pretext of negotiations. He now ordered the arrest of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and the start of the crackdown. Then he made his getaway from Dacca in his special plane. 

"Operation Searchlight was a vicious crackdown – unparalleled in recent history for its sheer brutality and ham-handedness. The army stormed into the Dacca University. Professors and students were pulled out of their houses and hostels and shot in cold blood. The up-market colonies where the middle-class officials lived were also attacked. People were ruthlessly pulled out of their beds and pumped with bullets by firing squads. There were bleeding bodies and people screaming all around.

"The Hindus were massacred brutally. Their houses had specifically been marked with huge ‘Hs’ by the plainclothes intelligence sleuths who preceded the military units. The soldiers were particularly brutal with them. Initially there were some molestations of the better looking Hindu women. When the officers looked away – there were instances of rape. This soon became a free for all. 

"The soldiers had hesitated initially on firing on unarmed civilians. They were soon overcome by that feeling of complete power as they saw the panic-stricken faces of their victims and heard the shrill screams of the women. Over time it was dehumanising but perversely intoxicating for the peasant Punjabi troops. This feeling of absolute power over their helpless victims – it seemed to have awakened some deep atavistic passion in their bellies. Passions of the dark ages when conquering armies threw themselves on hapless populations to loot, burn, kill and rape. Over time this erodes discipline and dehumanises a modern military force. Soon the soldiers were permitted to carry away the prettier girls to their barracks for sustained gang rapes."

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"Blood Bath at the University

"A strong column of the Pakistan Army wheeled into the Dhaka University. Heading it were two M-113 Armoured Personal Carriers (APCs). Behind them were jeeps fitted with Machine guns. Army trucks loaded with troops of the Baloch Regiment trundled behind. 

"The Students gaped at them in panic. A Pakistani Officer barked a word of command and the troops jumped off the vehicles and formed up in columns. A curious crowd of students gathered and gaped. Suddenly the officer shouted ‘fire’. The Machine guns opened fire and raked the crowds. The heart rending screams filled the air. 

"The panic stricken students fled in all directions. Tahira Siddiqui – a tall and stunningly beautiful Bengali girl looked out of the window of the College Library at the turmoil below. She was the daughter of Muhammed Kadir Siddiqui of Tangail, an influential local leader who would gain global fame subsequently as Tiger Siddiqui who led a 17,000 strong Guerilla Force called Kadir Bahini."

She saw her friend Sultana assaulted and murdered by soldiers, as she hid. 

" ... She reached a relative’s house and after hiding her for two days ,they sent her back to her hometown Tangail. 

"Her father Kader Siddiqui was putting together a group of Mukti guerillas to start resistance. She walked up to her Father. “Baba! I want to fight! I want revenge!” and broke down in heart rending sobs. She showed him Sultana’s blood soaked clothes. The father nodded grimly and embraced her. Tears flowed down his cheeks as he stroked her hair gently."

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"The troops carried out the ruthless crackdown in the urban centres of Dacca, Khulna, Comilla, Jessore, and Chittagong. Jeeps fitted with 0.50 calibre machine guns went around towns shooting at will. M-24 Chaffee light tanks roared down the streets. The Pakistani army deliberately set out to destroy any Bengali units in Dacca which might have military capability- particularly the Bengali troops of East Pakistan Rifles. They simply attacked their barracks and killed as many of them as they could. The Pakistanis used their F-86 fighter jets to bomb towns, colleges and villages. Even Napalm was used. Some 6,000 people were killed in Dacca itself. It was unprecedented savagery against an unarmed civilian population. Then the Pakistani troops were ordered to fan out to the villages.

"The orders were simple – ‘Kill all Awami League Leaders – Slaughter all Hindus’. It was a simplistic solution. The drill was simple. Artillery guns would accompany the convoys of military trucks. Short of the village the artillery guns would deploy and open fire on the village. After a few minutes of bombarding – the troops would move in – shooting and bayoneting at will. The Hindus were ruthlessly massacred, their houses looted and the better looking girls carried away. Some of the more sensitive officers baulked initially at this erosion of discipline but the fear of not looking macho enough impelled them to keep quiet. Soon the better looking girls were being sent to the Officers’ Messes. The aim was to terrify a civilian population into abject submission.

"Logistics were a problem. The troops had been moved in a hurry and adequate provisions had not been stocked up or sent by ship. Gen Tikka Khan’s orders were simple. Requisition whatever you need from the villages. So not only were villages razed to the ground – but their sacks of rice and provisions were also taken away by the Pakistani troops as part of “requisitioned” wartime logistics. The Justice Hamudur Rehman Commission that later investigated these atrocities was appalled. Their acts of savagery had slowly eroded the discipline and moral fibre of the Pakistan Army in the East.

"The genocide was so blatantly ethnic that the East Bengal Regiment (EBR-many of whose units had already been moved out to the west), the East Pakistan Rifles, (EPR) and the police and other Bengali units revolted. Col MAG Osmani led this rebellion. In desperation, the people formed the Mukti Fauj (later Mukti Bahini) groups to protect themselves. Mostly, however, the terrified people just picked up their belongings and fled. A tide of frightened refugees now began to stream into India – into the neighbouring states of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. The trickle soon became an unmanageable flood as lakhs of refugees fled in sheer panic ... "

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July 01, 2022 - July 01, 2022. 

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3. THE CYNICAL VIEW FROM WASHINGTON 

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"Richard Nixon – before becoming the President had traveled extensively. He had been to Pakistan and been received right royally by the Pakistani Generals. He liked their bluff, straight-forward and genial military ways. He had taken a particular liking to Gen Yahya Khan. Nixon had acquired an equal dislike for the more complex Indians who were non-aligned. Nixon found non-alignment morally repugnant. He had taken a particularly strong dislike to the imperious Indian Prime Minister – Mrs. Indira Gandhi – who seemed to arouse all his latent insecurities. Yahya Khan was now helping the American establishment effect direct communication with the Mao Zedong Government in China."

Wonder why most people fail to notice the explicitly abusive misogyny that was not veiled in persona of Nixon, although it's common to most US, most culture of Abrahamic-II and, of course, Abrahamic-III. 

Also of course, they refrain from mentioning the obvious - there's the common cultural roots shared between Abrahamic-II and Abrahamic-III, which ironically include not only doctrinal condemnation of Hindus to hellfire, but a hatred of Abrahamic-I, the Jewish! 

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" ... In fact in 1969, serious border clashes had broken out on the Amur-Ussuri river. Russia now clearly viewed China as a rising threat. It was now arming India as a counterweight to the rising power of China. They were supplying India cutting edge weapons and equipment at highly subsidised rates.

"Henry Kissinger was trying to change the global security architecture in one fell swoop by an outreach to Red China that would end the Sino-Soviet alliance and create a radically new Balance of Power in which, the USA and China would come together and balance the rising power and assertiveness of the USSR. 

"The negotiations then were at a very delicate stage and he needed a reliable conduit to the Chinese leadership in Beijing that could be kept totally under the wraps. Gen Yahya Khan of Pakistan had provided that conduit and opening. In fact later in that year itself, Kissinger would fly in to Islamabad for a visit, feign illness and then fly off to Beijing in a Pakistani jet for a top secret state visit to meet Mao Zedong, Tse Tung and Zhou-en-Lai in Beijing.

"The US State Department was kept out of the loop. The State Department had been watching developments in East Pakistan with rising concern. They were inclined to put pressure on the Government of Pakistan to respect the democratic verdict of the elections. State Department officials and the American public were also quite sympathetic to India which had to bear the influx of millions of refugees. The liberal US Press supported India and was awash with stories of atrocities by the Pakistan Army.

"Unfortunately at this critical juncture, America gave primacy to narrow national interests over the larger issue of Human Rights and liberal democratic values. Nixon sorely needed Yahya Khan and thus wanted no pressure to be put on him. The State Department wanted to stop arms shipments to the Pakistan Army as these were being used to brutalise the Bengalis. Richard Nixon was livid. He personally liked Yahya Khan and wanted to support him. It was a quid-pro-quo for the outreach to Beijing that Yahya Khan was felicitating with such secrecy and diligence.

"The American Ambassador to India, Robert Keating was deeply troubled by the outrage in India over the issue of the refugee influx and America’s continuing arms support to Pakistan that was being used to suppress the people of East Bengal. The crackdown was reaching the proportions of genocide and had drawn strident criticism and condemnation from the American media. Keating protested strongly to Washington and asked for pressure to be applied on Islamabad to stop this genocide."

" ... US Policies at that delicate juncture were solely guided by narrow and cynical self-interest. That US State Department however contested this self interest argument. The Birth of Bangladesh was now inevitable. It was a given. Why was the US putting itself on the wrong side of history? It would badly queer relations with the new state once it emerged. “We had to be realist about it,” they said. Kissinger’s retort had been chilling. Referring to past Muslim rulers he said, “They did not dominate 400 million Indian’s all those years by being gentle.” He was in effect cynically condoning Pakistani genocide. This had created a carnage worse than the partition in 1947."

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July 01, 2022 - July 01, 2022. 

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4.​ CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE SAGE COUNSEL OF SAM 

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"The flood of refugees was continuing unabated. Each day thousands upon thousands of them were streaming across the borders. This ethnic cleansing suited Pakistan. What was then kept a secret by the Indian Government was the fact that the bulk of the refugees were Hindus, who were being rather pointedly targeted. By the end of March 1971, some 30 lakh refugees had streamed into the bordering states of Assam, Tripura and primarily West Bengal. ... "

"The decade of the 1960s had been a tumultuous decade for South Asia. In 1962, the Chinese had shocked India with a sudden and massive attack across the Himalayas. This had shattered Pandit Nehru. His soft power oriented world view had collapsed suddenly like a deflated balloon. He had laid a somewhat misplaced and highly exaggerated emphasis on peace, neutrality and non-violence. Perhaps he was fighting the Ghost of Bose and his Indian National Army (INA), which had suddenly forced the British to leave in a hurry after they had just won the Second World War. Keen to gain political legitimacy, Nehru claimed that the British had left solely because of the soul force of Ahimsa (Non-violence). The British PM Lord Clement Atlee, who had signed the Independence of India Act – felt otherwise and had squarely blamed Bose and the INA for the precipitate British withdrawal."

General Bakshi is tempering facts and veiling reality, which is, it wasn't "feeling"! If "The British PM Lord Clement Atlee, who had signed the Independence of India Act – felt otherwise", it could only be because it was so; There was no reason for him to sign the independence of India and let go of a most prized colony, termed 'Jewel In The Crown', and be seen himself in the light of a lower, if it was in any way possible to keep India. 

Besides, not only Clement Atlee know the reality, but responded frankly to questions while on a visit to India subsequently, stating that congress and Gandhi were in no way responsible for British being forced to leave India in 1947; they were handled easily enough, was the gist of his response. 

What's more, General Bakshi has published a book to prove this fact, citing official documents of British government of the time. 

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"Nehru tried to lay the Ghost of Bose to rest by emphasising non-violence and soft power. He hated the Army and was keen to do away with it. When his British Army Chief of Staff Gen Sir Roy Bucher came to his office to present plans for the future of the Indian Army – he told him contemptuously, “General – we don’t need an army. We only need the Police.” It was only the realist Sardar Patel who saved the Indian Army from disbandment and used it to good effect to force the princely states to merge with India without a whimper. He thus made India a viable and governable entity. He sent in the Army to liberate Hyderabad and then to save Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). He was a great check on Nehru’s flights of liberal fancy. Unfortunately, he died very early.

"After Sardar Patel, Nehru’s antipathy to the armed forces found full play. In 1956, the military coup happened in Pakistan and Nehru turned paranoid about what his Army would do. He went out of his way to deny resources to the Armed Forces. He brought them down in the warrant of precedence and set the wily bureaucrats to tame them. Starved of resources they became neglected and embittered. BN Mullick, the boss of the Intelligence Bureau now stepped in to fill the breach. He usurped the Strategic Policy Planning space entirely and cut off the armed Forces from the political masters and decision making. Unfortunately, Mallik, a Police officer, had no experience of matters military. India became a pacifist state that strangely and thoroughly neglected its armed forces and marginalised them from all higher level decision making – quite unlike the British and American democracies which had very robust military traditions and where the military had a pride of place."

It needs to be said that it was also in flagrant deviation from traditions of India, right ip to times of Shivaji and subsequent Peshawas, where in fact a monarch (or an effective head of state, as Peshawas were, while descendents of Shivaji ruled nominally) was expected to - and most often did - personally lead armies in vital battles of state. 

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"The shock of the Chinese invasion in 1962 cured India very rudely of its exaggerated pacifism. Nehru’s successors – Lal Bahadur Shastri and then Nehru’s own daughter Indira Gandhi, had learnt their very bitter lessons in real politik. They set in motion a massive expansion and modernisation of the Indian Armed Forces. From some 400,000 they were expanded to over 850,000. A total of 10 new Mountain Divisions were raised for the Himalayan border. 

"Pakistan saw this military modernisation and was alarmed. American gifted military equipment had given it a clear edge in the quality of airpower (Star fighters and Sabres) and even the quantity and quality of tanks and artillery. The Pakistani Army now saw this military edge rapidly eroding. Bhutto egged on Ayub. The defeated and demoralised Indian Army was tottering – Ayub felt; and it needed just one push and it would collapse. He had met the short-statured Indian PM Shastri and felt contempt for the man. He failed to see the steel and resolve in his soul. Pakistan sensed its last chance in 1965 to grab Kashmir by force. Thereafter the balance of forces would change forever to its detriment.

"Pakistan gambled in 1965 and failed badly. It is one of the few cases of war-initiation by the weaker military power. The Indian Armed Forces were caught half-way in their expansion and modernisation plans. There was great flux and turbulence. Old units had been milked of experienced personnel to raise new units. Equipment was still coming in. However, India had a dynamic new Chief – Gen JN Chaudhuri. He was combat experienced and sharp. He had rebuilt the Indian Army. In Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, the Western Army Commander – India had a superb field commander with nerves of steel. Pakistan failed miserably to take Kashmir with its grandiose Op Gibraltar – an Algerian style insurrection to be instigated by infiltrating some 10,000 Pakistani soldiers in mufti. Pakistan made a final gamble to seize the Akhnur Bridge and cut off the state of Jammu & Kashmir. To its utter surprise India retaliated across the international border with two corps – one aimed at Sialkot and the other at Lahore. Pakistan had to recoil from Jammu & Kashmir and fight desperately to save its heartland in Punjab. Pakistan then launched its final masterstroke by launching its 1st Armoured Division in Kasur to get behind the two Indian attacking corps. This Pakistani Armoured Division however was trapped and destroyed in detail at Asal Uttar."

" ... India’s senior commanders had learnt a number of lessons from the 1962 and 1965 wars. It was an era of professionalism and threw up highly competent Indian Military commanders. In 1969 Gen SHFJ Manekshaw took over as the Chief of Army Staff. Indira Gandhi had selected him over the formidable Gen Harbaksh Singh, who had played such a stellar role in the 1965 War. Despite Sam’s best efforts the military buildup was not going as fast as he wanted. There were numerous bureaucratic delays and hold ups. There were still many glaring gaps and voids when the crisis suddenly erupted in the first half of 1971.

"The salient point however was that the Indian political and military leadership had learnt some valuable lessons, from the 1962 and 1965 wars and the Indian military had become highly professional in outlook. The Armed Forces which had been totally marginalised from national decision making, were now professionally consulted by the political leadership, which had realised that the generalised civil bureaucracy and intelligence services were out of their element on the battlefields. It was best to leave it to the military professionals."

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General Bakshi gives a succinct summary of the forces on each side. 

The Indian Air Force (IAF)

" ... India had some seven squadrons of Gnat Interceptors (these had put up a superb performance in the 1965 War); six squadrons of Hunter fighter bombers and two squadrons of the indigenously manufactured HF-24 Marut trans-sonic fighters. There were three squadrons of Canberra bombers. Radar surveillance and communications systems had been greatly improved after the 1965 War. The IAF now had a combat tested leadership and was led by the highly competent Air Marshal PC Lal. The IAF then was vastly superior to the Pakistani Air Force (PAF). It had expanded in size and inventory of fighters and was now a combat hardened force. It was to play a decisive role in the 1971 War ... "

"IAF had deployed 11 fighter and 1 Canberra squadron in the East. Faced with just one F-86 Pakistani squadron, the Indian Air Force had created a vast edge in air power in the East."

"The Indian Navy: The Indian Navy had been greatly expanded from 1965, when it had been asked to stay out of the war. ... "

Gandhian guilt feeling remnants, that stupidity!

" ... It was then led by Admiral SM Nanda – a highly aggressive and offensive oriented Chief who was determined that the Indian Navy would not sit out the next war. ... "

Shouldn't have had to, in 1965 - or 1962!

" ... It had received a lot of Russian equipment and had imbibed the aggressive and ruthless Russian military philosophy of annihilating the enemy. ... "

Hearing even descriptions about relaxing at Novaya Zemlya brings goosebumps!

" ... The Indian Armed Forces had a clear edge in airpower and naval power especially in the East."

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" ... The buildup continued and by October 1971, East Pakistan had four divisions plus (around 42 Infantry battalions). Some 40,000 West Punjab Rangers had been inducted to replace the East Pakistan Rifles (Border Security Force). The East Pakistan Rifles had a strength of some 20,000 men (Bengalis mixed with West Punjabis, but all commanded by Punjabi officers mostly). The Infantry Divisions were the 9th, 14th and 16th Infantry Divisions. Niazi had tried to give an impression of strength by raising two additional divisions (the 36th and 39th). However, in actual fact these were skeleton divisions with just over a brigade in each. 

"The fact to remember is that the Indian Army was entirely oriented to fighting battles against China and West Pakistan. East Pakistan was an entirely new front that had really not been catered for. There were two divisions sent to operate against the Naxals in West Bengal. However, these had come without their heavy weapons and could only be used for counter insurgency or defensive roles. India’s entire bridging equipment and armour was in the West."

And, presumably, also spread from North to Northeast, along the Himalayan border with Tibet, facing Chinese army?

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"The highly charismatic, flamboyant and competent Gen Sam Manekshaw was the Army Chief. Lt Gen JS Aurora – a sterling Sikh gentleman was the Eastern Army Commander. Sam had been the Eastern Army Commander before Gen Aurora and knew that Command inside out. He had brought in Maj Gen JFR Jacob as his Chief of Staff. Gen Jacob, an Armenian Jew, was a brilliant intellectual. He was mercurial and short tempered but brilliant and an unconventional thinker. Sam and he had been instructors at the Staff College and had a strange love-hate relationship. Sam was a great judge of people and trusted JFR Jacob implicitly. He had brought him to Eastern Command and the two men had a famous relationship. Sam often bypassed Gen Aurora, the Army Commander and interacted directly with the Chief of Staff – Gen Jacob. Quite incidentally, destiny has a strange way of putting the right man at the right job – at the right time. Jacob had been a student of a College in Dacca and knew East Pakistan like the palm of his hand. His intimate knowledge of the terrain was to stand the Indian Army in very good stead."

" ... There was great clamour in India and unbearable pressure on PM Indira Gandhi to do something to alter the intolerable situation in East Pakistan. On 4th April 1971 she held a Crisis Committee Meeting of the Cabinet in New Delhi. Present were the Defence, Foreign, Home and Finance Ministers. Gen Sam Manekshaw was called as a special invitee to this crucial meeting. It was an epochal and historic meeting and shaped the subsequent course of the war. There are numerous accounts of what went on in the meeting ... "

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"04 April 1971 – South Block, New Delhi 

"Mrs. Indira Gandhi did not waste time in preambles and preliminaries but in her charged sort of way, she came straight to the point, “Gentlemen, some 30 lakh Bengali refugees have already come into West Bengal, Tripura and Assam; and there are more pouring in everyday. West Bengal is already suffering a Naxalite insurgency and the state has its hands full. This enormous influx of the refugees could be dangerously destabilising. Epidemics like cholera are spreading rapidly. The monsoons have broken out and made things worse. We can’t sit back and take it any longer.”

"The Finance Minister Yashvantrao Balwantrao (YB) Chavan coughed discreetly, “Madam the financial strain upon our resources is becoming unbearable. I don’t think we can take it for very much longer. It could derail our economy.” 

"Mrs. Gandhi’s eyes flashed angrily. She turned to Gen Sam Manekshaw and said abruptly, “Sam, what are you doing about it?” 

"The General was somewhat taken aback, “Madam! What do you want me to do about it?” 

"“I want you to move in Sam! Take over East Pakistan,” said the imperious lady. Sam took a few seconds to absorb this. 

"“Madam that means war,” he said. “I don’t mind,” she retorted instantly.

"“But Madam, I’m not ready as yet. You want me to move in right now – I’ll obey your orders. But I cannot guarantee you success. In fact, right now we are most likely to fail.” 

"There was pin drop silence in the majestic conference hall. One could have cut the air with a knife. 

"The eyes of the imperious lady flashed with anger.. She opened her mouth to say something – then stopped herself with an effort. She turned to her ministers, “Gentlemen can we kindly meet after some time?” 

"Gen Sam Manekshaw also got up uncertainly to leave. “Not you Sam,” she snapped, “you stay back.”

"When they were alone – she stared at him. It was evident she was making a visible attempt to suppress her anger, 

"“Sam, what did you mean? You can’t go in now?” 

"“Madam I said I am not ready. The bulk of my forces are deployed in the West. All my bridging equipment is there. I’ll have to move it to the East. It could take a month and more. The monsoon is already upon us. East Pakistan becomes a quagmire in the rains. It will seriously hamper all air and ground operations. The flooded terrain would be impassable. Then there are the Chinese. The Himalayan Passes open after the rains and they could intervene. I strongly advise against going in now.” 

"Mrs. Gandhi continued to glare at him in silence. 

"He said, “Madam, if you want my resignation I can put it in right away – kindly let me know if you want it on physical or mental grounds.”

"Mrs. Gandhi registered what the General had put across so bluntly. She could however see the irrefutable logic. 

"“So what do you suggest Sam?” She queried briefly. 

"“Madam, please let me go in November. The monsoons would be over – the ground would have hardened. The Himalayan passes would have closed and the Chinese won’t be able to intervene even if they wanted to. Madam, you let me go in November and I can guarantee you 100 percent success.” 

"Mrs. Gandhi stared at him. Slowly the lines of her face softened. “All right Sam. That makes sense. You do it that way,” she said."

" ... Sam had spoken to Gen Jacob on the phone before he came for the meeting. Jacob had pleaded that they were just not ready then and would need time. Resources would have to be brought in from the West. New roads and railway line spurs were to be constructed to ensure smooth movement of troops and logistics supplies. 

"They needed time."

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"In fact, the Chief of the Border Security Force (BSF) was then another flamboyant Parsi officer – DG Rusotmji. Apprehensive of a coup – sections of the civilian establishment had been trying to build up the BSF as a counterweight to the Army. Hence it had been permitted to raise its own artillery and air wings. Rustomji now promised the political brass that the BSF would now do what the Indian Army had failed to do. It would move in. It was braggadocio. But perhaps Rustomji actually believed he could do it. In fact, it is said that he met Gen Jacob in HQ Eastern Command to inform him that he was going in and that the Army should keep a contingent ready for the victory parade in Dacca. The BSF did make some forays and attempts on the border and suffered severe casualties in the bargain. Much chastised, they gave up these quixotic attempts to do the job of the Army. They were now told to focus on receiving the fleeing elements of the EBR and EPR Bengali personnel and help them organise themselves to take on the Pakistani army."

"Sam’s professional advice had been well thought through and sagacious. He knew his own Army very well. The Indian army was a huge leviathan. Like an elephant it needed time to get its act together. Once it gained momentum it was unstoppable. However, it was not capable of cold starts and sudden operations with zero warning. With such speed it tended to blank out. That was what the intelligence agencies had been suggesting, However, It is a cardinal maxim of war – “Prepare slowly – execute fast.” The counterpoint was – a professional Army should be prepared to take to the field at very short notice. It cannot ask for an eight months preparation period. That was the theory. Sam knew that in practice it wouldn’t work out that way. In fact, Sam had stated bluntly, “I don’t like fancy stuff. My formations are not the German Panzer divisions. They take their time to move.” It was a most realistic and accurate assessment of his own forces."

But German panzer divisions hadn't moved at a moment's notice, even in WWII! They had had years to prepare while their leader bluffed the international scenes with his tantrums and promises, all the while having fixed exactly when the military machine of Germany shall roll forth. The German military had known several months in advance about their marching into Poland, with ultimately to be attempted takeover of all of East Europe upto Urals! 

" ... In Sri Lanka in 1987, it had been a pure cold start. Rajiv Gandhi had hustled and pushed Gen K. Sundarji and forced him to rush into Sri Lanka unprepared and with zero warning. It had almost turned out to be a disaster. The troops landed in without maps and heavy equipment initially and had suffered uncalled for losses and reverses. The Indian Army however is a big Army. It increased force levels subsequently and ultimately turned the situation around in Sri Lanka. By then the Sinhalese and Tamils both wanted the Indian Army out and it was something of a fiasco as the IPKF came back with some 1100 casualties and all the gains that it had made were undone."

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July 01, 2022 - July 01, 2022. 

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5. OPERATIONS OF THE MUKTI BAHINI: 

STRETCHING THE PAKISTANI EASTERN COMMAND 

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"Sam’s refusal rankled for long with the civilian establishment. They could not refute his logic or arguments but they did not like the idea that the soldier could decide when the nation should to go to war. Post-independence, the civilian bureaucracy and intelligence had completely cut the Armed Forces out of higher decision making loop. Post the coup in Pakistan, it was more of a “let us show the army its place” attitude. India, therefore, was the only big democracy where the soldiers had no say in higher defence decision-making. ... "

This shows the completely copycat reactionary Lutyen's character of the said bureaucracy that had been trained under colonial masters and was used for most part to looking up to ex-colonial rulers, and saw pakis in role of inheritors of mughals - as indeed pakis claim, to this day, delusionally. 

" ... The Commander in Chief (C-in-C) in India was next only to the Viceroy in the colonial era.

"The civilian establishment was wrestling with the threat of an imagined coup by the Indian Army. ... "

Which, if they had roots in India not replaced by colonial slave mindset, they wouldn't have had such fears. Such a coup belongs to the islamic mindset that accepts heritage of a Khilji, a Babar and cousins et al, but not to the nation that reverse Ramayana and Mahabharata, and unanimously postpones an assembly session to watch a not too sophisticated serial on television because it's one of those beloved epics. 

" ... They were shaken by the coup in Pakistan and the Nehruvian response was to completely marginalise the armed forces. ... "

India paid dearly for the severed roots of the young boy who had been transplanted by his wealthy father in Harrow and Cambridge, and enthroned by Gandhi on congress, three times by ignoring the supposedly democratic party's general vote and unseating another, properly elected, president. 

" ... India paid a very heavy price for this in 1962. Thereafter the Defence Chiefs had to be brought back into the decision making loop. The intelligence agencies could set the stage for war but they were in no position to fight it. Lack of experience in this realm had led BN Mullick to overreach himself before the 1962 border war. The civilian leadership had learnt a bitter lesson. Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri placed implicit trust in the Armed Forces leadership and let them take the professional decisions. This paid off handsomely in the 1965 War. Based on the chief’s advice – Shastri gave the momentous decision to attack across the International Border (IB). Mrs. Gandhi was a very strong leader. RN Kao, the then Chief of R&AW was her most trusted confidante. However, she was realist enough to listen to her Chairman Chiefs of Staff and had the sagacity to heed his professional advice."

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" ... For a time a pious hope was even entertained that perhaps the Mukti Bahini by itself would get the better of the Pakistan Army and resolve the crisis. It was escapist thinking.

"The Indian civilian establishment failed to factor in the sheer brutality and ruthlessness of which the Pakistani Army was capable of. The Indian Army inherently had exercised somewhat excessive restraint while dealing with insurgents and terrorists. It had confined weapons usage to infantry small arms alone and had completely eschewed the use of airpower, tanks and artillery. Not so the Pakistan Army. It has treated Counter Insurgency (CI) / Counter Terrorism (CT) as full scale conventional war and used every single weapon in its armoury. It used tanks, artillery and jet fighters to pound the Mukti Bahini. It used even greater force levels later to savage the Baluchis and after that the Pathan tribesmen in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It indiscriminately bombed and shelled the insurgents, almost pounding them into submission. ... "

The last bit is slightly short of facts on some cases. Pounding them into death is closer. 

" ... Nevertheless, the Mukti Bahini operations did greatly harass, tire down and extend the Pakistani forces in the East. The Mukti Bahini provided excellent terrain and enemy intelligence to the Indian Army, and greatly enhanced its situational awareness. It later provided intimate logistics support and local resources by way of country boats and ferries for trans-river operations. ... "

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"The Bengali Forces 

"The kernel of the Mukti Fauj came from the 70,000-strong Bengali troops, who formed part of the East Bengal Regiment, the East Pakistan Rifles (a border guard force) and the Razakars (subdivided into Mujahids and Ansars) as also the Police. ... "

"The Razakars, as stated were divided into two groups:- 

"The Mujahids: These were partly armed with obsolete rifles and guns. They were wholly composed of Biharis and other non-Bengali Muslims. They remained staunchly loyal to Pakistan and carried out many acts of brutality and savagery and were employed on an organised scale to abduct young women for Pakistani officers and men.

"The Ansars: were armed with only lathis and spears. Mostly they were Biharis but there were also some Bengalis. The Bengalis deserted to a man after the March 1971 crackdown.

"The Police: Police strength was around 45,000. Though not armed they were very politically conscious and highly motivated to act against the Pakistan Army by February-March 1971.They had been in touch with the political leadership and the unfolding events. The Pakistanis knew this and took major reprisals against these police personnel. Right from the 25th March 1971 crackdown itself, the Pakistan Army targeted many police posts and killed the men stationed there.

" ... In fact it was only on 19 March 1971 that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman made the first tentative attempts to establish contact with the East Bengal Regiment. He contacted Col Osmani. Col Osmani sent a three point Secret circular to the Bengali officers after his meeting with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. In typical military style he exhorted his officers to not get embroiled in politics!

"Unfortunately for them, the Pakistan Army viewed them as potential traitors. They had drawn up elaborate plans to strike preemptively. Even as they prepared for their brutal crackdown plans, they made elaborate efforts to render the Bengali officers ineffective:- 

"• Key Bengali officers were separated from their men by sending them out of their units and HQs on purposeless missions. 

"• Bengali personnel were disarmed on flimsy pretexts. 

"• Collective murder plans were made to simply kill them once orders were received from Dacca."

"In fact, it was these highly odious steps taken that forced the bulk of the Bengali officers to join the revolt. They were simply treated as traitors based on their ethnic origins. Col Osmani went so far as to say that if the Pakistani Military had not acted so stupidly and preemptively – the bulk of the Bengali military personnel may well have remained neutral. They were virtually pushed to mutiny. It was the Pakistani overkill that forced these Bengali officers and men who were wavering, to revolt. 

"Most senior Bengali officers had been separated from their men well in time. As a result when the crackdown commenced on 25 Mar, it was left to the junior Bengali officers to lead their men. They responded magnificently."

General Bakshi gives details of various officers who were sent preparatory to being killed, and how they succeeded instead. 

"The Pakistanis had planned to ship out a large contingent of East Bengal Regiment personnel to the west. They were put on board a ship at Chittagong and sent to West Pakistan. The restive Bengali soldiers sensed their fate and mutinied. They hijacked the ship and forced the Captain to take them back to Chittagong port to join the revolt."

"The Bengali resistance fighters took to guerilla warfare with finesse. Their most effective operations were in terms of sabotaging the communication infrastructure. They blew up rail and road bridges and attacked Pakistan Army ferries. They graduated to attacking Pakistani military convoys moving along the roads and made life difficult for the Pakistan Army. All this was part of a totally unplanned and spontaneous uprising. Their resourcefulness in hitting where it hurt the Pakistan Army the most, almost amounted to genius. The Pakistan Army had certainly not expected sabotage on such a widespread scale. As a result of these sabotage activities and hit-and-run raids – the Pakistan army had to stop all movement at night except in very large organised groups, and that too after proper road opening and area sanitisation. It was greatly harassed and put under psychological duress."

" ... The only effective underground organisation in the western sector was in the Kushtia-Jessore-Khulna area. Here the Mukti Bahini was able to organise an escape channel to spirit out key political leaders and senior Bengali military commanders to India. They established an Intelligence Centre for the Bangladesh government in exile, when it was finally set up at last in Indian Territory."

" ... The ruthless and savage Pakistani response was chilling. They used jet fighters, tanks and artillery in a no holds barred campaign. They were not engaged in Counter Insurgency (CI) operations. They treated it as an all out conventional war and laid waste the sections of towns that the Mukti Bahini had occupied – forcing them to withdraw in haste. 

"Apart from the armed Bengali soldiery – the Communists also took to guerilla warfare, particularly in the area north of Dacca. ... "

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"Gram Parishads 

"The Mukti Bahini now began to accelerate the formation of Gram Parishads – village insurgency cells – throughout the country. Though most of these did not take an active part in the insurgency operations, they provided excellent sanctuaries in the rural area from where the guerillas could operate. The fact is that the Bengali resistance movement was not so penetrated or ever so terrorised by Pakistan that it would lead to acts of betrayal or treachery. None have been recorded.

"By the end of April 1971 however, the initial operations of the Mukti Bahini had abated greatly. It was a mistake to seek pitched engagements with the better armed Pakistan military. It was quite an emotive and spontaneous revolt – an outburst of resentment. These conventional pitched engagements had cost them heavily. However, they were far more effective when they confined themselves to hit and run guerilla tactics and attacked the transport infrastructure and destroyed the roads and bridges.

"Many of these groups had crossed over to India to seek better arms and training. The Refugee Camps provided a huge pool of recruitable male manpower and they fully tapped this to enlarge their organisation. They established camps and recruited many Muslim and some Hindu youth – especially the better educated ones to recreate a fresh cadre to carry on the struggle. The recruitment and training periods were now shortened. Every six weeks some 2,000 new guerillas would join the Mukti Bahini ranks. The aim was now to flood the Pakistani rear with armed guerillas, who would harry them, draw them out and stretch them to the ulitimate – before the main Indian attacks started. The Pakistan Army in the East was tired out and a spent force by the time the Indian offensive commenced. A number of former East Bengal Regiment and East Pakistan Rifles units were now reorganised and infused with fresh manpower to serve along with the Indian Army units in regular combat operations. There was a large number of Bengali personnel from the Pakistan Air Force and Navy. All of them who were in the East joined the Mukti Bahini. Some of them undertook very bold riverine commando attacks using frogmen to target the Pakistani shipping in the riverine waterways. They also started estuarine operations to target coastal ships.

"In August 1971, Mukti Bahini frogmen operating in the Chalna and Chittagong harbours sank two British vessels – the 16,000 ton tanker Teviot Bank and the 10,000 ton freighter Chakdina using limpet mines. A number of other vessels were also sunk or damaged by the frogmen and on 12 October 1971, a Mukti Bahini gunboat attacked a British cargo boat – the 7,000 ton City of Albans out in the high seas. All these exorbitantly raised the freight rates and maintenance costs for Pakistan.

"Till July 1971 – the guerrilla raids were usually in groups of section and platoon strength (10-20) operating 5-10 miles within the Bangladesh borders. Beyond July-August 1971, these were stepped up to Company-sized raids that penetrated deep into enemy territory and fought pitched battles with the Pakistan Army units.

"At Belonia some 450 Pakistani troops were killed in a battle in which the Mukti Bahini lost 20 men. Eventually, Pakistan had to deploy a whole brigade to clear this area. 

"At Satkhira, Pakistan lost 300 soldiers in a pitched battle in which the guerrillas suffered 20 dead.

"Many other well-guarded targets were attacked. Over a 100 important rail and road bridges and nearly a thousand minor bridges and culverts were blown up.

"The Mukti Bahini thus played a stellar and highly significant role in the Liberation of their own country. Prior to the Indian offensive in December 1971, they served to spread out the Pakistani Army thinly all over the countryside. They tired them out with incessant pinprick attacks and destruction of rail/road bridges and ferries. Their most significant contribution came when the actual offensive commenced. They provided invaluable military and terrain intelligence and organised logistical support in terms of country boats and ferries to facilitate river crossings. They took part in the regular conventional operations and helped the para-drop and heli-landing operations."

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July 01, 2022 - July 01, 2022. 

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6.​ NIAZI’s PLANS OF A FORWARD DEFENCE 

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"The Genocide in East Pakistan had riveted the world’s attention. Swarms of TV and newspaper correspondents from all over the globe had descended in India and toured the Bangladesh border to see the pathetic conditions in the refugee camps, The flood of refugees had reached unprecedented proportions. By mid-July 1971, it was estimated that over six million refugees had poured into India. Almost 5.5 million of them were Hindus. There were 443,000 Muslims and 150,000 other refugees. It was the most callous attempt at ethnic cleansing triggered by a systematic programme of genocide. By November 1971, the number of refugees had reached the staggering figure of 10 million wretched human beings.

"The Hindus were targeted not because they supported Sheikh Mujibur Rehman or had taken active part in the revolt. This revolt was almost entirely triggered by the Muslim Bengalis in the uniformed forces of East Pakistan. Yet the Hindus were targeted with the diabolical purpose of simply driving them out of East Pakistan. Hindus were some 13 percent of the East Pakistan population and the genocidal campaign was primarily directed against them for no other cogent operational reason than the fact that they were Hindus. It was the Pakistani Army this time, that replicated the post-partition riots now on an industrial scale. The killing, raping and plundering were now done by the uniformed and otherwise disciplined Army of Pakistan. The brutality was unprecedented.

"It must be said to Mrs Gandhi’s government’s full credit that they were able to sensitise and influence the global, regional and local information environments. In fact, they were able to – highlight the enormity and scale of the genocide and brutality; and shape attitudes, emotions, opinions and actions of the audiences globally. There was an outpouring of support for the battered people of Bangladesh. Opinion in the west,for a change, was fully supportive of India and the long suffering people of Bangladesh. The Beatles along with the sitar Mastero, Ravi Shankar, held a massive rock concert in New York in support of the people of Bangaldesh. Intrepid newspaper correspondents went into East Pakistan with the Mukti Bahini guerrillas to report from the trenches and bunkers of that war."

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"The global outcry against the genocide in East Pakistan had earned Lt Gen Tikka Khan the sobriquet of ‘The Butcher of Bengal’. This rather dense and obtuse general had not batted an eyelid before ordering his men to slaughter unarmed civilians in their hundreds. 

"The global outcry had however made him a huge liability in Dacca. Hence on 4 April 1971, Lt Gen Tikka Khan was flown out and Lt Gen AAK Niazi moved in on promotion from GOC 4 Corps in Lahore to take charge of the Pakistani Eastern Command at Dacca. It is noteworthy that three Pakistani Generals (including the well known Lt Gen Bahadur Sher Khan) had refused to move to this appointment. Gen AAK Niazi was a flamboyant officer and a diehard optimist. He was also inordinately ambitious. He saw a lucrative opportunity in accepting this rather unpopular assignment into a professional backwater, which would soon propel him into the international limelight. What he had not bargained for was the shame and ignominy."

" ... He had a withering contempt for the Bengalis and was confident that he would get the better of them.

"Amir Abdullah Khan (AAK) Niazi was born in the Balo Khel village on the banks of the Indus river in Mianwali, Pakistan. On 18 March 1941 he was commissioned as an Emergency Commissioned Officer from the Officers’ Training School (OTS) in Bangalore (now called Bengaluru). He had joined the 4/7 Rajput Regiment and had been pitch-forked into the operations against the Japanese Army in Manipur in which he had exhibited great dash and courage. ... "

This amounts to his having fought against INA. 

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"11 April 1971 – HQ Eastern Command Dacca 

"Lt Gen Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, the newly appointed GOC-in-C Pakistan Eastern Command had taken charge in Dacca. He was supremely confident and came brimming with zeal. To get his Command HQ off their backsides (as he put it), he called for a conference of all the top commanders in East Pakistan. He used highly abusive and contemptuous language against the Bengali people. He had analysed the tactical situation. His solution was simple. Be offensive and aggressive – hit out at the Mukti Bahini – at their camps and sanctuaries in India. The Chief of Staff – Brig Baqir Siddiqui gave the intelligence brief – first about the Mukti Bahini and then the Indian Army.

"“Our Intelligence inputs indicate that the Indian Army will attempt shallow penetrations inside East Pakistan, to seize border enclaves where the refugees can be resettled. We do not think they will attempt any deep thrusts to occupy the whole of East Pakistan. At best they will seize the border enclaves, resettle the refugees here and set up a Government of Bangladesh. They will declare this as victory and step back. We feel this is all that the Indians are capable of doing or will attempt."

"Gen Niazi had sneered contemptuously, 

"“Gentlemen – the Indians do not know Lt Gen Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi. I had stopped the tank attacks of their Armoured Division at Zafarwal in the Sialkot sector. I will not let them take an inch of our territory in East Pakistan. We have three divisions in situ already and I plan to raise two more ad hoc divisions. Push all our troops to the borders. I don’t want people hanging out in the rear.”

"“I’m not going to sit back and take it. The Forward Posture means hit back at the Mukti Bahini camps in Indian Territory. You have my permission, engage them with artillery, launch raids across the border. Don’t wait to be hit – Hit them across the border. ... "

"“Aur yeh haramkhor Bangali (and these traitor Bengalis),” he continued, “be ruthless with them. Use air support, tanks and artillery. Teach these cowards a bloody lesson. Slaughter them remorselessly. That is the only language they understand. Don’t let them mount our heads.”"

And yet, only Bengal had voted clearly for partition, unlike Northwestern provinces, and Sindh vote had been divided evenly, resolved by speaker's vote. It had been Calcutta Direct Action Day massacre, ordered by Jinnah and executed by Suhrawardy, that broke Gandhi’s resolve against the Partition, while the Noakhali massacre of over 150,000 Hindus executed during a session of month long Hindu festivals preceded the subsequent massacres in North West across the border. And yet, the then newly independent Pakistan had not allowed Suhrawardy, who had assumed he'd be the PM since he headed the majority province, to even travel to attend the celebrations in Karachi! 

"“Exterminate these Hindus – drive them all across the borders. Let the Indians take care of them,” he sneered. He was really warming up to his theme. He harangued his commanders about his Forward Posture, his ‘not an inch will be lost’ philosophy and his totally offensive and proactive methods for dealing with the Bengali revolt."

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"“Toh kaisa raha? How was it?” queried Niazi, quite obviously fishing for compliments. His psycophantic staff went out of their way to please him ... "

" ... What he did not know was that the comments of some of his Generals after the conference had dispersed were most unflattering. The plan to attack across the borders was sheer folly. It would provide India just the excuse it needed to retaliate massively."

" ... Communications with GHQ Rawalpindi were difficult and mostly confined to cipher signals. Little could be said on the phone for fear of interception. Gen Niazi was more or less left to his own devices. Over the next few months, he crystallised his Forward Posture and formed a series of redoubts close to the border. His mantra was minimal loss of territory. Units were to fight doggedly to the last man, last round and prevent any Indian incursions. In fact, they were ordered to be offensive and attack Mukti Bahini camps even across the border. ... "

"Strategically Niazi had two broad options:- 

"He could either plan to hold a forward defence and hope to delay the Indian offensive long enough for international intervention – especially from China and the USA to become effective. 

"Alternatively, he could hold the Dacca triangle formed by the Jamuna-Padma-Meghna rivers very strongly and fight delaying actions on the border.

"There was a remarkable historical parallel. This was the precise decision dilemma that Poland had encountered in the Second World War. Either they could hold the border strongly ab initio or defend the Warsaw triangle formed by three rivers. They adopted a forward posture which the German Panzer columns completely bypassed and headed for the Warsaw core. This had collapsed the Polish defences."

" ... Niazi studied the communications and logistics infrastructure of the Indian Army opposite him and concluded that the main threat would come from the West from the direction of Calcutta and the northwest. All road approaches are in this direction and conformed to the grain of the country along the flow of the major rivers. The Indian logistics infrastructure opposite the Western and North Western quadrant was the most developed for supporting a major offensive. This included not just the road network but the stocks of ammunition, petrol and supplies. Hence he put his strongest division (the 9th) in this sector."

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" ... Pakistan had some 42 infantry battalions deployed in some 28 major strong points covering the available road axes coming from India. Each of these infantry battalions was equipped with two Light Machine Guns (LMGs) per section (compared to the Indian Army’s just one per section). The artillery component of the Pakistani divisions was less than the standard norm for the Pakistani Army – yet it was still superior to that of the Indian Mountain Divisions and the Counter Insurgency (CI) tasked divisions of Indian Eastern Command. Besides, Pakistan had four to five squadrons of the light M-24 Chaffee tanks."

"Niazi’s defence framework was built around the 28 strong points of brigade and battalion strength. These were strongly fortified with concrete pillboxes and bunkers with six feet of thick earth cover, anti-tank ditches and extensive minefields. A colossal dumping programme ensured that each strong point contained enough ammunition and supplies to hold out for months. At many places rivers were channeled to form moats and the strong points were held by brigade or battalions well supported by tanks and artillery.

"The worst was that Niazi had diverted a lot of American aid and money sent for the cyclone relief and refugee relief towards meeting the costs of these intensive fortification construction programs. The American money sent to alleviate the misery of the refugees was used by Pakistan instead to build massive fortresses and pill boxes and bunker complexes to delay for months any Indian advance into Bangladesh."

Did US know? 

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July 01, 2022 - July 01, 2022. 

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7.​ A BAND OF BROTHERS 

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General Bakshi describes three friends graduating NDA, December 1965, and joining three separate branches of the Indian military. ................................................................................................

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July 01, 2022 - July 01, 2022. 

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8. GENERATING SYNERGY AND SETTING THE STAGE 

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" ... The Eastern Air Command liaison cell was able to ensure that a certain number of sorties in support of ground troops were always available – irrespective of the air war situation. The key determinant of victory in this war was the overwhelming Offensive Air Support, in terms of Ground Attack fighters that were made available to the land forces. The IAF had achieved complete air supremacy over the East Pakistan theatre – once the war started. It enabled our convoys to move by daylight – bumper to bumper – with no threat whatsoever of enemy interference. A huge number of ground attack sorties were provided to the Army and this not only compensated for the deficiencies in artillery but also fulfilled the primary conditions of launching a Blitzkrieg – the availability of highly responsive air support.

"There was also no coordinating link with the Navy. This was also established subsequently with HQ of the Eastern Naval Command and very close coordination and synergy was ensured between the Eastern Fleet and the Eastern Army. In fact, the aircraft carrier ‘INS Vikrant’ was to provide invaluable air support for interdiction of enemy communications and naval facilities. A Naval HQ representing the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command Visakhapatnam was also established at Calcutta. This ensured Naval guns and aviation support for the ground forces and also enabled the Eastern Ground Forces to mount a hastily assembled Amphibious assault on the East Pakistan coastline."

General Bakshi describes a commando attack by Mukti Bahini, guided and aided by Indian military, in detail. 

"“The attack was on for tonight 14 August the Independence Day of Pakistan. Chaudharys Task unit 54.1.1 had to strike Chittagong at Midnight. The problem was being Independence day the city was on very high alert. The Pak Army check posts were checking all vehicles. Streets had been barricaded and armed men were all over. The plan entailed that the Mukti Bahini commandos would go North out of the city to Chalakhya on the Eastern bank of the Karnaphulli river and then swim downstream to attack the ships. The problem was to stick to attack timings they would have to go to launch point in motor vehicles. How would these Limpet mines get through?”"

"A third group of commandos were to reach Faujdar hut. There was no confirmation. They seemed to have lost their way. Choudhary waited tensely. Then he decided to go ahead with 40 commandos only. He lined up the commandos along the river bank. They got into their swimming trunks, put on the Abees rubber flippers and strapped commando knives on the calves. Then they helped each other to tie limpet mines around their necks with the help of gamchas, It had that simple double knot that would easily open under water. They then walked into the water backwards(easiest way to walk with flippers on your feet). Then a 100 commandos dived into the river of Kannaphulli in Chittagong, Pussor in Chalna, Shitalakshaya in Nyaranganj and the Meghna in Chandpur."

"The Limpeteers made great speed flowing downstream with the current floating backwards to keep the limpet mines safe. Some had covered their heads with water haycinths and breathed through bamboo reeds. Suddenly they saw a Pakistani patrol boat scanning the river with a searchlight. They ducked under water breathing through the Bamboo reeds. The search light scanned the area as they waited tensely. Then it moved ahead. They sighed with relief and moved on to the target area. They swam for a km towards the ships silhouetted on the horizon The ships were well lit merchantmen and easy to identify. The attack was planned for mid night as that was when the ebb tide began and the river waters rushed towards the Sea. It would aid the getaway."

" ... At 1.40 the first dull watery explosion resounded around Chittagong. The Al Abaas shuddered violently. Soon a series of under water explosions rattled ship sides. There was total panic on the harbour front. The Pakistani soldiers began to fire in sheer panic into the water. The river water rushed into the torn sides of the Al Abbas the Ohramazd, and the Orient Barge no 6 as the limpet mines tore huge holes in their flanks. All these ships settled at the bottom of the harbour – in some 20 feet of water. The commandos also seriously damaged five barges, two tugs and one gun boat. 

"Across the river Commandos counted 23 explosions. That night similar dull blasts echoed in the harbours of Narayan Nagar, Chandpur, Chalna and Mangla – crippling merchant ships and sowing chaos and confusion."

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" ... It was the deadly combination of Panzer tanks and Stuka dive bombers that had enabled the restoration of mobility on the battlefields. In the Bangladesh War the Indian Army made a very decisive shift from an attrition-oriented form of war to a Manoeuvre orientation. Surprise and speed were now to be of the essence. Complete air supremacy – a total control of the skies above Bangladesh, was to enable the Indian Army to actualise the expanding torrent concept of attack."

" ... This concerted attempt at ensuring staff work and synergy was a prime benefit and spin off of the eight month pause gained by the decision to postpone operations from March-November 1971. This enabled systematic and sustained preparations and a methodical buildup and detailed staff work and coordination. The staffs of the three services were able to sit together and closely mesh in their plans and facilitate synergistic tri-service operations. From the Intelligence model-highly compartmentalised way of functioning and strategic planning only on the need to know principle – India’s higher management of war now shifted to a mode characterised by close coordination and synergy between the three services and various organs of the state. This could only come about due to sharing of information across organisational boundaries."

"Bridging Equipment: Bridging resources in East Pakistan were now built up from a scratch – from zero to a level where at any given point of time, the Army in the East could lay 10,000 feet of bridges. Frankly, it was the largest bridging effort in military history."

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" ... Surprisingly, well before the Information warfare concepts had really come into vogue with the First Gulf War, India had blazed a path in the domain of Information Warfare. R&AW was tasked with psychological operations to support the Bangladesh war. It did an excellent job. The Indian media surpassed itself by shaping the global, regional and local information environments. It was able to very effectively propagate the Indian narrative about this war. It was able to tell the whole world about Pakistan’s vicious crackdown and their terrible atrocities amounting to genocide and ethnic cleansing of the Hindus and slaughter of unarmed civilians. This shaped opinions and attitudes in the whole world and generated a great deal of sympathy for the suffering people of East Pakistan. The Pakistani Military Junta was exposed as a brutal cabal which cared very little for human rights. A very strong wave of support and sympathy was generated in the whole world. Mrs. Gandhi’s government was brilliant in launching and sustaining this information warfare offensive to shape opinions, attitudes and emotions – not just in the country but also regionally and globally. Even though President Richard Nixon’s administration was leaning so hard towards Pakistan, India was able to completely sway American public opinion, largely via the mediums of print and radio, as well as the antiquated Films Division documentaries. It was a massive media mobilisation effort and it yielded excellent dividends in shaping perceptions across the globe. The greatest tool was opening up our country and frontlines to the western media correspondents and providing them access. Apart from the political authorities’ excellent handling of the media – even the Army shed its cacoon of secrecy and made very effective use of the media. Both Generals – Sam Manekshaw and JFR Jacob proved excellent at handling the global and national media. Sam almost became a cult figure during the war and had perhaps the best media profile of any Army or Service Chief in the history of India."

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"Signals Intelligence 

"While husbanding resources for the Eastern Theatre of operations, Gen Jacob made a special bid for additional Wireless Signal Experimental Units which could eavesdrop on every single radio communication emanating from East Pakistan. Ultimately he managed to get seven such wireless interception units deployed to the Eastern theatre. He had them deployed all around the borders of East Pakistan so that they would get complete 360° coverage of the area virtually and cover each emitter in East Pakistan. This provided highly accurate and timely intelligence of enemy plans and operations, his order of battle (ORBAT), personalities, commanders and state of morale."

" ... Mukti Bahini was another major source of human and terrain intelligence that made a massive contribution to the outcome of operations."

"Gen Jacob writes that he had requested the Army HQ for its reserve division – the Sixth Mountain Division for the dash to Dacca from the North. This was refused by Gen Manekshaw, who was not sure how the situation would pan out in the western theatre or if the Chinese would intervene. He did not want to let go of his Army HQ reserve. So an ad hoc force was created under the command of Maj Gen Gill and designated as 101 communication zone."

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July 01, 2022 - July 01, 2022. 

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9. FORMULATION OF WAR PLANS: THE CENTRE OF GRAVITY CONTROVERSY 

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" ... The Indian armed forces would adopt a ‘holding’ posture in the west and along the Himalayan border. Only this would enable the sizeable husbanding of resources needed for a decisive campaign in the East. This force level had perforce to be milked from the Western and Himalayan theatres."

"Gen Jacob based his operational plan for this offensive in East Pakistan on the following key parameters:- 

"• The final objective was to be Dacca – the geopolitical and geo-strategic heart of East Pakistan. 

"• It was the national capital and the key command & control centre of the Pakistani Army in the East. It was a key communication hub and all radial communications in East Pakistan converged on to the capital city. It was a critical prestige objective and its fall would bring about the psychological collapse of the Pakistani military forces in the East as it was the key command and control hub. Besides the advance to Dacca from multiple directions would conform to the grain of the country. 

"• The essence of this plan therefore was to bypass the key Pakistani fortresses/strong points on the borders and make a dash to the capital Dacca. Towards this end, thrust-lines were to be selected to isolate and bypass Pakistani forces enroute to reach the final objective earliest. 

"• This would actualise the concept of the Expanding Torrent that simply bypasses and goes around opposition/impediments and relentlessly moves forward at great speed. It dashes forward – not along lines of ‘least resistance’ but ‘least expectation’. It uses surprise and speed to paralyse the opponent and collapse his will to fight (Liddle Hart called it dislocating the mind of the enemy commander).

"• Subsidiary objectives were to be selected with the aim of securing communication centres and the destruction of the enemy’s command & control (C2) capabilities. Fortified centres of resistance were to be bypassed and dealt with later. Gen Jacob had been the GOC of the 12 Infantry Division in the desert sector and had perfected the techniques of bypassing nodes and strong points then. He simply applied the tenets of desert warfare to a highly mobile campaign in riverine terrain.

"• Preliminary operations were aimed at drawing out the Paksitani forces to the borders, thus leaving key areas in the rear/interior lightly defended. Thus Gen Jacob’s design attacked the enemy’s plan of a Forward Posture and fully exploited the vulnerabilities it had generated by an all out campaign to seize Dacca and collapse the enemy forces in the East.

"• Most attrition-oriented armies have an obsessive concern for the security of the flanks of an advance. This vulnerability of the flanks is merely an optical illusion. A blitzkrieg secures the safety of its advancing columns simply by the speed and unpredictability of its path of advance. Jacob repeatedly stressed this to the field commanders with mixed results. Another innovation Gen Jacob introduced from his days in the desert was the concept that it was not essential to choose an axis of maintenance as the axis of advance. This made plans so predictable. He exhorted his formations to use subsidiary and unexpected routes of advance to reduce/contain enemy strong points. Once this was done, the route of maintenance could be opened subsequently. The enemy could clearly see the map and guarded all the metalled roads as these would open the axes of maintenance. To conform to the enemy expectancy set was dangerous, as it robbed the offensive plans of the basic element of surprise. It is doing the unexpected that psychologically shocks and benumbs the minds of the enemy commander. Rommell had used this tactic fairly often in the North African campaign."

BRILLIANT! 

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" ... August 1971 when the Army HQ Directive was issued. As we will see, there were some surprising changes – especially in the designation of Dacca as their key centre of gravity. However, Gen Jacob had not waited for Army HQ’s approval. He had right away set in motion the process of putting in place the massive logistical infrastructure to support the Eastern Command Plan. This was a momentous decision and a great personal initiative. Had Jacob waited for official approval, this buildup could have never been completed in time. It was a massive and Herculean effort to put in place the new infrastructure to support a war in the formidable riverine terrain of Bangladesh. ... "

"• In Tripura, a new road network was created to cater for dumps and jump off points for which, two task forces of the General Reserve of Engineer Forces (GREF) were utilised. For 23 Mountain Division operations, 43 km of new road had to be constructed.

"• Railway Augmentation: The capacity of the meter gauge railway line in Tripura was more than doubled to support 23 Mountain Division’s operations.

"• Signal Communications: Brand new signal communications infrastructure had to be created in Tripura to support IV Corps operations. This was done even before the Corps moved there. Communications for a divisional HQ were created at Tura in Meghalaya, as also in Cooch Behar. An airstrip was constructed at Teliamura. 

"• Shortages in transport were made up. A 100 truck chassis were available with the Army HQ. These were driven to vehicle depot at Panagarh and the old vehicle bodies were grafted on to them. These were ingenuous and innovative solutions. Large amounts of civil-hired transport (CHT) were pressed into service."

BRILLIANT!

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"Rationalisation of Equipment 

"There was a whole range of artillery gun calibres to include 75/24 mm, 76 mm, 3.7 inch howitzers; 120 mm Brandt and Tempella mortars. To ease problems of ammunition and spares supply, guns of a particular calibre were all grouped with one formation. Each division now had the same type of gun and this reduced the staff’s nightmare of supporting several different calibres of artillery at multiple locations." 

Seems obvious doesn't It! 

But there was not just bureaucracy - there was also corruption that stopped future improvements. Until Kargil. 

"That is why post the Kargil War - the Indian Army has decided to standardise its artillery around the 155 mm/52 calibre of medium guns. This would enable massing of effects and establishing fire supremacy in the area of operations. Unfortunately, this artillery rationalisation plan was derailed and delayed by 30 years by the Ghost of the Bofors scandal.

"The logistical nightmare experienced by HQ Eastern Command Staff in 1971 to support multifarious gun calibres, only highlights this need for rationalisation of our gun calibre around one standard calibre. Mediumisation of the Indian artillery is a major and dangerously delayed operational necessity today.

"Artillery was thinned down from the Himalayan borders facing China. A great calculated risk was taken to move down these guns. Later the Army HQ allotted a 5.5-inch and a 130 mm Medium gun regiment. Fortunately,the shortage of artillery was compensated for by the very liberal availability of Ground Attack aircrafts from the IAF. 

"There was a shortage of Air Observation Post aircrafts/helicopters. Six Pushpak aircrafts were hired from the local flying clubs."

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" ... The key staff involved were the Brigadier General Staff (BGS), Brigadier (later Lt Gen) Adi Sethna, Brigadier-in-Charge Administration (Brig Adm) Brig Chhaju Ram and the Chief Engineer Baba Bhide. 

"In all this while, Gen Sam Manekshaw put heavy pressure on the Army Commander Gen Aurora to closely monitor the Mukti Bahini operations and furnish him daily reports. This totally occupied Gen Aurora and fortunately left Gen Jacob totally free to focus on the conventional operations to come and put in place the meticulous staff work needed to actualise a multi-corps offensive operation in East Pakistan. Whether this was deliberately intended by Sam to give a freehand to his trusted Gen Jacob or happened by accident is difficult to say. However – as the Mukti Bahini had initially taken a beating, it had to be supported to stand up to the brutal operations of the Pakistan Army – and hence Sam’s emphasis on energising the Mukti Bahani operations and preventing this fledging force from being battered completely by the enemy. Sam’s basic intention will however always remain a matter of conjecture.

"The Mukti Bahini slowly gained tremendous strength. As stated, towards the commencement of conflict – it had grown to an impressive strength of a 100,000 men. Some 30,000 were trained and organised for regular conventional war, the rest for guerrilla operations to harass and tie down the Pakistani Army in the East. The refugee camps had no dearth of recruitable male populations(RMP)."

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"0700 hours, 12 August 1971: Fort Williams – HQ Eastern Command Calcutta

" Gen Manekshaw asked his DMO to give out the gist of the Army HQ Draft Operational Directive. By and large it conformed to the plans sent earlier by Gen Jacob. However, there was one glaring difference. There was no mention whatsoever of Dacca. 

"Gen KK Singh explained that as per the Army HQ assessment – the key centre of gravity in East Pakistan was not the capital city Dacca, but the key “entry ports” of Khulna and Chittagong. These were the logistical lifelines of the Pakistan Army in the East and their primary source of connectivity with West Pakistan. Hence these were the key centres of gravity whose fall could lead to a collapse of the Pakistani Eastern Command. Dacca, he felt was not critical or important."

"Gen KK Singh continued. The aim of the offensive was to capture maximum territory in East Pakistan with Khulna and Chittagong as the primary objectives. Dacca was left out entirely from the draft directive. This implied liberating large enough areas for setting up a Free Bangladesh Government – a partial and half-hearted objective stemming from the fear of failure to do more. If Dacca was put down as an objective – it would simply have to be captured. Army HQ was then not sure if this could be done Gen Jacob was left flabbergasted and speechless. He had noted that though the draft directive instructions had duly incorporated the sectors identified and largely the troop allocations, the essentials of basic strategy and objectives that he had spelt out had been left out altogether. They had been replaced by a somewhat ambiguous aim – “to capture maximum territory in East Pakistan.”"

"Gen Jacob stood his ground, 

"“The fall of Khulna and Chittagong in no way hastens or facilitates the fall of Dacca. Dacca, Sir, is the key-stone. It is the political capital and its fall will have a tremendous psychological impact. Besides, it is the key communications hub. All roads lead to Dacca and are along the grain of the country. It would be easy to progress operations towards this key city. It would be very difficult to progress operations southwards of it. The closer you go to the sea, the wider the river estuaries become. It would be impossible to bridge them. As you go southwards of Dacca, you are entering the tidal estuaries.” 

"“Jakes, ease of capture does not determine the criticality of the objective. East and West Pakistan are separated by a 1,000 miles of Indian territory. The Pakistani Army there has almost entirely to be supplied by the sea. Hence the criticality of the entry ports of Khulna and Chittagong,” said Gen KK Singh."

"“Gen KK Singh,” Gen Jacob’s voice had risen to a high pitch, “in the event of a war – what will our Navy and Air Force do? They will blockade East Pakistan and completely isolate the two wings. What then would be the strategic or tactical significance of Khulna and Chittagong? Sweet Fanny Adams,” he almost shouted. “Dacca is the HQ of the Pakistani Eastern Command. It is the key Command & Control node. Its fall alone will lead to a systemic collapse of the Pakistani Army in the east!”"

"Gen Jacob had been desperately pleading for the release of 6 Mountain Division – the Army HQ reserve, precisely for this task. Sam was deep down worried about the Chinese reaction. This division then was earmarked to go into Bhutan in case of a sudden Chinese attack. It was a tremendous risk and gamble and Sam was not sure if it would be prudent to release his AHQ reserve, even before the war had commenced. 

"Higher commanders jealously husband their reserves. It means their ability to influence events and outcomes in the face of the unexpected and unforeseen. Meteorological Department was forecasting that the snow would come late in December 1971. So did that leave a window of opportunity to China for a sudden intervention before the passes closed for the winter? Should that happen, what was his reserve to retrieve the situation?

"Already they had taken a huge risk by thinning out the troops from the Himalayan borders. He was worried deep down. Would the Chinese intervene? Such are the decision dilemmas of war and the ultimate responsibility was that of Sam Manekshaw. Gen Jacob, he felt was only seeing the Eastern Command perspective.

"Gen Jacob made one last attempt to retrieve the situation, 

"“Sir, Dacca is the key command & control node. It lies in a very defensible triangle of rivers. As we put pressure on the border – the Pakistani troops will fall back on Dacca. It will go stronger with each day. It will not fall by itself like some ripe plum. The fall of Khulna and Chittagong will do absolutely nothing to hasten its fall. Besides, even as a port, Khulna is unimportant. Where is its criticality?”"

"By 30 November 1971 however, the Army Commander Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora had reason to change his opinion about Dacca. Maj Gen KK Singh was promoted and moved out as the GOC I Corps – India’s Strike Corps in the west. Maj Gen (later Lt Gen) Inder Gill, a flamboyant, blunt and plain speaking paratrooper took over as the DMO; he was one of the few men in the Indian Army who could stand up to the formidable Sam. Gen Inder Gill was convinced about the correctness of Dacca as the key centre of gravity in East Pakistan. In him, Gen Jacob found a friend and a critical ally. Both men kept going hammer and tongs about Dacca till the bitter end. They had the courage of their convictions."

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July 01, 2022 - July 01, 2022. 

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10.​ SAFEGUARDING THE FLANKS: FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION 

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"The Chinese rhetoric was highly critical of India and supportive of Pakistan. However, unlike in 1962 and 1965, this time no dire threats of military action/chastisement or teaching another bitter lesson were held out. From an analysis of the language in the Chinese news papers, the China experts concluded that Beijing would make highly critical noises but not intervene physically.

"Perhaps it was the turbulent situation caused by the Cultural Revolution in China, which would prevent China from taking any military action. Few knew then that in September 1971 Marshal Lin Biao had attempted a coup to assassinate Mao Zedong. He had failed and tried to flee to Russia. His plane was shot down over Mangolia. This episode had generated a lot of internal turbulence in China and possibly left it in no shape to undertake any military misadventure. The counterpoint was that whenever there was inner turmoil in China- she had turned aggressive on her borders to distract the attention of the masses. This had happened in 1962 after the Failure of the Great Leap Forward. So China was the key question agonising Indian decision makers all through the months leading up to the war in Bangladesh.

"However, on ground , there were no indications so far about any military buildup in Tibet or accretion in force levels. A number of Indian units and formations had been pulled out of the Himalayan front and diverted for the operations in Bangladesh. It was a very high risk decision and Sam could be forgiven for being apprehensive. What added to his apprehension were the inputs provided by the Soviets. The Soviets felt that the Chinese would intervene. The fact on the ground however, was that the Chinese had made no concrete military moves or forward movement of troops and stocks to indicate hostile intent. The terrain in Tibet was highly difficult and no sudden move forward of troops was feasible without extensive logistical preparations. None of these were visible on the ground in fall 1971. That is why India’s Eastern Command was emboldened to take the risks it did.

"In actual fact, snow had come late in 1971 and the Indian Higher Command had to exhibit nerves of steel in denuding the Himalayan Sector of substantial number of troops. The 4 and 33 Corps HQ Commanders and staff had moved down to the launch pads opposite Bangladesh – leaving their Chiefs of Staff with skeleton staffs behind to man the Himalayan front. A number of formations and artillery units had been thinned out to create force levels for the projected offensive in Bangladesh. It was a high profile risk.

"Sam was not the only one to be nervous. Apart from the Chinese, the American Administration’s response to the crisis was becoming a serious cause of concern in New Delhi. Richard Nixon had been highly supportive of the military dictator Yahya Khan. Despite a Congressional ban on sale of weapons to both India and Pakistan, these were being continued for Pakistan in a clandestine fashion. There was not a single word of condemnation about the genocide and no concern about the very heavy burden of refugees on India."

There was, however, personal abuse of uncouth level from Nixon who railled against the then PM of India, of an explicitly misogynistic nature. 

"Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her personal advisors were now also becoming concerned about the possibility of any Chinese or American intervention in this crisis. There was a palpable need to seek insurance against American intervention in this crisis. There was a highly prudent need to seek insurance against such a hostile stance being adopted by these two powers. It would be essential to deter such a hostile posture. The only way was to seek the support of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to counterveil these two hostile powers. This could only be assured by entering into a treaty relationship with the Soviet Union. That obviously had serious ramifications about India’s professed Non-Alignment policy and her autarky in decision making. However, realistic appraisal indicated that Non-Alignment was not an end in itself and could not override vital national security interests.

"Henry Kissinger had summoned LK Jha, the Indian Ambassador in Washington and warned that in the event of an India-Pakistan War breaking out and the Chinese supporting Pakistan, the United States of America (USA) would not come to the aid of India. On 6 July 1971, Kissinger visited Delhi enroute to Islamabad. There he was later to feign sickness and undertake a highly clandestine visit to China to meet the top Chinese leadership. Mercifully India did not know that then (it would have greatly added to the sense of unease in Delhi).

"Mrs. Gandhi now asked her Foreign Ministry to send feelers to the USSR. These feelers were sent through Mr. DP Dhar, the then Head of the Policy Planning Division in the Ministry of External Affairs. The Foreign Ministry was largely ignored and all Policy Planning was done by DP Dhar, TN Kaul (the Foreign Secretary), PN Haksar (PM’s Personal Advisor) and PN Dhar (Principal Secretary to PM). This powerful group was uncharitably referred to as the Kashmiri mafia. DP Dhar had been Ambassador to the USSR in 1969 and had then proposed a Friendship Treaty with the USSR. On Mrs. Gandhi’s prompting he revived the idea and broached it with the Soviets. 

"Their response was very quick and positive.

"In the first week of August 1971, this treaty was hastily concluded with the Soviets. Article IX of this treaty read, “In the event of either being subject to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultation in order to remove any threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.” This was a very major diplomatic breakthrough and acted as a massive deterrent to any chances of Chinese or American intervention in this conflict. 

"In fact, subsequently the Soviets had massed some 40 Divisions opposite Xinjiang and posed such a clear military threat that the Chinese wisely refrained from any hostile military moves against India. The Soviets offered to provide whatever military equipment India needed including the Backfire Tupolev bombers."

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" ... Gen Jacob was quite clear that the Chinese clearly had no intention of intervening militarily on the side of Pakistan. Perhaps they had concluded that Bangladesh was a lost cause already and were hedging their bets. In a very bold move Gen Jacob now decided to pull down three more brigades from the Chinese front. These were the 5 Mountain Brigade, 123 Mountain Brigade and 187 Mountain Brigade. These were to be allocated to 101 Communication Zone for the rapid dash to Dacca from the Northern sector of the Khasi-Garo Hills in Meghalaya. The stage was now being set for the attack on Dacca.

"Gen Jacob had informed the DMO Lt Gen Gill. He had quietly gone along with his assessment and plans and did not inform Gen Sam Manekshaw. Gen Gill was fully convinced about the need to attack and capture the capital city of Dacca. He was keen that the Para Brigade play a major role in the capture of the capital city and even set in motion contingency planning for the Para-drop at Tangail, which was to occur on D+7. Some preliminary work was commenced.

"Meanwhile Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora felt uneasy that Sam had not been kept in the loop. He sent him a signal to inform him of the move down of the three brigades from the Himalayan front. 

"Sam was apparently still tense about the threat of Chinese intervention and exploded.

"“I have nursed you better than a woman! Send them right back,” he ordered. Once again in an act of great courage and constructive disobedience, Gen Jacob spoke to the DMO Gen Inder Gill. He requested that the formations brought down for the dash to Dacca not be sent back as it would take far too much time to get them back again when needed. He pleaded that there were no indications of a Chinese military threat so far. Campaign season in the Himalayas lasts from September to November. This window was rapidly closing. He was certain they would be able to convince Sam that the risk of moving these formations was acceptable and worthwhile. Gen Jacob thus tenaciously clung to his vision of a dash to Dacca in the face of the very obvious reluctance of the Army Chief to discount the Chinese military threat.

"Between Gen Jacob and Gen Gill, they exhibited great tenacity of purpose. Both had put their careers and personal advancement on the line. They had intense courage of conviction and commitment to the cause of India’s ultimate victory. In the face of doubts and second thoughts, both these generals clung to their vision with an amazing tenacity of purpose and resolve. Those who have been in combat would be familiar with this syndrome. You are initially clearheaded and form a good plan of operations. As time proceeds however, the commanders tire and are overcome by self doubt and second thoughts. Sometimes in the face of these doubts – they hesitate and dilute their original plans. They have second thoughts and start taking the counsel of their fears. This had happened in the First World War. The Germans had an excellent Schliffen plan of attack on France that had been worked out very meticulously over the years. Just before the war the German Commanders hesitated and had second thoughts. They fatally diluted the original plans of attack and the war turned out to be a costly stalemate. Ultimately they lost

"India owes a great debt of gratitude to both these highly courageous and competent combat leaders, who did not waver in times of great ambiguity and stress – and trusted their gut instincts and took huge but calculated risks. War is the province of risk and ultimately the risks taken paid off in a spectacular fashion.

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July 01, 2022 - July 02, 2022. 

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11.​ THE LURCH TOWARDS WAR 

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"The initial and spontaneous revolt of the Mukti Bahini had been brutally crushed by the Pakistanis with heavy and indiscriminate usage of firepower. The Mukti Bahini made the cardinal error of engaging in pitched battles like a regular force. In the bargain they took heavy casualties from the enemy airpower and artillery. Most of them had to flee across the border for self-preservation of their forces. Those who remained, now switched to guerrilla warfare and sporadic attacks. Once on the Indian side however, the Mukti Bahini was rebuilt in the month of June-July 1971. In the refugee camps it had a huge reservoir of recruitable manpower. Angry young Bengali men were keen to take up arms to avenge the honour of their women and pay back the Pakistani Army for its atrocities. According to various reports, the strength of the Mukti Bahini steadily rose to 100,000 men in arms. The sage Indian counsel to them then, was to focus on guerrilla warfare and not engage in pitched battles with the Pakistan Army that had the advantage of recourse to airpower and firepower.

"Col MAG Osmani, the Commander of the Mukti Bahini however, was keen to raise regular units and formations of the East Bengal Regiment for participating in the conventional military campaign that was to follow. Perhaps, he was thinking more in terms of creating a nucleus around which the Army of a Free Bangladesh would be formed. Ultimately three out of five regular battalions were withdrawn from guerrilla operations to form them into a brigade. Later three more battalions and two more brigade HQs were raised. They carried out operations in Sylhet and were part of the force designated to capture Chittagong. Gen Jacob felt that the guerrilla mode of operations would have yielded greater dividends. Osmani however, was looking to the future. Ultimately some 30,000 Mukti Bahini troops fought in a conventional manner.

"Col MAG Osmani, the Commander of the Mukti Bahini however, was keen to raise regular units and formations of the East Bengal Regiment for participating in the conventional military campaign that was to follow. Perhaps, he was thinking more in terms of creating a nucleus around which the Army of a Free Bangladesh would be formed. Ultimately three out of five regular battalions were withdrawn from guerrilla operations to form them into a brigade. Later three more battalions and two more brigade HQs were raised. They carried out operations in Sylhet and were part of the force designated to capture Chittagong. Gen Jacob felt that the guerrilla mode of operations would have yielded greater dividends. Osmani however, was looking to the future. Ultimately some 30,000 Mukti Bahini troops fought in a conventional manner. From the months of September to October 1971, the Mukti Bahini began to push back. Initially raids and forays were launched to a shallow depth of some 10 km from the border. Some unoccupied stretches of territory were secured and declared as a liberated zone. A concerted attack was launched against the communication infrastructure – and a number of bridges and culverts were attacked. This harried and stretched out the Pakistani Army and forced them to stop all movement at night, except in big and organised convoys. The Mukti Bahini now gained tremendous experience and became bolder. From section and platoon-sized pinpricks they graduated to company sized operations in the depth areas.

"The Bengali personnel who had deserted from the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan Navy proved most useful and effective. Some 400 naval frogmen and commandos formed a highly effective group for attacking the port facilities in East Pakistan. The Mukti Bahini Naval wing now acquired a gunboat mounting a 40 mm Bofors gun. They captured and sank or damaged some 15 Pakistani ships, 11 coasters, 7 gunboats, 11 barges, 2 tankers and 19 river crafts. These were in fact, the most significant successes of the Mukti Bahini. Later during the war, Mukti Bahini gunboats even attacked the Khulna harbour. Unfortunately, the IAF sank them by mistake in a tragic instance of friendly fire. By end October 1971, Mukti Bahini guerrillas began to claim liberation of strips of territory both adjacent to the Indian border and in the rear in Mymensingh, Dinajpur, Rangpur, Rajshahi, Kushtia, Jessore, Khulna and Noakhali districts. In some of the liberated areas the Bangladesh Government-in exile sent administrators to reorganise the administration at village and Tahsil levels."

" ... Mukti Bahini was highly successful in guerrilla operations. It blew up 122 railway lines, 90 Electric stations and 231 bridges. Overall it claimed to have killed approximately 237 Pakistani Officers, 136 JCOs and 3559 ORs. For eight months it severely harassed and stretched out the Pakistani Army in the East and deprived it of sleep and rest. It induced combat fatigue and severe demoralisation. It set up the Pakistani Eastern command for defeat in detail. ... "

" ... Guerrillas provided invaluable intelligence on enemy forces and terrain and gave major logistics support to advancing formations of the Indian Army. They facilitated the Paradrop at Tangail, the heliborne operations across the Meghana and the Amphibious landing at Chittagong (Coxes Bazar). They marshalled 100s of local boats and crafts to help our forces cross the wide rivers of Bangladesh. Without their invaluable support this victory would not have been possible.

"In the East, Gen Niazi’s response amounted to arrogance and hubris. As the Military Governor of East Pakistan, he sought the GHQ’s permission to enter Indian territory in pursuit of Mukti Bahini guerrillas. Speaking at a gathering in Saidpur in the third week of October 1971, he declared, “the War would be fought on Indian territory.” He now began to order reprisals against India by shelling Indian territory and even launched local raids to set fire to Indian villages, kidnap village leaders and even carry out sabotage activities in terms of blowing up bridges and railway tracks. Large bands of Razakars were employed for this.

"India was therefore compelled to stage its Army forward to the East Pakistan border and respond to these pinpricks. The Indian artillery retaliated effectively and the stage was set for major escalation growing out of these incidents."

As a matter of fact, he merely succeeded in providing India the necessary diplomatic cover for a war - paki military attacking India in East was perfect reason enough for India to threaten pak in West! 

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"Kamalpur Incident: 

"The first such incident occurred in Kamalpur village in Tripura in end October 1971. This village is 8 km inside the Indian territory. The Pakistanis claimed it was a Mukti Bahini camp. Pakistani artillery shelled it indiscriminately and killed some 22 civilians. The Border Security Force (BSF) and a battalion of the East Bengal Regiment supported by the Indian Army, launched raids to silence these guns. In November 1971, the PAF increased its activity and began recce sorties across the border.

"Bogra Incident: 

"On 21 November 1971, Pakistani troops supported by tanks launched a major offensive against the “liberated” territory around Bogra on the western Calcutta front. Pakistani artillery shelled Indian positions and caused casualties. The Indian Army was forced to launch a major counter attack in which 13 Pakistani tanks were destroyed. The PAF jumped into the fray. The IAF now shot down three F-86 Sabre jet fighters with its diminutive Gnats. Two of the Pakistani pilots were captured as they parachuted into Indian territory. Alarmed by the scale of the Pakistani provocations, the Indian Government now gave permission to the Armed Forces to cross the border in self defence and counter attack to repel any such Pakistani aggression.

"The Hilli Incident: 

"The Hilli village spreads along both sides of the border. The Hilli bugle was strategically important because from here the Bangladesh border turns steeply northwards to the Siliguri Corridor. Meanwhile, Gen Yahya Khan had spoken on Pakistan Radio and vaguely hinted that within 10 days he would be off fighting a war. There were chances that Pakistan may contemplate a surprise foray into the vital Siliguri Corridor and communications bottleneck. Despite its overall inferiority in numbers, Pakistan was turning increasingly adventurous.

"In the last week of November 1971, Pakistani artillery heavily shelled Balurghat town (east of Hilli) and then launched a determined attack on Indian positions near Hilli with tanks and infantry. Gen Niazi was now putting into practice his threat of an offensive defence designed to minimise any loss of territory. The first attack was beaten off with heavy losses. The Pakistanis lost six tanks and suffered 80 killed. 

"A second assault was launched on 27 November 1971, in which another three Pakistani tanks were destroyed. The Indian forces too suffered fairly heavy casualties in these attacks. They now retaliated strongly and advanced 5 to 7 km into Bangladesh. The Pakistanis seemed determined to escalate the conflict to full scale war. Their radio made highly exaggerated and false claims of attacks by some 12 Indian divisions. The PAF now magnificently upped the ante by sending in its F-86 Sabre fighter bombers to attack the Agartala airfield. The ominous lurch towards full scale war had started."

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"India’s Final Efforts for Peace 

"Despite these grave provocations, Mrs. Indira Gandhi made a final last ditch effort to obtain peace somehow. She had made a whirlwind tour of all western capitals to impress upon them to rein in Pakistan, to make it accept the democratic verdict of the elections and persuade it to take back the 10 million refugees. It all proved futile.

"In the US, Senator Edward Kennedy had openly spoken against the Nixon administration. “The US,” he said, “was trying to purportedly prop up democracy in Vietnam while just 2000 miles from Saigon – it ignored the results of a free and fair election only to help a bunch of generals suppress an electoral mandate and in the process, subvert all principles for which we have sacrificed for so long.”

"Worried about a highly adverse media climate building up in favour of India, Henry Kissinger and Nixon got the US Congress to clear about US$ 100 million for relief in East Pakistan and a US$ 150 million for the refugees in India. Pakistan cynically purloined this relief aid to construct fortresses and pillboxes in East Pakistan. Nixon was highly irritated. He said, “American public opinion has been duped by India. There is a huge public relations campaign here … some of the nuts in our own party, soft heads, have jumped on, have completely bought the Indian line. And India has a very good propaganda line.”

"It was not a propaganda stance. India had stood for the principles of democracy and decency. It was the American and western positions that were so crassly hypocritical. Senator Kennedy and Congressional investigators found out that despite the Nixon Administration’s public stance of stopping arms shipments to both India and Pakistan, some US$ 2 million worth of arms shipments had been dispatched from Pentagon depots to Pakistan. The US Air Force had supplied some US$ 2.4 million worth of spares to the PAF till July 1971. The US Army and US Navy had also released spares to their Pakistani counterparts. “America’s heavy support of Islamabad,” said Senator Kennedy, “is nothing short of complicity in the human and political tragedy of East Bengal.”

"In fact in October 1971, Henry Kissinger made his second trip to Beijing. The city was in the grip of the worst leadership crisis in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). China was under Martial Law with armed troops in the streets and banners at the airport “denouncing” running dog capitalists. Marshal Lin Biao had tried to stage a coup against Mao Zedong. It had been a close shave and possibly explains why China could not intervene. Kissinger told his Chinese hosts that America had a free press and opposition which were not letting them act against India. Communist China he felt, had no such impediments and he exhorted them to act against India.

"Meanwhile a “Crush India” hysteria was being built up in Pakistan and the CIA warned that Pakistan might launch a preemptive attack against India in a few weeks. America was worried not about whether war would break out, but how and when.

"Mrs. Indira Gandhi had visited the Soviet Union in late September 1971. On 24 October 1971, she undertook a three weeks tour of the western capitals. As stated, she went to Great Britain, France, West Germany and finally came to Washington on 4 and 5 November 1971. She told the world it was genocide but few listened. Mrs. Gandhi was expecting a frosty summit in Washington. It was a disaster. Both Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi were anti-pathic to each other. There was tension and mutual loathing and Nixon had his trademark scowl.

"At the summit meeting (with only Kissinger and Haksar in attendance) there was virtually a shouting match. Nixon thought she was a war monger. Mrs. Gandhi told him he was helping genocide. Nixon warned that if India launched a war it would be unacceptable. He hinted at a possible Chinese intervention and said the war might not be confined only to India and Pakistan. Nixon ended with a steely warning that the disintegration of Pakistan would do no good for anyone. He would not countenance initiation of hostilities by India. It could have incalculable repercussions. He hinted not just at the reaction of the USA but also of China.

"Nixon and Kissinger were shaken by the showdown. Mrs. Gandhi had been forthright in her views. The next day when they met in Nixon’s office, Kissinger called her a bitch and the President called Indians bastards and said they were starting a war there. Kissinger praised his boss and said he had warned her from trying to break up or mess with West Pakistan.

"In the true Indian tradition of the Mahabharata – which underlines that war must be a last resort option, Mrs Gandhi had done her utmost to give peace a chance. For a war to be just (Nyay Yuddh or Dharma Yuddh – just and ethical), it has to be a last resort option. It had to be ethical in its aims and conduct. All attempts to make peace must be exhausted before we make the final resort to war. ... "

"Mrs. Gandhi had gone round all the major world capitals in a last minute bid to avert war. She could now sit back and rely on the inordinately high levels of subjectivity in the Pakistani military establishment. The Pakistanis had an inherent narrative of martial superiority over the Indians – that one Pakistani is equal to 10 Indians syndrome. It led them to treat India’s massive military superiority with contempt. They saw themselves as the Spartans or Israelis of the East. In a strange way they identified themselves with conquerors from the Middle East, Central Asia and Afghanistan. Their military narrative of superiority was so deeply ingrained that it made any rational military analysis impossible. Besides, Yahya Khan felt that he could bank on unprecedented levels of support from the US and Chinese military. After all he had just mid-wifed their new found alliance by his great support for setting up a secret channel of communication with Beijing and finally arranging Kissinger’s trip to China. Yahya Khan could be forgiven for being on cloud nine. Gen Niazi however, was showing signs of total hubris with his provocations across the East Pakistan border."

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July 02, 2022 - July 02, 2022. 

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12.​ PERSONAL NARRATIVES: THE INTERSECTION OF COLLECTIVE AND PERSONAL DESTINIES 

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"A Haunting Sense of Loss 

"The 39th Course had passed out of the National Defence Academy (NDA) in December 1970. The charismatic Gen Sam Manekshaw had come for our passing out parade. He was a dazzling figure – tall, ruddy pink and handsome. Resplendent in his specially tailored Service Dress(SD) with the Gurkha’s Black Pouch Belt and glittering array of medals, he gave a stirring, extempore address. His staccato words came out like bursts of machine gun fire. 

"“Gentlemen, I’ve come to pass you out. I’m impressed with your bearing, your turnout, your smartness and drill …. Remember – today there is no place for a defeated soldier – you either win or you die!” 

"It was a short but electrifying speech that left us spellbound.

"The sad strains of the Auld Lang Syne struck up and we marched past the quarter deck in that moving slow march ceremony. We saluted Sam and with the last step we had finished our three years of training at the NDA. In my case, it was three and a half. I had never been very amenable to barrack room discipline and had a somewhat rebellious streak. I had to lose a term in the bargain. I had initially come with the 38th Course and now have friends in both the 38th and 39th batches. So I have the dubious distinction of being able to speak for two NDA courses. These were the two batches that were the canon fodder for the 1971 War. We were at the cutting edge, leading our platoons and troops in that historic conflict. 38th Course had six months to settle in. 39th course was pitchforked into war on their very first night of service.

"My way to NDA had been paved by my elder brother Captain Raman Bakshi. He had been commissioned in 1963 into the 11th Battalion of the JAK Rifles (JAK RIF) Regiment. My father had been the Chief Education Officer of the same Regiment when they used to be the State Forces of Jammu & Kashmir and he had been the Durbari of Maharja Hari Singh. My brother joined the family regiment. He was killed in action in the 1965 War.

"The next year, I had applied for the NDA. In June 1967, I was in the NDA. For me the pink sandstone building of the Sudan Block, the deep pink Ashoka Pillar and the blood red Bougainvilleas were a dream come true. During the tea, post the passing out parade, Sam went around and spoke to the cadets. He came to me. My hand flew up in a salute. He was awe-inspiring. His eyes twinkled, 

"“Which Regiment are you going to join son?” I was bowled over. That moment is framed in my memory forever. Sam was an iconic figure – a great commander.

"Our batch moved to the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun. It was an eventful year. The year of the Vulture! The war clouds were gathering. War was imminent. In October 1971 we were told that our batch would be commissioned a month ahead of schedule. Our training was intensified. We were scheduled to pass out on 14 December 1971. As such, this was preponed to 14 November 1971. The colourful Passing Out Parade at the IMA Drill Square is imprinted in my memory forever.

"The haunting strains of the Auld Lang Syne and the splendour of military ceremonial! We slow marched out – past the First Step that was the last of our training and the preparatory period was at an end. We were newly minted 2nd Lieutenants of the Indian Army. I had been commissioned into the Sixth Battalion of the Jammu & Kashmir Rifles (6 JAK RIF). We were given 10 days leave to see our Moms and Dads. On 24th November 1971 I boarded the train from my home town Jabalpur – on way to Siliguri. My Battalion was then deployed on the watershed in Sikkim against the Chinese. If the Chinese had intervened this would have become the main theatre of this war. My parents had come to see me off at the Railway Station. I stood framed in the doorway as the train eased out of the station. I waved to them in farewell. I could see the tense and worried looks on their faces.

"Suddenly my mind flashed back to a very similar scene in 1965. 

"My brother was going by the train and we were waving out to him. He was waving back fondly. That was the last we saw of him. His remains had come back in a copper urn that contained his ashes. 

"Would I come back in another copper urn? 

"The circumstances were so similar. Was death near? I was just 21 and frankly I was not sure at all if my brother’s fate would overtake me. The next day the train halted at the Siliguri station. I will never forget that scene at Siliguri."

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"25th November 1971 

"It was a bright, clear winter morning. The Siliguri Railway Station was simply swarming with troops. They were all wearing steel helmets and gleaming bayonets were fixed on their rifles. There was an air of urgency. A whole lot of my batch mates were on that train to Siliguri. We embraced and hugged each other.

" ... They handed us our steel helmets and Sten machine carbines with bayonets duly fixed. We went different ways to our units. 2/Lt (later Brig) DK Mohan, myself and 2/Lt Rane went off to Sikkim to the Chinese front. Most of the others drove down straight to the Bangladesh border. ... "

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"Young 2/Lt MPS Choudhary of our batch was a great sportsman and athlete. He had been a Junior Under Officer (JUO). Towards the end of his training he was elevated to Battalion Cadet Adjutant (BCA) and then became Academy Cadet Adjutant (ACA). Naturally, he was on cloud nine. He was tall and fair and perhaps one of the handsomest boys of the39th course. He wanted to join the Armoured Corps or the Guards. He was allocated the Bihar Regiment (a Sterling Infantry Regiment). For some reason however, he was deeply disappointed because he did not get his first choice. He reached the unit. All new youngsters joining a unit are ribbed and ragged, “You were an ACA, is it? Let’s see what you are made of,” 

"The Adjutant sent him on a recce patrol into Bangladesh with two boys. They were dressed in lungis as the Mukti Bahini to avoid alerting the enemy. His patrol was ambushed. There was a firefight in which all three were wounded and captured by the Baloch Regiment of the Pakistan Army. 

"These wounded boys were horribly tortured by the Pakistanis. Their bodies were battered and bruised with rifle butts and burnt with cigarette stubs. Their eyes were gouged out with bayonets. MPS was such a handsome young man. Not after the Pakistanis had finished with him. One of his eyes was hanging on his cheek, dangling on the edge of his optic nerve. A Pakistani soldier saw it and smashed it with his Rifle butt. The fluid spread over his face.

"The next day the Pakistani Army – the ghouls of the Baluch Regiment – proudly displayed the battered dead bodies to an American correspondent of The Times magazine. He dutifully photographed the corpses and they figured on the cover of the magazine that week. MPS had lost his father in his childhood. He only had his mother and a sister. His mother was teaching in a school in Dehradun and had toiled hard to send her son to the NDA and IMA. He was the focus of all her dreams – a beautiful bride to match her handsome son. 

"Now it was all over. 

"“How did he die?” She asked the unit boy who brought his belongings back home as per the drill. 

"“Very bravely Madam,” the soldier stammered. “But where is his body?” 

"The soldier turned pale. 

"“We couldn’t recover it,” he mumbled.

"A few days later MPS Choudhary’s mother was in the school library. The Times magazine issue had come. She saw the Indian corpses displayed on its cover. Suddenly beyond the torture and disfigurement, she recognised the battered face of her son. She got up and began to scream. People rushed to her as she fainted. She went into depression. She could not continue anymore with her teaching profession. All her life and dreams had revolved around her handsome son, who would pull them out of the tough days they had seen after his father’s demise. Some years later a course mate married the sister of 2/Lt MPS Choudhary and the family saw better days. 

"In the end we soldiers are left alone to stand by our own."

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"2/Lt KM Nanavati had completed his B.Sc. when he applied to join the NDA. NDA academics were a cakewalk for him and he slept through most of the classes as he knew the subjects backwards. (Most of us did sleep in class in those days – the drill – PT routine and the sumptuous food in the Cadets’ Mess was so conducive to sleep in cosy classrooms where Physics and Differential Calculus were being taught.) Nanavati had an irrepressible sense of humour. 

"Our Physics teacher (another brilliant person) Mr. KJM Rao generally ignored him but when Nanavati began to snore loudly in the class – that was too much. Highly irritated he snapped. 

"“Nanavati you are always sleeping in the class.” 

"His neighbouring cadets woke up Nanavati from his profound slumber. Slowly he rose to his feet

"“Only occasionally sir,” 

"He suddenly said in such a loud but cheerful voice that the whole class had burst out laughing.

"Mr. KJM Rao tried hard to suppress a smile. He liked Nanavati. We all did. 2/Lt KM Nanavati was commissioned into the Maratha Light Infantry (Maratha LI) Regiment. His unit was already in action. We did not know anyone in our units. The boys did not recognise us. We were so keen to make a mark – to show everybody that we were not afraid and would lead the charge, be the first on the objective. Most of us charged ahead of the rest. Many of us were shot dead or wounded in the bargain. 2/Lt Nanavati’s unit was involved in a night attack. In the dark of the night he charged ahead of everyone in his josh and excitement, lustily shouting the unit war cry. Suddenly he found he was all alone in the darkness. He looked left and right and could see no one. He panicked for a while. Suddenly he saw ahead of him a huge Pakistani soldier, well over 6 ft. tall. He was shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ and charging towards Gentleman Nanavati (as we fondly called him) he pressed the trigger of his carbine – it jammed.

"His heart sank as he saw the tall soldier charging at him – his bayonet gleaming in the moonlight. 

"“Oh hell! He’s going to bayonet me,” he thought. 

"The soldier fired a burst a bullets at short range at his chest instead. Nanavati felt as if a horse had kicked him in the chest. He fell down seriously wounded. He regained consciousness only in the Operation Theatre where the surgeons picked out three bullets from his lungs and shoulder. 

"It was a miracle but Gentleman Nanavati survived. 

"He has become quiet and withdrawn since then. He broods a lot. That irrepressible sense of humour now surface only now and then."

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"2/Lt Shekhar Singh had also joined the Bihar Regiment. Shekhar was a star athlete and had a Cross Country Blue. His stamina and speed were a legend in the NDA. His battalion was attacking across a minefield. He blew up his leg on a mine. The blast and concussion was so severe that he fainted. They amputated his leg from below the knee and today, he hobbles around on a plastic leg. Try and give him support as he tries to climb steps, however, and he refuses with pride. He holds out his hand to say, “I don’t need help or pity.” His long distance running days are over, sadly. 

"His pride and spirit however are intact to this day."

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"I’m speaking so far merely of my batch mates who were in the fateful train with me and had gotten down at Siliguri station on 25 November 1971. A few days later we received the news that 2/Lt Shivane (who had joined the Gurkhas) was killed by a bolt of lightning as he was out patrolling on a steep outcrop of rocks some 14,000 feet above the sea level on the Chinese border in Sikkim. Little snippets of news kept floating in, now of this loved one who was dead and that dear friend whose arm or leg had been blown off or he was lying wounded with a burst of bullets or shrapnel. 

"The maximal contribution however came from 38th Course in the Western Theatre."

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"2/Lt Arun Khetarpal had joined the Poona Horse – a legendary Regiment whose Commandant, Lt Col Tarapore had earned a Param Vir Chakra (PVC) in the 1965 War and the unit earned the title of Fakhr-e-Hind (The Pride of India) from the Pakistanis. ... "

"The unit went into battle in the Shakargarh salient in Sialkot sector. The Infantry had formed a bridgehead across the Basantar River. A hundred enemy tanks were being lined up to counter attack the salient. The Brigade Commander requested tank support urgently. The minefield had still not been cleared. 

"Col Hanut Singh decided to simply bash through the minefield with his tanks. By first light the Regiment HQ and a squadron were inside the bridgehead. Arun Khetarpal and his troop reached the flank. The heaviest enemy attack by a brigade of Pakistani Patton tanks came here. The other two tanks of the troop were hit and disabled. Only 2/Lt Arun Khetarpal’s tank was left now. He fired again and again and destroyed three enemy Pattons. His own tank was hit and caught fire. It had some 30 rounds still inside. 

"“Abandon tank,” he was ordered. 

"“I will not,” he said grimly as the blood streamed into his eyes, “My gun is still firing.” 

"He wiped the blood with the back of his hand and engaged the next tank and blew it up. Then he turned on to the fifth tank and sent it in flames. The last enemy tank was now just 50 metres from his. They both fired, unluckily Arun missed. The shell exploded on the turret and Arun fell down on the spot. His driver took his bleeding body out and tried to revive him with a hot cup of tea. He had been moaning softly in pain. When the tank driver came back with the tea, Arun was gone."

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"2/Lt Arun Khetarpal was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra. He was all of 21 years and was the youngest PVC of our Army. That smiling visage has become the iconic face of the Indian Army in the 1971 War. 

"38th Course set a record benchmark of sorts. This one batch earned one PVC (Arun Khetarpal – posthumous) and one Ashok Chakra (again posthumous). This was Col NJC Nair AC, KC. He is one of the most highly decorated soldiers of the Indian Army."

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" ... Capt PK Ghosh VrC of the 2 PARA – the unit that had carried out the Paradrop at Tangail. It is very poignant story but absolutely unknown to the rest of the world outside that closely knit fraternity of paratroopers – the boys with the floppy Maroon Berets. Ghosh was the second member of Band of Borthers. Somewhere in the third week of November 1971 Capt Ghosh was called by the Commanding Officer of 2 PARA – Col (later to be Maj Gen) Kulwant Singh Pannu MVC, 

"“Ghosh, I have a rather daunting assignment for you son. Are you up to it? It would be a very dangerous and hazardous mission.” 

"“What is it Sir?” asked Ghosh.

"“As you are aware – around D plus 7 our unit will be paradropped at Tangail to cut off the enemy forces’ retreat towards Dacca. The Tiger Siddiqui group is operating in that area. It is their largest group. You would be required to infiltrate inside East Pakistan with two boys. Radio communications equipment will be sent with you. You will have to proceed about a 100 km deep in East Pakistan in plain clothes. You will establish contact with the Tiger Siddiqui group and be our liaison with him. This group will secure the Drop Zone on the day of the paradrop. Once you inform us – the Fly-in will commence. It is a very hazardous but vital task. You have the requisite language skills and the ethnic identity to be able to pull it off. Can you do this for 2 PARA?” asked Gen Pannu.

"“Sir, I will not let 2 PARA down. Consider me a volunteer for this assignment,” replied Capt Ghosh."

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"Border Out Post Meghalaya on India – Bangladesh Border, 25 November 1971 – 0130 hrs

"Bong – (Capt. Gosh), the second hero of our Band of Brothers was at the BSF outpost in Meghalaya. Accompanying him were two Paratroopers from his unit – one a Sniper and the other a code and signals specialist with an HF radio set. Rahim a guide from the Mukti Bahini was with them and all were dressed in Lungis and Kurtas. ... "

" ... They marched the whole night and before dawn got into a safe house just outside a small village hamlet. Thus they moved by night for three days. On the fourth day they had reached a village on the outskirts of Tangail. Tiered and spent they caught up on the their lost sleep. In the Afternoon the Mukti Bahini guide came and woke up Capt Gosh."

He met Tahira, before he could see her father, if she approved. 

"Just then one of her Mukti Jodha’s rushed up and said to Tahira. 

"“That SSG Captain Anwar and his Team are headed this way. We must get the hell out of here.”"

"“Just one Second.” Bong said, “Shekhawat, please scan the SSG, Frequencies locally.” 

"“Yes Sir”. Shekhawat did so. “Listen Sir”. they intercepted the SSG frequency." 

"“Anwar to Khalid. That bitch is in the village. I’m coming from the south. She will try and get out Northward to Barisal. Ambush her there. Get that slut alive. Let a whole company gang rape her publically. She has a lot to answer for.” 

"“Khalid to Anwar, the first turn will be mine. Then the company can take turns. Death by rape it will be.”

Bong planned an ambush and explained it to her. 

" ... Tahira nodded grimly. She set off with her men on the main track. Prashanta moved in the opposite direction – then wheeled to the night and sped off on a long circuitous route to get behind the Pakistani ambush. They reached short of the Barisal village, left their truck and moved forward tactically. They took position as they saw a Pakistani truck ahead. His sniper put on his silencer and neatly shot the driver who was lounging next to the truck. They moved ahead crawling on their bellies.

"They could see the Pakistani soldiers in position on a bund with their backs towards them. Prashanta gave three beeps on the walkie talkie. Tahira’s group now speeded up. The sound of her approaching vehicles kept the Pakistani parties attention riveted to the front. Prashanta closed in with his men. He raised his fist and brought it down. His team opened up a withering barrage of fire that mowed the Pakistani ambushers down in a hail of bullets. It was all over in seconds - some 20 Pakistani soldiers lay dead. Prashanta and his men walked up. Maj Khalid’s body was lying in the centre of the bunch. There was a radio set next to him. Prashanta switched it on. 

"“Anwar come quickly, we got the bitch”, he mimicked the dead Major’s voice on the set. “Mubaraq ho! Main aa rahan hun. I also want my turn on her . Marna mat Haramzadi ko. Keep her alive . She must pay.”

"Prashanta clicked off the set. He sent the Mukti Jodhas to get Tahira and her team to the site. She joined them and they waited patiently to welcome Anwar’s SSG Team. Some half an hour later they sighted, the SSG convoy. Capt Anwar was leading in an open jeep fitted with a 50 Cal machine gun. He was wearing a Maroon beret, a scarf and a Para Jacket. He had a smirk on his face. Tahira was renowned for her beauty and courage. He was looking forward to sweet revenge. That was what wars were all about Zar, Zan, Zameen – Gold, women, Land. Rape had now became the primary weapon in the war against the treacherous Bengalis. Their women were paying for their treachery. He was quite looking forward to dealing with Tahira the Mukti Bahini area commander. The smirk vanished from Anwar’s face as his column was greeted by a hail of automatic fire. It was a burst from Tahira’s AK that bloodied Anwar’s chest and face. He slumped and fell half out of the jeep. It was an intense barrage of fire that wiped out the SSG Party in a matter of two minutes. It was all over. Prashanta and his men got up to search the dead for documents and maps."

There were two alive, abused her and one tried to kill her. Bong finished the last one. 

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"Village 15 km North East of Tangail 30 November 1971

Bong met her father and they helped him recce, and he radioed coordinates to a suitable spot. 

"Finally on 10 December 1971, Prashanta got the codeword Mashaal. The para drop was due the next day. Prashanta now briefed Tiger Siddiqui. They planned the deployments to secure the Drop Zone. The drop was scheduled for last light on 11th December 1971. There was intense debate between Gen Jacob and the Para Brigade Deputy commander Col Scudder. Gen Jacob said that the DZ was secure and free of enemy troops. Hence they could go in after first light by 0900 hrs. There was a lot of debate and discussion on the timing of the paradrop. Finally, the drop was scheduled for 1600 hrs on 11 December 1971. A 12 knot wind spread the drop much beyond the designated drop zone and dispersed the unit. The CO himself landed in a pond and had to swim out. Some RCL Guns and equipment also landed in the ponds. Nevertheless the unit rapidly assembled in two hours and went into action."

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July 02, 2022 - July 02, 2022. 

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13.​ WAR BREAKS OUT: 

THE PREEMPTIVE STRIKE OF THE ‘FIZA YA’ 

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"1 December 1971: Somewhere on the Western Border 

in Punjab

"Gold Sword was one of the prime assets of R&AW. He had successfully wormed his way in as a Cipher clerk in the Pakistani Air HQ. They put a hood over his head, wrapped him in a blanket and rushed to the BSF Post. ... "

"“This is most urgent. The Pakistani Air Force will launch pre-emptive strikes at last light on 3 December 1971 on six Forward Indian Airbases. Their list is in the microfilms. There is no time. Make sure they get to New Delhi the fastest. There is absolutely no time to lose. I must get back before my absence is noted.”"

" ... embraced Gold Sword and handed him the bottles of Scotch Whisky. These were his cover story in case Gold Sword got caught. He was merely smuggling foreign liquor bottles. That was the legend for crossing the border. ... "

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"Peshawar Air Base: 3 December 1971, 1745 hrs 

"3 December 1971 had been chosen as the D-day because it was a moonlit night that would facilitate the attack. The Pakistani F-86 Sabre jets trundled on to the runway one by one. The roar of the jet engines became deafening. Then they screamed off and into the sky one by one on their Hi-Lo-High mission. They climbed up to some 5,000 feet and formed into four vics of three each, as they sped towards their targets in Srinagar.

"Sargodha Air Field 

"8 x Mirage-III French fighter bombers and two F-104 Starfighters roared on to the runway one after another and took off. They headed for their target in India. This was the Amritsar Radar and the Pathankot Air Field.

"Muridke Air Field 

"8 x F-86 Sabre jet fighters emerged from their blast pens and took off with deafening roars as they sped eastwards. They were to attack the Pathankot Air Field, while the two gleaming F-104 Starfighters were to hit the radar at Faridkot. Thus out of a total fighter strength of some 278 Pakistani combat aircrafts, only 32 were employed in the first wave. As a surgical strike it was somewhat of a damp squib.

"The Pakistani aircrafts attacked the six Forward Indian Airbases after last light. The 1971 War had begun. 

"Fortunately, as stated, the Indian Intelligence had penetrated the Pakistani GHQ successfully and had warned the Indian forces of this air attack. Therefore, when the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) struck, India was fully prepared. The entire fleet of our fighter aircrafts was concealed in steel-reinforced concrete blast pens. As a result, India suffered minimal losses. Their AD Gunners were waiting quietly for the enemy intruders. One Pakistani B-57 bomber and one F-104 Starfighter were shot down by AD Guns over Amritsar. The PAF attack on Amritsar airfield was rendered absolutely ineffective. As a pre-emptive strike, the Pakistani air attack was a damp squib. Pakistan had same 273 combat aircraft and could easily have generated 400 sorties for the initial attack. It generated just 30 sorties. Apparently, four squadrons were held back to support the Army counter-offensive (which never came). The PAF thought it would provoke the Indians to retaliate against its bases and take them on over its own territory.

"Air Mshl PC Lal summoned a meeting at the Air HQ at 2000 hrs that very night. Damage assessment reports indicated minimal damage. All our aircrafts were in steel reinforced cement concrete (RCC) bomb shelters and emerged unscathed. Contingency plans were ready and were activated right away. Counter attack plans had been prepared in thorough details and were actualised with great urgency and dispatch.

"The IAF hit back hard the same night. Indian B-58A Canberra bombers flew with 8,000 pound bomb loads. It is noteworthy that it takes up to 4 hours to fully load up a Canberra bomber. They rose to 40,000 ft. altitude and penetrated deep into Pakistan. They unleashed a wave of destruction on the nine Pakistani Airfields of Muridke, Mianwali, Chander, Sargodha, Sherkot, Rasoolwak and even as far as Karachi in West Pakistan. In East Pakistan, they hit Tezgaon and Kurmitola. Overall 23 missions were launched to flatten 9 Pakistani airfields in an immediate response. 

"The next morning on 4 December 1971, the Indian fighter aircrafts took off in swarms. Indian fighters, the Hunters, MiG-21s and SU-7s attacked the Pakistani airfields in the west. They destroyed 13 Pakistani aircrafts in these attacks. Pakistan lost 7 x F-86 Sabres, 2 x MiG-19s, 1 x Mirage III C, 2 x B-57s bombers and one C-130 Transport aircraft on the ground. They were shaken. On 4 December itself 4 Hunters of the IAF hit the Karachi Oil Storage depot and set it ablaze. It was struck the same night by the Indian Navy and set on fire for a second time. The air war had begun in earnest and Pakistan was left shaken by the sheer fury and speed of the Indian response."

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"The Decision for War 

"Thus the final decision to go to war had come not from India but from Pakistan. By any cold, empirical analysis of relative strengths it made no sense. The Pakistani forces were outgunned and outnumbered in a ratio of 1.7:1. The imbalance was most pronounced in the realm of airpower and naval power. Considering that the two wings of Pakistan were separated by a 1,000 miles of Indian territory, this was a glaring vulnerability. Pakistan’s decision to go to war seemed highly irrational. Yet it was Pakistan which had clearly initiated an all out conflict.

"Gen Yahya Khan was stung by the constant pinpricks of the Mukti Bahini and now the escalating border clashes and incursions on the East Pakistan border. In the end it was a matter of the Pakistani Punjabi military’s elite self-image. They saw themselves as the Spartans of the East – a highly macho race of superior warriors – as conquerors who held the wily Indians in sheer contempt. What galled them was that the Indians had seized the initiative and were dictating the pace of unfolding events. Gen Yahya Khan was furious about this. Bhutto added to his discomfiture by his constant taunts and insults. The first to press the escalatory pedal had been Lt Gen AAK Niazi, the Eastern Army Commander. It was sheer hubris on his part and it exhibited a most dangerous level of subjectivity. His artillery fires and raids across the border gave India a clear justification to effect a graduated level of escalation in successive quantum jumps of force usage. This in turn provoked Gen Yahya Khan to act irrationally and opt for all out war.

"On 2 December 1971, Gen Yahya Khan apparently had a meeting with the Air Chief Air Marshal Rahim Khan and his Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) at GHQ Rawalpindi. Yahya Khan expressed his exasperation with the escalating levels of Indian provocations. It galled him immensely and he shouted he would not take it lying down. Deep down he was convinced that when push came to shove – the USA and China would bail him out. They would not let Pakistan go down under. Yahya was only partially correct. An empirical analysis indicated that Bangladesh was now more or less a reality. Its birth could just not be stopped. So psychologically, perhaps both USA and China had accepted this ground reality. They would at best not let West Pakistan get dismembered.

"Mrs. Gandhi also knew that the emergence of Bangladesh was now inevitable, but she wanted it to happen in a way that would underline India’s primacy in South Asia. India had gained this primacy by a very methodical military buildup lasting a decade since the shock of 1962. This buildup had been heavily subsidised and supported by the Soviet Union. While Pakistan had gone into a complete self-congratulatory mode after the 1965 War, India had ingested its lessons and forged ahead to complete its military modernisation and expansion plans. The rise in its military power profile had a clear influence on the outcomes in the South Asian region."

" ... Air Marshal Rahim Khan was torn between the imperatives of launching an overwhelming first strike and preserving his force to last the full war. In the bargain, he diluted his preemptive strike. In any case, the Indians already had pinpoint intelligence about this air strike and had dispersed their aircrafts to blast pens and concrete shelters. They emerged unscathed and within an hour, the Canberra bombers of the IAF retaliated massively. The numbers alone were now heavily tilted against Pakistan. Irrational or otherwise, Yahya had taken the desperate plunge towards war. It was now truly a just war and India had all the right to respond to this unacceptable level of escalation that was a clear act of war. The US had lost its sole excuse for military intervention. India had conformed to the essence of the concept of a Just War – it should be just in its cause and aim and equally just in its conduct. It was what the Russian call a virtuous defense (or war). India had patiently waited for the aggressor to strike first and then and only then, retaliated with great vigour and vengeance.

"Nevertheless, the State Department (under immense pressure from President Nixon), still blamed India for the situation and took the case to the United Nations (UN) Security Council to enforce an immediate ceasefire and pull back of troops. The Soviets came to India’s rescue and vetoed three such resolutions. Why did the Chinese not intervene in 1971? They had expressed their hatred and contempt for the Indians to Henry Kissinger. Constrained as he was by the Congress and public opinion in the US, Kissinger had put considerable pressure on the Chinese to act against India and stage a diversion that would pull back Indian forces to the Himalayan border and weaken the assault on East Pakistan. ... "

"• In September 1971, Marshal Lin Biao had staged a coup to assassinate Mao Zedong and seize power. Apparently he was against the tilt towards America. The coup failed and he tried to escape to the USSR. His plane was shot down over Mongolia. As it is the Cultural Revolution of Mao had created chaos and instability. China was hardly in a position to act militarily against India.

"• Even if China had wanted to, it now had, at that stage, the Indo-Soviet treaty staring it in the face. Above all was the harsh military logic of 40 Soviet Divisions that had been deployed against Xinjiang. The militaristic Chinese leaders clearly understood that cold military logic and refrained from intervention. The Indo-Soviet Treaty had worked and had clearly deterred China.

"• A third factor is perhaps the Chinese suspicion that the Americans were being over clever and pushing them to fight this war even as they stayed aloof. Kissinger’s constant proddings to China to do something could easily have raised their suspicions about motives."

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July 02, 2022 - July 02, 2022. 

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14.​ AIR BRIDGE TO DACCA: A GUDERIAN IN 4 CORPS 

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"Mrs. Indira Gandhi was in Calcutta when the Pakistani pre-emptive air strikes took place in the west. Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw rang up Gen Jacob. He informed the Army Commander who rushed to apprise the Prime Minster of the situation. She took the news very calmly. 

"“Best of Luck Madam,” said the Army Commander. 

"Mrs. Gandhi smiled gently. Immediately thereafter she took off in her special aircraft for New Delhi. Later the same night, Army HQ gave the “go ahead” to commence planned operations. Confirmatory orders were simply passed on telephone, followed up by signals. By daybreak on 4 December 1971, the operations to liberate Bangladesh were well under way.

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"II Corps Operations"

"II Corps had rigidly adhered to the plan initially outlined by the Army HQ Operational Instructions of August 1971. As stated, Gen Jacob had been keen that the thrust towards Khulna be aborted and troops diverted towards Faridpur from where they could threaten Dacca directly. An inland waterways transport (IWT) Flotilla had been planned for to help speed up this corps advance to Dacca with a brigade group moving in the river in the IWT Flotilla. However, Gen Raina rigidly went by the original Army HQ instructions. It is noteworthy that by 30 November 1971, the Army Commander Gen Aurora was convinced that the Chinese would not intervene and had veered round to the view that Dacca should now be the primary objective.

"The problem was that the snows on the Himalayas had been unusually late in 1971. Generally they come in November but in 1971, they could came only around 8 December 1971. It was this that gave great relief to Sam on whose shoulders lay the overall operational responsibility. It was a heavy burden. The threat from China was real and could not easily be shrugged off. Perhaps Sam was right in erring on the side of caution. However, by 8 December 1971, he too had given the go ahead for the dash to Dacca from the North. II Corps however, rigidly stuck to the somewhat outdated op directives of Army HQ and lost a golden opportunity to go for Dacca in the bargain.

"As per plans that had been war gamed in detail earlier, II Corps bypassed the formidable brigade-sized fortress of Jessore. The Mukti Bahini had already gained a foothold in enemy territory at Chaugacha salient. One brigade silently moved cross country across the paddy fields, lugging all its equipment and stores with liberal help from the locals. Actually the preliminary Bogra incursions and battle had set the stage for operations in this sector."

" ... On the 7th itself, the Jessore Garrison became unnerved by the speed of the advance which was completely bypassing them. They now vacated their formidable strong point without literally a shot being fired. This was indicative of the psychological state of the harried Pakistani Army in the East. The prolonged operations against the Mukti Bahini had tiered out the Pakistani troops. Thus, though there were 5,000 men in Jessore – supported by tanks and artillery – they vacated that formidable fortress without a whimper. They fell back in panic to Nagina on the Madhumati. They had directly disobeyed Gen Niazi’s diktat that no unit would retreat unless it had suffered 75 percent casualties. This now lay in tatters. Philip Jacobsons of The Sunday Times reported, “They ran in less than 24 hours.”

"Gen Jacob now wanted 9 Infantry Division to divert a Brigade northwards towards Magura to reinforce the 4 Mountain Division’s thrust to Faridpur on the Padma River. Sadly, 9 Infantry Division began to regroup at Jessore and hidebound with its original orders – turned South and diverted its thrust towards the Khulna entry port with its 32 Infantry Brigade ex 9 Infantry Division leading. On 11 December 1971 they contacted enemy defences at Daulatpur. This was an extension of Khulna and the two together formed a long narrow belt of built up area extending some two miles. It was very difficult to bypass this as it was flanked by marshes on the west and Bhairab River on the east. It now became a senseless and bitterly fought series of battles of attrition in which the entire 9 Infantry Division got bogged down. By 16 December 1971 they had captured only three forward company localities after suffering heavy casualties. History may well have been different if 9 Div had moved on the Maghura-Faridpur axis. 42 Infantry Brigade now tried to bypass by crossing the Bhairab River on boats provided by the Mukti Bahini on night 13/14 December 1971. They encountered stiff opposition. Attacks had to be halted due to the ceasefire.

"4 Infantry Division: had captured Darsana and Kotchandpur on 5 December 1971. They advanced to Jhendia along the main road axis. A Battalion and a squadron group laid a road block between Chaugacha and Jehndia. Pakistanis made several attempts to break through the block but failed. 141 Brigade attacked Jhendia from another direction and it fell by 7 December 1971. Maghura fell on 8 December 1971 and the two company para drop planned here was no longer needed.

"By 8 December itself, the Madhumati ferry was contacted. After capture of Maghura 62 Mountain Brigade commenced the advance on Faridpur. The Pakistanis demolished the bridge on Madhumati. While preparations were on to cross the river, 7 Mountain Brigade which was advancing onto Kushtia was shaken by an enemy counter attack by a depleted brigade with a squadron of armour. We lost 5 tanks and the Vanguard company suffered heavy losses, the 4 Mountain Division however reacted and threw all its strength towards Kushtia – instead of focusing on the Madhumati crossing. In the bargain the advance to Faridpur was delayed by three days and the enemy blew up the Hardinge Bridge. This would not have happened had the original plan of crossing the Padma at Goalunao Ghat to Dacca been put into effect. The IWT Flotilla had in fact reached near the Hardinge Bridge on 05 December 1971 itself but was not utilised. All chances of taking Dacca from this direction now evaporated due to the rather hidebound and attrition-oriented mindset of II Corps and its divisions. Despite reaching Faridpur they could not cross the Padma and threaten Dacca from this direction."

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"IV Corps Operations 

If the operations of II Corps were characterised by rigidity, attrition and over caution – those of IV Corps represented a high point of mobility of mind and innovation along with unorthodox ways of speeding up the advance. This Corps had taken Gen Jacob’s advice on bypassing and rapid manoeuvre to heart. Its Commander was the very tall and imposing Gen Sagat Singh. Sagat Singh proved to be India’s Guderian – one of its best Field Commanders of this war – in fact of all of India’s wars. His corps made the most innovative use of some 14 x Mi-4 Russian helicopters allocated to bounce the Meghna River and mount a rapid advance to Dacca from the east."

"Gen Sagat was a strong personality. He had started service as a trooper in the Bikaner State Forces. This Rathore Rajput had risen from the ranks to become one of India’s best field commanders. At just six years of service, he had done the prestigious Staff College course at Calcutta. He had commanded the Crack 50(I) Para Brigade and led it for the Liberation of Goa in December 1961. He had then commanded the 17 Mountain Division in Sikkim. In his tenure, a major skirmish had erupted on the Nathu La and Cho La passes on the Himalayan watershed. Sagat Singh had retaliated very strongly and used medium artillery to inflict heavy punishment on the Chinese. Reports of Chinese casualties in these skirmishes range from 350 to 800 killed and wounded. It had a salutary impact. From then on the Chinese have not dared to open fire on the India-China border and there has been no kinetic incident on this front since 1967.

"Sagat’s resolute and courageous response to the Chinese had set a benchmark in professional competence and given the PLA bloody nose. Thereafter, Gen Sagat had led Counter Insurgency (CI) operations in the dense jungles of Mizoram. It was here that he pioneered the concepts of Special Heliborne Operations (SHBO). This was to prove providential and enabled him to mount heliborne assaults across the Meghna – one of the widest rivers in Bangladesh.

"Massive infrastructural and logistics investments were made to initiate operations from the side of Tripura. Both the Army HQ and Eastern Command operational instructions had made no mention of Dacca (though that had been the anchor premise of this plan when it was formulated by Gen Jacob in May 1971). Apart from the uncertainty of Chinese intervention, one of the primary reasons why Dacca was not put down in black and white as the primary objective – was the fear of failure. There were serious doubts whether it was not a bridge too far and whether the Indian Army would indeed be able to deliver Dacca? No one was sure. The Indian Army so far had not attempted such a daring feat of mobility (the only exception was Op Polo (Hyderabad) but the Nizam’s forces were hardly a credible opposition).

"Gen Sagat Singh could not deviate from the Operational Instructions issued in writing by the Army HQ and HQ Eastern Command. However, the more he thought about his impending task the more he was convinced that Dacca was the key objective. Thus, even though the Corps operational instructions made no mention of Dacca, Gen Sagat Singh was crystal clear that this was the final aim of his Corps operations. He was driven by this mission of the Dash to Dacca and it became a monumental obsession that consumed him in the days ahead. He infected his divisional, brigade and battalion commanders with that overwhelming enthusiasm for Dacca and constantly led operations from the front, helicoptering from one lead column to another and in many cases flying ahead of our leading advance guards on the multiple axes of advance to the Meghna River."

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"Plans 

"The Corps plan was to attack along three divisional thrust lines over a 250 km front between Meghalaya in the north and the Feni salient in the extreme south of Tripura. This was the strongest Corps in Eastern Command and implied that the Command Schwerpunkt had been designated not in the west (where it was most anticipated by Pakistan and its defences were the strongest) – but in the East.

"Pakistan’s 14 Infantry Division was deployed in the Sylhet sector under Maj Gen MM Kazi. To its south were the two newly created ad hoc divisions – the 36th and 39th. These were largely skeleton formations. The Corps operational instructions specified capture of maximum territory and also cutting off the vital rail-road link from Chittagong Port to seal off East Pakistan from any supplies and succor from the seas. Gen Sagat Singh however, had his eyes set on the Meghna river. He would seek crossings on this wide river, bounce this obstacle and advance as rapidly as possible on Dacca. The ace up his sleeves were 14 x Mi-4 helicopters under Group Captain Chandan Singh of the IAF. Each of these choppers could take up to 1,500 kg of stores or more. IV Corps now advanced along these thrust lines ... "

"8 Mountain Division: This was commanded by Maj Gen KV Krishna Rao – a highly professional officer who later became the Chief. His division advanced on the Silchar-Karimganj axis towards Sylhet. Sylhet was held by the Pakistani 202 Infantry Brigade as a formidable fortress and as per Niazi’s orders, the Pakistanis were prepared to fight to the bitter end here. 59 Mountain Brigade ex 8 Mountain division advanced on Kalaura and captured it on 7 December 1971 after heavy fighting. They isolated the Maulvi Bazaar defences where Pakistan’s 313 Infantry Brigade was deployed. The Pakistani Divisional Commander now ordered 313 Brigade ex Maulvi Bazaar to fall back on Sylhet. On 10 December 1971, 81 Mountain Brigade captured the Saidpur and Sherpur ferries, thus blocking the only road link southwest of Sylhet. Instead of now battering his head against Sylhet – Sagat Singh decided to bypass and isolate this garrison. Under no condition would this be allowed to fall back into the Dacca triangle. To do this he used the tried but spirited Battalion 4/5 Gukha Rifles (4/5 GR).

"The First Heliborne Operation: 303 Infantry Brigade of Pakistan at Maulvi Bazar was expected to fall back to Coronation Bridge and block the way to Meghna crossings. Very foolishly the Pakistanis diverted it to fall back on the bypassed strong point of Sylhet The Sylhet Garrison now had some 6 Battalions of the 202 and 313 Infantry Brigades bottled up here. These were supported by a battery each of 105 mm guns and 120 mm mortars. Very foolishly Pakistan had bottled up both brigades so far north at Sylhet. It was now a most formidable two brigade sized fortress. India’s response was simple. Bottle them all up here and dash onwards to the Meghna. The IAF and the armed helicopters bombed Sylhet. The entire garrison was bottled up in this fortress by the heliborne manoeuvres executed 4/5 GR .This battalion was airlifted in 22 sorties of Mi-4 helicopters and put behind Sylhet strong point – thus completely cutting off the retreat of this massive Pakistani force back towards the Dacca Triangle. This garrison later surrendered on 17 December 1971.

"57 Mountain Division: This was led by Maj Gen Kenneth Gonsalves. The division advanced along the central axis from Agartala towards Akhaura. The Mukti Bahini had already made a base here and was in contact with the defences of Akhaura. This sector was the 4 Corps Schwerpunkt and it was here that Gen Sagat Singh actually planned to bounce the Meghna and dash for Dacca. The Meghna River was more than a mile wide here. 57 Mountain Division was originally to advance to Daudkandi. However, this division had captured Ashuganj by 5 December 1971. They now discovered that the Brahmanbaria – Akhaura rail line had been converted into a road by the Pakistanis by removing the rails. They secured the railway bridge over the Teesta river. It was now decided to switch the axis of advance of 57 Mountain Division to Akhaura-Ashuganj-Brahmanbaria instead of south towards Daudkandi. It was a superb example of flexibility and agility of mind. It enabled IV Corps formations to exploit all fleeting opportunities and further the objective of speeding to Dacca. Commanders at all levels had been briefed about Gen Sagat Singh’s intent and did their best to further this intention of the Corps Commander. Elements of the Maulvi Bazaar Brigade (313 Brigade of Pakistan) were supported to withdraw to Brahmanbaria and bar the path to Dacca. However, very foolishly they went north on a total limb to reinforce Sylhet. The 4/5 GR’s heliborne operations completely sealed off and bottled up this garrison.

"Meanwhile, on the Ashuganj axis, the Pakistanis had blown up the bridge across the Meghna. The leading Indian Brigades began recce for a crossing place. The PT-76 tanks plunged in. But their engines could only work for 30 minutes in water. After that they overheated. Crossing the fast flowing Meghna would take three to four hours. Fortunately, the Mukti Bahini organised a whole host of country boats and fishing boats to help push the PT-76 tanks across to the other bank. Our troops moved ahead and invested Bhairab Bazaar. We needed to push far greater force levels across the Meghna and soon. The enemy brigade at Ashuganj was also subsequently invested by flying the 4 Guards battalion behind them and stopping their withdrawal to Dacca."

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"Bouncing the Meghna (Heliborne operations) 

"The 14 x Mi-4 helicopters of Chandan Singh were pressed into action a second time on 9 December 1971. They were tasked to bounce the Meghna at Bhairab Bazaar and land behind this enemy strong point. 4 Guards was heli-lifted and dropped behind this point. This operation was done by night. As per Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) evolved in Mizoram, the Mukti Bahini marked the heli-landing zone with 80 torches. In just one night some 650 troops of 4 Guards were inserted behind Bhairab Bazaar. For the next 36 hours, the helicopters shuttled relentlessly (without the pilots even stopping to eat their food). They just subsisted on coffee and biscuits and delivered some 5,000 troops and 51 tons of stores across the Meghna river. The entire Bhairab Bazaar garrison was now truly bottled up and could not fall back on to Dacca.

"In the next three days IV Corps rapidly advanced on Dacca. By the time of the ceasefire, they had brought Dacca within the range of their artillery guns. In addition to the heliborne operations a large force of the Indian Army was ferried across the Meghna river in the country boats and ferries marshaled by the Mukti Bahini.

"Thus by 9 December, IV Corps had reached the three key points along the line of the Meghna river – Ashuganj – Daudkandi and Chandpur. The approaches to Dacca from the east now lay wide open. Enemy troops from Comilla, Laksham and Chaudagram (around 4,000 strong) had fallen back on Mayamati. Gen Sagat Singh now bypassed this strong point and invested it. It finally surrendered on 16 December 1971 (some 86 officers, 175 JCOs and 4,000 men became prisoners of war). 

"Since Army HQ had mandated capture of the Chittagong Port, a Kilo Force was created to dash south and secure it (this had 2 battalions from Mizo hills, one BSF and one CRPF battalions along with two East Bengal Rifles Regiments). 

"Due to Indian operations in Laksham the enemy vacated Feni. This fell to Kilo Force on 6 December 1971. Kilo Force now advanced on Chittagong. Sagat Singh sought to speed up this advance and allocated the 83 Mountain Brigade to this sector. By 13/14 December, this force had reached the outskirts of Chittagong. The Special Frontier Force under Maj Gen Uban was pushed from Mizoram into the Chittagong Hill tracts, capture Rangmati and pose a threat to Chittagong."

"Gen Sagat Singh had relentlessly moved up and down his entire front, helicoptering down to push his leading units to move even faster; coming back to issue orders at the Corps HQ and moving out again. In the true tradition of Rommel and Guderian he led from the very front and took enormous risks. Many times his helicopter came under fire but he pushed ahead regardless. He was a dynamo of relentless energy. Meanwhile 2 Para (of 101 Communication Zone) was the first unit to enter Dacca from the North. Sagat was given overall charge of Dacca and had to organise the Surrender ceremony very hastily in a highly confused and charged atmosphere. Millions of excited and jubilant Bengalis lined the roads shouting Joy Bangla and showering flowers on the Indian Army. It was the heady wine of victory. The rapid advance to Dacca had totally unhinged the enemy plans and caused the collapse of the Pakistani Armed Forces in the East. It was extremely sad, however, that there were strong clashes of personality between Lt Gen Sagat Singh and his Army Commander (Lt Gen JS Aurora) and the Army Chief (Gen Sam Manekshaw). Despite his stellar performance as the Corps Commander, India’s best field commander was passed over for promotion. He never became an Army Commander. However a grateful civil government gave him the Padma Bhushan for his inspiring leadership in the race for Dacca."

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"India’s Sole Amphibious Operation 

"Army HQ had received information that some Pakistani troops were trying to escape to Burma via Cox’s Bazaar. Sam rang up Gen Jacob and asked him to mount an amphibious operation to seal off this route of escape. Gen Jacob protested that he had no troops trained in Amphibious operations and there were no nets or other specialised equipment. Sam brusquely told him to stop making excuses and get on with the job.

"Romeo Force 

"An ad hoc force was hurriedly formed under HQ 8 Mountain Artillery Brigade. This had 1/3 GR and 2 companies of 11 Bihar along with a detachment of artillery. The Merchant Vessel Vijay had just discharged her cargo at Calcutta. This was requisitioned immediately and the Force embarked. The force set sail from Calcutta on 12 December 1971 two days behind schedule.

"The Navy had agreed to provide two Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) to ferry the troops ashore from the Merchant Vessel. On 14 December 1971 the MV Vishwa Vijay reached off the coast of Cox’s Bazaar. The LSTs INS Gildar and Gharial came adjacent and the troops transferred to these. Unfortunately, no beach recce had been done and the beach there had many deep runnells. Gen Jacob had considerable experience of Amphibious operations here. He asked the Navy to beach the LSTs and let the untrained troops have a dry landing. The tide would lift the LSTs the next day. The aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was to provide air support but never fetched up. The boys now transferred to the LSTs, who did not beach them but dropped them near the shore and into the runnels. Only 12 men could disembark and 2 of the Gurkhas drowned. Another effort was made and some 30 men put ashore. Fortunately there were no Pakistanis in the area. However, there was a Mukti Bahini camp nearby. They got together a whole lot of local boats and put the force ashore.

"It was a rather hasty and ad hoc amphibious operation. May be Sam just wanted his boys to gain experience in the complexities of Amphibious Warfare. There were many reports of the Pakistani Army trying to escape by sea from Cox’s Bazaar. Most were tenditious reports. However, the Indian Army had shown resilience. Gen Sagat Singh’s IV Corps had shown the acme of mobility in all terrains and contexts. It had launched two major heliborne operations at Sylhet and Brahmanbaria to isolate and bottle up large enemy garrisons and prevent their escape to Dacca. The offensive in the East had succeeded brilliantly – thanks to the dynamic personality of its commander – the heroic Gen Sagat Singh, who proved to be its Guderian and India’s finest field commanders. Thanks to him – the attack from the east was overwhelming and had opened up a way to Dacca."

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July 02, 2022 - July 02, 2022. 

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15. TRUMP CARD AT TANGAIL 

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"The writing on the wall had been evident in Dacca almost after the first four days of war. India had bypassed all the forward deployed fortresses and strong points on the border and its leading columns had advanced deep inside Bangladesh. Most strong points had been contained and bypassed. Many however had simply fallen after they were bypassed and surrendered. Niazi’s rhetoric that no unit would retreat unless it had suffered 75 percent casualties had proved to be so much hot air. India’s total air supremacy was “massing effects” and was having a palpable effect on Pakistani troops’ morale. 80 air sorties per day in support of ground operations were having a be-numbing impact on the Pakistani forces. It was the massing of effects.

"From around 7th December 1971, Gen Niazi and Governor Abdul Motaleb Malik had started bleating for a ceasefire and withdrawal of Indian troops. The extended period of Mukti Bahini guerrilla operations had clearly worn out the Pakistani Army. The sudden shock of massed air attacks and the speed of the Indian Army’s advance were now taking a severe toll of their nerves. Morale was crumbling at a dramatic pace. After the war, a Pakistani Divisional Commander said, “Our minds were clogged by an incomprehensible conflict.” On the eve of war (3 December itself) a Brigade Commander had recorded, “My men were already near exhaustion and burdened by terrible fatigue and sleeplessness.” Eight months of the Mukti Bahini’s relentless guerrilla operations had taken their toll. The defeat in East Pakistan was inevitable.

"As part of psychological warfare operations Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw now began to issue daily appeals for surrender on All India Radio. Most officers and soldiers those days had their small transistor radios that were normally carried in the ammunition pouches. Each evening we used to listen to these electrifying broadcasts from the Indian Army Chief. It was as electrifying as when we had heard him at our NDA passing out parade. His sentences came like rapid fire staccato bursts of machine gun fire.

"“Officers and men of the Pakistan Army. I know you are trying to escape via the ports of Khulna and Chittagong. You cannot escape. Our Navy has cut off all routes of exit. I want to spare military lives. I do not needlessly want to shed the blood of soldiers. Surrender to me – lay down your arms and I will protect you. Your lives will be spared. You will be treated with dignity as per the Geneva Convention.” 

"That commanding voice still causes goose bumps. There was a heady feeling of victory in the air. After a 1000 years of invasions and humiliation – the Indian Armed Forces were at last winning and winning gloriously."

Again, he's not counting Shivaji and subsequent Peshawas, the Maratha empire. 

"The stage was now set for the final Dash to Dacca. By 8 December 1971, it had snowed in the mountains and the Himalayan Passes were finally closed. The precipitation had been light but the chances of Chinese operations had become virtually zero. No battle indications in the form of any concentrations of Chinese troops and material in Tibet were available. There was no unusual military activity worth the name in Tibet. At the 16,000 ft high Cho La Pass – where my own unit was later deployed on the Himalayan watershed, there was a pyramidal peak named Pt 4,752 (its height in meters) that formed the right shoulder of the Pass. From there a spur extended out along the knife-like edge of the McMahon Line that ran along this watershed. At the farthest point where it took a sharp turn was the independent platoon post of Garh. It was India’s forward most post on the Himalayan watershed in the Chola Pass complex. Normally it was commanded by an experienced captain."

"Had the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intervened it would have dangerously and dramatically altered the situation. The Himalayan front would have become the main theatre of operations. That is why, with the burden of responsibility on his shoulders, Sam had hesitated. It was an enormous risk but his trusted lieutenants (Gen Inder Gill and Gen Jacob) virtually goaded him to take the plunge. In hindsight it also indicated Sam’s deep faith in the abilities of these two upright and highly professional soldiers."

"On 12 December 1971, three Royal Air Force C-130s and one United Nations C-130 aircrafts had sought permission to land at Dacca to evacuate British and American nationals. India ordered a pause in the air attacks to facilitate this evacuation. The previous day also a number of UN aircrafts had touched down at Calcutta’s Dum Dum Airport carrying foreign evacuees from Dacca. They had seen a whole host of AN-12, C-119 Packets and Dakotas milling around. They thought that the entire 50(I) Para Brigade was mounting a major airborne operation. Meanwhile the situation on the Western Theatre was not going as well. The DMO had therefore asked Gen Jacob to revert two Medium Regiments of artillery, one Regiment of T-55 tanks and the 123 Infantry Brigade to the Western Theatre. This brigade had started emplaning at Barrackpore airport in the Boeing 737s of the Indian Airlines. This East to West movement of troops was picked up by satellites and caused panic attacks in Washington. Having virtually conquered the East, was Mrs. Gandhi planning to dismember West Pakistan also? The CIA reportedly had a mole in her cabinet (presumably a senior minister), who had informed that this was perhaps the case. The East to West movement of troops panicked Washington and made President Richard Nixon furious. As will be covered in detail later, he asked the Seventh Fleet to steam into the Bay of Bengal to browbeat India into apparently calling off any such plans. The air movement at Barrackpore also alerted Pakistani spies. They also reported to Niazi and convinced him that the whole Para Brigade was about to descend on Dacca or near-abouts. It added to the panic and hysteria mainly in the capital city of East Pakistan."

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"101 Communication Zone Operations 

"The 101 Communication Zone under Maj Gen Gill started operations with two brigade sized forces – the 95 Infantry Brigade and the FJ Sector (with an assortment of Army EBR and BSF units). The 95 Infantry Brigade crossed the Brahmaputra and invested the enemy position at Jamalpur. It put a road block behind it and cutoff its retreat to Mymensingh Garrison. There was only one Pakistani Infantry Brigade (93 Brigade) deployed in the north at Mymensingh. This was to fall back to Tangail and then to Dacca. Dacca initially had no regular formations but some 5,000 assorted troops. It was expected that the brigades from Ashuganj in the east, Mymensingh in the north and Daudkandi in the south were supposed to ultimately fall back on it. That would have made Dacca a formidable defensive triangle that could have held out for months.

"The 95 Infantry Brigade was advancing on the Jamalpur-Tangail-Kaliakair-Dacca axes. The FJ Sector was advancing on the Nasirabad-Tangail axis. On 8 December 1971, Army HQ had finally released the 167 and 5 Mountain Brigades to be employed in the Dash to Dacca. It was vital that the Mymensingh Garrison be prevented from falling back to Dacca at all costs. From the outset Gen Jacob had planned for an airdrop at Tangail which would prevent the Mymensingh Garrison from falling back on to Dacca. In fact, as described in the personal narratives, Capt PK Ghosh of 2 PARA had already been infiltrated over a 100 km deep into East Pakistan to contact the Tiger Siddiqui Force in the jungles north of Dacca and take their help to secure a 2 x 1 sq. km Drop Zone near Tangail.

"It was now time to put this para drop into effect. Gen Jacob wanted them to be dropped in the morning at 0900 hrs. We had total air supremacy and the drop zone was being secured by the Mukti Bahini. However the Deputy of the 50(I) Para Brigade Col Skudder wanted to do it in the more classical fashion at last light, so that the paras could regroup under cover of darkness and thus avoid enemy interference. Jacob insisted, there was no enemy interference around. The DZ had been secured by the Mukti Bahini. Considering the various types of aircrafts being employed – the drop was likely to get highly dispersed. It would be better to mount the paradrop operation early in the morning itself. It would also reduce the time needed by the enemy to fall back. Even the Army Commander joined the deliberations and ultimately a compromise solution of drop at 1600 hrs on 4 December 1971 was accepted."

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"1700 hrs, 10 December 1971: 2 PARA Battalion HQ at Dum Dum

"Dum Dum airport was a bustle of hectic activity. UN C-130 planes were landing with the evacuated civilians of different countries. As they got down they gaped. They could see so many assorted transport aircrafts lined up on the tarmac and the paratroopers mounting them with their battle loads. The buzz spread to the press – a massive paradrop operation was afoot. The whole Para Brigade was perhaps being dropped. The Transfer of troops to the west from Bagdogra was also picked up by the Pakistanis. Niazi was nervous that the whole Para Brigade was about to land near Dacca.

"1600 hrs, 11 December 1971: In the Sky over Tangail"

"It was a massive air train. The sky reverberated with the roar of some 48 turbo-prop aircrafts. Leading were the Dakotas, followed by the Packets at an altitude interval and lastly the huge lumbering 4-engined AN-12 Antonovs. Two MiG-21s flew fighter escorts overhead."

Amongst all the rest of superb photographs provided by General Bakshi to illustrate the story, including portraits and maps, here's an instantly thrilling set, depicting paratroopers dropping! It's captioned 'Trump Card at Tangail: Paradrop'.

"“Bolo Chhatri Mata ki Jai” (Hail to the Mother Parachute) shouted the boys as per the unit tradition in each aircraft. 2/Lt Lali Gill jumped for the first time in his life as he leapt out of a Fairchild Packet. He felt the butterflies in the pit of his stomach. Down, down, his breath got caught in his throat. Suddenly he felt a jerk of the cord and his parachute opened. It blossomed and he began to sail down gently. 

"What a sight it was! The sky seemed filled with hundreds of white parachutes blossoming like flowers and lazily floating down to the earth. Over 700 paratroopers were descending to a Drop Zone (DZ) some 70 km north of Tangail. They had jumped from the height of a 1,000-1,200 feet in a keen 12 knot breeze. There had been one hang up but he survived miraculously. The drop got spread much beyond the 2 x 1 sq. km DZ that had been secured by the Mukti Bahini. The countryside was flat and dotted with clusters of villages, each with its customary pond. The CO landed in the middle of one and had to cut the cords and swim his way ashore. A few mountain guns and anti-tank guns landed in the ponds and had to be fished out with great effort. Other paratroopers landed on rooftops and trees.

"In true Para Brigade style, the Battalion took it in its stride. Within 2 hours the men and equipment had been re-formed into platoons and companies. There was panic and consternation in the enemy ranks. Initially they reacted with idiotic euphoria. Were these the Chinese paratroopers who were coming to their rescue? Was it the Americans? The famed “Yellows” from the North and whites from the south who had come to deliver their beleaguered allies as Gen Yahya had promised? Some patrols were sent to probe. They drew fire and retreated hastily. Slowly the truth sank in. It was the Indian Para Brigade. Some 5,000 Indian paratroopers they said had landed. There was no sight of the Chinese or Americans. For the first time Gen Niazi felt a deep despair. He felt bitterly let down by his higher command.

"Col Pannu pulled himself out of the Pond he had fallen in. He then helped the boys pull his jeep out of the same pond. ... "

He met Bong and Tahira. 

"“Ok Bong you can do a quick rig change and join us. The enemy is almost here. Well done both of you.” 

"The Para battalion regrouped rapidly and very soon it had secured the Poongli Bridge on the Turag river. It was just in time. The first column of the Pakistani Brigade had already crossed this bridge in the late afternoon. Well after last light – the Paras saw the sidelights of the Pakistani 93 Infantry Brigade’s convoy of leading vehicles. Troops were alerted. When the convoy neared the bridge, it was met by a murderous barrage of anti-tank guns, rocket launchers and mortar fire. Machine guns raked the trucks. There were loud explosions, screams and shouts. The Pakistani troops quickly disembarked. They sited their mortars and began to engage 2 PARA positions. Then they launched one desperate counterattack after another to clear the bridge. Fierce fighting broke out. The enemy tried desperately to eject the Paras from the bridge but failed dismally. In all the enemy launched four attacks. The carnage was fierce and complete. The attacks petered out. After first light when the last attack had happened a sudden silence fell on the battlefield.

"In the morning the Paras counted some 344 Pakistani dead bodies littered around the bridge. The enemy Brigade Commander Brig Qadir surrendered the next day. Maj Gen Gill was with his leading columns. His jeep went over a mine and he was badly wounded. He was quickly evacuated by helicopter. Maj Gen Gandharva Nagra of the Gurkhas now took charge of 101 Communication Zone. Link up was established with the Paras. On night 12/13 December – the 95 Brigade of 101 Communication Zone charged ahead and captured the township of Tangail. On 13 December, 6 Sikh Light Infantry resumed the advance and had a fierce encounter with enemy tanks.

"2 PARA was now grouped with the FJ Sector column. This had 2 PARA, 3 Guards and one Mountain Battery. They now advanced on to Dacca via the Mirpur bridge route. Gen Nagra was with the leading columns. They were met by the Mukti Bahini who told them of a newly constructed highway that went via Manikganj and bypassed the main road along the Tungi-Dacca axis, along which the enemy expected the advance to come. Gen Gandharva Nagra now decided to take this open and undefended route and pushed 2 PARA down this road. The local people were now thronging the route in their thousands. They were besides themselves with joy and euphoria. Shouts of Joy Bangla rent the air. Men and women came forth spontaneously to greet the Indian soldiers and offer them food and refreshments. It was heady and euphoric to see a new nation reveling in its new found freedom. The Indian soldiers had literally dropped from heaven to free them from an unspeakable tyranny."

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July 02, 2022 - July 02, 2022. 

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16.​ STRIKING THE CORE: INSIDE OUT ATTACK ON THE GOVERNOR’s HOUSE 

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"The cipher clerk got up excitedly from his table. The Indians had cracked the Pakistani cipher code. Havildar Bipin Trivedi of the 17th Wireless Experimental Unit held in his hand a decrypted signal from Governor Abdul Motaleb Malik, calling all senior officials in Dacca to an urgent conference in the Governor’s House at 1200 hrs on 14 December 1971. Attending this conference were the Eastern Army Commander – Lt Gen AAK Niazi, Maj Gen Farman Ali, the military advisor to the Governor and some of Niazi’s senior staff officers. In fact the entire Command & Control (C&C) apparatus in Dacca was to get together under one roof at the Governor’s House.

"Lt Col Bhalla who was in charge Signals Intelligence, ran to his jeep excitedly and brought this message by hand to Gen Jacob at around 0930 hrs on 14 December 1971. Without batting an eyelid Gen Jacob rang up Air Vice Marhsal Daveshar, the very competent Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO) at HQ Eastern Air Command Shillong. This was a golden chance to put into practice what the famous US Airpower theorist John Warden (the mastermind behind the planning of the First Gulf War) called the “Inside Out Attack” theory. Generally, armies carry out a serial process of attack through various layers and rings of the fielded enemy forces to get to the core of his Command &Control set up in the enemy capital. However, directly striking the core itself could benumb and completely paralyse the whole enemy organisation. Warden felt it was stupid to attack this core serially through successive layers of defences – one by one from the outside (the border) to the core inside the national capital. Warden advocated the use of airpower to reverse the whole process and carry out an inside out attack that strikes the core right at the outset of fighting. Airpower was the best instrument to do this.

"Daveshar agreed readily. Apparently this information had also filtered down another channel. The Mukti Bahini had got the information of this meeting from its humanint sources and had alerted the R&AW. They had passed it on to Mrs. Gandhi, who told the Air Chief Air Mshl PC Lal. HQ Eastern Command received this input from both the Air HQ as well as Eastern Command HQ and hence, reacted with great speed and alacrity."

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"14 December Operations Room 28 Squadron (First Supersonics) 1055 hrs’

"Group Captain Wollen of the Air Force Intelligence rushed into the operations room of 28 Squadron (First Supersonics). He was breathless with excitement. There was an emergency message from Air HQ. A very important meeting had been called by the Governor of East Pakistan at the Circuit House in Dacca. This had to be attacked while the meeting was on! 

"What time is the meeting? Wing Commander(later Air Vice Marshal) Bishnoi queried urgently. 

"“Will commence around 1100 hrs as I’m told.” 

"“Wing Cdr Bishnoi looked at his watch and gasped. It is 21 minutes flying time to Dacca. We have to load armaments. He spoke urgently on the phone to the COO(Chief Operating Officer). Get four – MiG 21s loaded with 32 High Explosive (HE) rockets each. Move it. We take off as soon as those are loaded. Step on the gas!” 

"“Now where the hell is this circuit House?” Bishnoi turned to Wollen. 

"Wollen took out a tourist map of Dacca. They located the Circuit House and Wollen tapped it.

"“This should be it”, he said. 

"Bishnoi urgently briefed his pilots. Young Flt Lt Vinod Bhatia (of the band of brothers fame), Flt Lt Raghvachari and Flt Lt Mallhi heard his terse briefing with rapt attention. 

"“The Governor of East Pakistan has called all top officials for a meeting in Circuit House Dacca, let’s blow them to smithereens. Now let’s rush before the bloody conference ends.”"

Another thrilling set of photographs, titled "Pinpoint Air Attack on Governor’s House Dacca, 14 December 1971", here!

"The pilots charged to their planes. The ground crew had effected a miracle. All four MiGs were loaded with 32 HE rockets each and ready. 

"The pilots jumped into their cockpits. Wing Cdr Bishnoi had just closed his canopy when an officer rushed to his aircraft and clambered up the ladder and flashed up a handwritten card. It read: 

"“Target not Circuit House but Government House – repeat Government House.” 

"“Shit!” Wing Cdr Bishnoi – expostulated.

"He quickly checked his tourist map and located the Govt House. He was now in a quandry. Should he tell the other pilots on radio? He decided against it. It would be heard all over the region and perhaps alert the enemy. He decided he would only tell them once they were over Dacca. There was no time to lose. He opened the throttle and the MiG-21’s engine roared to life. It sped off in a blur of speed and the other three MiGs followed up close. 

"They got into Diamond formation and sped off for Dacca. 21 minutes later the four MiGs were circling Dacca like hawks. Bishnoi looked down and located the govt house on his map. He informed his pilots of the changed target and asked them to locate it on ground. Vinod spotted the target. 

"“Target” 11’Clock, 500 mtrs – building with high dome. 

"“Tiger Three Contact.” They descended rapidly to tree top height and formed up with the building broad side. Bishnoi was now flying over the main road in Dacca – so low that people in the high rise apartments could look down upon them as they flew beneath. He aligned himself with the huge bay windows."

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"1215 hrs, 14 December 1971: Government House, Dacca

"The Government House was a majestic building. Huge and glittering crystal chandeliers hung in the Conference Hall. There was a dark brown polished mahogany table with high-back plush chairs. His Excellency, the Governor Abdul Motaleb Malik had very refined tastes and his wife had just redone the interior décor at an exorbitant cost. There were stately and caparisoned curtains. The atmosphere however was one of intense gloom and irritability. The pall of gloom was so visible and palpable that it could be cut with a knife. 

"His Excellency, the Governor walked in and the Pakistani national anthem bars were played by the band. Gen Niazi deliberately entered a minute later to show everyone who was the boss. Governor Malik looked at him balefully, 

"“Janaab Qayamat aa gayi hai (The end of the world is upon us). I had contacted the American Counsel General Paul Mark here in Dacca and requested him to organise a ceasefire. He had passed it on to the US Embassy in Pakistan. However, when Gen Yahya Khan got to know of it, he rejected it.” He said dejectedly, ... "

"The sparks between the civil and military officials were now flying openly. The soldiers had messed it up thoroughly, felt the civilians, and rightly so. 

"“Target 11’clock, 300 meters. Engage Bay windows, follow me over.” Wing Commander Bishnoi said on RT. He could see a whole host of White and Green Sedan Staff cars parked in the vicinity of the building and realized the conference was still going on here.

"“Panther Leader going in now. Follow me.” Bishnoi pressed the trigger and felt his plane lurch as the rockets crackled and wooshed off towards the target. 

"The thunderous roar of the diving jets reverberated through the plush building. Gen Niazi sprang up. Through the huge bay window, he could see the lead jet fighter. A flash of flame erupted under its wings as it discharged a volley of rockets … zzzzraaatt …!

"Gen Niazi’s eyes rounded with horror. 

"“Air Attack! Air Attack!” he screamed as he dived under the table. He had been in combat often enough to know this. 

"All present in the room followed his example and dived with alacrity. The 32 rockets slammed into the room in flashes of Phat! Phat! Phat! Loud explosions rent the air. The chandelier came crashing down on to the table and the whole room was now littered with glass. Huge explosions filled the air and choked their lungs. Their ears began to ring. The second, third and then the fourth jet dived one after another and pumped a fusillade of rockets into the room. Tentatively, Gen Niazi raised his head over the table. 

"Then he heard the MiG-21s returning for a second run. They roared down and the reverberations of their engines made the window panes rattle. The sounds of the jet reached a deafening crescendo of power. …zzzzrrraaat…! The rippling sounds of multiple rockets being fired could be heard over the infernal din of the jet engines. It was terrible. The rockets smashed into the room and exploded into huge fireballs that singed the hair of Niazi and his commanders under the table. For an instant Niazi could not breathe. He felt the concussions of the explosions and almost blanked out. There was a sharp ringing sound in his ears. He felt great fear. How long would these planes keep attacking this target? Generally they made just one pass and fled. Where were the Sabres? They had all been grounded, the Indians had completely cratered the runway and the sheepish pilots of the Fiza Ya were focused more on preserving the force."

" ... Another set of explosions tore his breath away, then another and then another. The four MiG-21s had now emptied all their 32 rockets into the Conference Hall of the Old Governor’s House 128 rockets in that enclosed hall! Fortunately most rockets had hit the far end of the room, a portion of the wall and part of the roof had caved in."

"Tears ran down Niazi’s cheeks. The stress was mounting steadily and these days he used to burst in tears very often. But this near miss had been terrible. Experts on combat stress tell us that a near miss leaves us shaken. It is this that fatally erodes the morale. A near miss – a very close brush with death.

"Col Salik now heard Niazi sobbing loudly, 

"“Pindi men baithe haramzaadon ne marva diya (the bastards in Pindi have done us in),” he was now wailing loudly."

"“Niazi Sahab, here’s my resignation. I’m moving out with my family right now to the neutral zone in Intercontinental Hotel Dacca.” 

"The all clear air-raid siren sounded in the distance. People came out with very obvious relief from below the table. 

"“Please sit down,” Niazi though badly shaken tried to restore a semblance of order. The Conference Hall was a holy mess. Broken chandeliers, shards of glass, pieces of cement and plaster and the strong acrid stench of cordite!"

"This was the moment of total collapse of the Pakistani High Command in the East. Their will to fight had been pulverised with a barrage of 118 rockets of the Indian Air Force, delivered with great precision through the huge Bay windows of the Conference Hall. The high grandees in the Conference hall had a very narrow and very providential escape. But it had left them totally shaken and pale. It had blasted something inside them – that critical will to fight and hold on. It had been completely shattered. The way Niazi had sobbed inconsolably that day in Governor’s House Dacca showed that the cumulative stress of the last eight months had taken a heavy toll. This airstrike and the near miss had blasted whatever remained of his resolve as it were. Niazi was a psychologically defeated man already.

"On 15 December, to avoid incessant Indian air attacks, Niazi shifted his HQ to the Dacca University. This was detected by the Mukti Bahini and again attacked by the Indian Air force. This time 28 Squadron (First Supersonics) sent in two missions of four MiG-21s each. They slammed a total of 256 rockets into the newly shifted HQ. The blasts and inferno was terrible. This was pin point, inside-out attack at its best and it specifically targeted the command and control centre of the Pakistan Army in the East. The morale of the top military leadership in Dacca suffered a complete and total collapse. Their nerves were shot to pieces. Their brains were benumbed. Their will to fight had simply collapsed."

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July 02, 2022 - July 02, 2022. 

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17.​ NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER 

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"Even as the key Command and Control (C&C) target in East Pakistan (The Governor’s House Dacca) was hit and left completely devastated, Sam Manekshaw’s radio broadcasts calling upon the rank and file of the Pakistan Army to surrender were also having a palpable impact. The Pakistan Army in the field had now been fighting non-stop for eight months. It was tired, dispirited and harried. Worse was that sense of isolation in a far away land where the local people hated your guts and would rise up to slaughter you even if they got half a chance. Events were moving at a very swift pace now to a final denoument.

"Initially, Gen Manekshaw addressed these calls to Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali – the military advisor to the Governor of East Pakistan. The Governor was the key constitutional authority and on paper the highest ranking Pakistani functionary then in East Pakistan. He would have the locus standi to negotiate a surrender. 

"On 14 December 1971, the Governor again sent a signal to Gen Yahya Khan advocating an immediate ceasefire. Initially Yahya said he would leave the decision to him. He passed instructions accordingly to Gen Niazi. The Governor (with the help of his military advisor) now made a five point proposal incorporating inter alia the following conditions:- 

"• Immediate Cease Fire 

"• Repatriation of the armed forces of West Pakistan 

"• Repatriation of other West Pakistanis desirous of returning, safety of persons settled in East Pakistan since 1947 

"• Guarantees that there would be no reprisals"

"These proposals were dusted up and handed over to Marc Henri, the US Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations (UN). Yahya Khan was about to give his assent when fate intervened."

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"US satellites had picked up the staging of 2 PARA for the Tangail operations. They had also picked up the movement of Indian units and formations from the East to the West. The brigade move from Bagdogra to the West worried them inordinately. The war in the west was not going as planned. As it is, overall India had decided to maintain an offensive-defence posture in the West. Pakistan had taken the initiative and launched major offensives in the Poonch sector and then in Chhamb. The Chhamb offensive had caught the Indian Army imbalanced as it was planning to launch a limited counter offensive here. The Pakistani attack was contained with great difficulty.

"India hit back in the Shakargarh salient, in the Shyok valley in Ladakh and in the desert sector. Without the overwhelming superiority needed – the Shakargarh salient operation was proceeding in a slow, brutal slog- hamstrung by excessive caution and a highly exaggerated concern for the safety of the flanks. This was such a marked contrast to the way the Indian Army was pursuing operations in the East. That is why the Army HQ had sought to bring in reinforcements from the East. This movement had been picked up by the Americans and it had generated alarm in Washington. The USA had moved the UN Security Council to announce a ceasefire and force India to pull its troops from East Pakistan. This had been vetoed by the Soviets a total of three times. In its desperation Pakistan had appealed to allies like Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia for arms and spares. The US Congress had passed a law prohibiting sale of arms to both India and Pakistan.

"Yet the Americans continued to supply Pakistan with critical spares on the sly. As against this, they stopped shipment of radars to India that were to cover the Himalayan borders and actually passed this information on to the Chinese in a desperate bid to encourage them to intervene. It did not work. Either the Chinese internal situation or dissensions in the PLA prevented China from acting. Or they felt they were being conned and prodded into being pushed into a war they were not ready for. Bangladesh, as a free nation was now almost a fait accompli and why should China support a lost cause and thus queer the pitch with the new nation state emerging in South Asia?

"Meanwhile, Jordan had received a request from Yahya Khan for transfer of 8-10 sophisticated Frontline F-104 Starfighters. This was American equipment and as such came under the Congressional ban. It was a violation of the US Law. Pakistan was still legally under a US Arms embargo then and this move was opposed by the State Department. Harold Saunders, Kissinger’s staffer at the White House also opposed this. Henry Kissinger now went up to President Nixon. 

"Despite his fears and apprehensions of running foul of US Law – Nixon gave the go ahead for this transfer but insisted that it be kept strictly confidential. This was done very covertly to avoid an uproar in the media and Congress and on 8 December the Presidential clearance was officially sent for this vital arms transfer despite the Congressional ban. Crucial points of the meeting of the US Attorney General with the President in the White House on this issue were intentionally bleeped out. Jordan ultimately dispatched 17 x F-104 Starfighters via Saudi Arabia. Turkey was also going to transfer some 22 such war planes to Pakistan.

"The USA also now began to give dire warnings to the USSR to restrain India or risk derailing relations. President Nixon had deliberately risked an India-China border war, a confrontation with the Soviet Union, a domestic firestorm and getting the US Administration dragged to the courts and cleaners. (And all because he liked that tinpot – Pakistani dictator so much.) What was equally evident was the malice and hatred he personally harboured for the Indians. It was indeed disconcerting. America was, after all ostensibly fighting a war in Vietnam to save democracy."

Nixon obviously didn't give two hoots fir either democracy or law, which is clearer in hindsight. 

Why, with that example and three other following Chiefs of the same stripe, was Trump abused quite so much by media? Media couldn't possibly have forgotten Nixon, Watergate, Reagan and Iran-contra affair, or a guy continuing reading in nursery after being informed his country was under attack! 

Did they? 

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"10 December 1971 – Washington: White House Situation Room 

"On 7 December the UN General Assembly had passed a resolution by 104 to 11 votes calling for a ceasefire and immediate withdrawal of troops by both sides. This had been orchestrated by the pressure brought to bear by America on the smaller states of the Third World. America and China had supported this, UK and France had abstained and the Soviets had opposed this. President Nixon was now ratcheting up the diplomatic pressure on India. The previous day the Indian Government had granted recognition to the Bangladesh government in exile.

"President Nixon called for a meeting in the Situation Room (excerpts of this had emerged in the Anderson Tapes). It was clear that he was now having second thoughts. With the Indian Army closing in on Dacca Nixon had privately written off East Pakistan. He was now fully focused on safeguarding West Pakistan. He started the meeting by observing – 

"“The East is down the drain. The major problem now is how to protect West Pakistan. Their Army is going down. Two more weeks of war and they are finished in the west as much as they are in the east.”

"Nixon turned to Henry Kissinger, 

"“You see those people are welcoming Indian troops when they come in. So the point then is, Henry, why are we going through all this agony?”"

"Both Nixon and Kissinger had a great penchant for swinging around troop deployments around the world (without really meaning to go to war) .These deployments were designed to scare the Soviets – give them the impression that Nixon- the madman could go to any lengths. So, the meeting now decided the following:- 

"• The US 7th Fleet to be moved into the Bay of Bengal for a coercive show of force. Its ostensible purpose would be to evacuate US and British citizens (these had already been evacuated by air mostly). 

"• Encourage China to intervene militarily and spark off a border war with India. Information of US Naval manoeuvres and transfer of US war planes via Jordan and Turkey to Pakistan was to be told to the Chinese. Also they would be told that the US was not supplying radars for the Himalayan border with China and if China did intervene in this conflict, the US would do nothing. 

"• The US President authorised Jordan and Turkey to send their Starfighters to Pakistan. The State Department would be told to shut up about the legalities of this decision."

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"Based on these deliberations in the Situation Room, the mighty US 7th Fleet, which had already been warned earlier, was now ordered to move via the Malacca Straits and make a threatening move into the Bay of Bengal. This was a mighty Armada. At its core was the 90,000 tons giant American Air Craft Carrier – the USS Enterprise that had Phantom fighter- bombers on board. These could deliver nuclear weapons if required. It had the second aircraft carrier – the Commando Helicopter carrier – USS Tripoli. There were 6 Destroyers and one oiler ship. It was a massive armada. Tailing it under sea however, were a couple of Soviet nuclear submarines. The US columnist Anderson speculates that the tasks given to the 7th Fleet were:- 

"• To compel India to divert both ships and planes to shadow the Task Force 

"• To weaken India’s Blockade against Pakistan 

"• Possibly divert India’s sole aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, from its military mission 

"• To force India to keep planes on defensive alert – thus reducing their availability and operations against Pakistan’s ground troops who were taking hell of a beating from the air.

"India saw through this charade. It was evident that this Task Force was only designed to intimidate and coerce and not launch kinetic operations. However, it did create nervousness in some quarters in New Delhi initially. It was insane for the USA to fight a war now to save Pakistan. The East had almost fallen. Contacts were established with the Soviets who quietly assured India that their nuclear submarines were tailing this armada. Just so the message went home, once the Task Force was deployed in the Bay of Bengal, a Soviet nuclear submarine deliberately came to the surface in full view of the American fleet. It was apparent that no kinetic action was intended. However, under the terms of the Indo-Soviet treaty the Soviets were clearly signaling the Americans and were trying to deter them from any adventurism. The clear signal was that it could have unimaginable consequences.

"Meanwhile Gen Yahya Khan was desperately clutching at straws in Rawalpindi. Governor AM Malik’s signal asking for permission to negotiate a ceasefire had reached his table. Just then he got the news of the US armada. Overjoyed he brusquely rejected the Governor’s proposal and asked him to shelve it. 

"Reality sank in a day later. This was only a token show of force. Despite many secret meetings in New York between Henry Kissinger and other top US officials with the Chinese Ambassador to the UN- Huang Hua – the Chinese did not move. The Americans gushed that they had sent their mighty Task Force; had supplied Starfighters to Pakistan via Jordan and Turkey and should China intervene militarily, the USA would not interfere. The Chinese listened politely but they did not bite the bullet. ... "

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July 02, 2022 - July 03, 2022. 

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18. ​THE JACOB-NIAZI DIALOGUE: A HISTORIC SURRENDER 

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"The stage was now set for the end game in Dacca. The entire command hierarchy in East Pakistan was badly shaken by the pinpoint air strike on the Governor’s House at Dacca. Gavin Young (who later wrote a book entitled ‘World Apart’) had gone to meet John Kelly of the United Nations. Kelly had been to the Governor’s House immediately after the air strike. The shaken Governor Dr. AM Malik’s hands were still trembling. He was very upset that Gen Yahya Khan had trash-canned his ceasefire proposal because of the arrival of the 7th Fleet. That had not materially altered the situation one bit. In fact with this pin point air strike, it had only worsened. 

"The frightened Governor stammered as he asked Kelly, “Do you think we should give up now?” 

"Kelly was embarrassed. He did not want to commit the UN to such a monumental decision. ... "

"Just then the second air raid had started and Malik wrote out his letter of resignation to Yahya Khan. ... That was the collapse of the Pakistani Government in the East.

"Meanwhile, the tension was building up in New Delhi too. So far India had waged a war of manoeuvre. Most frontline fortresses had simply been bypassed as the columns raced towards Dacca. By 13 December 1971, only two fortresses had surrendered to Indian forces; rest were simply contained and bypassed. A lot of pressure was building up in the UN. The Soviets had vetoed some three resolutions for a Ceasefire in the UN Security Council. The matter had been taken to the UN General Assembly, where the US pressure on third world countries had prevailed. The Soviets were now rather worried. They asked India to wind up its operations in the East as quickly as possible. It was becoming very difficult for them to continue vetoing the resolutions. The Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Veisily Kuznetsov, himself now flew down to Delhi. He was worried. He asked the Indian’s, “to confine their objectives to East Pakistan.”

"Sam was worried too. What if a ceasefire were enforced tomorrow? How many towns did we hold in East Pakistan? Just two. This was unacceptable. He was irritated and annoyed and ordered the Eastern Command to send troops back and retake all these by-passed towns. Glaringly omitted in that list of towns was Dacca. The pressure was beginning to tell even on the formidable Field Marshal.

"Gen Jacob was horrified. He remonstrated with Sam and the DMO. This would be a disaster. The entire plan was not based on attrition but collapsing the organisational structure of Pakistan Army in the East. The plan would be completely unhinged with this highly retrograde step. It was now vital to take Dacca as quickly as possible and get the Pakistani Eastern Command to surrender. We could not afford to let up pressure on Dacca at this crucial stage. The DMO Gen Inder Gill managed to finally get him around and pacified the agitated Sam. The operations towards Dacca proceeded apace.

"On night 13/14 December Gen Niazi spoke to the Pakistani Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Gen Hamid. He requested him to ask Yahya Khan to expedite the ceasefire. Finally Yahya relented. His fantasies of US or Chinese military intervention had by now evaporated in thin air. The reality check was painful. On 14 December 1971, Gen Yahya Khan sent a signal to Niazi telling him to take necessary measures to stop the fighting; and preserve the lives of the armed forces personnel. Technically Yahya had thrown in the towel. His signal to Niazi read:- 

"“You have now reached a stage where further resistance is no longer humanly possible nor will it serve any useful purpose. It will only lead to a further loss of life and destruction. You should now take all necessary measures to stop the fighting.”"

"This signal was received by Niazi at 1500 hrs IST. Gen Niazi and Rao Farman Ali went to see the US Consul General Herbert Spirack in Dacca (who had replaced the feisty Archer Blood). Niazi now asked Spirack to negotiate a ceasefire with the Indians ensuring the guarantees requested earlier. Spirack was somewhat taken aback. He stated that he was not in a position to do so, but however would send the message. Thereupon Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali drafted a message similar to the one they had sent earlier. ... "

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"The message, however, was not sent by the US Consul General to India. It was sent to Washington to chew over. At around 1400 hrs a diplomat in the US Consular office in Calcutta apprised Gen Jacob of Niazi’s meeting with Spirack in Dacca and the ceasefire/surrender proposals. Jacob immediately telephoned Herbert Gordon, the US Consul General at Calcutta. He denied any knowledge of this.

"Gen Jacob then rang up Sam Manekshaw and apprised him of the latest developments. In the interest of saving time he requested if Sam could contact the US Ambassador. Sam did and the ambassador truthfully said he had no knowledge whatsoever of any request to Spirack.

"In actual fact, Spirack had sent this message to his boss, Joseph Farland the US Ambassador in Islamabad. He in turn had passed it on to the US State Department. Instead of taking any action, the department decided to hold on to it for one more day – in order to give the Pakistanis more time to take territory in the West before a ceasefire came into effect. For some reason Gen Yaha Kahn had lost the appetite to continue this fight. The fabled major Pakistani counter-offensive in the west never materialised The American establishment’s sympathy and support for Pakistan was so evident, it was painful. It was support for a military cabal that had just carried out the worst genocide and ethnic cleansing in recent history.

"General Sam Manekshaw finally received this message on 15 December 1971. He gave assurances that the safety of Pakistani personnel would be guaranteed provided they surrendered."

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"The Pakistani Eastern Command was now directed to contact the Indian Eastern Command at Fort Williams. The Pakistani C-in-C, Gen Hamid signaled to Niazi to accept. A ceasefire was agreed upon from 1700 hrs on 15 December 1971 until 0900 hrs the next day. This was later extended to 1500 hrs. As far as can be made out, Gen Yahya Khan had largely left it to Gen Niazi to decide the fate of his Army and carry the can for eternity. Hasan Zaheer however states that the Pakistanis did try their best to avoid the use of the word surrender. Niazi thought the negotiations would proceed on the lines of his ceasefire proposal.

"At 0915 hrs on 16 December 1971, Gen Manekshaw spoke on the phone to Gen Jacob. He asked him to go to Dacca immediately and organise the surrender so that it took place the same evening. ... "

"Gen Jacob had just received a message from Gen Niazi inviting him for lunch. ... "

"He now took Air Commodore Purushottam (of the Advance Air HQ) and Col Khara (the Intelligence Officer) with him and flew to Dacca with a copy of the draft Instrument of Surrender. Before leaving he had briefed Brig Sethna to organise the airlift of the Indian and foreign correspondents as also the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force in the East. Also he should ensure that Col MAG Osmani and Wing Commander Khondkar of the Mukti Bahini Command attended this event. All our formations were informed of the ceasefire negotiations.

"Meanwhile 101 Communication Zone was rapidly closing in on to Dacca. The 95 Infantry Brigade of this formation was advancing on Kaliakair-Tungi-Dacca axis while FJ Sector was closing in from the Jaydebpur-Tungi axis. These were the expected routes of advance. Suddenly, Maj Gen Nagra was informed by the Mukti Bahini and locals about the newly constructed bypass to Dacca from Kaliakair to Manikganj. This was not marked on the maps. Gen Nagra now diverted 2 PARA to this route. This was not held at all and the unit had a free run towards Dacca. There was no opposition worth the name on this axis. The Pakistanis had not updated their maps. The leading troops of IV Corps on the other hand, had reached Narsingdi on the Ashuganj-Tungi railway on the evening of 14 December itself and were pressing forward to Tungi. Dacca had been brought under Medium Artillery guns range from this axis also. 

"Meanwhile 2 PARA was racing ahead. By the dawn of 16th December the unit was on the outskirts of Dacca – just two miles from the city. The clean and plush Dacca cantonment was visible from here. Gen Nagra moved forward and joined the paratroopers. There was great elation all around. Some years earlier Gen Nagra had been Military Advisor to the Indian High Commission at Karachi. Niazi was then a Brigade commander in Sindh and the two knew each other well. Nagra now decided to do his bit of softening up of the Pakistani General.

"Gen Nagra sent his young ADC Captain Hitesh Mehta, along with the Adjutant of 2 PARA, Captain Nirbhay Sharma (later as Lt Gen he would command the prestigious 15 Corps in Srinagar; post retirement he became the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh and then Mizoram). The two young officers got into a jeep with a large white flag of truce tied to it. They were carrying a message for Gen Niazi. This was a message that would soon echo around the world. It simply read: 

"“My dear Abdulla, I am here. The game is up. I suggest you give yourself up to me and I’ll look after you.” 

"This really softened Niazi. It put a known face on the relentlessly advancing enemy. Niazi also sent one of his senior most officers present – a Major General to receive Nagra and escort him to his HQ in Dacca cantonment. By 1500 hrs Gen Nagra had entered the HQ Eastern Command of the Pakistani Army in Dacca. News came in that Maj Gen Jamshed GOC of the ad hoc 36 Infantry Division had surrendered to the Indian Army with a large body of troops. Then news also came in that Maj Gen Ansari GOC 9 Pak Division had also surrendered with his forces."

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"The Niazi-Jacob Dialogue 

"That was the time Gen Jacob’s helicopter landed at the recently captured town of Jessore to refuel. There he got Sam’s message that the Government had directed that he accept Niazi’s lunch invitation. They took off. As they were landing they saw an enemy helicopter take off and fly away. Pakistani air defence guns were following them. The Air Commodore wanted to abort the landing and turn back. Gen Jacob ordered that they land forthwith. The BGS of the Pakistani Eastern Command Brig Baqar Siddiqui (who had been elevated to Chief of Staff) was there to receive him. The UN Representative was also there to welcome him and to offer his good offices to negotiate with Pakistan. That was the last thing India needed just then. There were bitter memories of J&K still rankling. Jacob asked his Air Force colleague to tie up with the Pakistani Air Force personnel to ensure safe landing of Gen Aurora’s helicopter. Gen Jacob and Col Khara along with Brig Siddiqui drove down to the HQs of the Pakistani Eastern Command.

"Gen Niazi received Jacob in his office. Present for the discussion were Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali – the Military advisor to the Governor; Maj Gen Jamshed; Rear Admiral Sharif (the Pakistani Naval Chief in the East) and Air Cmde Inamul Haq (the highest ranking officer of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in the east) along with the ubiquitous Brig Baqar Siddiqui. 

"The GOC 101 Communication Zone had just come in a little earlier and he and Niazi had met with great gusto and were exchanging bawdy jokes in Punjabi. A distinct chill came over the room when Gen Jacob arrived there. Jacob asked Niazi to ensure that the ceasefire was rigorously ensured. There was still sporadic firing going in many areas including Tungi and he should issue orders to the concerned troops to cease firing.

"Jacob then took Gen Nagra outside and instructed him to move in sufficient troops to ensure law and order. Then he was to organise the surrender. Jacob wanted it done in full public view at the Race Course Maidan. This would have to be secured. Jacob asked Gen Nagra to organise a Guard of Honour with 2 Para and a Pakistani unit for the Army Commander when he landed. At the Race Course he was to arrange a table with just two chairs. He was also to ensure protection of the Intercontinental Hotel where the UN personnel, Red Cross representatives and members of the East Pakistan Government had sought shelter. Jacob just had two to three hours now to negotiate surrender. 

"Jacob then came back to Niazi’s office. He asked Col Khara to read out the terms of surrender. A stunned silence fell over the room. Silent tears ran down Gen Niazi’s face. Other Pakistani officers in the room began to fidget. They had expected the document to be on the lines of the proposals they had handed over on 14 December to Spirack. These envisioned a ceasefire and evacuation under UN arrangements. Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali objected to surrendering to the Joint Indian and Bangaldesh Command.

"Gen Niazi said, 

"“Jacob Sahib you are asking for an unconditional surrender.” 

"Jacob replied patiently, “In our earlier telephonic conversation we had duly informed you that you would be treated as soldiers with dignity and the Geneva Convention would be strictly honoured.”

"Gen Niazi fidgeted uncomfortably in his chair, 

"“Look Gen Jacob, you had come only to discuss the Ceasefire Proposals we had sent through Mr. Spirack, the US Consul General here. You are instead asking me for an unconditional surrender.” 

"Gen Jacob now said sternly, 

"“Gen Niazi if you do not accept the terms spelt out, we cannot be held responsible for your safety. And may I add, we will have no alternative but to immediately resume full scale offensive operations – starting with air attacks.” 

"Gen Niazis face blanched as the painful memory of yesterday’s air attack flashed through his mind. There was pin drop silence in that office. 

"Gen Jacob got up imperiously, 

"“Gen Niazi I am giving you 30 minutes to make up your mind.” 

"He walked out of the room, lit an enormous cigar and began to pace nonchalantly in the corridor outside."

"Precisely at that very time, the UN was in session. A Polish resolution for a ceasefire had been tabled. Bhutto came to India’s rescue. He gave an angry harangue to the UN General Assembly (UNGA), worked himself into a rage. The resolution was unacceptable. The Resolution did not name India as the aggressor. Bhutto then got up for dramatic effect and tore that draft resolution into pieces and staged a walk out from the august hall. The Americans were miffed. They asked the British/French to table another draft resolution. Bhutto had gained India another few valuable hours."

"Meanwhile Gen Jacob continued to pace restlessly in the corridor. Niazi had told him he had 30,000 troops and could fight on. 

"“For how much longer General?” he had shot back. ... The air attacks will resume within minutes. Think about it!”"

"Gen Jacob looked at his watch. The 30 minutes were over. He took a final drag at his cigar and tossed it into a waste paper basket. Then he strode into Niazi’s office with the air of a conqueror. 

"Quietly he asked Gen Niazi, 

"“General, do you accept the terms of the draft document now on your table?” 

"Gen Niazi was silent. His laboured breathing was almost audible in the room. He said nothing but there were tears rolling down his cheeks. 

"“General, I hope you understand, the Mukti Bahini are already all over this town. They are baying for your blood. If you do not surrender we can do nothing to protect you.” 

"Gen Niazi remained silent. He continued breathing heavily. 

"“General your officers have their families here. Have you thought of them? You know what your men have been doing to the Bengali women? The Muktis will slaughter you mercilessly. They are baying for your blood,” he hissed. 

"“I ask you again – do you accept the terms spelt out in this document?” 

"Gen Niazi continued to glare at him. Tears were streaming copiously down his face. 

"Gen Jacob noisily pulled the chair and sat down in front of Niazi. He looked deep into his eyes. 

"“General, from your silence I see that you have understood,” he said quietly. Suddenly with a flourish he picked up the draft document and got up, 

"“I take this document as signed. General you will surrender to Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora today at 1630 hrs at the Race Course.” 

"Niazi spluttered, “At the Race Course – that would not be appropriate.”

"“General – a combined Guard of Honour will be given to Gen Aurora by Indian and Pakistani detachments. You will surrender your sword to him,” Gen Jacob said. “I do not have a sword here,” Niazi was desperately clutching at straws. 

"“Then you will surrender your pistol,” Jacob said with an air of finality."

"Gavin Young of The Observer was outside. “Can I have lunch too?” he queried. “Come in,” said Jacob quietly. 

"He could hardly swallow that roast chicken. It had been a harrowing two hours for him. So much was at stake. It was, as he said later, rather modestly, “a close run thing.”"

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"The Power of Personality in War 

"Here was Gen Jacob unarmed in the midst of some 26,480 officers and soldiers of the Pakistan Army. Others would have been fearful of their lives and the ability to get out unscathed. Gen Jacob showed tremendous physical courage and a confidence bordering on arrogance. Through those very tense negotiations, he kept a poker face that just did not betray the tumult that was churning his belly. That is the power of personality in war. It was also illustrative of the complete psychological collapse of the Pakistani Army in the East. The war of manoeuvre was not aimed at killing masses of enemy soldiers. It was aimed at the minds of the enemy commanders. As Liddle Hart has described – the dislocation of the minds of the enemy commanders here was complete and total. “For to fight and win all your battles, is not the acme of excellence. Supreme excellence,” said Sun Tzu “lies in subduing your enemy without fighting.”

"Gen Jacob had subdued not just the shaken Niazi who the previous day only had a very close encounter with death – a near miss that had left his nerves shattered. Jack Farj Rafael Jacob had not just domineered the shaken Niazi but the entire Pakistani Tri-Service High Command in the East. It was not just one man called Niazi who had crumbled – it was the entire Pakistani High Command in the East."

" ... The Indian Army had come of age. In 13 action packed days, they had advanced over 400 miles in the worst, the most defensible terrain in the world. It had been the Engineers’ War. Indian combat engineers had laid over 10,000 feet of bridging. The Indian Air Force massed effects in a decisive way. The shock and concussion of air ordnance had left the Pakistanis dazed and shaken.

"The Indian Army had marched on an enemy capital, enforced a mass surrender of some 93,000 men (the biggest after the Second World War) and created a new nation state with the force of arms. 

"That magnificent surrender was about to take place – the final denouement of that 13 days war! Lunch over Jacob queried again about the time of arrival of the Army Commander. There was no news. The General was coming along with his wife. This had left Jacob a bit nonplussed. Dacca was still dangerous.

"At 1500 hrs he asked Niazi to accompany him to the helipad. They went in his car with a pilot, jeep upfront. Out there, there was a veritable tumult – a sea of excited hysterical Bengali faces – yelling “Joy Bangla.” The Mukti Bahini tried to prevent them from moving forward. Some of them threw themselves on the bonnet of the car. It was looking ugly. It was fortunate that Col Khara was a Sikh. He stuck his turbaned head out and yelled that Gen Niazi was now a prisoner of the Indian Army and that they should not impede them. The teeming crowds were now pressing down on the car. 

"The Pakistani Military Police escorts were armed only with pistols and could have done nothing to stop the mobs or the armed Mukti Bahini. The situation was turning decidedly ugly. 

"Suddenly Jacob spotted a jeep with two Indian paratroopers near the airfield. He quickly took them under command and ordered them to accompany Niazi’s car. It was most fortunate and perhaps saved Niazi from a lynching that he perhaps justly deserved. No Indian troops had reached as yet to secure the airfield.

"Jacob told Khara to quickly summon up some troops and tanks. IV Corps had tried to swim some tanks across the Meghna on 15 December evening and Jacob wanted them in Dacca urgently. 

"Suddenly he saw a tall bearded Mukti Bahini Commander come with a truck load of soldiers. He was wearing the badges of Maj Gen. This was Tiger Siddiqui. Jacob recognised him. They menacingly approached Niazi. Gen Jacob panicked. It was imperative that Niazi live till he signed the Instrument of Surrender. He asked the paratroopers to shield Niazi – while he went and gave a tongue lashing to Tiger Siddiqui. He was supposed to have accompanied our troops with his 20,000 men for the advance to Dacca. He had not done so. Now he was here, intent upon bayoneting quislings.

"Jacob shouted at him to move that damned truck off the tarmac. Just then Col Khara returned with a PT 76 tank. Siddiqui hesitated, saw the tank and to Gen Jacob’s immense relief – he left suddenly. 

"A few days later he would call the International media with camera crews to witness the public bayoneting of people he called traitors. These pictures received the widest possible circulation in the international media to India’s great chagrin."

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"16 December 1971, 1630 hrs: Dacca Airfield 

"The Army Commander Lt Gen JS Aurora landed with his entourage in a magnificent fleet of five Mi-4 and four Alouette helicopters. The helicopters clattered down with an infernal din. Niazi and Jacob went to receive him. The Army Commander alighted with his wife beside him. With them were Air Mshl Dewan VrC, Adm Krishnan, Lt Gen Sagat Singh and his three Divisional Commanders. The chief of the Mukti Bahini Col Osmani could not be seen anywhere. Niazi, Gen Aurora and Air Mshl Dewan proceeded to the car. Jacob was to travel with them but had to make way for Mrs. Aurora who took her place by the side of her husband. Her arrival in the war zone was rather incongruous and uncalled for. It was decidedly risky. Poor Gen Jacob had to hitch a ride in the Paratroopers jeep. One can imagine his chagrin. Peace had truly returned and the ladies would take precedence once more! A mass of humanity was surging down at the Dacca Race Course, where the Surrender Ceremony was to be held.

"Gen Aurora and Niazi jointly inspected the Guard of Honour. The poor boys of the 2 PARA were encrusted with mud and dirt. They had been on the march for the better part of the last week. They had hardly slept. Yet these dead tired troops put up an excellent display. The Pakistani Military Police contingent was shining by contrast in their smart peacetime uniforms. On their faces however, was the grim imprint of defeat.

"Gen Aurora and Niazi proceeded to the table and sat down. The Surrender document was placed on the table. Niazi glanced curiously at the Instrument of Surrender. Then he fumbled for a pen. Gen Aurora gave him his Sheaffer pen. Niazi signed. Then he got up slowly to his feet. Tears were streaming down his face. There were dark rings under his eyes. He undid his epaulette and took off his lanyard. He had borrowed a pistol from a Pakistani Military Police Soldier. He now handed over his pistol to Gen Aurora. The Pakistani Guards laid down their rifles on the ground.

"Shouts of Joy Bangla reverberated in the sky. Now they began to hear slogans against Gen Niazi and the Pakistan Army. There were hardly any Indian troops at the Race Course. The crowd surged towards Gen Niazi – almost wanting to tear him limb by limb. The Indian officers formed a protective ring around him and escorted him to the Indian jeep. 

"Gen Jacob quickly briefed Gen Sagat Singh regarding disarming the Pakistanis, maintenance of law and order and movement of the prisoners of war (POWs) to India. Then he rushed to the Mi-4 helicopter whose rotors were already whirring. Once on his seat he let out a deep breath in a whistle. 

"By God! It had been one hell of a day!

"The strain had been enormous but he had managed to pull it off. The Surrender Ceremony had been near flawless. The only hitch had been Col Osmani – the Chief of the Mukti Bahini. The helicopter sent for him had came under hostile fire and been considerably damaged. It could not be repaired in time and thus the Chief of the Mukti Bahini was missing from the Surrender Ceremony. This was to rankle for a long time as the surrender was supposed to be to the Joint Command of India and Bangladesh."

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July 03, 2022 - July 03, 2022. 

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19.​ THE CONUNDRUM: CHINESE NON-INTERVENTION 

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"The greatest threat during the Bangladesh War of 1971 was the spectre of Chinese intervention. It was the greatest conundrum of that war. To husband resources for a decisive military campaign in the East, the Indian top brass had to take great risk and denude troops from the Himalayan front against China. That was the only way a force superiority could be generated for the operations against the Pakistani Eastern Command. 

"It was to minimise the risk of the Chinese intervention that Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw had recommended postponement of the offensive from March 1971, as asked for by the political leadership and intelligence agencies, to November-December 1971. It took great political courage to take that highly unpopular decision. The entire Indian public was virtually clamouring for war that year. The people wanted India to hit back hard at Pakistan for its genocide and demographic aggression of pushing in some 10 million hapless Bengali refugees into India.

"Mrs. Gandhi’s administration had very sensibly withheld the information that some 80 percent of these were hapless Hindu refugees who had been singled out for systematic genocide and ethnic cleansing on a massive scale. It was one of the biggest population transfers of the century that exceeded the scale of refugee movement even in the holocaust of Partition in 1947. That time the refugee flows had been caused by hysterical lynch mobs and massive communal riots. This holocaust like pogrom had been done as a planned military operation by the Pakistani Army. The sheer scale of the killings, mass rape and ethnic cleansing was reminiscent of the Nazi holocaust against Jews during World War-II. To prevent communal rioting and arson in the country, the Indian government had very prudently hidden these brutal facts from its own people. Had these become public knowledge, the public pressure to act against Pakistan would have been so intense that no government worth the name could have withstood it.

"The Americans had coincidentally reached out to China in that very year. To cement their new found alliance with China against the Soviets – they had encouraged China to start a border war against India. All sorts of inducements were given. They pointed out to the move of the 7th Fleet into the Bay of Bengal; the Transfer of F-104 Starfighters from Jordan and Turkey to Pakistan and the fact that they were withholding critically needed Radars asked by India for the Himalayan front. They were in fact telling China of India’s radar coverage gaps to induce them to strike. When the Chinese hesitated, in secret meetings with the Chinese Ambassador to the UN, the Americans assured them that should they attack India, the United States would stay out of the fight. Even this failed to convince the Chinese to intervene militarily.

" ... It is noteworthy that in the previous conflict of September 1965, the Chinese had at least issued an ultimatum to dismantle certain structures on the Sikkim Border. Though no kinetic moves were made, China had at least put some psychological pressure. ... "

"• China’s Internal Dynamics: The key determinant of Chinese state behaviour in this conflict lay in the internal dynamics of China – in the great chaos unleashed deliberately by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It was China gone mad. Even more crucial was Marshal Lin Biao’s attempted coup against Mao Zedong – (precisely because of Mao’s outreach to the USA) and was the perhaps the primary reason for China not undertaking any military adventure. This will be covered in detail subsequently.

"• The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace & Friendship: the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace & friendship signed in August 1971 was a great deterrent for any military misadventure by China. The simple fact is that the Soviets had just given a drubbing to the PLA in the border clashes of the Armur-Ussuri River in 1969. In 1971, they had, as per Gen Jacob, massed 40 Soviet Divisions opposite the key and highly vulnerable province of Xinjiang. The Chinese were clear-headed realists. They clearly realised that any attack on India could result in serious, unintended consequences. The Soviet Union was eagerly looking for an opportunity to cut the Chinese down to size. After the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet split, they had cut off all weapons/equipment supplies. Even for the massive arms aid given in Stalin’s time for the Korean War, the Chinese had been made to pay through their nose in hard cash. The two powers simply did not trust one another.

"• Chinese Suspicion about being Pushed into a War: The Chinese have always been very pragmatic and realist. It is possible that their suspicions may have been aroused by the strident US advocacy for pushing China into a war with India. In fact, the American prodding had been most direct and unsubtle. They had said that because of the US Congress, their media and public opinion, they could not wage war against India. Hence they wanted China to do it. This was bound to raise Chinese suspicions that they were being suckered into a war for which they were not ready and in which (because of the Indo-Soviet Treaty), there were very major chances of escalation which could well involve China itself in a two front war. The Sino-American détente was far too recent and untested and it is possible that Chinese hackles were raised by the strident advocacy of the USA that China involve itself in the Indo-Pakistan conflict."

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"The Internal Dimension 

"The most likely reason for China’s non-intervention, however, was the internal dynamics within China. Little inside information had emerged then from behind the bamboo curtain. Because of obsessive Chinese secrecy – the world was not aware that China was almost on the verge of a civil war, Much greater details of the attempted coup by Marshal Lin Biao, (Mao’s number two and anointed successor) have now emerged and serve to give an insight into the reason for the Chinese hesitation for waging war against India in 1971. It is noteworthy that in their initial parleys with Henry Kissinger, the Chinese leaders – both Zhou en Lai and Mao Zedong had expressed hatred and contempt for India. They called it an over-aggressive nation like Japan and felt it had to be curbed. This had spurred Henry Kissinger into his charm offensive to induce China to intervene in the Bangladesh War. However, when push came to shove – the Chinese backed out completely and did nothing. They did not (a la 1965) even issue an ultimatum.

"Here could be the reason why. Marshal Lin Biao was regarded as China’s Rommel. He was one of the greatest Field Commanders to emerge from the Chinese Civil War. Such was his stature – that when Mao wanted him to head the intervention force in Korea, he had declined and Marshal Peng de Huai had led these massive attrition oriented operations. Every one considered Lin Biao as Mao’s heir apparent. His standing in the PLA was formidable. Obviously Lin Biao was getting a wee bit impatient. Mao showed no signs of retiring or even dying a natural death and Lin Biao was himself getting on in years. The great Cultural Revolution had seeded utter chaos in China and set back her consolidation and progress by a decade or more. Mao had created a personality cult that put him above the party, the state- everything. Mao was the great Helmsman and the media was filled with nothing but his hagiographies. I had heard some of the Chinese Foreign Ministries propaganda tapes while deployed in Cho La. They went to amazing lengths of inanity. One tape spoke of a farmer in Helulang (Yunnan province) who had a cow that gave a yield of 6.8 litres per day. The tape claimed that when The Thoughts of Mao Zedong were read out to that same cow – its yield of milk had jumped to 8.3 litres per day.

"Havaldar Balkar Singh, my Education NCO was tasked to record each of the Chinese broadcasts to send them to higher HQ and intelligence for analysis. This poor man almost had a psychological breakdown hearing such asinine nonsense for months on end. I pitied him. The propaganda tapes in highly Sanskritised Hindi had no impact on my Dogra boys who spoke mostly Dogri or Punjabi. However poor Balkar Singh had to record each word and it almost drove him insane.

"This personality cult of Mao and the unending hagiography was also beginning to rile Marshal Lin Biao. He was getting impatient to take charge. He was looking for a cause that would arouse the ire of the Chinese people against Mao. When Mao and Zhou made the outreach to America, Lin Biao had the cause he was looking for. This was a sell out to the imperialist, war-mongers. Mao had lost his judgment and his mind. The great Cultural Revolution was haunting China – but you dare not say it to those crazed youngsters in the streets – who were denouncing their elders as capitalist roaders, stooges of imperialists and plain dunces. Wasn’t Mao now turning into an imperialist stooge himself? Marshal Lin Biao thought he had the perfect provocation now to go hammer and tongs to destroy Mao and his personality cult.

"In February 1971, Lin Biao realised that Mao suspected him of Bonapartist tendencies. In fact after the 9th Chinese Communist Party’s National Congress, where Lin Biao had been critical of Mao over the outreach to the USA, the Party President for life had decided to purge him. In February 1971 Lin and his wife Ye Quin (a Politburo Member) now called a meeting of their closest followers to plan Mao’s assassination. In March that year a second meeting was held at a Shanghai air base of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) commanded by Lin Liguo (a very senior Air Force Officer). At this meeting Lin and his supporters drafted a plan to organise a coup to overthrow Mao. This was codenamed Project 571 and was focused on an armed uprising. In the end of March this group met again to formalise the command structure.

"August 1971: Mao had now received intelligence about this coup. He scheduled a conference for September 1971 to determine the political fate of Lin Biao. 

"15 August 1971: Mao left Beijing to discuss issues with senior political and military leaders in Southern China. Marshal Lin Biao was a highly popular leader and it was not easy to get rid of him just like that. 

"5 September 1971: Lin Biao received reports from his supporters that Mao was planning to purge him on 8 September. Lin now gave his followers the go ahead to actuate the coup plans. Lin’s men made a plan to sabotage the train in which Mao was returning to Beijing. 

"11 September 1971: Mao got wind of this assassination plan and at the very last minute on 11 September he changed the route and foiled this plot. Mao’s loyal bodyguards now foiled several other attempts to assassinate him. On 12 September Mao safely returned to his Zhongnanhai bunker in Beijing.

"Lin Biao was now in complete panic. His plot to assassinate Mao had failed dismally. A vengeful Mao would now hit back. He was fully alerted to their plans. The cabal had been penetrated. Lin Biao now considered fleeing south to his power base in Guangzhou. From there they would establish an alternative Party HQ and attack the forces still loyal to Mao. They would do this with the support of the USSR. Marshal Lin Biao now learnt that Zhou en Lai was investigating the recent incidents. Marshal Lin Biao panicked completely.

"13 September 1971: On the 13th morning Lin Biao and his cohorts decided to flee to the USSR. They boarded a pre-arranged Trident IE, a plane of the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC). The plane was being piloted by Pan jing Yin, the deputy Commander of the PLAAF’s 34th Division. Chinese official records state that the plane did not have adequate fuel to get to Russia. As a result it ran out of fuel over Ander Khan in Mongolia and all people onboard were killed. 

"Counter Assassination: Other sources suggest that this escaping Trident aircraft was shot down over Mongolia by Chinese fighter jets. Surprisingly Hua Guofeng later destroyed all records pertaining to this incident. These included telephone call records, records of meetings, telephone diaries and the alleged confessions of the supporters of Marshal Lin Biao obtained under gruesome torture. There are many grey areas of the official Chinese account. Vis-a-vis South China, USA and Taiwan would have been safer destinations to flee to. However Marshal Lin Biao was using the opening to America to now denounce Mao as a capitalist roader. He could hardly flee there. Lin Biao definitely seemed to be in close touch with the Soviet KGB and GRU, etc. It is this factor that possibly made the Chinese agonise over commencing hostilities against India. The Soviets had signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India in August 1971 – precisely when this unfolding of the coup drama in China was now entering a critical phase. The American prodding got them suspicious and cagey – were they being set up for a Soviet attack? The Russians had now amassed 40 Divisions opposite Xinjiang. The Chinese were not at all sure about the extent of the subversion of the PLA. Prisoners were still being tortured to get to the roots of this plot. Mao was not at all keen that this news should filter out of China. It was hardly the time to risk a major two front war with India in the south and the USSR in the west.

"Were the Americans playing games? Were they trying to instigate a military clash between China and the Soviet Union? Mao decided to hedge his bets. The best strategy was to do nothing but wait and watch. That is precisely what the Chinese Army did in 1971. They let down their most trusted friend and ally – Pakistan. It was supposed to be a friendship higher than the mountains and deeper than the seas. And so, at Cho La, Nathu La, Jelep La and all the other Himalayan Passes on the watershed, we kept waiting tensely for a Chinese attack that never came. We saw no troop movements and all that we heard were Chinese propaganda tapes telling us how reading the thoughts of Mao Zedong to a cow could dramatically increase its yield of milk from 6.8 to 8.3 litres per day."

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July 03, 2022 - July 03, 2022. 

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20. ​THE JUST WAR PARADIGM: RETURN TO AN INDIAN WAY OF WAR FIGHTING 

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"The Chinese philosopher on war and strategist Sun Tzu (Sun Zi) is world renowned. His pithy aphorisms are quoted not just by military leaders all over the world, but also by business leaders in the corporate sector. It is only now that the world is becoming aware of an Indian strategic genius called Chanakya (or Kautilya). Each nation has its own unique way of war fighting that is an expression of its innate genius, culture, historical experience and geography. Just as each culture has its own unique styles of art, its dance forms and its architecture – so does each nation state have its own, unique and distinctive form of war fighting – its own Art of War for that matter."

"A number of western military writers like Stephen Peter Rosen have opined that India lacks a Strategic Culture. He says in his book Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies. There is no primordial strategic culture in this country. In fact, George Tanham in his book India’s Strategic Culture felt that ancient India lacked a culture of strategic military thought and analysis. There was, he said, no coherent military tradition that had come down from the ancient past."

That's utter nonsense. This culture not only in existence but is well known to any Indian familiar with the epics, even if only due to teleserials What's more, it's also the reason of a millennium of struggle against barbaric invading colonizers who weren't as civilized. 

"In recent times this view of a total absence of a strategic culture in India has been challenged. The primary issue is that our political elite who won independence for our country, traditionally focused on the soft power of Ahimsa and non-violence and Satyagraha and soul force. In many ways it was like mobilising the general population in the form of Pink or Orange Revolutions that overthrow tyrannical regimes by using mass civil disobedience and psychological pressure – mostly through the media. Today flash mobs are created by texting on mobile phones and messaging on the internet."

Gandhi’s policy was a matter of political tool under circumstances, subsequently misused as spiritual and absolute diktat regardless of circumstances. Obviously it's of no use when facing a predatory beast, and even Gandhi did  write to say he admired bold muslims over the Hindus who were massacred by them, calling the latter cowardly. That he was viciously denouncing in the reverse case was a matter of a self image gone too far at cost of others who followed him. 

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"In those days, Mahatma Gandhi realised the lack of unity of the Indian people and their unpreparedness to wage an Armed Struggle. Post the last revolt in 1857 – the British had exploited every faultline in Indian society to divide and splinter the people along the fissures of caste, creed, language, ethnicity and above all religion. They had succeeded brilliantly and virtually destroyed the Idea of India. ... "

In fact the campaign by British to that effect, while it took root and flourished as a poisonous ivy will, was fraudulent, pretending that virtue was opposite of everything Indian, that good societies have no division of caste or creed. 

Facts are as opposite of this as is truth. 

" ... Gandhi and the Congress started a civil disobedience movement – a boycott of foreign goods and non-violent, non-cooperation to pressurise the British to Quit India. The British were very keen to prevent a resurgence of a violent armed revolution like 1857 and they tacitly encouraged Mahatma Gandhi to keep the freedom struggle peaceful. They felt they could contain this non-violent protest for decades if required and it was perhaps a good safety valve to release pent up emotions.

"The fact is India has always had a vibrant military tradition. It was only India’s disunity that had opened her to 10 centuries of defeat, loot and humiliation. By the 16th century, however, a process of an indigenous Indian military renaissance had started. The British success in India was premised on Nativisation. They recruited in India (manpower was dirt cheap), trained these armies on European lines and used that very Indian Army to conquer and subjugate the people."

General Bakshi is refraining from mentioning specifics. 

"The only Indian leader who could challenge Mahatma Gandhi’s moral authority in the Congress was Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose. He correctly identified that the centre of gravity of the British rule in India was the loyalty of its Armed Forces to the British. If that could be broken the British could not stay. India was a huge military manpower pool for the British. In the First World War India had fielded an Army of 1.3 million men and in the Second, a record all volunteer Army of 2.5 million men (without conscription). How could this come about without an extant military tradition of soldiering, courage and fidelity to one’s own salt? It was this militarised segment that Bose focused on. He escaped first to Germany and then Japan and raised the Indische Legion (A Brigade sized force from Indian Prisoners of War (POWs) from Germany) and then the, Indian National Army (INA) mainly from the POWs with the Japanese and local recruitment from the Indian diaspora in South-East Asia. With this three division sized force, Bose joined the Japanese invasion of India in 1944. Had this invasion come in 1943, it would have easily succeeded. By 1944, it was too little, too late and the tide of war had turned. The INA was defeated but yet it won the war for India’s freedom."

As admitted, openly and publicly, by the then PM of Britain, Clement Atlee, when subsequently on a visit to India. 

"Gandhi’s Quit India Movement of 1942 had literally failed. It had been easily crushed by the British. Post the Second World War the British, in a very foolish gesture of triumphalism, had put three INA officers on trial in the Red Fort. They had kept the INA a closely guarded secret during the war. Now they gave it very wide publicity to malign it. It backfired badly. Violent protests broke out all over India. The INA inspired uprising shook them. In February 1946, there were mutinies in the Royal Indian Navy, Royal Indian Air Force and then in some units of the British Indian Army. 2.5 million Indians in arms were being demobilised. What if they rose in massive revolt? How could less than 40,000 British soldiers then in India have stopped them? The British panicked and left in a tearing hurry the next year in August 1947."

And that's obviously the truth, unlike the rosy spun sugar candyfloss fed by congress governments for decades post independence. "

General Bakshi sums up here the facts and conclusions he published in his work on Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose. 

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"The Cult of Pacifism 

"However they ensured that power was handed over to the anglophile Nehruvian dispensation. Nehru agreed to a British Governor General (Pakistan did not) and retained British Chiefs for the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Indian Intelligence Bureau kept reporting to MI-5 in London about Bose and his INA.

"The INA men were not taken back in the Indian Army and were treated as traitors by Independent India. Nehru had to exorcise the Ghost of Bose and his militaristic INA persona. To gain legitimacy he crafted a narrative of soft power and pacifism which said that India had achieved her independence only and only through Ahimsa and non-violence. To buttress that claim he now began to lay inordinate amounts of emphasis on the Buddhist legacy of peace and non-violence. In fact he even shocked the First British Army Chief of Independent India by bluntly stating that India was a peaceful and non-violent country and did not need an Army. It only needed the Police. Mercifully the realist, Sardar Patel-Nehru’s Deputy, saved the armed forces from disbandment and utilised them effectively. Post Patel’s death however, Nehru had his way. He starved the armed forces of funding and prestige and completely marginalised them from all higher level decision making. This had led to the uncalled for disaster of 1962.

"Most western military historians tend to focus very hard on the last 200 years of Indian history to claim that India simply did not have a tradition of war fighting and no strategic culture. India’s history however did not start with the advent of the British. The Indian civilisation goes back unbroken to over 5,000 years (in fact 7,000 years as per carbon dating). ... "

Much longer, going by astronomical and geological observations in the epics. 

" ... Indian history is full of the accounts of major wars and eulogises bravery and sacrifice in battle. The Cult of Pacifism belongs to one isolated period of the rein of Emperor Ashoka. That too had contributed to India’s decline in military power then. Post independence India had its second enforced Cult of Pacifism. Like Japan this Cult of Pacifism neutered India’s power potential. 1962 awoke us to reality and led to the onset of a realist mindset in India’s civilian elite. It led to a reconstruction and expansion of India’s Armed Forces. The decade from 1961 to 1971 saw three wars in quick succession that thoroughly blooded the Indian Armed Forces and gave their senior leadership hands on combat experience. India had fielded enormous forces in the First and Second World Wars but only at the soldier and the Junior Officer level (platoon, company and battalion mostly). Now India’s Military Power began to bloom. Its military leadership had come to age.

"The 1971 War of Bangladesh marked the zenith of India’s revived Military Power and Glory. India had created a new nation state with the force of arms. It had marched on an enemy capital, enforced regime change and brought about a large scale surrender of troops by a brilliant war of manoeuvre. It was a Blitzkrieg in the very difficult riverine terrain of Bangladesh. In13 days flat our forces had raced for Dacca – the capital and created a new nation state with the force of arms. After a thousand years of defeat and humiliation, the Indian Armed Forces had at last come into their own once again."

Again, he's not counting Maratha empire and Sikhs, a mistake. 

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"Reassertion of an Ancient Strategic Culture 

"Very curiously and unconsciously, India’s ancient strategic culture had reasserted itself in the way it fought the Bangladesh War. The strategy emerged as a pattern in a stream of decisions. The ancient Kautilyan Paradigm of war fighting had reasserted itself unconsciously in a way that was remarkable. 

"India is a civilisational entity. Political Unity has been rare. Only three empires have united India in the past for periods of 200-300 years each. These were:-

"• The Mauryan Empire 

"• The Mughal Empire 

"• The British Empire"

Again, he's not counting Maratha empire, and forgetting another that spread through a large swath, that of Lalitaditya Muktapida. 

"The present Republic is a successor entity of the British Empire and the peaceful transfer of power enabled it to inherit intact the institutions of state power crystallised in the colonial era. 

"Indian Strategic Culture however can be traced back to the Imperial Mauryan Army which first unified India in the wake of Alexander – the Greek’s most brutal invasion. For the first time invading (non-local armies) had targeted and slaughtered the civilian population. This had never been touched in the local wars. It was the collision with the Greek non-self that crystallised India’s nascent sense of self. Chanakya (kautilya) recruited the Mauryan Army from the Indus Valley tract along which the Greek Armies had gone looting, burning and raping. With this Mauryan Army he unified the whole of India in just 25 years. India is a sub-continent – the size of Europe and this must rank as a terrific feat of arms.

"Kautilya had a genius for strategy. He crystallised an Indian form of war fighting that had the following salient characteristics:-

"Information Dominance and Psychological Operations: Kautilya was a master of intelligence. He relied on a vast army of spies for humint. In fact the spies were so many that the Greek Ambassador Megasthenes felt that they constituted a separate caste. Kautilya divided the enemy state into 6 key components and carried out a thorough net assessment of each component. This included:-

"• The King: his personality, traits, character, will power and intelligence, vulnerability/weaknesses. 

"• The Ministers: Their calibre, their relations with the king and inter se rivalries and equations with one another. 

"• The Army: size, structure, morale, quality of leadership. 

"• The Forts: Key strong points in the kingdom, their strengths and weaknesses. 

"• The Treasury: The economic power of the state and its natural resources. 

"• Allies: The allies it could call to its aid in times of war; their capabilities.

"Covert Warfare – Destablisation: No conventional or kinetic operations were launched in the Mauryan era without an extended period of destablisation and covert warfare. The balance of a state must be broken or destabilised before it is attacked. This destabilisation included:- 

"• Assassinations: of key commanders or command and control targets like ministers, etc. 

"• Suspicion Virus: The coherence of the state apparatus was destroyed by inducing mutual suspicion (planted letters to the enemy by key ministers, etc.), exploiting inter-personal personality clashes and dissonance. 

"• Subversion/Compromise: Compromise of key personnel by honey traps etc. or subvert loyalties by financial/other inducements. 

"• Strive to Demoralise Armed Forces: Usually by instigating covert war (Kuta Yuddha) at his rear. Encouraging border people or disaffected citizens to rebel. An extended period of destabilisation was the most essential pre-requisite to any major invasion in the Mauryan era.

"The Main Assault 

"• Mobility: Before Kautilya, Indian Armies had a fourfold organisation of Chariots, Elephants, Cavalry and Infantry. Chariots used to be the Prize Arm. In the war against the Greeks, Kautilya found the chariots were unfit for mobile operations of the type that the Greeks undertook. Till then the Indian penchant was on set piece battles of attrition in vast open battle plains – more or less in a tournament format.

"• Shock Action: Kautilya relegated chariots to ceremonial purposes. He increased the strength of war elephants from 3,000 to 9,000 and made it the primary shock arm. Elephants had excellent mobility over all terrains and when used in the mass they could induce shock and awe.

"• Manoeuvre Warfare: The aim was to prepare slowly, break the enemy’s geo-political and military balance by an extended covert warfare campaign and then strike fast – advance rapidly using elephants in the mass to paralyse the enemy. The enemy state was treated as an information system whose key nodes had to be neutralised or soft killed prior to launching the main kinetic operations. Suspicion and mistrust had to be sown into his information architecture. Speed and shock action was then used to paralyse the opposing king and his commanders. This implied slow preparation – rapid execution. 

"Thus, it was that in just 25 years, Kautilya unified the whole of South Asia from Afghanistan-Baluchistan to Assam and down to Karnataka into one tightly knit state – where the state controlled all economic activity and generated a huge surplus to raise massive armies. The Mauryan Army was 6,50,000 strong as per the testimony of Megasthenes. Kautilya had unified a civilisational state into a strong, centralised political entity that could defend its civilisational borders and its people. Kautilya had monetised the Indian economy on the silver standard. He had ended the period of warring states in India where 16 Mahajanapadas (major states) were constantly at war with one another for many centuries. This was analogous to the period of warring states in China – which had produced Sun Tzu classic The Art of War.

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"The 1971 Renaissance

"If we study how events and outcomes unfolded in the 1971 War, we will notice a curious, unintended revival of the Kautilyan Paradigm in the 1971 War in Bangladesh.

"• Long preparation: The political authority wanted to attack in March 1971. The military insisted on eight months of preparation time. 

"• Covert Warfare: The Mukti Bahini thoroughly destabilised East Pakistan. For eight months it harried and tired out the Pakistani Army in the east. 

"• Mobility and shock action: Like war elephants, air power was used for mobility and shock action. Air power massed effects and compensated for shortage of troops. It helped to overcome terrain friction by providing helicopters for air bridges and transport aircrafts for para drops. Above all fighter bombers compensated for a paucity of wheeled artillery. Like massed elephants – Air power induced shock and awe.

"• Information Dominance: signal Intelligence resources were focused in the East to gain accurate and reliable intelligence of the enemy dispositions and plans. The Mukti Bahini’s strength was raised to a 100,000 and they provided invaluable humint about the enemy, terrain and local resources.

"• Media and Psychological Operations: Media was used in a very skilful way to act as a local, force multiplier and shape the local, regional and even the global information environment. The atrocities of the Pakistan Army in the east were highlighted to the world at large – the genocide and ethnic cleansing aspects were driven home to all nations. Fear and Guilt were induced in the Pakistani High command and down to the rank and file. Radio broadcasts to surrender and assurances of humane treatment as per Geneva Convention finally induced the Pakistani Army to Surrender.

"• Pinpoint Attacks on Key Command & Control Nodes: The Governor’s Conference of all key decision makers in the east, was specifically targeted by a pinpoint air strike that collapsed their morale and will to fight and induced them to lay down its arms.

"• The Primary Target was not the troops fielded by Pakistan but the minds of the enemy commanders. These were paralysed by speed and manoeuvre and the shock action of air power."

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"The Just War Syndrome 

Above all the Bangladesh War conformed to the ancient Indian concepts of Nyaya Yuddha (Just War) or Dharma Yuddha (Ethical War). War to be just, has to be the last resort option. It must be just not merely in its causes and origins but also in the way it is conducted. It should seek to paralyse the minds of the opposing commanders and not merely seek a slaughter of his men. Such a campaign results in fewer casualties/fatalities, but generates a large number of Prisoners who have lost the will to fight. It attacks the mind of the opposing commander and erodes the will to fight.

"Reassertion of the Kautilyan Paradigm 

"Thus we see that rather unconsciously, events so shaped themselves that the Indians were able to revive the Indian Art of War-fighting in the Kautilyan tradition of extended preparation, covert destabilisation and rapid execution, using speed and shock action to benumb the enemy. The key domain of war is the psychological or mind dimension. Defeat or victory is ultimately a state of the mind. It is the higher commander’s business to induce a collapse of morale and complete paralysis of the will to fight. This is achieved by mobility of mind, manoeuvre and shock action. Whenever Indian armies have fallen back to attrition mindset and set piece battles for the sake of fighting – they have suffered. Whenever they have adopted the manoeuvre mindset they have done very well. Kautilya’s paradigm epitomised this mobility model of speed, surprise and shock action. Its liet motif was extensive and slow preparations – rapid execution. With Bangladesh, Indian Military History has come a full circle to actualise once again the Kautilyan paradigm of war. It is Indian in essence and outlook and suits our genius. It must become the Indian Way of War. Bangladesh therefore was not a one off. It represented the essence of the Indian Art of War – its revival and renaissance after almost 2,000 years.

"With Bangladesh, India had arrived as a Great Power and reached the acme of her skill in war fighting. The Indian Armed Forces had come of age and had displayed the skill and competence to conduct a well coordinated Tri-Service operation of great complexity. The Bangladesh Blitzkrieg was brilliant in conception and execution. India had to pay a price of course. We lost 105 officers, 159 JCOs and 3,468 men killed in action in the Eastern theatre alone. The Mukti Bahini of Bangladesh had made a stellar contribution to this war and played a heroic role in the liberation of their country."

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" ... The bravery and courage of the Indian soldiers had been amply seen in both the World Wars. British Commanders preferred to have Indian troops rather than British units. The Indian troops had tremendous resilience in the face of combat stress and adversity. Bangladesh amply displayed the skills and competence of Indian Commanders in the Higher Direction of War. It was a brilliant campaign by global standards and Fd Mshl Sam Manekshaw, Lt Gen JFR Jacob and Lt Gen Sagat Singh deserve to be counted amongst the Great Commanders of the World’s Military History. So do the Indian Navy Chief, the aggressive Chief, Admiral Nanda and the highly competent Air Mshl P C Lal qualify as great commanders of the worlds history. The nation owes its immense gratitude to the over 3,800 officers, JCOs and men who laid down their lives so that Bangladesh should be free. The world must equally recognise the tremendous grit and sacrifices made by the fighters (the Jodhas) of the Mukti Bahini."

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July 03, 2022 - July 04, 2022. 

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Author’s Profile

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"Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi, SM, VSM (Retd) is a well known strategic analyst and TV commentator on Security Issues. He is one of India’s most combat experienced officers and a prolific writer with over 35 books and 200 papers to his credit. 

"He led Counter Terrorist Operations (CT Ops) in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). He led his unit in major skirmishes in Kargil and later spearheaded CT ops in the rugged terrain of Kishtwar and subsequently in the sensitive districts of Rajouri and Poonch. He served extensively on India’s borders with China, and later led a National Defence College (NDC) delegation to China for a comprehensive interaction with China’s National Defence University (NDU), and visits to Chinese units and establishments of all three services. 

"He has had two tenures in India’s prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations (DGMO), in key appointments that provided him a unique overview of India’s threat assesment. He has also taught at the Indian Military Academy (IMA), the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) and the prestigious National Defence College (NDC) at New Delhi, where he completed his PhD on Limited Wars in South Asia. Currently he is the Editor of the Indian Military Review. In 2018, the Government of Madhya Pradesh honoured him with the Chandra Shekhar Rashtriya Samman Award."

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July 04, 2022 - July 04, 2022. 

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71 Dash to Dhaka 

by GD Bakshi  

(Author)  

Copyright © 2020 GD Bakshi

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June 30, 2022 - July 04, 2022.

Purchased June 24, 2022. 

Kindle Edition

Format: Kindle Edition

Publisher: ‎KW Publishers (29 June 2020)

Language: ‎English

ASIN:- B08C3VQLXZ

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Published in India by Kalpana Shukla 

KW Publishers Pvt Ltd 

4676/21, First Floor, 

Ansari Road Daryaganj, 

New Delhi 110002 

Phone:​+91 11 23263498/43528107

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https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/4816656768

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