From Kargil to the Coup: Events that shook Pakistan, by Nasim Zehra.

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From Kargil to the Coup: 

Events that shook Pakistan 

by Nasim Zehra. 

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Mostly verbose pentagonese attempted veiling of facts of paki history of military dictatorships, coups and fraudulent pretense of a democracy or any civilian government. 

As one arrives at chapters that one may have thought would reward one for wading through the propaganda, lies, and inaccuracies of author's paki narrative, one finds it hard to escape a sense of having been cheated, and being not surprised at that, either! 

For, the book seems to promise the story behind - and Other than plethora of names - and who did what -, there really isn't anything worth reading or buying the book for, after all. Facts have all been known if any worthy of notice, and perhaps an entertaining detail might be about a dinner on eve of the coup even as it was unfolding. Is that tidbit worth wading through the toxic rest? - Well, no! 

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"According to Napoleon, ‘Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.’"

Did India know of the paki incursion in November, when it happened, and waited to hit them in June, at leisure?

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"Could the international community have forced India to buckle under Kargil pressure?

"There were neither individual nor collective compulsions for key members of the international community to have even advised Delhi to enter into negotiations on any outstanding bilateral dispute. The question of any member, including Pakistan’s strategic ally China, to have even advised, leave aside forced, India to buckle under the pressure from Operation KP and enter into negotiations over Siachen etc. with Pakistan, did not arise. In fact, any move likely to culminate in a military confrontation between Pakistan and India, the two hostile neighbors who had recently acquired nuclear weapons, would make the international community panic. And Pakistan had made the move—which was also being interpreted as nuclear blackmail by Pakistan. ... There was complete consensus within the key members of the international community, including the US, EU states, the UN, and also Pakistan’s closest strategic ally, China, that Pakistan should not be rewarded for Operation Kargil. ... "

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"Did Pakistan plan to deploy nuclear weapons in an all-out war?

"There were neither individual nor collective compulsions for key members of the international community to have even advised Delhi to enter into negotiations on any outstanding bilateral dispute. The question of any member, including Pakistan’s strategic ally China, to have even advised, leave aside forced, India to buckle under the pressure from Operation KP and enter into negotiations over Siachen etc. with Pakistan, did not arise. In fact, any move likely to culminate in a military confrontation between Pakistan and India, the two hostile neighbors who had recently acquired nuclear weapons, would make the international community panic. ... "

Later, the then paki army chief made similar assertions after his coup, but he wasn't doing so without thought, and it was clear blackmail. 

" ... but was not backed by substantive evidence. ... "

When someone wielding a gun pointing at you is threatening to shoot to kill, and showing no sign of civilised conduct, it's a rare one who'd ask a prophet if the threat was intended to be carried out - or ask the gun wielding thug for proof of intentions by demonstration of performance. 

" ... Pakistan military’s high command had sabotaged the Lahore Summit and should not be rewarded. Pakistan had to be made to retreat unconditionally. ... "

" ... As a key member of the clique later recalled, they conveyed to the country’s elected leadership, ‘We are holding this. Now you take advantage, whatever you can, at military and political level.’[1156] However, the unfolding Kargil crisis proved the clique’s nuclear deterrence calculation flawed on two counts: Operation KP did turn into a military conflict and, while Washington and other Security Council members did exercise forceful diplomacy, it was to force Pakistan to retreat from Kargil, not to reward Pakistan’s operation. The spin-off of this clique’s brinkmanship (read nuclear blackmail) was immensely negative. It undid the diplomatic gains accrued to Pakistan for its mature diplomatic and political moves after the nuclear tests."

"Three factors point to deliberate manipulation. First, Pakistan was not in such a desperate military situation that it would have needed to opt for nuclear weapons. Secondly, and most importantly, Pakistan did not then have the capability to the deploy nuclear weapons[1158], nor had the Indians picked any intelligence on Pakistan readying nuclear weapons. Thirdly, the Americans deliberately chose an attitude of benign neglect and ignored Indian moves to ready its nuclear missiles for use.[1159] ... "

When a thug breaks in at midnight wielding a gun pointed at you, a policeman with any sense is likely to not ask if the gun is likely to fire or has a bullet, and what's more, would excuse the threatened victims of break-in - for arming and retaliation. 

Especially so in US.

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"Was there a pro-India tilt in Washington during Kargil?

"With the Kargil blunder, Pakistan provided the Clinton Administration a priceless opportunity to invest in strategic trust-building with India. Throughout the crisis, Washington’s key policy men opened multiple lines of communication with their Indian counterparts. It began with the 27 May call by Inderfurth, who called the India ambassador, Naresh Chandra, to inform him about what Pickering had told the Pakistanis. Subsequently, on 16 June, Inderfurth met with Brajesh Mishra in Cologne. After the 23 June Islamabad meetings between US CENTCOM Chief General Zinni and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and army chief General Musharraf, State Department official Lanpher went to brief Delhi on the Islamabad meetings. Similarly, during the crucial Sharif-Clinton summit on 4 July, in a manner unprecedented in summit diplomacy, Clinton would call Vajpayee to brief him of the summit talks. Similarly, the Indian NSA and External Affairs Minister were also updated on Sharif-Clinton talks by their counterparts, NSA Sandy Berger and Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. The sole purpose was to share with the Indians every aspect of their communications with Pakistan."

It's unclear if the above is realistic evaluation or a skewed perception. 

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"Was the Prime Minister’s Washington dash necessary? 

"As the country’s chief executive, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could have ordered withdrawal of Pakistani troops, bringing an end to Operation KP. In keeping with Islamabad’s public position that the Kashmiri Mujahideen and not the Pakistani troops had seized the heights, Sharif could have announced that Islamabad would use its goodwill to urge the Kashmiri Mujahideen to return from IOK. This would have been consistent with the farcical ‘Mujahideen’ position Pakistan had illogically and clumsily maintained since the beginning of Operation KP. The international community would have been relieved that the battle between two nuclear powers had drawn to a close. The prime minister, however, chose to engage the Clinton Administration because he had hoped that Washington would make a public statement of support for the Kashmiris and of facilitating a political resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Sharif and his close political aides also believed that American involvement at this withdrawal stage would make it more palatable for the army high command since the army chief had himself had sought Washington’s engagement. However, as subsequent developments showed, neither did the Clinton administration make any public statements supporting the Kashmir struggle, nor did the Sharif-Clinton 4 July encounter influence the post-Kargil tensions that surfaced between the elected prime minister and the army chief."

Here, and throughout the book on this point, author tries subterfuge to veil a lie. She claims that the Washington trip was for Kashmir. 

It wasn't. 

Plain truth is that, despite the lies to the contrary position proclaimed repeatedly by author, in reality pakis were being not only pounded relentlessly by India but couldn't take it, and the paki dash to Washington was the bully going crying to the police asking him to stop his intended victim bashing him up, something the bully hadn't expected - and this failed, since everyone in the international community was aware, via satellite footage, of who had invaded. 

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"Could the Prime Minister have Ordered an Inquiry Against The Kargil Planners, Especially the Army Chief?

"Immediately after 4 July, tensions began developing between Sharif and Musharraf, with each worried about his survival. Investigating the why, who, and how of Operation KP, to establish responsibility and to take action against those who had launched an operation that had ended in such a fiasco, was, however, far removed from the prime minister’s mind. Civil-military coordination remained generally smooth almost throughout the Kargil period. Some briefings for the PM were held at the 10 Corps Headquarters. Most, however, were held in the PM House, where the army brass would bring its maps, etc. Often, meetings would almost take the form of the DCC but hardly any decision-making took place in these. The prime minister had, in fact, left the decision-making process during Kargil in military hands. Although Sharif had the constitutional authority to directly lead decision-making, he did not ‘interfere’[1160] and had simply supported the army.

"The thought of holding an inquiry against Musharraf is unlikely to have occurred to a PM who had supported Operation KP. It is true that the PM was first briefed of the Operation only after it was a done deed. The PM had also declined Musharraf’s rhetorical mid-stream offer to withdraw his troops from Kargil. In fact, there was written evidence of the Parliament’s bipartisan Defense Committee’s positive support for Operation Kargil in a letter written by the Committee chairman in praise of the army chief’s presentation."

And, unlike the army chief with his openly thug mindset, Nawaz Sharif remained honest enough and decent enough to not turn immediately on someone when it was a fiasco, despite his own self having neither been aware nor initiated it, and never in control, of the assault, until he was required as the figurehead to get help from US to get India to stop! 

"In the overall asymmetric civil-military relations in Pakistan’s power structure, there have been only two incidences when elected prime ministers sought to hold army commanders to account. One was when, after the 1971 surrender at Dhaka and the breakup of Pakistan, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto formed the Hamoodur Rehman Commission to conduct an inquiry into the military debacle. His army chief, Zia ul-Haq overthrew him in a military coup and hanged him following legally dubious court proceedings. The second was in 1988, when Prime Minister Junejo ordered an inquiry into the deadly Ojri Camp ammunition disaster. No sooner had he announced the inquiry, the military President Zia ul-Haq sacked him."

And the post Kargil coup wasn't different, either. 

"In the absence of a political culture of holding the military accountable, the reactions of military men when held accountable, the complexities of the initiation and, indeed, of the termination of Operation KP, the fiercely anti-Nawaz mood of the political opposition, and the dominant claim of the time that Kashmiri Mujahideen had fought the Indians across the LOC while Pakistani troops fought mostly along the LOC: all these militated against Sharif conducting a Kargil inquiry. ... "

Again author is verbose in attempting to veil facts - namely, that pakis never have had a properly functioning government of any sort other than a military dictatorship, never any culture or education system other than one rooted in invader and looters mindset carrying heritage of history of hordes from Central and West Asia invading, looting and destroying India- which included until 1947 the very land pakis were given, torn out of India - and no other aim set for their very nation other than destruction of India, as a result of this choice of the heritage. 

The so-called nation, in reality is no more than a jihadist factory grown around a  military base, for West for freedom of expensive usage against Russia, conceived in this mindset of invading and looting, and aim of destruction of India now grown to destruction of the world, and born of deliberately perpetrated massacres of thousands of Hindus in 1946-47 that were intended to, and succeeded in, forcing India to let a piece be torn out. 

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"Beyond fear, the contradictions of the Operation, Kargil produced serious frictions even in the post-Kargil phase. For example, while maintain its insistence that Mujahideen had been fighting in Kargil, how could the army receive the bodies of the martyred soldiers? Similarly, while insisting that only Mujahideen fought in Kargil, how could major programmes honouring the martyrs of Kargil be organized by the Sharif government? ... The army sought widely publicized honouring of the Kargil martyrs and of those having returned alive from across the LOC."

"Throughout history, the acid test of generals at war or in military operations has been the victories they have piled up. No general is more successful than the outcome of the war he leads. In more complex situations, like those in South Asia in the second half of the twentieth century, the yardstick for assessment has to be what have the wars have achieved. History has examples of individual brilliance leading armies to victories and steering nations away from disaster. Outstanding military commanders, such as Alexander, Khalid bin Walid, Genghis Khan, Julius Caesar, Salahuddin Ayyubi, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Vo Nguyen Giap, were men who wrested victory from situations where deep imprints of defeat were written. Bin Walid became the legendary general who, despite the numerical superiority of battle-hardened adversaries like the Romans and the Sassanids, piled up victories for the Rashiddun Caliphate. Napoleon ‘inspired a ragged, mutinous, half-starved army and made it fight’[1161] like a winning combination that few would fight before or after. Salahuddin, with his less experienced army, reversed the Crusaders’ winning streak with his grand victory in the decisive Battle of Hattin in 1187. Julius Caesar, personally brave in battle, was creative in tactics and engineering. There was Alexander, another general facing most armies who outnumbered his own, but always remaining undefeated. Genghis Khan, a masterful general who, through excellent military intelligence and tactics and by uniting nomadic tribes and confederation and his strategic raids, became the founder of the Mongol Empire, the largest contiguous empire in history, which included most of Eurasia and substantial parts of Eastern Europe. In more recent times, the Viet Minh Commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap, who led his men to defeat a technologically superior adversary by perfecting and applying a unique war technique, which was the most important dimension of the Vietcong’s overall political, economic, and diplomatic strategy for defeating the Americans.

"In the Kargil operation, the performance of the clique of commanders, the quality of their strategic planning, and of their command, all tell a different story. Yet the power equation, absence of any accountability, the absence of censure when it mattered, and bravado minus logic or sound analysis, have ruled the day. Despite repeated blunders, the commanders in charge escaped accountability."

What author is either unable to perceive, or unable to say, is that the paki military is a bully who, thrashed outside, comes home to beat up his wife and children, old parents and helpless siblings. 

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" ... Major General Akbar Khan, the lead military man in Pakistan's first attempt to regain Kashmir, had readily accepted Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's label of ‘raiders’ for the Pakistani forces involved in the 1947–48 ‘Acquire Kashmir’ Operation. ... "

Kashmir had been free until invaded by pakis, and it wasn't Nehru but Jinnah who pretended thst it was tribals, not his military. 

" ... The former general, eulogising the Pakistani ‘raiders’, suggested, ‘We may perhaps also qualify for sitting in that distinguished gallery of personalities like Genghis Khan, Timur Lang, Mahmud of Ghazni, and even Alexander.’ Interestingly, Pakistan's senior-most general equated his own men with history’s prized military leaders, who had raided, ravaged, and even reigned over foreign lands in the pre-Westphalian world. ... "

No, he was far more specific, in his dream and desire to belong to the club that was all comprised of invaders each from elsewhere and attacked India, invaded and looted India, sought to destroy India. 

He included none of the tall figures that were from or of India, despite his own homeland having been a part of India for ever until then less than a year ago, and his own ancestral origins being in India, 

And that's the divide, of India- and those that seek to destroy India. 

" ... This voluntary characterization of a state's army as ‘raiders’, in the context especially of the Kashmir operation, flowed from the juxtaposition in this Pakistani soldier's mind, of the Pakistan Army as a force for right, dedicated to undoing the wrong committed at the time of Pakistan's creation. ... "

That's convoluted fraud seeking to justify invasions, massacres and loot, with fraudulent claims of rights. 

British had in fact given far too much land to pakis in the first place, when plebiscite would have denied them all but East Bengal, which alone had voted for partition. Sindh was evenly divided in vote. Punjab had voted for unionists and NWFP was determined to stay with India - as was Baluchistan. Brits rode roughshod over all of the provinces in handing over the land pakis got, because it was military base needed for use of West against Russia. 

What those raiders were identifying with was, has always been, identity of invaders, looters, destroyers and killers wreaking havoc against India. This isn't due to perceived rights but simply a mindset of a robber. 

And they certainly had no 'right' to Kashmir, which, until pakis attacked, was independent. 

Author does lie on level after level, not very differently from a rotten onion. 

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" ... India's  systematic role in being a mid-wife to the 1971 breakup of Pakistan ... "

Because East Bengal hadn't been subjected to racist discrimination and linguistic chauvinism of denying freedom of language, not to mention massacre of three million and mass gang rapes of half a million, by paki military? 

Or was it because India prevented pakis from massacring further millions? 

No, author simply lies through the rest of the paragraph along the lines. 

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"The period from Kargil to the Coup epitomizes the inherent and continuing problems that Pakistan faces in three specific areas. These include two policy areas Pakistan-US relations, relations with India including Kashmir. There is also the third structural issue of thorny civil-military relations. While on the two policy areas of India and Kashmir, there are external players that influence the nature of the challenges that Pakistan faces, Pakistan too as an interlocutor contributes to the dynamic of the relationship. Meanwhile the structural problem of civil-military relations, rooted in the process of State formation, and the unequal stature and authority of the political and the garrison entities, evolved into asymmetrical strengths of both. Within the ensuing power chemistry of Pakistan, the army acquired a dominant role, paving the way to military coups."

"The asymmetry of authority in the army’s favor has continued because of the inability of most elected governments, except for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, to bolster its Constitutional authority through institutional decision-making. ... "

Here author mentions a civilian government's head who was legally executed by a military dictator post coup, as an exception to paki history of "authority in the army’s favor"! 

What could be a better example of the fraudulent writing by the author?!

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One has to wonder if the main reason for writing this was a strenuous denial of India's victory at Kargil despite horrendous difficulties, of not only terrain and height but fighting uphill where not only shelling but boulders rolled down by enemy killed soldiers. 

Authors chief contention throughout the book, after ridicule heaped on India- in most abusive and obnoxious language - for trusting and not watching pakis through winter so they vould occupy peaks that belonged to India, is that pakis were pressured by US, treating pak not on par with India, to withdraw, because US was desperate to please India! 

How ridiculous can they get! 

Whether deliberately or otherwise, the book is at least half lies, mostly in statements by pakis and on behalf thereof or favouring them. One must be immune to the poisonous effect of the lies and abusive writing to be able to get through, or else have other means of resuscitation. 

And one is strongly tempted, in face of the authors crowing about Kargil, about her showering abuses on India et al, to merely quietly but audibly say- "Balakot". 

But then, Kargil was more than enough, despite the efforts by author to lie about that. Balakot and prior surgical strikes were cherry on top. Good, but the cake was Kargil. 

Increasingly author takes more to lying. It's hard avoiding quoting the lies of paki attitude veiling facts, but there's no point quoting lies. 

Author avoids saying what's plain, intent on veiling truth with paki lies. But pakis use invasion as the sole method of argument to assist their lies, as per the heritage they not only invoke but brag of, that of barbarians who invaded India for well over a millennium and a half until British rule, and hence their travails - which must befall a lying invader intent on destruction of all civilisation. 

Author has blown up, into a very verbose book, what can be summed up in two or three short sentences - one, pakis repeatedly assaulted India with military attacks, apart from continuous terrorism and massacres, genocides and worse perpetrated against India in general and nonmuslims in particular; India not merely repulsed the military attacks but had pakis begging for mercy, despite paki pretense that paki military were never involved; repeated in Kargil after 1947-48, 1965 and 1971. 

This blowing up is stuffed with lies from pakis and ill will for India from various abrahmic sources, quoted at length and repeatedly. 

Fact is, it was Indian soldiers who fought the uphill battle, at those impossible heights well over 10,000 feet, while the so-called terrorists (as pakis labeled their own soldiers) rained not only fire on them, but huge boulders downhill, killing Indian soldiers. 

Under those circumstances, the humongous achievement of India's soldiers was at least worthy of mention, even by a silly paki sitting in comfort of Harvard to compose this paen to paki terrorism. 

Over and over, author portrays US as eager and desperate to please India! But such a slant on this affair, kargil, implies clearly that Pakistan not only think thst their lies must be taken at par with or higher than facts, but imagine that the whole world must agree with this position, unless they are trying to please India! 

" ... Americans realized that ‘Indians were extremely skeptical that we will succeed and suspicious about what we were doing’. Only a success would have convinced the Indians of what the Americans kept telling Delhi they were doing ‘to get Pakistan to back down’."

When do pakis plan to learn that a Rottweiler used at Auschwitz isn't an icon worshipped through the world! 

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" ... First the two met with their aides. Nawaz Sharif was joined by the Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz and Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed. Clinton was assisted by National Security advisor Sandy Burger, assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Karl F. Inderfurth and a senior National security council official handling South Asian affairs Bruce Riedel. This meeting with aides lasted for barely five to seven minutes. It was followed by an almost two-hour long meeting between Clinton and Nawaz. While Clinton was joined by Bruce Riedel as a note taker, Nawaz Sharif went in without one. He did not want one.[838] Unknowing of this fact the Pakistan Foreign Office team insisted that their prime minister be treated on an equal basis with the host and also be accompanied by his aide to the meeting. It lasted approximately two hours. Clinton began by telling Sharif why Kargil was a blunder and how two nuclear powers were almost at the brink of war. Clinton told Sharif that he had information that the Pakistan Army had begun preparation to use nuclear weapons. Sharif said he was unaware of any such move. As a nuclear power, Clinton said, the international community expected Pakistan to behave more responsibly. ... "

"In the plain talking during his meeting with the Pakistani prime minister, the US President also demanded his government’s full cooperation in capturing OBL. Clinton in his memoirs recalls, ‘On 4 July, I also told Sharif that unless he did more to help I would have to announce Pakistan was in effect supporting terrorism in Afghanistan.’[839] Clinton was basing his assertions on the information and analysis provided by CIA’s Counter-terrorist Center. Pakistan was identified as the principal supporter of the Taliban, the principal protectors of OBL. Significantly, on the very day of his meeting with the Pakistani prime minister, Clinton announced sanctions against the Taliban. He subsequently wrote, ‘On the day I met Sharif, I also signed an executive order placing economic sanctions on the Taliban, freezing its assets, and prohibiting commercial exchanges.’

"Significantly, there was no discussion between Nawaz Sharif and the Foreign Office team before the Clinton meeting regarding the formulation of the statement that he and Clinton would sign. The Foreign Office team had prepared a Pakistani version of a draft agreement. The Americans were determined to stay with their own version."

" ... Sharif carefully chose his words so as not to directly implicate anyone but kept saying that it was an operation that ‘got out of control’. He did, however, distance himself from the Operation.  The striking contrast in the self-confidence of the two interlocutors could not have been lost. While one was backed by a unified and competently functioning government, the other was pretty much on a solo flight."

Perhaps the paragraph above was written so as to depict paki PM’s position as more sympathetic, but the result for any reader not schooled in lies by Pakistan is a disbelief at such an expectation. A democratic nation must function in a manner where the leader and the government function in tandem, not where the civilian leade us a mannequin in dressing window while owner is the terrorist in the back room. 

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Author has novel ways of lying, while seeming technically correct. 

"Nawaz Sharif was insisting that Clinton help him to get out of the crisis. An anxious Sharif’s long rambling on diplomacy with China and with Indian intermediaries was to establish his bona fides as a man in search of a solution. He was like a man who ‘wanted out’ off a train wreck approaching him. At one point, Sharif asked Clinton for a one-on-one meeting. Clinton declined. The Pakistani prime minister was told that the note-taker, Bruce Riedel, would not leave his President. US government rules made it obligatory upon Clinton to have this historic meeting documented. The President of the USA was not free to have his way. He could not act upon his whims."

The last two lines seem to imply that a US president refuses an unreasonable request by a terrorist nation only due to the said US president being "not free to have his way", and his whims must be nothing other than to please the said terrorist nation. 

Which is ridiculous. 

Clearly it was necessary for the US President to, not only follow protocol in this case, but be not seen as complicit with a terrorist nation invading a neighbour, or even be questioned subsequently as to veracity of his account, if pakis chose to lie for any reason. 

As to whims, there must have been a few million that the president could have indulged in at the time, and freely so, without any question of disturbing any protocol. 

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"During the break between the two sessions of the Sharif-Clinton meeting, Sharif’s team found him to be a ‘drained man’. He has been badgered by Clinton’s queries and hard talk on Kargil, OBL, etc. No less was the tension of what he was doing: giving a commitment for a Pakistani retreat from what the military was still publicly projecting as a successful occupation. In fact, during the meeting, the TV in the room was telecasting news of the fall of a strategically important peak, the Tiger Hill. During the break, the prime minister called his army chief to confirm news of the fall of the Tiger Hill.[841]"

" ... The Foreign Office team still ‘offered’ a few amendments to the draft. Sharif was extremely reluctant to take them to Clinton. He said he had been told it was a take it or leave it situation. His team still urged Sharif to ‘not give in’. They were all aware that their internal discussions were being monitored. The Americans knew what they were trying to convince Sharif to do, since the room they were sitting in was ‘not only bugged but also had cameras in it’. Sharif promised his team to make one last effort.

"The 4 July meeting was turned into a battle of nerves. Clinton was well prepared for this battle while the Pakistani prime minister had arrived in Washington having already lost his nerve, owing to what he believed were the Kargil reversals. Sharif had left Islamabad in panic and entered the Clinton meeting with a major psychological handicap. Clinton saw sitting before him a needy and desperate man, not a negotiator. The Americans too found Sharif nervous. In fact, they believed his decision to ‘invite himself at short notice and bringing the family along opened the possibility of his staying back in Washington in case the Army took over in his absence’.[843] ... "

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"Tough times test leadership mettle and a state’s collective institutional competence. Sharif’s mettle was being severely tested. He had opted to do mostly a lone act, nearly a personal operation, on the entire 4 July summit, from planning to execution. He had drawn on external wisdom and an external platform. He seemed to have banked on a major external power even for the political strength required for his 4 July decision. This bail-out operation, as Sharif saw it, of a medium-sized power by the major global power, was a page out of Wallerstein’s classic center-periphery relationship. The ‘comprador’ politician was at play, exposing so starkly the heavy interconnectedness between Pakistan’s internal power game and the global center, with the levers of control heavily tilted in the latter’s favor. Nothing could more acutely demonstrate Pakistan’s systemic weakness as a state run by those with scarce appreciation of institutional decision-making."

That's verbose rephrasing of a failed attempt by Pakistan to do another Munich, failed because they were pretending that they had a democracy and they weren't invading another neighbour after wrecking one, and they hadn't realised that such pretense doesn't wash in era of satellites observations of global goings-on. 

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"The meeting ended with the decision that Pakistan would withdraw its troops behind the LOC to the pre-Operation position. ... "

"The withdrawal discussion had not included any talk about safe passage for the withdrawing Pakistani forces. ... Sharif did not raise any question about safe passage for withdrawing troops.[846] Evidently, it was not an issue that had occupied his mind, nor was it part of the talking points that his Foreign Office team had prepared.  This issue escaped their respective radars because the premise from which it would logically flow, the Pakistani forces actually battling in Kargil and now their withdrawal, did not exist in their articulated consciousness. This kind of denial meant major lapses in policy-making. ... "

"Clinton, as part of a premeditated strategy, used this moment of Sharif’s utter vulnerability to aggressively raise the issue of the Osama bin Laden and the alleged ISI connection.[850] Before Sharif sat the man who had been told that Pakistan was at the center of supporting the Taliban and by extension the OBL network. This network, according to the CIA, was functioning in 60 different countries and was directly responsible for attacks on American embassies. Clinton reminded Nawaz Sharif that he had ‘asked repeatedly for Pakistani help to bring Osama bin Laden to justice from Afghanistan’ and that Sharif had ‘promised often to do so, but had done nothing. Instead, the ISI worked with OBL and the Taliban to foment terrorism’. Sharif had made a personal commitment to Clinton in December 1998 to help the United States in capturing OBL, but had not followed through on it.[851] ... Clinton threatened to tell the world of Pakistan’s support to bin Laden if Pakistan’s help in capturing him was not forthcoming.[852] The Pakistani prime minister reassured the US President that he would now follow through on his earlier commitment. ... "

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"During the London stopover, the real newsmaker was Pakistan’s articulate Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz. In a BBC Hard Talk interview, Sartaj declared that the reference in the 4 July statement to ‘upholding the sanctity of the LOC’ also implied that India must vacate the Siachen Glacier it had illegally occupied in 1984. A rapid rebuttal from Washington stated that the 4 July Statement was only about Kargil, that the US believed in the sanctity of the entire LOC but of immediate interest was the resolution of the Kargil conflict."

" ... Admittedly, the overwhelming deployment of Indian artillery and air power could not have allowed Pakistani troops to hold the peaks for much longer ... "

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Another lie by author. 

"Sharif’s Washington dash had earned him a statement with no face-saver for Pakistan. Sharif, in his pre-departure telephone conversation, had been clearly told by Clinton to expect no more and had seemed OK with that. In fact, he had cancelled the crucial meeting of the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) scheduled for July 5, whose agenda had been the Kargil Operation. With input of all stakeholders, the prime minister was to decide on how to draw curtains on Operation Koh Paima. However, at this crucial juncture in Pakistan’s history, Sharif had walked away from collective institutional decision-making. Instead, he headed to Washington."

Since Kargil invasion by paki army wasn't a collective decision, or even had the pm kept informed as in was executed, what is author blaming the pm for? He'd lost face internationally, if pakis as a nation ever had such a thing, for something that had been done without him being informed! If anything, he was more akin to a toddler of Munich blamed for Dachau! 

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" ... Only in private conversations did the army chief and others of the Kargil clique concede rising Pakistani casualties and logistical difficulties. Beginning mid-June, there was guarded conversation within the army command of the crisis of logistics, high casualties, and India’s very heavy force deployment. Reports about this alarming situation were trickling in from the front. Nevertheless, at the 2 July meeting the army chief had insisted that, despite rising Pakistani casualties, compromised logistical supplies, and India’s re-taking of the strategically located Tololing and Tiger Hill posts, it was not a militarily unsustainable position. No hard questioning or holistic discussion had followed. While moments of acrimony between the prime minister and the army chief did occur, the amiable Chaudhry Shujaat had intervened to cool off matters. Thus, policy matters had remained unsettled."

" ... disturbing questions may have crossed Sharif’s mind: what fate awaited him on his return to Pakistan? Would he be able to implement the 4 July statement? How would the army command respond to the 4 July statement? In a country in whose sixty-five year history the military had subverted the Constitution three times to remove an elected civilian ruler, ... In the White House, Clinton’s aide Bruce Riedel had made the dramatic deduction that the Pakistani prime minister had arrived in Washington with his family because, after agreeing on troop withdrawal from Kargil, he was hesitant to return to Pakistan because of fear of the army command."

Author isn't being explicit. After 1971, Bhutto, the pm of a leftover Pakistan, had been executed by an army chief after a coup, using what passes for law machinery of pak for the purpose. 

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" ... In the somewhat sullen silence that followed, one general did point out, “Sir, they (the Indians) are celebrating.” Many present in the room must have recalled the army chief’s 16 May assurance that Pakistan was in a “win-win” situation in Kargil as its positions were “unassailable.” Words did not matter. The original and vocal critics of Kargil, including commanders 1 Corps General Saleem Haider, Quetta corps General Tariq Pervez and other had been proven right.  Also, with restive troops and reports of low morale, especially of those who had participated in the Operation, the army chief had a huge task before him."

"It was going to be a hard sell, since government rhetoric had built a public perception since end May of victories for the Mujahedeen fighting Indian troops in the Kargil-Drass area. ... According to media reports based on official sources, Delhi was in a very difficult position since its troops were facing the danger of starvation in Siachen if the blockade of the Drass-Kargil Road continued. In fact, after the Washington agreement, the army spokesman said, “There is no change in ground realities as Drass-Kargil Road is still in range of Pakistani artillery fire…”"

" ... People drew a parallel with the 1965 events, when Pakistan was about to “liberate the whole of Kashmir...when Pakistani leaders succumbed to world pressure and stopped the military operation and we are facing a similar situation now...”[884] ... "

What is the author talking about, or just lies as usual by paki government to pakis? 

Indian tanks had been in centre of Lahore in 1965! 

................................................................................................

"Politicians fully capitalized on this anti-Nawaz mood. Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP), Pakistan’s leading opposition party, was critical of the prime minister for carrying out secret negotiations with Clinton. The MQM also opposed the Washington agreement as a ‘sell out of Kashmir.”[887] It demanded details of the Sharif-Clinton talks and said that an agreement on withdrawal “without a quid pro quo” would be a “a serious disappointment for the nation.”[888] The Jamaat-i-Islami, a right-wing party, who had protested in Lahore against the Lahore summit, was predictably critical of the prime minister. Its leader Munawar Hassan said the Washington statement was “treachery.” ... "

" ... PTI leader Abdus Sattar,[890] with forty years as Pakistan’s top diplomat behind him, predicted that Sharif “will be ousted from power like former rulers ... Regarding the 4 July agreement Sattar said while the army would carry out out orders of the political government in the given environment, the agreement applied to the Mujahideen, not to the Pakistan Army. Sattar merely repeated Pakistan’s official position as he claimed “they (the army) are on the LOC and you cannot ask them to vacate.”[893]"

" ... Gul warned the lawyers at the Lahore High Court Bar that the ... agreement dictated by the US. “We are not an American state…we should not follow American instructions blindly…”[899] He warned of a clash in case the Mujahedeen refused to withdraw from their positions in Kargil. ... "

Funny, he wasn't aware either, that it was all paki military in pajamas, asked to pretend they were terrorists - and disowned by pakis in life and death! 

"All the talk of Mujahideen disengaging or not was all fiction. The Mujahideen, were not involved. Op KP had no support by Hurriyat , ISI or the ongoing struggle in Kashmir creating rear area insecurity; a repeat of a Operation Gibraltar."

................................................................................................

"While the main thrust of all criticism targeting the Prime Minster was that he was responsible for Pakistan’s humiliation, some of Sharif’s cabinet members also rose to his defense. His close confidante, the Minister for Provincial Coordination and Political Affairs, was quick to retort to the critics, “The record of these generals is self-evident.” He reminded them that “in their period of leadership, the enemy occupied Siachen glacier. And so where was their military capability and patriotism then?” [908] The beginnings of a civil-military confrontation were discernable. A Sharif loyalist, General Javed Nasir, who had been appointed by Sharif as ISI chief, also supported the withdrawal. He wrote in Pakistan’s most widely read Urdu daily Jang, praising Sharif’s withdrawal decision, even though this former spy chief had equally vehemently supported the Kargil operation. In his Jang piece, he praised Sharif’s India policy and wrote that the prime minister had “spared no effort for the peace offensive, which he had launched on 21 February 1999 in the form of the Lahore Declaration. Privately, he has also been expressing the desire that we should enter the new millennium with pride and that Allah has ordained the Muslims to serve as an example worth following for the world.”[909] The spin did not work."

That last sentence betrays the author's own slant. 

................................................................................................

" ... The million-dollar question, raised in subdued tones since mid-June, was: “With whose permission was Kargil initiated?”"

"With ISPR the only source of all Kargil-related information their version of Kargil was the only reality the press knew. Hence, pressmen had not been privy to the ground situation, which had tilted in India’s favor. Having lost Tololing posts by the middle of June, Pakistani troops had also lost posts on the strategically located Tiger Hill. The Adjutant General branch at the GHQ had been getting reports of increasing casualties. Even the worried Kargil clique was deeply concerned over mounting deaths of senior colleagues.[910] Supply lines had come under enemy attack, making it difficult to maintain supplies to the posts. A catch-22 situation has been created. Neither was troop pullout possible nor was managing critical logistical supplies.

"The shortage of food had meant that some soldiers even had to resort to eating grass.[911] Ill-equipped, underfed, and frost-bitten, many soldiers had been surrounded by Indian infantry and come under artillery and aerial attacks. The inevitable question was: Where would this continued battle on the world’s highest and most vicious battleground have led? In the face of overwhelming force deployment by the Indians, the troops across the LOC would have either been killed or captured by the Indians."

Another lie there by author, in that "would have" bit. They were, in fact, killed or captured in quantities enough to inform India that they were paki soldiers being denied by pakis. 

................................................................................................

"The news of the prime minister’s effort to end the battle evoked a mixed response among those in the battle-zone. When the news of withdrawal blared from their wireless sets, it was received by many with a sense of relief. Most field commanders were not surprised. Some even prayed for Nawaz Sharif’s long life when they heard of the 4 July agreement.[912] They were losing their colleagues while India was beginning to succeed in reclaiming the peaks and ridges. They knew the balance of forces and numbers was heavily tilted in India’s favor.

"Nevertheless, fighting in the inhospitable terrain under terrible conditions, the question uppermost in the minds of many soldiers was: What had been the purpose of the Operation and of the battle that followed? If a unilateral withdrawal was the final outcome, why the sacrifices? At posts where the young and courageous soldiers had not experienced reversals, many were unable to understand the compulsion to withdraw. There was frustration. ... many could not understand why their country did not own them. Why were the dead bodies of their martyred colleagues not being received and honoured? Many also wondered why a seeming victory was being squandered and was turning into a surrender, and that too a globally broadcast surrender?"

"Predictably when the Kargil battle came to a close no official casualty figures were issued. The pretence of no Pakistani troop involvement also meant that accepting bodies of martyred soldiers would be difficult. Even during the withdrawal, the Indians claimed that they buried “army soldiers of 12 Northern Light Infantry, who had been killed at Point 4875” in the battle to reclaim posts in Drass sector.[926]  Also, while several guesstimates were made, the government issued no official casualty figures. For example, in Pakistan, the military quoted the figure of around 500 deaths, while there was talk of an estimated one thousand Pakistani casualties. The prime minister claimed there were more than thousand casualties.[927] Senior military officers claimed the worried army chief had shared a figure of one thousand casualties.[928] The war martyrs issue and their number came up when the army chief sought a rehabilitation budget for families of martyrs and veterans."

" ... Towards end-July, however, the army command changed its policy on receiving bodies of their fallen men because of Colonel Sher Khan. ... "

................................................................................................

"Pakistan continued with its disingenuous approach of claiming that the Mujahedeen, not its army, were present in the mountains. ... "

Author invents words - or sentences, paragraphs - to label the paki lies. 

" ... Meanwhile, at the July 11 joint presser, while giving an update on the withdrawal along with the ISPR’s Brigadier Rashid, foreign minister Aziz claimed, “In the past few weeks the Mujahedeen action has been gloriously successful as the just and legitimate cause of Kashmir has engaged the international community’s undivided attention throughout the period.”[933] The brigadier also recounted the Mujahedeen’s military victories over the Indians, who, he claimed, were suffering from “sagging morale.” If the Indian morale was “sagging” and the Mujahiedeen were “gloriously successful, then why the 4 July agreement?"

Precisely. 

As Molotov, fed up with nazi lies about RAF never daring to bomb Berlin and Berlin being completely safe, had asked his host who'd hurried him from dinner to shelter,  due to a precisely timed RAF raid - "so why are we hiding in this shelter, and whose bombs are these that are falling around us?"

................................................................................................

Author extensively quotes statements then issued from various terrorist organisations, based in or supported by pak, and their mouthpieces or leaders. 

"These endless statements claiming Mujahedeen presence also clashed with the widely known facts about Pakistani soldiers fighting in Kargil. Pakistan continued to spin this bizarre narrative. While the prime minister’s trusted bureaucrat Tariq Fatemi told the Indians we are “rolling our beds” and the Pakistan and Indian DGMOs were in contact coordinating Pakistani troops withdrawal and the international community was also commenting on Pakistani troop withdrawal, Islamabad was making a parallel stream of statements claiming that Pakistan had in fact requested the Mujahedeen groups fighting in Kargil-Drass, to withdraw!"

" ... Finally, when he himself was President, Musharraf opted for full disclosure. He acknowledged in his book that “as few as five battalions in support of freedom fighter groups, were able to compel the Indians to employ more than four divisions…”[944] In fact, adding a new dimension, the former army chief also claimed it was the “Pakistani freedom fighters”[945] who had occupied the front-line positions."

................................................................................................

" ... He mostly received cold, if not aggressive, receptions from the officers. For example, in the Quetta Garrison 41 Division auditorium, a captain asked the visiting army chief, ‘If you had to pull-out in exchange for a Nawaz Sharif and Clinton breakfast meeting, why did you go in?’ Another wanted to know why prime minister Nawaz Sharif had let them down. The Corps Commander Quetta, accompanying the army chief, had to intervene to ask his officers to take it easy. This resentment among the officers sprang from the widely held belief that, by calling off Operation KP when it was virtually impossible for the Indians to militarily dislodge Pakistani troops from their posts, the prime minister had committed a blunder.[969]"

" ... These young warriors had many hard questions. ‘Why did we conduct the Kargil Operation?’ ... The chief refrain was: ‘Who is responsible for this fiasco?’ And the young soldiers wanted to know.

"In rare cases, soldiers lying in delirious conditions on hospital beds even cursed at the commanders visiting the injured. According to one Kargil veteran who, after fighting at the Tiger Hill, lay injured in a hospital in Gilgit, another veteran on the bed next to his shouted and in abusive language cursed the military commanders as they came to visit the injured. ... Another injured brigadier, who had commanded an NLI brigade, was evacuated to Rawalpindi because it was not safe for him to be around the injured and extremely angry troops.[972]"

................................................................................................

"By such public expression of their angry emotions, the young officers and jawans of NLI had broken rigid institutional codes. This was particularly evident at the traditional Darbar gatherings convened by the NLI commander who had led the Kargil operation.

"The soldiers who returned home after almost being trapped in the world’s most inhospitable and treacherous battle field and having a close brush with death had expected heroes’ welcomes. Instead, they felt hurt and unappreciated. Many complained that the media ‘mistreated’ them and the people did not give them ‘the credit’ they deserved. And the withdrawal phase made matters even worse. Failure to ensure a proper scheme of withdrawal, to prevent the unnecessary loss of life to Indian artillery fire, had caused soldiers to feel badly let down. ... "

"In August, angrily weeping families had received Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the army chief in Gilgit with the demand that their sons, brothers, or husbands be brought back, dead or alive. Their anguish stemmed from the extraordinary circumstances. There was no declared war and their men had not announced they were going to the front, and there were dead bodies arriving and, worse, there were highly disturbing Indian media reports that the Pakistani authorities were refusing to accept many of the bodies of their soldiers.

"In July, Pakistan’s Political Counsellor in Delhi, Jalil Abbas Jillani, had received a call from his Indian counterpart asking him to receive the bodies of fallen Pakistani soldiers. Under instructions to refuse, Jillani told Vivek Katju, Additional Secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, that there were no Pakistani soldiers fighting in Kargil. The bodies Indian authorities wanted to handover included the body of captain Kernel Sher Khan who had been awarded the Nishan-i-Haider, the highest military award. By the end of July, these instructions to the Pakistan High Commission were changed and they had begun accepting the bodies. As Islamabad accused Delhi of torturing Pakistani soldiers, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesman offered to handover several Pakistani soldiers, captured in Kargil, to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[973]

................................................................................................

" ... Earlier in April 1998, Benazir and her husband were convicted on corruption charges. Deeply drawn battle lines all targeted Sharif’s corruption—his refusing to return billion of rupees of loans, his seeking to control the parliament by becoming Ameerul Momineen, his party workers’ attack on the Supreme Court, the controversy around the 4 July decision to withdraw: all these gave the Opposition another stick to seek government’s early removal. The ruling family’s loan scandals were snowballing into a major crisis. Interestingly, the Army, despite its huge and dangerous blunder in Kargil, was in a secure spot."

This has largely to do with paki caste system that sees conquering invaders as above all, despises traders as moneymaker and respects feudal system. Consequently army is owner of most of paki land and businesses, unlike most other - functioning - countries where business, military and land ownership do not mix. 

................................................................................................

" ... The PPP insisted that the government, and specifically the prime minister, had cleared the Kargil Operation. The religious parties criticized the withdrawal and the Sharif-led government’s re-engagement with India, as well as his decision to pull back support to the Taliban and enter into dialogue with the Northern Alliance. They consistently attacked the government for allowing US Special Forces to come to Pakistan to train Pakistanis involved in the ‘Capture bin Laden’ Operation. Through August, these protesting parties and sections of the media, who dominated popular discourse as well as public space, reiteratively popularized the narrative that Washington had stepped in to save India from a certain military defeat that the Mujahedeen had almost inflicted on India. The Washington Accord, for them, was a sell-out of the Kashmiri cause."

" ... The army chief in his meeting with the prime minister’s younger brother and Chief Minister of Punjab, Shehbaz Sharif, suggested that he must consider becoming the deputy prime minister in order to streamline the federal government’s performance![977] The younger Sharif, while having heard the army chief attentively, was clear that neither would his brother fancy such a suggestion coming from him and nor was his vacating Punjab, the fortress of Pakistan’s politics, a wise move. Meanwhile, the authors of the country’s biggest military debacle would call out the elected government on governance matters. The blundering group in khaki would hold the weak civilians accountable while they launched a campaign to discredit the elected government."

"In addition to the resentment within the rank and file, the army chief had to deal with internal rifts between his top military commanders, as their criticism of the Kargil Operation began to surface. They believed the ill-conceived Operation had caused embarrassment to the entire institution.  Even the military’s own top spymasters and senior commanders were actively kept out of the loop. When they had picked up indicators of unusual troop movement, the existence of the Operation was denied. Others, who had questioned the viability of the Kargil plan during the early May Corp Commanders meeting but had their concerns dismissed by the architects of Kargil, were also talking. This, after 4 Jul  many a hitherto tight-lipped and resentful commander was now more vocal in his indictment of the Operation.

"The public critique later by one of Pakistan’s most professional generals, Lt. General Ali Quli Khan,[979] best captured the views of Pakistan’s top commanders. Commenting on General Musharraf’s own conclusion on the Kargil Operations, ‘Considered in purely military terms, the Kargil Operations were a landmark in the history of the Pakistan Army,’[980] Khan, the former Chief of General Staff wrote, ‘I am totally amazed at such ostrich-like behavior when the whole world considers Kargil to be the worst debacle in Pakistan’s history and where countless innocent young lives were lost for nothing. Absolutely nothing!’ [981] He further added, ‘I regret to say that the conception and planning at the highest level had been poor—in fact, so poor that the only word which can adequately describe is it unprofessional. We all know that the main duty of the high command is to ensure that with their meticulous planning they create conditions whereby their junior combatants can fight easily. This was certainly not done at Kargil. It is also fairly obvious that the Kargil Operations was not conceived in its totality, with the result that apart from bringing ignominy to Pakistan it also caused unnecessary misery to a lot of innocent people.’[982] 

"Internally, within the institution, there was disquiet after the withdrawal. Instructions were that Kargil would not be discussed in any school of instruction, neither in any class nor in any study period. No courses would be taught at the NDC etc. The subject of Kargil was a ‘banned item’."

................................................................................................

"Criticism from beyond the borders also hit hard, especially when it floated in world capitals in form of the vicious, scathing criticism in the ‘Rogue Army’ advertisements campaign that targeted the Pakistan Army and multiplied the woes of the Kargil clique. Within days of the 4 July Sharif-Clinton Statement, the advertisement ran in leading US newspapers, including the New York Times. Musharraf wanted an official and very prominent rebuttal issued in the very papers in which the advertisement appeared. It was a matter of the troop morale, he asked a common friend to convey to the prime minister. The army chief also offered to pay for the rebuttal advertisement in case the government had funding problems.[983] The prime minister disagreed. Despite the intervention of his father and brother, Sharif was unrelenting. Only one article could be commissioned to counter the advertisement." 

Now, author returns to prevaricating. 

"Thus, the pressure from within the Army, the vocal criticism by the navy and the air force, and the general political chatter prompted the architects of Kargil to adopt an offensive defense posture. In August, deeper fault lines emerged between the civilian and military leadership’s approach to handling the post-Kargil period."

This is like death of a child due to physical assault by an adult blamed on those criticising the said assault. 

Does the author wish here to imply, or let reader infer, that those responsible for Kargil invasion against India and killing of Indians thereby, planned and executed, had been well-behaved, or well intentioned at any time? 

Had they not violated rvery norm, every protocol, in the process, of functioning of a proper military of a proper government, when invading Kargil - without informing their own government? 

Was their anything that could be termed proper in their conduct in their subsequent denial of their own soldiers, even to the extent of refusing the dead? 

................................................................................................

"The most public manifestation of this difference was over the question of decorating the Kargil heroes, martyrs and the living, with national awards for valor. Why this issue became a controversial one between the government and the Army was principally because the Army had publicly taken the position that it was not Pakistani soldiers but freedom fighters who had fought in Kargil. The prime minister had sustained this charade, begun initially by the Army during the Kargil Operation, even after the 4 July withdrawal. The army leadership now wanted the government to approve national awards for the ‘Kargil heroes.’

"The GHQ also wanted nationally broadcast television programmes honouring the heroes of Kargil. There was a reason why the Kargil clique now wanted to acknowledge and honour the brave and the best of the Army, earlier having opted to let them be projected as Mujahideen. The clique now detected the increasing anger and agitation of the troops caused towards their commanders, not only because of the debacle-like end of Kargil, but also in their role and sacrifices not having been acknowledged.

"Sitting in their secure garrisons, these were men of command and authority who must have silently been haunted by the calamitous Operation they had designed. More blood, their critics argued, of Pakistan’s brave soldiers had flowed in this calamity called Kargil, than put together in the two wars Pakistan fought in 1965 and 1971."

The claim about 1965, in view of the authors repeated ridicule of Indians ineffective and killed at Kargil, is debatable at best. 

But 1971? That's a horrible claim, considering the genocide perpetrated by paki military in East Bengal, accompanied by organised mass gang rapes they also perpetrated along with killings, in millions, comparable with and outdone by only nazis in WWII. 

The only way to reconcile that statement with reality is to not only deduce but accept a value system so racist that it had counted half its own citizens as not human. 

And the only reason that paki military did not have 93,000 of paki military dead in East Bengal was because India, instead of letting them be taken prisoners of war by the then new nation of Bangladesh, had instead returned them safe to the then remaining, truncated West Pakistan, which really had no right to retain the name because they'd lost 60% of their own erstwhile paki population, the Bengalis. 

................................................................................................

" ... Interestingly, although Pakistan’s public position was that Kashmiri Mujahideen, not Pakistani soldiers, were fighting the Indian Army in Kargil, yet, that night the Kargil clique, identified the recipients for the highest gallantry award, Nishan-i-Haider. Additionally, approximately 80 soldiers were given various other awards on General Javed Hassan’s recommendations. He insisted awards were necessary to raise the morale of the soldiers.

"The Awards ceremony, called Kargil kay Hero, was televised by PTV, but the Sharif-led government was keen to call off its broadcasting. The prime minister was trying to re-engage with the Indians. Thus, Nawaz Sharif and Shehbaz Sharif did not participate in the programme. While all the chief ministers participated, the Punjab chief minister avoided it."

It seems to have not occurred to the author that not everybody can sustain the doublespeak that paki army maintained, of both disclaming and awarding role of paki soldiers in Kargil simultaneously! 

If the then pm of pak had participated in such a televised spectacle, or his brother had, doesn't the author realise that the paki pm could then subsequently be questioned on the factual discrepancy, by world media, not to mention international diplomatic corps,  and even various governments and their leaders, even officially? 

................................................................................................

" ... State Department spokesman, James Rubin, said that, even on Kashmir, the US could mediate only if Pakistan and India both sought mediation. Away from 4 July, Pakistan had to manage its own relationship with India."

Author returns to paki lies. 

" ... In Pakistan, civilian intelligence agencies had reports of sectarian killers finding safe havens in neighboring Afghanistan. ... "

Fact is taliban were the spectrum created in and by Pakistan, to take control of Afghanistan in name of religion - and it wreaked havoc in a society that had women professors until then, teaching at university! Thereafter pakis pretending that it was an Afghanistan problem is height of duplicity and fraud. 

................................................................................................

More lies, more fraud. 

"The actual implementation of the ‘Capture Osama’ plan also began in August. The Taliban remained committed to protecting the 41-year-old Saudi millionaire. They kept him ‘under the protection of a special security commission’.[991] The US President’s most unusual threat of 4 July that, unless Pakistan did more, he ‘would have to announce Pakistan was in effect supporting terrorism in Afghanistan’ had worked.[992] The plan to capture OBL was first proposed by the Pakistani prime minister himself in his 2 December 1998, Washington meeting. Economic sanctions on the Taliban were already in place. Around this time, with Sharif’s support, US officials also began to train 60 Pakistani troops as commandoes to go into Afghanistan to get bin Laden. ‘I was skeptical about the project; even if Sharif wanted to help, the Pakistan military was full of Taliban and al-Qaeda sympathizers. But I thought we had nothing to lose by exploring every option.’[993]"

In view of his eventual capture - in Abbottabad, within walking distance of what US terms "West Point of Pakistan", was he really ever in Afghanistan? 

Or had he been spirited away out of sight straight into protection of paki military even before Kargil? 

................................................................................................

" ... The CIA planned a ‘ring of kidnapping squads around Afghanistan to move in to capture OBL when required’.[994] 

"After his commitment with Clinton, Sharif personally led the effort to convince the Taliban government to handover OBL. In July, he met, along with the visiting the Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan, the Afghan Foreign Minister Mulla Mutawakil at the Punjab House in Islamabad. With the help of an interpreter, the Saudi Prince reminded Muttawakil, ‘We had helped you, we had recognized you, but you are ungrateful.’ The Taliban leader was reprimanded in ‘strong and humiliating term’. Muttawakil said they were grateful, that they wanted Saudi assistance to continue, but handing over OBL or ‘extraditing him’ was ‘impossible’. This blanket refusal annoyed the prime minister and his Saudi guest.[995] Clinton’s ‘Get OBL’ policy included use of force at multiple levels. The Taliban leader Mullah Omar was under attack. At the end of August, a saboteur’s bomb exploded near his home in Kandahar.

"The ‘Capture Osama’ Operation was being launched. The Americans were funding the construction of barracks, three miles south of Rawalpindi, for SSG commandoes. According to the plan, Pakistani commandoes, on intelligence information, would be infiltrated into Afghanistan to kidnap bin Laden. While the ISI chief, now reporting to the prime minister and following his instructions, went along with the plan, the top operational tier opposed it. Senior generals believed that ‘nothing could be more foolish’. OBL, they believed, was an ‘elusive target’ and looking for him was tantamount ‘to searching for a needle in a haystack’. ... While the US sent FBI officials to train the commandoes and to monitor the operation, senior officials were skeptical of the scheme. ‘We said to ourselves: Why do they need searchers for someone they are already aware of? Well, we played along,’ recalled one US official.[996]

" ... Pakistan began its shuttle diplomacy between Kandahar and the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, trying to get talks restarted between Ahmed Shah Masood and the Taliban.[998] While the Northern Alliance blamed Pakistani officials for, in reality, siding with the Taliban, Pakistani officials repeatedly spoke of their ‘peace agenda’ and for initiating the shuttle diplomacy in response to President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s request.[999] ... "

Author now openly takes sides - with the fraudulent and the invader - who'd failed, to boot. 

" ... Whatever were coup-maker Musharraf’s justifications at the time of the coup, years later, he was more truthful as he wrote in his book, ‘It was in dealing with Kargil that the prime minister exposed his mediocrity and set himself on a collision course with the Army and me.’[1001]"

" ... Caught between trying to pull Pakistan out of the Kargil debacle, reviving the dialogue process with India, containing the fallout in the military and political circles, and also dealing with the political pressures generated from his government’s incompetence, no inquiry was instituted against the army chief and other architects of Kargil. Instead, a campaign was launched against the civilians, the army leadership feeling ironically confident enough to hold the civilian leadership over issues of governance."

................................................................................................

"The bonhomie of the prime minister and the army chief’s early September trip to the NLI headquarters in Skardu was short-lived. Although on Kashmiri rights, Sharif was unrelenting, calling for a UN-supervised plebiscite in Kashmir similar to East Timor[1002], the ghost of Kargil had sown distrust between Sharif and the military command. Behind closed doors, in the corridors of power, and in the homes of the powerful, subdued games were on. Some played for survival, others for reprimand and retribution. Tool bags for menacing games were thrown open. All was fair play: wiretapping, inspired media reports, surveillance, interpreting intercepts, spy men on the prowl, instigating anger, manufacturing street protests. The ghost of the Kargil debacle was haunting Pakistan’s corridors of power. The members of the Kargil clique, architects of the debacle, were fearful of being fired. Armed with institutional resources and experience at surreptitiously fighting civilian authority, they were all set to fight back.

"Sharif was in a difficult position. Unlike Sharif’s unbridled October 1998 reaction to a speech by Musharraf’s predecessor army chief general Jahangir Karamat, which led to latter’s dismissal, the post-Kargil situation was a very complex one. Pakistan had lost in martyrdom many of its brave young men yet internationally the country was being criticized. Pakistan’s credibility as a responsible nuclear State had received a serious setback. Yet the prime minister could not hold the army chief accountable for the debacle at Kargil. He was constrained by issues around his own public ownership of the Operation and of “national honor.” [1003]"

When do pakis plan to learn that neither killing nor giving one's own life is counted as praiseworthy (and nowhere outside of their own medieval creed, anyway), when in quest of world conquest, or simple looting of others, post medieval era - and, that, it's definitely no longer medieval era as of half a century ago, through most of the world? Calling those invaders martyrs is signatory of a creed of world conquest in name of a creed, but in every sensible process of thought, they were no more than oil thrown by those seeking to set fire to a neighbour's home. 

................................................................................................

" ... His Washington interlocutors were already aware of the real architects of Kargil. But, under siege from domestic troubles, with political opponents multiplying and unifying under the 19-party Grand Democratic Alliance[1004] banner, the prime minister seemed to have concluded that he was going to work silently on tackling the Kargil clique. Ouster of the army chief was unlikely. However, some form of reprimand was inevitable. The cumulative impact of all this was the rise of distrust and suspicion among Pakistan’s power players."

" ... In a heady moment during the landmark 17 May briefing, General Aziz, the Kargil kingpin, had prodded Pakistan’s prime minister to dream about being second only to Jinnah. ... As Chaudhry Nisar, his key aide, later argued, once the ball was set rolling, the Kargil Operation was ‘irreversible’, even if the Prime Minister had wanted to reverse it.[1006]

"In the media, a plethora of accusations surfaced, targeting the prime minister: that he had sold Kashmir, surrendered in Washington the victory won at Kargil; he had wasted the sacrifices of the brave soldiers at Kargil, had appeased the Americans, bowed before the Indians etc. With facts of the beginnings, the conduct, and the military outcome of this Operation little known, these accusations seemed plausible. Sharif’s dash to Washington had been widely publicized."

................................................................................................

" ... Pakistan’s chief executive was now under an extraordinary level of intelligence watch. The intelligence under the army’s high command maintained a close tab on the prime minister and his cabinet. The army intelligence picked up the Prime Minister House chatter. The army chief complained to a confidante that the PM’s intercepts had revealed that he would make Musharraf apologize publicly,[1007] claiming that the PM had promised this to the Indian Prime Minister! Considering that, ever since the cover was blown from the Kargil Operation plan, the PM had taken ownership of it and tried to extricate, in his calculation, Pakistan and its Army with honour, self-respect, and minimal diplomatic damage, such an undertaking seemed highly unlikely. ..."

"The army chief’s anger and nervousness persisted. The blame talk would just not end. There were complaints from within the army high command, chatter in Army messes, insinuations from the government’s men, and a few voices even within the media. He had requested the government several times to respond to news reports blaming the army chief for the debacle–indeed, even of conducting it unconstitutionally, i.e., without the chief executive’s permission."

In short, he wanted the lie and the cover, the pretense of it having been the civilian government decision to invade, to continue - along with the lies about no paki government involvement, it having been all independent terrorists.

................................................................................................

" ... Nervous and jumpy, the Kargil clique arranged to target its principal adversary, the prime minister himself, by weaving a two-front siege around him. They reached out to journalists to gauge the mood in the civilian quarters. Others were tasked to gauge the mood and reach out to the distraught Opposition parties and estranged politicians within the ruling party.

"The 14 September interview splashed by Pakistan’s most widely read Urdu daily, in which Sharif’s backchannel point-man Niaz A. Naik held the army responsible for sabotaging, what he claimed was, a time-bound plan that the two prime ministers had agreed upon for resolving the Kashmir dispute, deepened suspicion in the barracks. Naik had also asserted that Sharif had not been informed of the Kargil Operation, first hearing of it around 25 April. This contradicted Musharraf’s public statement of 16 July that ‘everyone was on board’.[1008] On 15 September, a prestigious English daily published ‘military source’s expectation that “some responsible functionary would remove the impression created by the former foreign secretary that the Army did not want resolution of the Kashmir dispute”’.[1009] The same day, Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz stepped in to more than clarify. In his Senate speech, he said that the armed forces had acted in the interests of Pakistan and it was ‘totally untrue’ that through the Kargil crisis the armed forces had undermined the Pakistan-India peace process.[1010] Nevertheless, the foreign minister seconded Naik’s claim that a time-bound approach to resolving Kashmir had been agreed upon. Sartaj’s speech also addressed the signing of the CTBT, a red herring issue in the hands of the political opposition. He was categorical that Pakistan ‘will not consider signing it till the time sanctions imposed by the US were removed’.[1011]

"Matters were in a flux. On 15 September, the Foreign Office spokesperson formally announced that the Prime minister had ‘no plans’ to attend the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session. The cancellation was unexpected. The reason that circulated in the press was that, because Pakistan had decided against signing the CTBT, the PM wanted to avoid the pressure he was likely to face at the UNGA, especially from the Clinton administration. However, less known was the fact that a close confidante of the army chief, who was also an intimate friend of the Sharif family with easy access to the prime minister’s father, contributed to the PM’s decision to miss the UNGA session. Musharraf, wary of what the PM might say about the Kargil clique, and especially about him, was keen that he not attend the UNGA.[1012] The confidante was therefore sent to Mian Sharif to convince him to dissuade his son from traveling to New York. Mian Sharif was convinced that, with trouble brewing at home, it was unwise for his son to travel. The PM did not travel."

Obviously, if it was that easy for the army to control the paki PM without subterfuge, the subsequent coup was merely making it official!

................................................................................................

"The angry chief’s words were interpreted by many as signalling a possible coup looming around the corner."

" ... Clinton administration had been sending messages through US Ambassador Milam, to send his envoy, so that Clinton could follow up with his 4 July promise of helping restart the Pakistan-India dialogue on Kashmir. ‘Do not send someone from the Foreign Office,’ was the message. In Islamabad, it was expected that the US would help Pakistan to continue with the Lahore process. ... ‘Trust’ was the key consideration for the prime minister. So, in the midst of raging political troubles, Nawaz Sharif sent off his brother Shehbaz Sharif as his special envoy to Washington."

" ... The State Department’s South Asia men had gauged Sharif’s political troubles. The Islamabad whispers of a possible coup or a likely Musharraf sacking were loud enough to reach Washington. They wanted to hear from Sharif’s emissary how deep the civil-military divide was. They were keen for facts on the follow-through on Pakistani troop withdrawal from Kargil and Islamabad’s re-engagement with India. Away from the India question, Islamabad and Washington were active partners in a ‘Get Osama’ Operation. This included both Islamabad directly persuading Mullah Omar to give up OBL and also the launch of a joint operation with the CIA to physically capture the al-Qaeda chief."

................................................................................................

"Shehbaz held a six-hour-long marathon session with Karl Inderfurth and Walter Anderson. The meeting took place at Washington’s historical Willard Hotel, where Shehbaz was staying. The Willard was where Abraham Lincoln had spent the night before his first inauguration as President in 1861. Before the Inderfurth-Shehbaz marathon session began, as an ice-breaker gesture, the otherwise frugal Inderfurth had spent $80 to buy his Pakistani guest The History of the Willard Hotel. 

"In Washington, Shehbaz Sharif’s concern about the possibility of a coup was apparent. Although he ‘never said he feared a coup but was beating around the bush’. There was very little discussion on how to advance the Lahore process. Some among the US side found that ‘the dialogue was sterile on Kashmir’.[1019]"

" ... On Kargil, Shehbaz Sharif informed them that troop movement was going according to plan. However, throughout the meeting, Shehbaz repeatedly expressed concern about ‘extra constitutional’ developments. He, in fact, referred to it 15 times. Yet, he did not once mention the word ‘military’ nor asked for US help in dealing with the military. His focus on ‘extra constitutional pressures on an elected government’, combined with what Washington was picking up from Islamabad, left no doubt among the Americans that trouble was brewing for the elected government that the Clinton administration would have rather seen in office. However, Sharif’s special envoy never said he feared a coup. He gave mixed signals and the Americans did not get candid answers on facts."

" ... In fact, as Talbott would later recall, ‘Shehbaz would not quite confirm, even in response to direct questions, that a military coup was brewing.’[1020] However, he added, ‘Shehbaz’s mannerisms, his mirthless smiles, long silences, and abrupt changes of subject when we asked about the situation at home, left us in no doubt that something was afoot.’[1021]"

" ... When Inderfurth pulled him to the side and asked him if Musharraf was alright, Shehbaz told him he was implementing the 4 July agreement and asked if he knew Musharraf.[1023] Inderfurth replied in the negative. ‘Why don’t you invite Musharraf?’ Shehbaz advised him."

................................................................................................

"A major American takeaway from the Shehbaz visit was that the Sharif-led government was in trouble at home. Senior US administration people like the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Pickering, saw Shehbaz as being ‘worried that they would have to pay for what they did (troop withdrawal)’.[1029]  The US Administration then took an unusual step. From New York, where the Clinton team was attending the UNGA session, Karl Inderfurth issued a statement that called on the Pakistan Army not to try any ‘extra-constitutional method’ to remove the Nawaz Sharif-led government.[1030]"

" ... Washington was keen to extend support to Nawaz Sharif, the man Clinton trusted, the man who had already become a high-value friend after consenting to Washington’s Pak-US collaborative ‘Capture OBL’ Operation. US officials had hoped this statement would alter the prevailing power dynamics in Pakistan to Sharif’s advantage. Such an expectation suggested two problems. One, Washington was delusional about the power its mere word carried. Two, Washington was ignorant of the local dynamics at work in Pakistan."

Author stretches one single point inyo two there, or rather, hides one by doing so. Point really she makes is that crazy jihadist nation that Pakistan have been since inception - that'd be since caliphate movement supported by Gandhi that nevertheless ended with massacre of over 1,500 Hindus in Kerala (termed 'Moplah killings', ie, son-in-law killings, because of Arab traditions of Arab seafaring muslims marrying and keeping local wives in Kerala) - there's no trusting their word even if anyone, including US, pours hundreds of billions of dollars in aid; they'd behead a US citizen as and when they please, anyway, as they fid to Daniel Pearl, denying all responsibility to boot and pretending that the authorities were not aware of goings-on. 

Her first point really should be that US is mistaken in assuming that a beneficiary to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars can influence a thug that the terrorist factory in reality is, all its always been and intends to remain, terrorising - and begging at gunpoint, in turn. 

................................................................................................

"It was the annual season of international diplomacy. The two foreign policy principals, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, had arrived in New York for the UNGA session. ... Jaswant Singh’s gift to Albright was United States and India, 1777 to 1996: Bridge over River Time with Albright reciprocating with Engaging India: U. S. Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy, a collection of essays on America’s strategic relations with India.[1036]  In a sign of growing cordiality between the two capitals, there were unprecedented ‘long, intensive discussions on Afghan developments’, on Clinton’s Delhi trip, the first in 21 years, and on possible counter-terrorism cooperation[1037].

"In New York generally, the Indians found themselves in a comfortable situation, with global focus being on terrorism and counter-terrorism, the very issues for which Delhi sought support. After decades of Washington-Delhi strategic dissonance, signs of strategic convergence were emerging. In fact, the US, Russia, and even Pakistan’s staunchest ally, China, all converged on sanctions against Kabul’s Taliban regime—hosts of  the terrorist mastermind OBL, who planned terrorist attacks against both American and Russian targets.[1038]"

Did the author have a delusion at any point that world - outside her own paki origin - can be comfortable with terrorists or terrorism? Why make it seem as if this, counterterrorism or disapproval of terrorism, was an agenda sold by a single nation that, until then and since, for decades, was victimised by this nothing but the terrorist factory that pakis have forever been?

................................................................................................

" ... Thousands of Kashmiris threatened to cross the LOC on 4 October. Delhi threatened to open fire on those crossing the LOC while Islamabad urged them to call off their march.[1044] While Islamabad, already reeling from the Kargil debacle, decided to let them go and cross over at Chhakoti, the Indian forces were to prevent the crossing in stages through a graduated application of forces.[1045]"

If there are any Kashmiris left in paki occupied parts of Kashmir valley region, they are far too repressed and terrorised to attempt a threat, the place having since paki occupation been completely flooded and dominated by those from Western Punjab, as indeed is everything in pak from army to every province, including East Bengal until 1971, when they fought back to independence. 

Any Kashmir original citizens who dream of independence are the delusional ones that are the pampered and coddled citizens of India who imagine that, while Pakistan exists, Kashmir could have an existence of any kind except a butchered and sold in pieces carcass, as Gilgit, Baltistan and Baluchistan have been since Pakistan occupied those by force. 

It was a Gandhian - mistaken - policy responsible for their travails, by Nehru who refused their accession until too late for Kashmir and more than late for Baluchistan or Nepal. 

................................................................................................

" ... the unstated consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council including Pakistan’s ‘all-weather friend’ and strategic partner China, was that Kargil was a diplomatic and political blunder that derailed the promising Lahore process. ... "

" ... Significantly, most anti-Sharif forces sought military intervention to remove the Sharif-led government."

" ... With Washington impatient for progress on tracking and nabbing bin Laden, the CIA’s counter-terrorism cell saw the ISI as a partner of last resort. In fact, the ISI was viewed as a Taliban and OBL sympathizer, but Ziauddin was not viewed as hard core ISI. Also, Clinton’s South Asia men were against getting directly involved in the Afghan battlefield or directly confronting Pakistan over Afghanistan. Instead, the policy decision was to use Pakistan’s influence with the Taliban to track OBL. During his Washington trip, Pickering sought a meeting with Pakistan’s top spy. Pickering urged Ziauddin to actively nudge Taliban head Mullah Omar to hand over bin Laden to the Americans. And Ziauddin did."

" ... Soon after his return from Washington, General Ziauddin arrived in Kandahar on 5 October. The head of the Afghanistan-Kashmir desk, Major General Jamshed Gulzar, accompanied him. They arrived in a special plane and met Mullah Omar at his abode, a small mosque in Kandahar. At this meeting, the Pakistani intelligence officials offered condolences over the death of his wife and child.[1057] The ISI officials then informed Omar of the reason for their trip. An agitated Omar’s response was, ‘Osama bin Laden is like a bone in my throat. Neither can I digest it nor can I cough him out ... My problem is that I have given him a commitment as an Afghan and I cannot get out.’ Omar continued, ‘I pray that I die or he dies.’ Omar was clear that he ‘will not extradite him but if he goes on his own he should go’. Omar then asked his guests, ‘Can you tell me a country where he could be given protection?’ His guests could not. ... "

Was this work a research thesis submitted before the guy was located, caught and killed in Abbottabad, within walking distance from what US terms 'West Point of' pak? 

Else, was the hiding him in plain sight in the fortress-like house in Abbottabad a subsequent plan? 

Or do pakis really honestly  laim he lived there gorgeous years and they knew nothing? That ISI is indeed so incompetent as to never having noticed Obama living in Abbottabad? 

No, it's far more believable they lied. 

................................................................................................

Here's the extent of paki arrogance - 

"The CIA, in its effort to get OBL extradited, was in direct contact with it’s Pakistani counterpart, the ISI. Recalling the extent of the US desperation to get OBL, a senior ISI official said, ‘If I would have asked him to lick my feet, he would have.’[1060] The ISI, meanwhile, maintained a distance from CIA officials. For example, meetings with the CIA regional chief were held in ISI-run ‘safe houses’ instead of the ISI headquarters."

It's not just that the ISI guy said it, but that it got published with no concern regarding any repercussions. 

................................................................................................

" ... Combined with its aggressive military retaliation, that included heavy artillery and aerial attacks, Delhi stonewalled every Pakistani effort to extract strategic advantage from Operation KP. By early June, although still holding on the heights, Pakistani troops had come under tremendous physical and psychological pressure from both the Indian military offensive and from the disruption of supply routes. ... The Euphoria and Excitement were no more. ... The reality slowly sank in that Operation KP could accrue no gains for Islamabad."

" ... Pakistani troops under Indian attack suffered heavy casualties. ... Given Pakistan’s asymmetrical power structure, it was no surprise that the blundering military clique of Kargil staged a coup against the elected prime minister."

"For the French general, Napoleon Bonaparte, whom Clausewitz called the ‘very god of war’[1127], the centrality of the planning principle for any military campaign meant looking at the ‘worst-case scenario’. This necessarily required that the campaign planner, irrespective of his record of battle successes, not operate from a point of confidence. Instead, as a critical aspect of the planning principle, Napoleon explained how the planner’s personal mindset is central in applying the ‘worst-case scenario’. According to Napoleon, while planning any military campaign, ‘There is no man more pusillanimous than I when I am planning a campaign. I purposely exaggerate all the dangers and all the calamities that the circumstances make possible. I am in a thoroughly painful state of agitation.’[1128] Rarely have world class generals uttered such words of caution and humility, as did Napoleon, thus, emphasizing the criticality of thoroughness of planning for any success in military campaigns.

"Bravado or overconfidence was, thus, unknown to this military genius who, at the age of 26, had commanded the armies of the French Republic against Lombardy (in present-day Italy) and demonstrated near-invincibility in battle.[1129]

"Clearly, most military theorists have not only emphasized the centrality of planning in war but have warned against letting a general’s personality traits and biases undermine his own planning. For example, Clausewitz[1130] especially underscores personality traits like vanity, ambition, and vindictiveness that can move a general from the very planning course that alone is critical to his success and the success of the battle he has planned.

"In contrast to the above mentioned approach of the world’s leading military theorists and military commanders, the Kargil planners were overtaken by enthusiasm and a sense of payback. They were so obsessed with settling historical scores that it never crossed their minds to factor in the worst-case scenario. When the junior officers at 10 Corps heard of the operation, some had muttered their concerns. A confidential document moved through GHQ pointed out, ‘Indians won’t be stupid enough to humiliate themselves by politicizing the conflict.’ On this, an intelligence officer had written, ‘What if they are?’ The officer got rebuked but the question was never answered. Finally, the army chief General Pervez Musharraf raised the question of the Indian response at the January meeting convened for final clearance. However, the Operation had already been launched two months earlier, in November.

"Thus, the foremost planning blunder committed by the Kargil clique was their absolute failure to even factor in, leave alone follow the Napoleonic principle of ‘exaggerating’, possible dangers and calamities that may have arisen during Operation KP. ... Implicit in the planning was the faulty notion that by the time India discovered Pakistani troops across the LOC and controlling India’s lifeline to its troops in Leh, Delhi would find itself locked in a virtual surrender mode with no option but to settle on terms dictated by Pakistan. In such an all-victorious projection for Operation KP, the Kargil planners had turned on its head the cardinal war planning principle of exaggerating your adversary’s response."

................................................................................................

" ... The first major Indian attack on the supplies targeted a key forward ammunition dump. Subsequent aerial bombing and heavy artillery attacks in the encounter and exit phases almost entirely disrupted the supply lines. The Indian counter-attack had effectively cut-off what the Kargil planners and, subsequently, the field commanders had established as the Pakistani perimeter within which Operation KP was to be conducted. This made it virtually impossible for men and mules to ply on the supply routes. ... "

" ... Expansion of the war theatre, a classic mission creep phenomenon, has serious implications for logistics, supply lines, and manpower. In Operation KP, the situation for the Pakistani foot soldiers was no different. Within two months of the Operation, they were lured by the vacant spaces and strategic heights in the Kargil area. They had calculated that deeper spread of Pakistani posts on the dominating heights meant greater strategic positioning to tackle Indian retaliation. For example, a platoon in a dominating position could destroy a battalion.

"The field commanders after communicating this ground scenario to the Commander FCNA were granted permission to increase the number of posts to be established across the LOC ... Hence, instead of the initial seven to eight posts, around 196 posts (including defensive centers and outposts) were established. These covered five sectors instead of the planned single sector. This mission creep had led Pakistani troops almost 10 to 15 km ... positioned across 500–600 km of Indian territory. Beyond strategic reasons, there was also the element of competitiveness and adventure among the soldiers that contributed to what had presented itself as classic mission creep.

"‘Rapid march … press on!’ Napoleon counselled men at war. In his seminal work on military operations, Napoleon explains, ‘The strength of an army is like the power in mechanics estimated by multiplying mass by rapidity; a rapid march augments the morale of an army and increases its means of victory.’ This obsession of Napoleon with rapid marches was the major pitfall in his flawed Russian campaign. Almost 200 years later, a similar lesson was manifested again at Kargil."

................................................................................................

"The Kargil planners launched Operation Kargil to exploit Indian vulnerability along the Srinagar-Leh Highway and to sufficiently weaken India so that Pakistan could literally, as Clausewitz would argue, ‘Impose conditions ... at the peace conference.’[1146] These conditions, which the Kargil clique had initially hoped to impose, related to getting Siachen vacated. Subsequently, they changed to seeking freedom for Kashmir, and then to ‘internationalizing’ the issue of Jammu and Kashmir."

" ... It was assumed that, with their Leh-based troops facing the prospect of receiving no supplies after Pakistan virtually blocked the Srinagar-Leh Highway, Delhi would be accommodating. The Kargil clique also believed that the global community would promptly intervene diplomatically to defuse a potentially war-like tension between the two new nuclear states.

"At several points, the planning clique’s half-baked and ill-conceived approach was exposed. There was talk that the planning and analysis wing of the ISI wrote a detailed report on the proposed operation when the plan reached its office but the COAS personally intervened with DG ISI to close down the study. In March, when a young team proposed opening new fronts in Kargil to increase the pressure on the Indians, they were warned that Pakistan could not risk destabilizing the relationship with India. Subsequently, the responses of the Kargil planners when, from May onwards they were in the dock, were muddled and confused. For example, in May, General Aziz, a key planner, had boasted of the Kargil Operation as providing an opportunity to the PM of becoming the Pakistani leader responsible for liberating Kashmiris. At the FO meeting that month, when asked by the deputy air chief what they wanted, the response was unclear. Similarly, at the 2 July DCC meeting, when Ishaq Dar asked what they wanted, the response was again ambiguous. Clarity of purpose, which is the first principle of all military planners, had vanished in a haze of euphoria and wishful thinking.

................................................................................................

"According to Napoleon, ‘Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.’"

Did India know of the paki incursion in November, when it happened, and waited to hit them in June, at leisure?

................................................................................................

" ... It was no surprise that Beijing virtually read the Riot Act to Pakistan’s foreign minister when he arrived in China for an SOS trip on 11 June. Pakistan, he was told, had to vacate Kargil, Kashmir had to be resolved bilaterally, and Beijing had no influence on Indian dealings with Pakistan. Within three days of Aziz’s departure, the Indian foreign minister arrived in Beijing to a rousing welcome."

" ... Javed Hassan’s exchanges as defense attaché in Washington had left him believing, though utterly unfounded,[1148] that in case of a Pakistan-initiated military exchange with India, Washington would support Pakistan against India.

"The past occasions, when perception of movement of some kind of nuclear weapons from Kahuta, had rung alarm bells in Washington, the Kargil clique saw a potential for nuclear blackmail working to Pakistan’s advantage. They believed that a panicked world community, led by Washington, would instantly intervene after the impact of a successfully executed Operation KP was publicized and the newly nuclearized neighbors would be seen as being on the brink of war. India checkmated this calculation primarily by Delhi’s decision to restrict Indian military response restricted to the Kargil region and by not opening new fronts. Hence, a consensus emerged within the global community, especially in the US and the EU, that a nuclear Pakistan’s rash behavior, which involved forsaking of diplomatic engagement and opting for military engagement with traces of nuclear blackmail, would not be rewarded."

" ... The first trip in ten years by an Indian foreign minister to China was in the works. Pakistan, by contrast, was in a difficult strategic situation. Its Afghanistan policy was under criticism and it was blamed for facilitating ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamic militancy’. ... "

Using quote marks does not transform facts, definitely does not veil truth, into or by a lie. It merely exposes one making the ridiculous attempt to be not taken seriously due to the attempted clever lie. 

................................................................................................

"10) Answers to Critical and Abiding Questions About Operation Koh Paima:

"Did the military inform the Prime Minister about the Kargil Operation?

" ... Only in March, General Aziz had asked one of his staff officers to hand him a map that he would use to brief the PM. Such a briefing pre-17 May did not, however, take place. Subsequently, the May Musharraf-Aziz telephone recordings left no doubt that the Kargil clique had undertaken Operation KP without specific clearance from the prime minister.[1149]

"Beginning with the November 1998 DCC meeting[1150] ... it was unlikely that the Kargil clique would have reached out to the same prime minister to get his support and clearance for Operation KP. Equally, the clique would have known that getting the prime minister’s support for a major operation in contested territory, just when arrangements for the Lahore Summit were under way, was unlikely. The prime minister was viewed by a section of the army high command and hard line analysts as being overly committed to peace with India, to the extent of a failing. Nawaz Sharif was, therefore, the most unlikely candidate to play a double game with India."

................................................................................................

"Did Pakistan’s Intelligence Agencies Fail over Kargil?

"The two agencies mandated to pick up intelligence are the Military Intelligence and the ISI. In the case of Kargil, while individuals from within the ISI and the MI both appear to have attempted to investigate, both these agencies failed to pick up anything indicating unusual troop movements as leads to the covert yet unfolding Kargil Operation. The ISI’s failure meant that this cross-service agency, reporting directly to the PM, was unable to report the moves and the implications of the Kargil Operation to the government. Similarly, the MI’s failure ensured that, except for the gang of four, no one within the army top brass knew of the Operation. This dual institutional failure also raised broader questions regarding the effectiveness of Pakistan’s intelligence in monitoring stray and subversive Pakistani elements within the country’s own defense institutions. If the remoteness of the theatre of operations prevented the ISI and MI from monitoring the crossing of the LOC, the failure to pick up unusual military and paramilitary troop movements, either of the NLI troops or the 19 Division or of the SSG, was symptomatic of a deficient intelligence setup. The ISI’s defense was that it does not follow any movements, including internal troop movements; therefore, unless the army informs them about its operational plans, the ISIwill not know. Meanwhile, with ISI and MI both outside of the planning and execution loop of Operation KP, they also failed to report Indian preparations for force deployment, including troops and weapon systems, in the zone of conflict. Significantly, among other factors, this complete ‘intel blindness’ also ruled out all possibility of any early and pre-emptive course correction during Operation KP."

So - all they can do is send terrorists to burn hotels and kill people in India?

................................................................................................

"Was Pakistan militarily on a winning curve when the July fourth withdrawal decision was made?

"Pakistan remained on a winning curve only until the Encounter Phase, when in early May Indian troops first discovered Pakistani troops across the LOC. That initial encounter was marked by artillery exchanges and with Indian induction of aerial power. From early June onwards, after the Indian Army command began discovering the extent ... there began a graduated Indian military retaliation. Operation KP had turned into a battle. For the Indian government ... "

No, it always was war, inflicted by pakis on India. 

" ... As the Indians deployed massive air power, disrupting Pakistan’s supply lines, hitting logistic dumps, targeting soldiers, and generating severe psychological pressure on the Pakistani troops, the original advantage to the Pakistani troops, of being positioned at heights and enjoying lethal strategic advantage over the Indian troops climbing to attack them, began to erode. On 4 June, Pakistan lost Tololing, the first peak, to the Indians. Thereon, as they came under severe artillery and aerial attacks and faced deployment of the Bofors guns, Pakistani troops began to lose posts and pickets. Pakistani troop casualties were also on the rise. ... "

Author's insinuations against India continue here, against soldiers and government both, as she praises pakis (for sitting on peaks) killing Indian soldiers battling uphill (with boulders pushed down), she credits Indian victories to Indian artillery shelling - as if pakis were raining flower petals on Indian soldiers! 

" ... Contrary to the allegations made against the prime minister that he had bartered away in Washington the military victory that the troops were winning in Kargil, the PM brought to a rapid close costly military, diplomatic, and political losses in Kargil."

................................................................................................

"Could the international community have forced India to buckle under Kargil pressure?

"There were neither individual nor collective compulsions for key members of the international community to have even advised Delhi to enter into negotiations on any outstanding bilateral dispute. The question of any member, including Pakistan’s strategic ally China, to have even advised, leave aside forced, India to buckle under the pressure from Operation KP and enter into negotiations over Siachen etc. with Pakistan, did not arise. In fact, any move likely to culminate in a military confrontation between Pakistan and India, the two hostile neighbors who had recently acquired nuclear weapons, would make the international community panic. And Pakistan had made the move—which was also being interpreted as nuclear blackmail by Pakistan. ... There was complete consensus within the key members of the international community, including the US, EU states, the UN, and also Pakistan’s closest strategic ally, China, that Pakistan should not be rewarded for Operation Kargil. ... "

"Did Pakistan plan to deploy nuclear weapons in an all-out war?

"There were neither individual nor collective compulsions for key members of the international community to have even advised Delhi to enter into negotiations on any outstanding bilateral dispute. The question of any member, including Pakistan’s strategic ally China, to have even advised, leave aside forced, India to buckle under the pressure from Operation KP and enter into negotiations over Siachen etc. with Pakistan, did not arise. In fact, any move likely to culminate in a military confrontation between Pakistan and India, the two hostile neighbors who had recently acquired nuclear weapons, would make the international community panic. ... "

Later, the then paki army chief made similar assertions after his coup, but he wasn't doing so without thought, and it was clear blackmail. 

" ... but was not backed by substantive evidence. ... "

When someone wielding a gun pointing at you is threatening to shoot to kill, and showing no sign of civilised conduct, it's a rare one who'd ask a prophet if the threat was intended to be carried out - or ask the gun wielding thug for proof of intentions by demonstration of performance. 

" ... Pakistan military’s high command had sabotaged the Lahore Summit and should not be rewarded. Pakistan had to be made to retreat unconditionally. ... "

" ... As a key member of the clique later recalled, they conveyed to the country’s elected leadership, ‘We are holding this. Now you take advantage, whatever you can, at military and political level.’[1156] However, the unfolding Kargil crisis proved the clique’s nuclear deterrence calculation flawed on two counts: Operation KP did turn into a military conflict and, while Washington and other Security Council members did exercise forceful diplomacy, it was to force Pakistan to retreat from Kargil, not to reward Pakistan’s operation. The spin-off of this clique’s brinkmanship (read nuclear blackmail) was immensely negative. It undid the diplomatic gains accrued to Pakistan for its mature diplomatic and political moves after the nuclear tests."

"Three factors point to deliberate manipulation. First, Pakistan was not in such a desperate military situation that it would have needed to opt for nuclear weapons. Secondly, and most importantly, Pakistan did not then have the capability to the deploy nuclear weapons[1158], nor had the Indians picked any intelligence on Pakistan readying nuclear weapons. Thirdly, the Americans deliberately chose an attitude of benign neglect and ignored Indian moves to ready its nuclear missiles for use.[1159] ... "

When a thug breaks in at midnight wielding a gun pointed at you, a policeman with any sense is likely to not ask if the gun is likely to fire or has a bullet, and what's more, would excuse the threatened victims of break-in - for arming and retaliation. 

Especially so in US.

................................................................................................

"Was there a pro-India tilt in Washington during Kargil?

"With the Kargil blunder, Pakistan provided the Clinton Administration a priceless opportunity to invest in strategic trust-building with India. Throughout the crisis, Washington’s key policy men opened multiple lines of communication with their Indian counterparts. It began with the 27 May call by Inderfurth, who called the India ambassador, Naresh Chandra, to inform him about what Pickering had told the Pakistanis. Subsequently, on 16 June, Inderfurth met with Brajesh Mishra in Cologne. After the 23 June Islamabad meetings between US CENTCOM Chief General Zinni and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and army chief General Musharraf, State Department official Lanpher went to brief Delhi on the Islamabad meetings. Similarly, during the crucial Sharif-Clinton summit on 4 July, in a manner unprecedented in summit diplomacy, Clinton would call Vajpayee to brief him of the summit talks. Similarly, the Indian NSA and External Affairs Minister were also updated on Sharif-Clinton talks by their counterparts, NSA Sandy Berger and Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. The sole purpose was to share with the Indians every aspect of their communications with Pakistan."

It's unclear if the above is realistic evaluation or a skewed perception. 

................................................................................................

"Was there a role for the backchannel?

"Washington’s decision to maintain complete transparency with Delhi on its diplomatic and political exchanges with Islamabad had left Islamabad with no negotiating space. Guaranteed for itself a bailout by Washington and for Islamabad an embarrassing retreat, Delhi was left with no motive to engage with Islamabad. The backchannel initiative was, thus, squeezed of any possibility of success."

Translated into normal honest words, there was no space left for duplicity, lies et al that's normal paki everyday language! 

They tried, and desperately so, especially in the most obvious lies maintained simultaneously in internal and international arena, despite the fraud being quite obvious to international community - of claiming publicly that the men invading india were not paki military, for one, while maintaining that their pm was aware of the Kargil invasion all along even as he was hosting the PM of India, for another - but then complain about these lies, once exposed, destroying any possibility of respect for pakis. 

Thus the claim and complaint about lack of equal treatment on par with that meted out to India. 

................................................................................................

"Was the Prime Minister’s Washington dash necessary? 

"As the country’s chief executive, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could have ordered withdrawal of Pakistani troops, bringing an end to Operation KP. In keeping with Islamabad’s public position that the Kashmiri Mujahideen and not the Pakistani troops had seized the heights, Sharif could have announced that Islamabad would use its goodwill to urge the Kashmiri Mujahideen to return from IOK. This would have been consistent with the farcical ‘Mujahideen’ position Pakistan had illogically and clumsily maintained since the beginning of Operation KP. The international community would have been relieved that the battle between two nuclear powers had drawn to a close. The prime minister, however, chose to engage the Clinton Administration because he had hoped that Washington would make a public statement of support for the Kashmiris and of facilitating a political resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Sharif and his close political aides also believed that American involvement at this withdrawal stage would make it more palatable for the army high command since the army chief had himself had sought Washington’s engagement. However, as subsequent developments showed, neither did the Clinton administration make any public statements supporting the Kashmir struggle, nor did the Sharif-Clinton 4 July encounter influence the post-Kargil tensions that surfaced between the elected prime minister and the army chief."

Here, and throughout the book on this point, author tries subterfuge to veil a lie. She claims that the Washington trip was for Kashmir. 

It wasn't. 

Plain truth is that, despite the lies to the contrary position proclaimed repeatedly by author, in reality pakis were being not only pounded relentlessly by India but couldn't take it, and the paki dash to Washington was the bully going crying to the police asking him to stop his intended victim bashing him up, something the bully hadn't expected - and this failed, since everyone in the international community was aware, via satellite footage, of who had invaded. 

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"Could the Prime Minister have Ordered an Inquiry Against The Kargil Planners, Especially the Army Chief?

"Immediately after 4 July, tensions began developing between Sharif and Musharraf, with each worried about his survival. Investigating the why, who, and how of Operation KP, to establish responsibility and to take action against those who had launched an operation that had ended in such a fiasco, was, however, far removed from the prime minister’s mind. Civil-military coordination remained generally smooth almost throughout the Kargil period. Some briefings for the PM were held at the 10 Corps Headquarters. Most, however, were held in the PM House, where the army brass would bring its maps, etc. Often, meetings would almost take the form of the DCC but hardly any decision-making took place in these. The prime minister had, in fact, left the decision-making process during Kargil in military hands. Although Sharif had the constitutional authority to directly lead decision-making, he did not ‘interfere’[1160] and had simply supported the army.

"The thought of holding an inquiry against Musharraf is unlikely to have occurred to a PM who had supported Operation KP. It is true that the PM was first briefed of the Operation only after it was a done deed. The PM had also declined Musharraf’s rhetorical mid-stream offer to withdraw his troops from Kargil. In fact, there was written evidence of the Parliament’s bipartisan Defense Committee’s positive support for Operation Kargil in a letter written by the Committee chairman in praise of the army chief’s presentation."

And, unlike the army chief with his openly thug mindset, Nawaz Sharif remained honest enough and decent enough to not turn immediately on someone when it was a fiasco, despite his own self having neither been aware nor initiated it, and never in control, of the assault, until he was required as the figurehead to get help from US to get India to stop! 

"In the overall asymmetric civil-military relations in Pakistan’s power structure, there have been only two incidences when elected prime ministers sought to hold army commanders to account. One was when, after the 1971 surrender at Dhaka and the breakup of Pakistan, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto formed the Hamoodur Rehman Commission to conduct an inquiry into the military debacle. His army chief, Zia ul-Haq overthrew him in a military coup and hanged him following legally dubious court proceedings. The second was in 1988, when Prime Minister Junejo ordered an inquiry into the deadly Ojri Camp ammunition disaster. No sooner had he announced the inquiry, the military President Zia ul-Haq sacked him."

And the post Kargil coup wasn't different, either. 

"In the absence of a political culture of holding the military accountable, the reactions of military men when held accountable, the complexities of the initiation and, indeed, of the termination of Operation KP, the fiercely anti-Nawaz mood of the political opposition, and the dominant claim of the time that Kashmiri Mujahideen had fought the Indians across the LOC while Pakistani troops fought mostly along the LOC: all these militated against Sharif conducting a Kargil inquiry. ... "

Again author is verbose in attempting to veil facts - namely, that pakis never have had a properly functioning government of any sort other than a military dictatorship, never any culture or education system other than one rooted in invader and looters mindset carrying heritage of history of hordes from Central and West Asia invading, looting and destroying India- which included until 1947 the very land pakis were given, torn out of India - and no other aim set for their very nation other than destruction of India, as a result of this choice of the heritage. 

The so-called nation, in reality is no more than a jihadist factory grown around a  military base, for West for freedom of expensive usage against Russia, conceived in this mindset of invading and looting, and aim of destruction of India now grown to destruction of the world, and born of deliberately perpetrated massacres of thousands of Hindus in 1946-47 that were intended to, and succeeded in, forcing India to let a piece be torn out. 

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"Beyond fear, the contradictions of the Operation, Kargil produced serious frictions even in the post-Kargil phase. For example, while maintain its insistence that Mujahideen had been fighting in Kargil, how could the army receive the bodies of the martyred soldiers? Similarly, while insisting that only Mujahideen fought in Kargil, how could major programmes honouring the martyrs of Kargil be organized by the Sharif government? ... The army sought widely publicized honouring of the Kargil martyrs and of those having returned alive from across the LOC."

"Throughout history, the acid test of generals at war or in military operations has been the victories they have piled up. No general is more successful than the outcome of the war he leads. In more complex situations, like those in South Asia in the second half of the twentieth century, the yardstick for assessment has to be what have the wars have achieved. History has examples of individual brilliance leading armies to victories and steering nations away from disaster. Outstanding military commanders, such as Alexander, Khalid bin Walid, Genghis Khan, Julius Caesar, Salahuddin Ayyubi, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Vo Nguyen Giap, were men who wrested victory from situations where deep imprints of defeat were written. Bin Walid became the legendary general who, despite the numerical superiority of battle-hardened adversaries like the Romans and the Sassanids, piled up victories for the Rashiddun Caliphate. Napoleon ‘inspired a ragged, mutinous, half-starved army and made it fight’[1161] like a winning combination that few would fight before or after. Salahuddin, with his less experienced army, reversed the Crusaders’ winning streak with his grand victory in the decisive Battle of Hattin in 1187. Julius Caesar, personally brave in battle, was creative in tactics and engineering. There was Alexander, another general facing most armies who outnumbered his own, but always remaining undefeated. Genghis Khan, a masterful general who, through excellent military intelligence and tactics and by uniting nomadic tribes and confederation and his strategic raids, became the founder of the Mongol Empire, the largest contiguous empire in history, which included most of Eurasia and substantial parts of Eastern Europe. In more recent times, the Viet Minh Commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap, who led his men to defeat a technologically superior adversary by perfecting and applying a unique war technique, which was the most important dimension of the Vietcong’s overall political, economic, and diplomatic strategy for defeating the Americans.

"In the Kargil operation, the performance of the clique of commanders, the quality of their strategic planning, and of their command, all tell a different story. Yet the power equation, absence of any accountability, the absence of censure when it mattered, and bravado minus logic or sound analysis, have ruled the day. Despite repeated blunders, the commanders in charge escaped accountability."

What author is either unable to perceive, or unable to say, is that the paki military is a bully who, thrashed outside, comes home to beat up his wife and children, old parents and helpless siblings. 

................................................................................................

" ... Major General Akbar Khan, the lead military man in Pakistan's first attempt to regain Kashmir, had readily accepted Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's label of ‘raiders’ for the Pakistani forces involved in the 1947–48 ‘Acquire Kashmir’ Operation. ... "

Kashmir had been free until invaded by pakis, and it wasn't Nehru but Jinnah who pretended thst it was tribals, not his military. 

" ... The former general, eulogising the Pakistani ‘raiders’, suggested, ‘We may perhaps also qualify for sitting in that distinguished gallery of personalities like Genghis Khan, Timur Lang, Mahmud of Ghazni, and even Alexander.’ Interestingly, Pakistan's senior-most general equated his own men with history’s prized military leaders, who had raided, ravaged, and even reigned over foreign lands in the pre-Westphalian world. ... "

No, he was far more specific, in his dream and desire to belong to the club that was all comprised of invaders each from elsewhere and attacked India, invaded and looted India, sought to destroy India. 

He included none of the tall figures that were from or of India, despite his own homeland having been a part of India for ever until then less than a year ago, and his own ancestral origins being in India, 

And that's the divide, of India- and those that seek to destroy India. 

" ... This voluntary characterization of a state's army as ‘raiders’, in the context especially of the Kashmir operation, flowed from the juxtaposition in this Pakistani soldier's mind, of the Pakistan Army as a force for right, dedicated to undoing the wrong committed at the time of Pakistan's creation. ... "

That's convoluted fraud seeking to justify invasions, massacres and loot, with fraudulent claims of rights. 

British had in fact given far too much land to pakis in the first place, when plebiscite would have denied them all but East Bengal, which alone had voted for partition. Sindh was evenly divided in vote. Punjab had voted for unionists and NWFP was determined to stay with India - as was Baluchistan. Brits rode roughshod over all of the provinces in handing over the land pakis got, because it was military base needed for use of West against Russia. 

What those raiders were identifying with was, has always been, identity of invaders, looters, destroyers and killers wreaking havoc against India. This isn't due to perceived rights but simply a mindset of a robber. 

And they certainly had no 'right' to Kashmir, which, until pakis attacked, was independent. 

Author does lie on level after level, not very differently from a rotten onion. 

................................................................................................

" ... India's  systematic role in being a mid-wife to the 1971 breakup of Pakistan ... "

Because East Bengal hadn't been subjected to racist discrimination and linguistic chauvinism of denying freedom of language, not to mention massacre of three million and mass gang rapes of half a million, by paki military? 

Or was it because India prevented pakis from massacring further millions? 

No, author simply lies through the rest of the paragraph along the lines. 

................................................................................................

"The period from Kargil to the Coup epitomizes the inherent and continuing problems that Pakistan faces in three specific areas. These include two policy areas Pakistan-US relations, relations with India including Kashmir. There is also the third structural issue of thorny civil-military relations. While on the two policy areas of India and Kashmir, there are external players that influence the nature of the challenges that Pakistan faces, Pakistan too as an interlocutor contributes to the dynamic of the relationship. Meanwhile the structural problem of civil-military relations, rooted in the process of State formation, and the unequal stature and authority of the political and the garrison entities, evolved into asymmetrical strengths of both. Within the ensuing power chemistry of Pakistan, the army acquired a dominant role, paving the way to military coups."

"The asymmetry of authority in the army’s favor has continued because of the inability of most elected governments, except for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, to bolster its Constitutional authority through institutional decision-making. ... "

Here author mentions a civilian government's head who was legally executed by a military dictator post coup, as an exception to paki history of "authority in the army’s favor"! 

What could be a better example of the fraudulent writing by the author?!

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"In 1989, Pakistan again turned towards Kashmir. ... Pakistan’s ISI began deploying its Afghan-trained muscle in the widespread and indigenous insurgency."

Pakis admit, there, the responsibility for terrorist attacks against India. 

Author refers to terrorism exported by pakis resulting in genocide and subsequent exodus of Hindus as ordered by the said terrorists, ordered on loudspeakers of mosques. 

" ... Especially since the 1989 Kashmir Uprising ... "

They do have expertise at lying don't they, pakis! Fraudulent labels is part of it. 

................................................................................................

"For Pakistan withdrawal inevitable

" ... They were continuously exposed to the Indian air and artillery pounding as hundreds of sorties dropped thousands of kilos of bombs.[609] On the ground, the young soldiers wondered why their own airpower was not being deployed. They felt “unnerved by the Indian airpower, in fact terrorized by the sound in the cold weather and those mountains’ ungodly heights.”[610] ... "

There, in a nutshell, is why Himaalaya belongs to India - no Indian would abuse it thus! Himaalaya is not only evered and loved, but seen as home of Gods and Goddesses - and very matter-of-factly so, throughout India. As is the very land of India, with all its rivers and mountains. Anyone who abuses it the way author does there, simply doesn't belong, and has no business being there. 

................................................................................................

Author titles a section "India’s Sledge & Hammer" to almost openly claim that Indian soldiers did no more than occupy posts emptied due chiefly to artillery and air strikes, having praised pakis repeatedly for climbing up peaks unopposed. 

This skewed perception and description would only explain heavy losses of paki military, but then, why do pakis boast repeatedly over past two decades snd more, about thousands of Indian soldiers killed by a handful of pakis? 

The two pictures don't match, and the disparity thereof only goes on to bolster the impression Hilary Clinton voiced, when she said that pakis lie so routinely, it's difficult to know if they are aware of it when they lie. 

Author ends the one-paragraph section with a giveaway. 

" ... Aerial reconnaissance, intel flow, and even possession of Pakistani maps showing Pakistan’s deployments, were captured from the fallen post at Tololing.[546]"

Were Author and pakis expecting Indian soldiers to avert glances from Intel left by enemy at captured post, and call them to hand the papers over? 

Notice that author doesn't criticise the arrogance of paki military in allowing this to happen at all in the first place, by having such information littering at the post - because they'd assumed, as author points out more than once in this work, that Indians don't fight. 

Author follows it up with more sledgehammering at India, with another section titled "Posts to Powder". A sample - 

" ... Following the high Indian casualties when their infantry troops had blindly and tentatively attempted to scale the Kargil-Drass mountains, in June they deliberately opted to use the “sledgehammer” approach “to save valuable lives of one’s troops while making the enemy cry out ’Uncle’.”[552] The preponderance of firepower now defined the continuing battle in the world’s highest war theatre. The Indian “sledgehammer” tactics, literally raining fire onto the exhausted yet still motivated Pakistanis soldiers, worked for the Indians. It incapacitated and killed the troops, already short in numbers, and disrupted supplies, ammunition, and logistics."

Were author and other pakis expecting rose bouquets rained on the men whom pakis had themselves labelled terrorists? 

................................................................................................

"June Reversals"

Another misleading title there, considering India had barely begun to be aware of attempted paki invasion in May; so June was only beginning, as far as war goes. 

"After making serious attempts on 3 June to retake the Tololing peak in Drass, Indian troops captured it on June 13. Several important heights in the Batalik sector were captured on 20 and 21 June; on June 23 several heights were captured around point 5203 and on June 30 strategic peaks closer to Tiger Hills.[553] The strategic Tiger Hill came under severe artillery attack. Around June 21, the Operation hit its lowest ebb for Pakistan, when the Indian troops, through fierce, ground, artillery and air attacks, recaptured Tololing complex. After Tololing fell, reports of Indian recapture flowed in daily as the Pakistani-held posts fell like ninepins. [554] The pressure was still on the Indians, given the scale of intrusion by the Pakistani troops.[555]The Indian Army chief himself conceded, “No time-frame could be fixed for vacating the incursions.”[556]"

"The Missing Mujahideen

"Significantly, the Mujahideen factor lagged behind at this critical juncture. The mainstay of Pakistan’s military strategy, since 1996-1997, was that through guerrilla-type ambushes targeting Indian troops in ... Kashmir, with full artillery support, bridges will be blown up, tracks uprooted, soldiers attacked, to prevent large scale offensive-induction of Indian troops. ... "

Some incorrect details, or deliberate lies, there. This strategy of so-called tribals oak is claimed were attacking, which author calls "guerrilla-type" here, was used by pakis in 1947 in attacking Kashmir, and again used by pakis in attack against India in 1965. 

Author mentions 1996-1997, but paki terrorists assaulting India had already begun in 1990, if not before.  

Exodus of nonmuslims enforced in Kashmir by the said terrorists, via genocide inflicted against Hindus and others in Kashmir in January 1990, is denied by pakis, as is hand of ISI behind terrorist attacks against Mumbai, but their phone conversations were intercepted and subsequently broadcast on public television. 

" ... Yet, keeping the Operation secret from the ISI meant that by the Pakistan Army’s own strategic calculations the pivot of such an operation, the Mujahideeen factor, men of the Kashmir Freedom struggle were left out of the calculus. The Kargil planners informed ISI after the Operation was underway, asking for upgrading the struggle in support of the Operation KP. “Too short a notice, we need at least one year to upgrade the movement,” was the ISI response. ISI needed presence inside the war zone to plan and execute. Neither was possible."

So while pakis officially went on claiming that the men attacking India were mujahedeen or tribals or anything but official soldiers of paki military - they were lying, not just largely, but completely! 

Hilary Clinton wouldn't be surprised. Nor would be anyone not blinded by abrahmic faiths. 

................................................................................................

"Logistics 

"By mid-June, men on the FDL posts required backups. There was a shortage of ammunition and supplies and troops were increasingly suffering from the pressures of a logistical stretch. But with Pakistan’s supply lines and the forward posts under attack from Indian artillery-fire and air sorties it was difficult to replenish depleting ammunition and rations, especially for the Forward Defense Lines (FDL) posts. As the snow melted and the Burzil pass opened, mule porters could ferry supplies only till the logistics bases. Base HQ was unable to respond timely to repeated logistics requests from FDLs on Tiger Hill and from other sectors.[557] At several posts, there was food shortage. At others, water too was not easily accessible for miles. In places where there was water, intensely heavy use of artillery had made it undrinkable. Ammunition too was fast depleting. Even the inadequate artillery was rendered ineffective because of wet, freezing weather conditions. Guns with sulphur deposits would stop firing after a thousand rounds. Yet maintenance of artillery in the freezing zones was not always possible."

None of this was expected, planned for, or even imagined, by the guys who planned and sent them up, which doesn't seem to occur to author as a point to mention, much less as the sole cause of the travails of the poor soldiers who were disowned by pakis officially. 

She seems to blame Indian shelling exclusively. 

Did she or pakis have an impression at any point in time that these guys had been invited for a royal honeymoon - or even a group tourism experience - by India? 

Funny, she makes fun of Indians for not realising the incursion and even for getting killed, but then blames them for retaliation of a war begun by pakis. No satisfying this one, is there! 

" ... As to how long could they hold on to their posts, the odds were heavily against them: terrible weather conditions, low supplies, no reinforcements, and positioned in posts confronted by major Indian numerical superiority in infantry and artillery."

Remember, India had to bury them too, if not caught alive - pak disowned them officially, even in death! 

................................................................................................

"Weapons & Communication 

"The Pakistani troops were equipped with standard infantry rifles. Typically, in a platoon, jawans had G-3 rifles, officers AK-47 rifles, and rocket launchers, and light machine Guns (LMGs) holder. Air defense units with Hatf battlefield range missiles and restored Stinger missiles were also positioned in several locations. Soldiers from the signals corps managed communications within the Ops area and with the brigade and battalion headquarters. They moved from post to post to keep the communication going using double TT and laying and protecting regular lines and managing the radio wireless communication in the Ops area. Wireless communication that could also help the troops listen in to Indian troop communication through frequency scanning and surfing was rightly dubbed ‘shikari det.’"

OK, they had all this, so they'd been killing Indian soldiers until India woke up to this being a huge paki invasion. 

What's unclear is, why's the author whining about Indians' retaliation with artillery, not after she brags about paki capabilities, but before, when it was pakis who began the whole thoughtless assault? 

Wouldn't it be proper to do so the other way around? 

It's a tad like she extolls a murderer for his bravery and exploits, after complaining about his being surrounded and shot dead by law enforcement. 

................................................................................................

" ... But the tables had turned. Only weeks ago, with adrenalin flowing, these daredevils had marched to high command’s orders and no less to their own resolve to punish the enemy. Now it was trouble-time. The Kargil clique’s calculation of a luke-warm Indian response was proving wrong."

"“No…Not Ours” 

"There were other painful offshoots that Pakistan’s policy of denying that Pakistani troops were conducting the Operations meant. Bodies of Pakistani soldiers could not be accepted. From mid-June onwards,   Pakistan’s Deputy Chief of Mission Jalil Abbas Jillani, whenever asked by his hosts to collect the bodies of Pakistani soldiers, would decline, saying these were not our boys. Resentfully, the Pakistani soldiers would watch the televised Muslim burial of the disowned bodies of their martyred comrades, conducted by the Indians with full honours and bodies wrapped in a Pakistani flag. According to a Brigadier who was witness to all this, “For many of us, the shame and the pain of watching all this happen to our colleagues, was killing.”[561]"

" ... Literally minute-by-minute news of the battlefront setbacks was passed to the commanders.[563]"

" ... The offensive operation had been planned with no defensive approach, no defensive layouts, and hence no fallback plans. Delusional thinking dominated the minds of the clique of Kargil planners ... "

"These generals planned operation KP, less as intelligent and accountable strategists, but as covert, unaccountable campaigners. ... "

In other - more realistic - words, as terrorists they send out against India for over three decades now, or as barbarian hordes invading India for well over a millennium until arrival of British. 

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"Lengthening Shadows

" ... Also, given Indian insistence on no bilateral dialogue without withdrawal from Kargil and the growing international pressure on Pakistan to vacate Kargil, it seemed increasingly unlikely that Pakistan could leverage its military achievements in Kargil for a “just settlement and time-bound settlement” of the Kashmir dispute.[564]"

What "military achievements"??? Like climbing peaks in winter when no one was likely to shoot at them? Like denying their own soldiers, in life and in death? 

"Additionally, another implicit assumption of the Kargil planners that India may not be willing to pay what it would take to recapture the Kargil heights was bring disproved. India not only deployed the requisite manpower and military force to reclaim Kargil ... "

"By mid June, the opening assumption of the architects of Operation Koh Paima that the military situation heavily favoring Pakistan was irreversible, was beginning to be proven wrong. With a fierce Indian response, on the military front, ... "

Author repeatedly accuses India of having used diplomacy as a weapon. 

Fact is no amount of lies from pak worked despite pakis doing diplomatic rounds, because international community aren't fools, and this was not 1947 but age of satellites. Everything supposedly done clandestinely by pakis had been seen, and not just by US, either. 

It wasn't india's diplomatic push, but the fact thst pakis did invade and lied, that went against them, as it must. 

" ... The fate of Op KP now squarely confronted the soldiers who had fervently volunteered to fight for their Homeland. ... "

There's a whopper of a lie by author. It's Kashmir that was invaded by pakis, and Kashmir had been signed accession of by its ruler to India in 1947 because, and after, pakis had then invaded it. "Homeland" it's not, not for any pakis. 

................................................................................................

Author states that India sought help of US via diplomatic channels to force Pakistan to withdraw unilaterally. She forgets more than one previous assertion in this work by her to the effect that US was unwilling to believe pakis and Clinton told sharif he had to withdraw. If she's insinuating that this was India’s doing, she's living in cuckooland. 

"In Pakistan, the diplomats were increasingly less sanguine about the Washington route for exit. Given Washington’s public stance about Pakistan’s ingress across the LOC, they merely responded to Washington’s queries about the Kargil crisis. In Washington, Ambassador Riaz Khokhar had half a dozen meetings with his Washington-based interlocutors. It was Nawaz Sharif’s kitchen cabinet[583] that considered Washington an important player for the end game. They believed that Sharif should use his personal rapport with Clinton[584] to manage the Kargil crisis on the domestic, Indian, and international fronts. Thus, through numerous letter exchanges and phone-calls, Nawaz was seeking Clinton's direct involvement in bringing Kargil to a close.[585] Pakistan’s army command was also keen to involve the US in Kargil’s end game. In fact, the army chief was the first to publicly mention the possibility of a Nawaz-Clinton meeting.[586] Significantly, by end-June, Musharraf himself had talked of positively of US intervention. [587]"

Author refers to terrorism exported by pakis resulting in genocide and subsequent exodus of Hindus as ordered by the said terrorists, ordered on loudspeakers of mosques. 

" ... Especially since the 1989 Kashmir Uprising ... "

They do have expertise at lying don't they, pakis! Fraudulent labels is part of it. 

................................................................................................

Author repeats her "Indian soldiers did nothing brave, pakis did everything bravely, Indians only bombarded paki brave poor soldiers while Indians took advantage of diplomatic pressuring of international community, they sided only with India" lament. 

Ad infinitum, it'd seem, throughout the work. 

"Most importantly, after Tololing, India had begun re-taking the strategically located posts overlooking NH-1A. For Pakistan, holding onto the frontline posts was of actual strategic significance. These were furthermost from the LOC but closest to NH-1, the logistical lifeline for the Indian troops stationed in Ladakh and Siachen. Meanwhile, the mid-zone posts were in Pakistan’s control but with no access to India’s strategic roads. To what end, then, could or should Pakistan hold on to the mid-posts? Located in the middle of the rugged iced mountain terrain, these had no artillery access to any strategic Indian feature, such as a highway, a cantonment, ammunition dumps etc. ... "

There's the raison d'etre of - not only the Kargil war initiated by pakis, not only every such war (and always initiated by them), every terrorist attack perpetrated against India - but of the very existence the very genesis of pak, spelt out in clear terms. 

Author has admitted that pakis had no reason to begin Kargil war via this incursion, except to kill Indians. And that's true of the very existence, even genesis of pak. There's no reason for pak to exist, except to kill India, to destroy the very culture and the humongous treasures of knowledge of antiquity that's still loving India. 

" ... Also, Delhi’s political resolve of no talks until complete withdrawal appeared ironclad. And the international community fully supported India’s position."

And therein the failure of pakis, the inability to not only admit but see truth. That "the international community fully supported India’s position" was because it was true. 

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Author again fraudulently strives to make it seem that the two sides, invaders and India fighting back, were equal and no different, for most part. 

" ... On both sides, casualties were mounting and political support was depleting.  Sharif and Vajpayee both wanted an early end. ... "

One, India wanted not "early end" but this to have never taken place, at all. 

But having been confronted with the horror thereof, what India wanted, and did achieve, was to clean the region of all invaders, with no compromises. As soon as possible, of course, it goes without saying. 

" ... Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front, having been widely censured by the international community, Islamabad’s political men, as well as the army chief, had faith that Washington could wrest a face-saver for Islamabad."

In other words - as termed by Tarek Fateh - they went crying to Clinton to beg him to tell India to stop fighting. Without admitting, nevertheless, that it was paki soldiers on peaks killing Indians, still pretending that it was terrorists not known to pak! 

Just so pakis could remain on peaks in comfort and keep on killing Indians, that is! 

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Here's an example of the said paki lies used by author towards veiling hard facts. 

"Zinni’s departure also signaled that the US bureaucracy had successfully overruled their President’s inclination to be accommodating to his friend the Pakistani prime minister. ... The State Department wanted a Clinton-Sharif meeting be made contingent upon Pakistan first vacating Kargil. [627]"

Clinton, a well educated Rhodes scholar, is, was always, smart enough to do as he thought fit, and making him seem a prisoner of others in Washington is a lie. 

Others may have helped him tow the line of propriety in world diplomacy, if he needed such maneuvers. But that's routine in democratic and other good governance worlds, which a despotic country used only to invading and lying wouldn't know. 

Perhaps pakis are only used to falsehoods and resent the failure of such tactics. But this tactic can only go so far. 

It's run its course, beginning with Kargil, the stupidest idea yet executed by pakis at the time. It was merely another version of the stupid declaration by paki military in 1971 to "change the DNA" of East Bengal - via invasion, genocide and mass gang rapes. But having claimed heritage of barbarian invaders, pakis don't see the fact of their stupid choice in doing so. Or lying. 

................................................................................................

Author exposes, again, the lie pakis including the then paki PM told everyone outside the paki military. 

"Significantly, before the Zinni meeting, General Musharraf had flown with the prime minister to the forward areas from where the Kargil operation was launched.[628]  The prime minister and the army chief visited the injured soldiers and met with the jawans. ... Yet it was not coincidental that this display of a unified civil-military stance on Kargil was planned for hours before the Zinni-Musharraf meeting."

So while pakis insisted on denying their own soldiers to everyone, so much so they were neither fed nor buried by pakis, those not bring shelled were encouraged with prayers and money to go right back up to kill Indians and be denied in turn! 

"In the meeting, Zinni told Musharraf that he had been specially sent by his President to talk about Kargil. Musharraf was told that the Kargil issue was “dangerously unwise and that Pakistan had no support for its Kargil operation.”[631] Clinton’s message was simple: “Just get out of there.” Musharraf, however, did not acknowledge that there were Pakistani soldiers in Kargil. Throughout the meeting, Musharraf maintained that Pakistan had no control over the Mujahideen who were in Kargil. ... "

"The meeting ended inconclusively. There was no agreement on the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army since Musharraf refused to acknowledge the presence of Pakistani troops.[633] ... "

"The following morning, on June 25, Zinni met with the prime minister. The army chief, DG ISI, and the senior Foreign Office team also participated in the meeting. ... Zinni also carried Clinton’s message to Nawaz Sharif that he would not meet the Pakistani prime minister “in the shadow of Kargil.” Finally, towards the end of the meeting, the prime minister took a deep breath and said, “What do you want me to do, General Zinni?” Nawaz Sharif then said, “We can talk to these people who are occupying the heights in Kargil and see whether we can do anything.”[637]"

Usual paki tactic, Jinnah in 1947-48 onwards. It's exactly what Jinnah had said to Mountbatten about the then paki military invasion of Kashmir pretending to be tribals. 

................................................................................................

"Interestingly, the Americans and the Pakistanis had different ‘takes’ on the meeting. The Pakistani camp was clear that the prime minister had been categorical that the “US should take a broader view of the problem - that Kargil was only one aspect of the larger problem of Jammu and Kashmir which must be addressed in it totality in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people.”[638] None of the Pakistani participants felt that Sharif had given Zinni a commitment to withdraw.[639] The Americans read almost the opposite. They believed that “not too long into the meeting the prime minister agreed to a withdrawal.”[640] They were relieved that they “did not have to wrestle Nawaz Sharif into the ground”[641] and had extracted a verbal agreement from Sharif to withdraw.[642] ... Lanpher argued with his colleagues that the Zinni mission got the green signal from Islamabad because the Pakistanis had decided to give him a positive response, not because they wanted to “slam the door in your face.” His conclusion was: “The Pakistanis, government officials, army officers and politicians were infinitely polite and these real gentlemen would not want to be rude to people, in contrast to the Indians who enjoyed being rude.” Lanpher based his expectation of a Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil on the Pakistani psychology of “wanting to please the Americans.” However, Zinni and Milam, both more familiar with the Pakistani working and particularly with Sharif and Musharraf, believed that Musharraf would not easily make his troops vacate Kargil.[644]"

Lanpher's reaction was the usual one - of someone inexperienced about behaviour differences between smiling liars versus upright honest, while the overall difference of perception there is the usual one when encountering pakis, nazis and similar liars. Chinese on the other hand are a slightly different matter only in that they don't admit to lying either, but know fully well what they do. 

................................................................................................

"On June 27, Lanpher met with MEA officials and with the Principal Secretary to the Indian Prime Minister, Brajesh Mishra.[663]Lanpher briefed Mishra thoroughly “with a very candid description of those present in the meetings and what they said.” He gave Mishra news of a likely withdrawal by the Pakistani forces.[664] Lanpher repeated in detail his conversations with the Pakistanis to assure the Indians that “these guys (Pakistanis) will get out.” Still not completely trusting of the United States support for the Indian position, the Indians did not believe “how rough” Zinni had been with the Pakistanis. The Americans saw themselves doing a “front channel thing,” Lanpher providing the Indians complete details on the Zinni meeting with the Pakistani prime minister and COAS.[665]"

Author goes abusive here exponentially claiming Indians had been bloodied and caught with pants down. 

"Lanpher found Mishra skeptical about the possibility of a Pakistani withdrawal.[666] “Having been bloodied, totally embarrassed, and caught with their pants down, and suffering heavy casualties,”[667] the Indians tended not to trust Lanpher’s reading of the Pakistani intentions. ... "

Since she's repeatedly blamed Kargil on Siachen, it's unclear why this abusive description has been applied by her only to Indians. 

Unless it was a personal dream of her own that excludes pakis in particular and is strictly restricted for Indians. 

................................................................................................

In the topsy-turvy world of what passes for thinking in pakis, US is abused in a resisted way, accused of taking advantage of Kargil failure of pak to get close to Delhi! 

"From Pakistan’s Kargil debacle, in cold statistical calculations, the Clinton administration’s key South Asian and non-proliferation experts wrested a strategic gain for Washington. The gain was winning Delhi’s trust and confidence it’s role in South Asia; that no other country’s interests, especially Pakistan’s, could trump Delhi’s interests. It was a classic act of gainful cunning that largely dictates State interaction."

And as every liar does, pakis too know it's necessary to throw some facts into their mix. 

" ... The Kargil clique’s secret launch of Op KP had inflicted a heavy military and diplomatic cost on the country. ... "

................................................................................................

"Now, during Kargil, Washington’s uneven policy between the two nuclearized South Asian neighbors again surfaced. The emphasis of the Clinton administration’s key men on Pakistan’s nuclear activity during Kargil, while completely ignoring what India may have been doing, was a mere continuation of Washington’s policy of the seventies. Strobe Talbott, Clinton’s personal friend and a journalist-turned diplomat, who documented his failure to convince India’s imposing Jaswant Singh to agree to Washington’s instruments for non-proliferation, appeared to have made much of very little in the Kargil days."

It's interesting to read this paragraph and it's accusations toned to seem indicative of grave moral lapse on part of US, and wonder where pakis get the moral or ethical ground for demanding equality, when they never practice it either internationally or at home. There's the racist treatment of East Bengal culminating in genocide and mass gang rapes organised by paki military in 1971, even if one were to go with the paki logic that genocide of eleven million Hindus and almost half as many Sikhs in pak in 1947 were an act of good deed as per the religion, repeated in genocide of Hindus in Kashmir in 1989-90. 

But where's this equality when pakis take money from US to send terrorists to Afghanistan to harass USSR out of Afghanistan, and subsequently, boast on internet for decades about having singlehandedly broken USSR into pieces? 

And if pakis haven't been dealing equally with others, why do they then expect equal treatment? 

No, their equality is one demanded by nawabs, strictly upwardly mobile but veiled in pretense. They are racist and communal, commit mass gang rapes and genocides and invade, but must be given everything they demand at asking, whether hundreds of billions of dollars without accounts from US  or territory in huge chunks out of India.  ................................................................................................

" ... In Washington, other than the generic concern regarding military confrontation, the intelligence had its ear to the ground to especially monitor nuclear-related developments. Data flow from several satellite paths, various policy departments, including the Defense Department, the State Department’s South Asia section, CENTCOM, the CIA, and the NSC, now focused particularly on nuclear related information. Some intelligence officials claimed that the ground information picked up by US intelligence sources indicated movement of missiles and placement of warheads. The concern, however, about active deployment of nuclear weapons, especially by Pakistan, was not uniformly shared within the Clinton Administration. There was great divergence in interpreting this intelligence data."

" ... contrary assessments notwithstanding, from mid-June onwards the administration’s core group appears to have been possessed by “nuclear phobia.” They directly involved the US President into the Kargil diplomacy. They alerted him to their “concern” regarding Pakistan taking action to make its nuclear weapons capable.[687]"

Lack of trustworthiness of pakis must have impressed even the generously friendly US, eventually! 

................................................................................................

"The growing Indo-US strategic relations were also at play in producing this nuclear phobia targeting Pakistan. Having discovered that in fact Pakistan regulars and not Mujahedeen were fighting in Kargil, and Pakistan therefore had control over them, the US weighed in heavily on to Pakistan to withdraw the troops. The US President wrote about six letters. The US Ambassador delivered the letters to the foreign minister. He had several meetings with the Pakistani prime minister and spent much of his time at the Prime Minister’s Secretariat with Additional Secretary Tariq Fatimi. He visited him almost daily with a constant barrage of escalating pressure on Pakistan to withdraw."

Author, in saying "Having discovered that in fact Pakistan regulars and not Mujahedeen were fighting in Kargil, and Pakistan therefore had control over them", omits mentioning that this amounted to in fact having caught pakis lying repeatedly, and perhaps having known it all along. 

So of course she fails to connect it to US seemingly deciding for India, since it seems that in paki mind paki lies aren't lies but nawabs' pronouncements, to be honoured over and above truth! 

................................................................................................

"Targeting Nawaz Sharif 

"There appeared to be politics around the use of even this information on Pakistan, unverified by majority of the US intelligence bodies within the Clinton administration. Why did Washington hold back the information Washington claimed it had on Pakistan’s preparedness for the use of nuclear weapons? Why was the information only shared with the prime minister – and that too without his aides? It was used to first target the prime minister behind closed doors. Equally, General Zinni had opted to warn the prime minister in a classified and limited meeting about “electronic” and “finally nuclear warfare.” As late as June 26, Zinni decided against raising the risks of a nuclear war with the army chief, the man Washington believed had more control than the prime minister on Pakistan’s nuclear trigger. First, the CENTCOM chief sketched a deadly picture for him and subsequently, on 4 July, the information was brought in full throttle at the Clinton-Nawaz meeting. Pakistan’s prime minister was instructed to not bring in an aide. Clinton with Riedel, the man riled up about Pakistan’s deployment of nuclear weapons, insisted that unknown to the prime minister the Pakistan Army was preparing to use nuclear weapons!"

This whole accusation above can only be understood with the following explanation - not only Pakistan demand that their lies be accepted, preferably over facts known to everyone but at least on par with truth in name of equality, but they demand that paki charade of democracy be taken for exactly what it is, and while paki pm is treated as someone to successfully meet US president to make up the mind of the said president for him whenever paki army wishes, he - the said paki pm - only be treated as disdainfully as paki army treats him, and no serious matters be discussed with him, which would be seen as suspicious behaviour on part of another government. 

In short, it's a decorative position akin to that of a receptionist at an arms dealership. 

................................................................................................

" ... Pakistan military signaled its nuclear preparedness. On June 24, The News reported, “The prime minister has also been told that deployment of short and long range missiles with extremely effective warheads has been completed.”[690] Pakistani media reports also focused on Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. For example, one report was headlined, “Pakistan Developing Advanced versions of Ghauri, Shaheen”.[691] ... "

................................................................................................

Author has been using certain terms that now acquire another connotation in view of her accusations against US government regarding meetings alone with paki pm excluding paki army. 

"On 25 June, R. K. Mishra,[700] Vajpayee’s point-man for the back-channel negotiations, flew in from Delhi ... "

To clear a normal perspective, if a man sent by PM of India arrives for diplomatic discussions with paki pm, it's not "back-channel"; India does not take active part in the charade that's paki structure of hierarchy, any more than US would, or then did. 

................................................................................................

" ... Nawaz Sharif flew to his hometown Lahore for the weekend. His concerns were clear. His thinking process was not. He was playing his cards close to his chest. The chief of army staff, ostensibly satisfied with the military situation of his troops, went off with family and friends to a hill resort for the weekend. He believed that his troops had staying power but he was also beginning to note the international pressures that were being applied on Pakistan.[777]"

Notice the open, unthinking bias exhibited here by the author, presumably in favour of those in power as she wrote. That's typical paki. 

................................................................................................

" ... The service chiefs had also differed. They knew that the political leadership was keen to withdraw, but the Army seemed unclear. They believed, ‘The Army’s body language conveyed their wanting to withdraw too.’ However, Musharraf had made no such statement. The bureaucrats were not there to take decisions but they believed their input influenced decision-making. ... A section within the core Foreign Office group was unsure of the wisdom of withdrawal.[778]

"The Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary, Saeed Mehdi, called US Ambassador Milam to convey Sharif’s intention to talk to the US President. Milam relayed the request to the State Department. Shortly before this request, Clinton had also received a letter from Sharif asking to meet him. However, the letter, which had been drafted by Sharif’s Foreign Office team, had yet again linked the Kargil flare-up with the broader Kashmir problem. In Washington, the tone of this letter conveyed that ‘Sharif was wringing his hands … that he was looking for personal cover … he was not a man of great courage’.[779] Sharif had written in response to Clinton’s letter, written a few days after Zinni’s return to Washington. Clinton had thanked Sharif for receiving Zinni but had wondered why there was no action on Zinni’s report that Sharif was willing to withdraw troops from Kargil. By now, the bottom line message of Washington’s communication to Islamabad was: ‘Get out!’ Clinton himself, his envoy General Zinni, and the State Department had repeatedly told Sharif that negotiations over the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Kargil were out. This was now Washington’s and Delhi’s shared objective.

................................................................................................

"The PM telephoned from the Governor’s House in Lahore.[783] During the call, Sharif was not assisted by members of either his ‘kitchen cabinet’ or of the core Foreign Office group. In attendance were Saeed Mehdi and Iftikhar Ali Khan. The prime minister’s brother, Shehbaz, was at the family home in Raiwind. Chaudhry Nisar, his close confidante and a member of his ‘kitchen cabinet’, was two hundred miles away in his home town, Taxila. The Foreign Office team was at work in Islamabad. By contrast, at the White House, Clinton was surrounded by his key aides. He remained, therefore, within the parameters set by Washington’s primary objective of forcing an unconditional Pakistani withdrawal. During the telephone conversation, the US President sent no mixed signals to his Pakistani friend. 

"Sharif, once again, urged Clinton to play a role in defusing the Kargil crisis and in resolving the Kashmir dispute. He asked to see him.  Clinton reminded Sharif of the precondition for a meeting. Sharif did not contest Clinton’s suggestion of a unilateral, unconditional withdrawal. Clinton told Sharif that he wanted to help him and to help Pakistan but Pakistani forces had to first withdraw. Clinton again rhetorically queried why Pakistan had done this. Sharif said he could give him ‘the entire scenario when we meet’. Clinton emphasized that time was of the essence and that they ‘are losing time’. According to Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Riaz Khokhar, Clinton agreed to receive Sharif because the Americans wanted that the prime minister to personally convey that the Pakistani troops would vacate Kargil. Clinton wanted to hear for himself from Sharif that he was willing to withdraw.[784]"

................................................................................................

" ... From Sharif, Washington needed a withdrawal as well as a commitment to help Washington find Osama Bin Laden.[789] The State Department laid out these demands on the one-page briefing paper it prepared for the US President for the 4 July meeting.[790]

"In Pakistan, there was no preparatory work that Nawaz Sharif sought from his core Foreign Office team, the cabinet members, or the Army. The focus was now on getting the logistics done for the Washington dash. Sharif knew that, in getting a meeting with Clinton, he had in fact proceeded ahead with his ‘kitchen cabinet’s’ consensus on involving the US.[791] According to a key member of the ‘kitchen cabinet’, ‘The call was made in line with the inner circle’s thinking about the need for an honorable withdrawal.’[792] He explained, ‘Since the Americans kept telling Nawaz Sharif there was a peaceful way of settling this issue, the idea was to suck them in to help settle Kargil peacefully.’ The ‘kitchen cabinet’ believed ‘it was preferable to talk to the US, not to the Indians, because talking to the Indians was like insulting the honest brokers [US]’.[793]

................................................................................................

"Sharif’s Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz, was not in this inner loop. He was not even remotely clued into his PM’s decision to explore the withdrawal option with Clinton. Therefore, when on arrival from Burkina Faso, when he was asked to comment on US Ambassador Milam’s statement that US ‘perceived flexibility’ in Pakistan’s position on the Kargil issue, Sartaj merely reaffirmed the existing position that the Kargil flare-up was not of Pakistan’s doing. He told reporters, ‘I think there is no flexibility or new position. Pakistan has always respected the LOC … The question is: What is the LOC? Who is sitting there? It needs verification and these violations on LOC, on either side, Pakistan side or Indian side, should be corrected. As far as Pakistan Army is concerned, it has not violated the LOC … We have invited UN observers that they should come and see where the LOC is. If anybody had violated it, it should be corrected.’[794]"

The paki lies, right there.

"At the prime minister’s family home in Raiwind, the prime minister, his father, and his younger brother, vigorously discussed the Sharif’s decision to go to Washington. At the DCC, there had been no discussion at all on a possible immediate Washington trip. It seems that major policy matters, which were not even brought up in constitutionally mandated forums, such as the DCC, were to be debated by the members of the ‘first family’ in their private home. The prime minister’s younger brother, a key political player and the chief minister of Punjab, vehemently opposed Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington. He opposed it ‘tooth and nail’. He argued that the PM’s attempt at closure would be portrayed by the Army as the squandering of a military victory by the civilians. The prime minister’s elderly father, Mian Mohammad Sharif, who often influenced key national decisions taken by his son, disagreed with the younger son. He supported the Nawaz Sharif’s decision to fly to Washington. He saw the Washington trip as ‘an effort to get Pakistan out of trouble’. Mian Mohammad believed that the developments in Kargil had landed the country, much like a family, in trouble and, therefore, it was required by the chief executive as head of the family to get the family out of trouble. Shehbaz was emphatic that, if the trip to Washington had to be made, it was important that the army chief be taken along for the 4 July meeting, so that the withdrawal agreement would not been seen as a ‘sell-out by the civilians’. The prime minister agreed. However, in subsequent conversations with his two close aides, Saeed Mehdi and Chaudhry Nisar, he became convinced otherwise. The prime minister felt that, if he, the elected prime minister, took the army chief along with him to Washington, the Clinton administration would conclude that, since the prime minister moved nowhere without the army chief, it would be better to cut Sharif out and directly deal with Musharraf.[795] Shehbaz’s suggestion to take along the army chief was torpedoed. The PM only went along with his brother’s decision to take the army chief ‘into confidence’. Sharif instructed his military secretary to later put a call through to Musharraf. The army chief was spending the weekend in the hills in Murree."

................................................................................................

"After the plan was made, phones started ringing. The prime minister was seeking attendance for an unusual meeting at the Islamabad airport. ... The participants of the ‘airport’ meeting were to be informed of the chief executive’s meeting with the US President. Actually, the finalization of Pakistan’s Kargil strategy was now to take place in Washington at the Sharif-Clinton meeting.

"In its 9pm news bulletin, Pakistan Television (PTV), the state-run television service, announced Sharif’s departure. The Foreign Office also issued a late night press statement. ... The Orwellian machine was at work. There was no mention of the word Kargil in the statement. ... "

................................................................................................

"While there were two kinds of views reflected in the media, the skeptical and the triumphal, it was the latter that had captured the public imagination. The expectation was that Pakistan would successfully pressurize Delhi into working on an early settlement of the Kashmir issue. Given the contradictory and contending assertions constantly made by different institutions, the majority of the reporters and commentators were unable to ascertain the facts of the situation. Most veered towards triumphalism. The average Pakistani mind was in the grip of official propaganda ... "

Author lies again, despite having given the facts clearly, in quoting from " ... Editorial, The Nation, 1 July 1999. ... ", including -

" ... Indian government which felt confident of its ability to suppress the freedom fighters, refused to talk at all. ... "

One, pakis were lying about the intruders being not paki military, and author has confirmed from beginning that it was paki military occupying the peaks in a move to cut off Kashmir into parts so pakis could, not only kill Indians via shelling, but by starving the Indian soldiers to death. 

Two, pakis lying regardless, it's no "freedom fighters" but terrorists that have been sent by pakis across border to inflict death and mayhem in India from Kashmir to South India. 

................................................................................................

Further lies quoted by author, for most of the next pages in the chapter, including abuse heaped on India due to pakis lying to everyone - a sample here. 

"‘It can be confirmed on the basis of sound evidence that not a single Pakistani soldier is present inside Kashmir across the LOC. Such allegations by India are patently absurd and an attempt to cover up her own designs. Pakistan would be insane in sending its soldiery into a highly disputed and disturbed area … Those opposing the Indian aggression in the Drass-Kargil area are the docile and peace-loving sons of the soil in Kashmir who have been driven to take up arms to defend their rights, honour, and dignity in the face of brutal Indian aggression ... The on-going Indian bellicosity is a matter of deep concern to the world … India has shut the diplomatic doors the way Hitler did in 1938–39.’ General (retd) Khalid Mahmud Arif in ‘What Realism Demands’, Dawn, 3 July 1999."

................................................................................................

Over and over, author portrays US as eager and desperate to please India! But such a slant on this affair, kargil, implies clearly that Pakistan not only think thst their lies must be taken at par with or higher than facts, but imagine that the whole world must agree with this position, unless they are trying to please India! 

" ... Americans realized that ‘Indians were extremely skeptical that we will succeed and suspicious about what we were doing’. Only a success would have convinced the Indians of what the Americans kept telling Delhi they were doing ‘to get Pakistan to back down’."

When do pakis plan to learn that a Rottweiler used at Auschwitz isn't an icon worshipped through the world! 

................................................................................................

" ... First the two met with their aides. Nawaz Sharif was joined by the Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz and Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed. Clinton was assisted by National Security advisor Sandy Burger, assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Karl F. Inderfurth and a senior National security council official handling South Asian affairs Bruce Riedel. This meeting with aides lasted for barely five to seven minutes. It was followed by an almost two-hour long meeting between Clinton and Nawaz. While Clinton was joined by Bruce Riedel as a note taker, Nawaz Sharif went in without one. He did not want one.[838] Unknowing of this fact the Pakistan Foreign Office team insisted that their prime minister be treated on an equal basis with the host and also be accompanied by his aide to the meeting. It lasted approximately two hours. Clinton began by telling Sharif why Kargil was a blunder and how two nuclear powers were almost at the brink of war. Clinton told Sharif that he had information that the Pakistan Army had begun preparation to use nuclear weapons. Sharif said he was unaware of any such move. As a nuclear power, Clinton said, the international community expected Pakistan to behave more responsibly. ... "

"In the plain talking during his meeting with the Pakistani prime minister, the US President also demanded his government’s full cooperation in capturing OBL. Clinton in his memoirs recalls, ‘On 4 July, I also told Sharif that unless he did more to help I would have to announce Pakistan was in effect supporting terrorism in Afghanistan.’[839] Clinton was basing his assertions on the information and analysis provided by CIA’s Counter-terrorist Center. Pakistan was identified as the principal supporter of the Taliban, the principal protectors of OBL. Significantly, on the very day of his meeting with the Pakistani prime minister, Clinton announced sanctions against the Taliban. He subsequently wrote, ‘On the day I met Sharif, I also signed an executive order placing economic sanctions on the Taliban, freezing its assets, and prohibiting commercial exchanges.’

"Significantly, there was no discussion between Nawaz Sharif and the Foreign Office team before the Clinton meeting regarding the formulation of the statement that he and Clinton would sign. The Foreign Office team had prepared a Pakistani version of a draft agreement. The Americans were determined to stay with their own version."

" ... Sharif carefully chose his words so as not to directly implicate anyone but kept saying that it was an operation that ‘got out of control’. He did, however, distance himself from the Operation.  The striking contrast in the self-confidence of the two interlocutors could not have been lost. While one was backed by a unified and competently functioning government, the other was pretty much on a solo flight."

Perhaps the paragraph above was written so as to depict paki PM’s position as more sympathetic, but the result for any reader not schooled in lies by Pakistan is a disbelief at such an expectation. A democratic nation must function in a manner where the leader and the government function in tandem, not where the civilian leade us a mannequin in dressing window while owner is the terrorist in the back room. 

................................................................................................

Author has novel ways of lying, while seeming technically correct. 

"Nawaz Sharif was insisting that Clinton help him to get out of the crisis. An anxious Sharif’s long rambling on diplomacy with China and with Indian intermediaries was to establish his bona fides as a man in search of a solution. He was like a man who ‘wanted out’ off a train wreck approaching him. At one point, Sharif asked Clinton for a one-on-one meeting. Clinton declined. The Pakistani prime minister was told that the note-taker, Bruce Riedel, would not leave his President. US government rules made it obligatory upon Clinton to have this historic meeting documented. The President of the USA was not free to have his way. He could not act upon his whims."

The last two lines seem to imply that a US president refuses an unreasonable request by a terrorist nation only due to the said US president being "not free to have his way", and his whims must be nothing other than to please the said terrorist nation. 

Which is ridiculous. 

Clearly it was necessary for the US President to, not only follow protocol in this case, but be not seen as complicit with a terrorist nation invading a neighbour, or even be questioned subsequently as to veracity of his account, if pakis chose to lie for any reason. 

As to whims, there must have been a few million that the president could have indulged in at the time, and freely so, without any question of disturbing any protocol. 

................................................................................................

"During the break between the two sessions of the Sharif-Clinton meeting, Sharif’s team found him to be a ‘drained man’. He has been badgered by Clinton’s queries and hard talk on Kargil, OBL, etc. No less was the tension of what he was doing: giving a commitment for a Pakistani retreat from what the military was still publicly projecting as a successful occupation. In fact, during the meeting, the TV in the room was telecasting news of the fall of a strategically important peak, the Tiger Hill. During the break, the prime minister called his army chief to confirm news of the fall of the Tiger Hill.[841]"

" ... The Foreign Office team still ‘offered’ a few amendments to the draft. Sharif was extremely reluctant to take them to Clinton. He said he had been told it was a take it or leave it situation. His team still urged Sharif to ‘not give in’. They were all aware that their internal discussions were being monitored. The Americans knew what they were trying to convince Sharif to do, since the room they were sitting in was ‘not only bugged but also had cameras in it’. Sharif promised his team to make one last effort.

"The 4 July meeting was turned into a battle of nerves. Clinton was well prepared for this battle while the Pakistani prime minister had arrived in Washington having already lost his nerve, owing to what he believed were the Kargil reversals. Sharif had left Islamabad in panic and entered the Clinton meeting with a major psychological handicap. Clinton saw sitting before him a needy and desperate man, not a negotiator. The Americans too found Sharif nervous. In fact, they believed his decision to ‘invite himself at short notice and bringing the family along opened the possibility of his staying back in Washington in case the Army took over in his absence’.[843] ... "

................................................................................................

"Tough times test leadership mettle and a state’s collective institutional competence. Sharif’s mettle was being severely tested. He had opted to do mostly a lone act, nearly a personal operation, on the entire 4 July summit, from planning to execution. He had drawn on external wisdom and an external platform. He seemed to have banked on a major external power even for the political strength required for his 4 July decision. This bail-out operation, as Sharif saw it, of a medium-sized power by the major global power, was a page out of Wallerstein’s classic center-periphery relationship. The ‘comprador’ politician was at play, exposing so starkly the heavy interconnectedness between Pakistan’s internal power game and the global center, with the levers of control heavily tilted in the latter’s favor. Nothing could more acutely demonstrate Pakistan’s systemic weakness as a state run by those with scarce appreciation of institutional decision-making."

That's verbose rephrasing of a failed attempt by Pakistan to do another Munich, failed because they were pretending that they had a democracy and they weren't invading another neighbour after wrecking one, and they hadn't realised that such pretense doesn't wash in era of satellites observations of global goings-on. 

................................................................................................

"The meeting ended with the decision that Pakistan would withdraw its troops behind the LOC to the pre-Operation position. ... "

"The withdrawal discussion had not included any talk about safe passage for the withdrawing Pakistani forces. ... Sharif did not raise any question about safe passage for withdrawing troops.[846] Evidently, it was not an issue that had occupied his mind, nor was it part of the talking points that his Foreign Office team had prepared.  This issue escaped their respective radars because the premise from which it would logically flow, the Pakistani forces actually battling in Kargil and now their withdrawal, did not exist in their articulated consciousness. This kind of denial meant major lapses in policy-making. ... "

"Clinton, as part of a premeditated strategy, used this moment of Sharif’s utter vulnerability to aggressively raise the issue of the Osama bin Laden and the alleged ISI connection.[850] Before Sharif sat the man who had been told that Pakistan was at the center of supporting the Taliban and by extension the OBL network. This network, according to the CIA, was functioning in 60 different countries and was directly responsible for attacks on American embassies. Clinton reminded Nawaz Sharif that he had ‘asked repeatedly for Pakistani help to bring Osama bin Laden to justice from Afghanistan’ and that Sharif had ‘promised often to do so, but had done nothing. Instead, the ISI worked with OBL and the Taliban to foment terrorism’. Sharif had made a personal commitment to Clinton in December 1998 to help the United States in capturing OBL, but had not followed through on it.[851] ... Clinton threatened to tell the world of Pakistan’s support to bin Laden if Pakistan’s help in capturing him was not forthcoming.[852] The Pakistani prime minister reassured the US President that he would now follow through on his earlier commitment. ... "

................................................................................................

"During the London stopover, the real newsmaker was Pakistan’s articulate Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz. In a BBC Hard Talk interview, Sartaj declared that the reference in the 4 July statement to ‘upholding the sanctity of the LOC’ also implied that India must vacate the Siachen Glacier it had illegally occupied in 1984. A rapid rebuttal from Washington stated that the 4 July Statement was only about Kargil, that the US believed in the sanctity of the entire LOC but of immediate interest was the resolution of the Kargil conflict."

" ... Admittedly, the overwhelming deployment of Indian artillery and air power could not have allowed Pakistani troops to hold the peaks for much longer ... "

................................................................................................

Another lie by author. 

"Sharif’s Washington dash had earned him a statement with no face-saver for Pakistan. Sharif, in his pre-departure telephone conversation, had been clearly told by Clinton to expect no more and had seemed OK with that. In fact, he had cancelled the crucial meeting of the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) scheduled for July 5, whose agenda had been the Kargil Operation. With input of all stakeholders, the prime minister was to decide on how to draw curtains on Operation Koh Paima. However, at this crucial juncture in Pakistan’s history, Sharif had walked away from collective institutional decision-making. Instead, he headed to Washington."

Since Kargil invasion by paki army wasn't a collective decision, or even had the pm kept informed as in was executed, what is author blaming the pm for? He'd lost face internationally, if pakis as a nation ever had such a thing, for something that had been done without him being informed! If anything, he was more akin to a toddler of Munich blamed for Dachau! 

................................................................................................

" ... Only in private conversations did the army chief and others of the Kargil clique concede rising Pakistani casualties and logistical difficulties. Beginning mid-June, there was guarded conversation within the army command of the crisis of logistics, high casualties, and India’s very heavy force deployment. Reports about this alarming situation were trickling in from the front. Nevertheless, at the 2 July meeting the army chief had insisted that, despite rising Pakistani casualties, compromised logistical supplies, and India’s re-taking of the strategically located Tololing and Tiger Hill posts, it was not a militarily unsustainable position. No hard questioning or holistic discussion had followed. While moments of acrimony between the prime minister and the army chief did occur, the amiable Chaudhry Shujaat had intervened to cool off matters. Thus, policy matters had remained unsettled."

" ... disturbing questions may have crossed Sharif’s mind: what fate awaited him on his return to Pakistan? Would he be able to implement the 4 July statement? How would the army command respond to the 4 July statement? In a country in whose sixty-five year history the military had subverted the Constitution three times to remove an elected civilian ruler, ... In the White House, Clinton’s aide Bruce Riedel had made the dramatic deduction that the Pakistani prime minister had arrived in Washington with his family because, after agreeing on troop withdrawal from Kargil, he was hesitant to return to Pakistan because of fear of the army command."

Author isn't being explicit. After 1971, Bhutto, the pm of a leftover Pakistan, had been executed by an army chief after a coup, using what passes for law machinery of pak for the purpose. 

................................................................................................

" ... In the somewhat sullen silence that followed, one general did point out, “Sir, they (the Indians) are celebrating.” Many present in the room must have recalled the army chief’s 16 May assurance that Pakistan was in a “win-win” situation in Kargil as its positions were “unassailable.” Words did not matter. The original and vocal critics of Kargil, including commanders 1 Corps General Saleem Haider, Quetta corps General Tariq Pervez and other had been proven right.  Also, with restive troops and reports of low morale, especially of those who had participated in the Operation, the army chief had a huge task before him."

"It was going to be a hard sell, since government rhetoric had built a public perception since end May of victories for the Mujahedeen fighting Indian troops in the Kargil-Drass area. ... According to media reports based on official sources, Delhi was in a very difficult position since its troops were facing the danger of starvation in Siachen if the blockade of the Drass-Kargil Road continued. In fact, after the Washington agreement, the army spokesman said, “There is no change in ground realities as Drass-Kargil Road is still in range of Pakistani artillery fire…”"

" ... People drew a parallel with the 1965 events, when Pakistan was about to “liberate the whole of Kashmir...when Pakistani leaders succumbed to world pressure and stopped the military operation and we are facing a similar situation now...”[884] ... "

What is the author talking about, or just lies as usual by paki government to pakis? 

Indian tanks had been in centre of Lahore in 1965! 

................................................................................................

"Politicians fully capitalized on this anti-Nawaz mood. Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP), Pakistan’s leading opposition party, was critical of the prime minister for carrying out secret negotiations with Clinton. The MQM also opposed the Washington agreement as a ‘sell out of Kashmir.”[887] It demanded details of the Sharif-Clinton talks and said that an agreement on withdrawal “without a quid pro quo” would be a “a serious disappointment for the nation.”[888] The Jamaat-i-Islami, a right-wing party, who had protested in Lahore against the Lahore summit, was predictably critical of the prime minister. Its leader Munawar Hassan said the Washington statement was “treachery.” ... "

" ... PTI leader Abdus Sattar,[890] with forty years as Pakistan’s top diplomat behind him, predicted that Sharif “will be ousted from power like former rulers ... Regarding the 4 July agreement Sattar said while the army would carry out out orders of the political government in the given environment, the agreement applied to the Mujahideen, not to the Pakistan Army. Sattar merely repeated Pakistan’s official position as he claimed “they (the army) are on the LOC and you cannot ask them to vacate.”[893]"

" ... Gul warned the lawyers at the Lahore High Court Bar that the ... agreement dictated by the US. “We are not an American state…we should not follow American instructions blindly…”[899] He warned of a clash in case the Mujahedeen refused to withdraw from their positions in Kargil. ... "

Funny, he wasn't aware either, that it was all paki military in pajamas, asked to pretend they were terrorists - and disowned by pakis in life and death! 

"All the talk of Mujahideen disengaging or not was all fiction. The Mujahideen, were not involved. Op KP had no support by Hurriyat , ISI or the ongoing struggle in Kashmir creating rear area insecurity; a repeat of a Operation Gibraltar."

................................................................................................

"While the main thrust of all criticism targeting the Prime Minster was that he was responsible for Pakistan’s humiliation, some of Sharif’s cabinet members also rose to his defense. His close confidante, the Minister for Provincial Coordination and Political Affairs, was quick to retort to the critics, “The record of these generals is self-evident.” He reminded them that “in their period of leadership, the enemy occupied Siachen glacier. And so where was their military capability and patriotism then?” [908] The beginnings of a civil-military confrontation were discernable. A Sharif loyalist, General Javed Nasir, who had been appointed by Sharif as ISI chief, also supported the withdrawal. He wrote in Pakistan’s most widely read Urdu daily Jang, praising Sharif’s withdrawal decision, even though this former spy chief had equally vehemently supported the Kargil operation. In his Jang piece, he praised Sharif’s India policy and wrote that the prime minister had “spared no effort for the peace offensive, which he had launched on 21 February 1999 in the form of the Lahore Declaration. Privately, he has also been expressing the desire that we should enter the new millennium with pride and that Allah has ordained the Muslims to serve as an example worth following for the world.”[909] The spin did not work."

That last sentence betrays the author's own slant. 

................................................................................................

" ... The million-dollar question, raised in subdued tones since mid-June, was: “With whose permission was Kargil initiated?”"

"With ISPR the only source of all Kargil-related information their version of Kargil was the only reality the press knew. Hence, pressmen had not been privy to the ground situation, which had tilted in India’s favor. Having lost Tololing posts by the middle of June, Pakistani troops had also lost posts on the strategically located Tiger Hill. The Adjutant General branch at the GHQ had been getting reports of increasing casualties. Even the worried Kargil clique was deeply concerned over mounting deaths of senior colleagues.[910] Supply lines had come under enemy attack, making it difficult to maintain supplies to the posts. A catch-22 situation has been created. Neither was troop pullout possible nor was managing critical logistical supplies.

"The shortage of food had meant that some soldiers even had to resort to eating grass.[911] Ill-equipped, underfed, and frost-bitten, many soldiers had been surrounded by Indian infantry and come under artillery and aerial attacks. The inevitable question was: Where would this continued battle on the world’s highest and most vicious battleground have led? In the face of overwhelming force deployment by the Indians, the troops across the LOC would have either been killed or captured by the Indians."

Another lie there by author, in that "would have" bit. They were, in fact, killed or captured in quantities enough to inform India that they were paki soldiers being denied by pakis. 

................................................................................................

"The news of the prime minister’s effort to end the battle evoked a mixed response among those in the battle-zone. When the news of withdrawal blared from their wireless sets, it was received by many with a sense of relief. Most field commanders were not surprised. Some even prayed for Nawaz Sharif’s long life when they heard of the 4 July agreement.[912] They were losing their colleagues while India was beginning to succeed in reclaiming the peaks and ridges. They knew the balance of forces and numbers was heavily tilted in India’s favor.

"Nevertheless, fighting in the inhospitable terrain under terrible conditions, the question uppermost in the minds of many soldiers was: What had been the purpose of the Operation and of the battle that followed? If a unilateral withdrawal was the final outcome, why the sacrifices? At posts where the young and courageous soldiers had not experienced reversals, many were unable to understand the compulsion to withdraw. There was frustration. ... many could not understand why their country did not own them. Why were the dead bodies of their martyred colleagues not being received and honoured? Many also wondered why a seeming victory was being squandered and was turning into a surrender, and that too a globally broadcast surrender?"

"Predictably when the Kargil battle came to a close no official casualty figures were issued. The pretence of no Pakistani troop involvement also meant that accepting bodies of martyred soldiers would be difficult. Even during the withdrawal, the Indians claimed that they buried “army soldiers of 12 Northern Light Infantry, who had been killed at Point 4875” in the battle to reclaim posts in Drass sector.[926]  Also, while several guesstimates were made, the government issued no official casualty figures. For example, in Pakistan, the military quoted the figure of around 500 deaths, while there was talk of an estimated one thousand Pakistani casualties. The prime minister claimed there were more than thousand casualties.[927] Senior military officers claimed the worried army chief had shared a figure of one thousand casualties.[928] The war martyrs issue and their number came up when the army chief sought a rehabilitation budget for families of martyrs and veterans."

" ... Towards end-July, however, the army command changed its policy on receiving bodies of their fallen men because of Colonel Sher Khan. ... "

................................................................................................

"Pakistan continued with its disingenuous approach of claiming that the Mujahedeen, not its army, were present in the mountains. ... "

Author invents words - or sentences, paragraphs - to label the paki lies. 

" ... Meanwhile, at the July 11 joint presser, while giving an update on the withdrawal along with the ISPR’s Brigadier Rashid, foreign minister Aziz claimed, “In the past few weeks the Mujahedeen action has been gloriously successful as the just and legitimate cause of Kashmir has engaged the international community’s undivided attention throughout the period.”[933] The brigadier also recounted the Mujahedeen’s military victories over the Indians, who, he claimed, were suffering from “sagging morale.” If the Indian morale was “sagging” and the Mujahiedeen were “gloriously successful, then why the 4 July agreement?"

Precisely. 

As Molotov, fed up with nazi lies about RAF never daring to bomb Berlin and Berlin being completely safe, had asked his host who'd hurried him from dinner to shelter,  due to a precisely timed RAF raid - "so why are we hiding in this shelter, and whose bombs are these that are falling around us?"

................................................................................................

Author extensively quotes statements then issued from various terrorist organisations, based in or supported by pak, and their mouthpieces or leaders. 

"These endless statements claiming Mujahedeen presence also clashed with the widely known facts about Pakistani soldiers fighting in Kargil. Pakistan continued to spin this bizarre narrative. While the prime minister’s trusted bureaucrat Tariq Fatemi told the Indians we are “rolling our beds” and the Pakistan and Indian DGMOs were in contact coordinating Pakistani troops withdrawal and the international community was also commenting on Pakistani troop withdrawal, Islamabad was making a parallel stream of statements claiming that Pakistan had in fact requested the Mujahedeen groups fighting in Kargil-Drass, to withdraw!"

" ... Finally, when he himself was President, Musharraf opted for full disclosure. He acknowledged in his book that “as few as five battalions in support of freedom fighter groups, were able to compel the Indians to employ more than four divisions…”[944] In fact, adding a new dimension, the former army chief also claimed it was the “Pakistani freedom fighters”[945] who had occupied the front-line positions."

................................................................................................

" ... He mostly received cold, if not aggressive, receptions from the officers. For example, in the Quetta Garrison 41 Division auditorium, a captain asked the visiting army chief, ‘If you had to pull-out in exchange for a Nawaz Sharif and Clinton breakfast meeting, why did you go in?’ Another wanted to know why prime minister Nawaz Sharif had let them down. The Corps Commander Quetta, accompanying the army chief, had to intervene to ask his officers to take it easy. This resentment among the officers sprang from the widely held belief that, by calling off Operation KP when it was virtually impossible for the Indians to militarily dislodge Pakistani troops from their posts, the prime minister had committed a blunder.[969]"

" ... These young warriors had many hard questions. ‘Why did we conduct the Kargil Operation?’ ... The chief refrain was: ‘Who is responsible for this fiasco?’ And the young soldiers wanted to know.

"In rare cases, soldiers lying in delirious conditions on hospital beds even cursed at the commanders visiting the injured. According to one Kargil veteran who, after fighting at the Tiger Hill, lay injured in a hospital in Gilgit, another veteran on the bed next to his shouted and in abusive language cursed the military commanders as they came to visit the injured. ... Another injured brigadier, who had commanded an NLI brigade, was evacuated to Rawalpindi because it was not safe for him to be around the injured and extremely angry troops.[972]"

................................................................................................

"By such public expression of their angry emotions, the young officers and jawans of NLI had broken rigid institutional codes. This was particularly evident at the traditional Darbar gatherings convened by the NLI commander who had led the Kargil operation.

"The soldiers who returned home after almost being trapped in the world’s most inhospitable and treacherous battle field and having a close brush with death had expected heroes’ welcomes. Instead, they felt hurt and unappreciated. Many complained that the media ‘mistreated’ them and the people did not give them ‘the credit’ they deserved. And the withdrawal phase made matters even worse. Failure to ensure a proper scheme of withdrawal, to prevent the unnecessary loss of life to Indian artillery fire, had caused soldiers to feel badly let down. ... "

"In August, angrily weeping families had received Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the army chief in Gilgit with the demand that their sons, brothers, or husbands be brought back, dead or alive. Their anguish stemmed from the extraordinary circumstances. There was no declared war and their men had not announced they were going to the front, and there were dead bodies arriving and, worse, there were highly disturbing Indian media reports that the Pakistani authorities were refusing to accept many of the bodies of their soldiers.

"In July, Pakistan’s Political Counsellor in Delhi, Jalil Abbas Jillani, had received a call from his Indian counterpart asking him to receive the bodies of fallen Pakistani soldiers. Under instructions to refuse, Jillani told Vivek Katju, Additional Secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, that there were no Pakistani soldiers fighting in Kargil. The bodies Indian authorities wanted to handover included the body of captain Kernel Sher Khan who had been awarded the Nishan-i-Haider, the highest military award. By the end of July, these instructions to the Pakistan High Commission were changed and they had begun accepting the bodies. As Islamabad accused Delhi of torturing Pakistani soldiers, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesman offered to handover several Pakistani soldiers, captured in Kargil, to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[973]

................................................................................................

" ... Earlier in April 1998, Benazir and her husband were convicted on corruption charges. Deeply drawn battle lines all targeted Sharif’s corruption—his refusing to return billion of rupees of loans, his seeking to control the parliament by becoming Ameerul Momineen, his party workers’ attack on the Supreme Court, the controversy around the 4 July decision to withdraw: all these gave the Opposition another stick to seek government’s early removal. The ruling family’s loan scandals were snowballing into a major crisis. Interestingly, the Army, despite its huge and dangerous blunder in Kargil, was in a secure spot."

This has largely to do with paki caste system that sees conquering invaders as above all, despises traders as moneymaker and respects feudal system. Consequently army is owner of most of paki land and businesses, unlike most other - functioning - countries where business, military and land ownership do not mix. 

................................................................................................

" ... The PPP insisted that the government, and specifically the prime minister, had cleared the Kargil Operation. The religious parties criticized the withdrawal and the Sharif-led government’s re-engagement with India, as well as his decision to pull back support to the Taliban and enter into dialogue with the Northern Alliance. They consistently attacked the government for allowing US Special Forces to come to Pakistan to train Pakistanis involved in the ‘Capture bin Laden’ Operation. Through August, these protesting parties and sections of the media, who dominated popular discourse as well as public space, reiteratively popularized the narrative that Washington had stepped in to save India from a certain military defeat that the Mujahedeen had almost inflicted on India. The Washington Accord, for them, was a sell-out of the Kashmiri cause."

" ... The army chief in his meeting with the prime minister’s younger brother and Chief Minister of Punjab, Shehbaz Sharif, suggested that he must consider becoming the deputy prime minister in order to streamline the federal government’s performance![977] The younger Sharif, while having heard the army chief attentively, was clear that neither would his brother fancy such a suggestion coming from him and nor was his vacating Punjab, the fortress of Pakistan’s politics, a wise move. Meanwhile, the authors of the country’s biggest military debacle would call out the elected government on governance matters. The blundering group in khaki would hold the weak civilians accountable while they launched a campaign to discredit the elected government."

"In addition to the resentment within the rank and file, the army chief had to deal with internal rifts between his top military commanders, as their criticism of the Kargil Operation began to surface. They believed the ill-conceived Operation had caused embarrassment to the entire institution.  Even the military’s own top spymasters and senior commanders were actively kept out of the loop. When they had picked up indicators of unusual troop movement, the existence of the Operation was denied. Others, who had questioned the viability of the Kargil plan during the early May Corp Commanders meeting but had their concerns dismissed by the architects of Kargil, were also talking. This, after 4 Jul  many a hitherto tight-lipped and resentful commander was now more vocal in his indictment of the Operation.

"The public critique later by one of Pakistan’s most professional generals, Lt. General Ali Quli Khan,[979] best captured the views of Pakistan’s top commanders. Commenting on General Musharraf’s own conclusion on the Kargil Operations, ‘Considered in purely military terms, the Kargil Operations were a landmark in the history of the Pakistan Army,’[980] Khan, the former Chief of General Staff wrote, ‘I am totally amazed at such ostrich-like behavior when the whole world considers Kargil to be the worst debacle in Pakistan’s history and where countless innocent young lives were lost for nothing. Absolutely nothing!’ [981] He further added, ‘I regret to say that the conception and planning at the highest level had been poor—in fact, so poor that the only word which can adequately describe is it unprofessional. We all know that the main duty of the high command is to ensure that with their meticulous planning they create conditions whereby their junior combatants can fight easily. This was certainly not done at Kargil. It is also fairly obvious that the Kargil Operations was not conceived in its totality, with the result that apart from bringing ignominy to Pakistan it also caused unnecessary misery to a lot of innocent people.’[982] 

"Internally, within the institution, there was disquiet after the withdrawal. Instructions were that Kargil would not be discussed in any school of instruction, neither in any class nor in any study period. No courses would be taught at the NDC etc. The subject of Kargil was a ‘banned item’."

................................................................................................

"Criticism from beyond the borders also hit hard, especially when it floated in world capitals in form of the vicious, scathing criticism in the ‘Rogue Army’ advertisements campaign that targeted the Pakistan Army and multiplied the woes of the Kargil clique. Within days of the 4 July Sharif-Clinton Statement, the advertisement ran in leading US newspapers, including the New York Times. Musharraf wanted an official and very prominent rebuttal issued in the very papers in which the advertisement appeared. It was a matter of the troop morale, he asked a common friend to convey to the prime minister. The army chief also offered to pay for the rebuttal advertisement in case the government had funding problems.[983] The prime minister disagreed. Despite the intervention of his father and brother, Sharif was unrelenting. Only one article could be commissioned to counter the advertisement." 

Now, author returns to prevaricating. 

"Thus, the pressure from within the Army, the vocal criticism by the navy and the air force, and the general political chatter prompted the architects of Kargil to adopt an offensive defense posture. In August, deeper fault lines emerged between the civilian and military leadership’s approach to handling the post-Kargil period."

This is like death of a child due to physical assault by an adult blamed on those criticising the said assault. 

Does the author wish here to imply, or let reader infer, that those responsible for Kargil invasion against India and killing of Indians thereby, planned and executed, had been well-behaved, or well intentioned at any time? 

Had they not violated rvery norm, every protocol, in the process, of functioning of a proper military of a proper government, when invading Kargil - without informing their own government? 

Was their anything that could be termed proper in their conduct in their subsequent denial of their own soldiers, even to the extent of refusing the dead? 

................................................................................................

"The most public manifestation of this difference was over the question of decorating the Kargil heroes, martyrs and the living, with national awards for valor. Why this issue became a controversial one between the government and the Army was principally because the Army had publicly taken the position that it was not Pakistani soldiers but freedom fighters who had fought in Kargil. The prime minister had sustained this charade, begun initially by the Army during the Kargil Operation, even after the 4 July withdrawal. The army leadership now wanted the government to approve national awards for the ‘Kargil heroes.’

"The GHQ also wanted nationally broadcast television programmes honouring the heroes of Kargil. There was a reason why the Kargil clique now wanted to acknowledge and honour the brave and the best of the Army, earlier having opted to let them be projected as Mujahideen. The clique now detected the increasing anger and agitation of the troops caused towards their commanders, not only because of the debacle-like end of Kargil, but also in their role and sacrifices not having been acknowledged.

"Sitting in their secure garrisons, these were men of command and authority who must have silently been haunted by the calamitous Operation they had designed. More blood, their critics argued, of Pakistan’s brave soldiers had flowed in this calamity called Kargil, than put together in the two wars Pakistan fought in 1965 and 1971."

The claim about 1965, in view of the authors repeated ridicule of Indians ineffective and killed at Kargil, is debatable at best. 

But 1971? That's a horrible claim, considering the genocide perpetrated by paki military in East Bengal, accompanied by organised mass gang rapes they also perpetrated along with killings, in millions, comparable with and outdone by only nazis in WWII. 

The only way to reconcile that statement with reality is to not only deduce but accept a value system so racist that it had counted half its own citizens as not human. 

And the only reason that paki military did not have 93,000 of paki military dead in East Bengal was because India, instead of letting them be taken prisoners of war by the then new nation of Bangladesh, had instead returned them safe to the then remaining, truncated West Pakistan, which really had no right to retain the name because they'd lost 60% of their own erstwhile paki population, the Bengalis. 

................................................................................................

" ... Interestingly, although Pakistan’s public position was that Kashmiri Mujahideen, not Pakistani soldiers, were fighting the Indian Army in Kargil, yet, that night the Kargil clique, identified the recipients for the highest gallantry award, Nishan-i-Haider. Additionally, approximately 80 soldiers were given various other awards on General Javed Hassan’s recommendations. He insisted awards were necessary to raise the morale of the soldiers.

"The Awards ceremony, called Kargil kay Hero, was televised by PTV, but the Sharif-led government was keen to call off its broadcasting. The prime minister was trying to re-engage with the Indians. Thus, Nawaz Sharif and Shehbaz Sharif did not participate in the programme. While all the chief ministers participated, the Punjab chief minister avoided it."

It seems to have not occurred to the author that not everybody can sustain the doublespeak that paki army maintained, of both disclaming and awarding role of paki soldiers in Kargil simultaneously! 

If the then pm of pak had participated in such a televised spectacle, or his brother had, doesn't the author realise that the paki pm could then subsequently be questioned on the factual discrepancy, by world media, not to mention international diplomatic corps,  and even various governments and their leaders, even officially? 

................................................................................................

" ... State Department spokesman, James Rubin, said that, even on Kashmir, the US could mediate only if Pakistan and India both sought mediation. Away from 4 July, Pakistan had to manage its own relationship with India."

Author returns to paki lies. 

" ... In Pakistan, civilian intelligence agencies had reports of sectarian killers finding safe havens in neighboring Afghanistan. ... "

Fact is taliban were the spectrum created in and by Pakistan, to take control of Afghanistan in name of religion - and it wreaked havoc in a society that had women professors until then, teaching at university! Thereafter pakis pretending that it was an Afghanistan problem is height of duplicity and fraud. 

................................................................................................

More lies, more fraud. 

"The actual implementation of the ‘Capture Osama’ plan also began in August. The Taliban remained committed to protecting the 41-year-old Saudi millionaire. They kept him ‘under the protection of a special security commission’.[991] The US President’s most unusual threat of 4 July that, unless Pakistan did more, he ‘would have to announce Pakistan was in effect supporting terrorism in Afghanistan’ had worked.[992] The plan to capture OBL was first proposed by the Pakistani prime minister himself in his 2 December 1998, Washington meeting. Economic sanctions on the Taliban were already in place. Around this time, with Sharif’s support, US officials also began to train 60 Pakistani troops as commandoes to go into Afghanistan to get bin Laden. ‘I was skeptical about the project; even if Sharif wanted to help, the Pakistan military was full of Taliban and al-Qaeda sympathizers. But I thought we had nothing to lose by exploring every option.’[993]"

In view of his eventual capture - in Abbottabad, within walking distance of what US terms "West Point of Pakistan", was he really ever in Afghanistan? 

Or had he been spirited away out of sight straight into protection of paki military even before Kargil? 

................................................................................................

" ... The CIA planned a ‘ring of kidnapping squads around Afghanistan to move in to capture OBL when required’.[994] 

"After his commitment with Clinton, Sharif personally led the effort to convince the Taliban government to handover OBL. In July, he met, along with the visiting the Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan, the Afghan Foreign Minister Mulla Mutawakil at the Punjab House in Islamabad. With the help of an interpreter, the Saudi Prince reminded Muttawakil, ‘We had helped you, we had recognized you, but you are ungrateful.’ The Taliban leader was reprimanded in ‘strong and humiliating term’. Muttawakil said they were grateful, that they wanted Saudi assistance to continue, but handing over OBL or ‘extraditing him’ was ‘impossible’. This blanket refusal annoyed the prime minister and his Saudi guest.[995] Clinton’s ‘Get OBL’ policy included use of force at multiple levels. The Taliban leader Mullah Omar was under attack. At the end of August, a saboteur’s bomb exploded near his home in Kandahar.

"The ‘Capture Osama’ Operation was being launched. The Americans were funding the construction of barracks, three miles south of Rawalpindi, for SSG commandoes. According to the plan, Pakistani commandoes, on intelligence information, would be infiltrated into Afghanistan to kidnap bin Laden. While the ISI chief, now reporting to the prime minister and following his instructions, went along with the plan, the top operational tier opposed it. Senior generals believed that ‘nothing could be more foolish’. OBL, they believed, was an ‘elusive target’ and looking for him was tantamount ‘to searching for a needle in a haystack’. ... While the US sent FBI officials to train the commandoes and to monitor the operation, senior officials were skeptical of the scheme. ‘We said to ourselves: Why do they need searchers for someone they are already aware of? Well, we played along,’ recalled one US official.[996]

" ... Pakistan began its shuttle diplomacy between Kandahar and the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, trying to get talks restarted between Ahmed Shah Masood and the Taliban.[998] While the Northern Alliance blamed Pakistani officials for, in reality, siding with the Taliban, Pakistani officials repeatedly spoke of their ‘peace agenda’ and for initiating the shuttle diplomacy in response to President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s request.[999] ... "

Author now openly takes sides - with the fraudulent and the invader - who'd failed, to boot. 

" ... Whatever were coup-maker Musharraf’s justifications at the time of the coup, years later, he was more truthful as he wrote in his book, ‘It was in dealing with Kargil that the prime minister exposed his mediocrity and set himself on a collision course with the Army and me.’[1001]"

" ... Caught between trying to pull Pakistan out of the Kargil debacle, reviving the dialogue process with India, containing the fallout in the military and political circles, and also dealing with the political pressures generated from his government’s incompetence, no inquiry was instituted against the army chief and other architects of Kargil. Instead, a campaign was launched against the civilians, the army leadership feeling ironically confident enough to hold the civilian leadership over issues of governance."

................................................................................................

"The bonhomie of the prime minister and the army chief’s early September trip to the NLI headquarters in Skardu was short-lived. Although on Kashmiri rights, Sharif was unrelenting, calling for a UN-supervised plebiscite in Kashmir similar to East Timor[1002], the ghost of Kargil had sown distrust between Sharif and the military command. Behind closed doors, in the corridors of power, and in the homes of the powerful, subdued games were on. Some played for survival, others for reprimand and retribution. Tool bags for menacing games were thrown open. All was fair play: wiretapping, inspired media reports, surveillance, interpreting intercepts, spy men on the prowl, instigating anger, manufacturing street protests. The ghost of the Kargil debacle was haunting Pakistan’s corridors of power. The members of the Kargil clique, architects of the debacle, were fearful of being fired. Armed with institutional resources and experience at surreptitiously fighting civilian authority, they were all set to fight back.

"Sharif was in a difficult position. Unlike Sharif’s unbridled October 1998 reaction to a speech by Musharraf’s predecessor army chief general Jahangir Karamat, which led to latter’s dismissal, the post-Kargil situation was a very complex one. Pakistan had lost in martyrdom many of its brave young men yet internationally the country was being criticized. Pakistan’s credibility as a responsible nuclear State had received a serious setback. Yet the prime minister could not hold the army chief accountable for the debacle at Kargil. He was constrained by issues around his own public ownership of the Operation and of “national honor.” [1003]"

When do pakis plan to learn that neither killing nor giving one's own life is counted as praiseworthy (and nowhere outside of their own medieval creed, anyway), when in quest of world conquest, or simple looting of others, post medieval era - and, that, it's definitely no longer medieval era as of half a century ago, through most of the world? Calling those invaders martyrs is signatory of a creed of world conquest in name of a creed, but in every sensible process of thought, they were no more than oil thrown by those seeking to set fire to a neighbour's home. 

................................................................................................

" ... His Washington interlocutors were already aware of the real architects of Kargil. But, under siege from domestic troubles, with political opponents multiplying and unifying under the 19-party Grand Democratic Alliance[1004] banner, the prime minister seemed to have concluded that he was going to work silently on tackling the Kargil clique. Ouster of the army chief was unlikely. However, some form of reprimand was inevitable. The cumulative impact of all this was the rise of distrust and suspicion among Pakistan’s power players."

" ... In a heady moment during the landmark 17 May briefing, General Aziz, the Kargil kingpin, had prodded Pakistan’s prime minister to dream about being second only to Jinnah. ... As Chaudhry Nisar, his key aide, later argued, once the ball was set rolling, the Kargil Operation was ‘irreversible’, even if the Prime Minister had wanted to reverse it.[1006]

"In the media, a plethora of accusations surfaced, targeting the prime minister: that he had sold Kashmir, surrendered in Washington the victory won at Kargil; he had wasted the sacrifices of the brave soldiers at Kargil, had appeased the Americans, bowed before the Indians etc. With facts of the beginnings, the conduct, and the military outcome of this Operation little known, these accusations seemed plausible. Sharif’s dash to Washington had been widely publicized."

................................................................................................

" ... Pakistan’s chief executive was now under an extraordinary level of intelligence watch. The intelligence under the army’s high command maintained a close tab on the prime minister and his cabinet. The army intelligence picked up the Prime Minister House chatter. The army chief complained to a confidante that the PM’s intercepts had revealed that he would make Musharraf apologize publicly,[1007] claiming that the PM had promised this to the Indian Prime Minister! Considering that, ever since the cover was blown from the Kargil Operation plan, the PM had taken ownership of it and tried to extricate, in his calculation, Pakistan and its Army with honour, self-respect, and minimal diplomatic damage, such an undertaking seemed highly unlikely. ..."

"The army chief’s anger and nervousness persisted. The blame talk would just not end. There were complaints from within the army high command, chatter in Army messes, insinuations from the government’s men, and a few voices even within the media. He had requested the government several times to respond to news reports blaming the army chief for the debacle–indeed, even of conducting it unconstitutionally, i.e., without the chief executive’s permission."

In short, he wanted the lie and the cover, the pretense of it having been the civilian government decision to invade, to continue - along with the lies about no paki government involvement, it having been all independent terrorists.

................................................................................................

" ... Nervous and jumpy, the Kargil clique arranged to target its principal adversary, the prime minister himself, by weaving a two-front siege around him. They reached out to journalists to gauge the mood in the civilian quarters. Others were tasked to gauge the mood and reach out to the distraught Opposition parties and estranged politicians within the ruling party.

"The 14 September interview splashed by Pakistan’s most widely read Urdu daily, in which Sharif’s backchannel point-man Niaz A. Naik held the army responsible for sabotaging, what he claimed was, a time-bound plan that the two prime ministers had agreed upon for resolving the Kashmir dispute, deepened suspicion in the barracks. Naik had also asserted that Sharif had not been informed of the Kargil Operation, first hearing of it around 25 April. This contradicted Musharraf’s public statement of 16 July that ‘everyone was on board’.[1008] On 15 September, a prestigious English daily published ‘military source’s expectation that “some responsible functionary would remove the impression created by the former foreign secretary that the Army did not want resolution of the Kashmir dispute”’.[1009] The same day, Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz stepped in to more than clarify. In his Senate speech, he said that the armed forces had acted in the interests of Pakistan and it was ‘totally untrue’ that through the Kargil crisis the armed forces had undermined the Pakistan-India peace process.[1010] Nevertheless, the foreign minister seconded Naik’s claim that a time-bound approach to resolving Kashmir had been agreed upon. Sartaj’s speech also addressed the signing of the CTBT, a red herring issue in the hands of the political opposition. He was categorical that Pakistan ‘will not consider signing it till the time sanctions imposed by the US were removed’.[1011]

"Matters were in a flux. On 15 September, the Foreign Office spokesperson formally announced that the Prime minister had ‘no plans’ to attend the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session. The cancellation was unexpected. The reason that circulated in the press was that, because Pakistan had decided against signing the CTBT, the PM wanted to avoid the pressure he was likely to face at the UNGA, especially from the Clinton administration. However, less known was the fact that a close confidante of the army chief, who was also an intimate friend of the Sharif family with easy access to the prime minister’s father, contributed to the PM’s decision to miss the UNGA session. Musharraf, wary of what the PM might say about the Kargil clique, and especially about him, was keen that he not attend the UNGA.[1012] The confidante was therefore sent to Mian Sharif to convince him to dissuade his son from traveling to New York. Mian Sharif was convinced that, with trouble brewing at home, it was unwise for his son to travel. The PM did not travel."

Obviously, if it was that easy for the army to control the paki PM without subterfuge, the subsequent coup was merely making it official!

................................................................................................

"The angry chief’s words were interpreted by many as signalling a possible coup looming around the corner."

" ... Clinton administration had been sending messages through US Ambassador Milam, to send his envoy, so that Clinton could follow up with his 4 July promise of helping restart the Pakistan-India dialogue on Kashmir. ‘Do not send someone from the Foreign Office,’ was the message. In Islamabad, it was expected that the US would help Pakistan to continue with the Lahore process. ... ‘Trust’ was the key consideration for the prime minister. So, in the midst of raging political troubles, Nawaz Sharif sent off his brother Shehbaz Sharif as his special envoy to Washington."

" ... The State Department’s South Asia men had gauged Sharif’s political troubles. The Islamabad whispers of a possible coup or a likely Musharraf sacking were loud enough to reach Washington. They wanted to hear from Sharif’s emissary how deep the civil-military divide was. They were keen for facts on the follow-through on Pakistani troop withdrawal from Kargil and Islamabad’s re-engagement with India. Away from the India question, Islamabad and Washington were active partners in a ‘Get Osama’ Operation. This included both Islamabad directly persuading Mullah Omar to give up OBL and also the launch of a joint operation with the CIA to physically capture the al-Qaeda chief."

................................................................................................

"Shehbaz held a six-hour-long marathon session with Karl Inderfurth and Walter Anderson. The meeting took place at Washington’s historical Willard Hotel, where Shehbaz was staying. The Willard was where Abraham Lincoln had spent the night before his first inauguration as President in 1861. Before the Inderfurth-Shehbaz marathon session began, as an ice-breaker gesture, the otherwise frugal Inderfurth had spent $80 to buy his Pakistani guest The History of the Willard Hotel. 

"In Washington, Shehbaz Sharif’s concern about the possibility of a coup was apparent. Although he ‘never said he feared a coup but was beating around the bush’. There was very little discussion on how to advance the Lahore process. Some among the US side found that ‘the dialogue was sterile on Kashmir’.[1019]"

" ... On Kargil, Shehbaz Sharif informed them that troop movement was going according to plan. However, throughout the meeting, Shehbaz repeatedly expressed concern about ‘extra constitutional’ developments. He, in fact, referred to it 15 times. Yet, he did not once mention the word ‘military’ nor asked for US help in dealing with the military. His focus on ‘extra constitutional pressures on an elected government’, combined with what Washington was picking up from Islamabad, left no doubt among the Americans that trouble was brewing for the elected government that the Clinton administration would have rather seen in office. However, Sharif’s special envoy never said he feared a coup. He gave mixed signals and the Americans did not get candid answers on facts."

" ... In fact, as Talbott would later recall, ‘Shehbaz would not quite confirm, even in response to direct questions, that a military coup was brewing.’[1020] However, he added, ‘Shehbaz’s mannerisms, his mirthless smiles, long silences, and abrupt changes of subject when we asked about the situation at home, left us in no doubt that something was afoot.’[1021]"

" ... When Inderfurth pulled him to the side and asked him if Musharraf was alright, Shehbaz told him he was implementing the 4 July agreement and asked if he knew Musharraf.[1023] Inderfurth replied in the negative. ‘Why don’t you invite Musharraf?’ Shehbaz advised him."

................................................................................................

"A major American takeaway from the Shehbaz visit was that the Sharif-led government was in trouble at home. Senior US administration people like the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Pickering, saw Shehbaz as being ‘worried that they would have to pay for what they did (troop withdrawal)’.[1029]  The US Administration then took an unusual step. From New York, where the Clinton team was attending the UNGA session, Karl Inderfurth issued a statement that called on the Pakistan Army not to try any ‘extra-constitutional method’ to remove the Nawaz Sharif-led government.[1030]"

" ... Washington was keen to extend support to Nawaz Sharif, the man Clinton trusted, the man who had already become a high-value friend after consenting to Washington’s Pak-US collaborative ‘Capture OBL’ Operation. US officials had hoped this statement would alter the prevailing power dynamics in Pakistan to Sharif’s advantage. Such an expectation suggested two problems. One, Washington was delusional about the power its mere word carried. Two, Washington was ignorant of the local dynamics at work in Pakistan."

Author stretches one single point inyo two there, or rather, hides one by doing so. Point really she makes is that crazy jihadist nation that Pakistan have been since inception - that'd be since caliphate movement supported by Gandhi that nevertheless ended with massacre of over 1,500 Hindus in Kerala (termed 'Moplah killings', ie, son-in-law killings, because of Arab traditions of Arab seafaring muslims marrying and keeping local wives in Kerala) - there's no trusting their word even if anyone, including US, pours hundreds of billions of dollars in aid; they'd behead a US citizen as and when they please, anyway, as they fid to Daniel Pearl, denying all responsibility to boot and pretending that the authorities were not aware of goings-on. 

Her first point really should be that US is mistaken in assuming that a beneficiary to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars can influence a thug that the terrorist factory in reality is, all it's always been and intends to remain, terrorising - and begging at gunpoint, in turn. 

................................................................................................

"It was the annual season of international diplomacy. The two foreign policy principals, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, had arrived in New York for the UNGA session. ... Jaswant Singh’s gift to Albright was United States and India, 1777 to 1996: Bridge over River Time with Albright reciprocating with Engaging India: U. S. Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy, a collection of essays on America’s strategic relations with India.[1036]  In a sign of growing cordiality between the two capitals, there were unprecedented ‘long, intensive discussions on Afghan developments’, on Clinton’s Delhi trip, the first in 21 years, and on possible counter-terrorism cooperation[1037].

"In New York generally, the Indians found themselves in a comfortable situation, with global focus being on terrorism and counter-terrorism, the very issues for which Delhi sought support. After decades of Washington-Delhi strategic dissonance, signs of strategic convergence were emerging. In fact, the US, Russia, and even Pakistan’s staunchest ally, China, all converged on sanctions against Kabul’s Taliban regime—hosts of  the terrorist mastermind OBL, who planned terrorist attacks against both American and Russian targets.[1038]"

Did the author have a delusion at any point that world - outside her own paki origin - can be comfortable with terrorists or terrorism? Why make it seem as if this, counterterrorism or disapproval of terrorism, was an agenda sold by a single nation that, until then and since, for decades, was victimised by this nothing but the terrorist factory that pakis have forever been?

................................................................................................

" ... Thousands of Kashmiris threatened to cross the LOC on 4 October. Delhi threatened to open fire on those crossing the LOC while Islamabad urged them to call off their march.[1044] While Islamabad, already reeling from the Kargil debacle, decided to let them go and cross over at Chhakoti, the Indian forces were to prevent the crossing in stages through a graduated application of forces.[1045]"

If there are any Kashmiris left in paki occupied parts of Kashmir valley region, they are far too repressed and terrorised to attempt a threat, the place having since paki occupation been completely flooded and dominated by those from Western Punjab, as indeed is everything in pak from army to every province, including East Bengal until 1971, when they fought back to independence. 

Any Kashmir original citizens who dream of independence are the delusional ones that are the pampered and coddled citizens of India who imagine that, while Pakistan exists, Kashmir could have an existence of any kind except a butchered and sold in pieces carcass, as Gilgit, Baltistan and Baluchistan have been since Pakistan occupied those by force. 

It was a Gandhian - mistaken - policy responsible for their travails, by Nehru who refused their accession until too late for Kashmir and more than late for Baluchistan or Nepal. 

................................................................................................

" ... the unstated consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council including Pakistan’s ‘all-weather friend’ and strategic partner China, was that Kargil was a diplomatic and political blunder that derailed the promising Lahore process. ... "

" ... Significantly, most anti-Sharif forces sought military intervention to remove the Sharif-led government."

" ... With Washington impatient for progress on tracking and nabbing bin Laden, the CIA’s counter-terrorism cell saw the ISI as a partner of last resort. In fact, the ISI was viewed as a Taliban and OBL sympathizer, but Ziauddin was not viewed as hard core ISI. Also, Clinton’s South Asia men were against getting directly involved in the Afghan battlefield or directly confronting Pakistan over Afghanistan. Instead, the policy decision was to use Pakistan’s influence with the Taliban to track OBL. During his Washington trip, Pickering sought a meeting with Pakistan’s top spy. Pickering urged Ziauddin to actively nudge Taliban head Mullah Omar to hand over bin Laden to the Americans. And Ziauddin did."

" ... Soon after his return from Washington, General Ziauddin arrived in Kandahar on 5 October. The head of the Afghanistan-Kashmir desk, Major General Jamshed Gulzar, accompanied him. They arrived in a special plane and met Mullah Omar at his abode, a small mosque in Kandahar. At this meeting, the Pakistani intelligence officials offered condolences over the death of his wife and child.[1057] The ISI officials then informed Omar of the reason for their trip. An agitated Omar’s response was, ‘Osama bin Laden is like a bone in my throat. Neither can I digest it nor can I cough him out ... My problem is that I have given him a commitment as an Afghan and I cannot get out.’ Omar continued, ‘I pray that I die or he dies.’ Omar was clear that he ‘will not extradite him but if he goes on his own he should go’. Omar then asked his guests, ‘Can you tell me a country where he could be given protection?’ His guests could not. ... "

Was this work a research thesis submitted before the guy was located, caught and killed in Abbottabad, within walking distance from what US terms 'West Point of' pak? 

Else, was the hiding him in plain sight in the fortress-like house in Abbottabad a subsequent plan? 

Or do pakis really honestly  laim he lived there gorgeous years and they knew nothing? That ISI is indeed so incompetent as to never having noticed Obama living in Abbottabad? 

No, it's far more believable they lied. 

................................................................................................

Here's the extent of paki arrogance - 

"The CIA, in its effort to get OBL extradited, was in direct contact with it’s Pakistani counterpart, the ISI. Recalling the extent of the US desperation to get OBL, a senior ISI official said, ‘If I would have asked him to lick my feet, he would have.’[1060] The ISI, meanwhile, maintained a distance from CIA officials. For example, meetings with the CIA regional chief were held in ISI-run ‘safe houses’ instead of the ISI headquarters."

It's not just that the ISI guy said it, but that it got published with no concern regarding any repercussions. 

................................................................................................

" ... Combined with its aggressive military retaliation, that included heavy artillery and aerial attacks, Delhi stonewalled every Pakistani effort to extract strategic advantage from Operation KP. By early June, although still holding on the heights, Pakistani troops had come under tremendous physical and psychological pressure from both the Indian military offensive and from the disruption of supply routes. ... The Euphoria and Excitement were no more. ... The reality slowly sank in that Operation KP could accrue no gains for Islamabad."

" ... Pakistani troops under Indian attack suffered heavy casualties. ... Given Pakistan’s asymmetrical power structure, it was no surprise that the blundering military clique of Kargil staged a coup against the elected prime minister."

"For the French general, Napoleon Bonaparte, whom Clausewitz called the ‘very god of war’[1127], the centrality of the planning principle for any military campaign meant looking at the ‘worst-case scenario’. This necessarily required that the campaign planner, irrespective of his record of battle successes, not operate from a point of confidence. Instead, as a critical aspect of the planning principle, Napoleon explained how the planner’s personal mindset is central in applying the ‘worst-case scenario’. According to Napoleon, while planning any military campaign, ‘There is no man more pusillanimous than I when I am planning a campaign. I purposely exaggerate all the dangers and all the calamities that the circumstances make possible. I am in a thoroughly painful state of agitation.’[1128] Rarely have world class generals uttered such words of caution and humility, as did Napoleon, thus, emphasizing the criticality of thoroughness of planning for any success in military campaigns.

"Bravado or overconfidence was, thus, unknown to this military genius who, at the age of 26, had commanded the armies of the French Republic against Lombardy (in present-day Italy) and demonstrated near-invincibility in battle.[1129]

"Clearly, most military theorists have not only emphasized the centrality of planning in war but have warned against letting a general’s personality traits and biases undermine his own planning. For example, Clausewitz[1130] especially underscores personality traits like vanity, ambition, and vindictiveness that can move a general from the very planning course that alone is critical to his success and the success of the battle he has planned.

"In contrast to the above mentioned approach of the world’s leading military theorists and military commanders, the Kargil planners were overtaken by enthusiasm and a sense of payback. They were so obsessed with settling historical scores that it never crossed their minds to factor in the worst-case scenario. When the junior officers at 10 Corps heard of the operation, some had muttered their concerns. A confidential document moved through GHQ pointed out, ‘Indians won’t be stupid enough to humiliate themselves by politicizing the conflict.’ On this, an intelligence officer had written, ‘What if they are?’ The officer got rebuked but the question was never answered. Finally, the army chief General Pervez Musharraf raised the question of the Indian response at the January meeting convened for final clearance. However, the Operation had already been launched two months earlier, in November.

"Thus, the foremost planning blunder committed by the Kargil clique was their absolute failure to even factor in, leave alone follow the Napoleonic principle of ‘exaggerating’, possible dangers and calamities that may have arisen during Operation KP. ... Implicit in the planning was the faulty notion that by the time India discovered Pakistani troops across the LOC and controlling India’s lifeline to its troops in Leh, Delhi would find itself locked in a virtual surrender mode with no option but to settle on terms dictated by Pakistan. In such an all-victorious projection for Operation KP, the Kargil planners had turned on its head the cardinal war planning principle of exaggerating your adversary’s response."

................................................................................................

" ... The first major Indian attack on the supplies targeted a key forward ammunition dump. Subsequent aerial bombing and heavy artillery attacks in the encounter and exit phases almost entirely disrupted the supply lines. The Indian counter-attack had effectively cut-off what the Kargil planners and, subsequently, the field commanders had established as the Pakistani perimeter within which Operation KP was to be conducted. This made it virtually impossible for men and mules to ply on the supply routes. ... "

" ... Expansion of the war theatre, a classic mission creep phenomenon, has serious implications for logistics, supply lines, and manpower. In Operation KP, the situation for the Pakistani foot soldiers was no different. Within two months of the Operation, they were lured by the vacant spaces and strategic heights in the Kargil area. They had calculated that deeper spread of Pakistani posts on the dominating heights meant greater strategic positioning to tackle Indian retaliation. For example, a platoon in a dominating position could destroy a battalion.

"The field commanders after communicating this ground scenario to the Commander FCNA were granted permission to increase the number of posts to be established across the LOC ... Hence, instead of the initial seven to eight posts, around 196 posts (including defensive centers and outposts) were established. These covered five sectors instead of the planned single sector. This mission creep had led Pakistani troops almost 10 to 15 km ... positioned across 500–600 km of Indian territory. Beyond strategic reasons, there was also the element of competitiveness and adventure among the soldiers that contributed to what had presented itself as classic mission creep.

"‘Rapid march … press on!’ Napoleon counselled men at war. In his seminal work on military operations, Napoleon explains, ‘The strength of an army is like the power in mechanics estimated by multiplying mass by rapidity; a rapid march augments the morale of an army and increases its means of victory.’ This obsession of Napoleon with rapid marches was the major pitfall in his flawed Russian campaign. Almost 200 years later, a similar lesson was manifested again at Kargil."

................................................................................................

"The Kargil planners launched Operation Kargil to exploit Indian vulnerability along the Srinagar-Leh Highway and to sufficiently weaken India so that Pakistan could literally, as Clausewitz would argue, ‘Impose conditions ... at the peace conference.’[1146] These conditions, which the Kargil clique had initially hoped to impose, related to getting Siachen vacated. Subsequently, they changed to seeking freedom for Kashmir, and then to ‘internationalizing’ the issue of Jammu and Kashmir."

" ... It was assumed that, with their Leh-based troops facing the prospect of receiving no supplies after Pakistan virtually blocked the Srinagar-Leh Highway, Delhi would be accommodating. The Kargil clique also believed that the global community would promptly intervene diplomatically to defuse a potentially war-like tension between the two new nuclear states.

"At several points, the planning clique’s half-baked and ill-conceived approach was exposed. There was talk that the planning and analysis wing of the ISI wrote a detailed report on the proposed operation when the plan reached its office but the COAS personally intervened with DG ISI to close down the study. In March, when a young team proposed opening new fronts in Kargil to increase the pressure on the Indians, they were warned that Pakistan could not risk destabilizing the relationship with India. Subsequently, the responses of the Kargil planners when, from May onwards they were in the dock, were muddled and confused. For example, in May, General Aziz, a key planner, had boasted of the Kargil Operation as providing an opportunity to the PM of becoming the Pakistani leader responsible for liberating Kashmiris. At the FO meeting that month, when asked by the deputy air chief what they wanted, the response was unclear. Similarly, at the 2 July DCC meeting, when Ishaq Dar asked what they wanted, the response was again ambiguous. Clarity of purpose, which is the first principle of all military planners, had vanished in a haze of euphoria and wishful thinking.

................................................................................................

"According to Napoleon, ‘Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.’"

Did India know of the paki incursion in November, when it happened, and waited to hit them in June, at leisure?

................................................................................................

" ... It was no surprise that Beijing virtually read the Riot Act to Pakistan’s foreign minister when he arrived in China for an SOS trip on 11 June. Pakistan, he was told, had to vacate Kargil, Kashmir had to be resolved bilaterally, and Beijing had no influence on Indian dealings with Pakistan. Within three days of Aziz’s departure, the Indian foreign minister arrived in Beijing to a rousing welcome."

" ... Javed Hassan’s exchanges as defense attaché in Washington had left him believing, though utterly unfounded,[1148] that in case of a Pakistan-initiated military exchange with India, Washington would support Pakistan against India.

"The past occasions, when perception of movement of some kind of nuclear weapons from Kahuta, had rung alarm bells in Washington, the Kargil clique saw a potential for nuclear blackmail working to Pakistan’s advantage. They believed that a panicked world community, led by Washington, would instantly intervene after the impact of a successfully executed Operation KP was publicized and the newly nuclearized neighbors would be seen as being on the brink of war. India checkmated this calculation primarily by Delhi’s decision to restrict Indian military response restricted to the Kargil region and by not opening new fronts. Hence, a consensus emerged within the global community, especially in the US and the EU, that a nuclear Pakistan’s rash behavior, which involved forsaking of diplomatic engagement and opting for military engagement with traces of nuclear blackmail, would not be rewarded."

" ... The first trip in ten years by an Indian foreign minister to China was in the works. Pakistan, by contrast, was in a difficult strategic situation. Its Afghanistan policy was under criticism and it was blamed for facilitating ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamic militancy’. ... "

Using quote marks does not transform facts, definitely does not veil truth, into or by a lie. It merely exposes one making the ridiculous attempt to be not taken seriously due to the attempted clever lie. 

................................................................................................

"10) Answers to Critical and Abiding Questions About Operation Koh Paima:

"Did the military inform the Prime Minister about the Kargil Operation?

" ... Only in March, General Aziz had asked one of his staff officers to hand him a map that he would use to brief the PM. Such a briefing pre-17 May did not, however, take place. Subsequently, the May Musharraf-Aziz telephone recordings left no doubt that the Kargil clique had undertaken Operation KP without specific clearance from the prime minister.[1149]

"Beginning with the November 1998 DCC meeting[1150] ... it was unlikely that the Kargil clique would have reached out to the same prime minister to get his support and clearance for Operation KP. Equally, the clique would have known that getting the prime minister’s support for a major operation in contested territory, just when arrangements for the Lahore Summit were under way, was unlikely. The prime minister was viewed by a section of the army high command and hard line analysts as being overly committed to peace with India, to the extent of a failing. Nawaz Sharif was, therefore, the most unlikely candidate to play a double game with India."

................................................................................................

"Did Pakistan’s Intelligence Agencies Fail over Kargil?

"The two agencies mandated to pick up intelligence are the Military Intelligence and the ISI. In the case of Kargil, while individuals from within the ISI and the MI both appear to have attempted to investigate, both these agencies failed to pick up anything indicating unusual troop movements as leads to the covert yet unfolding Kargil Operation. The ISI’s failure meant that this cross-service agency, reporting directly to the PM, was unable to report the moves and the implications of the Kargil Operation to the government. Similarly, the MI’s failure ensured that, except for the gang of four, no one within the army top brass knew of the Operation. This dual institutional failure also raised broader questions regarding the effectiveness of Pakistan’s intelligence in monitoring stray and subversive Pakistani elements within the country’s own defense institutions. If the remoteness of the theatre of operations prevented the ISI and MI from monitoring the crossing of the LOC, the failure to pick up unusual military and paramilitary troop movements, either of the NLI troops or the 19 Division or of the SSG, was symptomatic of a deficient intelligence setup. The ISI’s defense was that it does not follow any movements, including internal troop movements; therefore, unless the army informs them about its operational plans, the ISIwill not know. Meanwhile, with ISI and MI both outside of the planning and execution loop of Operation KP, they also failed to report Indian preparations for force deployment, including troops and weapon systems, in the zone of conflict. Significantly, among other factors, this complete ‘intel blindness’ also ruled out all possibility of any early and pre-emptive course correction during Operation KP."

So - all they can do is send terrorists to burn hotels and kill people in India?

................................................................................................

"Was Pakistan militarily on a winning curve when the July fourth withdrawal decision was made?

"Pakistan remained on a winning curve only until the Encounter Phase, when in early May Indian troops first discovered Pakistani troops across the LOC. That initial encounter was marked by artillery exchanges and with Indian induction of aerial power. From early June onwards, after the Indian Army command began discovering the extent ... there began a graduated Indian military retaliation. Operation KP had turned into a battle. For the Indian government ... "

No, it always was war, inflicted by pakis on India. 

" ... As the Indians deployed massive air power, disrupting Pakistan’s supply lines, hitting logistic dumps, targeting soldiers, and generating severe psychological pressure on the Pakistani troops, the original advantage to the Pakistani troops, of being positioned at heights and enjoying lethal strategic advantage over the Indian troops climbing to attack them, began to erode. On 4 June, Pakistan lost Tololing, the first peak, to the Indians. Thereon, as they came under severe artillery and aerial attacks and faced deployment of the Bofors guns, Pakistani troops began to lose posts and pickets. Pakistani troop casualties were also on the rise. ... "

Author's insinuations against India continue here, against soldiers and government both, as she praises pakis (for sitting on peaks) killing Indian soldiers battling uphill (with boulders pushed down), she credits Indian victories to Indian artillery shelling - as if pakis were raining flower petals on Indian soldiers! 

" ... Contrary to the allegations made against the prime minister that he had bartered away in Washington the military victory that the troops were winning in Kargil, the PM brought to a rapid close costly military, diplomatic, and political losses in Kargil."

................................................................................................

"Could the international community have forced India to buckle under Kargil pressure?

"There were neither individual nor collective compulsions for key members of the international community to have even advised Delhi to enter into negotiations on any outstanding bilateral dispute. The question of any member, including Pakistan’s strategic ally China, to have even advised, leave aside forced, India to buckle under the pressure from Operation KP and enter into negotiations over Siachen etc. with Pakistan, did not arise. In fact, any move likely to culminate in a military confrontation between Pakistan and India, the two hostile neighbors who had recently acquired nuclear weapons, would make the international community panic. And Pakistan had made the move—which was also being interpreted as nuclear blackmail by Pakistan. ... There was complete consensus within the key members of the international community, including the US, EU states, the UN, and also Pakistan’s closest strategic ally, China, that Pakistan should not be rewarded for Operation Kargil. ... "

................................................................................................

"Did Pakistan plan to deploy nuclear weapons in an all-out war?

"There were neither individual nor collective compulsions for key members of the international community to have even advised Delhi to enter into negotiations on any outstanding bilateral dispute. The question of any member, including Pakistan’s strategic ally China, to have even advised, leave aside forced, India to buckle under the pressure from Operation KP and enter into negotiations over Siachen etc. with Pakistan, did not arise. In fact, any move likely to culminate in a military confrontation between Pakistan and India, the two hostile neighbors who had recently acquired nuclear weapons, would make the international community panic. ... "

Later, the then paki army chief made similar assertions after his coup, but he wasn't doing so without thought, and it was clear blackmail. 

" ... but was not backed by substantive evidence. ... "

When someone wielding a gun pointing at you is threatening to shoot to kill, and showing no sign of civilised conduct, it's a rare one who'd ask a prophet if the threat was intended to be carried out - or ask the gun wielding thug for proof of intentions by demonstration of performance. 

" ... Pakistan military’s high command had sabotaged the Lahore Summit and should not be rewarded. Pakistan had to be made to retreat unconditionally. ... "

" ... As a key member of the clique later recalled, they conveyed to the country’s elected leadership, ‘We are holding this. Now you take advantage, whatever you can, at military and political level.’[1156] However, the unfolding Kargil crisis proved the clique’s nuclear deterrence calculation flawed on two counts: Operation KP did turn into a military conflict and, while Washington and other Security Council members did exercise forceful diplomacy, it was to force Pakistan to retreat from Kargil, not to reward Pakistan’s operation. The spin-off of this clique’s brinkmanship (read nuclear blackmail) was immensely negative. It undid the diplomatic gains accrued to Pakistan for its mature diplomatic and political moves after the nuclear tests."

"Three factors point to deliberate manipulation. First, Pakistan was not in such a desperate military situation that it would have needed to opt for nuclear weapons. Secondly, and most importantly, Pakistan did not then have the capability to the deploy nuclear weapons[1158], nor had the Indians picked any intelligence on Pakistan readying nuclear weapons. Thirdly, the Americans deliberately chose an attitude of benign neglect and ignored Indian moves to ready its nuclear missiles for use.[1159] ... "

When a thug breaks in at midnight wielding a gun pointed at you, a policeman with any sense is likely to not ask if the gun is likely to fire or has a bullet, and what's more, would excuse the threatened victims of break-in - for arming and retaliation. 

Especially so in US.

................................................................................................

"Was there a pro-India tilt in Washington during Kargil?

"With the Kargil blunder, Pakistan provided the Clinton Administration a priceless opportunity to invest in strategic trust-building with India. Throughout the crisis, Washington’s key policy men opened multiple lines of communication with their Indian counterparts. It began with the 27 May call by Inderfurth, who called the India ambassador, Naresh Chandra, to inform him about what Pickering had told the Pakistanis. Subsequently, on 16 June, Inderfurth met with Brajesh Mishra in Cologne. After the 23 June Islamabad meetings between US CENTCOM Chief General Zinni and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and army chief General Musharraf, State Department official Lanpher went to brief Delhi on the Islamabad meetings. Similarly, during the crucial Sharif-Clinton summit on 4 July, in a manner unprecedented in summit diplomacy, Clinton would call Vajpayee to brief him of the summit talks. Similarly, the Indian NSA and External Affairs Minister were also updated on Sharif-Clinton talks by their counterparts, NSA Sandy Berger and Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. The sole purpose was to share with the Indians every aspect of their communications with Pakistan."

It's unclear if the above is realistic evaluation or a skewed perception. 

................................................................................................

"Was there a role for the backchannel?

"Washington’s decision to maintain complete transparency with Delhi on its diplomatic and political exchanges with Islamabad had left Islamabad with no negotiating space. Guaranteed for itself a bailout by Washington and for Islamabad an embarrassing retreat, Delhi was left with no motive to engage with Islamabad. The backchannel initiative was, thus, squeezed of any possibility of success."

Translated into normal honest words, there was no space left for duplicity, lies et al that's normal paki everyday language! 

They tried, and desperately so, especially in the most obvious lies maintained simultaneously in internal and international arena, despite the fraud being quite obvious to international community - of claiming publicly that the men invading india were not paki military, for one, while maintaining that their pm was aware of the Kargil invasion all along even as he was hosting the PM of India, for another - but then complain about these lies, once exposed, destroying any possibility of respect for pakis. 

Thus the claim and complaint about lack of equal treatment on par with that meted out to India. 

................................................................................................

"Was the Prime Minister’s Washington dash necessary? 

"As the country’s chief executive, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could have ordered withdrawal of Pakistani troops, bringing an end to Operation KP. In keeping with Islamabad’s public position that the Kashmiri Mujahideen and not the Pakistani troops had seized the heights, Sharif could have announced that Islamabad would use its goodwill to urge the Kashmiri Mujahideen to return from IOK. This would have been consistent with the farcical ‘Mujahideen’ position Pakistan had illogically and clumsily maintained since the beginning of Operation KP. The international community would have been relieved that the battle between two nuclear powers had drawn to a close. The prime minister, however, chose to engage the Clinton Administration because he had hoped that Washington would make a public statement of support for the Kashmiris and of facilitating a political resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Sharif and his close political aides also believed that American involvement at this withdrawal stage would make it more palatable for the army high command since the army chief had himself had sought Washington’s engagement. However, as subsequent developments showed, neither did the Clinton administration make any public statements supporting the Kashmir struggle, nor did the Sharif-Clinton 4 July encounter influence the post-Kargil tensions that surfaced between the elected prime minister and the army chief."

Here, and throughout the book on this point, author tries subterfuge to veil a lie. She claims that the Washington trip was for Kashmir. 

It wasn't. 

Plain truth is that, despite the lies to the contrary position proclaimed repeatedly by author, in reality pakis were being not only pounded relentlessly by India but couldn't take it, and the paki dash to Washington was the bully going crying to the police asking him to stop his intended victim bashing him up, something the bully hadn't expected - and this failed, since everyone in the international community was aware, via satellite footage, of who had invaded. 

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"Could the Prime Minister have Ordered an Inquiry Against The Kargil Planners, Especially the Army Chief?

"Immediately after 4 July, tensions began developing between Sharif and Musharraf, with each worried about his survival. Investigating the why, who, and how of Operation KP, to establish responsibility and to take action against those who had launched an operation that had ended in such a fiasco, was, however, far removed from the prime minister’s mind. Civil-military coordination remained generally smooth almost throughout the Kargil period. Some briefings for the PM were held at the 10 Corps Headquarters. Most, however, were held in the PM House, where the army brass would bring its maps, etc. Often, meetings would almost take the form of the DCC but hardly any decision-making took place in these. The prime minister had, in fact, left the decision-making process during Kargil in military hands. Although Sharif had the constitutional authority to directly lead decision-making, he did not ‘interfere’[1160] and had simply supported the army.

"The thought of holding an inquiry against Musharraf is unlikely to have occurred to a PM who had supported Operation KP. It is true that the PM was first briefed of the Operation only after it was a done deed. The PM had also declined Musharraf’s rhetorical mid-stream offer to withdraw his troops from Kargil. In fact, there was written evidence of the Parliament’s bipartisan Defense Committee’s positive support for Operation Kargil in a letter written by the Committee chairman in praise of the army chief’s presentation."

And, unlike the army chief with his openly thug mindset, Nawaz Sharif remained honest enough and decent enough to not turn immediately on someone when it was a fiasco, despite his own self having neither been aware nor initiated it, and never in control, of the assault, until he was required as the figurehead to get help from US to get India to stop! 

"In the overall asymmetric civil-military relations in Pakistan’s power structure, there have been only two incidences when elected prime ministers sought to hold army commanders to account. One was when, after the 1971 surrender at Dhaka and the breakup of Pakistan, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto formed the Hamoodur Rehman Commission to conduct an inquiry into the military debacle. His army chief, Zia ul-Haq overthrew him in a military coup and hanged him following legally dubious court proceedings. The second was in 1988, when Prime Minister Junejo ordered an inquiry into the deadly Ojri Camp ammunition disaster. No sooner had he announced the inquiry, the military President Zia ul-Haq sacked him."

And the post Kargil coup wasn't different, either. 

"In the absence of a political culture of holding the military accountable, the reactions of military men when held accountable, the complexities of the initiation and, indeed, of the termination of Operation KP, the fiercely anti-Nawaz mood of the political opposition, and the dominant claim of the time that Kashmiri Mujahideen had fought the Indians across the LOC while Pakistani troops fought mostly along the LOC: all these militated against Sharif conducting a Kargil inquiry. ... "

Again author is verbose in attempting to veil facts - namely, that pakis never have had a properly functioning government of any sort other than a military dictatorship, never any culture or education system other than one rooted in invader and looters mindset carrying heritage of history of hordes from Central and West Asia invading, looting and destroying India- which included until 1947 the very land pakis were given, torn out of India - and no other aim set for their very nation other than destruction of India, as a result of this choice of the heritage. 

The so-called nation, in reality is no more than a jihadist factory grown around a  military base, for West for freedom of expensive usage against Russia, conceived in this mindset of invading and looting, and aim of destruction of India now grown to destruction of the world, and born of deliberately perpetrated massacres of thousands of Hindus in 1946-47 that were intended to, and succeeded in, forcing India to let a piece be torn out. 

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"Beyond fear, the contradictions of the Operation, Kargil produced serious frictions even in the post-Kargil phase. For example, while maintain its insistence that Mujahideen had been fighting in Kargil, how could the army receive the bodies of the martyred soldiers? Similarly, while insisting that only Mujahideen fought in Kargil, how could major programmes honouring the martyrs of Kargil be organized by the Sharif government? ... The army sought widely publicized honouring of the Kargil martyrs and of those having returned alive from across the LOC."

"Throughout history, the acid test of generals at war or in military operations has been the victories they have piled up. No general is more successful than the outcome of the war he leads. In more complex situations, like those in South Asia in the second half of the twentieth century, the yardstick for assessment has to be what have the wars have achieved. History has examples of individual brilliance leading armies to victories and steering nations away from disaster. Outstanding military commanders, such as Alexander, Khalid bin Walid, Genghis Khan, Julius Caesar, Salahuddin Ayyubi, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Vo Nguyen Giap, were men who wrested victory from situations where deep imprints of defeat were written. Bin Walid became the legendary general who, despite the numerical superiority of battle-hardened adversaries like the Romans and the Sassanids, piled up victories for the Rashiddun Caliphate. Napoleon ‘inspired a ragged, mutinous, half-starved army and made it fight’[1161] like a winning combination that few would fight before or after. Salahuddin, with his less experienced army, reversed the Crusaders’ winning streak with his grand victory in the decisive Battle of Hattin in 1187. Julius Caesar, personally brave in battle, was creative in tactics and engineering. There was Alexander, another general facing most armies who outnumbered his own, but always remaining undefeated. Genghis Khan, a masterful general who, through excellent military intelligence and tactics and by uniting nomadic tribes and confederation and his strategic raids, became the founder of the Mongol Empire, the largest contiguous empire in history, which included most of Eurasia and substantial parts of Eastern Europe. In more recent times, the Viet Minh Commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap, who led his men to defeat a technologically superior adversary by perfecting and applying a unique war technique, which was the most important dimension of the Vietcong’s overall political, economic, and diplomatic strategy for defeating the Americans.

"In the Kargil operation, the performance of the clique of commanders, the quality of their strategic planning, and of their command, all tell a different story. Yet the power equation, absence of any accountability, the absence of censure when it mattered, and bravado minus logic or sound analysis, have ruled the day. Despite repeated blunders, the commanders in charge escaped accountability."

What author is either unable to perceive, or unable to say, is that the paki military is a bully who, thrashed outside, comes home to beat up his wife and children, old parents and helpless siblings. 

................................................................................................

" ... Major General Akbar Khan, the lead military man in Pakistan's first attempt to regain Kashmir, had readily accepted Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's label of ‘raiders’ for the Pakistani forces involved in the 1947–48 ‘Acquire Kashmir’ Operation. ... "

Kashmir had been free until invaded by pakis, and it wasn't Nehru but Jinnah who pretended thst it was tribals, not his military. 

" ... The former general, eulogising the Pakistani ‘raiders’, suggested, ‘We may perhaps also qualify for sitting in that distinguished gallery of personalities like Genghis Khan, Timur Lang, Mahmud of Ghazni, and even Alexander.’ Interestingly, Pakistan's senior-most general equated his own men with history’s prized military leaders, who had raided, ravaged, and even reigned over foreign lands in the pre-Westphalian world. ... "

No, he was far more specific, in his dream and desire to belong to the club that was all comprised of invaders each from elsewhere and attacked India, invaded and looted India, sought to destroy India. 

He included none of the tall figures that were from or of India, despite his own homeland having been a part of India for ever until then less than a year ago, and his own ancestral origins being in India, 

And that's the divide, of India- and those that seek to destroy India. 

" ... This voluntary characterization of a state's army as ‘raiders’, in the context especially of the Kashmir operation, flowed from the juxtaposition in this Pakistani soldier's mind, of the Pakistan Army as a force for right, dedicated to undoing the wrong committed at the time of Pakistan's creation. ... "

That's convoluted fraud seeking to justify invasions, massacres and loot, with fraudulent claims of rights. 

British had in fact given far too much land to pakis in the first place, when plebiscite would have denied them all but East Bengal, which alone had voted for partition. Sindh was evenly divided in vote. Punjab had voted for unionists and NWFP was determined to stay with India - as was Baluchistan. Brits rode roughshod over all of the provinces in handing over the land pakis got, because it was military base needed for use of West against Russia. 

What those raiders were identifying with was, has always been, identity of invaders, looters, destroyers and killers wreaking havoc against India. This isn't due to perceived rights but simply a mindset of a robber. 

And they certainly had no 'right' to Kashmir, which, until pakis attacked, was independent. 

Author does lie on level after level, not very differently from a rotten onion. 

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" ... India's  systematic role in being a mid-wife to the 1971 breakup of Pakistan ... "

Because East Bengal hadn't been subjected to racist discrimination and linguistic chauvinism of denying freedom of language, not to mention massacre of three million and mass gang rapes of half a million, by paki military? 

Or was it because India prevented pakis from massacring further millions? 

No, author simply lies through the rest of the paragraph along the lines. 

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"The period from Kargil to the Coup epitomizes the inherent and continuing problems that Pakistan faces in three specific areas. These include two policy areas Pakistan-US relations, relations with India including Kashmir. There is also the third structural issue of thorny civil-military relations. While on the two policy areas of India and Kashmir, there are external players that influence the nature of the challenges that Pakistan faces, Pakistan too as an interlocutor contributes to the dynamic of the relationship. Meanwhile the structural problem of civil-military relations, rooted in the process of State formation, and the unequal stature and authority of the political and the garrison entities, evolved into asymmetrical strengths of both. Within the ensuing power chemistry of Pakistan, the army acquired a dominant role, paving the way to military coups."

"The asymmetry of authority in the army’s favor has continued because of the inability of most elected governments, except for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, to bolster its Constitutional authority through institutional decision-making. ... "

Here author mentions a civilian government's head who was legally executed by a military dictator post coup, as an exception to paki history of "authority in the army’s favor"! 

What could be a better example of the fraudulent writing by the author?!

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"A big thank you finally also to all those individuals in the various libraries and coffee shops in Pakistan and abroad, where I intermittently ‘resided’ over the years for very long hours to work on my manuscript. ... "

That pak has not only libraries, but coffee shops where women can sit and do reading, writing et al, without being punished as per an islamic law - that's news! 

Or are these strictly private facilities? Presumably for privileged few? 

" ... Whether it was the management and tea-providers at the library of the Institute of Strategic Studies or the program officer Jorge Espada and Holly Angell at the Harvard University’s Asia Center, their friendly demeanors energized me to work untiringly in solitude."

So this was a research project that was supported by Harvard, perhaps a thesis? 

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"Whatever Sharif said during the Zinni meeting, he was an extremely worried man after what he had heard from Clinton’s envoy. The prime minister was convinced that a full-scale Pakistan-India war along the international border was likely and that could mean electronic devices with which India could jam Pakistan’s radars and signals. Zinni had also convinced the prime minister that a nuclear war was on the cards and that even his own army, the Pakistan Army, had begun deploying nuclear weapons.[659] He felt that, between electronic and nuclear warfare, it was a doomsday scenario for Pakistan. Hence, it can safely be presumed this was the definitive point at which the Pakistani prime minister had concluded that a war had to be avoided at all costs. The back-channel communications were on but now other avenues for ‘exit facilitation’ were to be sought: Beijing, Riyadh, and DC. However, Sharif played these cards close to his chest. For example, only his kitchen cabinet knew of his contacts with Washington and Riyadh. The Foreign Office team was working the Delhi and Beijing routes while the Defense Committee and the cabinet knew of neither. The contact with the Saudis was established in the last week of June. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, who was close to the Sharif family, was contacted seeking Saudi intervention with Washington for a Clinton-Sharif meeting."

Presumably his army chief was happy at prospect of playing with nukes. 

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

Author's writing treats India in manner that's derogatory at best, and would be considered abusive on diplomatic level, making it difficult to quote without seemingly being in accord therewith. 

Author spends much of the work justifying pakis attacking India throughout the short history of existence of Pakistan, by claiming - not exactly explicitly, but via implications and roundabouts - that India's not ceding territory claimed and demanded by pakis justified every attack by and from pak against India, including not only all the wars but all the terrorist attacks as well, over several decades. 

" ... Contrary to a politician’s response, influential sections within the army leadership believed covert use of force against India was an effective way to tackle the adversary. The military coup of the late seventies and the overall Pakistani institutional power balance tilted in the army’s favor allowed the military leadership to autonomously conduct policy. Moreover, the army’s partnership with the CIA in conducting the covert war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan further strengthened the Pakistani military as the principal policy-maker.

"By November 1998, two policy approaches towards India were in play. The constitutionally elected government had already opted for diplomacy and dialogue. While a small clique of army generals had, however, surreptitiously, set off on the path of covert war. And this clique must have received India’s recalcitrance over Siachen with a sense of vindication."

"The Kargil planners’ clique had troops crossing the LOC to pay back in kind to India for Siachen. Or so they had believed."

Oh, no they don't. Pakistan never did have any right to separate merely on basis of fanaticism in name of religion and massacres of eleven million Hindus and nearly five million Sikhs as the sole argument for this separation. It's about as justified as, say, a Confederate South claiming States' Rights for slavery. 

As for demanding even more extra territory than already conceded quite unreasonably in 1947 by UK, that's pakis copying Hitler at and after his Munich performance. 

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" ... The Kargil clique’s calculation was markedly opposed to the dialogue and détente policy with India that Pakistan’s elected political leadership was pursuing after the tests. ... "

Author makes them sound equally valid and legitimate, but that's falsehood. Reality is that the then PM of pak had no clue about what paki military was upto, much less having okayed it before PM of India visited. This is not only typical of the sham that pakis maintain in order to claim they are just as good as India and equally valid,  but the fact that the sham is maintained often enough shows pakis are ashamed of their own bragging about being inheritors of barbarians from Central and West Asia, the invaders and destroyers of India in name of a fanatic creed. 

This has led to a schizophrenia on national level in pak, whereby they tried to establish themselves as Arab, by claiming Arabic as national language, until they were laughing stock as far as Arabs went, for this pretension. Hassan Nisar tells this tale well, on his program, several years ago. 

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"Hassan, especially during Musharraf’s period, was widely regarded within the army High Command as the best mind on India. He advocated an aggressive posture towards India and often maintained that “Pakistan’s size and power should match, i.e. if Pakistan did not militarily and otherwise expand, they (India) will atrophy you”[178]

"As Director Military Operations, Hassan was actively involved in monitoring the Kashmiri insurgency in Indian Occupied Kashmir. ... "

That's tacit admission that he was training and arming terrorists and sending them across border into India, by thousands. 

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" ... In 1992-93, when Pakistan concluded that the “insurgency’s spirit was depleting,” to give the home-grown insurgency a fillip the army facilitated the induction of ‘mehman mujahideen’ (guest mujahids) in Indian Occupied Kashmir. ... "

This is admission that so called freedom fighters in Kashmir never had been local; calling some sent across border "guest mujahids" was only because they never could pretend to be Kashmir locals, because they were not even from West Punjab, the province that not only dominates pak but has replaced Kashmiris in POK. So the "guest mujahids" were, what, Africans? Surely not Iranian or Saudi or European, not those from wealthier countries such as gulf nations? 

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"Mission Creep 

"However, within two months of the start of the operation, the FCNA commander believed the opportunity existed to expand the operation. Around the areas where Pakistani troops ingressed, there were vast unoccupied areas across the LOC[205] with no Indian presence. In these areas, either the Indian posts had been vacated during winter or on those steep peaks they simply had no posts.[206] Stashed away in the harsh, remote and forbidding peaks, in the dead of winter, the commanders who were planning to enlarge their operation, foresaw no immediate counter-moves as the Indian forces were altogether absent.

"This expansion of the originally one-sector Kargil operation to five sectors was in response to the ‘opportunity’ that was discovered by the NLI command in the zone of operation. The expanded operation was, therefore neither war-gamed nor comprehensively planned. The planners had thought of occupying 10 or 12 posts but the expanded Operation ended with 140 posts. Hence, an operation that expanded on detection of military opportunity by military men at the planning and implementation stage, precluded comprehensive intra-institutional deliberations on the nature of this ‘opportunity’ and, more importantly, on the merits and demerits of an expanded operation. Although, within the restricted group of military commanders, questions related to India’s military, diplomatic, and political reaction and the international community’s diplomatic reaction were raised, the linear experience of that one institution combined with the personal proclivity of the individuals towards the Operation influenced their answers to these questions.

"There was excitement about the expansion, about undetected penetration into enemy territory. ... So they went into Mission Creep and by December 1998 the troops had begun to cross the LOC from seven directions. This included areas west of river Indus, east of river Shyok, from the top of Shyok Valley and from Shaqma. Primarily, NLI infantry troops were the ones involved in Operation KP. They continued establishing of posts undetected by the Indians and penetrated to approximately 14 kilometers into the Indian side of the LOC. Pakistani troops had ended up establishing 196 posts, which included bases and outposts. The daring men, on a victory prowl on the world’s highest battlefield and grasped by excitement and a sense of victory, were unaware of the very critical problems of logistical stretch this operational creep would soon generate. Equally, this deeper penetration into the Indian-controlled territory meant the greater risk of exposure to enemy troops and to the unpredictable enemy reaction."

But elsewhere author has asserted that pakis were overwhelmed by India's response taking the war to an extent that they had not wished for, their objective having been small and simple! So she, the author, has simply lied, and her meaning thereby is that, whatever pakis did, India should simply have surrendered whatever demanded by pakis, by whatever method? 

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" ... Indian team brought R.K.Mishra and Admiral Nayyar to Islamabad on 2 November. Vajpayee had personally cleared their trip. At the breakfast meeting with Nawaz Sharif, the Indian envoys conveyed Vajpayee’s message. India was willing to give one billion rupees in soft loans or three million tons of wheat as a loan to Pakistan.[214] This was Vajpayee’s goodwill gesture for an economically troubled Pakistan. Sharif asked his Additional Secretary, Tariq Fatimi, who was also present, to examine the offer. Fatimi told the prime minister that Pakistan had already taken care of its wheat requirements.[215] Given the history of their relationship, it was unthinkable for the Pakistani establishment, or even the political leadership, to let India “bail” them, no matter what its condition."

Not quite true. After the tsunami, pakis were willing to receive help India offered, if it came via US - that'd change labels as far as public perception went. 

But far more telling is the fact that, not only these offers have come from India after a history of pakis perpetrating deadly assaults against India whether terrorism or war, having pak genesis in massacres of several millions in India, but thst here author pretends the opposite, as if those assaults, massacres and murders were of no account, and paki demands of more and more territory to be wrested from India by hook or by crook were a just expectation, with use of terrorism as fair as diplomatic route and legal accession unjust. 

Author further takes pains to portray pakis as sort of nawab,  while reducing Indian envoys to minimal.  

"The other message that Sharif’s Indian guests carried from Vajpayee was that “cross-border terrorism” must stop. The prime minister moved three paces, away from Fatemi’s hearing, and according to his Indian guest said that Vajpayee should be told that Sharif had his own man in the ISI. And that in two or three months, Sharif will control the LOC situation situation and focus on dialogue.”[216]   During the breakfast meeting with his Indian guests, Sharif again repeated his idea of Vajpayee traveling to Lahore on the inaugural bus. An optimistic Sharif somewhat lightly said that if Vajpayee sat in the bus and came to Lahore, fifty percent of the problem would be resolved and, if he himself went in the bus to India, the remaining fifty percent would also be solved.[217] ... Nawaz Sharif believed it was time to reorient Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. He was also getting increasingly uneasy about continuing with Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy."

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" ... Post-Bhutto Pakistan, under the military ruler Zia ul Haq,was totally immersed in an international jihad tailored to achieve the US objective of destroying the ‘Evil Empire’ of the USSR. Pakistan’s role as the main architect and facilitator of the international jihad led to Islamabad wanting a friendly government in Kabul."

Friendly???? More like puppets trained by pakis, but now lost control of, it'd seem after two decades. "

" ... Recalling his government’s cooperation, especially on bin Laden, he reminded his host that Pakistan had “been fighting terrorism, and you know that we’ve been cooperating with the United States of America also.” [224]"

Hilary Clinton had a better assessment, however - or perhaps so fid her husband, even then. 

After all, there were those unforgettable scenes from his visit to India, soon after, televised live for the whole world to watch - as he smiled when PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee affirmed India's position, as he met everyone crowding around before leaving, and as he got off his vehicle to dance with the villagers, en route to Jaipur!

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" ... Nawaz had arrived in Washington armed with hugely expensive gifts.[226] "

This from a reportedly well off businessman isn't worth mentioning, but author has been explicit in the two paragraphs ending above,mentioning details that would make it seem that pakis were grandiose to a US deserving of only shame. 

Nawaz Sharif being friendly to or friends with another similar person isn't surprising, considering his relationships with two very different leaders of India separated by a decade. 

He paid heavily, too, every time. 

"Nawaz and Clinton, aided by their teams, met for two hours at the Oval Office. They discussed non-proliferation, economic sanctions, relations with India, bin Laden, Afghanistan, and the F-16 issue. For Pakistan, the good news was Clinton’s commitment to settle the F-16 issue, which had become known in Pakistan as ‘highway robbery’ by the United States (Pakistan had paid the US $658 million for 28 F-16s. In 1991, after President George H.W. Bush withheld non-proliferation certification, Washington unilaterally aborted the sale and held back considerably more than half a billion dollars from cash-strapped Pakistan). while refusing to deliver the F16s.[227] Nawaz Sharif’s government decided to inform the Clinton Administration of its decision to take the matter to court. In Islamabad, Foreign Secretary Shamshad had strongly advocated the legal option and an American lawyer had already been engaged. He had already visited Islamabad for discussions. ... "

Hold on. Pakis paid US, millions of dollars? How? Isn't the glow usually other way, of aid? 

"For Clinton the bin Laden issue topped the agenda. At the meeting, his whereabouts were discussed. Sharif and his team maintained Pakistan could do little since bin Laden was in Afghanistan. None from Clinton’s team were convinced. Secretary of State Albright was particularly tough with the Pakistani prime minister. Sharif, to everyone’s surprise, at the conclusion of the meeting asked to meet Clinton separately. Clinton agreed. At the meeting, Sharif offered Pakistan’s help in abducting bin Laden. Pakistan’s prime minister proposed that the US train a Pakistani team to hunt for bin Laden. Clinton, beaten by the Lewinsky scandal, was very keen to achieve a breakthrough on bin Laden. He was tantalized by the offer. After the meeting, a delighted Clinton told US Ambassador to Pakistan Bill Milam and Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth about Sharif’s offer. Milam wondered how significant Sharif’s offer if he did not have Pakistan’s security apparatus on board. It was unclear if he did. Nonetheless, soon after the offer, the  CIA launched their Get-Osama operation. Men from the Special Forces Group arrived in Pakistan to train former Pakistani SSG commandos."

Perhaps this was why Nawaz Sharif was ousted and that too by someone who had attacked India without informing his PM - while the said PM was hosting PM of India for peace talks? 

And then not only lost the war hed started, but being thoroughly beaten as well? 

How did that loser get to conduct a coup and throw out a PM who was personally friendly with Clinton - unless the key was support by OBL? 

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Whether deliberately or unwittingly, the fraudulent position of pakis - that author tacitly seems to join - is twofold - one, a pretense thst India and Pakistan are equal, both born in 1947; and that Pakistan isn't the aggressor of every war, every terrorist attack against India (and Afghanistan, too). All this is rooted in an abrahmic deadly prejudice and war against every other culture, especially Hindu, Jewish, Parsi or Zorostrian, and any spiritual stream originating anywhere other than West Asia, but chiefly those of Indian origin. 

Reality is, India is a land and a nation whose existence and culture of immense treasures of knowledge are of antiquities millennia if not millions of years older, and precisely hence, sought to be obliterated by Macaulay after his predecessors the islamic barbarian invaders, via fraudulent propaganda as much as via genocides and destructions. 

"In Vajpayee, Sharif had a serious partner for peace. Senior to Sharif in age and political experience, Vajpayee was a certified peace veteran. ... "

Author has a penchant for spewing venom regarding Hindus at every possible opportunity, and does do whenever she mentions the then PM of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. 

Also, she keeps mentioning South Block in a poisonous way, insinuating somehow that the bureaucracy in Government of India is responsible for Pakistan's problems. 

Reality is, despite hundreds of billions of dollars given freely by US in aid to pakis apart from other hundreds of billions of dollars for purposes of "fighting terror", pakis have not only shortage of fuel and other necessities but food, as well, repeatedly reported during last decade, apart from the lack of education and health. 

This is due, chiefly, to the said hundreds of billions of dollars having been spent partly on arming and training terrorists for assaults against nrighbouring countries India and Afghanistan, and rest having been simply stolen by paki military generals. 

" ... The Sharif-Vajpayee 29 July meeting in Colombo, on the sidelines of the SAARC summit, was finalized.  Ahead of this meeting a preliminary political back channel was established. Nawaz Sharif deputed a PML Senator and former Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Akram Zaki, to meet with Vajpayee’s point man on National Security, the astute former diplomat-turned politician Brajesh Mishra in London. [116] Neither the Mishra-Zaki channel nor the foreign secretaries meeting helped bridge the gap at Colombo. The Indian military’s mood too was evident from the Indian defense minister’s 18 July  declaration that India “needs to hold on to Siachen, both for strategic reasons and wider security in the region."[117] ... "

That's the typical vicious trick, labeling realistic necessities of others as 'moods', apart from the insinuations of various similar and other kind about India and Hindus throughout the book. 

"The two prime ministers first held a one-on-one meeting[123] at the Taj Samudra hotel followed by a delegation level meeting.[124] Vajpayee was keen for a joint statement on commitment to peace. ... "

Author makes a horrible mistake in the name of the Taj Samudra, whether typo or, deliberately, otherwise. 

" ... Vajpayee maintained that the primary issue was “Pakistan-supported cross-border terrorism.” The Pakistani team unsuccessfully urged the Indians that the unresolved Kashmir dispute be reflected as a central issue in the joint statement. The 90- minute Sharif-Vajpayee meetings in Colombo failed to produce a road map for further dialogue. Firstly after the first-ever meeting between the two prime ministers no joint statement came forth."

Is it possible for the author to visualise peace talks with a bully while being physically assaulted, with family members in the process of being killed? 

Or is that the only way pakis know, of holding 'peace talks'? By holding a knife to throat of others? As done in the countless conversions, whether via fraudulent marriages or otherwise, to their own religion? 

" ... India linked dialogue on Kashmir with Pakistan ending support to Kashmiri freedom fighters."

There's the fraudulent language describing paki trained and armed terrorists as "Kashmiri freedom fighters". 

Even in Afghanistan, Afghans know that the taliban are pakis, although they - and paki regime - lie, calling them Afghans. 

Locals know the difference. 

"Subsequent statements by Indian officials suggested the possibility of Indian attacks on “terrorist sanctuaries across the LOC.” Vajpayee warned Pakistan that his government will “fully back” the Indian Army to “repulse the nefarious designs.”[130] ... "

When, post 2014, this was done, pakis denied it, just as they had denied OBL had been found and neutralised by US forces in Abbottabad. 

" ... Meanwhile human rights organizations reported that Indian troops were responsible for raping, torturing, and executing Kashmiri people.[132]"

This is a double lie, on the style of those perpetrated repeatedly against Israel. One, it wasn't "human rights organizations" who "reported", but jihadists and pakis who propagated that lie; two, when investigations were carried out by global organisations, no such viilages or victims of atrocities were to be found. 

Similar lies, for example one regarding a ten year old Palestinian boy supposedly shot dead by Israeli forces but that, when investigated by a New York set of young students, in reality could only have been shot by Palestinians, have been propagated before. 

For that matter there was also the lie about mid 1980s killings in Beirut that were blamed on Israel, but subsequently that was discovered to have been a false accusation as well. 

" ... Sharif knew that continued operations by the militants in the Valley, which was infested with Indian security forces, was unlikely to resolve the Kashmir dispute. ... "

Notice the poisonous mindset, (author's in particular and paki in general), that pretends that paki trained terrorists exported to massacre in India are legitimate, while an ancient nation's security forces including Indian military are an "infestation". 

" ... For Kashmiris, the human rights conditions deteriorated ... "

"Deteriorated" is false unless the jihadist position, namely, that nonmuslim lives are of no account, is to be universally accepted, and a doctrine that teaches killing of all nonmuslims is to be not only lauded but necessary, is accepted by all the world. That is the jihadist aim. 

Else, it's impossible that the statement above by author can be said to have any validity if situation in Kashmir were compared with either January 1990 or in general with 1947, when, both times, several thousands of nonmuslims were massacred, forcing others to flee - if possible at all. 

In 1947 Nehru, the then PM of India, had refused to help Hindus attempting to save their own lives, as per Gandhi's wish that Hindus die happily murdered by Muslims but not flee; as a result, over a hundred thousand Hindus had been massacred in POK. 

In 1990, Hindus in Kashmir were helped to exodus instead of being left to be massacred, to the tune of half a million, by paki terrorists infiltrated in Kashmir from across the border. 

"By July, Nawaz Sharif’s government was dealing with a growing problem of sectarianism and militancy. To Strobe Talbot, US Deputy Secretary of State [133],Nawaz complained that his 1997 victory was not against Benazir Bhutto alone. He had won against the “right-wing radicals” whom he claimed had wanted an Iranian-style revolution in Pakistan."

" ... Nawaz would also raise the specter of the threat that was increasingly worrying Washington, the Islamic militant threat."

Not "specter", it was reality, begun by pak military dictator in 1960s onwards, and used by US for war against Russia, chiefly in Afghanistan, but also Chechnya. Now those victories won, the terrorists were confident of victory against India, and not only in one state of Jammu and Kashmir either. 

................................................................................................

"Just before Sharif left for Colombo, Talbot met him on 22 July to convince him of the need to sign up on the non-proliferation mechanisms. Part of the tool-kit Talbot carried with him, which he naively believed would help him ‘fix’ Pakistan’s position on non-proliferation, was a letter from his President. It did not work. Sharif was irked by Clinton’s reference to Pakistan’s nuclear test as a “mistake.” Sharif’s retort was political and convenient, not strategic and straightforward. “If I had not made the mistake, as the President calls it, someone else would be sitting in the Prime Minister’s House right now. That someone probably would be a fanatic. We have no dearth of those.”[134] Adding more flair to perhaps his real fear, Pakistan’s prime minister added, “Either that, or the country would have gone to the dogs.”[135] ... "

That was realities of paki situation. 

" ... This kind of talk was clearly ‘conduct unbecoming’ for a country’s prime minister. Although militancy and sectarianism were on the rise in Pakistan, such comments by the country’s prime minister to a US official were highly inappropriate. Unsurprisingly recalling the conversation, the US official wrote, “I could not imagine hearing something similar in Delhi.”[136]"

Because it wouldn't be true of realities in India, unless pakis - beyond their dreams - succeeded in wiping out all nonmuslims. 

................................................................................................

" ... Essentially, the partnership had run its course. The former partners were now entering a conflict zone. The CIA watched with great apprehension the beginnings of triangular ties between the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the Kashmiri Mujahedeen. While the Clinton Administration itself engaged with the Taliban, it was the ISI, as principal mentors and patrons of the Taliban and the Kashmiri Mujahedeen, which the CIA viewed as being indirectly responsible for this three-way nexus. Increasingly, the CIA would expect the ISI to leverage its control and good will with the Taliban to rein in Osama bin Laden, the al-Qaeda chief. While Washington was not confrontational with bin Laden’s hosts, it was getting weary of them. The CIA’s Counter-terrorist Cell was expanding the focus of its operations to Pakistan’s borderlands."

Funny how abrahmic fellow-feeling blinkered them to reality. 

................................................................................................

"In early August, al-Qaeda struck and struck hard. On 7 August, it conducted signature attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam, leaving dozens dead. ... "

Notice the laudatory, almost exilarant, tone describing it - "struck and struck hard."; which isn't modified for the rest of the paragraph, at least. 

" ... The very next day, not in a connected but related development, on 8 August, al-Qaeda’s hosts, the Taliban, with support from the pro-Pakistan Mujahedeen group led by Gulbadin Hikmatyar, managed a decisive victory in Mazar-i-Sharif. US intelligence claimed that intercepts proved that members of a Pakistan-based sectarian group, Sipah-i-Sahaba, and Pakistan military men also participated in the offensive. ... "

It would only be idiotic or pretenders who'd act surprised at this. 

" ... A Hazara massacre followed the Taliban victory. ... "

This is racism of pakis and Afghans, exposed in not its worst, but its normal manifestation, not unlike killings of Hindus or Jewish people. 

Any doubts as to this racism, can be cleared by internet posts from pakis describing themselves as handsome unlike "short, dark and ugly Indians" - an attitude given its reply when a Tamil former Indian consul to Pakistan faces an average paki, frequently seen on public debates on TV, are noticed as to looks, after reading such posts by pakis. 

Alternatively, one can read the autobiography by Ms. (Tehmina?) Durrani, now a member of family of Sharif. 

" ... A Taliban attack on the Iranian Consulate, in which one journalist and seven intelligence officers were killed, prompted Washington’s counter-terrorism machinery to zero in on Pakistan for monitoring and countering bin Laden’s activities." 

Finally! 

Light dawns! 

................................................................................................

"Buoyed by their Mazar victory, the Taliban were gaining in self-confidence. Around the same time, Washington would seek their acquiescence in what was becoming the Clinton’s Administration immediate and primary security concern. Washington wanted Osama bin Laden, alive or dead. The intelligence chatter was that he had moved in the Pakistan-Afghan border areas. CIA Counter-terrorist Center planned the August strike. General Ralston visited the Pakistan Army General Jehangir Karamat to inform him of their Tomahawk missiles flying through Pakistan airspace lest he mistakes them for Indian missiles. Accordingly, through the hour of the planned attack, Ralston arranged to have dinner with the Pakistan Army chief to ensure there were no costly misunderstandings."

This is author preparing ground for tacit justification of NY attacks by terrorists. 

"The Cruise missiles were fired as planned. But it was an unsuccessful attack. Despite intelligence reports of bin Laden’s impending arrival, he never came. Eight men in al-Qaeda training camps were killed, probably men from a Pakistani sectarian outfit being trained to kill. For the reported Pakistani civilian deaths along the border, the US President wrote a letter of regret to the Pakistani prime minister. Later, the reports were proven incorrect. In the coming months, Washington intensified its trailing of Osama bin Laden."

Obviously unsuccessfully, since he was found in Abbottabad. 

Perhaps he'd been there, for decades,with Afghanistan being a ruse by pakis? 

"The matter of “sanctuaries” was also raised by Washington. Announcing the Cruise missile strikes against several al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and an alleged chemical weapons facility in Sudan, Clinton told the Americans, “There will be no sanctuaries for terror. We will defend our people, our interests, and values.”[137] The issue of sanctuaries was to haunt Pakistan-US relations for almost two decades."

The said "Pakistan-US relations" were always pretended by pakis to have been a friendship between equals, despite the one way street of flow of hundreds of billions of dollars. 

................................................................................................

"Breakthrough at Durban

"For Pakistan-India relations, the 29 August to 3 September NAM summit in Durban proved the breakthrough event. The two peace-seeking prime ministers had ensured that the groundwork was done by their respective sides. Nawaz Sharif had inducted his Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz as the new Foreign Minister. Aziz replaced the former military Captain (and military ruler Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s son) Gohar Ayub. ... "

The father, incidentally, had proposed unification to Nehru, who was shortsighted enough to not only refuse, but do so expressing a thinking proved false soon enough by China attacking in 1962. 

" ... Sartaj Aziz, an economist, a former international bureaucrat, and two-time Finance Minister in Sharif’s government, was Nawaz Sharif’s trusted man."

" ... Prime Minister Vajpayee warned “third parties” to stay out of the dispute.[138] ... "

" ... Pakistan’s use of militancy to pressurize India and to draw global attention to the Kashmir question often drew criticism. ... "

Anyone else reminded of Sudetanland? UK had then openly pressured Czechoslovakia to give in, and that, instead of satisfying Hitler, had only snowballed - rather, fireballed - into WWII. 

And in this case, the current administration of US has offered Afghanistan, sacrificing females thereof, to taliban, a sham of a front for pakis. 

................................................................................................

" ... Transferring the Afghan Mujahedeen phenomenon onto the Kashmir context was backfiring. It was proving divisive for the Kashmiri struggle and was also alienating the non-violent movement. At home in Pakistan, its blowback was increased sectarian killings."

Yes, pile on the jihadists and racism, lack of forethought by paki regimes beyond exploiting "geostrategic location", everything onto india - including lack of education, health, and any industry other than terrorism. 

................................................................................................

" ... By announcing his dialogue offer, with the caveat that “the dialogue must be comprehensive and not just focused on Kashmir”[139], Vajpayee assured the Indians that his offer was conditional on Pakistan’s commitment to stop “cross-border terrorism.”"

" ... Kashmir, the Indian prime minister categorically stated, however, “was and would remain an integral part of India.” The "real problem" in Kashmir was one of cross-border terrorism."

Notice the denial by author, and presumably by her paki sources, that terrorists attacking India was a concern. 

So by paki logic, acquisition of territory for Islamic countries, chiefly for pak, supersedes terrorists trained killing civilians of those countries,which is in accord with foundations of jihadist ideology - namely, that nonmuslim lives not only for not matter, but must be finished off. 

................................................................................................

"Almost a decade into India’s failure to crush the Kashmiri freedom movement, for the international community Delhi was increasingly framing the movement as a terrorist movement. And with evidence of Pakistani men, munitions and military training aiding the indigenous freedom struggle Delhi believed it could superimpose the ‘terrorism’ problem upon the political struggle. Additionally, sections of the freedom movement had taken to violent ways, harming civilians and hence aiding  Indian propaganda."

Lies galore there. 

It is nothing but terrorism exported by pak from across birder via paki trained terrorists bearing weapons and ammo, stolen from what US provided for a US prescribed use in Afghanistan. 

"Indian strategy was to dovetail cross-border terrorism into the emerging global level concern regarding terrorism. Delhi began equating what it considered “cross-border terrorism” with the Taliban problem in Afghanistan. The concern about terrorism was fast spreading.  Washington had also attacked Sudan. India had argued that the common factor linking terrorism, the Taliban, and the cross-border terrorism it faced was Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI. At Durban, Vajpayee advocated a “concerted international action” against terrorism. In a veiled criticism of the United States ignoring India’s concerns, he said “terrorism could not be fought unilaterally or selectively.”"

Truth of what India said is found, not merely in common sense, but internet posts from pakis bragging about various victories using terrorism. 

But notice the author's twisting of language to make it seem that terrorism against India by pakis is only fair, and of no concern, especially to anyone not Indian, because Indian lives are of course - so is paki position - of no importance whatsoever, being considered not human if not muslim, as per islamic law. 

................................................................................................

" ... After the New York meeting, names of back-channel envoys were exchanged. India nominated former journalist R.K Misra.[148] Nawaz Sharif’s choice was his Principal Secretary Anwar Zahid.[149] However, Zahid died shortly after.[150]Niaz Naik, a former Foreign Secretary, was the second choice.

"The seeds for the historic Lahore summit were sown in New York. At the lunch meeting that Sharif hosted for Vajpayee, he invited the Indian prime minister to visit Pakistan. And, when the two Prime Ministers agreed on starting a Delhi-Lahore bus service, Nawaz Sharif invited Vajpayee to travel on that bus. Vajpayee agreed."

" ... Pakistan was conditionally willing to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. First, it had to be in conditions “free from coercion and pressure”, which meant the international community had to remove the sanctions. Secondly, it was necessary that India also signed the CTBT. Both conditions were unlikely to be fulfilled."

Hence, precisely, the conditions? 

Of course.  

................................................................................................

"Vajpayee, meanwhile, detailed the nature of bilateral dialogue decided for October. He announced that the two sides had decided to end cross-LOC firing and discuss defense matters, including the question of deploying nuclear missiles, in the October dialogue. "A new era in Indo-Pakistani co-operation is being opened," a satisfied Vajpayee told the press.

"This was happening in less than a hundred days after having conducted the nuclear tests ... Hence within months of the nuclear tests, new vistas for peace and cooperation had opened up."

As if paki military and ISI would ever allow that! They, quite rightly, fear gor thror own existence, if there were peace, trade, goodwill and peace allowed to prevail across the border. 

A colleague had, some time in late eighties, remarked to the effect that the East Germany premiere wasn't happy about the developments towards German unification. 

"Of course", one could easily see why - "he's going to lose a job!" 

And that'd be true of those, too, who have been behind paki attacks against India, whichever state they were perpetrated in. 

................................................................................................

"Peace Gets Going

" ... preparation of the Lahore Summit was overseen by the political leaders, the prime minister and the foreign ministers, and was not left to bureaucrats alone.

"Significantly, around this time, on 7 October, against the backdrop of continuous political unrest, the prime minister decided to send the Army chief General JehangirKaramat packing. The newspapers had carried front-page headlines that, during his lecture at the Naval War College, the army chief had recommended the setting up of a National Security Council to act as a joint civil-military arbiter of the nation's affairs.[159] A livid Nawaz Sharif, driving on his way to Murree, wanted the defense ministry to simply issue a notification announcing the army chief’s dismissal. Sharif‘s cool-headed Principal Secretary, the seasoned bureaucrat Saeed Mehdi, advised him to meet with General Karamat personally. The General was called in to meet the prime minister. The prime minister let him know he could not work with him. The army chief sent in his resignation. The civilian chatter was that the matter was “amicably settled.”

"Interestingly, General Karamat been put to the test for his commitment to the Constitution during the prime minister’s 1997 confrontation with the judiciary and the President Farooq Leghari. The general was called upon to act by all sides yet he acted strictly within Constitutional parameters. After the departure of the President, General (retd) Iftikhar Ali Khan, the former Chief of General Staff and then Defense Secretary, made a statement on behalf of the government generously complimenting the army’s role, stating, "After the removal of the 8th Amendment, the army has taken its orders from the prime minister and not the President… The army's positive (sic) role during the crisis would be remembered forever."[160] Such praise had seemed unnecessary yet not unprecedented.[161] Perhaps deep in trouble and swamped by endless criticism, Nawaz Sharif, like all politicians, was haunted by the fear of some military general lurking on the side planning his exit. ... "

Oh, is that what he foresaw? 

Would that be remarkable as a vision of future? 

Or not so, considering it's routine in pak? 

................................................................................................

"Karamat’s dismissal was not the first of a forces chief by Nawaz Sharif. In May 1997, after a probe into the controversial Agosta submarine deal had established the culpability of the Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Mansur ulHaq, the prime minister asked the then Secretary Defense H. R. Pasha to “advise” the naval chief to resign. The naval chief did resign. That earned Sharif praise from the media. A leading independent weekly wrote, “Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif deserves high praise for relieving Admiral MansoorulHaq of his duties. The navy chief embroiled his service in unbecoming controversy, gave it a bad name and undermined its morale.”[163]

"After sending General Karamat home, Prime Minister Sharif appointed General Pervez Musharraf, then serving as Corps Commander Mangla, as the new chief.  Musharraf, who superseded two generals, was appointed on the recommendation of his key aide and Minister for Petroleum Chaudhary Nisar.  Nisar’s brother Iftikhar Ali Khan, the Defense Secretary and a retired general, would vouch for Musharraf as a professional non-political general.  Elected prime ministers always factored in these considerations, hoping they would prove a safety valve against coup-makers. The widespread chatter on possible reactions from the GHQ to the unprecedented removal of their chief soon died down. It appeared that the men in khaki would remain subservient to the orders of the elected prime minister."

In pak? 

Ha! 

................................................................................................

"Within days of his appointment the new army chief set about bringing his own men into key posts. In fact, within three days of his appointment, he had changed the commanders of the three strategic corps: the Lahore 4 Corps, Rawalpindi 10 Corps, and Karachi 5 Corps. While in doing so the new chief was exercising his institutional authority, yet this scale and haste in the shuffle drew comment from the media. After all, there was a history of repeated direct and indirect army coups that had overthrown constitutionally elected prime ministers. Some eyebrows were raised in the prime minister’s inner circle too.

"However, the only appointment in which the prime minister had a say was that of the chief of the ISI. Musharraf wanted to appoint General Aziz, the head of ISI’s Research & Analysis Wing, to the top slot at ISI and General Ziauddin Khawaja as the new Chief of General Staff at the GHQ. The prime minister, constitutionally authorized to appoint the country’s spy chief, declined the army chief’s request to promote General Aziz. Nawaz Sharif interviewed both officers and selected Ziauddin as the DG ISI. Musharraf appointed Aziz as the Chief of General Staff. The prime minister, constitutionally the reporting as well as the appointing authority for the ISI chief, picked Ziauddin for the post. This general was serving as Adjutant General and before that had commanded the 30 Corps Gujranwala. The military talk was that Ziauddin, with only limited command experience, was not a strong candidate for either of the two positions. However, he was the new army chief’s close friend and also known to the prime minister’s family with especially close ties to his father.

"While Ziauddin held the top slot, the army chief ensured that his own trusted appointees filled all the strategic slots in the ISI. This included the second tier command positions at the ISI headquarters and in key cities, including Lahore, Karachi, and Quetta, Ziauddin, did not resist this. The DG-Internal security was bound by rules to report to the army chief. Also, with eight to nine brigadiers serving under every section head, the ISI was operationally under GHQ control."

................................................................................................

" ... India’s four-point proposal presented at the talks called for a comprehensive ceasefire based on a freeze of "present ground positions", discussions on the modalities for implementing the ceasefire within an agreed time-frame, a "bilateral monitoring mechanism", and authentication of existing ground positions. ... "

" ... Rajiv Gandhi on 16 November 1989 referring to Operation Meghdoot ... on the hustings in Kolkata that "We have recovered about 5,000 square kilometers of area from occupied Kashmir in Siachen. We will not forgo one square kilometer of that."

"Indians also complained about Pakistani troops firing on Siachen.[166]It is possible the firing was taking place. The Kargil planners may have sought a way to engage Indian attention away from the Kargil area. Obviously unaware, the Pakistani delegation denied that their troops had carried out any such attack.[167]  The talks ended in a fiasco. There was an unraveling of the progress made during the earlier rounds. For the generals’ clique, in the Indian reiteration of its recalcitrance over Siachen, lay a sense of vindication."

Author now spends next paragraph blaming Delhi and the then PM of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, fir talks being a fiasco. 

Did author, and pakis, expect that they could shoot down Indian soldiers with impugnity, with not a word in protest? 

................................................................................................

" ... question of the accession of the princely State of Jammu Kashmir. Pakistan’s response to this had been the use of covert force. Larger in size, a confident Delhi did believe, it could violate explicit and implicit legal parameters. ... "

What world do the pakis, and the author, inhabit, where legitimately signed accession is considered illegal, and "use of covert force" legitimate? 

Obviously, it's a world where a female rape victim is accused of adultery by her assaulter who raped her, and as a consequence, is legally executed by stones pelted by a mob. 

................................................................................................

Author spends much of next part justifying pakis attacking India throughout the short history of existence of Pakistan, by claiming - not exactly explicitly, but via implications and roundabouts - that India's not ceding territory claimed and demanded by pakis justified every attack by and from pak against India, including not only all the wars but all the terrorist attacks as well,  over several decades. 

" ... Contrary to a politician’s response, influential sections within the army leadership believed covert use of force against India was an effective way to tackle the adversary. The military coup of the late seventies and the overall Pakistani institutional power balance tilted in the army’s favor allowed the military leadership to autonomously conduct policy. Moreover, the army’s partnership with the CIA in conducting the covert war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan further strengthened the Pakistani military as the principal policy-maker.

"By November 1998, two policy approaches towards India were in play. The constitutionally elected government had already opted for diplomacy and dialogue. While a small clique of army generals had, however, surreptitiously, set off on the path of covert war. And this clique must have received India’s recalcitrance over Siachen with a sense of vindication."

"The Kargil planners’ clique had troops crossing the LOC to pay back in kind to India for Siachen. Or so they had believed."

Oh, no they don't. Pakistan never did have any right to separate merely on basis of fanaticism in name of religion and massacres of eleven million Hindus and nearly five million Sikhs as the sole argument for this separation. It's about as justified as, say, a Confederate South claiming States' Rights for slavery. 

As for demanding even more extra territory than already conceded quite unreasonably in 1947 by UK, that's pakis copying Hitler at and after his Munich performance. 

................................................................................................

" ... The Kargil clique’s calculation was markedly opposed to the dialogue and détente policy with India that Pakistan’s elected political leadership was pursuing after the tests. ... "

Author makes them sound equally valid and legitimate, but that's falsehood. Reality is that the then PM of pak had no clue about what paki military was upto, much less having okayed it before PM of India visited. This is not only typical of the sham that pakis maintain in order to claim they are just as good as India and equally valid,  but the fact that the sham is maintained often enough shows pakis are ashamed of their own bragging about being inheritors of barbarians from Central and West Asia, the invaders and destroyers of India in name of a fanatic creed. 

This has led to a schizophrenia on national level in pak, whereby they tried to establish themselves as Arab, by claiming Arabic as national language, until they were laughing stock as far as Arabs went, for this pretension. Hassan Nisar tells this tale well, on his program, several years ago. 

................................................................................................

"Hassan, especially during Musharraf’s period, was widely regarded within the army High Command as the best mind on India. He advocated an aggressive posture towards India and often maintained that “Pakistan’s size and power should match, i.e. if Pakistan did not militarily and otherwise expand, they (India) will atrophy you”[178]

"As Director Military Operations, Hassan was actively involved in monitoring the Kashmiri insurgency in Indian Occupied Kashmir. ... "

That's tacit admission that he was training and arming terrorists and sending them across border into India, by thousands. 

................................................................................................

" ... In 1992-93, when Pakistan concluded that the “insurgency’s spirit was depleting,” to give the home-grown insurgency a fillip the army facilitated the induction of ‘mehman mujahideen’ (guest mujahids) in Indian Occupied Kashmir. ... "

This is admission that so called freedom fighters in Kashmir never had been local; calling some sent across border "guest mujahids" was only because they never could pretend to be Kashmir locals, because they were not even from West Punjab, the province that not only dominates pak but has replaced Kashmiris in POK. So the "guest mujahids" were, what, Africans? Surely not Iranian or Saudi or European, not those from wealthier countries such as gulf nations? 

................................................................................................

"Hence, with this orientation, soon after taking over as Commander FCNA in October 1997 and completing the reconnaissance of the area around the LOC, Javed Hassan’s general refrain to his officers was “get offensive, we have to cross the borders.”[180]

"Given Hassan’s inclinations, this approach was no surprise. This had also been the way of many of his predecessors. Often the FCNA Commander’s enthusiasm for aggressive conduct along the LOC translated into issuing aggressive directives, without always getting the requisite Corps Commander clearances, or not maintaining the required confidentiality or suitable discretion and restraint in the display of the enthusiasm on successful conduct of an operation."

Is this the authors way of admitting that paki military is unprofessional? 

................................................................................................

" ... Indian team brought R.K.Mishra and Admiral Nayyar to Islamabad on 2 November. Vajpayee had personally cleared their trip. At the breakfast meeting with Nawaz Sharif, the Indian envoys conveyed Vajpayee’s message. India was willing to give one billion rupees in soft loans or three million tons of wheat as a loan to Pakistan.[214] This was Vajpayee’s goodwill gesture for an economically troubled Pakistan. Sharif asked his Additional Secretary, Tariq Fatimi, who was also present, to examine the offer. Fatimi told the prime minister that Pakistan had already taken care of its wheat requirements.[215] Given the history of their relationship, it was unthinkable for the Pakistani establishment, or even the political leadership, to let India “bail” them, no matter what its condition."

Not quite true. After the tsunami, pakis were willing to receive help India offered, if it came via US - that'd change labels as far as public perception went. 

But far more telling is the fact that, not only these offers have come from India after a history of pakis perpetrating deadly assaults against India whether terrorism or war, having pak genesis in massacres of several millions in India, but thst here author pretends the opposite, as if those assaults, massacres and murders were of no account, and paki demands of more and more territory to be wrested from India by hook or by crook were a just expectation, with use of terrorism as fair as diplomatic route and legal accession unjust. 

Author further takes pains to portray pakis as sort of nawab,  while reducing Indian envoys to minimal.  

"The other message that Sharif’s Indian guests carried from Vajpayee was that “cross-border terrorism” must stop. The prime minister moved three paces, away from Fatemi’s hearing, and according to his Indian guest said that Vajpayee should be told that Sharif had his own man in the ISI. And that in two or three months, Sharif will control the LOC situation situation and focus on dialogue.”[216]   During the breakfast meeting with his Indian guests, Sharif again repeated his idea of Vajpayee traveling to Lahore on the inaugural bus. An optimistic Sharif somewhat lightly said that if Vajpayee sat in the bus and came to Lahore, fifty percent of the problem would be resolved and, if he himself went in the bus to India, the remaining fifty percent would also be solved.[217] ... Nawaz Sharif believed it was time to reorient Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. He was also getting increasingly uneasy about continuing with Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy."

................................................................................................

" ... Post-Bhutto Pakistan, under the military ruler Zia ul Haq,was totally immersed in an international jihad tailored to achieve the US objective of destroying the ‘Evil Empire’ of the USSR. Pakistan’s role as the main architect and facilitator of the international jihad led to Islamabad wanting a friendly government in Kabul."

Friendly???? More like puppets trained by pakis, but now lost control of, it'd seem after two decades. "

" ... Recalling his government’s cooperation, especially on bin Laden, he reminded his host that Pakistan had “been fighting terrorism, and you know that we’ve been cooperating with the United States of America also.” [224]"

Hilary Clinton had a better assessment, however - or perhaps so fid her husband, even then. 

After all, there were those unforgettable scenes from his visit to India, soon after, televised live for the whole world to watch - as he smiled when PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee affirmed India's position, as he met everyone crowding around before leaving, and as he got off his vehicle to dance with the villagers, en route to Jaipur!

................................................................................................

" ... Nawaz had arrived in Washington armed with hugely expensive gifts.[226] "

This from a reportedly well off businessman isn't worth mentioning, but author has been explicit in the two paragraphs ending above,mentioning details that would make it seem that pakis were grandiose to a US deserving of only shame. 

Nawaz Sharif being friendly to or friends with another similar person isn't surprising, considering his relationships with two very different leaders of India separated by a decade. 

He paid heavily, too, every time. 

"Nawaz and Clinton, aided by their teams, met for two hours at the Oval Office. They discussed non-proliferation, economic sanctions, relations with India, bin Laden, Afghanistan, and the F-16 issue. For Pakistan, the good news was Clinton’s commitment to settle the F-16 issue, which had become known in Pakistan as ‘highway robbery’ by the United States (Pakistan had paid the US $658 million for 28 F-16s. In 1991, after President George H.W. Bush withheld non-proliferation certification, Washington unilaterally aborted the sale and held back considerably more than half a billion dollars from cash-strapped Pakistan). while refusing to deliver the F16s.[227] Nawaz Sharif’s government decided to inform the Clinton Administration of its decision to take the matter to court. In Islamabad, Foreign Secretary Shamshad had strongly advocated the legal option and an American lawyer had already been engaged. He had already visited Islamabad for discussions. ... "

Hold on. Pakis paid US, millions of dollars? How? Isn't the glow usually other way, of aid? 

"For Clinton the bin Laden issue topped the agenda. At the meeting, his whereabouts were discussed. Sharif and his team maintained Pakistan could do little since bin Laden was in Afghanistan. None from Clinton’s team were convinced. Secretary of State Albright was particularly tough with the Pakistani prime minister. Sharif, to everyone’s surprise, at the conclusion of the meeting asked to meet Clinton separately. Clinton agreed. At the meeting, Sharif offered Pakistan’s help in abducting bin Laden. Pakistan’s prime minister proposed that the US train a Pakistani team to hunt for bin Laden. Clinton, beaten by the Lewinsky scandal, was very keen to achieve a breakthrough on bin Laden. He was tantalized by the offer. After the meeting, a delighted Clinton told US Ambassador to Pakistan Bill Milam and Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth about Sharif’s offer. Milam wondered how significant Sharif’s offer if he did not have Pakistan’s security apparatus on board. It was unclear if he did. Nonetheless, soon after the offer, the  CIA launched their Get-Osama operation. Men from the Special Forces Group arrived in Pakistan to train former Pakistani SSG commandos."

Perhaps this was why Nawaz Sharif was ousted and that too by someone who had attacked India without informing his PM - while the said PM was hosting PM of India for peace talks? 

And then not only lost the war hed started, but being thoroughly beaten as well? 

How did that loser get to conduct a coup and throw out a PM who was personally friendly with Clinton - unless the key was support by OBL? 

................................................................................................

"The Taliban, as Mulla Omar’s exchange with Saudi Prince Turki had clearly conveyed, were in no mood to handover their benefactor and now comrade to either the Saudis or to the Americans. As for the ISI, it continued to mentor the Taliban as Kabul’s rightful and pro-Pakistani government in Kabul. Another dimension of the Taliban-Pakistan link was now the Kashmir factor. Non-Kashmiri militants sent by Pakistan into ... Kashmir[239] were increasingly being trained in Afghanistan and often in bin Laden’s training camps.[240] Some of these militants were pursuing a dual agenda. ... they conducted sabotage activities targeting Indian forces and even moderate Kashmiris. Within Pakistan they pursued their own ideological agenda, targeting Pakistan’s Shia Muslim population."

Why does author avoid pointing out the ideology that had Malala, a teenager, for going to school, despite orders by taliban that females should be instead made available for providing every service to taliban? Malala shooting happened later, but it was only a copy of what Afghanistan women and girls suffered under taliban, as soon as Russia was forced to leave. 

................................................................................................

Author seems yo have a skewed vision due perhaps to personal prejudices. 

"From Bhutto to Zia, Pakistan had presented a contrasting picture. Bhutto exhibited world-class diplomacy while Zia was of men trained to view the world in a dependent and derivative mode. On the global stage Bhutto had dragged a defeated nation with the power of his vision to impressive levels of self-confidence and expanding influence. Bhutto led the new world opening with South-West Asia, leadership in the strategically important Muslim world, structural bonding with China, engaging the Russian bear, and putting Pakistan on the immutable nuclear path."

Author isn't aware that, having sworn he eouldnt allow the elected leader Mujibur Rehman to not only step into office but on soil on the then Western half of the country, Bhutto had been the leader responsible for imprisonment of Mujibur Rehman, the paki military attack against its iwn Eastern half East Bengal, the genocide and mass rapes thst had been declared intentions of before the military set sail for East Bengal around Sri Lanka, and subsequently losing thst other half? 

"Zia, by contrast, had taken Pakistan into a covert war, in a subservient role, believing it to be autonomous. Nevertheless overlooking the damage his policies did to the Pakistani state, society and politics, many in the army credited Zia for the hardware he brought to the armed forces, including staying the course on the nuclear program. Zia also abandoned the nuances of diplomacy, he had entirely bought into the threat perceptions of the West. ... "

Wasn't he the guy US found useful since already begun jihadist attacks in Afghanistan, making Afghanistan regime ask Russia for help? 

................................................................................................

Author seems to be as much a fan of the losers of Kargil as she's a fan of losers of East Bengal. So she blames every wrongdoing of the Kargil fiasco on zia instead. 

" ... Pakistan’s state power and public peace were adrift. Even worse was the divided picture that Pakistan’s institutions presented. For example the army chief versus the army, the ISI chief versus the rest, etc. Within the very architecture of state and governance, there was conflict and contest. The narratives were several and divided. It has resulted in a clash of power and narratives on the foreign policy and national security. Little wonder that often Pakistan did not present a cohesive game plan while engaging with interlocutors. Sharif, at the close of 1998, was set to pull all this together."

................................................................................................

"The confident clique of Kargil planners was satisfied with the progress of the operation. By the end of December, Pakistani forces had already infiltrated almost seven kilometers from seven directions which included  east of Shyok river outflank, from the top of Shyok Valley, from the western side of the river Indus, from Shakma. Pakistan Army troops from 13 NLI, 3 NLI, 5 NLI, 12 NLI and Sindh Regiment directly penetrated the seven areas. ... "

And yet pakis still lie on public television  kissing there were just a few tribals, no more than five hundred or so. 

" ... Although the army chief had given the nod, formal approval of the Operation was still needed. The revered day of Jumatul Wida, the last Friday of Ramadan, the sacred month of fasting, was picked for a formal approval of Operation Koh Paima. On 16 January, in the operations room of the Military Operations Directorate, Operation KP was approved although the bulk of the plan was already under way.. ... "

So the army was aware at the highest echelons, but civil government wasn't even informed, and general public was lied to. 

" ... The meeting, chaired by army chief General Musharraf, was attended by Lt. General Aziz Khan(Chief of General Staff), Lt. General Mahmud Ahmad  (Corps Commander 10 Corps), Lt. General Tauqir Zia (Director General Military Operations), Major General Javed Hasan (Commander FCNA),  Brigadier Masood Aslam (Commander 323 Brigade), Brigadier Nadeem Ahmad  (Director Military Operations) and Colonel Nisar Ahmad (GI Operations). Colonel Nisar Ahmad formally presented the tactical plan and its execution. The entire plan was spread over 15 pages and included a detailed map with logistics, ammunition, rations, and troops at posts set up across the LOC.

................................................................................................

"Predicting an Indian Response

"Pakistan’s calculation was that, in the case of a localized Indian response failing to expel the Pakistani forces, “a second tier” Indian response would come into play with India opening additional fronts along the LOC across from the Pakistani towns of Murree and Chamb-Jaurian.[251] For this, India would require additional forces from outside of Jammu and Kashmir."

" ... The GHQ was certain that ... Indians did not have the force structure to execute an all-our offensive against Pakistan elsewhere. The planners moved with a linear calculation of an Indian response. As military men, they only focused on the military dimension."

................................................................................................

"In a meeting at the Corps Commander’s home, where the possible Indian response was being discussed, Kayani’s view differed from that of his colleagues. He believed India would not attack where Pakistan’s defense was the weakest. Instead Kayani believed India would attack directly at Kargil, which was strategically important for India. In more restricted meetings, Kayani let his seniors know he believed the operation had conceptual flaws. Indian strategic capacity included its existing ammunition dumps, its two airfields, the National Highway, and the large Kargil Valley. On the Pakistani side, there was the smaller Minimarg Valley, the snow-clogged Burzil Pass, and the Deosai Plains. Added to this was the very hostile operation terrain, extending from Minimarg to Drass-Kargil, essentially a pack of formidable mountains, translating into communications barriers for the Pakistani soldiers. [252]

"Leading the charge for Operation Koh Paima were simplistic and patriotic mindsets. Commander 10 Corps would tell his team that the aim was to occupy the heights undetected and then inflict heavy casualties on the Indians during summer. The Commander FCNA would say that the Indians would not know what hit them. They only talked of defensive battle and he did not believe they were even capable of that. In response to concerns expressed by other officers about a tough Indian response, Major General Javed Hasan’s unprofessional, prejudiced refrain was: “The timid Indian will never fight the battle.” Javed Hasan used to go to the battle headquarters but mostly not across the LOC, yet all the posts were established with his clearance."

Wonder if he - and his likes - learned? 

................................................................................................

"Troops and Logistics 

"By March, additional troops were called in as FCNA troops had ventured deeper. Units were moved from Peshawar. At any given time, Pakistan had 600 to 700 troops across the LOC.  One post or picket did not require more than 8 to10 soldiers and the rest were there to support the base, etc. However, with troop rotation, in total around 3000 to 4000 troops participated in the operation."

And yet, pakis lie on public television, claiming it was only a few hundred tribals. 

"Depending on where the troops were positioned, helicopters, human porters, and mule brigades were used for delivering supplies. For the 80 Brigade areas, army helicopters would ferry across supplies daily. For 12 NLI based in the easier terrain in the Mushkoh Valley, human porters were used. About 300 to 400 porters were used.

"Supplies for the troops came from the existing forward battalion supplies, dumped especially within the 80 Brigade area. The main logistics base from where supplies were transferred to different battalion headquarters was located at Jaglot, around 40 miles from Gilgit and 250 miles from Skardu. Undetected by the Indians, Lama helicopters were regularly flown across the LOC to drop food and limited medical supplies to feed the forward posts through summer months to last the many snow-bound months.[275]"

" ... Some contingents, including NLI 5, were not supplied. Even those who had food were unable to cook it, either because they were in the igloos or lighting fire raised the possibility of being tracked by the Indians. Troops in Indian-held territory would talk of going hungry for days or surviving only on honey. Home-bound troops would talk of having eaten grass for days."

................................................................................................

"Deceptive Briefings

"On 29 January in Skardu, they told Sharif the general thrust of their intentions while not revealing the plan in full. In order to give a boost to the Kashmir struggle, they said, they needed to become active along the LOC. Sharif was told that local level operations along the LOC were being undertaken. Though he still had no clue that Pakistani troops had already crossed the LOC, Sharif felt that small-scale operations could complement his political and diplomatic efforts to move forward on détente and peace with India. At the Skardu airport, the prime minister was told that, just as the Indians were interdicting our traffic in the Neelum Valley, the Pakistan army too would set up a couple of posts to interdict the main artery, the Srinagar-Leh NH-1A. The army chief mentioned setting up of a couple of posts across the LOC so that visual rather than the usual blind firing by Pakistan was conducted  to interdict NH-IA.[277]

"In the second briefing, on 13 March, the then ISI official Major General Jamshed Gulzar, in charge of Afghan and Kashmir policy, gave a presentation on Mujahideen activities. Gulzar’s presentation was completely unrelated to Operation KP. In fact, throughout the presentation, the Kargil Operation went unmentioned since neither General Gulzar nor any other official within the ISI were aware of it.  The prime minister, the army chief, the DG ISI, and commander 10 Corps were among the attendees.

"In his presentation, Gulzar informed the political and military leadership of the limitations within which the Mujahideen operated. They did not have the ability to inflict heavy damage on the Indian Army and make the environment conducive for the Pakistan Army to move in. Infiltration had also increased. The general said the Mujahideen were, however, capable of “imposing caution and casualties” on the Indian troops by laying ambushes, attacking isolated military posts, and blowing up bridges and culverts along the only route available for the movement of weapons, troops and supplies in the Srinagar and Leh area. During the question and answer session, it was suggested to Sharif at the briefing that scaling up the Mujahideen operations would positively impact Pakistan’s negotiating position. Musharraf proposed that Pakistan supply Stinger missiles to the Kashmiri Mujahideen, so they could inflict heavier losses on the Indian forces. The great success of the Stinger missiles, first introduced by the US to the Afghan Mujahideen for guerilla warfare against the Soviets, made the Stingers popular weapons among the Pakistan intelligence agencies.

"However, with diplomatic engagement now on a relatively positive track, the ministers present opposed delivering Stingers to the Mujahedeen. Former General Majeed Malik strongly objected to such a plan. “The proposal to provide Stinger missiles to the Mujahedeen will be treated by India as an act of war,” he argued. Moreover, providing Stingers was also opposed to Pakistan’s “basic stand that Kashmiris inside occupied Kashmir were waging their own struggle for self determination and Pakistan was only providing moral and diplomatic support,” [278] ... "

" ... Musharraf and his Kargil clique were on a different track. As if to justify his clique’s stance, Musharraf retorted, “We know the Indians. They will negotiate seriously only under maximum pressure.” Deceiving Sharif, he added that he “could not take responsibility for restraining Mujahedeen activity inside Occupied Kashmir.” He did, however, agree to “postpone” the plan to supply Stinger missiles."

................................................................................................

"Lotus Lakes and leisurely talks

" ... It was on 19 March, during the SAARC foreign minister’s retreat in Norellia at the Sri Lankan President’s summer home, that, after a long walk together in a huge garden with two lotus lakes, Jaswant Singh of India and Sartaj Azz of Pakistan sat down on a bench for a ninety-minute talk. It was about Kashmir. ... "

" ... The “Chenab formula” was discussed. All majority Muslim areas lay on the west of the river Chenab and the Hindu majority to the east of the Chenab. This formulation would at least convert the negotiations away from a communal discourse. The substance still involved different communities. ... "

"However, away from the gardens of Norellia, unbeknown to the Pakistani and Indian interlocutors, in the world’s highest battleground, the occupation of peaks was underway.  “We were not wanting territory, we just wanted to strengthen the hands of the prime minister,” was the refrain of the key architect of Kargil, General Aziz. How this linkage would work was anyone’s guess."

................................................................................................

"‘Indians Do Not Fight’ 

"The Kargil plan was based on the belief that, once Pakistani troops would have successfully choked the lifeline of the Indian troops based in Leh and Siachen by interdicting NH1A and by setting up posts and pickets in the DrassKargil sectors, the Indian response would not be determined and decisive. In the minds of the Pakistani leadership, Delhi’s reaction of anger and panic would attract global attention. In the presence of nuclear overhang in South Asia, world powers would be forced to seek a quick political settlement. Pakistan would have a distinct advantage then, with its troops having cut-off the NH1A and planted themselves on the strategic peaks of DrassKargil, and would be able to dictate its terms for the settlement of Siachen and the Kashmir issue. 

"This belief of the Operation Koh Paima planners came under test in May."

Did pakis learn nothing in 1965, or even in 1971?

................................................................................................

"“Cock and Bull Story” 

"Meanwhile, Washington too entered the fray and called for troop withdrawal. Pakistan was asked to vacate immediately. Within a period of one week, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, seasoned diplomat Riaz Khokhar, was told four times to convey Washington’s concern to Islamabad over Pakistan’s violation of the LOC.[330] During his first meeting with the US Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering at the State Department Club, Khokhar was plainly told that the Clinton administration did not believe Islamabad’s “cock and bull story of freedom fighters”[331] fighting in Kargil with no Pakistani involvement. After his first meeting, a puzzled Khokhar called the Foreign Office in Islamabad to convey Washington’s message. However, the response to his queries on Kargil was that “all will be well, no need to worry!”

"The flip side of Washington’s message to Islamabad was the message that the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright conveyed to the Indians. On May 30, Albright called her Indian counterpart Jaswant Singh. She let him know that she had spoken to the Pakistani prime minister and assured Singh that “the United States knew fully well how the chain of events had started.”[332] A worried Albright had also suggested that “things could go out of control...it was important to commence the dialogue.”[333] Singh said he was not averse to a dialogue but wanted the “aggressor” to first end aggression against India.

"After it was known that Pakistani troops had crossed the LOC ... Pakistan earned widespread criticism. The criticism was simple: responsible nuclear states always stay away from |military confrontation. They do not undermine nuclear deterrence. They do not sabotage peace initiatives and especially the ones that they themselves initiate, like the Lahore summit. They do not opt for the confrontation path. Operation KP had landed Pakistan in an isolated space where criticism of the present overrode all else. ... "

Author attempts to justify pakis at this point claiming pakis claims were bring ignored. 

She forgets Russian claim to Alaska - leased to US for 99 years, never returned due to the document being lost during revolution - is far more genuine. 

................................................................................................

"The Contours of Denial 

"Throughout May, the army planners of the operation worked with a variety of themes to maintain deniability of the Pakistan Army’s involvement. These ranged from contentions that the Mujahideen were conducting the operation, to assertions that the Pakistan Army was not crossing the actual LOC. The decision to attribute the fictitious identity of the Mujahideen to the NLI was largely an unplanned one. It had been triggered by the wireless intercepts of exchanges between the Indian forces, which the ISI and the MI had picked up. The Indians were informing each other that the Afghan Mujahideen had crossed over the LOC. This Indian assessment was based on the wireless exchanges they had picked up between the NLI personnel recruited from Pakistan’s Pashto-speaking areas.[390] The Indians mistook them for Afghans.

"In fact, there was no Mujahideen participation at all. The Mujahideen, often physically hardy, were “essentially a rag-a-tag force wearing second hand clothes and PT shoes.” Incapable of fighting pitched battles, they were certainly not capable of supporting the Kargil operation.  At best they could “apply pinpricks” to India using their very weak artillery and ammunition, including AK47 assault rifles, light motors, explosive devices.[391] They were capable of ambushes and of raiding posts. The Mujahideen “could not have operated in the Kargil area where even the eagles dare not fly.”[392]"

Author says "motors" where it should say 'mortar'.

................................................................................................

"Nevertheless, to ensure deniability, a decision was taken within the GHQ to “play along” with the Indian version that Afghan Mujahideen had entered the Kargil region.[393] By the third week of May, the FCNA commander got orders from the GHQ that the troops participating in the operation should “go in civvies” and to “remove their identity discs.” The FCNA found this order disturbing. The troops were to be identified as Mujahideen. Camouflaging their identity would affect their morale.[394] The broader implications of acquiring the fictitious identity were overlooked by the army generals. The participation of the Afghan Mujahideen in the Kargil area would establish their engagement with the Kashmir freedom struggle. Such a linkage would strengthen the Indian position that, in fact, Pakistan was involved in spreading the Taliban brand of extremism in the region and justify Delhi’s framing of the Kashmir movement within the Islamic international terrorism framework and link it to Osama Bin Laden and to al-Qaeda.[395]

"Closer to home, the Mujahideen leadership, agitated over Pakistan’s decision to project the Op as a Mujahideen operation, sought meetings with the Pakistan leadership. They complained to their ISI interlocutors that linking them to the Kargil Operation gave them “a bad name.”[396] In their meetings with the prime minister and the DG ISI they demanded that the projection of this linkage be discontinued. The prime minister pacified them and said their name was included in this national effort to liberate Kashmir and that the success of the operation would mean also the Mujahideen’s success.

"The planners of Operation Koh Paima continued with this fictitious identity till almost the very end of the Kargil operation. Notwithstanding, of course, the fact that during the mid-May GHQ briefing for the foreign military attachés, the ‘cat had been let out of the bag!’[397] By around 26 May, even the Indians publicly confirmed that it was the Pakistan Army and not the Mujahideen who were involved in the operation. Subsequently, international media reports, reflecting the perception of   foreign governments, also highlighted army and not Mujahideen involvement. Nevertheless, Pakistan official policy to the very end remained insistent that it was the Afghan and Kashmiri Mujahideen had crossed the LOC."

And those lies continue, but they - the lies - began in 1947 and were used in 1965 too, to the effect that it was never paki military, only local tribals; to this effect soldiers were sent dressed in pajamas. 

................................................................................................

"On the ground, the projected accomplishment of the Kargil clique was turning into an acute crisis."

Author has a strange title for next section. 

"Military Fight-Back"

Considering paki attack was military, pretending they were stray terrorists, what other "Fight-Back" did author or any other paki expect? 

A ghazal duet? 

Certainly not a science Olympiad, where pakis couldn't begin to compete, or even perform! 

" ... Yet, by mid-June, adversity struck Pakistan’s young warriors perched on mountaintops. The wounded Indians of May had now returned in June with a vengeance and, above all, with a plan. The Pakistanis found themselves in a difficult military environment.  The Pakistani posts that previously neither the Indian air force sorties could hit nor the Indian soldiers could scale alive, were now under continuous artillery attack.  Their Bofor guns had done the trick for them. [481] Their maximum range of 30 kilometers enabled deep strikes on the enemy's gun positions, administrative installations, ammunition dumps, and headquarters, besides neutralizing forward positions held by the intruders. By moving up these guns, 105 mm field guns, 160 mm and 120 mm mortars and 122 mm GRAD BM 21 Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRLs) into forward positions, the Indians were capable of ‘direct’ fire on enemy localities - literally under the nose of the enemy[482] By early June, it became almost impossible to move logistics from the logistic base to the posts and pickets on the forward ridges via nullahs and mountains. Intense shelling and bombing destroyed Pakistan’s logistics network.  If a hundred porters left, only ten could reach their destination.[483] The Indians planned their attacks using a map marking Pakistani deployments that Indian troops had picked up from the Tololing base they had captured around June 6,.

"In mid-June, the Indian air force struck at the Badar base, a logistics hub, set up by Pakistan in the Batalik sector, across the LOC, which was heavily stocked with ammunition.[484] The logistics crisis was now mounting for the Pakistanis with no easy or rapid route for replenishment. In the words of the Indian Commander Brigadier Bajwa, the commander of 192 Mountain Brigade, this is what the Pakistani men perched on Tiger Hill and running out of ammunition were confronting: “The sight of over one hundred guns pounding Tiger Hill... The fireballs of the explosions lit up … We closed in up to 40 meters of the shelling. The accuracy was so great that not one shell strayed from its target …” [485] The sustained, accurate and close up shooting, using Bofor guns on a vast scale, proved devastating for the Pakistanis."

Author has not a word for the brave soldiers of India fighting literally uphill, while bring rained death on by their own officially so-called terrorists sitting on top. She had plenty of praise gor the pakis climbing up unopposed, though. 

It'd seem that the all too frequent accusations by pakis against India, delivered on public TV and consisting of a single plaintive wail of Indians lacking a big heart (because India refuses to concede huge chunks of India's territory?), are in fact true of pakis, who behave as author does in descriptions of wars, battles etc al. 

................................................................................................

"By June 10th Indian Artillery regiment had amassed a large number of artillery units in extremely difficult terrain. On the military front this Indian artillery fire turned the tables on Pakistan. If the Indian infantry had suffered high casualties until early June, by mid-June it was raining fire and brimstone onto Pakistani troops occupying posts on the Tololing and Tiger Hills. Op KP was facing sharp military reversals and singularly on account of accurate and timely delivery of TNT. The Gunners’ fire assaults became the principle battle-winning factor. An Indian account of the intense and lethal use of artillery was thus: “The Indian artillery fired over 250,000 shells, bombs, and rockets during the Kargil conflict. Approximately 5,000 artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired daily from 300 guns, mortars and MBRLs while 9,000 shells were fired the day Tiger Hill was regained. During the peak period of assaults, on an average, each artillery battery fired over one round per minute for 17 days continuously.” [486] This intensive artillery firing sustained through the three weeks was uncommon, almost unparalleled in military history. 

"This intensity of artillery fire devastated both men and mountains. By June 10, India’s infantry was provided the solid backing it had lacked during May and early June.  The Indian Artillery regiment had amassed a large number of fire units within a short period, in wet weather, and over very hostile terrain at extremely high altitudes. India’s point man on the ground GOC in C Southern Command and army chief designate acknowledged that, in Operation Vijay, “ (The) devastation caused by extremely accurate and timely fire assaults in most difficult and inhospitable terrain greatly facilitated the capture of key objectives…”[487]"

Again, that description is supposed to impress a reader subconsciously with lack of any fighting other than a raining of artillery fire by India, while author has repeatedly extolled Pakistan as brave for climbing up unopposed. 

Fact is, it was Indian soldiers who fought the uphill battle, at those impossible heights well over 10,000 feet, while the so-called terrorists (as pakis labeled their own soldiers) rained not only fire on them, but huge boulders downhill, killing Indian soldiers. 

Under those circumstances, the humongous achievement of India's soldiers was at least worthy of mention, even by a silly paki sitting in comfort of Harvard to compose this paen to paki terrorism. 

................................................................................................

"A Handicapped Sartaj

"With these facts unknown to him, it was a handicapped Sartaj that was taking off for Delhi. Far from the corridors of power in Islamabad and from the Ops room in the GHQ, where Op KP was still a success story, the Indians with massive firepower were targeting Pakistani troops perched on the peaks and slopes of the Drass and Kargil mountains. For the Pakistani troops, the military situation was turning nasty. Yet the Kargil planners were still heady with the self-created euphoria around Op KP. Reports of heavy Indian attacks were neither easily reaching them nor were being readily received even at the operational headquarters in Skardu. For example, around June 4, the first reports of Pakistani casualties and loss of the Pakistani-held position at Tololing lumbered into the FCNA Operations room, but were received with denial and frustration. In some cases, officers explained away troop injuries caused by Indian attacks as injuries from ricocheting bullets fired by Pakistani troops![488] ... "

That last bit belongs to choice paki pronouncements, such as one by redcap about white horses frightening India in 1965! 

"Even as adversity struck, with military pressure mounting on Pakistani troops, the commander FCNA lost his nerve. Although he knew it was not a hopeful position, he tried to paint rosy picture.” In a meeting Hasan implored the others, “Allah kay wasta mujheay ma’af kar do. Bohat ghalti ho ga’ee. Ab dua’aon [491]ka waqt hain.” (For God’s sake, forgive me. I have made a big mistake. Now is the time for prayers).[492]"

Funny, pakis seem to alternate between perpetrating terrorism and praying for terrorists, or their own soldiers whom they publicly labell terrorists, within pak and to world at large! 

................................................................................................

"To illustrate the faulty information flow, caused by individual fears and professional incompetence, a key staff officer at the FCNA headquarters recalled: “On June 4 around 3am, a brigade major of artillery called me and said we have lost Tololing. The brigade major had also been informed that Indian troops had mounted a counterattack and our troops had asked for on-site fire. However from the Ops room I contacted CO of 4NLI who assured me everything was OK. However by the morning the CO 4NLI informed Commander FCNA’s staff officer that the Tololing post had been lost. But the staff officer forgot to inform the Commander! Meanwhile I asked CO 6NLI if Tololing post had been lost and he confirmed. Subsequently Commander FCNA Javed Hasan called the Brigade Commander Masood Aslam who also confirmed that the post at Tololing had been lost but CO NLI6 continued to deny for at least three days, the loss of the post...”[493]"

The very existence of pak is founded in denial of Reality, so of course, it's rooted in their character- officially!

" ... Troubles for the Pakistani troops had mounted also because, contrary to Pakistan’s expectation that engagement with Indian troops would begin in mid-June, it had begun approximately six weeks earlier, around 5 May. Early opening of the Zojila pass was critical. Normally it would open late summer but in 1999 it opened end-April-early May, facilitating early return of the Indian Army. This early engagement was contrary to Op KP planners’ calculation that replenishment of ammunition and ration would be required by mid-June, when it would be managed through the Burzil Pass. However with engagement having started much earlier, and the Burzil Pass still not opened until mid-June, movement of artillery in the forward lines and supply lines replenishment became very difficult.[494] For example, at the 15000 feet high Tashfeen post, the small weapons with the troops had carbonized and could not be used.[495]"

Again, authors omission of chief reason why Pakistan couldn't support their so-called "terrorists" logistically, amounts to her lying. 

Fact is, having denied strenuously to world at large and to public at home that it was indeed a paki military operation, and gone around claiming that these attackers against India were independent terrorists, how could Pakistan supply them even food, never mind ammunition? 

It was, after all, US and other independent satellite records that had confirmed the truth about these having been officially paki military supported attackers, by whatever label; and now any effort or attempt to support them would forever blacken Pakistan as brazen liars no better than toddlers with face all chocolate, denying stealing. 

................................................................................................

"The ‘Shock’ Revelation 

"Waiting inside the airport lounge was the highly disturbed Press Counsellor of the Pakistan High Commission. He was armed with at least half a dozen leading dailies with bold headlines about the situation. The banner headlines were quotes from a telephone conversation between Pakistan’s Army chief General Pervez Musharraf, who was visiting Beijing, and the Chief of General Staff (CGS) Lt. General Aziz Khan[498] – a conversation between two leading members of the Kargil clique.  The Indian foreign minister, on the eve of Sartaj Aziz’s arrival, had held a press conference to release the transcript of this conversation.  Their discussion about Op KP was a huge self-indictment. It set the stage for the almost four-hour-long critical Sartaj Aziz visit.[499] The Pakistan Army chief’s master-stroke in recklessness, of holding a highly sensitive conversation with his CGS over an open line, made it easy for any interested agency to record the conversation. Most likely recorded by the CIA and shared with the Indians, this conversation publicly affirmed the central role of Pakistan’s top army command in the Kargil Op.[500]"

Overconfidence of an arrogant invader, a sword his solution to everything, is the key there. 

When pakis were caught stealing hundreds of billions of dollars of aid and not accounting for it, and US demanded accounts, this man had turned up in US and, instead of accounting apology - or even embarrassment,  as expected of anyone with a shred of decency - he'd brazenly demanded drones for attacking India. 

................................................................................................

"Sino-Indian relations were then on the mend. Beijing clearly did not want to support Pakistan’s crossing of the LOC and cause a setback to its relations with India.[530] In fact, on the eve of the Pakistani foreign minister’s visit the Chinese had publicly conveyed their ‘neutral’ position on Kargil and their interest in improving relations with India. On the Kargil issue the Chinese position was that “the matter maybe discussed between Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan and the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan.”[531] And regarding the June 14 trip of the Indian foreign minister the Chinese maintained, “We are confident that, through the joint efforts of the two sides, relations between China and India will constantly improve and develop.”[532] ... "

" ... By now the European positions matched that of India and the US. ... "

"For example, in early June, the Secretary General of the French foreign office. Mounier Heineken, summoned the Pakistani ambassador to a meeting in which he was polite but firm. He maintained the French reading of Kargil was based on independent French sources and French intelligence from the region. Heinikin said that the status quo disturbed by Pakistan could lead to war. France, he said, “did not believe Pakistan’s version that the people gone to war are the Mujahideen.”  The French maintained that given the strategic knowledge of the area of the men who occupied Kargil and given how they were armed and trained was evidence of the direct involvement by the Pakistan government and the army. Pakistan having upset the status quo was now responsible for reversing it. In case Islamabad failed to do so, Paris threatened to openly declare Pakistan the aggressor.[534]"

With very good reason, the chain of reasoning given explicitly by French to pakis summoned for the purpose, and quoted here above by author. 

"Washington, too, was making no concessions, accepting no false steps. Washington refused to accept Pakistan’s position that it was not involved in Kargil, especially after the Pakistani military had accepted that Pakistani troops were fighting in Kargil. In early June, on a Saturday, the Pakistani foreign minister handed a letter to the US Ambassador for Secretary of State Madeleine Albright from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Milam refused to accept the letter, complaining that it was not a serious communication as it claimed that Pakistan was not involved in Kargil. Subsequently, by that evening, the foreign minister called in the United States Ambassador again and handed him a different letter.[535]"

Author doesn't explain what letter, exactly, if it was accepted. 

................................................................................................

"“Two Cyclists Flashed Victory”

" ... two messages from air force centers in Delhi had been intercepted being sent, respectively, to the headquarters at Udhampur (near Jammu) and Bathinda (in Indian Punjab, near Bahawalnagar). The message to the command at the Udhampur base was that it should prepare to use all weapons under its command. Likewise, the message to Bathinda was to carry out air defense of the area. ... The participants focused on reading the implication of these intercepts; the army chief was convinced the messages indicated “something big is coming up.” The consensus was that the Indians had marked Udhampur base for carrying out air operations in Kargil. Bathinda was given a precautionary message in case air strikes across the international border were required. A worried Musharraf suggested they go and brief the PM, who was in Lahore. ... "

" ... Iftikhar questioned whether in Pakistan’s current economic situation Pakistan go to war and face the consequences. , He quoted the well-known saying that the armed forces fight a battle, but it is the nation that goes to war. In Pakistan’s case, the nation was “certainly not prepared.” The army chief claimed that many countries, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, were willing to give money to Pakistan. He was reminded that this would not be possible without US clearance. ... "

"The army chief was equally confident regarding national morale. At the JS Headquarters he insisted, “This nation can be prepared for war in no time. I will tell you that when I was coming from the army house to the JS headquarters that two cyclists flashed victory signs at me. I will request the PM to address two houses of the parliament so I can give points to the parliamentarians and they will spread it in the country side.”[536] Such simplistic talk would enter policy-making discussions in the absence of institutionalized decision-making. The simplistic thinking of powerfully placed individuals would raise the probability of flawed decision-making."

That last sentence is epitome of how author's tone hoes from salutary to forgiving when it comes to paki crimes - and as for "probability", it takes the whole lot of baked goods in West at Xmas!

................................................................................................

" ... Interestingly traveling in the same aircraft to Lahore, the naval and air chiefs, accompanied by the Defense Secretary, decided to tell the PM “the entire truth”. The PM, they believed, was still being misled that Pakistan was doing well, and that the Indians would not escalate and go to war. They were also concerned that the PM fully comprehended the risks involved in the situation."

Author seems to have omitted "had not" in "PM fully comprehended the risks involved in the situation". It should read "They were also concerned that the PM had not fully comprehended the risks involved in the situation". 

" ... The naval and air force chiefs criticized the operation and argued that it would compromise Pakistan’s overall security. The naval chief maintained that a naval blockade by India could not be ruled out, a position that the army chief contested. Similarly, the air chief opposed the army’s advice that air power should be inducted. The army was seeking deployment of air power[537] to not only curtail the damage inflicted on Pakistani troops from the Indian use of heavy artillery and hundreds of air sorties but also to inflict damage on the Indian troops locked up in tight, unprotected spaces.” The army ruled out a “full spectrum war” with India and argued that in a limited engagement like Kargil the Pakistan air force “would not be at a disadvantage.”[538] The air chief nevertheless opposed induction of air power, arguing that deploying air power could mean placing squadrons in Azad Kashmir and leaving Lahore and Karachi unprotected. Already, the air force had deployed extra radars in the North to observe Indian aircraft movement."

" ... Differences over the Kargil Operation were now being openly voiced in the cabinet meetings as well. The ISI chief, who had privately been critical of the operation, had taken a “military army line” during a mid-June cabinet meeting.[541] This prompted the Secretary Defense Iftikhar Ali Khan to raise specific questions regarding the viability of Operation KP. Cabinet Minister Gohar Ayub Khan wondered how the army’s views and those of General Iftikhar were at a tangent. At the same meeting, Chaudhry Nisar also asked who had ordered this operation. His thrust was that Pakistan was heading for a disaster in Kargil.[542] 

"He knew that the news from the battle-zone was not encouraging."

................................................................................................

Author titles a section "India’s Sledge & Hammer" to almost openly claim that Indian soldiers did no more than occupy posts emptied due chiefly to artillery and air strikes, having praised pakis repeatedly for climbing up peaks unopposed. 

This skewed perception and description would only explain heavy losses of paki military, but then, why do pakis boast repeatedly over past two decades snd more, about thousands of Indian soldiers killed by a handful of pakis? 

The two pictures don't match, and the disparity thereof only goes on to bolster the impression Hilary Clinton voiced, when she said that pakis lie so routinely, it's difficult to know if they are aware of it when they lie. 

Author ends the one-paragraph section with a giveaway. 

" ... Aerial reconnaissance, intel flow, and even possession of Pakistani maps showing Pakistan’s deployments, were captured from the fallen post at Tololing.[546]"

Were Author and pakis expecting Indian soldiers to avert glances from Intel left by enemy at captured post, and call them to hand the papers over? 

Notice that author doesn't criticise the arrogance of paki military in allowing this to happen at all in the first place, by having such information littering at the post - because they'd assumed, as author points out more than once in this work, that Indians don't fight. 

Author follows it up with more sledgehammering at India, with another section titled "Posts to Powder". A sample - 

" ... Following the high Indian casualties when their infantry troops had blindly and tentatively attempted to scale the Kargil-Drass mountains, in June they deliberately opted to use the “sledgehammer” approach “to save valuable lives of one’s troops while making the enemy cry out ’Uncle’.”[552] The preponderance of firepower now defined the continuing battle in the world’s highest war theatre. The Indian “sledgehammer” tactics, literally raining fire onto the exhausted yet still motivated Pakistanis soldiers, worked for the Indians. It incapacitated and killed the troops, already short in numbers, and disrupted supplies, ammunition, and logistics."

Were author and other pakis expecting rose bouquets rained on the men whom pakis had themselves labelled terrorists? 

................................................................................................

"June Reversals"

Another misleading title there, considering India had barely begun to be aware of attempted paki invasion in May; so June was only beginning, as far as war goes. 

"After making serious attempts on 3 June to retake the Tololing peak in Drass, Indian troops captured it on June 13. Several important heights in the Batalik sector were captured on 20 and 21 June; on June 23 several heights were captured around point 5203 and on June 30 strategic peaks closer to Tiger Hills.[553] The strategic Tiger Hill came under severe artillery attack. Around June 21, the Operation hit its lowest ebb for Pakistan, when the Indian troops, through fierce, ground, artillery and air attacks, recaptured Tololing complex. After Tololing fell, reports of Indian recapture flowed in daily as the Pakistani-held posts fell like ninepins. [554] The pressure was still on the Indians, given the scale of intrusion by the Pakistani troops.[555]The Indian Army chief himself conceded, “No time-frame could be fixed for vacating the incursions.”[556]"

"The Missing Mujahideen

"Significantly, the Mujahideen factor lagged behind at this critical juncture. The mainstay of Pakistan’s military strategy, since 1996-1997, was that through guerrilla-type ambushes targeting Indian troops in ... Kashmir, with full artillery support, bridges will be blown up, tracks uprooted, soldiers attacked, to prevent large scale offensive-induction of Indian troops. ... "

Some incorrect details, or deliberate lies, there. This strategy of so-called tribals oak is claimed were attacking, which author calls "guerrilla-type" here, was used by pakis in 1947 in attacking Kashmir, and again used by pakis in attack against India in 1965. 

Author mentions 1996-1997, but paki terrorists assaulting India had already begun in 1990, if not before.  

Exodus of nonmuslims enforced in Kashmir by the said terrorists, via genocide inflicted against Hindus and others in Kashmir in January 1990, is denied by pakis, as is hand of ISI behind terrorist attacks against Mumbai, but their phone conversations were intercepted and subsequently broadcast on public television. 

" ... Yet, keeping the Operation secret from the ISI meant that by the Pakistan Army’s own strategic calculations the pivot of such an operation, the Mujahideeen factor, men of the Kashmir Freedom struggle were left out of the calculus. The Kargil planners informed ISI after the Operation was underway, asking for upgrading the struggle in support of the Operation KP. “Too short a notice, we need at least one year to upgrade the movement,” was the ISI response. ISI needed presence inside the war zone to plan and execute. Neither was possible."

So while pakis officially went on claiming that the men attacking India were mujahedeen or tribals or anything but official soldiers of paki military - they were lying, not just largely, but completely! 

Hilary Clinton wouldn't be surprised. Nor would be anyone not blinded by abrahmic faiths. 

................................................................................................

"Logistics 

"By mid-June, men on the FDL posts required backups. There was a shortage of ammunition and supplies and troops were increasingly suffering from the pressures of a logistical stretch. But with Pakistan’s supply lines and the forward posts under attack from Indian artillery-fire and air sorties it was difficult to replenish depleting ammunition and rations, especially for the Forward Defense Lines (FDL) posts. As the snow melted and the Burzil pass opened, mule porters could ferry supplies only till the logistics bases. Base HQ was unable to respond timely to repeated logistics requests from FDLs on Tiger Hill and from other sectors.[557] At several posts, there was food shortage. At others, water too was not easily accessible for miles. In places where there was water, intensely heavy use of artillery had made it undrinkable. Ammunition too was fast depleting. Even the inadequate artillery was rendered ineffective because of wet, freezing weather conditions. Guns with sulphur deposits would stop firing after a thousand rounds. Yet maintenance of artillery in the freezing zones was not always possible."

None of this was expected, planned for, or even imagined, by the guys who planned and sent them up, which doesn't seem to occur to author as a point to mention, much less as the sole cause of the travails of the poor soldiers who were disowned by pakis officially. 

She seems to blame Indian shelling exclusively. 

Did she or pakis have an impression at any point in time that these guys had been invited for a royal honeymoon - or even a group tourism experience - by India? 

Funny, she makes fun of Indians for not realising the incursion and even for getting killed, but then blames them for retaliation of a war begun by pakis. No satisfying this one, is there! 

" ... As to how long could they hold on to their posts, the odds were heavily against them: terrible weather conditions, low supplies, no reinforcements, and positioned in posts confronted by major Indian numerical superiority in infantry and artillery."

Remember, India had to bury them too, if not caught alive - pak disowned them officially, even in death! 

................................................................................................

"Weapons & Communication 

"The Pakistani troops were equipped with standard infantry rifles. Typically, in a platoon, jawans had G-3 rifles, officers AK-47 rifles, and rocket launchers, and light machine Guns (LMGs) holder. Air defense units with Hatf battlefield range missiles and restored Stinger missiles were also positioned in several locations. Soldiers from the signals corps managed communications within the Ops area and with the brigade and battalion headquarters. They moved from post to post to keep the communication going using double TT and laying and protecting regular lines and managing the radio wireless communication in the Ops area. Wireless communication that could also help the troops listen in to Indian troop communication through frequency scanning and surfing was rightly dubbed ‘shikari det.’"

OK, they had all this, so they'd been killing Indian soldiers until India woke up to this being a huge paki invasion. 

What's unclear is, why's the author whining about Indians' retaliation with artillery, not after she brags about paki capabilities, but before, when it was pakis who began the whole thoughtless assault? 

Wouldn't it be proper to do so the other way around? 

It's a tad like she extolls a murderer for his bravery and exploits, after complaining about his being surrounded and shot dead by law enforcement. 

................................................................................................

" ... But the tables had turned. Only weeks ago, with adrenalin flowing, these daredevils had marched to high command’s orders and no less to their own resolve to punish the enemy. Now it was trouble-time. The Kargil clique’s calculation of a luke-warm Indian response was proving wrong."

"“No…Not Ours” 

"There were other painful offshoots that Pakistan’s policy of denying that Pakistani troops were conducting the Operations meant. Bodies of Pakistani soldiers could not be accepted. From mid-June onwards,   Pakistan’s Deputy Chief of Mission Jalil Abbas Jillani, whenever asked by his hosts to collect the bodies of Pakistani soldiers, would decline, saying these were not our boys. Resentfully, the Pakistani soldiers would watch the televised Muslim burial of the disowned bodies of their martyred comrades, conducted by the Indians with full honours and bodies wrapped in a Pakistani flag. According to a Brigadier who was witness to all this, “For many of us, the shame and the pain of watching all this happen to our colleagues, was killing.”[561]"

" ... Literally minute-by-minute news of the battlefront setbacks was passed to the commanders.[563]"

" ... The offensive operation had been planned with no defensive approach, no defensive layouts, and hence no fallback plans. Delusional thinking dominated the minds of the clique of Kargil planners ... "

"These generals planned operation KP, less as intelligent and accountable strategists, but as covert, unaccountable campaigners. ... "

In other - more realistic - words, as terrorists they send out against India for over three decades now, or as barbarian hordes invading India for well over a millennium until arrival of British. 

................................................................................................

"Lengthening Shadows

" ... Also, given Indian insistence on no bilateral dialogue without withdrawal from Kargil and the growing international pressure on Pakistan to vacate Kargil, it seemed increasingly unlikely that Pakistan could leverage its military achievements in Kargil for a “just settlement and time-bound settlement” of the Kashmir dispute.[564]"

What "military achievements"??? Like climbing peaks in winter when no one was likely to shoot at them? Like denying their own soldiers, in life and in death? 

"Additionally, another implicit assumption of the Kargil planners that India may not be willing to pay what it would take to recapture the Kargil heights was bring disproved. India not only deployed the requisite manpower and military force to reclaim Kargil ... "

"By mid June, the opening assumption of the architects of Operation Koh Paima that the military situation heavily favoring Pakistan was irreversible, was beginning to be proven wrong. With a fierce Indian response, on the military front, ... "

Author repeatedly accuses India of having used diplomacy as a weapon. 

Fact is no amount of lies from pak worked despite pakis doing diplomatic rounds, because international community aren't fools, and this was not 1947 but age of satellites. Everything supposedly done clandestinely by pakis had been seen, and not just by US, either. 

It wasn't india's diplomatic push, but the fact thst pakis did invade and lied, that went against them, as it must. 

" ... The fate of Op KP now squarely confronted the soldiers who had fervently volunteered to fight for their Homeland. ... "

There's a whopper of a lie by author. It's Kashmir that was invaded by pakis, and Kashmir had been signed accession of by its ruler to India in 1947 because, and after, pakis had then invaded it. "Homeland" it's not, not for any pakis. 

................................................................................................

Author states that India sought help of US via diplomatic channels to force Pakistan to withdraw unilaterally. She forgets more than one previous assertion in this work by her to the effect that US was unwilling to believe pakis and Clinton told sharif he had to withdraw. If she's insinuating that this was India’s doing, she's living in cuckooland.

"In Pakistan, the diplomats were increasingly less sanguine about the Washington route for exit. Given Washington’s public stance about Pakistan’s ingress across the LOC, they merely responded to Washington’s queries about the Kargil crisis. In Washington, Ambassador Riaz Khokhar had half a dozen meetings with his Washington-based interlocutors. It was Nawaz Sharif’s kitchen cabinet[583] that considered Washington an important player for the end game. They believed that Sharif should use his personal rapport with Clinton[584] to manage the Kargil crisis on the domestic, Indian, and international fronts. Thus, through numerous letter exchanges and phone-calls, Nawaz was seeking Clinton's direct involvement in bringing Kargil to a close.[585] Pakistan’s army command was also keen to involve the US in Kargil’s end game. In fact, the army chief was the first to publicly mention the possibility of a Nawaz-Clinton meeting.[586] Significantly, by end-June, Musharraf himself had talked of positively of US intervention. [587]"

Author refers to terrorism exported by pakis resulting in genocide and subsequent exodus of Hindus as ordered by the said terrorists, ordered on loudspeakers of mosques. 

" ... Especially since the 1989 Kashmir Uprising ... "

They do have expertise at lying don't they, pakis! Fraudulent labels is part of it. 

................................................................................................

"Initially, the Sharif-Clinton communication culminated in a mutual agreement to meet mid-June in Europe, around the time of the of G-8 summit.[589] Sharif had proposed and Clinton had agreed to the meeting. However, the US Ambassador later conveyed to the Pakistan Foreign Office, the US President’s inability to proceed with a Clinton- Sharif meeting.[590] 

"In Washington, it had been concluded that Pakistan would have erroneously interpreted such a meeting as a sign of US support for Islamabad’s position on Kargil.[591] The National Security Council(NSC) and the State Department were sure that an unconditional exit was the only way forward and “unless a meeting would guarantee that outcome it wouldn’t be productive.” [592] The Talbott-Riedel-Inderfurth team was mindful of the challenge. Washington’s clear Kargil policy was not “anything but exercise restrain… Action we wanted out of Pakistan to get Pakistan to back down.” Nevertheless, there was a realization that “the Indians were extremely skeptical that we will succeed and suspicious about what we were doing…”[593] Any Pakistan-US meeting therefore that failed to induce a Pakistani withdrawal would have been resented in India and could have undermined Washington’s imminent strategic lock with Delhi. [594]"

Now author turns abusive against non-proliferation and peace seekers. 

"The Clinton administration also believed that Pakistan had not delivered on the earlier commitment that Nawaz Sharif would help in getting the Taliban to expel OBL.[595] Pakistan’s Foreign office team saw this as a reason for Clinton to subsequently “wriggle out of the meeting.”[596] The US State Department sought a different engagement with Pakistan. In Washington, the nuclear non-proliferation saints and the Indo-philes had also made common cause. They twinned the Kargil aggression with what the non-proliferation saints claimed was Pakistan’s plan to use nuclear weapons. They wanted the ‘riot act’ be read to Pakistan."

................................................................................................

"For Pakistan withdrawal inevitable

" ... They were continuously exposed to the Indian air and artillery pounding as hundreds of sorties dropped thousands of kilos of bombs.[609] On the ground, the young soldiers wondered why their own airpower was not being deployed. They felt “unnerved by the Indian airpower, in fact terrorized by the sound in the cold weather and those mountains’ ungodly heights.”[610] ... "

There, in a nutshell, is why Himaalaya belongs to India - no Indian would abuse it thus! Himaalaya is not only evered and loved, but seen as home of Gods and Goddesses - and very matter-of-factly so, throughout India. As is the very land of India, with all its rivers and mountains. Anyone who abuses it the way author does there, simply doesn't belong, and has no business being there. 

................................................................................................

Author repeats her "Indian soldiers did nothing brave, pakis did everything bravely, Indians only bombarded paki brave poor soldiers while Indians took advantage of diplomatic pressuring of international community, they sided only with India" lament. 

Ad infinitum, it'd seem, throughout the work. 

"Most importantly, after Tololing, India had begun re-taking the strategically located posts overlooking NH-1A. For Pakistan, holding onto the frontline posts was of actual strategic significance. These were furthermost from the LOC but closest to NH-1, the logistical lifeline for the Indian troops stationed in Ladakh and Siachen. Meanwhile, the mid-zone posts were in Pakistan’s control but with no access to India’s strategic roads. To what end, then, could or should Pakistan hold on to the mid-posts? Located in the middle of the rugged iced mountain terrain, these had no artillery access to any strategic Indian feature, such as a highway, a cantonment, ammunition dumps etc. ... "

There's the raison d'etre of - not only the Kargil war initiated by pakis, not only every such war (and always initiated by them), every terrorist attack perpetrated against India - but of the very existence the very genesis of pak, spelt out in clear terms. 

Author has admitted that pakis had no reason to begin Kargil war via this incursion, except to kill Indians. And that's true of the very existence, even genesis of pak. There's no reason for pak to exist, except to kill India, to destroy the very culture and the humongous treasures of knowledge of antiquity that's still loving India. 

" ... Also, Delhi’s political resolve of no talks until complete withdrawal appeared ironclad. And the international community fully supported India’s position."

And therein the failure of pakis, the inability to not only admit but see truth. That "the international community fully supported India’s position" was because it was true. 

................................................................................................

"Doubts set in 

"By end-June, the problem of a “logistical stretch”[612] was beginning to surface for the Pakistani troops. In addition to the disruption being caused by air strikes, the Pakistani supply lines and the supplies were becoming increasingly vulnerable to harsh weather and to Indian artillery attacks. The phenomenon of ‘Operation Creep’[613] had led to the unplanned increase in the demand for supplies.[614] The increasing demand for supplies in an expanding battle zone, where even maintaining existing bunkers and posts defensively was difficult, had begun to put pressure on the logistics. Launching and sustaining an operation of this scale would have been inconceivable. For example to maintain a force of fourteen hundred people, an additional ten thousand were needed to provide logistical support."

One, did they imagine otherwise when they planned, sent men up in winter, killed Indian soldiers from positions up the peaks, and generally were gleeful about expectations? It'd seem so. Did they, then, expect their own soldiers to establish self sustainable villages on mountain peaks, with farms and wells? 

No, pakis as usual had banked only on killing and looting Indians, nothing further. 

Two, did they expect love letters in response from India? Or free food supplied up to them? They'd theorised India not picking up the gauntlet, wrongly. 

................................................................................................

"With June becoming a month of heavy losses, the army chief found himself in a difficult situation. The confidence of the opening days, when the field was open and uncontested for his men, had begun eroding. Doubts had set in. The general had begun conceding in private conversations with members of the prime minister’s kitchen cabinet that some ‘operation creep’ had occurred. The Op had been expanded beyond the originally planned territorial limits. Within his close circles, the army chief was candid. He could see the reasons for his soldiers to return from the war theatre, to end the fighting.[615] But who would bell the cat? The chief, was supposed to have sent one of his friends, also appointed as an envoy in an African country, to convey a suggestion to the prime minister’s father. Known to be an exceptionally obedient son to his ’Abbaji‘, Sharif could never resist his father’s ‘advice.’ Accordingly, Musharraf decided that commanding a retreat in the midst of a hard-fought battle with many sacrifices rendered, could lead to discontent among the soldiers. Also, the army chief feared an Indian offensive on the retreating soldiers. Accordingly, he likely had a message conveyed to Sharif’s father that the PM be advised to recall the troops since continued or accelerated fighting could also mean the Indians might open other war fronts. The message was conveyed and the prime minister’s father agreed to do as advised. [616]"

The coward general wouldn't admit he'd been wrong, but went through an old man to pressure an obedient son, in short!!! 

"This difficult military situation was not filtering through in the public arena. Unlike India, where Kargil had turned into a media war, in Pakistan the refrain was that Mujahideen and Kashmiri freedom fighters were fighting Indian forces. Conflicting official statements trickled in. While the army chief was welcoming talks with the Americans, he was also saying that unilateral withdrawal was not on. As news of casualties and perhaps of possible retreat found its way into the chat rooms of influential people, including retired generals, they publicly demanded that pressure on the Indian Army must continue. Retired General Hameed Gul, for example, felt that the Indians should be sucked in in order to get messed up. After mid-June, there were no formal meetings held to consider options, to discuss possibilities, or to build scenarios for exiting from Kargil. Instead, the way out from the Kargil crisis, from this ‘symmetry of desperation,’ was discussed mostly in informal kitchen cabinet meetings with no sense of a collective decision-making."

That's typical pak - mess after blunders, as usual, and lies strictly, but no admission of facts. 

................................................................................................

Author now titles a section "Prime Minister Witness to Casualties", beginning with a long description of his journey to a valley presumably somewhere close to Kargil, but it's a deceptive title - it's not about his witnessing any deaths due to Indian shelling in process, rather his return to safety of Skardu and seeing wounded at a military hospital in next paragraph. The most he seems yo have been in danger would be of falling to death from a window sill where his army chief helped him up insisting that he speak to locals. 

"Throughout the return journey, the prime minister actively avoided any interaction with the army chief. True to his personal style, the incredulous policy-making ways, and above all the horrors of Op K that were now a fait accompli, he opted to not confront his army chief. The PM engaged with his State Minister on Investment Humayun Akhtar to finalize the government’s power investment policy. At one point during the journey, the army chief did manage to sit beside the Prime minister. Much to everyone’s shock, he did not ask for additional finances for either the wounded or the battlefront soldiers. Instead he requested that a recently retired general be appointed in a public corporation. The PM acceded to Musharraf’s request.

"After landing at Chaklala, ... He shared with them his anguish over what he had seen at the Skardu hospital. He was angry with the army chief and recalled Musharraf’s repeated, direct and indirect, requests to the prime minister to meet Clinton to plan a retreat from Kargil. ... "

So the army chief initiated the invasion without informing, much less with consent of, his own PM - and then made him a scapegoat internationally, expecting him to get the army out of the mess made by the army chief. 

As usual with pak, isn't that! 

................................................................................................

Author again fraudulently strives to make it seem that the two sides, invaders and India fighting back, were equal and no different, for most part. 

" ... On both sides, casualties were mounting and political support was depleting.  Sharif and Vajpayee both wanted an early end. ... "

One, India wanted not "early end" but this to have never taken place, at all. 

But having been confronted with the horror thereof, what India wanted, and did achieve, was to clean the region of all invaders, with no compromises. As soon as possible, of course, it goes without saying. 

" ... Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front, having been widely censured by the international community, Islamabad’s political men, as well as the army chief, had faith that Washington could wrest a face-saver for Islamabad."

In other words - as termed by Tarek Fateh - they went crying to Clinton to beg him to tell India to stop fighting. Without admitting, nevertheless, that it was paki soldiers on peaks killing Indians, still pretending that it was terrorists not known to pak! 

Just so pakis could remain on peaks in comfort and keep on killing Indians, that is! 

................................................................................................

Here's an example of the said paki lies used by author towards veiling hard facts. 

"Zinni’s departure also signaled that the US bureaucracy had successfully overruled their President’s inclination to be accommodating to his friend the Pakistani prime minister. ... The State Department wanted a Clinton-Sharif meeting be made contingent upon Pakistan first vacating Kargil. [627]"

Clinton, a well educated Rhodes scholar, is, was always, smart enough to do as he thought fit, and making him seem a prisoner of others in Washington is a lie. 

Others may have helped him tow the line of propriety in world diplomacy, if he needed such maneuvers. But that's routine in democratic and other good governance worlds, which a despotic country used only to invading and lying wouldn't know. 

Perhaps pakis are only used to falsehoods and resent the failure of such tactics. But this tactic can only go so far. 

It's run its course, beginning with Kargil, the stupidest idea yet executed by pakis at the time. It was merely another version of the stupid declaration by paki military in 1971 to "change the DNA" of East Bengal - via invasion, genocide and mass gang rapes. But having claimed heritage of barbarian invaders, pakis don't see the fact of their stupid choice in doing so. Or lying. 

................................................................................................

Author exposes, again, the lie pakis including the then paki PM told everyone outside the paki military. 

"Significantly, before the Zinni meeting, General Musharraf had flown with the prime minister to the forward areas from where the Kargil operation was launched.[628]  The prime minister and the army chief visited the injured soldiers and met with the jawans. ... Yet it was not coincidental that this display of a unified civil-military stance on Kargil was planned for hours before the Zinni-Musharraf meeting."

So while pakis insisted on denying their own soldiers to everyone, so much so they were neither fed nor buried by pakis, those not bring shelled were encouraged with prayers and money to go right back up to kill Indians and be denied in turn! 

"In the meeting, Zinni told Musharraf that he had been specially sent by his President to talk about Kargil. Musharraf was told that the Kargil issue was “dangerously unwise and that Pakistan had no support for its Kargil operation.”[631] Clinton’s message was simple: “Just get out of there.” Musharraf, however, did not acknowledge that there were Pakistani soldiers in Kargil. Throughout the meeting, Musharraf maintained that Pakistan had no control over the Mujahideen who were in Kargil. ... "

"The meeting ended inconclusively. There was no agreement on the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army since Musharraf refused to acknowledge the presence of Pakistani troops.[633] ... "

"The following morning, on June 25, Zinni met with the prime minister. The army chief, DG ISI, and the senior Foreign Office team also participated in the meeting. ... Zinni also carried Clinton’s message to Nawaz Sharif that he would not meet the Pakistani prime minister “in the shadow of Kargil.” Finally, towards the end of the meeting, the prime minister took a deep breath and said, “What do you want me to do, General Zinni?” Nawaz Sharif then said, “We can talk to these people who are occupying the heights in Kargil and see whether we can do anything.”[637]"

Usual paki tactic, Jinnah in 1947-48 onwards. It's exactly what Jinnah had said to Mountbatten about the then paki military invasion of Kashmir pretending to be tribals. 

................................................................................................

"Interestingly, the Americans and the Pakistanis had different ‘takes’ on the meeting. The Pakistani camp was clear that the prime minister had been categorical that the “US should take a broader view of the problem - that Kargil was only one aspect of the larger problem of Jammu and Kashmir which must be addressed in it totality in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people.”[638] None of the Pakistani participants felt that Sharif had given Zinni a commitment to withdraw.[639] The Americans read almost the opposite. They believed that “not too long into the meeting the prime minister agreed to a withdrawal.”[640] They were relieved that they “did not have to wrestle Nawaz Sharif into the ground”[641] and had extracted a verbal agreement from Sharif to withdraw.[642] ... Lanpher argued with his colleagues that the Zinni mission got the green signal from Islamabad because the Pakistanis had decided to give him a positive response, not because they wanted to “slam the door in your face.” His conclusion was: “The Pakistanis, government officials, army officers and politicians were infinitely polite and these real gentlemen would not want to be rude to people, in contrast to the Indians who enjoyed being rude.” Lanpher based his expectation of a Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil on the Pakistani psychology of “wanting to please the Americans.” However, Zinni and Milam, both more familiar with the Pakistani working and particularly with Sharif and Musharraf, believed that Musharraf would not easily make his troops vacate Kargil.[644]"

Lanpher's reaction was the usual one - of someone inexperienced about behaviour differences between smiling liars versus upright honest, while the overall difference of perception there is the usual one when encountering pakis, nazis and similar liars. Chinese on the other hand are a slightly different matter only in that they don't admit to lying either, but know fully well what they do. 

................................................................................................

"Whatever Sharif said during the Zinni meeting, he was an extremely worried man after what he had heard from Clinton’s envoy. The prime minister was convinced that a full-scale Pakistan-India war along the international border was likely and that could mean electronic devices with which India could jam Pakistan’s radars and signals. Zinni had also convinced the prime minister that a nuclear war was on the cards and that even his own army, the Pakistan Army, had begun deploying nuclear weapons.[659] He felt that, between electronic and nuclear warfare, it was a doomsday scenario for Pakistan. Hence, it can safely be presumed this was the definitive point at which the Pakistani prime minister had concluded that a war had to be avoided at all costs. The back-channel communications were on but now other avenues for ‘exit facilitation’ were to be sought: Beijing, Riyadh, and DC. However, Sharif played these cards close to his chest. For example, only his kitchen cabinet knew of his contacts with Washington and Riyadh. The Foreign Office team was working the Delhi and Beijing routes while the Defense Committee and the cabinet knew of neither. The contact with the Saudis was established in the last week of June. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, who was close to the Sharif family, was contacted seeking Saudi intervention with Washington for a Clinton-Sharif meeting."

Presumably his army chief was happy at prospect of playing with nukes. 

................................................................................................

"On June 27, Lanpher met with MEA officials and with the Principal Secretary to the Indian Prime Minister, Brajesh Mishra.[663]Lanpher briefed Mishra thoroughly “with a very candid description of those present in the meetings and what they said.” He gave Mishra news of a likely withdrawal by the Pakistani forces.[664] Lanpher repeated in detail his conversations with the Pakistanis to assure the Indians that “these guys (Pakistanis) will get out.” Still not completely trusting of the United States support for the Indian position, the Indians did not believe “how rough” Zinni had been with the Pakistanis. The Americans saw themselves doing a “front channel thing,” Lanpher providing the Indians complete details on the Zinni meeting with the Pakistani prime minister and COAS.[665]"

Author goes abusive here exponentially claiming Indians had been bloodied and caught with pants down. 

"Lanpher found Mishra skeptical about the possibility of a Pakistani withdrawal.[666] “Having been bloodied, totally embarrassed, and caught with their pants down, and suffering heavy casualties,”[667] the Indians tended not to trust Lanpher’s reading of the Pakistani intentions. ... "

Since she's repeatedly blamed Kargil on Siachen, it's unclear why this abusive description has been applied by her only to Indians. 

Unless it was a personal dream of her own that excludes pakis in particular and is strictly restricted for Indians.  

................................................................................................

In the topsy-turvy world of what passes for thinking in pakis, US is abused in a resisted way, accused of taking advantage of Kargil failure of pak to get close to Delhi! 

"From Pakistan’s Kargil debacle, in cold statistical calculations, the Clinton administration’s key South Asian and non-proliferation experts wrested a strategic gain for Washington. The gain was winning Delhi’s trust and confidence it’s role in South Asia; that no other country’s interests, especially Pakistan’s, could trump Delhi’s interests. It was a classic act of gainful cunning that largely dictates State interaction."

And as every liar does, pakis too know it's necessary to throw some facts into their mix. 

" ... The Kargil clique’s secret launch of Op KP had inflicted a heavy military and diplomatic cost on the country. ... "

................................................................................................

"Now, during Kargil, Washington’s uneven policy between the two nuclearized South Asian neighbors again surfaced. The emphasis of the Clinton administration’s key men on Pakistan’s nuclear activity during Kargil, while completely ignoring what India may have been doing, was a mere continuation of Washington’s policy of the seventies. Strobe Talbott, Clinton’s personal friend and a journalist-turned diplomat, who documented his failure to convince India’s imposing Jaswant Singh to agree to Washington’s instruments for non-proliferation, appeared to have made much of very little in the Kargil days."

It's interesting to read this paragraph and it's accusations toned to seem indicative of grave moral lapse on part of US, and wonder where pakis get the moral or ethical ground for demanding equality, when they never practice it either internationally or at home. There's the racist treatment of East Bengal culminating in genocide and mass gang rapes organised by paki military in 1971, even if one were to go with the paki logic that genocide of eleven million Hindus and almost half as many Sikhs in pak in 1947 were an act of good deed as per the religion, repeated in genocide of Hindus in Kashmir in 1989-90. 

But where's this equality when pakis take money from US to send terrorists to Afghanistan to harass USSR out of Afghanistan, and subsequently, boast on internet for decades about having singlehandedly broken USSR into pieces? 

And if pakis haven't been dealing equally with others, why do they then expect equal treatment? 

No, their equality is one demanded by nawabs, strictly upwardly mobile but veiled in pretense. They are racist and communal, commit mass gang rapes and genocides and invade, but must be given everything they demand at asking, whether hundreds of billions of dollars without accounts from US  or territory in huge chunks out of India. 

................................................................................................

" ... In Washington, other than the generic concern regarding military confrontation, the intelligence had its ear to the ground to especially monitor nuclear-related developments. Data flow from several satellite paths, various policy departments, including the Defense Department, the State Department’s South Asia section, CENTCOM, the CIA, and the NSC, now focused particularly on nuclear related information. Some intelligence officials claimed that the ground information picked up by US intelligence sources indicated movement of missiles and placement of warheads. The concern, however, about active deployment of nuclear weapons, especially by Pakistan, was not uniformly shared within the Clinton Administration. There was great divergence in interpreting this intelligence data."

" ... contrary assessments notwithstanding, from mid-June onwards the administration’s core group appears to have been possessed by “nuclear phobia.” They directly involved the US President into the Kargil diplomacy. They alerted him to their “concern” regarding Pakistan taking action to make its nuclear weapons capable.[687]"

Lack of trustworthiness of pakis must have impressed even the generously friendly US, eventually! 

................................................................................................

"The growing Indo-US strategic relations were also at play in producing this nuclear phobia targeting Pakistan. Having discovered that in fact Pakistan regulars and not Mujahedeen were fighting in Kargil, and Pakistan therefore had control over them, the US weighed in heavily on to Pakistan to withdraw the troops. The US President wrote about six letters. The US Ambassador delivered the letters to the foreign minister. He had several meetings with the Pakistani prime minister and spent much of his time at the Prime Minister’s Secretariat with Additional Secretary Tariq Fatimi. He visited him almost daily with a constant barrage of escalating pressure on Pakistan to withdraw."

Author, in saying "Having discovered that in fact Pakistan regulars and not Mujahedeen were fighting in Kargil, and Pakistan therefore had control over them", omits mentioning that this amounted to in fact having caught pakis lying repeatedly,  and perhaps having known it all along. 

So of course she fails to connect it to US seemingly deciding for India, since it seems that in paki mind paki lies aren't lies but nawabs' pronouncements, to be honoured over and above truth! 

................................................................................................

"Targeting Nawaz Sharif 

"There appeared to be politics around the use of even this information on Pakistan, unverified by majority of the US intelligence bodies within the Clinton administration. Why did Washington hold back the information Washington claimed it had on Pakistan’s preparedness for the use of nuclear weapons? Why was the information only shared with the prime minister – and that too without his aides? It was used to first target the prime minister behind closed doors. Equally, General Zinni had opted to warn the prime minister in a classified and limited meeting about “electronic” and “finally nuclear warfare.” As late as June 26, Zinni decided against raising the risks of a nuclear war with the army chief, the man Washington believed had more control than the prime minister on Pakistan’s nuclear trigger. First, the CENTCOM chief sketched a deadly picture for him and subsequently, on 4 July, the information was brought in full throttle at the Clinton-Nawaz meeting. Pakistan’s prime minister was instructed to not bring in an aide. Clinton with Riedel, the man riled up about Pakistan’s deployment of nuclear weapons, insisted that unknown to the prime minister the Pakistan Army was preparing to use nuclear weapons!"

This whole accusation above can only be understood with the following explanation - not only Pakistan demand that their lies be accepted, preferably over facts known to everyone but at least on par with truth in name of equality, but they demand that paki charade of democracy be taken for exactly what it is, and while paki pm is treated as someone to successfully meet US president to make up the mind of the said president for him whenever paki army wishes, he - the said paki pm - only be treated as disdainfully as paki army treats him, and no serious matters be discussed with him, which would be seen as suspicious behaviour on part of another government. 

In short, it's a decorative position akin to that of a receptionist at an arms dealership. 

................................................................................................

" ... Pakistan military signaled its nuclear preparedness. On June 24, The News reported, “The prime minister has also been told that deployment of short and long range missiles with extremely effective warheads has been completed.”[690] Pakistani media reports also focused on Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. For example, one report was headlined, “Pakistan Developing Advanced versions of Ghauri, Shaheen”.[691] ... "

................................................................................................

Author has been using certain terms that now acquire another connotation in view of her accusations against US government regarding meetings alone with paki pm excluding paki army. 

"On 25 June, R. K. Mishra,[700] Vajpayee’s point-man for the back-channel negotiations, flew in from Delhi ... "

To clear a normal perspective, if a man sent by PM of India arrives for diplomatic discussions with paki pm, it's not "back-channel"; India does not take active part in the charade that's paki structure of hierarchy, any more than US would, or then did. 

................................................................................................

" ... Nawaz Sharif flew to his hometown Lahore for the weekend. His concerns were clear. His thinking process was not. He was playing his cards close to his chest. The chief of army staff, ostensibly satisfied with the military situation of his troops, went off with family and friends to a hill resort for the weekend. He believed that his troops had staying power but he was also beginning to note the international pressures that were being applied on Pakistan.[777]"

Notice the open, unthinking bias exhibited here by the author, presumably in favour of those in power as she wrote. That's typical paki. 

................................................................................................

" ... The service chiefs had also differed. They knew that the political leadership was keen to withdraw, but the Army seemed unclear. They believed, ‘The Army’s body language conveyed their wanting to withdraw too.’ However, Musharraf had made no such statement. The bureaucrats were not there to take decisions but they believed their input influenced decision-making. ... A section within the core Foreign Office group was unsure of the wisdom of withdrawal.[778]

"The Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary, Saeed Mehdi, called US Ambassador Milam to convey Sharif’s intention to talk to the US President. Milam relayed the request to the State Department. Shortly before this request, Clinton had also received a letter from Sharif asking to meet him. However, the letter, which had been drafted by Sharif’s Foreign Office team, had yet again linked the Kargil flare-up with the broader Kashmir problem. In Washington, the tone of this letter conveyed that ‘Sharif was wringing his hands … that he was looking for personal cover … he was not a man of great courage’.[779] Sharif had written in response to Clinton’s letter, written a few days after Zinni’s return to Washington. Clinton had thanked Sharif for receiving Zinni but had wondered why there was no action on Zinni’s report that Sharif was willing to withdraw troops from Kargil. By now, the bottom line message of Washington’s communication to Islamabad was: ‘Get out!’ Clinton himself, his envoy General Zinni, and the State Department had repeatedly told Sharif that negotiations over the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Kargil were out. This was now Washington’s and Delhi’s shared objective.

................................................................................................

"The PM telephoned from the Governor’s House in Lahore.[783] During the call, Sharif was not assisted by members of either his ‘kitchen cabinet’ or of the core Foreign Office group. In attendance were Saeed Mehdi and Iftikhar Ali Khan. The prime minister’s brother, Shehbaz, was at the family home in Raiwind. Chaudhry Nisar, his close confidante and a member of his ‘kitchen cabinet’, was two hundred miles away in his home town, Taxila. The Foreign Office team was at work in Islamabad. By contrast, at the White House, Clinton was surrounded by his key aides. He remained, therefore, within the parameters set by Washington’s primary objective of forcing an unconditional Pakistani withdrawal. During the telephone conversation, the US President sent no mixed signals to his Pakistani friend. 

"Sharif, once again, urged Clinton to play a role in defusing the Kargil crisis and in resolving the Kashmir dispute. He asked to see him.  Clinton reminded Sharif of the precondition for a meeting. Sharif did not contest Clinton’s suggestion of a unilateral, unconditional withdrawal. Clinton told Sharif that he wanted to help him and to help Pakistan but Pakistani forces had to first withdraw. Clinton again rhetorically queried why Pakistan had done this. Sharif said he could give him ‘the entire scenario when we meet’. Clinton emphasized that time was of the essence and that they ‘are losing time’. According to Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Riaz Khokhar, Clinton agreed to receive Sharif because the Americans wanted that the prime minister to personally convey that the Pakistani troops would vacate Kargil. Clinton wanted to hear for himself from Sharif that he was willing to withdraw.[784]

................................................................................................

"The phone call had made it clear to the Clinton administration that ‘Sharif was looking for a political cover for withdrawing Pakistan’s forces’.[785] Equally, Clinton made it clear to Nawaz Sharif ‘that he could not provide cover and withdrawal had to proceed on its own merit’. Sharif insisted that they talk face-to-face. It was an unusual conversation between two heads of government. Clinton’s advisors saw it no differently. They had ‘never seen anything quite like that, i.e., you invite yourself, that it was a bizarre time to invite yourself’.[786]

"Clinton agreed that the beleaguered Sharif come the following day. It was a national holiday, US Independence Day, but Clinton agreed, sensing that the Pakistani prime minister was likely to concede unconditional withdrawal. In Islamabad, it was read differently. According to one of Sharif’s close confidantes, by inviting him on a holiday, Sharif was told by Clinton, ‘While we do not work on a national day, but this is a measure of the importance we give to this issue.’[787] The American account of this call also confirms that, detecting from Sharif’s conversation the willingness to withdraw troops from Kargil. Clinton conceded to an immediate meeting with the prime minister, who offered to arrive the next day.[788] A Sunday surprise was in the offing."

................................................................................................

" ... From Sharif, Washington needed a withdrawal as well as a commitment to help Washington find Osama Bin Laden.[789] The State Department laid out these demands on the one-page briefing paper it prepared for the US President for the 4 July meeting.[790]

"In Pakistan, there was no preparatory work that Nawaz Sharif sought from his core Foreign Office team, the cabinet members, or the Army. The focus was now on getting the logistics done for the Washington dash. Sharif knew that, in getting a meeting with Clinton, he had in fact proceeded ahead with his ‘kitchen cabinet’s’ consensus on involving the US.[791] According to a key member of the ‘kitchen cabinet’, ‘The call was made in line with the inner circle’s thinking about the need for an honorable withdrawal.’[792] He explained, ‘Since the Americans kept telling Nawaz Sharif there was a peaceful way of settling this issue, the idea was to suck them in to help settle Kargil peacefully.’ The ‘kitchen cabinet’ believed ‘it was preferable to talk to the US, not to the Indians, because talking to the Indians was like insulting the honest brokers [US]’.[793]

................................................................................................

"Sharif’s Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz, was not in this inner loop. He was not even remotely clued into his PM’s decision to explore the withdrawal option with Clinton. Therefore, when on arrival from Burkina Faso, when he was asked to comment on US Ambassador Milam’s statement that US ‘perceived flexibility’ in Pakistan’s position on the Kargil issue, Sartaj merely reaffirmed the existing position that the Kargil flare-up was not of Pakistan’s doing. He told reporters, ‘I think there is no flexibility or new position. Pakistan has always respected the LOC … The question is: What is the LOC? Who is sitting there? It needs verification and these violations on LOC, on either side, Pakistan side or Indian side, should be corrected. As far as Pakistan Army is concerned, it has not violated the LOC … We have invited UN observers that they should come and see where the LOC is. If anybody had violated it, it should be corrected.’[794]"

The paki lies, right there.

"At the prime minister’s family home in Raiwind, the prime minister, his father, and his younger brother, vigorously discussed the Sharif’s decision to go to Washington. At the DCC, there had been no discussion at all on a possible immediate Washington trip. It seems that major policy matters, which were not even brought up in constitutionally mandated forums, such as the DCC, were to be debated by the members of the ‘first family’ in their private home. The prime minister’s younger brother, a key political player and the chief minister of Punjab, vehemently opposed Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington. He opposed it ‘tooth and nail’. He argued that the PM’s attempt at closure would be portrayed by the Army as the squandering of a military victory by the civilians. The prime minister’s elderly father, Mian Mohammad Sharif, who often influenced key national decisions taken by his son, disagreed with the younger son. He supported the Nawaz Sharif’s decision to fly to Washington. He saw the Washington trip as ‘an effort to get Pakistan out of trouble’. Mian Mohammad believed that the developments in Kargil had landed the country, much like a family, in trouble and, therefore, it was required by the chief executive as head of the family to get the family out of trouble. Shehbaz was emphatic that, if the trip to Washington had to be made, it was important that the army chief be taken along for the 4 July meeting, so that the withdrawal agreement would not been seen as a ‘sell-out by the civilians’. The prime minister agreed. However, in subsequent conversations with his two close aides, Saeed Mehdi and Chaudhry Nisar, he became convinced otherwise. The prime minister felt that, if he, the elected prime minister, took the army chief along with him to Washington, the Clinton administration would conclude that, since the prime minister moved nowhere without the army chief, it would be better to cut Sharif out and directly deal with Musharraf.[795] Shehbaz’s suggestion to take along the army chief was torpedoed. The PM only went along with his brother’s decision to take the army chief ‘into confidence’. Sharif instructed his military secretary to later put a call through to Musharraf. The army chief was spending the weekend in the hills in Murree."

................................................................................................

"After the plan was made, phones started ringing. The prime minister was seeking attendance for an unusual meeting at the Islamabad airport. ... The participants of the ‘airport’ meeting were to be informed of the chief executive’s meeting with the US President. Actually, the finalization of Pakistan’s Kargil strategy was now to take place in Washington at the Sharif-Clinton meeting.

"In its 9pm news bulletin, Pakistan Television (PTV), the state-run television service, announced Sharif’s departure. The Foreign Office also issued a late night press statement. ... The Orwellian machine was at work. There was no mention of the word Kargil in the statement. ... "

................................................................................................

"While there were two kinds of views reflected in the media, the skeptical and the triumphal, it was the latter that had captured the public imagination. The expectation was that Pakistan would successfully pressurize Delhi into working on an early settlement of the Kashmir issue. Given the contradictory and contending assertions constantly made by different institutions, the majority of the reporters and commentators were unable to ascertain the facts of the situation. Most veered towards triumphalism. The average Pakistani mind was in the grip of official propaganda ... "

Author lies again, despite having given the facts clearly, in quoting from " ... Editorial, The Nation, 1 July 1999. ... ", including -

" ... Indian government which felt confident of its ability to suppress the freedom fighters, refused to talk at all. ... "

One, pakis were lying about the intruders being not paki military, and author has confirmed from beginning that it was paki military occupying the peaks in a move to cut off Kashmir into parts so pakis could, not only kill Indians via shelling, but by starving the Indian soldiers to death. 

Two, pakis lying regardless, it's no "freedom fighters" but terrorists that have been sent by pakis across border to inflict death and mayhem in India from Kashmir to South India. 

................................................................................................

Further lies quoted by author, for most of the next pages in the chapter, including abuse heaped on India due to pakis lying to everyone - a sample here. 

"‘It can be confirmed on the basis of sound evidence that not a single Pakistani soldier is present inside Kashmir across the LOC. Such allegations by India are patently absurd and an attempt to cover up her own designs. Pakistan would be insane in sending its soldiery into a highly disputed and disturbed area … Those opposing the Indian aggression in the Drass-Kargil area are the docile and peace-loving sons of the soil in Kashmir who have been driven to take up arms to defend their rights, honour, and dignity in the face of brutal Indian aggression ... The on-going Indian bellicosity is a matter of deep concern to the world … India has shut the diplomatic doors the way Hitler did in 1938–39.’ General (retd) Khalid Mahmud Arif in ‘What Realism Demands’, Dawn, 3 July 1999."

................................................................................................

Over and over, author portrays US as eager and desperate to please India! But such a slant on this affair, kargil, implies clearly that Pakistan not only think thst their lies must be taken at par with or higher than facts, but imagine that the whole world must agree with this position, unless they are trying to please India! 

" ... Americans realized that ‘Indians were extremely skeptical that we will succeed and suspicious about what we were doing’. Only a success would have convinced the Indians of what the Americans kept telling Delhi they were doing ‘to get Pakistan to back down’."

When do pakis plan to learn that a Rottweiler used at Auschwitz isn't an icon worshipped through the world! 

................................................................................................

" ... First the two met with their aides. Nawaz Sharif was joined by the Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz and Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed. Clinton was assisted by National Security advisor Sandy Burger, assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Karl F. Inderfurth and a senior National security council official handling South Asian affairs Bruce Riedel. This meeting with aides lasted for barely five to seven minutes. It was followed by an almost two-hour long meeting between Clinton and Nawaz. While Clinton was joined by Bruce Riedel as a note taker, Nawaz Sharif went in without one. He did not want one.[838] Unknowing of this fact the Pakistan Foreign Office team insisted that their prime minister be treated on an equal basis with the host and also be accompanied by his aide to the meeting. It lasted approximately two hours. Clinton began by telling Sharif why Kargil was a blunder and how two nuclear powers were almost at the brink of war. Clinton told Sharif that he had information that the Pakistan Army had begun preparation to use nuclear weapons. Sharif said he was unaware of any such move. As a nuclear power, Clinton said, the international community expected Pakistan to behave more responsibly. ... "

"In the plain talking during his meeting with the Pakistani prime minister, the US President also demanded his government’s full cooperation in capturing OBL. Clinton in his memoirs recalls, ‘On 4 July, I also told Sharif that unless he did more to help I would have to announce Pakistan was in effect supporting terrorism in Afghanistan.’[839] Clinton was basing his assertions on the information and analysis provided by CIA’s Counter-terrorist Center. Pakistan was identified as the principal supporter of the Taliban, the principal protectors of OBL. Significantly, on the very day of his meeting with the Pakistani prime minister, Clinton announced sanctions against the Taliban. He subsequently wrote, ‘On the day I met Sharif, I also signed an executive order placing economic sanctions on the Taliban, freezing its assets, and prohibiting commercial exchanges.’

"Significantly, there was no discussion between Nawaz Sharif and the Foreign Office team before the Clinton meeting regarding the formulation of the statement that he and Clinton would sign. The Foreign Office team had prepared a Pakistani version of a draft agreement. The Americans were determined to stay with their own version."

" ... Sharif carefully chose his words so as not to directly implicate anyone but kept saying that it was an operation that ‘got out of control’. He did, however, distance himself from the Operation.  The striking contrast in the self-confidence of the two interlocutors could not have been lost. While one was backed by a unified and competently functioning government, the other was pretty much on a solo flight."

Perhaps the paragraph above was written so as to depict paki PM’s position as more sympathetic, but the result for any reader not schooled in lies by Pakistan is a disbelief at such an expectation. A democratic nation must function in a manner where the leader and the government function in tandem, not where the civilian leade us a mannequin in dressing window while owner is the terrorist in the back room. 

................................................................................................

Author has novel ways of lying, while seeming technically correct. 

"Nawaz Sharif was insisting that Clinton help him to get out of the crisis. An anxious Sharif’s long rambling on diplomacy with China and with Indian intermediaries was to establish his bona fides as a man in search of a solution. He was like a man who ‘wanted out’ off a train wreck approaching him. At one point, Sharif asked Clinton for a one-on-one meeting. Clinton declined. The Pakistani prime minister was told that the note-taker, Bruce Riedel, would not leave his President. US government rules made it obligatory upon Clinton to have this historic meeting documented. The President of the USA was not free to have his way. He could not act upon his whims."

The last two lines seem to imply that a US president refuses an unreasonable request by a terrorist nation only due to the said US president being "not free to have his way", and his whims must be nothing other than to please the said terrorist nation. 

Which is ridiculous. 

Clearly it was necessary for the US President to, not only follow protocol in this case, but be not seen as complicit with a terrorist nation invading a neighbour, or even be questioned subsequently as to veracity of his account, if pakis chose to lie for any reason. 

As to whims, there must have been a few million that the president could have indulged in at the time, and freely so, without any question of disturbing any protocol. 

................................................................................................

"During the break between the two sessions of the Sharif-Clinton meeting, Sharif’s team found him to be a ‘drained man’. He has been badgered by Clinton’s queries and hard talk on Kargil, OBL, etc. No less was the tension of what he was doing: giving a commitment for a Pakistani retreat from what the military was still publicly projecting as a successful occupation. In fact, during the meeting, the TV in the room was telecasting news of the fall of a strategically important peak, the Tiger Hill. During the break, the prime minister called his army chief to confirm news of the fall of the Tiger Hill.[841]"

" ... The Foreign Office team still ‘offered’ a few amendments to the draft. Sharif was extremely reluctant to take them to Clinton. He said he had been told it was a take it or leave it situation. His team still urged Sharif to ‘not give in’. They were all aware that their internal discussions were being monitored. The Americans knew what they were trying to convince Sharif to do, since the room they were sitting in was ‘not only bugged but also had cameras in it’. Sharif promised his team to make one last effort.

"The 4 July meeting was turned into a battle of nerves. Clinton was well prepared for this battle while the Pakistani prime minister had arrived in Washington having already lost his nerve, owing to what he believed were the Kargil reversals. Sharif had left Islamabad in panic and entered the Clinton meeting with a major psychological handicap. Clinton saw sitting before him a needy and desperate man, not a negotiator. The Americans too found Sharif nervous. In fact, they believed his decision to ‘invite himself at short notice and bringing the family along opened the possibility of his staying back in Washington in case the Army took over in his absence’.[843] ... "

................................................................................................

"Tough times test leadership mettle and a state’s collective institutional competence. Sharif’s mettle was being severely tested. He had opted to do mostly a lone act, nearly a personal operation, on the entire 4 July summit, from planning to execution. He had drawn on external wisdom and an external platform. He seemed to have banked on a major external power even for the political strength required for his 4 July decision. This bail-out operation, as Sharif saw it, of a medium-sized power by the major global power, was a page out of Wallerstein’s classic center-periphery relationship. The ‘comprador’ politician was at play, exposing so starkly the heavy interconnectedness between Pakistan’s internal power game and the global center, with the levers of control heavily tilted in the latter’s favor. Nothing could more acutely demonstrate Pakistan’s systemic weakness as a state run by those with scarce appreciation of institutional decision-making."

That's verbose rephrasing of a failed attempt by Pakistan to do another Munich, failed because they were pretending that they had a democracy and they weren't invading another neighbour after wrecking one, and they hadn't realised that such pretense doesn't wash in era of satellites observations of global goings-on. 

................................................................................................

"The meeting ended with the decision that Pakistan would withdraw its troops behind the LOC to the pre-Operation position. ... "

"The withdrawal discussion had not included any talk about safe passage for the withdrawing Pakistani forces. ... Sharif did not raise any question about safe passage for withdrawing troops.[846] Evidently, it was not an issue that had occupied his mind, nor was it part of the talking points that his Foreign Office team had prepared.  This issue escaped their respective radars because the premise from which it would logically flow, the Pakistani forces actually battling in Kargil and now their withdrawal, did not exist in their articulated consciousness. This kind of denial meant major lapses in policy-making. ... "

"Clinton, as part of a premeditated strategy, used this moment of Sharif’s utter vulnerability to aggressively raise the issue of the Osama bin Laden and the alleged ISI connection.[850] Before Sharif sat the man who had been told that Pakistan was at the center of supporting the Taliban and by extension the OBL network. This network, according to the CIA, was functioning in 60 different countries and was directly responsible for attacks on American embassies. Clinton reminded Nawaz Sharif that he had ‘asked repeatedly for Pakistani help to bring Osama bin Laden to justice from Afghanistan’ and that Sharif had ‘promised often to do so, but had done nothing. Instead, the ISI worked with OBL and the Taliban to foment terrorism’. Sharif had made a personal commitment to Clinton in December 1998 to help the United States in capturing OBL, but had not followed through on it.[851] ... Clinton threatened to tell the world of Pakistan’s support to bin Laden if Pakistan’s help in capturing him was not forthcoming.[852] The Pakistani prime minister reassured the US President that he would now follow through on his earlier commitment. ... "

................................................................................................

"During the London stopover, the real newsmaker was Pakistan’s articulate Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz. In a BBC Hard Talk interview, Sartaj declared that the reference in the 4 July statement to ‘upholding the sanctity of the LOC’ also implied that India must vacate the Siachen Glacier it had illegally occupied in 1984. A rapid rebuttal from Washington stated that the 4 July Statement was only about Kargil, that the US believed in the sanctity of the entire LOC but of immediate interest was the resolution of the Kargil conflict."

" ... Admittedly, the overwhelming deployment of Indian artillery and air power could not have allowed Pakistani troops to hold the peaks for much longer ... "

................................................................................................

Another lie by author. 

"Sharif’s Washington dash had earned him a statement with no face-saver for Pakistan. Sharif, in his pre-departure telephone conversation, had been clearly told by Clinton to expect no more and had seemed OK with that. In fact, he had cancelled the crucial meeting of the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) scheduled for July 5, whose agenda had been the Kargil Operation. With input of all stakeholders, the prime minister was to decide on how to draw curtains on Operation Koh Paima. However, at this crucial juncture in Pakistan’s history, Sharif had walked away from collective institutional decision-making. Instead, he headed to Washington."

Since Kargil invasion by paki army wasn't a collective decision, or even had the pm kept informed as in was executed, what is author blaming the pm for? He'd lost face internationally, if pakis as a nation ever had such a thing, for something that had been done without him being informed! If anything, he was more akin to a toddler of Munich blamed for Dachau! 

................................................................................................

" ... Only in private conversations did the army chief and others of the Kargil clique concede rising Pakistani casualties and logistical difficulties. Beginning mid-June, there was guarded conversation within the army command of the crisis of logistics, high casualties, and India’s very heavy force deployment. Reports about this alarming situation were trickling in from the front. Nevertheless, at the 2 July meeting the army chief had insisted that, despite rising Pakistani casualties, compromised logistical supplies, and India’s re-taking of the strategically located Tololing and Tiger Hill posts, it was not a militarily unsustainable position. No hard questioning or holistic discussion had followed. While moments of acrimony between the prime minister and the army chief did occur, the amiable Chaudhry Shujaat had intervened to cool off matters. Thus, policy matters had remained unsettled."

" ... disturbing questions may have crossed Sharif’s mind: what fate awaited him on his return to Pakistan? Would he be able to implement the 4 July statement? How would the army command respond to the 4 July statement? In a country in whose sixty-five year history the military had subverted the Constitution three times to remove an elected civilian ruler, ... In the White House, Clinton’s aide Bruce Riedel had made the dramatic deduction that the Pakistani prime minister had arrived in Washington with his family because, after agreeing on troop withdrawal from Kargil, he was hesitant to return to Pakistan because of fear of the army command."

Author isn't being explicit. After 1971, Bhutto, the pm of a leftover Pakistan, had been executed by an army chief after a coup, using what passes for law machinery of pak for the purpose. 

................................................................................................

" ... In the somewhat sullen silence that followed, one general did point out, “Sir, they (the Indians) are celebrating.” Many present in the room must have recalled the army chief’s 16 May assurance that Pakistan was in a “win-win” situation in Kargil as its positions were “unassailable.” Words did not matter. The original and vocal critics of Kargil, including commanders 1 Corps General Saleem Haider, Quetta corps General Tariq Pervez and other had been proven right.  Also, with restive troops and reports of low morale, especially of those who had participated in the Operation, the army chief had a huge task before him."

"It was going to be a hard sell, since government rhetoric had built a public perception since end May of victories for the Mujahedeen fighting Indian troops in the Kargil-Drass area. ... According to media reports based on official sources, Delhi was in a very difficult position since its troops were facing the danger of starvation in Siachen if the blockade of the Drass-Kargil Road continued. In fact, after the Washington agreement, the army spokesman said, “There is no change in ground realities as Drass-Kargil Road is still in range of Pakistani artillery fire…”"

" ... People drew a parallel with the 1965 events, when Pakistan was about to “liberate the whole of Kashmir...when Pakistani leaders succumbed to world pressure and stopped the military operation and we are facing a similar situation now...”[884] ... "

What is the author talking about, or just lies as usual by paki government to pakis? 

Indian tanks had been in centre of Lahore in 1965! 

................................................................................................

"Politicians fully capitalized on this anti-Nawaz mood. Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP), Pakistan’s leading opposition party, was critical of the prime minister for carrying out secret negotiations with Clinton. The MQM also opposed the Washington agreement as a ‘sell out of Kashmir.”[887] It demanded details of the Sharif-Clinton talks and said that an agreement on withdrawal “without a quid pro quo” would be a “a serious disappointment for the nation.”[888] The Jamaat-i-Islami, a right-wing party, who had protested in Lahore against the Lahore summit, was predictably critical of the prime minister. Its leader Munawar Hassan said the Washington statement was “treachery.” ... "

" ... PTI leader Abdus Sattar,[890] with forty years as Pakistan’s top diplomat behind him, predicted that Sharif “will be ousted from power like former rulers ... Regarding the 4 July agreement Sattar said while the army would carry out out orders of the political government in the given environment, the agreement applied to the Mujahideen, not to the Pakistan Army. Sattar merely repeated Pakistan’s official position as he claimed “they (the army) are on the LOC and you cannot ask them to vacate.”[893]"

" ... Gul warned the lawyers at the Lahore High Court Bar that the ... agreement dictated by the US. “We are not an American state…we should not follow American instructions blindly…”[899] He warned of a clash in case the Mujahedeen refused to withdraw from their positions in Kargil. ... "

Funny, he wasn't aware either, that it was all paki military in pajamas, asked to pretend they were terrorists - and disowned by pakis in life and death! 

"All the talk of Mujahideen disengaging or not was all fiction. The Mujahideen, were not involved. Op KP had no support by Hurriyat , ISI or the ongoing struggle in Kashmir creating rear area insecurity; a repeat of a Operation Gibraltar."

................................................................................................

"While the main thrust of all criticism targeting the Prime Minster was that he was responsible for Pakistan’s humiliation, some of Sharif’s cabinet members also rose to his defense. His close confidante, the Minister for Provincial Coordination and Political Affairs, was quick to retort to the critics, “The record of these generals is self-evident.” He reminded them that “in their period of leadership, the enemy occupied Siachen glacier. And so where was their military capability and patriotism then?” [908] The beginnings of a civil-military confrontation were discernable. A Sharif loyalist, General Javed Nasir, who had been appointed by Sharif as ISI chief, also supported the withdrawal. He wrote in Pakistan’s most widely read Urdu daily Jang, praising Sharif’s withdrawal decision, even though this former spy chief had equally vehemently supported the Kargil operation. In his Jang piece, he praised Sharif’s India policy and wrote that the prime minister had “spared no effort for the peace offensive, which he had launched on 21 February 1999 in the form of the Lahore Declaration. Privately, he has also been expressing the desire that we should enter the new millennium with pride and that Allah has ordained the Muslims to serve as an example worth following for the world.”[909] The spin did not work."

That last sentence betrays the author's own slant. 

................................................................................................

" ... The million-dollar question, raised in subdued tones since mid-June, was: “With whose permission was Kargil initiated?”"

"With ISPR the only source of all Kargil-related information their version of Kargil was the only reality the press knew. Hence, pressmen had not been privy to the ground situation, which had tilted in India’s favor. Having lost Tololing posts by the middle of June, Pakistani troops had also lost posts on the strategically located Tiger Hill. The Adjutant General branch at the GHQ had been getting reports of increasing casualties. Even the worried Kargil clique was deeply concerned over mounting deaths of senior colleagues.[910] Supply lines had come under enemy attack, making it difficult to maintain supplies to the posts. A catch-22 situation has been created. Neither was troop pullout possible nor was managing critical logistical supplies.

"The shortage of food had meant that some soldiers even had to resort to eating grass.[911] Ill-equipped, underfed, and frost-bitten, many soldiers had been surrounded by Indian infantry and come under artillery and aerial attacks. The inevitable question was: Where would this continued battle on the world’s highest and most vicious battleground have led? In the face of overwhelming force deployment by the Indians, the troops across the LOC would have either been killed or captured by the Indians."

Another lie there by author, in that "would have" bit. They were, in fact, killed or captured in quantities enough to inform India that they were paki soldiers being denied by pakis. 

................................................................................................

"The news of the prime minister’s effort to end the battle evoked a mixed response among those in the battle-zone. When the news of withdrawal blared from their wireless sets, it was received by many with a sense of relief. Most field commanders were not surprised. Some even prayed for Nawaz Sharif’s long life when they heard of the 4 July agreement.[912] They were losing their colleagues while India was beginning to succeed in reclaiming the peaks and ridges. They knew the balance of forces and numbers was heavily tilted in India’s favor.

"Nevertheless, fighting in the inhospitable terrain under terrible conditions, the question uppermost in the minds of many soldiers was: What had been the purpose of the Operation and of the battle that followed? If a unilateral withdrawal was the final outcome, why the sacrifices? At posts where the young and courageous soldiers had not experienced reversals, many were unable to understand the compulsion to withdraw. There was frustration. ... many could not understand why their country did not own them. Why were the dead bodies of their martyred colleagues not being received and honoured? Many also wondered why a seeming victory was being squandered and was turning into a surrender, and that too a globally broadcast surrender?"

"Predictably when the Kargil battle came to a close no official casualty figures were issued. The pretence of no Pakistani troop involvement also meant that accepting bodies of martyred soldiers would be difficult. Even during the withdrawal, the Indians claimed that they buried “army soldiers of 12 Northern Light Infantry, who had been killed at Point 4875” in the battle to reclaim posts in Drass sector.[926]  Also, while several guesstimates were made, the government issued no official casualty figures. For example, in Pakistan, the military quoted the figure of around 500 deaths, while there was talk of an estimated one thousand Pakistani casualties. The prime minister claimed there were more than thousand casualties.[927] Senior military officers claimed the worried army chief had shared a figure of one thousand casualties.[928] The war martyrs issue and their number came up when the army chief sought a rehabilitation budget for families of martyrs and veterans."

" ... Towards end-July, however, the army command changed its policy on receiving bodies of their fallen men because of Colonel Sher Khan. ... "

................................................................................................

"Pakistan continued with its disingenuous approach of claiming that the Mujahedeen, not its army, were present in the mountains. ... "

Author invents words - or sentences, paragraphs - to label the paki lies. 

" ... Meanwhile, at the July 11 joint presser, while giving an update on the withdrawal along with the ISPR’s Brigadier Rashid, foreign minister Aziz claimed, “In the past few weeks the Mujahedeen action has been gloriously successful as the just and legitimate cause of Kashmir has engaged the international community’s undivided attention throughout the period.”[933] The brigadier also recounted the Mujahedeen’s military victories over the Indians, who, he claimed, were suffering from “sagging morale.” If the Indian morale was “sagging” and the Mujahiedeen were “gloriously successful, then why the 4 July agreement?"

Precisely. 

As Molotov, fed up with nazi lies about RAF never daring to bomb Berlin and Berlin being completely safe, had asked his host who'd hurried him from dinner to shelter, due to a precisely timed RAF raid - "so why are we hiding in this shelter, and whose bombs are these that are falling around us?"

................................................................................................

Author extensively quotes statements then issued from various terrorist organisations, based in or supported by pak, and their mouthpieces or leaders. 

"These endless statements claiming Mujahedeen presence also clashed with the widely known facts about Pakistani soldiers fighting in Kargil. Pakistan continued to spin this bizarre narrative. While the prime minister’s trusted bureaucrat Tariq Fatemi told the Indians we are “rolling our beds” and the Pakistan and Indian DGMOs were in contact coordinating Pakistani troops withdrawal and the international community was also commenting on Pakistani troop withdrawal, Islamabad was making a parallel stream of statements claiming that Pakistan had in fact requested the Mujahedeen groups fighting in Kargil-Drass, to withdraw!"

" ... Finally, when he himself was President, Musharraf opted for full disclosure. He acknowledged in his book that “as few as five battalions in support of freedom fighter groups, were able to compel the Indians to employ more than four divisions…”[944] In fact, adding a new dimension, the former army chief also claimed it was the “Pakistani freedom fighters”[945] who had occupied the front-line positions."

................................................................................................

" ... He mostly received cold, if not aggressive, receptions from the officers. For example, in the Quetta Garrison 41 Division auditorium, a captain asked the visiting army chief, ‘If you had to pull-out in exchange for a Nawaz Sharif and Clinton breakfast meeting, why did you go in?’ Another wanted to know why prime minister Nawaz Sharif had let them down. The Corps Commander Quetta, accompanying the army chief, had to intervene to ask his officers to take it easy. This resentment among the officers sprang from the widely held belief that, by calling off Operation KP when it was virtually impossible for the Indians to militarily dislodge Pakistani troops from their posts, the prime minister had committed a blunder.[969]"

" ... These young warriors had many hard questions. ‘Why did we conduct the Kargil Operation?’ ... The chief refrain was: ‘Who is responsible for this fiasco?’ And the young soldiers wanted to know.

"In rare cases, soldiers lying in delirious conditions on hospital beds even cursed at the commanders visiting the injured. According to one Kargil veteran who, after fighting at the Tiger Hill, lay injured in a hospital in Gilgit, another veteran on the bed next to his shouted and in abusive language cursed the military commanders as they came to visit the injured. ... Another injured brigadier, who had commanded an NLI brigade, was evacuated to Rawalpindi because it was not safe for him to be around the injured and extremely angry troops.[972]"

................................................................................................

"By such public expression of their angry emotions, the young officers and jawans of NLI had broken rigid institutional codes. This was particularly evident at the traditional Darbar gatherings convened by the NLI commander who had led the Kargil operation.

"The soldiers who returned home after almost being trapped in the world’s most inhospitable and treacherous battle field and having a close brush with death had expected heroes’ welcomes. Instead, they felt hurt and unappreciated. Many complained that the media ‘mistreated’ them and the people did not give them ‘the credit’ they deserved. And the withdrawal phase made matters even worse. Failure to ensure a proper scheme of withdrawal, to prevent the unnecessary loss of life to Indian artillery fire, had caused soldiers to feel badly let down. ... "

"In August, angrily weeping families had received Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the army chief in Gilgit with the demand that their sons, brothers, or husbands be brought back, dead or alive. Their anguish stemmed from the extraordinary circumstances. There was no declared war and their men had not announced they were going to the front, and there were dead bodies arriving and, worse, there were highly disturbing Indian media reports that the Pakistani authorities were refusing to accept many of the bodies of their soldiers.

"In July, Pakistan’s Political Counsellor in Delhi, Jalil Abbas Jillani, had received a call from his Indian counterpart asking him to receive the bodies of fallen Pakistani soldiers. Under instructions to refuse, Jillani told Vivek Katju, Additional Secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, that there were no Pakistani soldiers fighting in Kargil. The bodies Indian authorities wanted to handover included the body of captain Kernel Sher Khan who had been awarded the Nishan-i-Haider, the highest military award. By the end of July, these instructions to the Pakistan High Commission were changed and they had begun accepting the bodies. As Islamabad accused Delhi of torturing Pakistani soldiers, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesman offered to handover several Pakistani soldiers, captured in Kargil, to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[973]

................................................................................................

" ... Earlier in April 1998, Benazir and her husband were convicted on corruption charges. Deeply drawn battle lines all targeted Sharif’s corruption—his refusing to return billion of rupees of loans, his seeking to control the parliament by becoming Ameerul Momineen, his party workers’ attack on the Supreme Court, the controversy around the 4 July decision to withdraw: all these gave the Opposition another stick to seek government’s early removal. The ruling family’s loan scandals were snowballing into a major crisis. Interestingly, the Army, despite its huge and dangerous blunder in Kargil, was in a secure spot."

This has largely to do with paki caste system that sees conquering invaders as above all, despises traders as moneymaker and respects feudal system. Consequently army is owner of most of paki land and businesses, unlike most other - functioning - countries where business, military and land ownership do not mix. 

................................................................................................

" ... The PPP insisted that the government, and specifically the prime minister, had cleared the Kargil Operation. The religious parties criticized the withdrawal and the Sharif-led government’s re-engagement with India, as well as his decision to pull back support to the Taliban and enter into dialogue with the Northern Alliance. They consistently attacked the government for allowing US Special Forces to come to Pakistan to train Pakistanis involved in the ‘Capture bin Laden’ Operation. Through August, these protesting parties and sections of the media, who dominated popular discourse as well as public space, reiteratively popularized the narrative that Washington had stepped in to save India from a certain military defeat that the Mujahedeen had almost inflicted on India. The Washington Accord, for them, was a sell-out of the Kashmiri cause."

" ... The army chief in his meeting with the prime minister’s younger brother and Chief Minister of Punjab, Shehbaz Sharif, suggested that he must consider becoming the deputy prime minister in order to streamline the federal government’s performance![977] The younger Sharif, while having heard the army chief attentively, was clear that neither would his brother fancy such a suggestion coming from him and nor was his vacating Punjab, the fortress of Pakistan’s politics, a wise move. Meanwhile, the authors of the country’s biggest military debacle would call out the elected government on governance matters. The blundering group in khaki would hold the weak civilians accountable while they launched a campaign to discredit the elected government."

"In addition to the resentment within the rank and file, the army chief had to deal with internal rifts between his top military commanders, as their criticism of the Kargil Operation began to surface. They believed the ill-conceived Operation had caused embarrassment to the entire institution.  Even the military’s own top spymasters and senior commanders were actively kept out of the loop. When they had picked up indicators of unusual troop movement, the existence of the Operation was denied. Others, who had questioned the viability of the Kargil plan during the early May Corp Commanders meeting but had their concerns dismissed by the architects of Kargil, were also talking. This, after 4 Jul  many a hitherto tight-lipped and resentful commander was now more vocal in his indictment of the Operation.

"The public critique later by one of Pakistan’s most professional generals, Lt. General Ali Quli Khan,[979] best captured the views of Pakistan’s top commanders. Commenting on General Musharraf’s own conclusion on the Kargil Operations, ‘Considered in purely military terms, the Kargil Operations were a landmark in the history of the Pakistan Army,’[980] Khan, the former Chief of General Staff wrote, ‘I am totally amazed at such ostrich-like behavior when the whole world considers Kargil to be the worst debacle in Pakistan’s history and where countless innocent young lives were lost for nothing. Absolutely nothing!’ [981] He further added, ‘I regret to say that the conception and planning at the highest level had been poor—in fact, so poor that the only word which can adequately describe is it unprofessional. We all know that the main duty of the high command is to ensure that with their meticulous planning they create conditions whereby their junior combatants can fight easily. This was certainly not done at Kargil. It is also fairly obvious that the Kargil Operations was not conceived in its totality, with the result that apart from bringing ignominy to Pakistan it also caused unnecessary misery to a lot of innocent people.’[982] 

"Internally, within the institution, there was disquiet after the withdrawal. Instructions were that Kargil would not be discussed in any school of instruction, neither in any class nor in any study period. No courses would be taught at the NDC etc. The subject of Kargil was a ‘banned item’."

................................................................................................

"Criticism from beyond the borders also hit hard, especially when it floated in world capitals in form of the vicious, scathing criticism in the ‘Rogue Army’ advertisements campaign that targeted the Pakistan Army and multiplied the woes of the Kargil clique. Within days of the 4 July Sharif-Clinton Statement, the advertisement ran in leading US newspapers, including the New York Times. Musharraf wanted an official and very prominent rebuttal issued in the very papers in which the advertisement appeared. It was a matter of the troop morale, he asked a common friend to convey to the prime minister. The army chief also offered to pay for the rebuttal advertisement in case the government had funding problems.[983] The prime minister disagreed. Despite the intervention of his father and brother, Sharif was unrelenting. Only one article could be commissioned to counter the advertisement." 

Now, author returns to prevaricating. 

"Thus, the pressure from within the Army, the vocal criticism by the navy and the air force, and the general political chatter prompted the architects of Kargil to adopt an offensive defense posture. In August, deeper fault lines emerged between the civilian and military leadership’s approach to handling the post-Kargil period."

This is like death of a child due to physical assault by an adult blamed on those criticising the said assault. 

Does the author wish here to imply, or let reader infer, that those responsible for Kargil invasion against India and killing of Indians thereby, planned and executed, had been well-behaved, or well intentioned at any time? 

Had they not violated rvery norm, every protocol, in the process, of functioning of a proper military of a proper government, when invading Kargil - without informing their own government? 

Was their anything that could be termed proper in their conduct in their subsequent denial of their own soldiers, even to the extent of refusing the dead? 

................................................................................................

"The most public manifestation of this difference was over the question of decorating the Kargil heroes, martyrs and the living, with national awards for valor. Why this issue became a controversial one between the government and the Army was principally because the Army had publicly taken the position that it was not Pakistani soldiers but freedom fighters who had fought in Kargil. The prime minister had sustained this charade, begun initially by the Army during the Kargil Operation, even after the 4 July withdrawal. The army leadership now wanted the government to approve national awards for the ‘Kargil heroes.’

"The GHQ also wanted nationally broadcast television programmes honouring the heroes of Kargil. There was a reason why the Kargil clique now wanted to acknowledge and honour the brave and the best of the Army, earlier having opted to let them be projected as Mujahideen. The clique now detected the increasing anger and agitation of the troops caused towards their commanders, not only because of the debacle-like end of Kargil, but also in their role and sacrifices not having been acknowledged.

"Sitting in their secure garrisons, these were men of command and authority who must have silently been haunted by the calamitous Operation they had designed. More blood, their critics argued, of Pakistan’s brave soldiers had flowed in this calamity called Kargil, than put together in the two wars Pakistan fought in 1965 and 1971."

The claim about 1965, in view of the authors repeated ridicule of Indians ineffective and killed at Kargil, is debatable at best. 

But 1971? That's a horrible claim, considering the genocide perpetrated by paki military in East Bengal, accompanied by organised mass gang rapes they also perpetrated along with killings, in millions, comparable with and outdone by only nazis in WWII. 

The only way to reconcile that statement with reality is to not only deduce but accept a value system so racist that it had counted half its own citizens as not human. 

And the only reason that paki military did not have 93,000 of paki military dead in East Bengal was because India, instead of letting them be taken prisoners of war by the then new nation of Bangladesh, had instead returned them safe to the then remaining, truncated West Pakistan, which really had no right to retain the name because they'd lost 60% of their own erstwhile paki population, the Bengalis. 

................................................................................................

" ... Interestingly, although Pakistan’s public position was that Kashmiri Mujahideen, not Pakistani soldiers, were fighting the Indian Army in Kargil, yet, that night the Kargil clique, identified the recipients for the highest gallantry award, Nishan-i-Haider. Additionally, approximately 80 soldiers were given various other awards on General Javed Hassan’s recommendations. He insisted awards were necessary to raise the morale of the soldiers.

"The Awards ceremony, called Kargil kay Hero, was televised by PTV, but the Sharif-led government was keen to call off its broadcasting. The prime minister was trying to re-engage with the Indians. Thus, Nawaz Sharif and Shehbaz Sharif did not participate in the programme. While all the chief ministers participated, the Punjab chief minister avoided it."

It seems to have not occurred to the author that not everybody can sustain the doublespeak that paki army maintained, of both disclaming and awarding role of paki soldiers in Kargil simultaneously! 

If the then pm of pak had participated in such a televised spectacle, or his brother had, doesn't the author realise that the paki pm could then subsequently be questioned on the factual discrepancy, by world media, not to mention international diplomatic corps,  and even various governments and their leaders, even officially? 

................................................................................................

" ... State Department spokesman, James Rubin, said that, even on Kashmir, the US could mediate only if Pakistan and India both sought mediation. Away from 4 July, Pakistan had to manage its own relationship with India."

Author returns to paki lies. 

" ... In Pakistan, civilian intelligence agencies had reports of sectarian killers finding safe havens in neighboring Afghanistan. ... "

Fact is taliban were the spectrum created in and by Pakistan, to take control of Afghanistan in name of religion - and it wreaked havoc in a society that had women professors until then, teaching at university! Thereafter pakis pretending that it was an Afghanistan problem is height of duplicity and fraud. 

................................................................................................

More lies, more fraud. 

"The actual implementation of the ‘Capture Osama’ plan also began in August. The Taliban remained committed to protecting the 41-year-old Saudi millionaire. They kept him ‘under the protection of a special security commission’.[991] The US President’s most unusual threat of 4 July that, unless Pakistan did more, he ‘would have to announce Pakistan was in effect supporting terrorism in Afghanistan’ had worked.[992] The plan to capture OBL was first proposed by the Pakistani prime minister himself in his 2 December 1998, Washington meeting. Economic sanctions on the Taliban were already in place. Around this time, with Sharif’s support, US officials also began to train 60 Pakistani troops as commandoes to go into Afghanistan to get bin Laden. ‘I was skeptical about the project; even if Sharif wanted to help, the Pakistan military was full of Taliban and al-Qaeda sympathizers. But I thought we had nothing to lose by exploring every option.’[993]"

In view of his eventual capture - in Abbottabad, within walking distance of what US terms "West Point of Pakistan", was he really ever in Afghanistan? 

Or had he been spirited away out of sight straight into protection of paki military even before Kargil? 

................................................................................................

" ... The CIA planned a ‘ring of kidnapping squads around Afghanistan to move in to capture OBL when required’.[994] 

"After his commitment with Clinton, Sharif personally led the effort to convince the Taliban government to handover OBL. In July, he met, along with the visiting the Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan, the Afghan Foreign Minister Mulla Mutawakil at the Punjab House in Islamabad. With the help of an interpreter, the Saudi Prince reminded Muttawakil, ‘We had helped you, we had recognized you, but you are ungrateful.’ The Taliban leader was reprimanded in ‘strong and humiliating term’. Muttawakil said they were grateful, that they wanted Saudi assistance to continue, but handing over OBL or ‘extraditing him’ was ‘impossible’. This blanket refusal annoyed the prime minister and his Saudi guest.[995] Clinton’s ‘Get OBL’ policy included use of force at multiple levels. The Taliban leader Mullah Omar was under attack. At the end of August, a saboteur’s bomb exploded near his home in Kandahar.

"The ‘Capture Osama’ Operation was being launched. The Americans were funding the construction of barracks, three miles south of Rawalpindi, for SSG commandoes. According to the plan, Pakistani commandoes, on intelligence information, would be infiltrated into Afghanistan to kidnap bin Laden. While the ISI chief, now reporting to the prime minister and following his instructions, went along with the plan, the top operational tier opposed it. Senior generals believed that ‘nothing could be more foolish’. OBL, they believed, was an ‘elusive target’ and looking for him was tantamount ‘to searching for a needle in a haystack’. ... While the US sent FBI officials to train the commandoes and to monitor the operation, senior officials were skeptical of the scheme. ‘We said to ourselves: Why do they need searchers for someone they are already aware of? Well, we played along,’ recalled one US official.[996]

" ... Pakistan began its shuttle diplomacy between Kandahar and the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, trying to get talks restarted between Ahmed Shah Masood and the Taliban.[998] While the Northern Alliance blamed Pakistani officials for, in reality, siding with the Taliban, Pakistani officials repeatedly spoke of their ‘peace agenda’ and for initiating the shuttle diplomacy in response to President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s request.[999] ... "

Author now openly takes sides - with the fraudulent and the invader - who'd failed, to boot. 

" ... Whatever were coup-maker Musharraf’s justifications at the time of the coup, years later, he was more truthful as he wrote in his book, ‘It was in dealing with Kargil that the prime minister exposed his mediocrity and set himself on a collision course with the Army and me.’[1001]"

" ... Caught between trying to pull Pakistan out of the Kargil debacle, reviving the dialogue process with India, containing the fallout in the military and political circles, and also dealing with the political pressures generated from his government’s incompetence, no inquiry was instituted against the army chief and other architects of Kargil. Instead, a campaign was launched against the civilians, the army leadership feeling ironically confident enough to hold the civilian leadership over issues of governance."

................................................................................................

"The bonhomie of the prime minister and the army chief’s early September trip to the NLI headquarters in Skardu was short-lived. Although on Kashmiri rights, Sharif was unrelenting, calling for a UN-supervised plebiscite in Kashmir similar to East Timor[1002], the ghost of Kargil had sown distrust between Sharif and the military command. Behind closed doors, in the corridors of power, and in the homes of the powerful, subdued games were on. Some played for survival, others for reprimand and retribution. Tool bags for menacing games were thrown open. All was fair play: wiretapping, inspired media reports, surveillance, interpreting intercepts, spy men on the prowl, instigating anger, manufacturing street protests. The ghost of the Kargil debacle was haunting Pakistan’s corridors of power. The members of the Kargil clique, architects of the debacle, were fearful of being fired. Armed with institutional resources and experience at surreptitiously fighting civilian authority, they were all set to fight back.

"Sharif was in a difficult position. Unlike Sharif’s unbridled October 1998 reaction to a speech by Musharraf’s predecessor army chief general Jahangir Karamat, which led to latter’s dismissal, the post-Kargil situation was a very complex one. Pakistan had lost in martyrdom many of its brave young men yet internationally the country was being criticized. Pakistan’s credibility as a responsible nuclear State had received a serious setback. Yet the prime minister could not hold the army chief accountable for the debacle at Kargil. He was constrained by issues around his own public ownership of the Operation and of “national honor.” [1003]"

When do pakis plan to learn that neither killing nor giving one's own life is counted as praiseworthy (and nowhere outside of their own medieval creed, anyway), when in quest of world conquest, or simple looting of others, post medieval era - and, that, it's definitely no longer medieval era as of half a century ago, through most of the world? Calling those invaders martyrs is signatory of a creed of world conquest in name of a creed, but in every sensible process of thought, they were no more than oil thrown by those seeking to set fire to a neighbour's home. 

................................................................................................

" ... His Washington interlocutors were already aware of the real architects of Kargil. But, under siege from domestic troubles, with political opponents multiplying and unifying under the 19-party Grand Democratic Alliance[1004] banner, the prime minister seemed to have concluded that he was going to work silently on tackling the Kargil clique. Ouster of the army chief was unlikely. However, some form of reprimand was inevitable. The cumulative impact of all this was the rise of distrust and suspicion among Pakistan’s power players."

" ... In a heady moment during the landmark 17 May briefing, General Aziz, the Kargil kingpin, had prodded Pakistan’s prime minister to dream about being second only to Jinnah. ... As Chaudhry Nisar, his key aide, later argued, once the ball was set rolling, the Kargil Operation was ‘irreversible’, even if the Prime Minister had wanted to reverse it.[1006]

"In the media, a plethora of accusations surfaced, targeting the prime minister: that he had sold Kashmir, surrendered in Washington the victory won at Kargil; he had wasted the sacrifices of the brave soldiers at Kargil, had appeased the Americans, bowed before the Indians etc. With facts of the beginnings, the conduct, and the military outcome of this Operation little known, these accusations seemed plausible. Sharif’s dash to Washington had been widely publicized."

................................................................................................

" ... Pakistan’s chief executive was now under an extraordinary level of intelligence watch. The intelligence under the army’s high command maintained a close tab on the prime minister and his cabinet. The army intelligence picked up the Prime Minister House chatter. The army chief complained to a confidante that the PM’s intercepts had revealed that he would make Musharraf apologize publicly,[1007] claiming that the PM had promised this to the Indian Prime Minister! Considering that, ever since the cover was blown from the Kargil Operation plan, the PM had taken ownership of it and tried to extricate, in his calculation, Pakistan and its Army with honour, self-respect, and minimal diplomatic damage, such an undertaking seemed highly unlikely. ..."

"The army chief’s anger and nervousness persisted. The blame talk would just not end. There were complaints from within the army high command, chatter in Army messes, insinuations from the government’s men, and a few voices even within the media. He had requested the government several times to respond to news reports blaming the army chief for the debacle–indeed, even of conducting it unconstitutionally, i.e., without the chief executive’s permission."

In short, he wanted the lie and the cover, the pretense of it having been the civilian government decision to invade, to continue - along with the lies about no paki government involvement, it having been all independent terrorists.

................................................................................................

" ... Nervous and jumpy, the Kargil clique arranged to target its principal adversary, the prime minister himself, by weaving a two-front siege around him. They reached out to journalists to gauge the mood in the civilian quarters. Others were tasked to gauge the mood and reach out to the distraught Opposition parties and estranged politicians within the ruling party.

"The 14 September interview splashed by Pakistan’s most widely read Urdu daily, in which Sharif’s backchannel point-man Niaz A. Naik held the army responsible for sabotaging, what he claimed was, a time-bound plan that the two prime ministers had agreed upon for resolving the Kashmir dispute, deepened suspicion in the barracks. Naik had also asserted that Sharif had not been informed of the Kargil Operation, first hearing of it around 25 April. This contradicted Musharraf’s public statement of 16 July that ‘everyone was on board’.[1008] On 15 September, a prestigious English daily published ‘military source’s expectation that “some responsible functionary would remove the impression created by the former foreign secretary that the Army did not want resolution of the Kashmir dispute”’.[1009] The same day, Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz stepped in to more than clarify. In his Senate speech, he said that the armed forces had acted in the interests of Pakistan and it was ‘totally untrue’ that through the Kargil crisis the armed forces had undermined the Pakistan-India peace process.[1010] Nevertheless, the foreign minister seconded Naik’s claim that a time-bound approach to resolving Kashmir had been agreed upon. Sartaj’s speech also addressed the signing of the CTBT, a red herring issue in the hands of the political opposition. He was categorical that Pakistan ‘will not consider signing it till the time sanctions imposed by the US were removed’.[1011]

"Matters were in a flux. On 15 September, the Foreign Office spokesperson formally announced that the Prime minister had ‘no plans’ to attend the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session. The cancellation was unexpected. The reason that circulated in the press was that, because Pakistan had decided against signing the CTBT, the PM wanted to avoid the pressure he was likely to face at the UNGA, especially from the Clinton administration. However, less known was the fact that a close confidante of the army chief, who was also an intimate friend of the Sharif family with easy access to the prime minister’s father, contributed to the PM’s decision to miss the UNGA session. Musharraf, wary of what the PM might say about the Kargil clique, and especially about him, was keen that he not attend the UNGA.[1012] The confidante was therefore sent to Mian Sharif to convince him to dissuade his son from traveling to New York. Mian Sharif was convinced that, with trouble brewing at home, it was unwise for his son to travel. The PM did not travel."

Obviously, if it was that easy for the army to control the paki PM without subterfuge, the subsequent coup was merely making it official!

................................................................................................

"The angry chief’s words were interpreted by many as signalling a possible coup looming around the corner."

" ... Clinton administration had been sending messages through US Ambassador Milam, to send his envoy, so that Clinton could follow up with his 4 July promise of helping restart the Pakistan-India dialogue on Kashmir. ‘Do not send someone from the Foreign Office,’ was the message. In Islamabad, it was expected that the US would help Pakistan to continue with the Lahore process. ... ‘Trust’ was the key consideration for the prime minister. So, in the midst of raging political troubles, Nawaz Sharif sent off his brother Shehbaz Sharif as his special envoy to Washington."

" ... The State Department’s South Asia men had gauged Sharif’s political troubles. The Islamabad whispers of a possible coup or a likely Musharraf sacking were loud enough to reach Washington. They wanted to hear from Sharif’s emissary how deep the civil-military divide was. They were keen for facts on the follow-through on Pakistani troop withdrawal from Kargil and Islamabad’s re-engagement with India. Away from the India question, Islamabad and Washington were active partners in a ‘Get Osama’ Operation. This included both Islamabad directly persuading Mullah Omar to give up OBL and also the launch of a joint operation with the CIA to physically capture the al-Qaeda chief."

................................................................................................

"Shehbaz held a six-hour-long marathon session with Karl Inderfurth and Walter Anderson. The meeting took place at Washington’s historical Willard Hotel, where Shehbaz was staying. The Willard was where Abraham Lincoln had spent the night before his first inauguration as President in 1861. Before the Inderfurth-Shehbaz marathon session began, as an ice-breaker gesture, the otherwise frugal Inderfurth had spent $80 to buy his Pakistani guest The History of the Willard Hotel. 

"In Washington, Shehbaz Sharif’s concern about the possibility of a coup was apparent. Although he ‘never said he feared a coup but was beating around the bush’. There was very little discussion on how to advance the Lahore process. Some among the US side found that ‘the dialogue was sterile on Kashmir’.[1019]"

" ... On Kargil, Shehbaz Sharif informed them that troop movement was going according to plan. However, throughout the meeting, Shehbaz repeatedly expressed concern about ‘extra constitutional’ developments. He, in fact, referred to it 15 times. Yet, he did not once mention the word ‘military’ nor asked for US help in dealing with the military. His focus on ‘extra constitutional pressures on an elected government’, combined with what Washington was picking up from Islamabad, left no doubt among the Americans that trouble was brewing for the elected government that the Clinton administration would have rather seen in office. However, Sharif’s special envoy never said he feared a coup. He gave mixed signals and the Americans did not get candid answers on facts."

" ... In fact, as Talbott would later recall, ‘Shehbaz would not quite confirm, even in response to direct questions, that a military coup was brewing.’[1020] However, he added, ‘Shehbaz’s mannerisms, his mirthless smiles, long silences, and abrupt changes of subject when we asked about the situation at home, left us in no doubt that something was afoot.’[1021]"

" ... When Inderfurth pulled him to the side and asked him if Musharraf was alright, Shehbaz told him he was implementing the 4 July agreement and asked if he knew Musharraf.[1023] Inderfurth replied in the negative. ‘Why don’t you invite Musharraf?’ Shehbaz advised him."

................................................................................................

"A major American takeaway from the Shehbaz visit was that the Sharif-led government was in trouble at home. Senior US administration people like the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Pickering, saw Shehbaz as being ‘worried that they would have to pay for what they did (troop withdrawal)’.[1029]  The US Administration then took an unusual step. From New York, where the Clinton team was attending the UNGA session, Karl Inderfurth issued a statement that called on the Pakistan Army not to try any ‘extra-constitutional method’ to remove the Nawaz Sharif-led government.[1030]"

" ... Washington was keen to extend support to Nawaz Sharif, the man Clinton trusted, the man who had already become a high-value friend after consenting to Washington’s Pak-US collaborative ‘Capture OBL’ Operation. US officials had hoped this statement would alter the prevailing power dynamics in Pakistan to Sharif’s advantage. Such an expectation suggested two problems. One, Washington was delusional about the power its mere word carried. Two, Washington was ignorant of the local dynamics at work in Pakistan."

Author stretches one single point inyo two there, or rather, hides one by doing so. Point really she makes is that crazy jihadist nation that Pakistan have been since inception - that'd be since caliphate movement supported by Gandhi that nevertheless ended with massacre of over 1,500 Hindus in Kerala (termed 'Moplah killings', ie, son-in-law killings, because of Arab traditions of Arab seafaring muslims marrying and keeping local wives in Kerala) - there's no trusting their word even if anyone, including US, pours hundreds of billions of dollars in aid; they'd behead a US citizen as and when they please, anyway, as they fid to Daniel Pearl, denying all responsibility to boot and pretending that the authorities were not aware of goings-on. 

Her first point really should be that US is mistaken in assuming that a beneficiary to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars can influence a thug that the terrorist factory in reality is, all it's always been and intends to remain, terrorising - and begging at gunpoint, in turn. 

................................................................................................

"It was the annual season of international diplomacy. The two foreign policy principals, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, had arrived in New York for the UNGA session. ... Jaswant Singh’s gift to Albright was United States and India, 1777 to 1996: Bridge over River Time with Albright reciprocating with Engaging India: U. S. Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy, a collection of essays on America’s strategic relations with India.[1036]  In a sign of growing cordiality between the two capitals, there were unprecedented ‘long, intensive discussions on Afghan developments’, on Clinton’s Delhi trip, the first in 21 years, and on possible counter-terrorism cooperation[1037].

"In New York generally, the Indians found themselves in a comfortable situation, with global focus being on terrorism and counter-terrorism, the very issues for which Delhi sought support. After decades of Washington-Delhi strategic dissonance, signs of strategic convergence were emerging. In fact, the US, Russia, and even Pakistan’s staunchest ally, China, all converged on sanctions against Kabul’s Taliban regime—hosts of  the terrorist mastermind OBL, who planned terrorist attacks against both American and Russian targets.[1038]"

Did the author have a delusion at any point that world - outside her own paki origin - can be comfortable with terrorists or terrorism? Why make it seem as if this, counterterrorism or disapproval of terrorism, was an agenda sold by a single nation that, until then and since, for decades, was victimised by this nothing but the terrorist factory that pakis have forever been?

................................................................................................

" ... Thousands of Kashmiris threatened to cross the LOC on 4 October. Delhi threatened to open fire on those crossing the LOC while Islamabad urged them to call off their march.[1044] While Islamabad, already reeling from the Kargil debacle, decided to let them go and cross over at Chhakoti, the Indian forces were to prevent the crossing in stages through a graduated application of forces.[1045]"

If there are any Kashmiris left in paki occupied parts of Kashmir valley region, they are far too repressed and terrorised to attempt a threat, the place having since paki occupation been completely flooded and dominated by those from Western Punjab, as indeed is everything in pak from army to every province, including East Bengal until 1971, when they fought back to independence. 

Any Kashmir original citizens who dream of independence are the delusional ones that are the pampered and coddled citizens of India who imagine that, while Pakistan exists, Kashmir could have an existence of any kind except a butchered and sold in pieces carcass, as Gilgit, Baltistan and Baluchistan have been since Pakistan occupied those by force. 

It was a Gandhian - mistaken - policy responsible for their travails, by Nehru who refused their accession until too late for Kashmir and more than late for Baluchistan or Nepal. 

................................................................................................

" ... the unstated consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council including Pakistan’s ‘all-weather friend’ and strategic partner China, was that Kargil was a diplomatic and political blunder that derailed the promising Lahore process. ... "

" ... Significantly, most anti-Sharif forces sought military intervention to remove the Sharif-led government."

" ... With Washington impatient for progress on tracking and nabbing bin Laden, the CIA’s counter-terrorism cell saw the ISI as a partner of last resort. In fact, the ISI was viewed as a Taliban and OBL sympathizer, but Ziauddin was not viewed as hard core ISI. Also, Clinton’s South Asia men were against getting directly involved in the Afghan battlefield or directly confronting Pakistan over Afghanistan. Instead, the policy decision was to use Pakistan’s influence with the Taliban to track OBL. During his Washington trip, Pickering sought a meeting with Pakistan’s top spy. Pickering urged Ziauddin to actively nudge Taliban head Mullah Omar to hand over bin Laden to the Americans. And Ziauddin did."

" ... Soon after his return from Washington, General Ziauddin arrived in Kandahar on 5 October. The head of the Afghanistan-Kashmir desk, Major General Jamshed Gulzar, accompanied him. They arrived in a special plane and met Mullah Omar at his abode, a small mosque in Kandahar. At this meeting, the Pakistani intelligence officials offered condolences over the death of his wife and child.[1057] The ISI officials then informed Omar of the reason for their trip. An agitated Omar’s response was, ‘Osama bin Laden is like a bone in my throat. Neither can I digest it nor can I cough him out ... My problem is that I have given him a commitment as an Afghan and I cannot get out.’ Omar continued, ‘I pray that I die or he dies.’ Omar was clear that he ‘will not extradite him but if he goes on his own he should go’. Omar then asked his guests, ‘Can you tell me a country where he could be given protection?’ His guests could not. ... "

Was this work a research thesis submitted before the guy was located, caught and killed in Abbottabad, within walking distance from what US terms 'West Point of' pak? 

Else, was the hiding him in plain sight in the fortress-like house in Abbottabad a subsequent plan? 

Or do pakis really honestly  laim he lived there gorgeous years and they knew nothing? That ISI is indeed so incompetent as to never having noticed Obama living in Abbottabad? 

No, it's far more believable they lied. 

................................................................................................

Here's the extent of paki arrogance - 

"The CIA, in its effort to get OBL extradited, was in direct contact with it’s Pakistani counterpart, the ISI. Recalling the extent of the US desperation to get OBL, a senior ISI official said, ‘If I would have asked him to lick my feet, he would have.’[1060] The ISI, meanwhile, maintained a distance from CIA officials. For example, meetings with the CIA regional chief were held in ISI-run ‘safe houses’ instead of the ISI headquarters."

It's not just that the ISI guy said it, but that it got published with no concern regarding any repercussions. 

................................................................................................

" ... Combined with its aggressive military retaliation, that included heavy artillery and aerial attacks, Delhi stonewalled every Pakistani effort to extract strategic advantage from Operation KP. By early June, although still holding on the heights, Pakistani troops had come under tremendous physical and psychological pressure from both the Indian military offensive and from the disruption of supply routes. ... The Euphoria and Excitement were no more. ... The reality slowly sank in that Operation KP could accrue no gains for Islamabad."

" ... Pakistani troops under Indian attack suffered heavy casualties. ... Given Pakistan’s asymmetrical power structure, it was no surprise that the blundering military clique of Kargil staged a coup against the elected prime minister."

"For the French general, Napoleon Bonaparte, whom Clausewitz called the ‘very god of war’[1127], the centrality of the planning principle for any military campaign meant looking at the ‘worst-case scenario’. This necessarily required that the campaign planner, irrespective of his record of battle successes, not operate from a point of confidence. Instead, as a critical aspect of the planning principle, Napoleon explained how the planner’s personal mindset is central in applying the ‘worst-case scenario’. According to Napoleon, while planning any military campaign, ‘There is no man more pusillanimous than I when I am planning a campaign. I purposely exaggerate all the dangers and all the calamities that the circumstances make possible. I am in a thoroughly painful state of agitation.’[1128] Rarely have world class generals uttered such words of caution and humility, as did Napoleon, thus, emphasizing the criticality of thoroughness of planning for any success in military campaigns.

"Bravado or overconfidence was, thus, unknown to this military genius who, at the age of 26, had commanded the armies of the French Republic against Lombardy (in present-day Italy) and demonstrated near-invincibility in battle.[1129]

"Clearly, most military theorists have not only emphasized the centrality of planning in war but have warned against letting a general’s personality traits and biases undermine his own planning. For example, Clausewitz[1130] especially underscores personality traits like vanity, ambition, and vindictiveness that can move a general from the very planning course that alone is critical to his success and the success of the battle he has planned.

"In contrast to the above mentioned approach of the world’s leading military theorists and military commanders, the Kargil planners were overtaken by enthusiasm and a sense of payback. They were so obsessed with settling historical scores that it never crossed their minds to factor in the worst-case scenario. When the junior officers at 10 Corps heard of the operation, some had muttered their concerns. A confidential document moved through GHQ pointed out, ‘Indians won’t be stupid enough to humiliate themselves by politicizing the conflict.’ On this, an intelligence officer had written, ‘What if they are?’ The officer got rebuked but the question was never answered. Finally, the army chief General Pervez Musharraf raised the question of the Indian response at the January meeting convened for final clearance. However, the Operation had already been launched two months earlier, in November.

"Thus, the foremost planning blunder committed by the Kargil clique was their absolute failure to even factor in, leave alone follow the Napoleonic principle of ‘exaggerating’, possible dangers and calamities that may have arisen during Operation KP. ... Implicit in the planning was the faulty notion that by the time India discovered Pakistani troops across the LOC and controlling India’s lifeline to its troops in Leh, Delhi would find itself locked in a virtual surrender mode with no option but to settle on terms dictated by Pakistan. In such an all-victorious projection for Operation KP, the Kargil planners had turned on its head the cardinal war planning principle of exaggerating your adversary’s response."

................................................................................................

" ... The first major Indian attack on the supplies targeted a key forward ammunition dump. Subsequent aerial bombing and heavy artillery attacks in the encounter and exit phases almost entirely disrupted the supply lines. The Indian counter-attack had effectively cut-off what the Kargil planners and, subsequently, the field commanders had established as the Pakistani perimeter within which Operation KP was to be conducted. This made it virtually impossible for men and mules to ply on the supply routes. ... "

" ... Expansion of the war theatre, a classic mission creep phenomenon, has serious implications for logistics, supply lines, and manpower. In Operation KP, the situation for the Pakistani foot soldiers was no different. Within two months of the Operation, they were lured by the vacant spaces and strategic heights in the Kargil area. They had calculated that deeper spread of Pakistani posts on the dominating heights meant greater strategic positioning to tackle Indian retaliation. For example, a platoon in a dominating position could destroy a battalion.

"The field commanders after communicating this ground scenario to the Commander FCNA were granted permission to increase the number of posts to be established across the LOC ... Hence, instead of the initial seven to eight posts, around 196 posts (including defensive centers and outposts) were established. These covered five sectors instead of the planned single sector. This mission creep had led Pakistani troops almost 10 to 15 km ... positioned across 500–600 km of Indian territory. Beyond strategic reasons, there was also the element of competitiveness and adventure among the soldiers that contributed to what had presented itself as classic mission creep.

"‘Rapid march … press on!’ Napoleon counselled men at war. In his seminal work on military operations, Napoleon explains, ‘The strength of an army is like the power in mechanics estimated by multiplying mass by rapidity; a rapid march augments the morale of an army and increases its means of victory.’ This obsession of Napoleon with rapid marches was the major pitfall in his flawed Russian campaign. Almost 200 years later, a similar lesson was manifested again at Kargil."

................................................................................................

"The Kargil planners launched Operation Kargil to exploit Indian vulnerability along the Srinagar-Leh Highway and to sufficiently weaken India so that Pakistan could literally, as Clausewitz would argue, ‘Impose conditions ... at the peace conference.’[1146] These conditions, which the Kargil clique had initially hoped to impose, related to getting Siachen vacated. Subsequently, they changed to seeking freedom for Kashmir, and then to ‘internationalizing’ the issue of Jammu and Kashmir."

" ... It was assumed that, with their Leh-based troops facing the prospect of receiving no supplies after Pakistan virtually blocked the Srinagar-Leh Highway, Delhi would be accommodating. The Kargil clique also believed that the global community would promptly intervene diplomatically to defuse a potentially war-like tension between the two new nuclear states.

"At several points, the planning clique’s half-baked and ill-conceived approach was exposed. There was talk that the planning and analysis wing of the ISI wrote a detailed report on the proposed operation when the plan reached its office but the COAS personally intervened with DG ISI to close down the study. In March, when a young team proposed opening new fronts in Kargil to increase the pressure on the Indians, they were warned that Pakistan could not risk destabilizing the relationship with India. Subsequently, the responses of the Kargil planners when, from May onwards they were in the dock, were muddled and confused. For example, in May, General Aziz, a key planner, had boasted of the Kargil Operation as providing an opportunity to the PM of becoming the Pakistani leader responsible for liberating Kashmiris. At the FO meeting that month, when asked by the deputy air chief what they wanted, the response was unclear. Similarly, at the 2 July DCC meeting, when Ishaq Dar asked what they wanted, the response was again ambiguous. Clarity of purpose, which is the first principle of all military planners, had vanished in a haze of euphoria and wishful thinking.

................................................................................................

"According to Napoleon, ‘Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.’"

Did India know of the paki incursion in November, when it happened, and waited to hit them in June, at leisure?

................................................................................................

" ... It was no surprise that Beijing virtually read the Riot Act to Pakistan’s foreign minister when he arrived in China for an SOS trip on 11 June. Pakistan, he was told, had to vacate Kargil, Kashmir had to be resolved bilaterally, and Beijing had no influence on Indian dealings with Pakistan. Within three days of Aziz’s departure, the Indian foreign minister arrived in Beijing to a rousing welcome."

" ... Javed Hassan’s exchanges as defense attaché in Washington had left him believing, though utterly unfounded,[1148] that in case of a Pakistan-initiated military exchange with India, Washington would support Pakistan against India.

"The past occasions, when perception of movement of some kind of nuclear weapons from Kahuta, had rung alarm bells in Washington, the Kargil clique saw a potential for nuclear blackmail working to Pakistan’s advantage. They believed that a panicked world community, led by Washington, would instantly intervene after the impact of a successfully executed Operation KP was publicized and the newly nuclearized neighbors would be seen as being on the brink of war. India checkmated this calculation primarily by Delhi’s decision to restrict Indian military response restricted to the Kargil region and by not opening new fronts. Hence, a consensus emerged within the global community, especially in the US and the EU, that a nuclear Pakistan’s rash behavior, which involved forsaking of diplomatic engagement and opting for military engagement with traces of nuclear blackmail, would not be rewarded."

" ... The first trip in ten years by an Indian foreign minister to China was in the works. Pakistan, by contrast, was in a difficult strategic situation. Its Afghanistan policy was under criticism and it was blamed for facilitating ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamic militancy’. ... "

Using quote marks does not transform facts, definitely does not veil truth, into or by a lie. It merely exposes one making the ridiculous attempt to be not taken seriously due to the attempted clever lie. 

................................................................................................

"10) Answers to Critical and Abiding Questions About Operation Koh Paima:

"Did the military inform the Prime Minister about the Kargil Operation?

" ... Only in March, General Aziz had asked one of his staff officers to hand him a map that he would use to brief the PM. Such a briefing pre-17 May did not, however, take place. Subsequently, the May Musharraf-Aziz telephone recordings left no doubt that the Kargil clique had undertaken Operation KP without specific clearance from the prime minister.[1149]

"Beginning with the November 1998 DCC meeting[1150] ... it was unlikely that the Kargil clique would have reached out to the same prime minister to get his support and clearance for Operation KP. Equally, the clique would have known that getting the prime minister’s support for a major operation in contested territory, just when arrangements for the Lahore Summit were under way, was unlikely. The prime minister was viewed by a section of the army high command and hard line analysts as being overly committed to peace with India, to the extent of a failing. Nawaz Sharif was, therefore, the most unlikely candidate to play a double game with India."

................................................................................................

"Did Pakistan’s Intelligence Agencies Fail over Kargil?

"The two agencies mandated to pick up intelligence are the Military Intelligence and the ISI. In the case of Kargil, while individuals from within the ISI and the MI both appear to have attempted to investigate, both these agencies failed to pick up anything indicating unusual troop movements as leads to the covert yet unfolding Kargil Operation. The ISI’s failure meant that this cross-service agency, reporting directly to the PM, was unable to report the moves and the implications of the Kargil Operation to the government. Similarly, the MI’s failure ensured that, except for the gang of four, no one within the army top brass knew of the Operation. This dual institutional failure also raised broader questions regarding the effectiveness of Pakistan’s intelligence in monitoring stray and subversive Pakistani elements within the country’s own defense institutions. If the remoteness of the theatre of operations prevented the ISI and MI from monitoring the crossing of the LOC, the failure to pick up unusual military and paramilitary troop movements, either of the NLI troops or the 19 Division or of the SSG, was symptomatic of a deficient intelligence setup. The ISI’s defense was that it does not follow any movements, including internal troop movements; therefore, unless the army informs them about its operational plans, the ISIwill not know. Meanwhile, with ISI and MI both outside of the planning and execution loop of Operation KP, they also failed to report Indian preparations for force deployment, including troops and weapon systems, in the zone of conflict. Significantly, among other factors, this complete ‘intel blindness’ also ruled out all possibility of any early and pre-emptive course correction during Operation KP."

So - all they can do is send terrorists to burn hotels and kill people in India?

................................................................................................

"Was Pakistan militarily on a winning curve when the July fourth withdrawal decision was made?

"Pakistan remained on a winning curve only until the Encounter Phase, when in early May Indian troops first discovered Pakistani troops across the LOC. That initial encounter was marked by artillery exchanges and with Indian induction of aerial power. From early June onwards, after the Indian Army command began discovering the extent ... there began a graduated Indian military retaliation. Operation KP had turned into a battle. For the Indian government ... "

No, it always was war, inflicted by pakis on India. 

" ... As the Indians deployed massive air power, disrupting Pakistan’s supply lines, hitting logistic dumps, targeting soldiers, and generating severe psychological pressure on the Pakistani troops, the original advantage to the Pakistani troops, of being positioned at heights and enjoying lethal strategic advantage over the Indian troops climbing to attack them, began to erode. On 4 June, Pakistan lost Tololing, the first peak, to the Indians. Thereon, as they came under severe artillery and aerial attacks and faced deployment of the Bofors guns, Pakistani troops began to lose posts and pickets. Pakistani troop casualties were also on the rise. ... "

Author's insinuations against India continue here, against soldiers and government both, as she praises pakis (for sitting on peaks) killing Indian soldiers battling uphill (with boulders pushed down), she credits Indian victories to Indian artillery shelling - as if pakis were raining flower petals on Indian soldiers! 

" ... Contrary to the allegations made against the prime minister that he had bartered away in Washington the military victory that the troops were winning in Kargil, the PM brought to a rapid close costly military, diplomatic, and political losses in Kargil."

................................................................................................

"Could the international community have forced India to buckle under Kargil pressure?

"There were neither individual nor collective compulsions for key members of the international community to have even advised Delhi to enter into negotiations on any outstanding bilateral dispute. The question of any member, including Pakistan’s strategic ally China, to have even advised, leave aside forced, India to buckle under the pressure from Operation KP and enter into negotiations over Siachen etc. with Pakistan, did not arise. In fact, any move likely to culminate in a military confrontation between Pakistan and India, the two hostile neighbors who had recently acquired nuclear weapons, would make the international community panic. And Pakistan had made the move—which was also being interpreted as nuclear blackmail by Pakistan. ... There was complete consensus within the key members of the international community, including the US, EU states, the UN, and also Pakistan’s closest strategic ally, China, that Pakistan should not be rewarded for Operation Kargil. ... "

................................................................................................

"Did Pakistan plan to deploy nuclear weapons in an all-out war?

"There were neither individual nor collective compulsions for key members of the international community to have even advised Delhi to enter into negotiations on any outstanding bilateral dispute. The question of any member, including Pakistan’s strategic ally China, to have even advised, leave aside forced, India to buckle under the pressure from Operation KP and enter into negotiations over Siachen etc. with Pakistan, did not arise. In fact, any move likely to culminate in a military confrontation between Pakistan and India, the two hostile neighbors who had recently acquired nuclear weapons, would make the international community panic. ... "

Later, the then paki army chief made similar assertions after his coup, but he wasn't doing so without thought, and it was clear blackmail. 

" ... but was not backed by substantive evidence. ... "

When someone wielding a gun pointing at you is threatening to shoot to kill, and showing no sign of civilised conduct, it's a rare one who'd ask a prophet if the threat was intended to be carried out - or ask the gun wielding thug for proof of intentions by demonstration of performance. 

" ... Pakistan military’s high command had sabotaged the Lahore Summit and should not be rewarded. Pakistan had to be made to retreat unconditionally. ... "

" ... As a key member of the clique later recalled, they conveyed to the country’s elected leadership, ‘We are holding this. Now you take advantage, whatever you can, at military and political level.’[1156] However, the unfolding Kargil crisis proved the clique’s nuclear deterrence calculation flawed on two counts: Operation KP did turn into a military conflict and, while Washington and other Security Council members did exercise forceful diplomacy, it was to force Pakistan to retreat from Kargil, not to reward Pakistan’s operation. The spin-off of this clique’s brinkmanship (read nuclear blackmail) was immensely negative. It undid the diplomatic gains accrued to Pakistan for its mature diplomatic and political moves after the nuclear tests."

"Three factors point to deliberate manipulation. First, Pakistan was not in such a desperate military situation that it would have needed to opt for nuclear weapons. Secondly, and most importantly, Pakistan did not then have the capability to the deploy nuclear weapons[1158], nor had the Indians picked any intelligence on Pakistan readying nuclear weapons. Thirdly, the Americans deliberately chose an attitude of benign neglect and ignored Indian moves to ready its nuclear missiles for use.[1159] ... "

When a thug breaks in at midnight wielding a gun pointed at you, a policeman with any sense is likely to not ask if the gun is likely to fire or has a bullet, and what's more, would excuse the threatened victims of break-in - for arming and retaliation. 

Especially so in US.

................................................................................................

"Was there a pro-India tilt in Washington during Kargil?

"With the Kargil blunder, Pakistan provided the Clinton Administration a priceless opportunity to invest in strategic trust-building with India. Throughout the crisis, Washington’s key policy men opened multiple lines of communication with their Indian counterparts. It began with the 27 May call by Inderfurth, who called the India ambassador, Naresh Chandra, to inform him about what Pickering had told the Pakistanis. Subsequently, on 16 June, Inderfurth met with Brajesh Mishra in Cologne. After the 23 June Islamabad meetings between US CENTCOM Chief General Zinni and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and army chief General Musharraf, State Department official Lanpher went to brief Delhi on the Islamabad meetings. Similarly, during the crucial Sharif-Clinton summit on 4 July, in a manner unprecedented in summit diplomacy, Clinton would call Vajpayee to brief him of the summit talks. Similarly, the Indian NSA and External Affairs Minister were also updated on Sharif-Clinton talks by their counterparts, NSA Sandy Berger and Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. The sole purpose was to share with the Indians every aspect of their communications with Pakistan."

It's unclear if the above is realistic evaluation or a skewed perception. 

................................................................................................

"Was there a role for the backchannel?

"Washington’s decision to maintain complete transparency with Delhi on its diplomatic and political exchanges with Islamabad had left Islamabad with no negotiating space. Guaranteed for itself a bailout by Washington and for Islamabad an embarrassing retreat, Delhi was left with no motive to engage with Islamabad. The backchannel initiative was, thus, squeezed of any possibility of success."

Translated into normal honest words, there was no space left for duplicity, lies et al that's normal paki everyday language! 

They tried, and desperately so, especially in the most obvious lies maintained simultaneously in internal and international arena, despite the fraud being quite obvious to international community - of claiming publicly that the men invading india were not paki military, for one, while maintaining that their pm was aware of the Kargil invasion all along even as he was hosting the PM of India, for another - but then complain about these lies, once exposed, destroying any possibility of respect for pakis. 

Thus the claim and complaint about lack of equal treatment on par with that meted out to India. 

................................................................................................

"Was the Prime Minister’s Washington dash necessary? 

"As the country’s chief executive, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could have ordered withdrawal of Pakistani troops, bringing an end to Operation KP. In keeping with Islamabad’s public position that the Kashmiri Mujahideen and not the Pakistani troops had seized the heights, Sharif could have announced that Islamabad would use its goodwill to urge the Kashmiri Mujahideen to return from IOK. This would have been consistent with the farcical ‘Mujahideen’ position Pakistan had illogically and clumsily maintained since the beginning of Operation KP. The international community would have been relieved that the battle between two nuclear powers had drawn to a close. The prime minister, however, chose to engage the Clinton Administration because he had hoped that Washington would make a public statement of support for the Kashmiris and of facilitating a political resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Sharif and his close political aides also believed that American involvement at this withdrawal stage would make it more palatable for the army high command since the army chief had himself had sought Washington’s engagement. However, as subsequent developments showed, neither did the Clinton administration make any public statements supporting the Kashmir struggle, nor did the Sharif-Clinton 4 July encounter influence the post-Kargil tensions that surfaced between the elected prime minister and the army chief."

Here, and throughout the book on this point, author tries subterfuge to veil a lie. She claims that the Washington trip was for Kashmir. 

It wasn't. 

Plain truth is that, despite the lies to the contrary position proclaimed repeatedly by author, in reality pakis were being not only pounded relentlessly by India but couldn't take it, and the paki dash to Washington was the bully going crying to the police asking him to stop his intended victim bashing him up, something the bully hadn't expected - and this failed, since everyone in the international community was aware, via satellite footage, of who had invaded. 

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"Could the Prime Minister have Ordered an Inquiry Against The Kargil Planners, Especially the Army Chief?

"Immediately after 4 July, tensions began developing between Sharif and Musharraf, with each worried about his survival. Investigating the why, who, and how of Operation KP, to establish responsibility and to take action against those who had launched an operation that had ended in such a fiasco, was, however, far removed from the prime minister’s mind. Civil-military coordination remained generally smooth almost throughout the Kargil period. Some briefings for the PM were held at the 10 Corps Headquarters. Most, however, were held in the PM House, where the army brass would bring its maps, etc. Often, meetings would almost take the form of the DCC but hardly any decision-making took place in these. The prime minister had, in fact, left the decision-making process during Kargil in military hands. Although Sharif had the constitutional authority to directly lead decision-making, he did not ‘interfere’[1160] and had simply supported the army.

"The thought of holding an inquiry against Musharraf is unlikely to have occurred to a PM who had supported Operation KP. It is true that the PM was first briefed of the Operation only after it was a done deed. The PM had also declined Musharraf’s rhetorical mid-stream offer to withdraw his troops from Kargil. In fact, there was written evidence of the Parliament’s bipartisan Defense Committee’s positive support for Operation Kargil in a letter written by the Committee chairman in praise of the army chief’s presentation."

And, unlike the army chief with his openly thug mindset, Nawaz Sharif remained honest enough and decent enough to not turn immediately on someone when it was a fiasco, despite his own self having neither been aware nor initiated it, and never in control, of the assault, until he was required as the figurehead to get help from US to get India to stop! 

"In the overall asymmetric civil-military relations in Pakistan’s power structure, there have been only two incidences when elected prime ministers sought to hold army commanders to account. One was when, after the 1971 surrender at Dhaka and the breakup of Pakistan, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto formed the Hamoodur Rehman Commission to conduct an inquiry into the military debacle. His army chief, Zia ul-Haq overthrew him in a military coup and hanged him following legally dubious court proceedings. The second was in 1988, when Prime Minister Junejo ordered an inquiry into the deadly Ojri Camp ammunition disaster. No sooner had he announced the inquiry, the military President Zia ul-Haq sacked him."

And the post Kargil coup wasn't different, either. 

"In the absence of a political culture of holding the military accountable, the reactions of military men when held accountable, the complexities of the initiation and, indeed, of the termination of Operation KP, the fiercely anti-Nawaz mood of the political opposition, and the dominant claim of the time that Kashmiri Mujahideen had fought the Indians across the LOC while Pakistani troops fought mostly along the LOC: all these militated against Sharif conducting a Kargil inquiry. ... "

Again author is verbose in attempting to veil facts - namely, that pakis never have had a properly functioning government of any sort other than a military dictatorship, never any culture or education system other than one rooted in invader and looters mindset carrying heritage of history of hordes from Central and West Asia invading, looting and destroying India- which included until 1947 the very land pakis were given, torn out of India - and no other aim set for their very nation other than destruction of India, as a result of this choice of the heritage. 

The so-called nation, in reality is no more than a jihadist factory grown around a  military base, for West for freedom of expensive usage against Russia, conceived in this mindset of invading and looting, and aim of destruction of India now grown to destruction of the world, and born of deliberately perpetrated massacres of thousands of Hindus in 1946-47 that were intended to, and succeeded in, forcing India to let a piece be torn out. 

................................................................................................

"Beyond fear, the contradictions of the Operation, Kargil produced serious frictions even in the post-Kargil phase. For example, while maintain its insistence that Mujahideen had been fighting in Kargil, how could the army receive the bodies of the martyred soldiers? Similarly, while insisting that only Mujahideen fought in Kargil, how could major programmes honouring the martyrs of Kargil be organized by the Sharif government? ... The army sought widely publicized honouring of the Kargil martyrs and of those having returned alive from across the LOC."

"Throughout history, the acid test of generals at war or in military operations has been the victories they have piled up. No general is more successful than the outcome of the war he leads. In more complex situations, like those in South Asia in the second half of the twentieth century, the yardstick for assessment has to be what have the wars have achieved. History has examples of individual brilliance leading armies to victories and steering nations away from disaster. Outstanding military commanders, such as Alexander, Khalid bin Walid, Genghis Khan, Julius Caesar, Salahuddin Ayyubi, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Vo Nguyen Giap, were men who wrested victory from situations where deep imprints of defeat were written. Bin Walid became the legendary general who, despite the numerical superiority of battle-hardened adversaries like the Romans and the Sassanids, piled up victories for the Rashiddun Caliphate. Napoleon ‘inspired a ragged, mutinous, half-starved army and made it fight’[1161] like a winning combination that few would fight before or after. Salahuddin, with his less experienced army, reversed the Crusaders’ winning streak with his grand victory in the decisive Battle of Hattin in 1187. Julius Caesar, personally brave in battle, was creative in tactics and engineering. There was Alexander, another general facing most armies who outnumbered his own, but always remaining undefeated. Genghis Khan, a masterful general who, through excellent military intelligence and tactics and by uniting nomadic tribes and confederation and his strategic raids, became the founder of the Mongol Empire, the largest contiguous empire in history, which included most of Eurasia and substantial parts of Eastern Europe. In more recent times, the Viet Minh Commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap, who led his men to defeat a technologically superior adversary by perfecting and applying a unique war technique, which was the most important dimension of the Vietcong’s overall political, economic, and diplomatic strategy for defeating the Americans.

"In the Kargil operation, the performance of the clique of commanders, the quality of their strategic planning, and of their command, all tell a different story. Yet the power equation, absence of any accountability, the absence of censure when it mattered, and bravado minus logic or sound analysis, have ruled the day. Despite repeated blunders, the commanders in charge escaped accountability."

What author is either unable to perceive, or unable to say, is that the paki military is a bully who, thrashed outside, comes home to beat up his wife and children, old parents and helpless siblings. 

................................................................................................

" ... Major General Akbar Khan, the lead military man in Pakistan's first attempt to regain Kashmir, had readily accepted Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's label of ‘raiders’ for the Pakistani forces involved in the 1947–48 ‘Acquire Kashmir’ Operation. ... "

Kashmir had been free until invaded by pakis, and it wasn't Nehru but Jinnah who pretended thst it was tribals, not his military. 

" ... The former general, eulogising the Pakistani ‘raiders’, suggested, ‘We may perhaps also qualify for sitting in that distinguished gallery of personalities like Genghis Khan, Timur Lang, Mahmud of Ghazni, and even Alexander.’ Interestingly, Pakistan's senior-most general equated his own men with history’s prized military leaders, who had raided, ravaged, and even reigned over foreign lands in the pre-Westphalian world. ... "

No, he was far more specific, in his dream and desire to belong to the club that was all comprised of invaders each from elsewhere and attacked India, invaded and looted India, sought to destroy India. 

He included none of the tall figures that were from or of India, despite his own homeland having been a part of India for ever until then less than a year ago, and his own ancestral origins being in India, 

And that's the divide, of India- and those that seek to destroy India. 

" ... This voluntary characterization of a state's army as ‘raiders’, in the context especially of the Kashmir operation, flowed from the juxtaposition in this Pakistani soldier's mind, of the Pakistan Army as a force for right, dedicated to undoing the wrong committed at the time of Pakistan's creation. ... "

That's convoluted fraud seeking to justify invasions, massacres and loot, with fraudulent claims of rights. 

British had in fact given far too much land to pakis in the first place, when plebiscite would have denied them all but East Bengal, which alone had voted for partition. Sindh was evenly divided in vote. Punjab had voted for unionists and NWFP was determined to stay with India - as was Baluchistan. Brits rode roughshod over all of the provinces in handing over the land pakis got, because it was military base needed for use of West against Russia. 

What those raiders were identifying with was, has always been, identity of invaders, looters, destroyers and killers wreaking havoc against India. This isn't due to perceived rights but simply a mindset of a robber. 

And they certainly had no 'right' to Kashmir, which, until pakis attacked, was independent. 

Author does lie on level after level, not very differently from a rotten onion. 

................................................................................................

" ... India's  systematic role in being a mid-wife to the 1971 breakup of Pakistan ... "

Because East Bengal hadn't been subjected to racist discrimination and linguistic chauvinism of denying freedom of language, not to mention massacre of three million and mass gang rapes of half a million, by paki military? 

Or was it because India prevented pakis from massacring further millions? 

No, author simply lies through the rest of the paragraph along the lines. 

................................................................................................

"The period from Kargil to the Coup epitomizes the inherent and continuing problems that Pakistan faces in three specific areas. These include two policy areas Pakistan-US relations, relations with India including Kashmir. There is also the third structural issue of thorny civil-military relations. While on the two policy areas of India and Kashmir, there are external players that influence the nature of the challenges that Pakistan faces, Pakistan too as an interlocutor contributes to the dynamic of the relationship. Meanwhile the structural problem of civil-military relations, rooted in the process of State formation, and the unequal stature and authority of the political and the garrison entities, evolved into asymmetrical strengths of both. Within the ensuing power chemistry of Pakistan, the army acquired a dominant role, paving the way to military coups."

"The asymmetry of authority in the army’s favor has continued because of the inability of most elected governments, except for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, to bolster its Constitutional authority through institutional decision-making. ... "

Here author mentions a civilian government's head who was legally executed by a military dictator post coup, as an exception to paki history of "authority in the army’s favor"! 

What could be a better example of the fraudulent writing by the author?!

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

"In 1989, Pakistan again turned towards Kashmir. ... Pakistan’s ISI began deploying its Afghan-trained muscle in the widespread and indigenous insurgency."

Pakis admit, there, the responsibility for terrorist attacks against India. 

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

"While the DG ISI concluded that it was not the ISI’s mandate to conduct this operation, the plan was not shelved. For the determined backers of the plan, those keen to settle scores with India on Siachen, those who would point to India’s repeated back tracking on the Siachen negotiations and those who insisted that diplomacy alone was not the way forward, the operation remained enticing. Its backers had decided that the Siachen offensive could be dropped from the plan but dropping the operation in total, was ruled out. 

"Lt. General Aziz Khan was one such man."

Here, pakis tacitly admit intentions of never stopping attacking India whether with terrorism or otherwise, until India is no more. On the internet and on public television debates such intentions have been, repeatedly, avowed, by several pakis, of various stature. Siachen is as much of an excuse as Kashmir, and the real intention is the centuries old dream of wiping out all civilisation in name of a creed. 

Egypt, Persia and much else was thus wiped out in a century by the barbarians, whose deadly onslaught India suffered ever since, until era of European colonial centuries. India survived, despite a horror perpetrated through centuries, that was several times as deadly as the holocaust perpetrated by nazis. 

There's no other purpose for existence of Pakistan internally other than finishing off this war against civilisation by destroying India and her culture once for all. External support for its creation was, of course, for use as military bases against Russia. But as a nation it doesn't have any soul any more than East Germany did. The wall, however, isn't concrete. It's jihadist mindset out to destroy world civilisation. Hence 2001 on the attacks throughout the world, preparations for which were begun in 1960s with the then paki military supremo using religious terrorism as weapon against Afghanistan - used subsequently by US against Russia. 

................................................................................................

"India Gifts Pakistan a Good Strategic Space 

"In May 1998, the world’s worst kept nuclear secret was out in the open. India and Pakistan, long known to be clandestine nuclear weapon states, had conducted bomb tests to openly establish their nuclear credentials. If there was a trigger that was needed to push the Pakistan-India relationship, already locked in distrust, constant covert hostility, and periodic open confrontation, further along the hostility path, it was provided by these May 1998 nuclear tests. 

"To prompt criticism by the global community, which had studiously ignored Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s 2 April letter, warning of India’s preparation for such tests, India conducted its nuclear explosions on 11 May and 13 May.[75] The tests, as India’s scientists verified were a “culmination of India’s weaponization programme.” US President Clinton said the tests were unjustified and they clearly created a dangerous new instability in the region.[76]  His National Security Advisor Samuel Berger announced that the United States was "deeply disappointed" by the Indian decision to "test nuclear weapons." [77] Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl said the tests were “in a way a direct challenge to the neighboring countries."[78] China urged the international community to "adopt a unified stand and strongly demand that India immediately stop development of nuclear weapons." [79]"

Notice that, although paki tests followed within far too short a period - a week? - to be a coincidence, they weren't criticised on par, but instead, supported by US and of course, China. 

So the only possible inference or logical conclusion possible is that pakis were there already, US knew, and had planned to comment regarding deplorability thereof, but then armtwist India into abandoning any intentions, plans or thoughts thereof, forever making India subject to terror from pakis. The surprise India threw had them change the plans, and make pakis do theirs in a short period and promptly pretend that India was the sole reason pakis had to do it. 

Reality, as Tarek Fateh states, is that pakis have no reason to have nuclear capabilities ranging far beyond furthest reach of Indian territory from paki borders, since their intentions aren't about attacking China. (Or Australia for that matter.) 

Reality, he points out, is that the aim is Israel, and thus the perpetual tomtomming of paki weapons as, not paki, but islamic. It's not about survival of a small part of India separated as needed by West for military bases for use against Russia, but as 'homeland of islam' - not Muslims, but islam - aimed at destruction of all else, beginning with India and Israel. 

................................................................................................

"Another unlikely voice on the Indian nuclear tests was that of Osama bin Laden (OBL). The only one to publicly advocate that Pakistan conduct the nuclear tests, OBL urged “the Muslim nation and Pakistan” to prepare for a Jihad which should “include a nuclear force.”[80] ... "

You'd think this have grabbed attention, this pointed coming together of OBL, paki nuclear drvice and jihad as intentions thereof. 

Author promptly sidelines by throwing detailed information as dust storm deflecting real questions. 

" ... Even if this OBL advice slipped the attention of the White House and State Department’s men at Foggy Bottom, who were focused entirely on South Asia’s unfolding nuclear saga, it had grabbed the attention of the CIA’s Counter-Terrorist Center. Ever since this center’s late February alert memo on the OBL threat, it was sharply focused on Osama. They were keen to capture him, either with or without the help of Kabul’s Taliban government. ... " 

Which was terrorists trained by oakis and imposed on Afghanistan in name of jihad, incidentally, and funded - to yhe tune of billions of dollars, not incidentally - by US, until they bit US back. 

Any lessons there about raising a Rottweiler as a pet for use against neighbours, learned yet? 

" ... In February, the US Ambassador to the UN, Bill Richardson, was in Kabul asking the Taliban to handover Osama, telling them, “Look, bin Laden is in your territory...he’s a bad guy.[81] Richardson was aware of the connections that America’s oil giant Unocal was developing with the Taliban. ... " 

Notice pointed omissions there, of connections between Unocal and subsequent government leaders in US, in place in 2001. 

"After making several trips to Kabul and Kandahar in November 1997 Unocal invited a Taliban delegation to its headquarters. A spokesman for the company, Unocal, said the Taleban were expected to spend several days at the company's headquarters in California.[82] Unocal was competing with the Argentinean firm Bridasfor on a multi-billion project to construct a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan into Pakistan. With the raging civil war in Afghanistan, Unocal remained hopeful of pushing the project forward. In fact, by end 1997, the oil giant had already contracted the University of Nebraska to begin training of around 140 Afghans in technical skills for pipeline construction. The training, interestingly, was to be held in Kandahar, the ideological headquarters city of the Taliban."

Notice, again, pointed omissions there, of connections between Unocal and subsequent government leaders in US, in place in 2001. 

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"Washington’s engagement with Afghanistan proceeded on several not necessarily complementary, commercial, diplomatic, security, intelligence, and counter-terrorism tracks. In spring, the Counter-terrorist center had made plans with its Islamabad-based CIA case officers and Afghan tribals to capture OBL. Since February, OBL, along with the Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, was running the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders. The front was an international declaration of war against the United States.[83] America was identified as the “distant enemy” and al-Zawahiri advocated “the need to inflict the maximum casualties against the opponent, for this is the language understood by the West, no matter how much time and effort such operations take.”[84]Several militants from Egypt, Bangladesh, Kashmir, and Pakistan had signed the Front’s manifesto, authored by OBL and al-Zawahiri."

And yet it was ignored, including the vital point, which shouldn't have come as shock, but known all along, regarding deep connections between OBL, pakis or rather ISI, and jihad intended against the world, including especially US, despite the latter having funded jihadist activities in Afghanistan because it was useful against Russia?

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"Clinton’s attention was also divided. In Washington, alongside the nuclear issue, red lights were flashing on the OBL issue and the growing threat of terrorism. On both sides of the Potomac, dedicated individuals were bracing America against a threat of a hitherto unprecedented level. On 22 May, Clinton appointed a Counterterrorism Czar at the White House. He signed the Presidential Decision Directive-62 entitled ‘Protection Against Unconventional Threat to the Homeland and American Overseas’. A new group, the Counter-Terrorism Security Group,was formed with the heads of the counterterrorism departments of the CIA, FBI, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Departments of Defense, Justice, and State as core members. Across the Potomac River from Foggy Bottom, the CIA’s Counter-Terrorist Center at Langley, in April, had made an elaborate night attack plan to strike OBL’s known abode, the Tarnak Farms, located close to Kandahar airport. The area was scouted and satellite photographs taken as Islamabad-based CIA case officers worked on preparing the plan with Afghan assets and with tribal leaders. Finally, the plan was aborted for fear of collateral civilian casualties and a lack of legal cover.[85]

"Returning to the issue of nuclear tests, the widespread view in Pakistan was that India’s tests went unmonitored in Washington because of the US’s benign neglect of its new strategic ally’s activities. An agitated Additional Secretary at the Foreign Office had conveyed Pakistan’s resentment in undiplomatic words. Around midnight on 11 May, the US deputy chief of mission (DCM) was called and given a demarche. In the demarche Pakistan complained that India and the US were in fact in cahoots with each other. The DCM asked his Pakistani counterpart if he wanted him to send “this shit” to the US? Pakistan did.

"Leading British experts indicated that, given the every-thirty-minute coverage of the Indian nuclear site Pokhran by US satellites, their missing the early warnings of the tests was highly unlikely.[86]In Washington, several analysts explained the Clinton Administration’s late 1997 decision to strike a strategic alliance with India as a major cause for the Administration’s failure to read even the obvious signs pointing to imminent nuclear testing by India, which was “poised to become a new Asian tiger.”[87] Reflecting this, a senior State Department official said, "There wasn't a voice in the wilderness…there was nobody anywhere – no voices saying, 'Watch out!’”[88]"

No one willing to credit India with intelligence despite the home grown nature of the tests? 

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"Significantly, within India the news of the tests was received with both surprise and panic. The news landed in the parliament while the BJP government’s nuclear policy was under discussion. Indian lawmakers erupted in a shouting bout at the news. The blame game began. Former Prime Ministers I.K. Gujral and H.D. Deve-Gowda said that Pakistan's tests were a reaction to India's tests. Similarly, former Defense Minister and President of the Samajwadi Party, Mulayam Singh Yadav, condemned the BJP-led government for "provoking" Pakistan's tests. Addressing Vajpayee, the leader of the Communist Party of India-(Marxist), Somnath Chatterjee, said: "It is a nuclear arms race that you have started in this region."[92] 

"As if in support of Islamabad’s stance in Islamabad, the Congress pointedly blamed Vajpayee for “using incendiary rhetoric that set off a regional nuclear arms race.” In its statement, the Congress party said the tests were a "grave development". Fearing a regional nuclear arms race, they called for restraint by the Hindu nationalist-led government. But Vajpayee denied that India's action had forced Pakistan to respond. He, on the contrary, blamed Pakistan for prompting the Indian tests. Vajpayee said, “In fact, it was Pakistan's clandestine preparation that forced us to take the path of a nuclear deterrent.""

Despite being then much abused, despitehis open, candid, and learned persona, respect for the then PM of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, has only grown since then. 

His then opposition, meanwhile, has descended to new levels of falsehood and abusive speech, evident to a large extent even in these quotes above. 

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"India’s army chief V.P. Malik was measured in his reaction. "We are no more a soft state and we are not a push-over when it comes to national security concerns." He conceded "a situation of symmetry has finally been established among the country's neighbors now. If there was any ambiguity earlier about Pakistan's nuclear capability, it no longer exists.” On a realistic note, the general said, “Now it is known to the world and it is better this way."[93] ... "

Measured words from man wiser than all of the then opposition. 

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"Islamabad’s official mantra for its own May 28 nuclear tests was that Pakistan’s tests were “defensive and responsive.” The prime minister himself reassured the international community that Pakistan’s “nuclear weapon systems are meant only for self-defense.”[94] Addressing global disarmament concerns, he said Pakistan would “continue to support the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, especially in the Conference on Disarmament.”[95] Pakistan also would engage in a “constructive dialogue” with other countries “on ways and means to promoting these goals…” 

"To the Indian leadership, Sharif’s message was clear: “We are prepared to resume the Pakistan-India dialogue to address all outstanding issues including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as peace and security. These should include urgent steps for mutual restraint and equitable measures for nuclear stabilization.” He reiterated Pakistan’s earlier offer of a non-aggression pact to India “on the basis of a just settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.”"

This amounts clearly to a veiled threat of nuclear attack intended by pak against India, whether or not India hands over anything demanded promptly. 

But the assertions about self defence as sole intended use of paki nuclear weapons are falsified not merely by this threat delivered to India; it's far more so by the range pakis acquired, that went far beyond the furthest territory of India from paki borders. 

Paki device, labelled and tomtommed from beginning as 'islamic bomb' by pakis, is and always has been intended for jihad, which is against every nonmuslim by definition of the term.  

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"Seeking to stay clear of ideological and religious blocs, Pakistan had framed the tests solely as a defensive step forced on it by India. ... "

Every one of three parts of that is a lie. 

" ... Having had its nuclear program labeled as being dedicated to the making of an ‘Islamic bomb’, Pakistan was wary of linking any cause other than that of its own defense to its nuclear tests. As a testimony to its success in managing this, the Israelis understood to be the first target of any Islamic bomb, did not wave any red flag after Pakistan’s tests. Instead, a reassured Israeli Deputy Minister Silvan Shalom said that Israel “did not see the Pakistani nuclear tests as a threat to Israel.” In an interview to the Israel Defense Forces Radio, he explained, "We do not view Pakistan as our enemy. Pakistan has never been Israel's enemy, Pakistan has never threatened Israel.”[96] There were fears, but only to a negligible extent, of an ‘Islamic bomb’, or of Pakistan exporting technology to other Muslim countries; indeed, according to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a former US Ambassador to India, “Pakistan’s Ghauri missile demonstrated Pakistan’s plan to re-establish Muslim rule over all of India.” [97]"

One, that Moynihan seeing that as reassuring says more about him and his likes, who prefer military juntas in most of nations except the few seen as their ancestral homes in Europe - specifically, England, France and Germany - and this has little to do with anything but racist abrahmic attitude. 

Two, Israel declaring not feeling threatened is as much falsified by paki furore over Palestinian concerns real or otherwise, as by paki acquisition of long range nuclear capabilities far beyond furthest territory of India from paki borders, but enough to strike Israel. 

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" ... Clearly, for Bhutto this was the cumulative learning from the 1948 Pakistan-India encounter and the 1965 and 1971 defeats: Nuclear power was now indispensable. “We will eat grass if need be,” Bhutto had thundered. Similarly, Bhutto had said “we will fight a thousand years” to resist Indian hegemony."

It's quite well known who talked about "a thousand years" before him, and not too long before either, just a few decades. 

But in his stance of assaults against India for ever, this then PM of pak - who was hanged to death by paki regime subsequently - was, as most pakis do, only declaring intentions to carry on heritage of barbarians Invading and destroying India for most of last millennium and a half. 

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" ... However, ultimately, served by seasoned gurus like Shahis, twenty years later Pakistan stood vindicated."

Chiefly through theft of nuclear blueprints, and as if that blot wasn't enough, by dishonouring father of paki device for religious reasons - apart from stocking Chinese gifts of nuclear variety. 

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" ... Pakistan was sending trained militants, to keep an already restive Kashmir on the boil. The message from the Indian government’s most influential voice, its Home Minister and BJP’s former president, was clear: “Any further misadventure on Indian territory shall be dealt with on a proactive basis.” ... "

That's nth admission by author, sourced from pakis judging by wording, that Pakistan has perpetrated terrorism against India for decades. 

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" ... In fact, increased violence in Kashmir had further augmented global panic. ... "

If there were any truth in that, the said alarm would have set off in January 1990, when accelerated genocide of Kashmir nonmuslims forced their exodus out of the valley. 

So the so-called global panic was only the abrahmic onslaught against the sole ancient civilisation still living, unlike the rest of the world fallen prey to Abrahmic-II, Abrahmic-III or Abrahmic-IV, last bring communism, which has killed Buddhism in China and attempted that in Tibet, using genocides as well. 

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"With unusual candor, the daughter of Joseph Korbel, who had presented the best summation of the Kashmir problem in his book Danger in Kashmir (Princeton: 1954), addressed the Kashmir problem. On 3 June talking to press reporters, the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said of Kashmir, “It is a problem that came about the minute that the partition proposals came about ... "

True. 

Rest quoted is the garbage spiel that's paki excuse for terrorist activities, namely, religion. But if that excuse were valid, minorities in rest of India- at least muslims, if not others who werent killing Hindus - should long ago have met exactly the same fate they did in pak in 1947, and pak forced in 1990 via terrorist attacks in Kashmir. 

Fact is, India has more muslims than pak, and this number - and proportion thereof in total population, as well - has grown since 1947, chiefly via not only the overpopulation tendencies gone completely unchecked, but also a deliberate inculcation of a doctrine of taking over India via simply growing in number while reducing that of Hindus by killings and rioting, and abduction of young girls via fraudulent representation. 

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"Within a week on 10 June, dismissing Indian agitation over the P-5 statement on Kashmir, US Assistant Secretary of State Karl Indurfurth said, “Kashmir issue is a fact of life in the region and cannot be wished away. We are absolutely convinced that it is time now for India and Pakistan to meet, to resume the dialogue and address the fundamental issue that had divided the two countries for 50 years.” ... "

That's another fraud perpetrated by pakis, nonstop. Inherent in the false representation is the reality that nothing short of a complete takeover of India and wiping out all non muslims, whether via massacres or conversions or abductions of all nonmuslim females, or all of the above, will stop pak from either attacking India with false accusations in global platforms or physically via terrorists, any more than hundreds of billions of dollars aid from US stopped pakis, from not only being party to attacks against West beginning 2001 but hiding OBL in a secure house more of a fortress, within a short distance of what US terms 'West Point of Pakistan'. 

Pakistan was conceived as a nation carrying heritage of barbaric invaders who attempted complete destruction of India and her civilisation of antiquity with all her treasure of knowledge, as Moynihan realised and said explicitly - however nonchalantly or even happily - and this aim has only grown to encompasses rest of the world, chiefly West, along with India, as targets. 

" ... The communiqué called on India and Pakistan to “avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, or other provocative acts.”[107]"

This relates far more to the thousands of terrorists trained and sent by pakis, however blandly equal it seems. 

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Author now spews not only false but fraudulent but total, complete garbage, having quoted various convenient statements from different sources, pushed chiefly by petrodollars. 

"In linking its nuclear weaponization to forcing through its own version of a resolution on Kashmir, India had clearly committed a diplomatic faux pas. Moreover, the Indian President’s letter to the US President linking Indian nuclear tests to the Chinese threat did not succeed in disrupting the Pakistan-India equation in global perception and thereby deny Pakistan justification for nuclear tests. Few countries accepted India’s original justification that the ‘China factor’ prompted its nuclear tests. All recognized that Pakistan-India relations were responsible for the beginning of a nuclear arms race in South Asia and the undermining of the non-proliferation regime. 

"The belligerence at display, by a section of India’s Hindu nationalist leadership, immediately after the nuclear tests was in contrast to Pakistan’s studied statements. Gandhi’s India, having consciously crafted its peace image since inception, had now taken to some reckless nuclear brandishing. India’s position, even for the US seeking a strategic alliance, was hard to defend. In fact, the US took the lead in pushing India’s skeleton from inside the closet, Kashmir, into a global limelight.

"By contrast, Pakistan was in a better diplomatic position. Even if grudgingly, and despite its statements to the contrary, the world was constrained to acknowledge that, after the Indian tests and clearly anti-Pakistan rhetoric, the die had been cast for Pakistan, which was obliged to conduct the tests. Islamabad’s simultaneous dialogue offer to India, saying “no” to an arms race, and the renewed commitment to disarmament helped position Pakistan in a comfortable strategic space–of a kind Pakistan had seldom experienced. India’s own follies had helped create this space."

Had any of that been true, it wouldn't have reversed quite so dramatically in quite so short a period of time, regardless of US president taking action regarding OBL. 

But fact is, pakis fraud was then exposed in a way that they can neither confirm nor deny, instead questioning US account by asking, repeatedly on internet, for a proof of the person of OBL being found and killed - "where's the body" - and generally going into a denial mode, not only about OBL but almost everything, with an "how do you know? Were you there?", whenever facts don't suit their own falsehoods but can't be denied. 

................................................................................................

"The world seemed to be where Pakistan wanted. It acknowledged the unresolved issue of Jammu and Kashmir as the root cause of India-Pakistan problems, acknowledged that the international community had a role in resolving the problem, and offered to do so. Hence, several factors conspired to position Pakistan in a better strategic space than it had been for a long time."

Until pakis were, once for all, exposed as fraudulent and cheats in general, by not only US discovering location of OBL but also the financial fraud by pakis regarding several hundred billion dollars in aid given by US that were not only unaccounted but, apart from going into various pockets, were discovered having been used to help terrorists attacking US forces. 

Hillary Clinton had openly stated to the effect that pakis are so used to lying, it's difficult to know if they know they are lying. 

................................................................................................

"The Peace-Makers

"In Vajpayee, Sharif had a serious partner for peace. Senior to Sharif in age and political experience, Vajpayee was a certified peace veteran. ... "

Author has a penchant for spewing venom regarding Hindus at every possible opportunity, and does do whenever she mentions the then PM of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. 

Also, she keeps mentioning South Block in a poisonous way, insinuating somehow that the bureaucracy in Government of India is responsible for Pakistan's problems. 

Reality is, despite hundreds of billions of dollars given freely by US in aid to pakis apart from other hundreds of billions of dollars for purposes of "fighting terror", pakis have not only shortage of fuel and other necessities but food, as well, repeatedly reported during last decade, apart from the lack of education and health. 

This is due, chiefly, to the said hundreds of billions of dollars having been spent partly on arming and training terrorists for assaults against nrighbouring countries India and Afghanistan, and rest having been simply stolen by paki military generals. 

................................................................................................

" ... The Sharif-Vajpayee 29 July meeting in Colombo, on the sidelines of the SAARC summit, was finalized. Ahead of this meeting a preliminary political back channel was established. Nawaz Sharif deputed a PML Senator and former Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Akram Zaki, to meet with Vajpayee’s point man on National Security, the astute former diplomat-turned politician Brajesh Mishra in London. [116] Neither the Mishra-Zaki channel nor the foreign secretaries meeting helped bridge the gap at Colombo. The Indian military’s mood too was evident from the Indian defense minister’s 18 July declaration that India “needs to hold on to Siachen, both for strategic reasons and wider security in the region."[117] ... "

That's the typical vicious trick, labeling realistic necessities of others as 'moods', apart from the insinuations of various similar and other kind about India and Hindus throughout the book. 

................................................................................................

"The two prime ministers first held a one-on-one meeting[123] at the Taj Samudra hotel followed by a delegation level meeting.[124] Vajpayee was keen for a joint statement on commitment to peace. ... "

Author makes a horrible mistake in the name of the Taj Samudra, whether typo or, deliberately, otherwise. 

" ... Vajpayee maintained that the primary issue was “Pakistan-supported cross-border terrorism.” The Pakistani team unsuccessfully urged the Indians that the unresolved Kashmir dispute be reflected as a central issue in the joint statement. The 90- minute Sharif-Vajpayee meetings in Colombo failed to produce a road map for further dialogue. Firstly after the first-ever meeting between the two prime ministers no joint statement came forth."

Is it possible for the author to visualise peace talks with a bully while being physically assaulted, with family members in the process of being killed? 

Or is that the only way pakis know, of holding 'peace talks'? By holding a knife to throat of others? As done in the countless conversions, whether via fraudulent marriages or otherwise, to their own religion? 

................................................................................................

" ... India linked dialogue on Kashmir with Pakistan ending support to Kashmiri freedom fighters."

There's the fraudulent language describing paki trained and armed terrorists as "Kashmiri freedom fighters".

Even in Afghanistan, Afghans know that the taliban are pakis, although they - and paki regime - lie, calling them Afghans. 

Locals know the difference. 

"Subsequent statements by Indian officials suggested the possibility of Indian attacks on “terrorist sanctuaries across the LOC.” Vajpayee warned Pakistan that his government will “fully back” the Indian Army to “repulse the nefarious designs.”[130] ... "

When, post 2014, this was done, pakis denied it, just as they had denied OBL had been found and neutralised by US forces in Abbottabad. 

" ... Meanwhile human rights organizations reported that Indian troops were responsible for raping, torturing, and executing Kashmiri people.[132]"

This is a double lie, on the style of those perpetrated repeatedly against Israel. One, it wasn't "human rights organizations" who "reported", but jihadists and pakis who propagated that lie; two, when investigations were carried out by global organisations, no such viilages or victims of atrocities were to be found. 

Similar lies, for example one regarding a ten year old Palestinian boy supposedly shot dead by Israeli forces but that, when investigated by a New York set of young students, in reality could only have been shot by Palestinians, have been propagated before. 

For that matter there was also the lie about mid 1980s killings in Beirut that were blamed on Israel, but subsequently that was discovered to have been a false accusation as well. 

" ... Sharif knew that continued operations by the militants in the Valley, which was infested with Indian security forces, was unlikely to resolve the Kashmir dispute. ... "

Notice the poisonous mindset, (author's in particular and paki in general), that pretends that paki trained terrorists exported to massacre in India are legitimate, while an ancient nation's security forces including Indian military are an "infestation". 

" ... For Kashmiris, the human rights conditions deteriorated ... "

"Deteriorated" is false unless the jihadist position, namely, that nonmuslim lives are of no account, is to be universally accepted, and a doctrine that teaches killing of all nonmuslims is to be not only lauded but necessary, is accepted by all the world. That is the jihadist aim. 

Else, it's impossible that the statement above by author can be said to have any validity if situation in Kashmir were compared with either January 1990 or in general with 1947, when, both times, several thousands of nonmuslims were massacred, forcing others to flee - if possible at all. 

In 1947 Nehru, the then PM of India, had refused to help Hindus attempting to save their own lives, as per Gandhi's wish that Hindus die happily murdered by Muslims but not flee; as a result, over a hundred thousand Hindus had been massacred in POK. 

In 1990, Hindus in Kashmir were helped to exodus instead of being left to be massacred, to the tune of half a million, by paki terrorists infiltrated in Kashmir from across the border. 

"By July, Nawaz Sharif’s government was dealing with a growing problem of sectarianism and militancy. To Strobe Talbot, US Deputy Secretary of State [133],Nawaz complained that his 1997 victory was not against Benazir Bhutto alone. He had won against the “right-wing radicals” whom he claimed had wanted an Iranian-style revolution in Pakistan."

" ... Nawaz would also raise the specter of the threat that was increasingly worrying Washington, the Islamic militant threat."

Not "specter", it was reality, begun by pak military dictator in 1960s onwards, and used by US for war against Russia, chiefly in Afghanistan, but also Chechnya. Now those victories won, the terrorists were confident of victory against India, and not only in one state of Jammu and Kashmir either. 

................................................................................................

"Just before Sharif left for Colombo, Talbot met him on 22 July to convince him of the need to sign up on the non-proliferation mechanisms. Part of the tool-kit Talbot carried with him, which he naively believed would help him ‘fix’ Pakistan’s position on non-proliferation, was a letter from his President. It did not work. Sharif was irked by Clinton’s reference to Pakistan’s nuclear test as a “mistake.” Sharif’s retort was political and convenient, not strategic and straightforward. “If I had not made the mistake, as the President calls it, someone else would be sitting in the Prime Minister’s House right now. That someone probably would be a fanatic. We have no dearth of those.”[134]  Adding more flair to perhaps his real fear, Pakistan’s prime minister added, “Either that, or the country would have gone to the dogs.”[135] ... "

That was realities of paki situation. 

" ... This kind of talk was clearly ‘conduct unbecoming’ for a country’s prime minister. Although militancy and sectarianism were on the rise in Pakistan, such comments by the country’s prime minister to a US official were highly inappropriate. Unsurprisingly recalling the conversation, the US official wrote, “I could not imagine hearing something similar in Delhi.”[136]"

Because it wouldn't be true of realities in India, unless pakis - beyond their dreams - succeeded in wiping out all nonmuslims. 

................................................................................................

"Emerging stress on the western front: CIA, OBL, Taliban, and the ISI

Look at the author's clubbing of CIA with "OBL, Taliban, and the ISI". 

Tells much about their perspective and thinking, doesn't it! That of the author in particular, and pakis in general, that is. 

"Militancy as a tool to flag the Kashmir issue was now boomeranging. For Pakistan too, the law of diminishing returns had kicked in. Pakistan generally and the ISI specifically, were being blamed for most militant activities in India ... " 

Including in Kashmir. 

" ... Kashmir. ISI-CIA’s principal partnership objective, of avenging the US defeat in Vietnam by defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan, had been achieved, with the monumental additional bonus of the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. ... "

Pakis haven't stopped bragging about this victory that they have considered personal, with "some help", "only money" from US; and this had brought them confidence they'd massacre all Hindus throughout India, before and after breaking up and/or conquering India. 

................................................................................................

" ... Essentially, the partnership had run its course. The former partners were now entering a conflict zone. The CIA watched with great apprehension the beginnings of triangular ties between the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the Kashmiri Mujahedeen. While the Clinton Administration itself engaged with the Taliban, it was the ISI, as principal mentors and patrons of the Taliban and the Kashmiri Mujahedeen, which the CIA viewed as being indirectly responsible for this three-way nexus. Increasingly, the CIA would expect the ISI to leverage its control and good will with the Taliban to rein in Osama bin Laden, the al-Qaeda chief. While Washington was not confrontational with bin Laden’s hosts, it was getting weary of them. The CIA’s Counter-terrorist Cell was expanding the focus of its operations to Pakistan’s borderlands."

Funny how abrahmic fellow-feeling blinkered them to reality. 

................................................................................................

"In early August, al-Qaeda struck and struck hard. On 7 August, it conducted signature attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam, leaving dozens dead. ... "

Notice the laudatory, almost exilarant, tone describing it - "struck and struck hard."; which isn't modified for the rest of the paragraph, at least. 

" ... The very next day, not in a connected but related development, on 8 August, al-Qaeda’s hosts, the Taliban, with support from the pro-Pakistan Mujahedeen group led by Gulbadin Hikmatyar, managed a decisive victory in Mazar-i-Sharif. US intelligence claimed that intercepts proved that members of a Pakistan-based sectarian group, Sipah-i-Sahaba, and Pakistan military men also participated in the offensive. ... "

It would only be idiotic or pretenders who'd act surprised at this. 

" ... A Hazara massacre followed the Taliban victory. ... "

This is racism of pakis and Afghans, exposed in not its worst, but its normal manifestation, not unlike killings of Hindus or Jewish people. 

Any doubts as to this racism, can be cleared by internet posts from pakis describing themselves as handsome unlike "short, dark and ugly Indians" - an attitude given its reply when a Tamil former Indian consul to Pakistan faces an average paki, frequently seen on public debates on TV, are noticed as to looks, after reading such posts by pakis. 

Alternatively, one can read the autobiography by Ms. (Tehmina?) Durrani, now a member of family of Sharif. 

" ... A Taliban attack on the Iranian Consulate, in which one journalist and seven intelligence officers were killed, prompted Washington’s counter-terrorism machinery to zero in on Pakistan for monitoring and countering bin Laden’s activities." 

Finally! 

Light dawns! 

................................................................................................

"Buoyed by their Mazar victory, the Taliban were gaining in self-confidence. Around the same time, Washington would seek their acquiescence in what was becoming the Clinton’s Administration immediate and primary security concern. Washington wanted Osama bin Laden, alive or dead. The intelligence chatter was that he had moved in the Pakistan-Afghan border areas. CIA Counter-terrorist Center planned the August strike. General Ralston visited the Pakistan Army General Jehangir Karamat to inform him of their Tomahawk missiles flying through Pakistan airspace lest he mistakes them for Indian missiles. Accordingly, through the hour of the planned attack, Ralston arranged to have dinner with the Pakistan Army chief to ensure there were no costly misunderstandings."

This is author preparing ground for tacit justification of NY attacks by terrorists. 

"The Cruise missiles were fired as planned. But it was an unsuccessful attack. Despite intelligence reports of bin Laden’s impending arrival, he never came. Eight men in al-Qaeda training camps were killed, probably men from a Pakistani sectarian outfit being trained to kill. For the reported Pakistani civilian deaths along the border, the US President wrote a letter of regret to the Pakistani prime minister. Later, the reports were proven incorrect. In the coming months, Washington intensified its trailing of Osama bin Laden."

Obviously unsuccessfully, since he was found in Abbottabad. 

Perhaps he'd been there, for decades,with Afghanistan being a ruse by pakis? 

"The matter of “sanctuaries” was also raised by Washington.  Announcing the Cruise missile strikes against several al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and an alleged chemical weapons facility in Sudan, Clinton told the Americans, “There will be no sanctuaries for terror. We will defend our people, our interests, and values.”[137] The issue of sanctuaries was to haunt Pakistan-US relations for almost two decades."

The said "Pakistan-US relations" were always pretended by pakis to have been a friendship between equals, despite the one way street of flow of hundreds of billions of dollars. 

................................................................................................

"Breakthrough at Durban

"For Pakistan-India relations, the 29 August to 3 September NAM summit in Durban proved the breakthrough event. The two peace-seeking prime ministers had ensured that the groundwork was done by their respective sides. Nawaz Sharif had inducted his Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz as the new Foreign Minister. Aziz replaced the former military Captain (and military ruler Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s son) Gohar Ayub. ... "

The father, incidentally, had proposed unification to Nehru, who was shortsighted enough to not only refuse, but do so expressing a thinking proved false soon enough by China attacking in 1962. 

" ... Sartaj Aziz, an economist, a former international bureaucrat, and two-time Finance Minister in Sharif’s government, was Nawaz Sharif’s trusted man."

" ... Prime Minister Vajpayee warned “third parties” to stay out of the dispute.[138] ... "

" ... Pakistan’s use of militancy to pressurize India and to draw global attention to the Kashmir question often drew criticism. ... "

Anyone else reminded of Sudetanland? UK had then openly pressured Czechoslovakia to give in, and that, instead of satisfying Hitler, had only snowballed - rather, fireballed - into WWII. 

And in this case, the current administration of US has offered Afghanistan, sacrificing females thereof, to taliban, a sham of a front for pakis. 

................................................................................................

" ... Transferring the Afghan Mujahedeen phenomenon onto the Kashmir context was backfiring. It was proving divisive for the Kashmiri struggle and was also alienating the non-violent movement. At home in Pakistan, its blowback was increased sectarian killings."

................................................................................................

Yes, pile on the jihadists and racism, lack of forethought by paki regimes beyond exploiting "geostrategic location", everything onto india - including lack of education, health, and any industry other than terrorism. 

" ... By announcing his dialogue offer, with the caveat that “the dialogue must be comprehensive and not just focused on Kashmir”[139], Vajpayee assured the Indians that his offer was conditional on Pakistan’s commitment to stop “cross-border terrorism.”"

" ... Kashmir, the Indian prime minister categorically stated, however, “was and would remain an integral part of India.” The "real problem" in Kashmir was one of cross-border terrorism."

Notice the denial by author, and presumably by her paki sources, that terrorists attacking India was a concern. 

So by paki logic, acquisition of territory for Islamic countries, chiefly for pak, supersedes terrorists trained killing civilians of those countries,which is in accord with foundations of jihadist ideology - namely, that nonmuslim lives not only for not matter, but must be finished off. 

................................................................................................

"Almost a decade into India’s failure to crush the Kashmiri freedom movement, for the international community Delhi was increasingly framing the movement as a terrorist movement. And with evidence of Pakistani men, munitions and military training aiding the indigenous freedom struggle Delhi believed it could superimpose the ‘terrorism’ problem upon the political struggle. Additionally, sections of the freedom movement had taken to violent ways, harming civilians and hence aiding  Indian propaganda."

Lies galore there. 

It is nothing but terrorism exported by pak from across birder via paki trained terrorists bearing weapons and ammo, stolen from what US provided for a US prescribed use in Afghanistan. 

"Indian strategy was to dovetail cross-border terrorism into the emerging global level concern regarding terrorism. Delhi began equating what it considered “cross-border terrorism” with the Taliban problem in Afghanistan. The concern about terrorism was fast spreading.  Washington had also attacked Sudan. India had argued that the common factor linking terrorism, the Taliban, and the cross-border terrorism it faced was Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI. At Durban, Vajpayee advocated a “concerted international action” against terrorism. In a veiled criticism of the United States ignoring India’s concerns, he said “terrorism could not be fought unilaterally or selectively.”"

Truth of what India said is found, not merely in common sense, but internet posts from pakis bragging about various victories using terrorism. 

But notice the author's twisting of language to make it seem that terrorism against India by pakis is only fair, and of no concern, especially to anyone not Indian, because Indian lives are of course - so is paki position - of no importance whatsoever, being considered not human if not muslim, as per islamic law. 

................................................................................................

"New York Bonding

" ... However, unknown to these two peace-partners, a sharply contrasting movement in a parallel universe was taking place. From the Himalayan peaks, a clique of senior Pakistani Generals had interpreted the post-May global concern for the settlement of Kashmir as an opportunity to ... force Delhi’s hand on Kashmir, or at least on Siachen. ... "

" ... It would take none less than the prime ministers to put behind them the chronic hostility and distrust that had virtually become part of the DNA of the Pakistan and Indian civil and military bureaucracy. ... "

If they weren't thwarted by paki military. 

................................................................................................

" ... After the New York meeting, names of back-channel envoys were exchanged. India nominated former journalist R.K Misra.[148] Nawaz Sharif’s choice was his Principal Secretary Anwar Zahid.[149] However, Zahid died shortly after.[150]Niaz Naik,  a former Foreign Secretary, was the second choice.

"The seeds for the historic Lahore summit were sown in New York. At the lunch meeting that Sharif hosted for Vajpayee, he invited the Indian prime minister to visit Pakistan. And, when the two Prime Ministers agreed on starting a Delhi-Lahore bus service, Nawaz Sharif invited Vajpayee to travel on that bus. Vajpayee agreed."

" ... Pakistan was conditionally willing to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. First, it had to be in conditions “free from coercion and pressure”, which meant the international community had to remove the sanctions. Secondly, it was necessary that India also signed the CTBT. Both conditions were unlikely to be fulfilled."

Hence, precisely, the conditions? 

Of course.  

................................................................................................

"Vajpayee, meanwhile, detailed the nature of bilateral dialogue decided for October. He announced that the two sides had decided to end cross-LOC firing and discuss defense matters, including the question of deploying nuclear missiles, in the October dialogue. "A new era in Indo-Pakistani co-operation is being opened," a satisfied Vajpayee told the press.

"This was happening in less than a hundred days after having conducted the nuclear tests ... Hence within months of the nuclear tests, new vistas for peace and cooperation had opened up."

As if paki military and ISI would ever allow that! They, quite rightly, fear gor thror own existence, if there were peace, trade, goodwill and peace allowed to prevail across the border. 

A colleague had, some time in late eighties, remarked to the effect that the East Germany premiere wasn't happy about the developments towards German unification. 

"Of course", one could easily see why - "he's going to lose a job!" 

And that'd be true of those, too, who have been behind paki attacks against India, whichever state they were perpetrated in. 

................................................................................................

"Peace Gets Going

" ... preparation of the Lahore Summit was overseen by the political leaders, the prime minister and the foreign ministers, and was not left to bureaucrats alone.

"Significantly, around this time, on 7 October, against the backdrop of continuous political unrest, the prime minister decided to send the Army chief General JehangirKaramat packing. The newspapers had carried front-page headlines that, during his lecture at the Naval War College, the army chief had recommended the setting up of a National Security Council to act as a joint civil-military arbiter of the nation's affairs.[159] A livid Nawaz Sharif, driving on his way to Murree, wanted the defense ministry to simply issue a notification announcing the army chief’s dismissal. Sharif‘s cool-headed Principal Secretary, the seasoned bureaucrat Saeed Mehdi, advised him to meet with General Karamat personally. The General was called in to meet the prime minister. The prime minister let him know he could not work with him. The army chief sent in his resignation. The civilian chatter was that the matter was “amicably settled.”

"Interestingly, General Karamat been put to the test for his commitment to the Constitution during the prime minister’s 1997 confrontation with the judiciary and the President Farooq Leghari. The general was called upon to act by all sides yet he acted strictly within Constitutional parameters. After the departure of the President, General (retd) Iftikhar Ali Khan, the former Chief of General Staff and then Defense Secretary, made a statement on behalf of the government generously complimenting the army’s role, stating, "After the removal of the 8th Amendment, the army has taken its orders from the prime minister and not the President… The army's positive (sic) role during the crisis would be remembered forever."[160] Such praise had seemed unnecessary yet not unprecedented.[161] Perhaps deep in trouble and swamped by endless criticism, Nawaz Sharif, like all politicians, was haunted by the fear of some military general lurking on the side planning his exit. ... "

Oh, is that what he foresaw? 

Would that be remarkable as a vision of future? 

Or not so, considering it's routine in pak? 

................................................................................................

"Karamat’s dismissal was not the first of a forces chief by Nawaz Sharif. In May 1997, after a probe into the controversial Agosta submarine deal had established the culpability of the Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Mansur ulHaq, the prime minister asked the then Secretary Defense H. R. Pasha to “advise” the naval chief to resign. The naval chief did resign. That earned Sharif praise from the media. A leading independent weekly wrote, “Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif deserves high praise for relieving Admiral MansoorulHaq of his duties. The navy chief embroiled his service in unbecoming controversy, gave it a bad name and undermined its morale.”[163]

"After sending General Karamat home, Prime Minister Sharif appointed General Pervez Musharraf, then serving as Corps Commander Mangla, as the new chief.  Musharraf, who superseded two generals, was appointed on the recommendation of his key aide and Minister for Petroleum Chaudhary Nisar.  Nisar’s brother Iftikhar Ali Khan, the Defense Secretary and a retired general, would vouch for Musharraf as a professional non-political general.  Elected prime ministers always factored in these considerations, hoping they would prove a safety valve against coup-makers. The widespread chatter on possible reactions from the GHQ to the unprecedented removal of their chief soon died down. It appeared that the men in khaki would remain subservient to the orders of the elected prime minister."

In pak? 

Ha! 

................................................................................................

"Within days of his appointment the new army chief set about bringing his own men into key posts. In fact, within three days of his appointment, he had changed the commanders of the three strategic corps: the Lahore 4 Corps, Rawalpindi 10 Corps, and Karachi 5 Corps. While in doing so the new chief was exercising his institutional authority, yet this scale and haste in the shuffle drew comment from the media. After all, there was a history of repeated direct and indirect army coups that had overthrown constitutionally elected prime ministers. Some eyebrows were raised in the prime minister’s inner circle too.

"However, the only appointment in which the prime minister had a say was that of the chief of the ISI. Musharraf wanted to appoint General Aziz, the head of ISI’s Research & Analysis Wing, to the top slot at ISI and General Ziauddin Khawaja as the new Chief of General Staff at the GHQ. The prime minister, constitutionally authorized to appoint the country’s spy chief, declined the army chief’s request to promote General Aziz.   Nawaz Sharif interviewed both officers and selected Ziauddin as the DG ISI. Musharraf appointed Aziz as the Chief of General Staff.  The prime minister, constitutionally the reporting as well as the appointing authority for the ISI chief, picked Ziauddin for the post.  This general was serving as Adjutant General and before that had commanded the 30 Corps Gujranwala. The military talk was that Ziauddin, with only limited command experience, was not a strong candidate for either of the two positions. However, he was the new army chief’s close friend and also known to the prime minister’s family with especially close ties to his father.

"While Ziauddin held the top slot, the army chief ensured that his own trusted appointees filled all the strategic slots in the ISI. This included the second tier command positions at the ISI headquarters and in key cities, including Lahore, Karachi, and Quetta, Ziauddin, did not resist this.  The DG-Internal security was bound by rules to report to the army chief. Also, with eight to nine brigadiers serving under every section head, the ISI was operationally under GHQ control."

................................................................................................

" ... India’s four-point proposal presented at the talks called for a comprehensive ceasefire based on a freeze of "present ground positions", discussions on the modalities for implementing the ceasefire within an agreed time-frame, a "bilateral monitoring mechanism", and authentication of existing ground positions. ... "

" ... Rajiv Gandhi on 16 November 1989 referring to Operation Meghdoot ... on the hustings in Kolkata that "We have recovered about 5,000 square kilometers of area from occupied Kashmir in Siachen. We will not forgo one square kilometer of that."

"Indians also complained about Pakistani troops firing on Siachen.[166]It is possible the firing was taking place. The Kargil planners may have sought a way to engage Indian attention away from the Kargil area. Obviously unaware, the Pakistani delegation denied that their troops had carried out any such attack.[167] The talks ended in a fiasco. There was an unraveling of the progress made during the earlier rounds. For the generals’ clique, in the Indian reiteration of its recalcitrance over Siachen, lay a sense of vindication."

Author now spends next paragraph blaming Delhi and the then PM of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, fir talks being a fiasco. 

Did author, and pakis, expect that they could shoot down Indian soldiers with impugnity, with not a word in protest? 

................................................................................................

" ... question of the accession of the princely State of Jammu Kashmir. Pakistan’s response to this had been the use of covert force. Larger in size, a confident Delhi did believe, it could violate explicit and implicit legal parameters. ... "

What world do the pakis, and the author, inhabit, where legitimately signed accession is considered illegal, and "use of covert force" legitimate? 

Obviously, it's a world where a female rape victim is accused of adultery by her assaulter who raped her, and as a consequence, is legally executed by stones pelted by a mob. 

................................................................................................

Author spends much of next part justifying pakis attacking India throughout the short history of existence of Pakistan, by claiming - not exactly explicitly, but via implications and roundabouts - that India's not ceding territory claimed and demanded by pakis justified every attack by and from pak against India, including not only all the wars but all the terrorist attacks as well, over several decades. 

" ... Contrary to a politician’s response, influential sections within the army leadership believed covert use of force against India was an effective way to tackle the adversary. The military coup of the late seventies and the overall Pakistani institutional power balance tilted in the army’s favor allowed the military leadership to autonomously conduct policy. Moreover, the army’s partnership with the CIA in conducting the covert war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan further strengthened the Pakistani military as the principal policy-maker.

"By November 1998, two policy approaches towards India were in play. The constitutionally elected government had already opted for diplomacy and dialogue. While a small clique of army generals had, however, surreptitiously, set off on the path of covert war. And this clique must have received India’s recalcitrance over Siachen with a sense of vindication."

"The Kargil planners’ clique had troops crossing the LOC to pay back in kind to India for Siachen. Or so they had believed."

Oh, no they don't. Pakistan never did have any right to separate merely on basis of fanaticism in name of religion and massacres of eleven million Hindus and nearly five million Sikhs as the sole argument for this separation. It's about as justified as, say, a Confederate South claiming States' Rights for slavery. 

As for demanding even more extra territory than already conceded quite unreasonably in 1947 by UK, that's pakis copying Hitler at and after his Munich performance. 

................................................................................................

" ... The Kargil clique’s calculation was markedly opposed to the dialogue and détente policy with India that Pakistan’s elected political leadership was pursuing after the tests. ... "

Author makes them sound equally valid and legitimate, but that's falsehood. Reality is that the then PM of pak had no clue about what paki military was upto, much less having okayed it before PM of India visited. This is not only typical of the sham that pakis maintain in order to claim they are just as good as India and equally valid, but the fact that the sham is maintained often enough shows pakis are ashamed of their own bragging about being inheritors of barbarians from Central and West Asia, the invaders and destroyers of India in name of a fanatic creed. 

This has led to a schizophrenia on national level in pak, whereby they tried to establish themselves as Arab, by claiming Arabic as national language, until they were laughing stock as far as Arabs went, for this pretension. Hassan Nisar tells this tale well, on his program, several years ago. 

................................................................................................

"Hassan, especially during Musharraf’s period, was widely regarded within the army High Command as the best mind on India. He advocated an aggressive posture towards India and often maintained that “Pakistan’s size and power should match, i.e. if Pakistan did not militarily and otherwise expand, they (India) will atrophy you”[178]

"As Director Military Operations, Hassan was actively involved in monitoring the Kashmiri insurgency in Indian Occupied Kashmir. ... "

That's tacit admission that he was training and arming terrorists and sending them across border into India, by thousands. 

................................................................................................

" ... In 1992-93, when Pakistan concluded that the “insurgency’s spirit was depleting,” to give the home-grown insurgency a fillip the army facilitated the induction of ‘mehman mujahideen’ (guest mujahids) in Indian Occupied Kashmir. ... "

This is admission that so called freedom fighters in Kashmir never had been local; calling some sent across border "guest mujahids" was only because they never could pretend to be Kashmir locals, because they were not even from West Punjab, the province that not only dominates pak but has replaced Kashmiris in POK. So the "guest mujahids" were, what, Africans? Surely not Iranian or Saudi or European, not those from wealthier countries such as gulf nations? 

................................................................................................

"Hence, with this orientation, soon after taking over as Commander FCNA in October 1997 and completing the reconnaissance of the area around the LOC, Javed Hassan’s general refrain to his officers was “get offensive, we have to cross the borders.”[180]

"Given Hassan’s inclinations, this approach was no surprise. This had also been the way of many of his predecessors. Often the FCNA Commander’s enthusiasm for aggressive conduct along the LOC translated into issuing aggressive directives, without always getting the requisite Corps Commander clearances, or not maintaining the required confidentiality or suitable discretion and restraint in the display of the enthusiasm on successful conduct of an operation."

Is this the authors way of admitting that paki military is unprofessional? 

................................................................................................

" ... Indian team brought R.K.Mishra and Admiral Nayyar to Islamabad on 2 November. Vajpayee had personally cleared their trip. At the breakfast meeting with Nawaz Sharif, the Indian envoys conveyed Vajpayee’s message. India was willing to give one billion rupees in soft loans or three million tons of wheat as a loan to Pakistan.[214] This was Vajpayee’s goodwill gesture for an economically troubled Pakistan. Sharif asked his Additional Secretary, Tariq Fatimi, who was also present, to examine the offer. Fatimi told the prime minister that Pakistan had already taken care of its wheat requirements.[215] Given the history of their relationship, it was unthinkable for the Pakistani establishment, or even the political leadership, to let India “bail” them, no matter what its condition."

Not quite true. After the tsunami, pakis were willing to receive help India offered, if it came via US - that'd change labels as far as public perception went. 

But far more telling is the fact that, not only these offers have come from India after a history of pakis perpetrating deadly assaults against India whether terrorism or war, having pak genesis in massacres of several millions in India, but thst here author pretends the opposite, as if those assaults, massacres and murders were of no account, and paki demands of more and more territory to be wrested from India by hook or by crook were a just expectation, with use of terrorism as fair as diplomatic route and legal accession unjust. 

Author further takes pains to portray pakis as sort of nawab,  while reducing Indian envoys to minimal.  

"The other message that Sharif’s Indian guests carried from Vajpayee was that “cross-border terrorism” must stop. The prime minister moved three paces, away from Fatemi’s hearing, and according to his Indian guest said that Vajpayee should be told that Sharif had his own man in the ISI. And that in two or three months, Sharif will control the LOC situation situation and focus on dialogue.”[216]   During the breakfast meeting with his Indian guests, Sharif again repeated his idea of Vajpayee traveling to Lahore on the inaugural bus. An optimistic Sharif somewhat lightly said that if Vajpayee sat in the bus and came to Lahore, fifty percent of the problem would be resolved and, if he himself went in the bus to India, the remaining fifty percent would also be solved.[217] ... Nawaz Sharif believed it was time to reorient Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. He was also getting increasingly uneasy about continuing with Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy."

................................................................................................

" ... Post-Bhutto Pakistan, under the military ruler Zia ul Haq,was totally immersed in an international jihad tailored to achieve the US objective of destroying the ‘Evil Empire’ of the USSR. Pakistan’s role as the main architect and facilitator of the international jihad led to Islamabad wanting a friendly government in Kabul."

Friendly???? More like puppets trained by pakis, but now lost control of, it'd seem after two decades. "

" ... Recalling his government’s cooperation, especially on bin Laden, he reminded his host that Pakistan had “been fighting terrorism, and you know that we’ve been cooperating with the United States of America also.” [224]"

Hilary Clinton had a better assessment, however - or perhaps so fid her husband, even then. 

After all, there were those unforgettable scenes from his visit to India, soon after, televised live for the whole world to watch - as he smiled when PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee affirmed India's position, as he met everyone crowding around before leaving, and as he got off his vehicle to dance with the villagers, en route to Jaipur!

................................................................................................

" ... Nawaz had arrived in Washington armed with hugely expensive gifts.[226] "

This from a reportedly well off businessman isn't worth mentioning, but author has been explicit in the two paragraphs ending above,mentioning details that would make it seem that pakis were grandiose to a US deserving of only shame. 

Nawaz Sharif being friendly to or friends with another similar person isn't surprising, considering his relationships with two very different leaders of India separated by a decade. 

He paid heavily, too, every time. 

"Nawaz and Clinton, aided by their teams, met for two hours at the Oval Office. They discussed non-proliferation, economic sanctions, relations with India, bin Laden, Afghanistan, and the F-16 issue. For Pakistan, the good news was Clinton’s commitment to settle the F-16 issue, which had become known in Pakistan as ‘highway robbery’ by the United States (Pakistan had paid the US $658 million for 28 F-16s. In 1991, after President George H.W. Bush withheld non-proliferation certification, Washington unilaterally aborted the sale and held back considerably more than half a billion dollars from cash-strapped Pakistan). while refusing to deliver the F16s.[227] Nawaz Sharif’s government decided to inform the Clinton Administration of its decision to take the matter to court. In Islamabad, Foreign Secretary Shamshad had strongly advocated the legal option and an American lawyer had already been engaged. He had already visited Islamabad for discussions. ... "

Hold on. Pakis paid US, millions of dollars? How? Isn't the glow usually other way, of aid? 

"For Clinton the bin Laden issue topped the agenda. At the meeting, his whereabouts were discussed. Sharif and his team maintained Pakistan could do little since bin Laden was in Afghanistan. None from Clinton’s team were convinced. Secretary of State Albright was particularly tough with the Pakistani prime minister. Sharif, to everyone’s surprise, at the conclusion of the meeting asked to meet Clinton separately. Clinton agreed. At the meeting, Sharif offered Pakistan’s help in abducting bin Laden. Pakistan’s prime minister proposed that the US train a Pakistani team to hunt for bin Laden. Clinton, beaten by the Lewinsky scandal, was very keen to achieve a breakthrough on bin Laden. He was tantalized by the offer. After the meeting, a delighted Clinton told US Ambassador to Pakistan Bill Milam and Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth about Sharif’s offer. Milam wondered how significant Sharif’s offer if he did not have Pakistan’s security apparatus on board. It was unclear if he did. Nonetheless, soon after the offer, the  CIA launched their Get-Osama operation. Men from the Special Forces Group arrived in Pakistan to train former Pakistani SSG commandos."

Perhaps this was why Nawaz Sharif was ousted and that too by someone who had attacked India without informing his PM - while the said PM was hosting PM of India for peace talks? 

And then not only lost the war hed started, but being thoroughly beaten as well? 

How did that loser get to conduct a coup and throw out a PM who was personally friendly with Clinton - unless the key was support by OBL? 

................................................................................................

"The Taliban, as Mulla Omar’s exchange with Saudi Prince Turki had clearly conveyed, were in no mood to handover their benefactor and now comrade to either the Saudis or to the Americans. As for the ISI, it continued to mentor the Taliban as Kabul’s rightful and pro-Pakistani government in Kabul. Another dimension of the Taliban-Pakistan link was now the Kashmir factor. Non-Kashmiri militants sent by Pakistan into ... Kashmir[239] were increasingly being trained in Afghanistan and often in bin Laden’s training camps.[240] Some of these militants were pursuing a dual agenda. ... they conducted sabotage activities targeting Indian forces and even moderate Kashmiris. Within Pakistan they pursued their own ideological agenda, targeting Pakistan’s Shia Muslim population."

Why does author avoid pointing out the ideology that had Malala, a teenager, for going to school, despite orders by taliban that females should be instead made available for providing every service to taliban? Malala shooting happened later, but it was only a copy of what Afghanistan women and girls suffered under taliban, as soon as Russia was forced to leave. 

................................................................................................

Author seems to have a skewed vision due perhaps to personal prejudices. 

"From Bhutto to Zia, Pakistan had presented a contrasting picture. Bhutto exhibited world-class diplomacy while Zia was of men trained to view the world in a dependent and derivative mode. On the global stage Bhutto had dragged a defeated nation with the power of his vision to impressive levels of self-confidence and expanding influence. Bhutto led the new world opening with South-West Asia, leadership in the strategically important Muslim world, structural bonding with China, engaging the Russian bear, and putting Pakistan on the immutable nuclear path."

Author isn't aware that, having sworn he eouldnt allow the elected leader Mujibur Rehman to not only step into office but on soil on the then Western half of the country, Bhutto had been the leader responsible for imprisonment of Mujibur Rehman, the paki military attack against its iwn Eastern half East Bengal, the genocide and mass rapes thst had been declared intentions of before the military set sail for East Bengal around Sri Lanka, and subsequently losing thst other half? 

"Zia, by contrast, had taken Pakistan into a covert war, in a subservient role, believing it to be autonomous. Nevertheless overlooking the damage his policies did to the Pakistani state, society and politics, many in the army credited Zia for the hardware he brought to the armed forces, including staying the course on the nuclear program. Zia also abandoned the nuances of diplomacy, he had entirely bought into the threat perceptions of the West. ... "

Wasn't he the guy US found useful since already begun jihadist attacks in Afghanistan, making Afghanistan regime ask Russia for help? 

................................................................................................

Author seems to be as much a fan of the losers of Kargil as she's a fan of losers of East Bengal. So she blames every wrongdoing of the Kargil fiasco on zia instead. 

" ... Pakistan’s state power and public peace were adrift.  Even worse was the divided picture that Pakistan’s institutions presented. For example the army chief versus the army, the ISI chief versus the rest, etc. Within the very architecture of state and governance, there was conflict and contest. The narratives were several and divided. It has resulted in a clash of power and narratives on the foreign policy and national security. Little wonder that often Pakistan did not present a cohesive game plan while engaging with interlocutors.  Sharif, at the close of 1998, was set to pull all this together."

................................................................................................

"The confident clique of Kargil planners was satisfied with the progress of the operation. By the end of December, Pakistani forces had already infiltrated almost seven kilometers from seven directions which included east of Shyok river outflank, from the top of Shyok Valley, from the western side of the river Indus, from Shakma. Pakistan Army troops from 13 NLI, 3 NLI, 5 NLI, 12 NLI and Sindh Regiment directly penetrated the seven areas. ... "

And yet pakis still lie on public television kissing there were just a few tribals, no more than five hundred or so. 

" ... Although the army chief had given the nod, formal approval of the Operation was still needed. The revered day of Jumatul Wida, the last Friday of Ramadan, the sacred month of fasting, was picked for a formal approval of Operation Koh Paima. On 16 January, in the operations room of the Military Operations Directorate, Operation KP was approved although the bulk of the plan was already under way.. ... "

So the army was aware at the highest echelons, but civil government wasn't even informed, and general public was lied to. 

" ... The meeting, chaired by army chief General Musharraf, was attended by Lt. General Aziz Khan(Chief of General Staff), Lt. General Mahmud Ahmad (Corps Commander 10 Corps), Lt. General Tauqir Zia (Director General Military Operations), Major General Javed Hasan (Commander FCNA), Brigadier Masood Aslam (Commander 323 Brigade), Brigadier Nadeem Ahmad (Director Military Operations) and Colonel Nisar Ahmad (GI Operations). Colonel Nisar Ahmad formally presented the tactical plan and its execution. The entire plan was spread over 15 pages and included a detailed map with logistics, ammunition, rations, and troops at posts set up across the LOC.

................................................................................................

"Predicting an Indian Response

"Pakistan’s calculation was that, in the case of a localized Indian response failing to expel the Pakistani forces, “a second tier” Indian response would come into play with India opening additional fronts along the LOC across from the Pakistani towns of Murree and Chamb-Jaurian.[251] For this, India would require additional forces from outside of Jammu and Kashmir."

" ... The GHQ was certain that ... Indians did not have the force structure to execute an all-our offensive against Pakistan elsewhere. The planners moved with a linear calculation of an Indian response. As military men, they only focused on the military dimension."

................................................................................................

"In a meeting at the Corps Commander’s home, where the possible Indian response was being discussed, Kayani’s view differed from that of his colleagues. He believed India would not attack where Pakistan’s defense was the weakest. Instead Kayani believed India would attack directly at Kargil, which was strategically important for India.  In more restricted meetings, Kayani let his seniors know he believed the operation had conceptual flaws. Indian strategic capacity included its existing ammunition dumps, its two airfields, the National Highway, and the large Kargil Valley. On the Pakistani side, there was the smaller Minimarg Valley, the snow-clogged Burzil Pass, and the Deosai Plains. Added to this was the very hostile operation terrain, extending from Minimarg to Drass-Kargil, essentially a pack of formidable mountains, translating into communications barriers for the Pakistani soldiers. [252]

"Leading the charge for Operation Koh Paima were simplistic and patriotic mindsets.  Commander 10 Corps would tell his team that the aim was to occupy the heights undetected and then inflict heavy casualties on the Indians during summer. The Commander FCNA would say that the Indians would not know what hit them. They only talked of defensive battle and he did not believe they were even capable of that. In response to concerns expressed by other officers about a tough Indian response, Major General Javed Hasan’s unprofessional, prejudiced refrain was: “The timid Indian will never fight the battle.” Javed Hasan used to go to the battle headquarters but mostly not across the LOC, yet all the posts were established with his clearance."

Wonder if he - and his likes - learned? 

................................................................................................

"Troops and Logistics 

"By March, additional troops were called in as FCNA troops had ventured deeper. Units were moved from Peshawar. At any given time, Pakistan had 600 to 700 troops across the LOC.  One post or picket did not require more than 8 to10 soldiers and the rest were there to support the base, etc. However, with troop rotation, in total around 3000 to 4000 troops participated in the operation."

And yet, pakis lie on public television, claiming it was only a few hundred tribals. 

"Depending on where the troops were positioned, helicopters, human porters, and mule brigades were used for delivering supplies. For the 80 Brigade areas, army helicopters would ferry across supplies daily. For 12 NLI based in the easier terrain in the Mushkoh Valley, human porters were used. About 300 to 400 porters were used.

"Supplies for the troops came from the existing forward battalion supplies, dumped especially within the 80 Brigade area. The main logistics base from where supplies were transferred to different battalion headquarters was located at Jaglot, around 40 miles from Gilgit and 250 miles from Skardu. Undetected by the Indians, Lama helicopters were regularly flown across the LOC to drop food and limited medical supplies to feed the forward posts through summer months to last the many snow-bound months.[275]"

" ... Some contingents, including NLI 5, were not supplied. Even those who had food were unable to cook it, either because they were in the igloos or lighting fire raised the possibility of being tracked by the Indians. Troops in Indian-held territory would talk of going hungry for days or surviving only on honey. Home-bound troops would talk of having eaten grass for days."

................................................................................................

"Deceptive Briefings

"On 29 January in Skardu, they told Sharif the general thrust of their intentions while not revealing the plan in full. In order to give a boost to the Kashmir struggle, they said, they needed to become active along the LOC. Sharif was told that local level operations along the LOC were being undertaken. Though he still had no clue that Pakistani troops had already crossed the LOC, Sharif felt that small-scale operations could complement his political and diplomatic efforts to move forward on détente and peace with India. At the Skardu airport, the prime minister was told that, just as the Indians were interdicting our traffic in the Neelum Valley, the Pakistan army too would set up a couple of posts to interdict the main artery, the Srinagar-Leh NH-1A. The army chief mentioned setting up of a couple of posts across the LOC so that visual rather than the usual blind firing by Pakistan was conducted  to interdict NH-IA.[277]

"In the second briefing, on 13 March, the then ISI official Major General Jamshed Gulzar, in charge of Afghan and Kashmir policy, gave a presentation on Mujahideen activities. Gulzar’s presentation was completely unrelated to Operation KP. In fact, throughout the presentation, the Kargil Operation went unmentioned since neither General Gulzar nor any other official within the ISI were aware of it.  The prime minister, the army chief, the DG ISI, and commander 10 Corps were among the attendees.

"In his presentation, Gulzar informed the political and military leadership of the limitations within which the Mujahideen operated. They did not have the ability to inflict heavy damage on the Indian Army and make the environment conducive for the Pakistan Army to move in. Infiltration had also increased. The general said the Mujahideen were, however, capable of “imposing caution and casualties” on the Indian troops by laying ambushes, attacking isolated military posts, and blowing up bridges and culverts along the only route available for the movement of weapons, troops and supplies in the Srinagar and Leh area. During the question and answer session, it was suggested to Sharif at the briefing that scaling up the Mujahideen operations would positively impact Pakistan’s negotiating position. Musharraf proposed that Pakistan supply Stinger missiles to the Kashmiri Mujahideen, so they could inflict heavier losses on the Indian forces. The great success of the Stinger missiles, first introduced by the US to the Afghan Mujahideen for guerilla warfare against the Soviets, made the Stingers popular weapons among the Pakistan intelligence agencies.

"However, with diplomatic engagement now on a relatively positive track, the ministers present opposed delivering Stingers to the Mujahedeen. Former General Majeed Malik strongly objected to such a plan. “The proposal to provide Stinger missiles to the Mujahedeen will be treated by India as an act of war,” he argued. Moreover, providing Stingers was also opposed to Pakistan’s “basic stand that Kashmiris inside occupied Kashmir were waging their own struggle for self determination and Pakistan was only providing moral and diplomatic support,” [278] ... "

" ... Musharraf and his Kargil clique were on a different track. As if to justify his clique’s stance, Musharraf retorted, “We know the Indians. They will negotiate seriously only under maximum pressure.” Deceiving Sharif, he added that he “could not take responsibility for restraining Mujahedeen activity inside Occupied Kashmir.” He did, however, agree to “postpone” the plan to supply Stinger missiles."

................................................................................................

"Lotus Lakes and leisurely talks

" ... It was on 19 March, during the SAARC foreign minister’s retreat in Norellia at the Sri Lankan President’s summer home, that, after a long walk together in a huge garden with two lotus lakes, Jaswant Singh of India and Sartaj Azz of Pakistan sat down on a bench for a ninety-minute talk. It was about Kashmir. ... "

" ... The “Chenab formula” was discussed. All majority Muslim areas lay on the west of the river Chenab and the Hindu majority to the east of the Chenab. This formulation would at least convert the negotiations away from a communal discourse. The substance still involved different communities. ... "

"However, away from the gardens of Norellia, unbeknown to the Pakistani and Indian interlocutors, in the world’s highest battleground, the occupation of peaks was underway.  “We were not wanting territory, we just wanted to strengthen the hands of the prime minister,” was the refrain of the key architect of Kargil, General Aziz. How this linkage would work was anyone’s guess."

................................................................................................

"‘Indians Do Not Fight’ 

"The Kargil plan was based on the belief that, once Pakistani troops would have successfully choked the lifeline of the Indian troops based in Leh and Siachen by interdicting NH1A and by setting up posts and pickets in the DrassKargil sectors, the Indian response would not be determined and decisive. In the minds of the Pakistani leadership, Delhi’s reaction of anger and panic would attract global attention. In the presence of nuclear overhang in South Asia, world powers would be forced to seek a quick political settlement. Pakistan would have a distinct advantage then, with its troops having cut-off the NH1A and planted themselves on the strategic peaks of DrassKargil, and would be able to dictate its terms for the settlement of Siachen and the Kashmir issue. 

"This belief of the Operation Koh Paima planners came under test in May."

Did pakis learn nothing in 1965, or even in 1971?

................................................................................................

"“Cock and Bull Story” 

"Meanwhile, Washington too entered the fray and called for troop withdrawal. Pakistan was asked to vacate immediately. Within a period of one week, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, seasoned diplomat Riaz Khokhar, was told four times to convey Washington’s concern to Islamabad over Pakistan’s violation of the LOC.[330] During his first meeting with the US Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering at the State Department Club, Khokhar was plainly told that the Clinton administration did not believe Islamabad’s “cock and bull story of freedom fighters”[331] fighting in Kargil with no Pakistani involvement. After his first meeting, a puzzled Khokhar called the Foreign Office in Islamabad to convey Washington’s message. However, the response to his queries on Kargil was that “all will be well, no need to worry!”

"The flip side of Washington’s message to Islamabad was the message that the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright conveyed to the Indians. On May 30, Albright called her Indian counterpart Jaswant Singh. She let him know that she had spoken to the Pakistani prime minister and assured Singh that “the United States knew fully well how the chain of events had started.”[332] A worried Albright had also suggested that “things could go out of control...it was important to commence the dialogue.”[333] Singh said he was not averse to a dialogue but wanted the “aggressor” to first end aggression against India.

"After it was known that Pakistani troops had crossed the LOC ... Pakistan earned widespread criticism. The criticism was simple: responsible nuclear states always stay away from |military confrontation. They do not undermine nuclear deterrence. They do not sabotage peace initiatives and especially the ones that they themselves initiate, like the Lahore summit. They do not opt for the confrontation path. Operation KP had landed Pakistan in an isolated space where criticism of the present overrode all else. ... "

Author attempts to justify pakis at this point claiming pakis claims were bring ignored. 

She forgets Russian claim to Alaska - leased to US for 99 years, never returned due to the document being lost during revolution - is far more genuine. 

................................................................................................

"The Contours of Denial 

"Throughout May, the army planners of the operation worked with a variety of themes to maintain deniability of the Pakistan Army’s involvement. These ranged from contentions that the Mujahideen were conducting the operation, to assertions that the Pakistan Army was not crossing the actual LOC. The decision to attribute the fictitious identity of the Mujahideen to the NLI was largely an unplanned one. It had been triggered by the wireless intercepts of exchanges between the Indian forces, which the ISI and the MI had picked up. The Indians were informing each other that the Afghan Mujahideen had crossed over the LOC. This Indian assessment was based on the wireless exchanges they had picked up between the NLI personnel recruited from Pakistan’s Pashto-speaking areas.[390] The Indians mistook them for Afghans.

"In fact, there was no Mujahideen participation at all. The Mujahideen, often physically hardy, were “essentially a rag-a-tag force wearing second hand clothes and PT shoes.” Incapable of fighting pitched battles, they were certainly not capable of supporting the Kargil operation.  At best they could “apply pinpricks” to India using their very weak artillery and ammunition, including AK47 assault rifles, light motors, explosive devices.[391] They were capable of ambushes and of raiding posts. The Mujahideen “could not have operated in the Kargil area where even the eagles dare not fly.”[392]"

Author says "motors" where it should say 'mortar'.

................................................................................................

"Nevertheless, to ensure deniability, a decision was taken within the GHQ to “play along” with the Indian version that Afghan Mujahideen had entered the Kargil region.[393] By the third week of May, the FCNA commander got orders from the GHQ that the troops participating in the operation should “go in civvies” and to “remove their identity discs.” The FCNA found this order disturbing. The troops were to be identified as Mujahideen. Camouflaging their identity would affect their morale.[394] The broader implications of acquiring the fictitious identity were overlooked by the army generals. The participation of the Afghan Mujahideen in the Kargil area would establish their engagement with the Kashmir freedom struggle. Such a linkage would strengthen the Indian position that, in fact, Pakistan was involved in spreading the Taliban brand of extremism in the region and justify Delhi’s framing of the Kashmir movement within the Islamic international terrorism framework and link it to Osama Bin Laden and to al-Qaeda.[395]

"Closer to home, the Mujahideen leadership, agitated over Pakistan’s decision to project the Op as a Mujahideen operation, sought meetings with the Pakistan leadership. They complained to their ISI interlocutors that linking them to the Kargil Operation gave them “a bad name.”[396] In their meetings with the prime minister and the DG ISI they demanded that the projection of this linkage be discontinued. The prime minister pacified them and said their name was included in this national effort to liberate Kashmir and that the success of the operation would mean also the Mujahideen’s success.

"The planners of Operation Koh Paima continued with this fictitious identity till almost the very end of the Kargil operation. Notwithstanding, of course, the fact that during the mid-May GHQ briefing for the foreign military attachés, the ‘cat had been let out of the bag!’[397] By around 26 May, even the Indians publicly confirmed that it was the Pakistan Army and not the Mujahideen who were involved in the operation. Subsequently, international media reports, reflecting the perception of   foreign governments, also highlighted army and not Mujahideen involvement. Nevertheless, Pakistan official policy to the very end remained insistent that it was the Afghan and Kashmiri Mujahideen had crossed the LOC."

And those lies continue, but they - the lies - began in 1947 and were used in 1965 too, to the effect that it was never paki military, only local tribals; to this effect soldiers were sent dressed in pajamas. 

................................................................................................

"On the ground, the projected accomplishment of the Kargil clique was turning into an acute crisis."

Author has a strange title for next section. 

"Military Fight-Back"

Considering paki attack was military, pretending they were stray terrorists, what other "Fight-Back" did author or any other paki expect? 

A ghazal duet? 

Certainly not a science Olympiad, where pakis couldn't begin to compete, or even perform! 

" ... Yet, by mid-June, adversity struck Pakistan’s young warriors perched on mountaintops. The wounded Indians of May had now returned in June with a vengeance and, above all, with a plan. The Pakistanis found themselves in a difficult military environment.  The Pakistani posts that previously neither the Indian air force sorties could hit nor the Indian soldiers could scale alive, were now under continuous artillery attack.  Their Bofor guns had done the trick for them. [481] Their maximum range of 30 kilometers enabled deep strikes on the enemy's gun positions, administrative installations, ammunition dumps, and headquarters, besides neutralizing forward positions held by the intruders. By moving up these guns, 105 mm field guns, 160 mm and 120 mm mortars and 122 mm GRAD BM 21 Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRLs) into forward positions, the Indians were capable of ‘direct’ fire on enemy localities - literally under the nose of the enemy[482] By early June, it became almost impossible to move logistics from the logistic base to the posts and pickets on the forward ridges via nullahs and mountains. Intense shelling and bombing destroyed Pakistan’s logistics network.  If a hundred porters left, only ten could reach their destination.[483] The Indians planned their attacks using a map marking Pakistani deployments that Indian troops had picked up from the Tololing base they had captured around June 6,.

"In mid-June, the Indian air force struck at the Badar base, a logistics hub, set up by Pakistan in the Batalik sector, across the LOC, which was heavily stocked with ammunition.[484] The logistics crisis was now mounting for the Pakistanis with no easy or rapid route for replenishment. In the words of the Indian Commander Brigadier Bajwa, the commander of 192 Mountain Brigade, this is what the Pakistani men perched on Tiger Hill and running out of ammunition were confronting: “The sight of over one hundred guns pounding Tiger Hill... The fireballs of the explosions lit up … We closed in up to 40 meters of the shelling. The accuracy was so great that not one shell strayed from its target …” [485] The sustained, accurate and close up shooting, using Bofor guns on a vast scale, proved devastating for the Pakistanis."

Author has not a word for the brave soldiers of India fighting literally uphill, while bring rained death on by their own officially so-called terrorists sitting on top. She had plenty of praise gor the pakis climbing up unopposed, though. 

It'd seem that the all too frequent accusations by pakis against India, delivered on public TV and consisting of a single plaintive wail of Indians lacking a big heart (because India refuses to concede huge chunks of India's territory?), are in fact true of pakis, who behave as author does in descriptions of wars, battles etc al. 

................................................................................................

"By June 10th Indian Artillery regiment had amassed a large number of artillery units in extremely difficult terrain. On the military front this Indian artillery fire turned the tables on Pakistan. If the Indian infantry had suffered high casualties until early June, by mid-June it was raining fire and brimstone onto Pakistani troops occupying posts on the Tololing and Tiger Hills. Op KP was facing sharp military reversals and singularly on account of accurate and timely delivery of TNT. The Gunners’ fire assaults became the principle battle-winning factor. An Indian account of the intense and lethal use of artillery was thus: “The Indian artillery fired over 250,000 shells, bombs, and rockets during the Kargil conflict. Approximately 5,000 artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired daily from 300 guns, mortars and MBRLs while 9,000 shells were fired the day Tiger Hill was regained. During the peak period of assaults, on an average, each artillery battery fired over one round per minute for 17 days continuously.” [486] This intensive artillery firing sustained through the three weeks was uncommon, almost unparalleled in military history. 

"This intensity of artillery fire devastated both men and mountains. By June 10, India’s infantry was provided the solid backing it had lacked during May and early June.  The Indian Artillery regiment had amassed a large number of fire units within a short period, in wet weather, and over very hostile terrain at extremely high altitudes. India’s point man on the ground GOC in C Southern Command and army chief designate acknowledged that, in Operation Vijay, “ (The) devastation caused by extremely accurate and timely fire assaults in most difficult and inhospitable terrain greatly facilitated the capture of key objectives…”[487]"

Again, that description is supposed to impress a reader subconsciously with lack of any fighting other than a raining of artillery fire by India, while author has repeatedly extolled Pakistan as brave for climbing up unopposed. 

Fact is, it was Indian soldiers who fought the uphill battle, at those impossible heights well over 10,000 feet, while the so-called terrorists (as pakis labeled their own soldiers) rained not only fire on them, but huge boulders downhill, killing Indian soldiers. 

Under those circumstances, the humongous achievement of India's soldiers was at least worthy of mention, even by a silly paki sitting in comfort of Harvard to compose this paen to paki terrorism. 

................................................................................................

"A Handicapped Sartaj

"With these facts unknown to him, it was a handicapped Sartaj that was taking off for Delhi. Far from the corridors of power in Islamabad and from the Ops room in the GHQ, where Op KP was still a success story, the Indians with massive firepower were targeting Pakistani troops perched on the peaks and slopes of the Drass and Kargil mountains. For the Pakistani troops, the military situation was turning nasty. Yet the Kargil planners were still heady with the self-created euphoria around Op KP. Reports of heavy Indian attacks were neither easily reaching them nor were being readily received even at the operational headquarters in Skardu. For example, around June 4, the first reports of Pakistani casualties and loss of the Pakistani-held position at Tololing lumbered into the FCNA Operations room, but were received with denial and frustration. In some cases, officers explained away troop injuries caused by Indian attacks as injuries from ricocheting bullets fired by Pakistani troops![488] ... "

That last bit belongs to choice paki pronouncements, such as one by redcap about white horses frightening India in 1965! 

"Even as adversity struck, with military pressure mounting on Pakistani troops, the commander FCNA lost his nerve. Although he knew it was not a hopeful position, he tried to paint rosy picture.” In a meeting Hasan implored the others, “Allah kay wasta mujheay ma’af kar do. Bohat ghalti ho ga’ee. Ab dua’aon [491]ka waqt hain.” (For God’s sake, forgive me. I have made a big mistake. Now is the time for prayers).[492]"

Funny, pakis seem to alternate between perpetrating terrorism and praying for terrorists, or their own soldiers whom they publicly labell terrorists, within pak and to world at large! 

................................................................................................

"To illustrate the faulty information flow, caused by individual fears and professional incompetence, a key staff officer at the FCNA headquarters recalled: “On June 4 around 3am, a brigade major of artillery called me and said we have lost Tololing. The brigade major had also been informed that Indian troops had mounted a counterattack and our troops had asked for on-site fire. However from the Ops room I contacted CO of 4NLI who assured me everything was OK. However by the morning the CO 4NLI informed Commander FCNA’s staff officer that the Tololing post had been lost. But the staff officer forgot to inform the Commander! Meanwhile I asked CO 6NLI if Tololing post had been lost and he confirmed. Subsequently Commander FCNA Javed Hasan called the Brigade Commander Masood Aslam who also confirmed that the post at Tololing had been lost but CO NLI6 continued to deny for at least three days, the loss of the post...”[493]"

The very existence of pak is founded in denial of Reality, so of course, it's rooted in their character- officially!

" ... Troubles for the Pakistani troops had mounted also because, contrary to Pakistan’s expectation that engagement with Indian troops would begin in mid-June, it had begun approximately six weeks earlier, around 5 May. Early opening of the Zojila pass was critical. Normally it would open late summer but in 1999 it opened end-April-early May, facilitating early return of the Indian Army. This early engagement was contrary to Op KP planners’ calculation that replenishment of ammunition and ration would be required by mid-June, when it would be managed through the Burzil Pass. However with engagement having started much earlier, and the Burzil Pass still not opened until mid-June, movement of artillery in the forward lines and supply lines replenishment became very difficult.[494] For example, at the 15000 feet high Tashfeen post, the small weapons with the troops had carbonized and could not be used.[495]"

Again, authors omission of chief reason why Pakistan couldn't support their so-called "terrorists" logistically, amounts to her lying. 

Fact is, having denied strenuously to world at large and to public at home that it was indeed a paki military operation, and gone around claiming that these attackers against India were independent terrorists, how could Pakistan supply them even food, never mind ammunition? 

It was, after all, US and other independent satellite records that had confirmed the truth about these having been officially paki military supported attackers, by whatever label; and now any effort or attempt to support them would forever blacken Pakistan as brazen liars no better than toddlers with face all chocolate, denying stealing. 

................................................................................................

"The Kargil clique did not share these early military difficulties with the prime minister and his team. The defense secretary, however, had by early June become wary of the military situation. He was being alerted by the battlefield accounts trickling in through junior army officers and by Indian Zee TV reports. By mid-June, it appeared that Pakistani troops were losing hold over several posts in the Batalik sector, at Points 5120 and 5203 in the area of Jabbar complex, plus posts in the Drass sector at 3 Pimple. The Defense Secretary shared this disturbing information with the prime minister’s kitchen cabinet. The prime minister too depended on his Defense Secretary for regular updates.  For example, barely hours after Sharif had ended the 12 June meeting on Kargil, he was again on the phone with his Defense Secretary. The PM wanted him to check with the army chief if a critical peak on Tololing had fallen. Iftikhar called the DGMO who assured him that Pakistani forces had merely carried out “readjustments in the area.” The skeptical Iftikhar informed the PM that Tololing seems to have fallen but the army is not accepting it; instead, it is coining new terms. This misleading flow of information from the Operations room in Skardu confused the ground situation for the prime minister, his cabinet, and the generals."

Their own lies confusing their own selves, exactly as a very exasperated Hilary Clinton had later described pakis. 

Perhaps thats why author comments incorrectly about India, chiefly because she and Pakistani have no clue about truth, and power thereof, so she makes assumptions about India depending on international opinions as pakis do, instead. 

"In Delhi, by contrast, Sartaj Aziz’s counterpart had a clear picture of the ground situation. Accordingly, Jaswant Singh’s confidence in his meeting with Aziz told the tale of Delhi’s growing confidence on the military front complemented by its astute diplomatic strategy.  India’s growing confidence in being able to resolve Kargil on its own terms was largely derived from the international community’s support to the Indian position. Delhi’s confidence was distinctly evident in its handling of the Pakistani foreign minister’s visit to Delhi. Accordingly in their 12 June meetings with Minister Sartaj Aziz the Indian prime minister and the foreign minister categorically stated that the only one-point formula for resolving Kargil was that “Pakistan vacate Indian territory.” [496] The fate of the Pakistan foreign minister’s 8-hour Delhi trip was sealed even before the talks began.[497] The body language of the Indian reception team conveyed the tone and tenor of the remaining trip. The Indian foreign minister accompanied by MEA officials and the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad G. Parthasarthy were present on the airport to receive their unwanted guest from Pakistan."

No, the confidence was based in strong foundation the then PM of India had, as the current PM of India has always had, in Truth. 

................................................................................................

"The ‘Shock’ Revelation 

"Waiting inside the airport lounge was the highly disturbed Press Counsellor of the Pakistan High Commission. He was armed with at least half a dozen leading dailies with bold headlines about the situation. The banner headlines were quotes from a telephone conversation between Pakistan’s Army chief General Pervez Musharraf, who was visiting Beijing, and the Chief of General Staff (CGS) Lt. General Aziz Khan[498] – a conversation between two leading members of the Kargil clique.  The Indian foreign minister, on the eve of Sartaj Aziz’s arrival, had held a press conference to release the transcript of this conversation.  Their discussion about Op KP was a huge self-indictment. It set the stage for the almost four-hour-long critical Sartaj Aziz visit.[499] The Pakistan Army chief’s master-stroke in recklessness, of holding a highly sensitive conversation with his CGS over an open line, made it easy for any interested agency to record the conversation. Most likely recorded by the CIA and shared with the Indians, this conversation publicly affirmed the central role of Pakistan’s top army command in the Kargil Op.[500]"

Overconfidence of an arrogant invader, a sword his solution to everything, is the key there. 

When pakis were caught stealing hundreds of billions of dollars of aid and not accounting for it, and US demanded accounts, this man had turned up in US and, instead of accounting apology - or even embarrassment,  as expected of anyone with a shred of decency - he'd brazenly demanded drones for attacking India. 

................................................................................................

"Sino-Indian relations were then on the mend. Beijing clearly did not want to support Pakistan’s crossing of the LOC and cause a setback to its relations with India.[530] In fact, on the eve of the Pakistani foreign minister’s visit the Chinese had publicly conveyed their ‘neutral’ position on Kargil and their interest in improving relations with India. On the Kargil issue the Chinese position was that “the matter maybe discussed between Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan and the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan.”[531] And regarding the June 14 trip of the Indian foreign minister the Chinese maintained, “We are confident that, through the joint efforts of the two sides, relations between China and India will constantly improve and develop.”[532] ... "

" ... By now the European positions matched that of India and the US. ... "

"For example, in early June, the Secretary General of the French foreign office. Mounier Heineken, summoned the Pakistani ambassador to a meeting in which he was polite but firm. He maintained the French reading of Kargil was based on independent French sources and French intelligence from the region. Heinikin said that the status quo disturbed by Pakistan could lead to war. France, he said, “did not believe Pakistan’s version that the people gone to war are the Mujahideen.”  The French maintained that given the strategic knowledge of the area of the men who occupied Kargil and given how they were armed and trained was evidence of the direct involvement by the Pakistan government and the army. Pakistan having upset the status quo was now responsible for reversing it. In case Islamabad failed to do so, Paris threatened to openly declare Pakistan the aggressor.[534]"

With very good reason, the chain of reasoning given explicitly by French to pakis summoned for the purpose, and quoted here above by author. 

"Washington, too, was making no concessions, accepting no false steps. Washington refused to accept Pakistan’s position that it was not involved in Kargil, especially after the Pakistani military had accepted that Pakistani troops were fighting in Kargil. In early June, on a Saturday, the Pakistani foreign minister handed a letter to the US Ambassador for Secretary of State Madeleine Albright from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Milam refused to accept the letter, complaining that it was not a serious communication as it claimed that Pakistan was not involved in Kargil. Subsequently, by that evening, the foreign minister called in the United States Ambassador again and handed him a different letter.[535]"

Author doesn't explain what letter, exactly, if it was accepted. 

................................................................................................

"“Two Cyclists Flashed Victory”

" ... two messages from air force centers in Delhi had been intercepted being sent, respectively, to the headquarters at Udhampur (near Jammu) and Bathinda (in Indian Punjab, near Bahawalnagar). The message to the command at the Udhampur base was that it should prepare to use all weapons under its command. Likewise, the message to Bathinda was to carry out air defense of the area. ... The participants focused on reading the implication of these intercepts; the army chief was convinced the messages indicated “something big is coming up.” The consensus was that the Indians had marked Udhampur base for carrying out air operations in Kargil. Bathinda was given a precautionary message in case air strikes across the international border were required. A worried Musharraf suggested they go and brief the PM, who was in Lahore. ... "

" ... Iftikhar questioned whether in Pakistan’s current economic situation Pakistan go to war and face the consequences. , He quoted the well-known saying that the armed forces fight a battle, but it is the nation that goes to war. In Pakistan’s case, the nation was “certainly not prepared.” The army chief claimed that many countries, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, were willing to give money to Pakistan. He was reminded that this would not be possible without US clearance. ... "

"The army chief was equally confident regarding national morale. At the JS Headquarters he insisted, “This nation can be prepared for war in no time. I will tell you that when I was coming from the army house to the JS headquarters that two cyclists flashed victory signs at me. I will request the PM to address two houses of the parliament so I can give points to the parliamentarians and they will spread it in the country side.”[536] Such simplistic talk would enter policy-making discussions in the absence of institutionalized decision-making. The simplistic thinking of powerfully placed individuals would raise the probability of flawed decision-making."

That last sentence is epitome of how author's tone hoes from salutary to forgiving when it comes to paki crimes - and as for "probability", it takes the whole lot of baked goods in West at Xmas!

................................................................................................

" ... Interestingly traveling in the same aircraft to Lahore, the naval and air chiefs, accompanied by the Defense Secretary, decided to tell the PM “the entire truth”. The PM, they believed, was still being misled that Pakistan was doing well, and that the Indians would not escalate and go to war. They were also concerned that the PM fully comprehended the risks involved in the situation."

Author seems to have omitted "had not" in "PM fully comprehended the risks involved in the situation". It should read "They were also concerned that the PM had not fully comprehended the risks involved in the situation". 

" ... The naval and air force chiefs criticized the operation and argued that it would compromise Pakistan’s overall security. The naval chief maintained that a naval blockade by India could not be ruled out, a position that the army chief contested. Similarly, the air chief opposed the army’s advice that air power should be inducted. The army was seeking deployment of air power[537] to not only curtail the damage inflicted on Pakistani troops from the Indian use of heavy artillery and hundreds of air sorties but also to inflict damage on the Indian troops locked up in tight, unprotected spaces.” The army ruled out a “full spectrum war” with India and argued that in a limited engagement like Kargil the Pakistan air force “would not be at a disadvantage.”[538] The air chief nevertheless opposed induction of air power, arguing that deploying air power could mean placing squadrons in Azad Kashmir and leaving Lahore and Karachi unprotected. Already, the air force had deployed extra radars in the North to observe Indian aircraft movement."

" ... Differences over the Kargil Operation were now being openly voiced in the cabinet meetings as well. The ISI chief, who had privately been critical of the operation, had taken a “military army line” during a mid-June cabinet meeting.[541] This prompted the Secretary Defense Iftikhar Ali Khan to raise specific questions regarding the viability of Operation KP. Cabinet Minister Gohar Ayub Khan wondered how the army’s views and those of General Iftikhar were at a tangent. At the same meeting, Chaudhry Nisar also asked who had ordered this operation. His thrust was that Pakistan was heading for a disaster in Kargil.[542] 

"He knew that the news from the battle-zone was not encouraging."

................................................................................................

Author titles a section "India’s Sledge & Hammer" to almost openly claim that Indian soldiers did no more than occupy posts emptied due chiefly to artillery and air strikes, having praised pakis repeatedly for climbing up peaks unopposed. 

This skewed perception and description would only explain heavy losses of paki military, but then, why do pakis boast repeatedly over past two decades snd more, about thousands of Indian soldiers killed by a handful of pakis? 

The two pictures don't match, and the disparity thereof only goes on to bolster the impression Hilary Clinton voiced, when she said that pakis lie so routinely, it's difficult to know if they are aware of it when they lie. 

Author ends the one-paragraph section with a giveaway. 

" ... Aerial reconnaissance, intel flow, and even possession of Pakistani maps showing Pakistan’s deployments, were captured from the fallen post at Tololing.[546]"

Were Author and pakis expecting Indian soldiers to avert glances from Intel left by enemy at captured post, and call them to hand the papers over? 

Notice that author doesn't criticise the arrogance of paki military in allowing this to happen at all in the first place, by having such information littering at the post - because they'd assumed, as author points out more than once in this work, that Indians don't fight. 

Author follows it up with more sledgehammering at India, with another section titled "Posts to Powder". A sample - 

" ... Following the high Indian casualties when their infantry troops had blindly and tentatively attempted to scale the Kargil-Drass mountains, in June they deliberately opted to use the “sledgehammer” approach “to save valuable lives of one’s troops while making the enemy cry out ’Uncle’.”[552] The preponderance of firepower now defined the continuing battle in the world’s highest war theatre. The Indian “sledgehammer” tactics, literally raining fire onto the exhausted yet still motivated Pakistanis soldiers, worked for the Indians. It incapacitated and killed the troops, already short in numbers, and disrupted supplies, ammunition, and logistics."

Were author and other pakis expecting rose bouquets rained on the men whom pakis had themselves labelled terrorists? 

................................................................................................

"June Reversals"

Another misleading title there, considering India had barely begun to be aware of attempted paki invasion in May; so June was only beginning, as far as war goes. 

"After making serious attempts on 3 June to retake the Tololing peak in Drass, Indian troops captured it on June 13. Several important heights in the Batalik sector were captured on 20 and 21 June; on June 23 several heights were captured around point 5203 and on June 30 strategic peaks closer to Tiger Hills.[553] The strategic Tiger Hill came under severe artillery attack. Around June 21, the Operation hit its lowest ebb for Pakistan, when the Indian troops, through fierce, ground, artillery and air attacks, recaptured Tololing complex. After Tololing fell, reports of Indian recapture flowed in daily as the Pakistani-held posts fell like ninepins. [554] The pressure was still on the Indians, given the scale of intrusion by the Pakistani troops.[555]The Indian Army chief himself conceded, “No time-frame could be fixed for vacating the incursions.”[556]"

"The Missing Mujahideen

"Significantly, the Mujahideen factor lagged behind at this critical juncture. The mainstay of Pakistan’s military strategy, since 1996-1997, was that through guerrilla-type ambushes targeting Indian troops in ... Kashmir, with full artillery support, bridges will be blown up, tracks uprooted, soldiers attacked, to prevent large scale offensive-induction of Indian troops. ... "

Some incorrect details, or deliberate lies, there. This strategy of so-called tribals oak is claimed were attacking, which author calls "guerrilla-type" here, was used by pakis in 1947 in attacking Kashmir, and again used by pakis in attack against India in 1965. 

Author mentions 1996-1997, but paki terrorists assaulting India had already begun in 1990, if not before.  

Exodus of nonmuslims enforced in Kashmir by the said terrorists, via genocide inflicted against Hindus and others in Kashmir in January 1990, is denied by pakis, as is hand of ISI behind terrorist attacks against Mumbai, but their phone conversations were intercepted and subsequently broadcast on public television. 

" ... Yet, keeping the Operation secret from the ISI meant that by the Pakistan Army’s own strategic calculations the pivot of such an operation, the Mujahideeen factor, men of the Kashmir Freedom struggle were left out of the calculus. The Kargil planners informed ISI after the Operation was underway, asking for upgrading the struggle in support of the Operation KP. “Too short a notice, we need at least one year to upgrade the movement,” was the ISI response. ISI needed presence inside the war zone to plan and execute. Neither was possible."

So while pakis officially went on claiming that the men attacking India were mujahedeen or tribals or anything but official soldiers of paki military - they were lying, not just largely, but completely! 

Hilary Clinton wouldn't be surprised. Nor would be anyone not blinded by abrahmic faiths. 

................................................................................................

"Logistics 

"By mid-June, men on the FDL posts required backups. There was a shortage of ammunition and supplies and troops were increasingly suffering from the pressures of a logistical stretch. But with Pakistan’s supply lines and the forward posts under attack from Indian artillery-fire and air sorties it was difficult to replenish depleting ammunition and rations, especially for the Forward Defense Lines (FDL) posts. As the snow melted and the Burzil pass opened, mule porters could ferry supplies only till the logistics bases. Base HQ was unable to respond timely to repeated logistics requests from FDLs on Tiger Hill and from other sectors.[557] At several posts, there was food shortage. At others, water too was not easily accessible for miles. In places where there was water, intensely heavy use of artillery had made it undrinkable. Ammunition too was fast depleting. Even the inadequate artillery was rendered ineffective because of wet, freezing weather conditions. Guns with sulphur deposits would stop firing after a thousand rounds. Yet maintenance of artillery in the freezing zones was not always possible."

None of this was expected, planned for, or even imagined, by the guys who planned and sent them up, which doesn't seem to occur to author as a point to mention, much less as the sole cause of the travails of the poor soldiers who were disowned by pakis officially. 

She seems to blame Indian shelling exclusively. 

Did she or pakis have an impression at any point in time that these guys had been invited for a royal honeymoon - or even a group tourism experience - by India? 

Funny, she makes fun of Indians for not realising the incursion and even for getting killed, but then blames them for retaliation of a war begun by pakis. No satisfying this one, is there! 

" ... As to how long could they hold on to their posts, the odds were heavily against them: terrible weather conditions, low supplies, no reinforcements, and positioned in posts confronted by major Indian numerical superiority in infantry and artillery."

Remember, India had to bury them too, if not caught alive - pak disowned them officially, even in death! 

................................................................................................

"Weapons & Communication 

"The Pakistani troops were equipped with standard infantry rifles. Typically, in a platoon, jawans had G-3 rifles, officers AK-47 rifles, and rocket launchers, and light machine Guns (LMGs) holder. Air defense units with Hatf battlefield range missiles and restored Stinger missiles were also positioned in several locations. Soldiers from the signals corps managed communications within the Ops area and with the brigade and battalion headquarters. They moved from post to post to keep the communication going using double TT and laying and protecting regular lines and managing the radio wireless communication in the Ops area. Wireless communication that could also help the troops listen in to Indian troop communication through frequency scanning and surfing was rightly dubbed ‘shikari det.’"

OK, they had all this, so they'd been killing Indian soldiers until India woke up to this being a huge paki invasion. 

What's unclear is, why's the author whining about Indians' retaliation with artillery, not after she brags about paki capabilities, but before, when it was pakis who began the whole thoughtless assault? 

Wouldn't it be proper to do so the other way around? 

It's a tad like she extolls a murderer for his bravery and exploits, after complaining about his being surrounded and shot dead by law enforcement. 

................................................................................................

" ... But the tables had turned. Only weeks ago, with adrenalin flowing, these daredevils had marched to high command’s orders and no less to their own resolve to punish the enemy. Now it was trouble-time. The Kargil clique’s calculation of a luke-warm Indian response was proving wrong."

"“No…Not Ours” 

"There were other painful offshoots that Pakistan’s policy of denying that Pakistani troops were conducting the Operations meant. Bodies of Pakistani soldiers could not be accepted. From mid-June onwards,   Pakistan’s Deputy Chief of Mission Jalil Abbas Jillani, whenever asked by his hosts to collect the bodies of Pakistani soldiers, would decline, saying these were not our boys. Resentfully, the Pakistani soldiers would watch the televised Muslim burial of the disowned bodies of their martyred comrades, conducted by the Indians with full honours and bodies wrapped in a Pakistani flag. According to a Brigadier who was witness to all this, “For many of us, the shame and the pain of watching all this happen to our colleagues, was killing.”[561]"

" ... Literally minute-by-minute news of the battlefront setbacks was passed to the commanders.[563]"

" ... The offensive operation had been planned with no defensive approach, no defensive layouts, and hence no fallback plans. Delusional thinking dominated the minds of the clique of Kargil planners ... "

"These generals planned operation KP, less as intelligent and accountable strategists, but as covert, unaccountable campaigners. ... "

In other - more realistic - words, as terrorists they send out against India for over three decades now, or as barbarian hordes invading India for well over a millennium until arrival of British. 

................................................................................................

"Lengthening Shadows

" ... Also, given Indian insistence on no bilateral dialogue without withdrawal from Kargil and the growing international pressure on Pakistan to vacate Kargil, it seemed increasingly unlikely that Pakistan could leverage its military achievements in Kargil for a “just settlement and time-bound settlement” of the Kashmir dispute.[564]"

What "military achievements"??? Like climbing peaks in winter when no one was likely to shoot at them? Like denying their own soldiers, in life and in death? 

"Additionally, another implicit assumption of the Kargil planners that India may not be willing to pay what it would take to recapture the Kargil heights was bring disproved. India not only deployed the requisite manpower and military force to reclaim Kargil ... "

"By mid June, the opening assumption of the architects of Operation Koh Paima that the military situation heavily favoring Pakistan was irreversible, was beginning to be proven wrong. With a fierce Indian response, on the military front, ... "

Author repeatedly accuses India of having used diplomacy as a weapon. 

Fact is no amount of lies from pak worked despite pakis doing diplomatic rounds, because international community aren't fools, and this was not 1947 but age of satellites. Everything supposedly done clandestinely by pakis had been seen, and not just by US, either. 

It wasn't india's diplomatic push, but the fact thst pakis did invade and lied, that went against them, as it must. 

" ... The fate of Op KP now squarely confronted the soldiers who had fervently volunteered to fight for their Homeland. ... "

There's a whopper of a lie by author. It's Kashmir that was invaded by pakis, and Kashmir had been signed accession of by its ruler to India in 1947 because, and after, pakis had then invaded it. "Homeland" it's not, not for any pakis. 

................................................................................................

Author states that India sought help of US via diplomatic channels to force Pakistan to withdraw unilaterally. She forgets more than one previous assertion in this work by her to the effect that US was unwilling to believe pakis and Clinton told sharif he had to withdraw. If she's insinuating that this was India’s doing, she's living in cuckooland.

"In Pakistan, the diplomats were increasingly less sanguine about the Washington route for exit. Given Washington’s public stance about Pakistan’s ingress across the LOC, they merely responded to Washington’s queries about the Kargil crisis. In Washington, Ambassador Riaz Khokhar had half a dozen meetings with his Washington-based interlocutors. It was Nawaz Sharif’s kitchen cabinet[583] that considered Washington an important player for the end game. They believed that Sharif should use his personal rapport with Clinton[584] to manage the Kargil crisis on the domestic, Indian, and international fronts. Thus, through numerous letter exchanges and phone-calls, Nawaz was seeking Clinton's direct involvement in bringing Kargil to a close.[585] Pakistan’s army command was also keen to involve the US in Kargil’s end game. In fact, the army chief was the first to publicly mention the possibility of a Nawaz-Clinton meeting.[586] Significantly, by end-June, Musharraf himself had talked of positively of US intervention. [587]"

Author refers to terrorism exported by pakis resulting in genocide and subsequent exodus of Hindus as ordered by the said terrorists, ordered on loudspeakers of mosques. 

" ... Especially since the 1989 Kashmir Uprising ... "

They do have expertise at lying don't they, pakis! Fraudulent labels is part of it. 

................................................................................................

"Initially, the Sharif-Clinton communication culminated in a mutual agreement to meet mid-June in Europe, around the time of the of G-8 summit.[589] Sharif had proposed and Clinton had agreed to the meeting. However, the US Ambassador later conveyed to the Pakistan Foreign Office, the US President’s inability to proceed with a Clinton- Sharif meeting.[590] 

"In Washington, it had been concluded that Pakistan would have erroneously interpreted such a meeting as a sign of US support for Islamabad’s position on Kargil.[591] The National Security Council(NSC) and the State Department were sure that an unconditional exit was the only way forward and “unless a meeting would guarantee that outcome it wouldn’t be productive.” [592] The Talbott-Riedel-Inderfurth team was mindful of the challenge. Washington’s clear Kargil policy was not “anything but exercise restrain… Action we wanted out of Pakistan to get Pakistan to back down.” Nevertheless, there was a realization that “the Indians were extremely skeptical that we will succeed and suspicious about what we were doing…”[593] Any Pakistan-US meeting therefore that failed to induce a Pakistani withdrawal would have been resented in India and could have undermined Washington’s imminent strategic lock with Delhi. [594]"

Now author turns abusive against non-proliferation and peace seekers. 

"The Clinton administration also believed that Pakistan had not delivered on the earlier commitment that Nawaz Sharif would help in getting the Taliban to expel OBL.[595] Pakistan’s Foreign office team saw this as a reason for Clinton to subsequently “wriggle out of the meeting.”[596] The US State Department sought a different engagement with Pakistan. In Washington, the nuclear non-proliferation saints and the Indo-philes had also made common cause. They twinned the Kargil aggression with what the non-proliferation saints claimed was Pakistan’s plan to use nuclear weapons. They wanted the ‘riot act’ be read to Pakistan."

................................................................................................

"For Pakistan withdrawal inevitable

" ... They were continuously exposed to the Indian air and artillery pounding as hundreds of sorties dropped thousands of kilos of bombs.[609] On the ground, the young soldiers wondered why their own airpower was not being deployed. They felt “unnerved by the Indian airpower, in fact terrorized by the sound in the cold weather and those mountains’ ungodly heights.”[610] ... "

There, in a nutshell, is why Himaalaya belongs to India - no Indian would abuse it thus! Himaalaya is not only evered and loved, but seen as home of Gods and Goddesses - and very matter-of-factly so, throughout India. As is the very land of India, with all its rivers and mountains. Anyone who abuses it the way author does there, simply doesn't belong, and has no business being there. 

................................................................................................

Author repeats her "Indian soldiers did nothing brave, pakis did everything bravely, Indians only bombarded paki brave poor soldiers while Indians took advantage of diplomatic pressuring of international community, they sided only with India" lament. 

Ad infinitum, it'd seem, throughout the work. 

"Most importantly, after Tololing, India had begun re-taking the strategically located posts overlooking NH-1A. For Pakistan, holding onto the frontline posts was of actual strategic significance. These were furthermost from the LOC but closest to NH-1, the logistical lifeline for the Indian troops stationed in Ladakh and Siachen. Meanwhile, the mid-zone posts were in Pakistan’s control but with no access to India’s strategic roads. To what end, then, could or should Pakistan hold on to the mid-posts? Located in the middle of the rugged iced mountain terrain, these had no artillery access to any strategic Indian feature, such as a highway, a cantonment, ammunition dumps etc. ... "

There's the raison d'etre of - not only the Kargil war initiated by pakis, not only every such war (and always initiated by them), every terrorist attack perpetrated against India - but of the very existence the very genesis of pak, spelt out in clear terms. 

Author has admitted that pakis had no reason to begin Kargil war via this incursion, except to kill Indians. And that's true of the very existence, even genesis of pak. There's no reason for pak to exist, except to kill India, to destroy the very culture and the humongous treasures of knowledge of antiquity that's still loving India. 

" ... Also, Delhi’s political resolve of no talks until complete withdrawal appeared ironclad. And the international community fully supported India’s position."

And therein the failure of pakis, the inability to not only admit but see truth. That "the international community fully supported India’s position" was because it was true. 

................................................................................................

"Doubts set in 

"By end-June, the problem of a “logistical stretch”[612] was beginning to surface for the Pakistani troops. In addition to the disruption being caused by air strikes, the Pakistani supply lines and the supplies were becoming increasingly vulnerable to harsh weather and to Indian artillery attacks. The phenomenon of ‘Operation Creep’[613] had led to the unplanned increase in the demand for supplies.[614] The increasing demand for supplies in an expanding battle zone, where even maintaining existing bunkers and posts defensively was difficult, had begun to put pressure on the logistics. Launching and sustaining an operation of this scale would have been inconceivable. For example to maintain a force of fourteen hundred people, an additional ten thousand were needed to provide logistical support."

One, did they imagine otherwise when they planned, sent men up in winter, killed Indian soldiers from positions up the peaks, and generally were gleeful about expectations? It'd seem so. Did they, then, expect their own soldiers to establish self sustainable villages on mountain peaks, with farms and wells? 

No, pakis as usual had banked only on killing and looting Indians, nothing further. 

Two, did they expect love letters in response from India? Or free food supplied up to them? They'd theorised India not picking up the gauntlet, wrongly. 

................................................................................................

"With June becoming a month of heavy losses, the army chief found himself in a difficult situation. The confidence of the opening days, when the field was open and uncontested for his men, had begun eroding. Doubts had set in. The general had begun conceding in private conversations with members of the prime minister’s kitchen cabinet that some ‘operation creep’ had occurred. The Op had been expanded beyond the originally planned territorial limits. Within his close circles, the army chief was candid. He could see the reasons for his soldiers to return from the war theatre, to end the fighting.[615] But who would bell the cat? The chief, was supposed to have sent one of his friends, also appointed as an envoy in an African country, to convey a suggestion to the prime minister’s father. Known to be an exceptionally obedient son to his ’Abbaji‘, Sharif could never resist his father’s ‘advice.’ Accordingly, Musharraf decided that commanding a retreat in the midst of a hard-fought battle with many sacrifices rendered, could lead to discontent among the soldiers. Also, the army chief feared an Indian offensive on the retreating soldiers. Accordingly, he likely had a message conveyed to Sharif’s father that the PM be advised to recall the troops since continued or accelerated fighting could also mean the Indians might open other war fronts. The message was conveyed and the prime minister’s father agreed to do as advised. [616]"

The coward general wouldn't admit he'd been wrong, but went through an old man to pressure an obedient son, in short!!! 

"This difficult military situation was not filtering through in the public arena. Unlike India, where Kargil had turned into a media war, in Pakistan the refrain was that Mujahideen and Kashmiri freedom fighters were fighting Indian forces. Conflicting official statements trickled in. While the army chief was welcoming talks with the Americans, he was also saying that unilateral withdrawal was not on. As news of casualties and perhaps of possible retreat found its way into the chat rooms of influential people, including retired generals, they publicly demanded that pressure on the Indian Army must continue. Retired General Hameed Gul, for example, felt that the Indians should be sucked in in order to get messed up. After mid-June, there were no formal meetings held to consider options, to discuss possibilities, or to build scenarios for exiting from Kargil. Instead, the way out from the Kargil crisis, from this ‘symmetry of desperation,’ was discussed mostly in informal kitchen cabinet meetings with no sense of a collective decision-making."

That's typical pak - mess after blunders, as usual, and lies strictly, but no admission of facts. 

................................................................................................

Author now titles a section "Prime Minister Witness to Casualties", beginning with a long description of his journey to a valley presumably somewhere close to Kargil, but it's a deceptive title - it's not about his witnessing any deaths due to Indian shelling in process, rather his return to safety of Skardu and seeing wounded at a military hospital in next paragraph. The most he seems yo have been in danger would be of falling to death from a window sill where his army chief helped him up insisting that he speak to locals. 

"Throughout the return journey, the prime minister actively avoided any interaction with the army chief. True to his personal style, the incredulous policy-making ways, and above all the horrors of Op K that were now a fait accompli, he opted to not confront his army chief. The PM engaged with his State Minister on Investment Humayun Akhtar to finalize the government’s power investment policy. At one point during the journey, the army chief did manage to sit beside the Prime minister. Much to everyone’s shock, he did not ask for additional finances for either the wounded or the battlefront soldiers. Instead he requested that a recently retired general be appointed in a public corporation. The PM acceded to Musharraf’s request.

"After landing at Chaklala, ... He shared with them his anguish over what he had seen at the Skardu hospital. He was angry with the army chief and recalled Musharraf’s repeated, direct and indirect, requests to the prime minister to meet Clinton to plan a retreat from Kargil. ... "

So the army chief initiated the invasion without informing, much less with consent of, his own PM - and then made him a scapegoat internationally, expecting him to get the army out of the mess made by the army chief. 

As usual with pak, isn't that! 

................................................................................................

Author again fraudulently strives to make it seem that the two sides, invaders and India fighting back, were equal and no different, for most part. 

" ... On both sides, casualties were mounting and political support was depleting.  Sharif and Vajpayee both wanted an early end. ... "

One, India wanted not "early end" but this to have never taken place, at all. 

But having been confronted with the horror thereof, what India wanted, and did achieve, was to clean the region of all invaders, with no compromises. As soon as possible, of course, it goes without saying. 

" ... Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front, having been widely censured by the international community, Islamabad’s political men, as well as the army chief, had faith that Washington could wrest a face-saver for Islamabad."

In other words - as termed by Tarek Fateh - they went crying to Clinton to beg him to tell India to stop fighting. Without admitting, nevertheless, that it was paki soldiers on peaks killing Indians, still pretending that it was terrorists not known to pak! 

Just so pakis could remain on peaks in comfort and keep on killing Indians, that is! 

................................................................................................

Here's an example of the said paki lies used by author towards veiling hard facts. 

"Zinni’s departure also signaled that the US bureaucracy had successfully overruled their President’s inclination to be accommodating to his friend the Pakistani prime minister. ... The State Department wanted a Clinton-Sharif meeting be made contingent upon Pakistan first vacating Kargil. [627]"

Clinton, a well educated Rhodes scholar, is, was always, smart enough to do as he thought fit, and making him seem a prisoner of others in Washington is a lie. 

Others may have helped him tow the line of propriety in world diplomacy, if he needed such maneuvers. But that's routine in democratic and other good governance worlds, which a despotic country used only to invading and lying wouldn't know. 

Perhaps pakis are only used to falsehoods and resent the failure of such tactics. But this tactic can only go so far. 

It's run its course, beginning with Kargil, the stupidest idea yet executed by pakis at the time. It was merely another version of the stupid declaration by paki military in 1971 to "change the DNA" of East Bengal - via invasion, genocide and mass gang rapes. But having claimed heritage of barbarian invaders, pakis don't see the fact of their stupid choice in doing so. Or lying. 

................................................................................................

Author exposes, again, the lie pakis including the then paki PM told everyone outside the paki military. 

"Significantly, before the Zinni meeting, General Musharraf had flown with the prime minister to the forward areas from where the Kargil operation was launched.[628]  The prime minister and the army chief visited the injured soldiers and met with the jawans. ... Yet it was not coincidental that this display of a unified civil-military stance on Kargil was planned for hours before the Zinni-Musharraf meeting."

So while pakis insisted on denying their own soldiers to everyone, so much so they were neither fed nor buried by pakis, those not bring shelled were encouraged with prayers and money to go right back up to kill Indians and be denied in turn! 

"In the meeting, Zinni told Musharraf that he had been specially sent by his President to talk about Kargil. Musharraf was told that the Kargil issue was “dangerously unwise and that Pakistan had no support for its Kargil operation.”[631] Clinton’s message was simple: “Just get out of there.” Musharraf, however, did not acknowledge that there were Pakistani soldiers in Kargil. Throughout the meeting, Musharraf maintained that Pakistan had no control over the Mujahideen who were in Kargil. ... "

"The meeting ended inconclusively. There was no agreement on the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army since Musharraf refused to acknowledge the presence of Pakistani troops.[633] ... "

"The following morning, on June 25, Zinni met with the prime minister. The army chief, DG ISI, and the senior Foreign Office team also participated in the meeting. ... Zinni also carried Clinton’s message to Nawaz Sharif that he would not meet the Pakistani prime minister “in the shadow of Kargil.” Finally, towards the end of the meeting, the prime minister took a deep breath and said, “What do you want me to do, General Zinni?” Nawaz Sharif then said, “We can talk to these people who are occupying the heights in Kargil and see whether we can do anything.”[637]"

Usual paki tactic, Jinnah in 1947-48 onwards. It's exactly what Jinnah had said to Mountbatten about the then paki military invasion of Kashmir pretending to be tribals. 

................................................................................................

"Interestingly, the Americans and the Pakistanis had different ‘takes’ on the meeting. The Pakistani camp was clear that the prime minister had been categorical that the “US should take a broader view of the problem - that Kargil was only one aspect of the larger problem of Jammu and Kashmir which must be addressed in it totality in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people.”[638] None of the Pakistani participants felt that Sharif had given Zinni a commitment to withdraw.[639] The Americans read almost the opposite. They believed that “not too long into the meeting the prime minister agreed to a withdrawal.”[640] They were relieved that they “did not have to wrestle Nawaz Sharif into the ground”[641] and had extracted a verbal agreement from Sharif to withdraw.[642] ... Lanpher argued with his colleagues that the Zinni mission got the green signal from Islamabad because the Pakistanis had decided to give him a positive response, not because they wanted to “slam the door in your face.” His conclusion was: “The Pakistanis, government officials, army officers and politicians were infinitely polite and these real gentlemen would not want to be rude to people, in contrast to the Indians who enjoyed being rude.” Lanpher based his expectation of a Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil on the Pakistani psychology of “wanting to please the Americans.” However, Zinni and Milam, both more familiar with the Pakistani working and particularly with Sharif and Musharraf, believed that Musharraf would not easily make his troops vacate Kargil.[644]"

Lanpher's reaction was the usual one - of someone inexperienced about behaviour differences between smiling liars versus upright honest, while the overall difference of perception there is the usual one when encountering pakis, nazis and similar liars. Chinese on the other hand are a slightly different matter only in that they don't admit to lying either, but know fully well what they do. 

................................................................................................

"Whatever Sharif said during the Zinni meeting, he was an extremely worried man after what he had heard from Clinton’s envoy. The prime minister was convinced that a full-scale Pakistan-India war along the international border was likely and that could mean electronic devices with which India could jam Pakistan’s radars and signals. Zinni had also convinced the prime minister that a nuclear war was on the cards and that even his own army, the Pakistan Army, had begun deploying nuclear weapons.[659] He felt that, between electronic and nuclear warfare, it was a doomsday scenario for Pakistan. Hence, it can safely be presumed this was the definitive point at which the Pakistani prime minister had concluded that a war had to be avoided at all costs. The back-channel communications were on but now other avenues for ‘exit facilitation’ were to be sought: Beijing, Riyadh, and DC. However, Sharif played these cards close to his chest. For example, only his kitchen cabinet knew of his contacts with Washington and Riyadh. The Foreign Office team was working the Delhi and Beijing routes while the Defense Committee and the cabinet knew of neither. The contact with the Saudis was established in the last week of June. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, who was close to the Sharif family, was contacted seeking Saudi intervention with Washington for a Clinton-Sharif meeting."

Presumably his army chief was happy at prospect of playing with nukes. 

................................................................................................

"On June 27, Lanpher met with MEA officials and with the Principal Secretary to the Indian Prime Minister, Brajesh Mishra.[663]Lanpher briefed Mishra thoroughly “with a very candid description of those present in the meetings and what they said.” He gave Mishra news of a likely withdrawal by the Pakistani forces.[664] Lanpher repeated in detail his conversations with the Pakistanis to assure the Indians that “these guys (Pakistanis) will get out.” Still not completely trusting of the United States support for the Indian position, the Indians did not believe “how rough” Zinni had been with the Pakistanis. The Americans saw themselves doing a “front channel thing,” Lanpher providing the Indians complete details on the Zinni meeting with the Pakistani prime minister and COAS.[665]"

Author goes abusive here exponentially claiming Indians had been bloodied and caught with pants down. 

"Lanpher found Mishra skeptical about the possibility of a Pakistani withdrawal.[666] “Having been bloodied, totally embarrassed, and caught with their pants down, and suffering heavy casualties,”[667] the Indians tended not to trust Lanpher’s reading of the Pakistani intentions. ... "

Since she's repeatedly blamed Kargil on Siachen, it's unclear why this abusive description has been applied by her only to Indians. 

Unless it was a personal dream of her own that excludes pakis in particular and is strictly restricted for Indians.  

................................................................................................

In the topsy-turvy world of what passes for thinking in pakis, US is abused in a resisted way, accused of taking advantage of Kargil failure of pak to get close to Delhi! 

"From Pakistan’s Kargil debacle, in cold statistical calculations, the Clinton administration’s key South Asian and non-proliferation experts wrested a strategic gain for Washington. The gain was winning Delhi’s trust and confidence it’s role in South Asia; that no other country’s interests, especially Pakistan’s, could trump Delhi’s interests. It was a classic act of gainful cunning that largely dictates State interaction."

And as every liar does, pakis too know it's necessary to throw some facts into their mix. 

" ... The Kargil clique’s secret launch of Op KP had inflicted a heavy military and diplomatic cost on the country. ... "

................................................................................................

"Now, during Kargil, Washington’s uneven policy between the two nuclearized South Asian neighbors again surfaced. The emphasis of the Clinton administration’s key men on Pakistan’s nuclear activity during Kargil, while completely ignoring what India may have been doing, was a mere continuation of Washington’s policy of the seventies. Strobe Talbott, Clinton’s personal friend and a journalist-turned diplomat, who documented his failure to convince India’s imposing Jaswant Singh to agree to Washington’s instruments for non-proliferation, appeared to have made much of very little in the Kargil days."

It's interesting to read this paragraph and it's accusations toned to seem indicative of grave moral lapse on part of US, and wonder where pakis get the moral or ethical ground for demanding equality, when they never practice it either internationally or at home. There's the racist treatment of East Bengal culminating in genocide and mass gang rapes organised by paki military in 1971, even if one were to go with the paki logic that genocide of eleven million Hindus and almost half as many Sikhs in pak in 1947 were an act of good deed as per the religion, repeated in genocide of Hindus in Kashmir in 1989-90. 

But where's this equality when pakis take money from US to send terrorists to Afghanistan to harass USSR out of Afghanistan, and subsequently, boast on internet for decades about having singlehandedly broken USSR into pieces? 

And if pakis haven't been dealing equally with others, why do they then expect equal treatment? 

No, their equality is one demanded by nawabs, strictly upwardly mobile but veiled in pretense. They are racist and communal, commit mass gang rapes and genocides and invade, but must be given everything they demand at asking, whether hundreds of billions of dollars without accounts from US  or territory in huge chunks out of India. 

................................................................................................

" ... In Washington, other than the generic concern regarding military confrontation, the intelligence had its ear to the ground to especially monitor nuclear-related developments. Data flow from several satellite paths, various policy departments, including the Defense Department, the State Department’s South Asia section, CENTCOM, the CIA, and the NSC, now focused particularly on nuclear related information. Some intelligence officials claimed that the ground information picked up by US intelligence sources indicated movement of missiles and placement of warheads. The concern, however, about active deployment of nuclear weapons, especially by Pakistan, was not uniformly shared within the Clinton Administration. There was great divergence in interpreting this intelligence data."

" ... contrary assessments notwithstanding, from mid-June onwards the administration’s core group appears to have been possessed by “nuclear phobia.” They directly involved the US President into the Kargil diplomacy. They alerted him to their “concern” regarding Pakistan taking action to make its nuclear weapons capable.[687]"

Lack of trustworthiness of pakis must have impressed even the generously friendly US, eventually! 

................................................................................................

"The growing Indo-US strategic relations were also at play in producing this nuclear phobia targeting Pakistan. Having discovered that in fact Pakistan regulars and not Mujahedeen were fighting in Kargil, and Pakistan therefore had control over them, the US weighed in heavily on to Pakistan to withdraw the troops. The US President wrote about six letters. The US Ambassador delivered the letters to the foreign minister. He had several meetings with the Pakistani prime minister and spent much of his time at the Prime Minister’s Secretariat with Additional Secretary Tariq Fatimi. He visited him almost daily with a constant barrage of escalating pressure on Pakistan to withdraw."

Author, in saying "Having discovered that in fact Pakistan regulars and not Mujahedeen were fighting in Kargil, and Pakistan therefore had control over them", omits mentioning that this amounted to in fact having caught pakis lying repeatedly,  and perhaps having known it all along. 

So of course she fails to connect it to US seemingly deciding for India, since it seems that in paki mind paki lies aren't lies but nawabs' pronouncements, to be honoured over and above truth! 

................................................................................................

"Targeting Nawaz Sharif 

"There appeared to be politics around the use of even this information on Pakistan, unverified by majority of the US intelligence bodies within the Clinton administration. Why did Washington hold back the information Washington claimed it had on Pakistan’s preparedness for the use of nuclear weapons? Why was the information only shared with the prime minister – and that too without his aides? It was used to first target the prime minister behind closed doors. Equally, General Zinni had opted to warn the prime minister in a classified and limited meeting about “electronic” and “finally nuclear warfare.” As late as June 26, Zinni decided against raising the risks of a nuclear war with the army chief, the man Washington believed had more control than the prime minister on Pakistan’s nuclear trigger. First, the CENTCOM chief sketched a deadly picture for him and subsequently, on 4 July, the information was brought in full throttle at the Clinton-Nawaz meeting. Pakistan’s prime minister was instructed to not bring in an aide. Clinton with Riedel, the man riled up about Pakistan’s deployment of nuclear weapons, insisted that unknown to the prime minister the Pakistan Army was preparing to use nuclear weapons!"

This whole accusation above can only be understood with the following explanation - not only Pakistan demand that their lies be accepted, preferably over facts known to everyone but at least on par with truth in name of equality, but they demand that paki charade of democracy be taken for exactly what it is, and while paki pm is treated as someone to successfully meet US president to make up the mind of the said president for him whenever paki army wishes, he - the said paki pm - only be treated as disdainfully as paki army treats him, and no serious matters be discussed with him, which would be seen as suspicious behaviour on part of another government. 

In short, it's a decorative position akin to that of a receptionist at an arms dealership. 

................................................................................................

" ... Pakistan military signaled its nuclear preparedness. On June 24, The News reported, “The prime minister has also been told that deployment of short and long range missiles with extremely effective warheads has been completed.”[690] Pakistani media reports also focused on Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. For example, one report was headlined, “Pakistan Developing Advanced versions of Ghauri, Shaheen”.[691] ... "

................................................................................................

Author has been using certain terms that now acquire another connotation in view of her accusations against US government regarding meetings alone with paki pm excluding paki army. 

"On 25 June, R. K. Mishra,[700] Vajpayee’s point-man for the back-channel negotiations, flew in from Delhi ... "

To clear a normal perspective, if a man sent by PM of India arrives for diplomatic discussions with paki pm, it's not "back-channel"; India does not take active part in the charade that's paki structure of hierarchy, any more than US would, or then did. 

................................................................................................

" ... Nawaz Sharif flew to his hometown Lahore for the weekend. His concerns were clear. His thinking process was not. He was playing his cards close to his chest. The chief of army staff, ostensibly satisfied with the military situation of his troops, went off with family and friends to a hill resort for the weekend. He believed that his troops had staying power but he was also beginning to note the international pressures that were being applied on Pakistan.[777]"

Notice the open, unthinking bias exhibited here by the author, presumably in favour of those in power as she wrote. That's typical paki. 

................................................................................................

" ... The service chiefs had also differed. They knew that the political leadership was keen to withdraw, but the Army seemed unclear. They believed, ‘The Army’s body language conveyed their wanting to withdraw too.’ However, Musharraf had made no such statement. The bureaucrats were not there to take decisions but they believed their input influenced decision-making. ... A section within the core Foreign Office group was unsure of the wisdom of withdrawal.[778]

"The Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary, Saeed Mehdi, called US Ambassador Milam to convey Sharif’s intention to talk to the US President. Milam relayed the request to the State Department. Shortly before this request, Clinton had also received a letter from Sharif asking to meet him. However, the letter, which had been drafted by Sharif’s Foreign Office team, had yet again linked the Kargil flare-up with the broader Kashmir problem. In Washington, the tone of this letter conveyed that ‘Sharif was wringing his hands … that he was looking for personal cover … he was not a man of great courage’.[779] Sharif had written in response to Clinton’s letter, written a few days after Zinni’s return to Washington. Clinton had thanked Sharif for receiving Zinni but had wondered why there was no action on Zinni’s report that Sharif was willing to withdraw troops from Kargil. By now, the bottom line message of Washington’s communication to Islamabad was: ‘Get out!’ Clinton himself, his envoy General Zinni, and the State Department had repeatedly told Sharif that negotiations over the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Kargil were out. This was now Washington’s and Delhi’s shared objective.

................................................................................................

"The PM telephoned from the Governor’s House in Lahore.[783] During the call, Sharif was not assisted by members of either his ‘kitchen cabinet’ or of the core Foreign Office group. In attendance were Saeed Mehdi and Iftikhar Ali Khan. The prime minister’s brother, Shehbaz, was at the family home in Raiwind. Chaudhry Nisar, his close confidante and a member of his ‘kitchen cabinet’, was two hundred miles away in his home town, Taxila. The Foreign Office team was at work in Islamabad. By contrast, at the White House, Clinton was surrounded by his key aides. He remained, therefore, within the parameters set by Washington’s primary objective of forcing an unconditional Pakistani withdrawal. During the telephone conversation, the US President sent no mixed signals to his Pakistani friend. 

"Sharif, once again, urged Clinton to play a role in defusing the Kargil crisis and in resolving the Kashmir dispute. He asked to see him.  Clinton reminded Sharif of the precondition for a meeting. Sharif did not contest Clinton’s suggestion of a unilateral, unconditional withdrawal. Clinton told Sharif that he wanted to help him and to help Pakistan but Pakistani forces had to first withdraw. Clinton again rhetorically queried why Pakistan had done this. Sharif said he could give him ‘the entire scenario when we meet’. Clinton emphasized that time was of the essence and that they ‘are losing time’. According to Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Riaz Khokhar, Clinton agreed to receive Sharif because the Americans wanted that the prime minister to personally convey that the Pakistani troops would vacate Kargil. Clinton wanted to hear for himself from Sharif that he was willing to withdraw.[784]

................................................................................................

"The phone call had made it clear to the Clinton administration that ‘Sharif was looking for a political cover for withdrawing Pakistan’s forces’.[785] Equally, Clinton made it clear to Nawaz Sharif ‘that he could not provide cover and withdrawal had to proceed on its own merit’. Sharif insisted that they talk face-to-face. It was an unusual conversation between two heads of government. Clinton’s advisors saw it no differently. They had ‘never seen anything quite like that, i.e., you invite yourself, that it was a bizarre time to invite yourself’.[786]

"Clinton agreed that the beleaguered Sharif come the following day. It was a national holiday, US Independence Day, but Clinton agreed, sensing that the Pakistani prime minister was likely to concede unconditional withdrawal. In Islamabad, it was read differently. According to one of Sharif’s close confidantes, by inviting him on a holiday, Sharif was told by Clinton, ‘While we do not work on a national day, but this is a measure of the importance we give to this issue.’[787] The American account of this call also confirms that, detecting from Sharif’s conversation the willingness to withdraw troops from Kargil. Clinton conceded to an immediate meeting with the prime minister, who offered to arrive the next day.[788] A Sunday surprise was in the offing."

................................................................................................

" ... From Sharif, Washington needed a withdrawal as well as a commitment to help Washington find Osama Bin Laden.[789] The State Department laid out these demands on the one-page briefing paper it prepared for the US President for the 4 July meeting.[790]

"In Pakistan, there was no preparatory work that Nawaz Sharif sought from his core Foreign Office team, the cabinet members, or the Army. The focus was now on getting the logistics done for the Washington dash. Sharif knew that, in getting a meeting with Clinton, he had in fact proceeded ahead with his ‘kitchen cabinet’s’ consensus on involving the US.[791] According to a key member of the ‘kitchen cabinet’, ‘The call was made in line with the inner circle’s thinking about the need for an honorable withdrawal.’[792] He explained, ‘Since the Americans kept telling Nawaz Sharif there was a peaceful way of settling this issue, the idea was to suck them in to help settle Kargil peacefully.’ The ‘kitchen cabinet’ believed ‘it was preferable to talk to the US, not to the Indians, because talking to the Indians was like insulting the honest brokers [US]’.[793]

................................................................................................

"Sharif’s Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz, was not in this inner loop. He was not even remotely clued into his PM’s decision to explore the withdrawal option with Clinton. Therefore, when on arrival from Burkina Faso, when he was asked to comment on US Ambassador Milam’s statement that US ‘perceived flexibility’ in Pakistan’s position on the Kargil issue, Sartaj merely reaffirmed the existing position that the Kargil flare-up was not of Pakistan’s doing. He told reporters, ‘I think there is no flexibility or new position. Pakistan has always respected the LOC … The question is: What is the LOC? Who is sitting there? It needs verification and these violations on LOC, on either side, Pakistan side or Indian side, should be corrected. As far as Pakistan Army is concerned, it has not violated the LOC … We have invited UN observers that they should come and see where the LOC is. If anybody had violated it, it should be corrected.’[794]"

The paki lies, right there.

"At the prime minister’s family home in Raiwind, the prime minister, his father, and his younger brother, vigorously discussed the Sharif’s decision to go to Washington. At the DCC, there had been no discussion at all on a possible immediate Washington trip. It seems that major policy matters, which were not even brought up in constitutionally mandated forums, such as the DCC, were to be debated by the members of the ‘first family’ in their private home. The prime minister’s younger brother, a key political player and the chief minister of Punjab, vehemently opposed Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington. He opposed it ‘tooth and nail’. He argued that the PM’s attempt at closure would be portrayed by the Army as the squandering of a military victory by the civilians. The prime minister’s elderly father, Mian Mohammad Sharif, who often influenced key national decisions taken by his son, disagreed with the younger son. He supported the Nawaz Sharif’s decision to fly to Washington. He saw the Washington trip as ‘an effort to get Pakistan out of trouble’. Mian Mohammad believed that the developments in Kargil had landed the country, much like a family, in trouble and, therefore, it was required by the chief executive as head of the family to get the family out of trouble. Shehbaz was emphatic that, if the trip to Washington had to be made, it was important that the army chief be taken along for the 4 July meeting, so that the withdrawal agreement would not been seen as a ‘sell-out by the civilians’. The prime minister agreed. However, in subsequent conversations with his two close aides, Saeed Mehdi and Chaudhry Nisar, he became convinced otherwise. The prime minister felt that, if he, the elected prime minister, took the army chief along with him to Washington, the Clinton administration would conclude that, since the prime minister moved nowhere without the army chief, it would be better to cut Sharif out and directly deal with Musharraf.[795] Shehbaz’s suggestion to take along the army chief was torpedoed. The PM only went along with his brother’s decision to take the army chief ‘into confidence’. Sharif instructed his military secretary to later put a call through to Musharraf. The army chief was spending the weekend in the hills in Murree."

................................................................................................

"After the plan was made, phones started ringing. The prime minister was seeking attendance for an unusual meeting at the Islamabad airport. ... The participants of the ‘airport’ meeting were to be informed of the chief executive’s meeting with the US President. Actually, the finalization of Pakistan’s Kargil strategy was now to take place in Washington at the Sharif-Clinton meeting.

"In its 9pm news bulletin, Pakistan Television (PTV), the state-run television service, announced Sharif’s departure. The Foreign Office also issued a late night press statement. ... The Orwellian machine was at work. There was no mention of the word Kargil in the statement. ... "

................................................................................................

"While there were two kinds of views reflected in the media, the skeptical and the triumphal, it was the latter that had captured the public imagination. The expectation was that Pakistan would successfully pressurize Delhi into working on an early settlement of the Kashmir issue. Given the contradictory and contending assertions constantly made by different institutions, the majority of the reporters and commentators were unable to ascertain the facts of the situation. Most veered towards triumphalism. The average Pakistani mind was in the grip of official propaganda ... "

Author lies again, despite having given the facts clearly, in quoting from " ... Editorial, The Nation, 1 July 1999. ... ", including -

" ... Indian government which felt confident of its ability to suppress the freedom fighters, refused to talk at all. ... "

One, pakis were lying about the intruders being not paki military, and author has confirmed from beginning that it was paki military occupying the peaks in a move to cut off Kashmir into parts so pakis could, not only kill Indians via shelling, but by starving the Indian soldiers to death. 

Two, pakis lying regardless, it's no "freedom fighters" but terrorists that have been sent by pakis across border to inflict death and mayhem in India from Kashmir to South India. 

................................................................................................

Further lies quoted by author, for most of the next pages in the chapter, including abuse heaped on India due to pakis lying to everyone - a sample here. 

"‘It can be confirmed on the basis of sound evidence that not a single Pakistani soldier is present inside Kashmir across the LOC. Such allegations by India are patently absurd and an attempt to cover up her own designs. Pakistan would be insane in sending its soldiery into a highly disputed and disturbed area … Those opposing the Indian aggression in the Drass-Kargil area are the docile and peace-loving sons of the soil in Kashmir who have been driven to take up arms to defend their rights, honour, and dignity in the face of brutal Indian aggression ... The on-going Indian bellicosity is a matter of deep concern to the world … India has shut the diplomatic doors the way Hitler did in 1938–39.’ General (retd) Khalid Mahmud Arif in ‘What Realism Demands’, Dawn, 3 July 1999."

................................................................................................

Over and over, author portrays US as eager and desperate to please India! But such a slant on this affair, kargil, implies clearly that Pakistan not only think thst their lies must be taken at par with or higher than facts, but imagine that the whole world must agree with this position, unless they are trying to please India! 

" ... Americans realized that ‘Indians were extremely skeptical that we will succeed and suspicious about what we were doing’. Only a success would have convinced the Indians of what the Americans kept telling Delhi they were doing ‘to get Pakistan to back down’."

When do pakis plan to learn that a Rottweiler used at Auschwitz isn't an icon worshipped through the world! 

................................................................................................

" ... First the two met with their aides. Nawaz Sharif was joined by the Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz and Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed. Clinton was assisted by National Security advisor Sandy Burger, assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Karl F. Inderfurth and a senior National security council official handling South Asian affairs Bruce Riedel. This meeting with aides lasted for barely five to seven minutes. It was followed by an almost two-hour long meeting between Clinton and Nawaz. While Clinton was joined by Bruce Riedel as a note taker, Nawaz Sharif went in without one. He did not want one.[838] Unknowing of this fact the Pakistan Foreign Office team insisted that their prime minister be treated on an equal basis with the host and also be accompanied by his aide to the meeting. It lasted approximately two hours. Clinton began by telling Sharif why Kargil was a blunder and how two nuclear powers were almost at the brink of war. Clinton told Sharif that he had information that the Pakistan Army had begun preparation to use nuclear weapons. Sharif said he was unaware of any such move. As a nuclear power, Clinton said, the international community expected Pakistan to behave more responsibly. ... "

"In the plain talking during his meeting with the Pakistani prime minister, the US President also demanded his government’s full cooperation in capturing OBL. Clinton in his memoirs recalls, ‘On 4 July, I also told Sharif that unless he did more to help I would have to announce Pakistan was in effect supporting terrorism in Afghanistan.’[839] Clinton was basing his assertions on the information and analysis provided by CIA’s Counter-terrorist Center. Pakistan was identified as the principal supporter of the Taliban, the principal protectors of OBL. Significantly, on the very day of his meeting with the Pakistani prime minister, Clinton announced sanctions against the Taliban. He subsequently wrote, ‘On the day I met Sharif, I also signed an executive order placing economic sanctions on the Taliban, freezing its assets, and prohibiting commercial exchanges.’

"Significantly, there was no discussion between Nawaz Sharif and the Foreign Office team before the Clinton meeting regarding the formulation of the statement that he and Clinton would sign. The Foreign Office team had prepared a Pakistani version of a draft agreement. The Americans were determined to stay with their own version."

" ... Sharif carefully chose his words so as not to directly implicate anyone but kept saying that it was an operation that ‘got out of control’. He did, however, distance himself from the Operation.  The striking contrast in the self-confidence of the two interlocutors could not have been lost. While one was backed by a unified and competently functioning government, the other was pretty much on a solo flight."

Perhaps the paragraph above was written so as to depict paki PM’s position as more sympathetic, but the result for any reader not schooled in lies by Pakistan is a disbelief at such an expectation. A democratic nation must function in a manner where the leader and the government function in tandem, not where the civilian leade us a mannequin in dressing window while owner is the terrorist in the back room. 

................................................................................................

Author has novel ways of lying, while seeming technically correct. 

"Nawaz Sharif was insisting that Clinton help him to get out of the crisis. An anxious Sharif’s long rambling on diplomacy with China and with Indian intermediaries was to establish his bona fides as a man in search of a solution. He was like a man who ‘wanted out’ off a train wreck approaching him. At one point, Sharif asked Clinton for a one-on-one meeting. Clinton declined. The Pakistani prime minister was told that the note-taker, Bruce Riedel, would not leave his President. US government rules made it obligatory upon Clinton to have this historic meeting documented. The President of the USA was not free to have his way. He could not act upon his whims."

The last two lines seem to imply that a US president refuses an unreasonable request by a terrorist nation only due to the said US president being "not free to have his way", and his whims must be nothing other than to please the said terrorist nation. 

Which is ridiculous. 

Clearly it was necessary for the US President to, not only follow protocol in this case, but be not seen as complicit with a terrorist nation invading a neighbour, or even be questioned subsequently as to veracity of his account, if pakis chose to lie for any reason. 

As to whims, there must have been a few million that the president could have indulged in at the time, and freely so, without any question of disturbing any protocol. 

................................................................................................

"During the break between the two sessions of the Sharif-Clinton meeting, Sharif’s team found him to be a ‘drained man’. He has been badgered by Clinton’s queries and hard talk on Kargil, OBL, etc. No less was the tension of what he was doing: giving a commitment for a Pakistani retreat from what the military was still publicly projecting as a successful occupation. In fact, during the meeting, the TV in the room was telecasting news of the fall of a strategically important peak, the Tiger Hill. During the break, the prime minister called his army chief to confirm news of the fall of the Tiger Hill.[841]"

" ... The Foreign Office team still ‘offered’ a few amendments to the draft. Sharif was extremely reluctant to take them to Clinton. He said he had been told it was a take it or leave it situation. His team still urged Sharif to ‘not give in’. They were all aware that their internal discussions were being monitored. The Americans knew what they were trying to convince Sharif to do, since the room they were sitting in was ‘not only bugged but also had cameras in it’. Sharif promised his team to make one last effort.

"The 4 July meeting was turned into a battle of nerves. Clinton was well prepared for this battle while the Pakistani prime minister had arrived in Washington having already lost his nerve, owing to what he believed were the Kargil reversals. Sharif had left Islamabad in panic and entered the Clinton meeting with a major psychological handicap. Clinton saw sitting before him a needy and desperate man, not a negotiator. The Americans too found Sharif nervous. In fact, they believed his decision to ‘invite himself at short notice and bringing the family along opened the possibility of his staying back in Washington in case the Army took over in his absence’.[843] ... "

................................................................................................

"Tough times test leadership mettle and a state’s collective institutional competence. Sharif’s mettle was being severely tested. He had opted to do mostly a lone act, nearly a personal operation, on the entire 4 July summit, from planning to execution. He had drawn on external wisdom and an external platform. He seemed to have banked on a major external power even for the political strength required for his 4 July decision. This bail-out operation, as Sharif saw it, of a medium-sized power by the major global power, was a page out of Wallerstein’s classic center-periphery relationship. The ‘comprador’ politician was at play, exposing so starkly the heavy interconnectedness between Pakistan’s internal power game and the global center, with the levers of control heavily tilted in the latter’s favor. Nothing could more acutely demonstrate Pakistan’s systemic weakness as a state run by those with scarce appreciation of institutional decision-making."

That's verbose rephrasing of a failed attempt by Pakistan to do another Munich, failed because they were pretending that they had a democracy and they weren't invading another neighbour after wrecking one, and they hadn't realised that such pretense doesn't wash in era of satellites observations of global goings-on. 

................................................................................................

"The meeting ended with the decision that Pakistan would withdraw its troops behind the LOC to the pre-Operation position. ... "

"The withdrawal discussion had not included any talk about safe passage for the withdrawing Pakistani forces. ... Sharif did not raise any question about safe passage for withdrawing troops.[846] Evidently, it was not an issue that had occupied his mind, nor was it part of the talking points that his Foreign Office team had prepared.  This issue escaped their respective radars because the premise from which it would logically flow, the Pakistani forces actually battling in Kargil and now their withdrawal, did not exist in their articulated consciousness. This kind of denial meant major lapses in policy-making. ... "

"Clinton, as part of a premeditated strategy, used this moment of Sharif’s utter vulnerability to aggressively raise the issue of the Osama bin Laden and the alleged ISI connection.[850] Before Sharif sat the man who had been told that Pakistan was at the center of supporting the Taliban and by extension the OBL network. This network, according to the CIA, was functioning in 60 different countries and was directly responsible for attacks on American embassies. Clinton reminded Nawaz Sharif that he had ‘asked repeatedly for Pakistani help to bring Osama bin Laden to justice from Afghanistan’ and that Sharif had ‘promised often to do so, but had done nothing. Instead, the ISI worked with OBL and the Taliban to foment terrorism’. Sharif had made a personal commitment to Clinton in December 1998 to help the United States in capturing OBL, but had not followed through on it.[851] ... Clinton threatened to tell the world of Pakistan’s support to bin Laden if Pakistan’s help in capturing him was not forthcoming.[852] The Pakistani prime minister reassured the US President that he would now follow through on his earlier commitment. ... "

................................................................................................

"During the London stopover, the real newsmaker was Pakistan’s articulate Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz. In a BBC Hard Talk interview, Sartaj declared that the reference in the 4 July statement to ‘upholding the sanctity of the LOC’ also implied that India must vacate the Siachen Glacier it had illegally occupied in 1984. A rapid rebuttal from Washington stated that the 4 July Statement was only about Kargil, that the US believed in the sanctity of the entire LOC but of immediate interest was the resolution of the Kargil conflict."

" ... Admittedly, the overwhelming deployment of Indian artillery and air power could not have allowed Pakistani troops to hold the peaks for much longer ... "

................................................................................................

Another lie by author. 

"Sharif’s Washington dash had earned him a statement with no face-saver for Pakistan. Sharif, in his pre-departure telephone conversation, had been clearly told by Clinton to expect no more and had seemed OK with that. In fact, he had cancelled the crucial meeting of the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) scheduled for July 5, whose agenda had been the Kargil Operation. With input of all stakeholders, the prime minister was to decide on how to draw curtains on Operation Koh Paima. However, at this crucial juncture in Pakistan’s history, Sharif had walked away from collective institutional decision-making. Instead, he headed to Washington."

Since Kargil invasion by paki army wasn't a collective decision, or even had the pm kept informed as in was executed, what is author blaming the pm for? He'd lost face internationally, if pakis as a nation ever had such a thing, for something that had been done without him being informed! If anything, he was more akin to a toddler of Munich blamed for Dachau! 

................................................................................................

" ... Only in private conversations did the army chief and others of the Kargil clique concede rising Pakistani casualties and logistical difficulties. Beginning mid-June, there was guarded conversation within the army command of the crisis of logistics, high casualties, and India’s very heavy force deployment. Reports about this alarming situation were trickling in from the front. Nevertheless, at the 2 July meeting the army chief had insisted that, despite rising Pakistani casualties, compromised logistical supplies, and India’s re-taking of the strategically located Tololing and Tiger Hill posts, it was not a militarily unsustainable position. No hard questioning or holistic discussion had followed. While moments of acrimony between the prime minister and the army chief did occur, the amiable Chaudhry Shujaat had intervened to cool off matters. Thus, policy matters had remained unsettled."

" ... disturbing questions may have crossed Sharif’s mind: what fate awaited him on his return to Pakistan? Would he be able to implement the 4 July statement? How would the army command respond to the 4 July statement? In a country in whose sixty-five year history the military had subverted the Constitution three times to remove an elected civilian ruler, ... In the White House, Clinton’s aide Bruce Riedel had made the dramatic deduction that the Pakistani prime minister had arrived in Washington with his family because, after agreeing on troop withdrawal from Kargil, he was hesitant to return to Pakistan because of fear of the army command."

Author isn't being explicit. After 1971, Bhutto, the pm of a leftover Pakistan, had been executed by an army chief after a coup, using what passes for law machinery of pak for the purpose. 

................................................................................................

" ... In the somewhat sullen silence that followed, one general did point out, “Sir, they (the Indians) are celebrating.” Many present in the room must have recalled the army chief’s 16 May assurance that Pakistan was in a “win-win” situation in Kargil as its positions were “unassailable.” Words did not matter. The original and vocal critics of Kargil, including commanders 1 Corps General Saleem Haider, Quetta corps General Tariq Pervez and other had been proven right.  Also, with restive troops and reports of low morale, especially of those who had participated in the Operation, the army chief had a huge task before him."

"It was going to be a hard sell, since government rhetoric had built a public perception since end May of victories for the Mujahedeen fighting Indian troops in the Kargil-Drass area. ... According to media reports based on official sources, Delhi was in a very difficult position since its troops were facing the danger of starvation in Siachen if the blockade of the Drass-Kargil Road continued. In fact, after the Washington agreement, the army spokesman said, “There is no change in ground realities as Drass-Kargil Road is still in range of Pakistani artillery fire…”"

" ... People drew a parallel with the 1965 events, when Pakistan was about to “liberate the whole of Kashmir...when Pakistani leaders succumbed to world pressure and stopped the military operation and we are facing a similar situation now...”[884] ... "

What is the author talking about, or just lies as usual by paki government to pakis? 

Indian tanks had been in centre of Lahore in 1965! 

................................................................................................

"Politicians fully capitalized on this anti-Nawaz mood. Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP), Pakistan’s leading opposition party, was critical of the prime minister for carrying out secret negotiations with Clinton. The MQM also opposed the Washington agreement as a ‘sell out of Kashmir.”[887] It demanded details of the Sharif-Clinton talks and said that an agreement on withdrawal “without a quid pro quo” would be a “a serious disappointment for the nation.”[888] The Jamaat-i-Islami, a right-wing party, who had protested in Lahore against the Lahore summit, was predictably critical of the prime minister. Its leader Munawar Hassan said the Washington statement was “treachery.” ... "

" ... PTI leader Abdus Sattar,[890] with forty years as Pakistan’s top diplomat behind him, predicted that Sharif “will be ousted from power like former rulers ... Regarding the 4 July agreement Sattar said while the army would carry out out orders of the political government in the given environment, the agreement applied to the Mujahideen, not to the Pakistan Army. Sattar merely repeated Pakistan’s official position as he claimed “they (the army) are on the LOC and you cannot ask them to vacate.”[893]"

" ... Gul warned the lawyers at the Lahore High Court Bar that the ... agreement dictated by the US. “We are not an American state…we should not follow American instructions blindly…”[899] He warned of a clash in case the Mujahedeen refused to withdraw from their positions in Kargil. ... "

Funny, he wasn't aware either, that it was all paki military in pajamas, asked to pretend they were terrorists - and disowned by pakis in life and death! 

"All the talk of Mujahideen disengaging or not was all fiction. The Mujahideen, were not involved. Op KP had no support by Hurriyat , ISI or the ongoing struggle in Kashmir creating rear area insecurity; a repeat of a Operation Gibraltar."

................................................................................................

"While the main thrust of all criticism targeting the Prime Minster was that he was responsible for Pakistan’s humiliation, some of Sharif’s cabinet members also rose to his defense. His close confidante, the Minister for Provincial Coordination and Political Affairs, was quick to retort to the critics, “The record of these generals is self-evident.” He reminded them that “in their period of leadership, the enemy occupied Siachen glacier. And so where was their military capability and patriotism then?” [908] The beginnings of a civil-military confrontation were discernable. A Sharif loyalist, General Javed Nasir, who had been appointed by Sharif as ISI chief, also supported the withdrawal. He wrote in Pakistan’s most widely read Urdu daily Jang, praising Sharif’s withdrawal decision, even though this former spy chief had equally vehemently supported the Kargil operation. In his Jang piece, he praised Sharif’s India policy and wrote that the prime minister had “spared no effort for the peace offensive, which he had launched on 21 February 1999 in the form of the Lahore Declaration. Privately, he has also been expressing the desire that we should enter the new millennium with pride and that Allah has ordained the Muslims to serve as an example worth following for the world.”[909] The spin did not work."

That last sentence betrays the author's own slant. 

................................................................................................

" ... The million-dollar question, raised in subdued tones since mid-June, was: “With whose permission was Kargil initiated?”"

"With ISPR the only source of all Kargil-related information their version of Kargil was the only reality the press knew. Hence, pressmen had not been privy to the ground situation, which had tilted in India’s favor. Having lost Tololing posts by the middle of June, Pakistani troops had also lost posts on the strategically located Tiger Hill. The Adjutant General branch at the GHQ had been getting reports of increasing casualties. Even the worried Kargil clique was deeply concerned over mounting deaths of senior colleagues.[910] Supply lines had come under enemy attack, making it difficult to maintain supplies to the posts. A catch-22 situation has been created. Neither was troop pullout possible nor was managing critical logistical supplies.

"The shortage of food had meant that some soldiers even had to resort to eating grass.[911] Ill-equipped, underfed, and frost-bitten, many soldiers had been surrounded by Indian infantry and come under artillery and aerial attacks. The inevitable question was: Where would this continued battle on the world’s highest and most vicious battleground have led? In the face of overwhelming force deployment by the Indians, the troops across the LOC would have either been killed or captured by the Indians."

Another lie there by author, in that "would have" bit. They were, in fact, killed or captured in quantities enough to inform India that they were paki soldiers being denied by pakis. 

................................................................................................

"The news of the prime minister’s effort to end the battle evoked a mixed response among those in the battle-zone. When the news of withdrawal blared from their wireless sets, it was received by many with a sense of relief. Most field commanders were not surprised. Some even prayed for Nawaz Sharif’s long life when they heard of the 4 July agreement.[912] They were losing their colleagues while India was beginning to succeed in reclaiming the peaks and ridges. They knew the balance of forces and numbers was heavily tilted in India’s favor.

"Nevertheless, fighting in the inhospitable terrain under terrible conditions, the question uppermost in the minds of many soldiers was: What had been the purpose of the Operation and of the battle that followed? If a unilateral withdrawal was the final outcome, why the sacrifices? At posts where the young and courageous soldiers had not experienced reversals, many were unable to understand the compulsion to withdraw. There was frustration. ... many could not understand why their country did not own them. Why were the dead bodies of their martyred colleagues not being received and honoured? Many also wondered why a seeming victory was being squandered and was turning into a surrender, and that too a globally broadcast surrender?"

"Predictably when the Kargil battle came to a close no official casualty figures were issued. The pretence of no Pakistani troop involvement also meant that accepting bodies of martyred soldiers would be difficult. Even during the withdrawal, the Indians claimed that they buried “army soldiers of 12 Northern Light Infantry, who had been killed at Point 4875” in the battle to reclaim posts in Drass sector.[926]  Also, while several guesstimates were made, the government issued no official casualty figures. For example, in Pakistan, the military quoted the figure of around 500 deaths, while there was talk of an estimated one thousand Pakistani casualties. The prime minister claimed there were more than thousand casualties.[927] Senior military officers claimed the worried army chief had shared a figure of one thousand casualties.[928] The war martyrs issue and their number came up when the army chief sought a rehabilitation budget for families of martyrs and veterans."

" ... Towards end-July, however, the army command changed its policy on receiving bodies of their fallen men because of Colonel Sher Khan. ... "

................................................................................................

"Pakistan continued with its disingenuous approach of claiming that the Mujahedeen, not its army, were present in the mountains. ... "

Author invents words - or sentences, paragraphs - to label the paki lies. 

" ... Meanwhile, at the July 11 joint presser, while giving an update on the withdrawal along with the ISPR’s Brigadier Rashid, foreign minister Aziz claimed, “In the past few weeks the Mujahedeen action has been gloriously successful as the just and legitimate cause of Kashmir has engaged the international community’s undivided attention throughout the period.”[933] The brigadier also recounted the Mujahedeen’s military victories over the Indians, who, he claimed, were suffering from “sagging morale.” If the Indian morale was “sagging” and the Mujahiedeen were “gloriously successful, then why the 4 July agreement?"

Precisely. 

As Molotov, fed up with nazi lies about RAF never daring to bomb Berlin and Berlin being completely safe, had asked his host who'd hurried him from dinner to shelter,  due to a precisely timed RAF raid - "so why are we hiding in this shelter, and whose bombs are these that are falling around us?"

................................................................................................

Author extensively quotes statements then issued from various terrorist organisations, based in or supported by pak, and their mouthpieces or leaders. 

"These endless statements claiming Mujahedeen presence also clashed with the widely known facts about Pakistani soldiers fighting in Kargil. Pakistan continued to spin this bizarre narrative. While the prime minister’s trusted bureaucrat Tariq Fatemi told the Indians we are “rolling our beds” and the Pakistan and Indian DGMOs were in contact coordinating Pakistani troops withdrawal and the international community was also commenting on Pakistani troop withdrawal, Islamabad was making a parallel stream of statements claiming that Pakistan had in fact requested the Mujahedeen groups fighting in Kargil-Drass, to withdraw!"

" ... Finally, when he himself was President, Musharraf opted for full disclosure. He acknowledged in his book that “as few as five battalions in support of freedom fighter groups, were able to compel the Indians to employ more than four divisions…”[944] In fact, adding a new dimension, the former army chief also claimed it was the “Pakistani freedom fighters”[945] who had occupied the front-line positions."

................................................................................................

" ... He mostly received cold, if not aggressive, receptions from the officers. For example, in the Quetta Garrison 41 Division auditorium, a captain asked the visiting army chief, ‘If you had to pull-out in exchange for a Nawaz Sharif and Clinton breakfast meeting, why did you go in?’ Another wanted to know why prime minister Nawaz Sharif had let them down. The Corps Commander Quetta, accompanying the army chief, had to intervene to ask his officers to take it easy. This resentment among the officers sprang from the widely held belief that, by calling off Operation KP when it was virtually impossible for the Indians to militarily dislodge Pakistani troops from their posts, the prime minister had committed a blunder.[969]"

" ... These young warriors had many hard questions. ‘Why did we conduct the Kargil Operation?’ ... The chief refrain was: ‘Who is responsible for this fiasco?’ And the young soldiers wanted to know.

"In rare cases, soldiers lying in delirious conditions on hospital beds even cursed at the commanders visiting the injured. According to one Kargil veteran who, after fighting at the Tiger Hill, lay injured in a hospital in Gilgit, another veteran on the bed next to his shouted and in abusive language cursed the military commanders as they came to visit the injured. ... Another injured brigadier, who had commanded an NLI brigade, was evacuated to Rawalpindi because it was not safe for him to be around the injured and extremely angry troops.[972]"

................................................................................................

"By such public expression of their angry emotions, the young officers and jawans of NLI had broken rigid institutional codes. This was particularly evident at the traditional Darbar gatherings convened by the NLI commander who had led the Kargil operation.

"The soldiers who returned home after almost being trapped in the world’s most inhospitable and treacherous battle field and having a close brush with death had expected heroes’ welcomes. Instead, they felt hurt and unappreciated. Many complained that the media ‘mistreated’ them and the people did not give them ‘the credit’ they deserved. And the withdrawal phase made matters even worse. Failure to ensure a proper scheme of withdrawal, to prevent the unnecessary loss of life to Indian artillery fire, had caused soldiers to feel badly let down. ... "

"In August, angrily weeping families had received Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the army chief in Gilgit with the demand that their sons, brothers, or husbands be brought back, dead or alive. Their anguish stemmed from the extraordinary circumstances. There was no declared war and their men had not announced they were going to the front, and there were dead bodies arriving and, worse, there were highly disturbing Indian media reports that the Pakistani authorities were refusing to accept many of the bodies of their soldiers.

"In July, Pakistan’s Political Counsellor in Delhi, Jalil Abbas Jillani, had received a call from his Indian counterpart asking him to receive the bodies of fallen Pakistani soldiers. Under instructions to refuse, Jillani told Vivek Katju, Additional Secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, that there were no Pakistani soldiers fighting in Kargil. The bodies Indian authorities wanted to handover included the body of captain Kernel Sher Khan who had been awarded the Nishan-i-Haider, the highest military award. By the end of July, these instructions to the Pakistan High Commission were changed and they had begun accepting the bodies. As Islamabad accused Delhi of torturing Pakistani soldiers, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesman offered to handover several Pakistani soldiers, captured in Kargil, to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[973]

................................................................................................

" ... Earlier in April 1998, Benazir and her husband were convicted on corruption charges. Deeply drawn battle lines all targeted Sharif’s corruption—his refusing to return billion of rupees of loans, his seeking to control the parliament by becoming Ameerul Momineen, his party workers’ attack on the Supreme Court, the controversy around the 4 July decision to withdraw: all these gave the Opposition another stick to seek government’s early removal. The ruling family’s loan scandals were snowballing into a major crisis. Interestingly, the Army, despite its huge and dangerous blunder in Kargil, was in a secure spot."

This has largely to do with paki caste system that sees conquering invaders as above all, despises traders as moneymaker and respects feudal system. Consequently army is owner of most of paki land and businesses, unlike most other - functioning - countries where business, military and land ownership do not mix. 

................................................................................................

" ... The PPP insisted that the government, and specifically the prime minister, had cleared the Kargil Operation. The religious parties criticized the withdrawal and the Sharif-led government’s re-engagement with India, as well as his decision to pull back support to the Taliban and enter into dialogue with the Northern Alliance. They consistently attacked the government for allowing US Special Forces to come to Pakistan to train Pakistanis involved in the ‘Capture bin Laden’ Operation. Through August, these protesting parties and sections of the media, who dominated popular discourse as well as public space, reiteratively popularized the narrative that Washington had stepped in to save India from a certain military defeat that the Mujahedeen had almost inflicted on India. The Washington Accord, for them, was a sell-out of the Kashmiri cause."

" ... The army chief in his meeting with the prime minister’s younger brother and Chief Minister of Punjab, Shehbaz Sharif, suggested that he must consider becoming the deputy prime minister in order to streamline the federal government’s performance![977] The younger Sharif, while having heard the army chief attentively, was clear that neither would his brother fancy such a suggestion coming from him and nor was his vacating Punjab, the fortress of Pakistan’s politics, a wise move. Meanwhile, the authors of the country’s biggest military debacle would call out the elected government on governance matters. The blundering group in khaki would hold the weak civilians accountable while they launched a campaign to discredit the elected government."

"In addition to the resentment within the rank and file, the army chief had to deal with internal rifts between his top military commanders, as their criticism of the Kargil Operation began to surface. They believed the ill-conceived Operation had caused embarrassment to the entire institution.  Even the military’s own top spymasters and senior commanders were actively kept out of the loop. When they had picked up indicators of unusual troop movement, the existence of the Operation was denied. Others, who had questioned the viability of the Kargil plan during the early May Corp Commanders meeting but had their concerns dismissed by the architects of Kargil, were also talking. This, after 4 Jul  many a hitherto tight-lipped and resentful commander was now more vocal in his indictment of the Operation.

"The public critique later by one of Pakistan’s most professional generals, Lt. General Ali Quli Khan,[979] best captured the views of Pakistan’s top commanders. Commenting on General Musharraf’s own conclusion on the Kargil Operations, ‘Considered in purely military terms, the Kargil Operations were a landmark in the history of the Pakistan Army,’[980] Khan, the former Chief of General Staff wrote, ‘I am totally amazed at such ostrich-like behavior when the whole world considers Kargil to be the worst debacle in Pakistan’s history and where countless innocent young lives were lost for nothing. Absolutely nothing!’ [981] He further added, ‘I regret to say that the conception and planning at the highest level had been poor—in fact, so poor that the only word which can adequately describe is it unprofessional. We all know that the main duty of the high command is to ensure that with their meticulous planning they create conditions whereby their junior combatants can fight easily. This was certainly not done at Kargil. It is also fairly obvious that the Kargil Operations was not conceived in its totality, with the result that apart from bringing ignominy to Pakistan it also caused unnecessary misery to a lot of innocent people.’[982] 

"Internally, within the institution, there was disquiet after the withdrawal. Instructions were that Kargil would not be discussed in any school of instruction, neither in any class nor in any study period. No courses would be taught at the NDC etc. The subject of Kargil was a ‘banned item’."

................................................................................................

"Criticism from beyond the borders also hit hard, especially when it floated in world capitals in form of the vicious, scathing criticism in the ‘Rogue Army’ advertisements campaign that targeted the Pakistan Army and multiplied the woes of the Kargil clique. Within days of the 4 July Sharif-Clinton Statement, the advertisement ran in leading US newspapers, including the New York Times. Musharraf wanted an official and very prominent rebuttal issued in the very papers in which the advertisement appeared. It was a matter of the troop morale, he asked a common friend to convey to the prime minister. The army chief also offered to pay for the rebuttal advertisement in case the government had funding problems.[983] The prime minister disagreed. Despite the intervention of his father and brother, Sharif was unrelenting. Only one article could be commissioned to counter the advertisement." 

Now, author returns to prevaricating. 

"Thus, the pressure from within the Army, the vocal criticism by the navy and the air force, and the general political chatter prompted the architects of Kargil to adopt an offensive defense posture. In August, deeper fault lines emerged between the civilian and military leadership’s approach to handling the post-Kargil period."

This is like death of a child due to physical assault by an adult blamed on those criticising the said assault. 

Does the author wish here to imply, or let reader infer, that those responsible for Kargil invasion against India and killing of Indians thereby, planned and executed, had been well-behaved, or well intentioned at any time? 

Had they not violated rvery norm, every protocol, in the process, of functioning of a proper military of a proper government, when invading Kargil - without informing their own government? 

Was their anything that could be termed proper in their conduct in their subsequent denial of their own soldiers, even to the extent of refusing the dead? 

................................................................................................

"The most public manifestation of this difference was over the question of decorating the Kargil heroes, martyrs and the living, with national awards for valor. Why this issue became a controversial one between the government and the Army was principally because the Army had publicly taken the position that it was not Pakistani soldiers but freedom fighters who had fought in Kargil. The prime minister had sustained this charade, begun initially by the Army during the Kargil Operation, even after the 4 July withdrawal. The army leadership now wanted the government to approve national awards for the ‘Kargil heroes.’

"The GHQ also wanted nationally broadcast television programmes honouring the heroes of Kargil. There was a reason why the Kargil clique now wanted to acknowledge and honour the brave and the best of the Army, earlier having opted to let them be projected as Mujahideen. The clique now detected the increasing anger and agitation of the troops caused towards their commanders, not only because of the debacle-like end of Kargil, but also in their role and sacrifices not having been acknowledged.

"Sitting in their secure garrisons, these were men of command and authority who must have silently been haunted by the calamitous Operation they had designed. More blood, their critics argued, of Pakistan’s brave soldiers had flowed in this calamity called Kargil, than put together in the two wars Pakistan fought in 1965 and 1971."

The claim about 1965, in view of the authors repeated ridicule of Indians ineffective and killed at Kargil, is debatable at best. 

But 1971? That's a horrible claim, considering the genocide perpetrated by paki military in East Bengal, accompanied by organised mass gang rapes they also perpetrated along with killings, in millions, comparable with and outdone by only nazis in WWII. 

The only way to reconcile that statement with reality is to not only deduce but accept a value system so racist that it had counted half its own citizens as not human. 

And the only reason that paki military did not have 93,000 of paki military dead in East Bengal was because India, instead of letting them be taken prisoners of war by the then new nation of Bangladesh, had instead returned them safe to the then remaining, truncated West Pakistan, which really had no right to retain the name because they'd lost 60% of their own erstwhile paki population, the Bengalis. 

................................................................................................

" ... Interestingly, although Pakistan’s public position was that Kashmiri Mujahideen, not Pakistani soldiers, were fighting the Indian Army in Kargil, yet, that night the Kargil clique, identified the recipients for the highest gallantry award, Nishan-i-Haider. Additionally, approximately 80 soldiers were given various other awards on General Javed Hassan’s recommendations. He insisted awards were necessary to raise the morale of the soldiers.

"The Awards ceremony, called Kargil kay Hero, was televised by PTV, but the Sharif-led government was keen to call off its broadcasting. The prime minister was trying to re-engage with the Indians. Thus, Nawaz Sharif and Shehbaz Sharif did not participate in the programme. While all the chief ministers participated, the Punjab chief minister avoided it."

It seems to have not occurred to the author that not everybody can sustain the doublespeak that paki army maintained, of both disclaming and awarding role of paki soldiers in Kargil simultaneously! 

If the then pm of pak had participated in such a televised spectacle, or his brother had, doesn't the author realise that the paki pm could then subsequently be questioned on the factual discrepancy, by world media, not to mention international diplomatic corps,  and even various governments and their leaders, even officially? 

................................................................................................

" ... State Department spokesman, James Rubin, said that, even on Kashmir, the US could mediate only if Pakistan and India both sought mediation. Away from 4 July, Pakistan had to manage its own relationship with India."

Author returns to paki lies. 

" ... In Pakistan, civilian intelligence agencies had reports of sectarian killers finding safe havens in neighboring Afghanistan. ... "

Fact is taliban were the spectrum created in and by Pakistan, to take control of Afghanistan in name of religion - and it wreaked havoc in a society that had women professors until then, teaching at university! Thereafter pakis pretending that it was an Afghanistan problem is height of duplicity and fraud. 

................................................................................................

More lies, more fraud. 

"The actual implementation of the ‘Capture Osama’ plan also began in August. The Taliban remained committed to protecting the 41-year-old Saudi millionaire. They kept him ‘under the protection of a special security commission’.[991] The US President’s most unusual threat of 4 July that, unless Pakistan did more, he ‘would have to announce Pakistan was in effect supporting terrorism in Afghanistan’ had worked.[992] The plan to capture OBL was first proposed by the Pakistani prime minister himself in his 2 December 1998, Washington meeting. Economic sanctions on the Taliban were already in place. Around this time, with Sharif’s support, US officials also began to train 60 Pakistani troops as commandoes to go into Afghanistan to get bin Laden. ‘I was skeptical about the project; even if Sharif wanted to help, the Pakistan military was full of Taliban and al-Qaeda sympathizers. But I thought we had nothing to lose by exploring every option.’[993]"

In view of his eventual capture - in Abbottabad, within walking distance of what US terms "West Point of Pakistan", was he really ever in Afghanistan? 

Or had he been spirited away out of sight straight into protection of paki military even before Kargil? 

................................................................................................

" ... The CIA planned a ‘ring of kidnapping squads around Afghanistan to move in to capture OBL when required’.[994] 

"After his commitment with Clinton, Sharif personally led the effort to convince the Taliban government to handover OBL. In July, he met, along with the visiting the Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan, the Afghan Foreign Minister Mulla Mutawakil at the Punjab House in Islamabad. With the help of an interpreter, the Saudi Prince reminded Muttawakil, ‘We had helped you, we had recognized you, but you are ungrateful.’ The Taliban leader was reprimanded in ‘strong and humiliating term’. Muttawakil said they were grateful, that they wanted Saudi assistance to continue, but handing over OBL or ‘extraditing him’ was ‘impossible’. This blanket refusal annoyed the prime minister and his Saudi guest.[995] Clinton’s ‘Get OBL’ policy included use of force at multiple levels. The Taliban leader Mullah Omar was under attack. At the end of August, a saboteur’s bomb exploded near his home in Kandahar.

"The ‘Capture Osama’ Operation was being launched. The Americans were funding the construction of barracks, three miles south of Rawalpindi, for SSG commandoes. According to the plan, Pakistani commandoes, on intelligence information, would be infiltrated into Afghanistan to kidnap bin Laden. While the ISI chief, now reporting to the prime minister and following his instructions, went along with the plan, the top operational tier opposed it. Senior generals believed that ‘nothing could be more foolish’. OBL, they believed, was an ‘elusive target’ and looking for him was tantamount ‘to searching for a needle in a haystack’. ... While the US sent FBI officials to train the commandoes and to monitor the operation, senior officials were skeptical of the scheme. ‘We said to ourselves: Why do they need searchers for someone they are already aware of? Well, we played along,’ recalled one US official.[996]

" ... Pakistan began its shuttle diplomacy between Kandahar and the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, trying to get talks restarted between Ahmed Shah Masood and the Taliban.[998] While the Northern Alliance blamed Pakistani officials for, in reality, siding with the Taliban, Pakistani officials repeatedly spoke of their ‘peace agenda’ and for initiating the shuttle diplomacy in response to President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s request.[999] ... "

Author now openly takes sides - with the fraudulent and the invader - who'd failed, to boot. 

" ... Whatever were coup-maker Musharraf’s justifications at the time of the coup, years later, he was more truthful as he wrote in his book, ‘It was in dealing with Kargil that the prime minister exposed his mediocrity and set himself on a collision course with the Army and me.’[1001]"

" ... Caught between trying to pull Pakistan out of the Kargil debacle, reviving the dialogue process with India, containing the fallout in the military and political circles, and also dealing with the political pressures generated from his government’s incompetence, no inquiry was instituted against the army chief and other architects of Kargil. Instead, a campaign was launched against the civilians, the army leadership feeling ironically confident enough to hold the civilian leadership over issues of governance."

................................................................................................

"The bonhomie of the prime minister and the army chief’s early September trip to the NLI headquarters in Skardu was short-lived. Although on Kashmiri rights, Sharif was unrelenting, calling for a UN-supervised plebiscite in Kashmir similar to East Timor[1002], the ghost of Kargil had sown distrust between Sharif and the military command. Behind closed doors, in the corridors of power, and in the homes of the powerful, subdued games were on. Some played for survival, others for reprimand and retribution. Tool bags for menacing games were thrown open. All was fair play: wiretapping, inspired media reports, surveillance, interpreting intercepts, spy men on the prowl, instigating anger, manufacturing street protests. The ghost of the Kargil debacle was haunting Pakistan’s corridors of power. The members of the Kargil clique, architects of the debacle, were fearful of being fired. Armed with institutional resources and experience at surreptitiously fighting civilian authority, they were all set to fight back.

"Sharif was in a difficult position. Unlike Sharif’s unbridled October 1998 reaction to a speech by Musharraf’s predecessor army chief general Jahangir Karamat, which led to latter’s dismissal, the post-Kargil situation was a very complex one. Pakistan had lost in martyrdom many of its brave young men yet internationally the country was being criticized. Pakistan’s credibility as a responsible nuclear State had received a serious setback. Yet the prime minister could not hold the army chief accountable for the debacle at Kargil. He was constrained by issues around his own public ownership of the Operation and of “national honor.” [1003]"

When do pakis plan to learn that neither killing nor giving one's own life is counted as praiseworthy (and nowhere outside of their own medieval creed, anyway), when in quest of world conquest, or simple looting of others, post medieval era - and, that, it's definitely no longer medieval era as of half a century ago, through most of the world? Calling those invaders martyrs is signatory of a creed of world conquest in name of a creed, but in every sensible process of thought, they were no more than oil thrown by those seeking to set fire to a neighbour's home. 

................................................................................................

" ... His Washington interlocutors were already aware of the real architects of Kargil. But, under siege from domestic troubles, with political opponents multiplying and unifying under the 19-party Grand Democratic Alliance[1004] banner, the prime minister seemed to have concluded that he was going to work silently on tackling the Kargil clique. Ouster of the army chief was unlikely. However, some form of reprimand was inevitable. The cumulative impact of all this was the rise of distrust and suspicion among Pakistan’s power players."

" ... In a heady moment during the landmark 17 May briefing, General Aziz, the Kargil kingpin, had prodded Pakistan’s prime minister to dream about being second only to Jinnah. ... As Chaudhry Nisar, his key aide, later argued, once the ball was set rolling, the Kargil Operation was ‘irreversible’, even if the Prime Minister had wanted to reverse it.[1006]

"In the media, a plethora of accusations surfaced, targeting the prime minister: that he had sold Kashmir, surrendered in Washington the victory won at Kargil; he had wasted the sacrifices of the brave soldiers at Kargil, had appeased the Americans, bowed before the Indians etc. With facts of the beginnings, the conduct, and the military outcome of this Operation little known, these accusations seemed plausible. Sharif’s dash to Washington had been widely publicized."

................................................................................................

" ... Pakistan’s chief executive was now under an extraordinary level of intelligence watch. The intelligence under the army’s high command maintained a close tab on the prime minister and his cabinet. The army intelligence picked up the Prime Minister House chatter. The army chief complained to a confidante that the PM’s intercepts had revealed that he would make Musharraf apologize publicly,[1007] claiming that the PM had promised this to the Indian Prime Minister! Considering that, ever since the cover was blown from the Kargil Operation plan, the PM had taken ownership of it and tried to extricate, in his calculation, Pakistan and its Army with honour, self-respect, and minimal diplomatic damage, such an undertaking seemed highly unlikely. ..."

"The army chief’s anger and nervousness persisted. The blame talk would just not end. There were complaints from within the army high command, chatter in Army messes, insinuations from the government’s men, and a few voices even within the media. He had requested the government several times to respond to news reports blaming the army chief for the debacle–indeed, even of conducting it unconstitutionally, i.e., without the chief executive’s permission."

In short, he wanted the lie and the cover, the pretense of it having been the civilian government decision to invade, to continue - along with the lies about no paki government involvement, it having been all independent terrorists.

................................................................................................

" ... Nervous and jumpy, the Kargil clique arranged to target its principal adversary, the prime minister himself, by weaving a two-front siege around him. They reached out to journalists to gauge the mood in the civilian quarters. Others were tasked to gauge the mood and reach out to the distraught Opposition parties and estranged politicians within the ruling party.

"The 14 September interview splashed by Pakistan’s most widely read Urdu daily, in which Sharif’s backchannel point-man Niaz A. Naik held the army responsible for sabotaging, what he claimed was, a time-bound plan that the two prime ministers had agreed upon for resolving the Kashmir dispute, deepened suspicion in the barracks. Naik had also asserted that Sharif had not been informed of the Kargil Operation, first hearing of it around 25 April. This contradicted Musharraf’s public statement of 16 July that ‘everyone was on board’.[1008] On 15 September, a prestigious English daily published ‘military source’s expectation that “some responsible functionary would remove the impression created by the former foreign secretary that the Army did not want resolution of the Kashmir dispute”’.[1009] The same day, Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz stepped in to more than clarify. In his Senate speech, he said that the armed forces had acted in the interests of Pakistan and it was ‘totally untrue’ that through the Kargil crisis the armed forces had undermined the Pakistan-India peace process.[1010] Nevertheless, the foreign minister seconded Naik’s claim that a time-bound approach to resolving Kashmir had been agreed upon. Sartaj’s speech also addressed the signing of the CTBT, a red herring issue in the hands of the political opposition. He was categorical that Pakistan ‘will not consider signing it till the time sanctions imposed by the US were removed’.[1011]

"Matters were in a flux. On 15 September, the Foreign Office spokesperson formally announced that the Prime minister had ‘no plans’ to attend the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session. The cancellation was unexpected. The reason that circulated in the press was that, because Pakistan had decided against signing the CTBT, the PM wanted to avoid the pressure he was likely to face at the UNGA, especially from the Clinton administration. However, less known was the fact that a close confidante of the army chief, who was also an intimate friend of the Sharif family with easy access to the prime minister’s father, contributed to the PM’s decision to miss the UNGA session. Musharraf, wary of what the PM might say about the Kargil clique, and especially about him, was keen that he not attend the UNGA.[1012] The confidante was therefore sent to Mian Sharif to convince him to dissuade his son from traveling to New York. Mian Sharif was convinced that, with trouble brewing at home, it was unwise for his son to travel. The PM did not travel."

Obviously, if it was that easy for the army to control the paki PM without subterfuge, the subsequent coup was merely making it official!

................................................................................................

"The angry chief’s words were interpreted by many as signalling a possible coup looming around the corner."

" ... Clinton administration had been sending messages through US Ambassador Milam, to send his envoy, so that Clinton could follow up with his 4 July promise of helping restart the Pakistan-India dialogue on Kashmir. ‘Do not send someone from the Foreign Office,’ was the message. In Islamabad, it was expected that the US would help Pakistan to continue with the Lahore process. ... ‘Trust’ was the key consideration for the prime minister. So, in the midst of raging political troubles, Nawaz Sharif sent off his brother Shehbaz Sharif as his special envoy to Washington."

" ... The State Department’s South Asia men had gauged Sharif’s political troubles. The Islamabad whispers of a possible coup or a likely Musharraf sacking were loud enough to reach Washington. They wanted to hear from Sharif’s emissary how deep the civil-military divide was. They were keen for facts on the follow-through on Pakistani troop withdrawal from Kargil and Islamabad’s re-engagement with India. Away from the India question, Islamabad and Washington were active partners in a ‘Get Osama’ Operation. This included both Islamabad directly persuading Mullah Omar to give up OBL and also the launch of a joint operation with the CIA to physically capture the al-Qaeda chief."

................................................................................................

"Shehbaz held a six-hour-long marathon session with Karl Inderfurth and Walter Anderson. The meeting took place at Washington’s historical Willard Hotel, where Shehbaz was staying. The Willard was where Abraham Lincoln had spent the night before his first inauguration as President in 1861. Before the Inderfurth-Shehbaz marathon session began, as an ice-breaker gesture, the otherwise frugal Inderfurth had spent $80 to buy his Pakistani guest The History of the Willard Hotel. 

"In Washington, Shehbaz Sharif’s concern about the possibility of a coup was apparent. Although he ‘never said he feared a coup but was beating around the bush’. There was very little discussion on how to advance the Lahore process. Some among the US side found that ‘the dialogue was sterile on Kashmir’.[1019]"

" ... On Kargil, Shehbaz Sharif informed them that troop movement was going according to plan. However, throughout the meeting, Shehbaz repeatedly expressed concern about ‘extra constitutional’ developments. He, in fact, referred to it 15 times. Yet, he did not once mention the word ‘military’ nor asked for US help in dealing with the military. His focus on ‘extra constitutional pressures on an elected government’, combined with what Washington was picking up from Islamabad, left no doubt among the Americans that trouble was brewing for the elected government that the Clinton administration would have rather seen in office. However, Sharif’s special envoy never said he feared a coup. He gave mixed signals and the Americans did not get candid answers on facts."

" ... In fact, as Talbott would later recall, ‘Shehbaz would not quite confirm, even in response to direct questions, that a military coup was brewing.’[1020] However, he added, ‘Shehbaz’s mannerisms, his mirthless smiles, long silences, and abrupt changes of subject when we asked about the situation at home, left us in no doubt that something was afoot.’[1021]"

" ... When Inderfurth pulled him to the side and asked him if Musharraf was alright, Shehbaz told him he was implementing the 4 July agreement and asked if he knew Musharraf.[1023] Inderfurth replied in the negative. ‘Why don’t you invite Musharraf?’ Shehbaz advised him."

................................................................................................

"A major American takeaway from the Shehbaz visit was that the Sharif-led government was in trouble at home. Senior US administration people like the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Pickering, saw Shehbaz as being ‘worried that they would have to pay for what they did (troop withdrawal)’.[1029]  The US Administration then took an unusual step. From New York, where the Clinton team was attending the UNGA session, Karl Inderfurth issued a statement that called on the Pakistan Army not to try any ‘extra-constitutional method’ to remove the Nawaz Sharif-led government.[1030]"

" ... Washington was keen to extend support to Nawaz Sharif, the man Clinton trusted, the man who had already become a high-value friend after consenting to Washington’s Pak-US collaborative ‘Capture OBL’ Operation. US officials had hoped this statement would alter the prevailing power dynamics in Pakistan to Sharif’s advantage. Such an expectation suggested two problems. One, Washington was delusional about the power its mere word carried. Two, Washington was ignorant of the local dynamics at work in Pakistan."

Author stretches one single point inyo two there, or rather, hides one by doing so. Point really she makes is that crazy jihadist nation that Pakistan have been since inception - that'd be since caliphate movement supported by Gandhi that nevertheless ended with massacre of over 1,500 Hindus in Kerala (termed 'Moplah killings', ie, son-in-law killings, because of Arab traditions of Arab seafaring muslims marrying and keeping local wives in Kerala) - there's no trusting their word even if anyone, including US, pours hundreds of billions of dollars in aid; they'd behead a US citizen as and when they please, anyway, as they fid to Daniel Pearl, denying all responsibility to boot and pretending that the authorities were not aware of goings-on. 

Her first point really should be that US is mistaken in assuming that a beneficiary to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars can influence a thug that the terrorist factory in reality is, all it's always been and intends to remain, terrorising - and begging at gunpoint, in turn. 

................................................................................................

"It was the annual season of international diplomacy. The two foreign policy principals, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, had arrived in New York for the UNGA session. ... Jaswant Singh’s gift to Albright was United States and India, 1777 to 1996: Bridge over River Time with Albright reciprocating with Engaging India: U. S. Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy, a collection of essays on America’s strategic relations with India.[1036] In a sign of growing cordiality between the two capitals, there were unprecedented ‘long, intensive discussions on Afghan developments’, on Clinton’s Delhi trip, the first in 21 years, and on possible counter-terrorism cooperation[1037].

"In New York generally, the Indians found themselves in a comfortable situation, with global focus being on terrorism and counter-terrorism, the very issues for which Delhi sought support. After decades of Washington-Delhi strategic dissonance, signs of strategic convergence were emerging. In fact, the US, Russia, and even Pakistan’s staunchest ally, China, all converged on sanctions against Kabul’s Taliban regime—hosts of the terrorist mastermind OBL, who planned terrorist attacks against both American and Russian targets.[1038]"

Did the author have a delusion at any point that world - outside her own paki origin - can be comfortable with terrorists or terrorism? Why make it seem as if this, counterterrorism or disapproval of terrorism, was an agenda sold by a single nation that, until then and since, for decades, was victimised by this nothing but the terrorist factory that pakis have forever been?

................................................................................................

" ... Thousands of Kashmiris threatened to cross the LOC on 4 October. Delhi threatened to open fire on those crossing the LOC while Islamabad urged them to call off their march.[1044] While Islamabad, already reeling from the Kargil debacle, decided to let them go and cross over at Chhakoti, the Indian forces were to prevent the crossing in stages through a graduated application of forces.[1045]"

If there are any Kashmiris left in paki occupied parts of Kashmir valley region, they are far too repressed and terrorised to attempt a threat, the place having since paki occupation been completely flooded and dominated by those from Western Punjab, as indeed is everything in pak from army to every province, including East Bengal until 1971, when they fought back to independence. 

Any Kashmir original citizens who dream of independence are the delusional ones that are the pampered and coddled citizens of India who imagine that, while Pakistan exists, Kashmir could have an existence of any kind except a butchered and sold in pieces carcass, as Gilgit, Baltistan and Baluchistan have been since Pakistan occupied those by force. 

It was a Gandhian - mistaken - policy responsible for their travails, by Nehru who refused their accession until too late for Kashmir and more than late for Baluchistan or Nepal. 

................................................................................................

" ... the unstated consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council including Pakistan’s ‘all-weather friend’ and strategic partner China, was that Kargil was a diplomatic and political blunder that derailed the promising Lahore process. ... "

" ... Significantly, most anti-Sharif forces sought military intervention to remove the Sharif-led government."

" ... With Washington impatient for progress on tracking and nabbing bin Laden, the CIA’s counter-terrorism cell saw the ISI as a partner of last resort. In fact, the ISI was viewed as a Taliban and OBL sympathizer, but Ziauddin was not viewed as hard core ISI. Also, Clinton’s South Asia men were against getting directly involved in the Afghan battlefield or directly confronting Pakistan over Afghanistan. Instead, the policy decision was to use Pakistan’s influence with the Taliban to track OBL. During his Washington trip, Pickering sought a meeting with Pakistan’s top spy. Pickering urged Ziauddin to actively nudge Taliban head Mullah Omar to hand over bin Laden to the Americans. And Ziauddin did."

" ... Soon after his return from Washington, General Ziauddin arrived in Kandahar on 5 October. The head of the Afghanistan-Kashmir desk, Major General Jamshed Gulzar, accompanied him. They arrived in a special plane and met Mullah Omar at his abode, a small mosque in Kandahar. At this meeting, the Pakistani intelligence officials offered condolences over the death of his wife and child.[1057] The ISI officials then informed Omar of the reason for their trip. An agitated Omar’s response was, ‘Osama bin Laden is like a bone in my throat. Neither can I digest it nor can I cough him out ... My problem is that I have given him a commitment as an Afghan and I cannot get out.’ Omar continued, ‘I pray that I die or he dies.’ Omar was clear that he ‘will not extradite him but if he goes on his own he should go’. Omar then asked his guests, ‘Can you tell me a country where he could be given protection?’ His guests could not. ... "

Was this work a research thesis submitted before the guy was located, caught and killed in Abbottabad, within walking distance from what US terms 'West Point of' pak? 

Else, was the hiding him in plain sight in the fortress-like house in Abbottabad a subsequent plan? 

Or do pakis really honestly  laim he lived there gorgeous years and they knew nothing? That ISI is indeed so incompetent as to never having noticed Obama living in Abbottabad? 

No, it's far more believable they lied. 

................................................................................................

Here's the extent of paki arrogance - 

"The CIA, in its effort to get OBL extradited, was in direct contact with it’s Pakistani counterpart, the ISI. Recalling the extent of the US desperation to get OBL, a senior ISI official said, ‘If I would have asked him to lick my feet, he would have.’[1060] The ISI, meanwhile, maintained a distance from CIA officials. For example, meetings with the CIA regional chief were held in ISI-run ‘safe houses’ instead of the ISI headquarters."

It's not just that the ISI guy said it, but that it got published with no concern regarding any repercussions. 

................................................................................................

" ... The PM was surrounded by his brother Shehbaz Sharif, his most trusted friend Saifur Rehman, and the latter’s brother Mujeebur Rehman. Seeing the writing on the wall, Chaudhary Nisar had earlier left the PM House. Suddenly, the door was flung open and in walked General Mahmud and the Vice-chief of General Staff, MajorGeneral Mohammad Jan Orakzai. About two dozen soldiers followed. Shehbaz Sharif was the first to speak. “Why so many people, general? This is a private lounge of the PM.” Mahmud asked the troops to leave. He then turned to the PM, “Sir, why did you have to do this?” The PM repeated what he had said a couple of hours earlier on hearing that army troops had arrived at the television station,“I was legally and constitutionally competent to do this.” The Commander 10 Corps, whose troops had executed the coup plans, sardonically replied to the all-but deposed PM, “What was constitutional and legal, we will now find out.” He further added, “I had always prayed I would never have to see this day..”"

" ... Mahmud and Orakzai escorted the PM and his brother Shehbaz Sharif to a Mercedes car parked outside. Mahmud accompanied them to the 10 Corps Annexe, essentially a VIP Mess. Saeed Mehdi was kept in the annexe of the PM House, Saif ur Rehman, and Mujeeb ur Rehman, accompanied by Orakzai, were taken to the corps headquarters in Chaklala. The PTV Chairman, Parvaiz Rasheed, was held in the PTV Headquarters till 1:30 am, then taken to his Parliamentary Lodge and kept under detention there.[1114]

"Away from the PM’s initial order of banning the landing of PK805 on Pakistani soil and the subsequent GHQ trashing of the Constitution, the theatre of the absurd continued. After the army take over was confirmed, the Governor Sindh Mamnoon Hussain called President Tarrar to inquire about the fate of the dinner he had invited him to. “The dinner must go on,” the President told his guest. And it did."

................................................................................................

" ... Combined with its aggressive military retaliation, that included heavy artillery and aerial attacks, Delhi stonewalled every Pakistani effort to extract strategic advantage from Operation KP. By early June, although still holding on the heights, Pakistani troops had come under tremendous physical and psychological pressure from both the Indian military offensive and from the disruption of supply routes. ... The Euphoria and Excitement were no more. ... The reality slowly sank in that Operation KP could accrue no gains for Islamabad."

" ... Pakistani troops under Indian attack suffered heavy casualties. ... Given Pakistan’s asymmetrical power structure, it was no surprise that the blundering military clique of Kargil staged a coup against the elected prime minister."

"For the French general, Napoleon Bonaparte, whom Clausewitz called the ‘very god of war’[1127], the centrality of the planning principle for any military campaign meant looking at the ‘worst-case scenario’. This necessarily required that the campaign planner, irrespective of his record of battle successes, not operate from a point of confidence. Instead, as a critical aspect of the planning principle, Napoleon explained how the planner’s personal mindset is central in applying the ‘worst-case scenario’. According to Napoleon, while planning any military campaign, ‘There is no man more pusillanimous than I when I am planning a campaign. I purposely exaggerate all the dangers and all the calamities that the circumstances make possible. I am in a thoroughly painful state of agitation.’[1128] Rarely have world class generals uttered such words of caution and humility, as did Napoleon, thus, emphasizing the criticality of thoroughness of planning for any success in military campaigns.

"Bravado or overconfidence was, thus, unknown to this military genius who, at the age of 26, had commanded the armies of the French Republic against Lombardy (in present-day Italy) and demonstrated near-invincibility in battle.[1129]

"Clearly, most military theorists have not only emphasized the centrality of planning in war but have warned against letting a general’s personality traits and biases undermine his own planning. For example, Clausewitz[1130] especially underscores personality traits like vanity, ambition, and vindictiveness that can move a general from the very planning course that alone is critical to his success and the success of the battle he has planned.

"In contrast to the above mentioned approach of the world’s leading military theorists and military commanders, the Kargil planners were overtaken by enthusiasm and a sense of payback. They were so obsessed with settling historical scores that it never crossed their minds to factor in the worst-case scenario. When the junior officers at 10 Corps heard of the operation, some had muttered their concerns. A confidential document moved through GHQ pointed out, ‘Indians won’t be stupid enough to humiliate themselves by politicizing the conflict.’ On this, an intelligence officer had written, ‘What if they are?’ The officer got rebuked but the question was never answered. Finally, the army chief General Pervez Musharraf raised the question of the Indian response at the January meeting convened for final clearance. However, the Operation had already been launched two months earlier, in November.

"Thus, the foremost planning blunder committed by the Kargil clique was their absolute failure to even factor in, leave alone follow the Napoleonic principle of ‘exaggerating’, possible dangers and calamities that may have arisen during Operation KP. ... Implicit in the planning was the faulty notion that by the time India discovered Pakistani troops across the LOC and controlling India’s lifeline to its troops in Leh, Delhi would find itself locked in a virtual surrender mode with no option but to settle on terms dictated by Pakistan. In such an all-victorious projection for Operation KP, the Kargil planners had turned on its head the cardinal war planning principle of exaggerating your adversary’s response."

................................................................................................

" ... The first major Indian attack on the supplies targeted a key forward ammunition dump. Subsequent aerial bombing and heavy artillery attacks in the encounter and exit phases almost entirely disrupted the supply lines. The Indian counter-attack had effectively cut-off what the Kargil planners and, subsequently, the field commanders had established as the Pakistani perimeter within which Operation KP was to be conducted. This made it virtually impossible for men and mules to ply on the supply routes. ... "

" ... Expansion of the war theatre, a classic mission creep phenomenon, has serious implications for logistics, supply lines, and manpower. In Operation KP, the situation for the Pakistani foot soldiers was no different. Within two months of the Operation, they were lured by the vacant spaces and strategic heights in the Kargil area. They had calculated that deeper spread of Pakistani posts on the dominating heights meant greater strategic positioning to tackle Indian retaliation. For example, a platoon in a dominating position could destroy a battalion.

"The field commanders after communicating this ground scenario to the Commander FCNA were granted permission to increase the number of posts to be established across the LOC ... Hence, instead of the initial seven to eight posts, around 196 posts (including defensive centers and outposts) were established. These covered five sectors instead of the planned single sector. This mission creep had led Pakistani troops almost 10 to 15 km ... positioned across 500–600 km of Indian territory. Beyond strategic reasons, there was also the element of competitiveness and adventure among the soldiers that contributed to what had presented itself as classic mission creep.

"‘Rapid march … press on!’ Napoleon counselled men at war. In his seminal work on military operations, Napoleon explains, ‘The strength of an army is like the power in mechanics estimated by multiplying mass by rapidity; a rapid march augments the morale of an army and increases its means of victory.’ This obsession of Napoleon with rapid marches was the major pitfall in his flawed Russian campaign. Almost 200 years later, a similar lesson was manifested again at Kargil."

................................................................................................

"The Kargil planners launched Operation Kargil to exploit Indian vulnerability along the Srinagar-Leh Highway and to sufficiently weaken India so that Pakistan could literally, as Clausewitz would argue, ‘Impose conditions ... at the peace conference.’[1146] These conditions, which the Kargil clique had initially hoped to impose, related to getting Siachen vacated. Subsequently, they changed to seeking freedom for Kashmir, and then to ‘internationalizing’ the issue of Jammu and Kashmir."

" ... It was assumed that, with their Leh-based troops facing the prospect of receiving no supplies after Pakistan virtually blocked the Srinagar-Leh Highway, Delhi would be accommodating. The Kargil clique also believed that the global community would promptly intervene diplomatically to defuse a potentially war-like tension between the two new nuclear states.

"At several points, the planning clique’s half-baked and ill-conceived approach was exposed. There was talk that the planning and analysis wing of the ISI wrote a detailed report on the proposed operation when the plan reached its office but the COAS personally intervened with DG ISI to close down the study. In March, when a young team proposed opening new fronts in Kargil to increase the pressure on the Indians, they were warned that Pakistan could not risk destabilizing the relationship with India. Subsequently, the responses of the Kargil planners when, from May onwards they were in the dock, were muddled and confused. For example, in May, General Aziz, a key planner, had boasted of the Kargil Operation as providing an opportunity to the PM of becoming the Pakistani leader responsible for liberating Kashmiris. At the FO meeting that month, when asked by the deputy air chief what they wanted, the response was unclear. Similarly, at the 2 July DCC meeting, when Ishaq Dar asked what they wanted, the response was again ambiguous. Clarity of purpose, which is the first principle of all military planners, had vanished in a haze of euphoria and wishful thinking.

................................................................................................

"According to Napoleon, ‘Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.’"

Did India know of the paki incursion in November, when it happened, and waited to hit them in June, at leisure?

................................................................................................

" ... It was no surprise that Beijing virtually read the Riot Act to Pakistan’s foreign minister when he arrived in China for an SOS trip on 11 June. Pakistan, he was told, had to vacate Kargil, Kashmir had to be resolved bilaterally, and Beijing had no influence on Indian dealings with Pakistan. Within three days of Aziz’s departure, the Indian foreign minister arrived in Beijing to a rousing welcome."

" ... Javed Hassan’s exchanges as defense attaché in Washington had left him believing, though utterly unfounded,[1148] that in case of a Pakistan-initiated military exchange with India, Washington would support Pakistan against India.

"The past occasions, when perception of movement of some kind of nuclear weapons from Kahuta, had rung alarm bells in Washington, the Kargil clique saw a potential for nuclear blackmail working to Pakistan’s advantage. They believed that a panicked world community, led by Washington, would instantly intervene after the impact of a successfully executed Operation KP was publicized and the newly nuclearized neighbors would be seen as being on the brink of war. India checkmated this calculation primarily by Delhi’s decision to restrict Indian military response restricted to the Kargil region and by not opening new fronts. Hence, a consensus emerged within the global community, especially in the US and the EU, that a nuclear Pakistan’s rash behavior, which involved forsaking of diplomatic engagement and opting for military engagement with traces of nuclear blackmail, would not be rewarded."

" ... The first trip in ten years by an Indian foreign minister to China was in the works. Pakistan, by contrast, was in a difficult strategic situation. Its Afghanistan policy was under criticism and it was blamed for facilitating ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamic militancy’. ... "

Using quote marks does not transform facts, definitely does not veil truth, into or by a lie. It merely exposes one making the ridiculous attempt to be not taken seriously due to the attempted clever lie. 

................................................................................................

"10) Answers to Critical and Abiding Questions About Operation Koh Paima:

"Did the military inform the Prime Minister about the Kargil Operation?

" ... Only in March, General Aziz had asked one of his staff officers to hand him a map that he would use to brief the PM. Such a briefing pre-17 May did not, however, take place. Subsequently, the May Musharraf-Aziz telephone recordings left no doubt that the Kargil clique had undertaken Operation KP without specific clearance from the prime minister.[1149]

"Beginning with the November 1998 DCC meeting[1150] ... it was unlikely that the Kargil clique would have reached out to the same prime minister to get his support and clearance for Operation KP. Equally, the clique would have known that getting the prime minister’s support for a major operation in contested territory, just when arrangements for the Lahore Summit were under way, was unlikely. The prime minister was viewed by a section of the army high command and hard line analysts as being overly committed to peace with India, to the extent of a failing. Nawaz Sharif was, therefore, the most unlikely candidate to play a double game with India."

................................................................................................

"Did Pakistan’s Intelligence Agencies Fail over Kargil?

"The two agencies mandated to pick up intelligence are the Military Intelligence and the ISI. In the case of Kargil, while individuals from within the ISI and the MI both appear to have attempted to investigate, both these agencies failed to pick up anything indicating unusual troop movements as leads to the covert yet unfolding Kargil Operation. The ISI’s failure meant that this cross-service agency, reporting directly to the PM, was unable to report the moves and the implications of the Kargil Operation to the government. Similarly, the MI’s failure ensured that, except for the gang of four, no one within the army top brass knew of the Operation. This dual institutional failure also raised broader questions regarding the effectiveness of Pakistan’s intelligence in monitoring stray and subversive Pakistani elements within the country’s own defense institutions. If the remoteness of the theatre of operations prevented the ISI and MI from monitoring the crossing of the LOC, the failure to pick up unusual military and paramilitary troop movements, either of the NLI troops or the 19 Division or of the SSG, was symptomatic of a deficient intelligence setup. The ISI’s defense was that it does not follow any movements, including internal troop movements; therefore, unless the army informs them about its operational plans, the ISIwill not know. Meanwhile, with ISI and MI both outside of the planning and execution loop of Operation KP, they also failed to report Indian preparations for force deployment, including troops and weapon systems, in the zone of conflict. Significantly, among other factors, this complete ‘intel blindness’ also ruled out all possibility of any early and pre-emptive course correction during Operation KP."

So - all they can do is send terrorists to burn hotels and kill people in India?

................................................................................................

"Was Pakistan militarily on a winning curve when the July fourth withdrawal decision was made?

"Pakistan remained on a winning curve only until the Encounter Phase, when in early May Indian troops first discovered Pakistani troops across the LOC. That initial encounter was marked by artillery exchanges and with Indian induction of aerial power. From early June onwards, after the Indian Army command began discovering the extent ... there began a graduated Indian military retaliation. Operation KP had turned into a battle. For the Indian government ... "

No, it always was war, inflicted by pakis on India. 

" ... As the Indians deployed massive air power, disrupting Pakistan’s supply lines, hitting logistic dumps, targeting soldiers, and generating severe psychological pressure on the Pakistani troops, the original advantage to the Pakistani troops, of being positioned at heights and enjoying lethal strategic advantage over the Indian troops climbing to attack them, began to erode. On 4 June, Pakistan lost Tololing, the first peak, to the Indians. Thereon, as they came under severe artillery and aerial attacks and faced deployment of the Bofors guns, Pakistani troops began to lose posts and pickets. Pakistani troop casualties were also on the rise. ... "

Author's insinuations against India continue here, against soldiers and government both, as she praises pakis (for sitting on peaks) killing Indian soldiers battling uphill (with boulders pushed down), she credits Indian victories to Indian artillery shelling - as if pakis were raining flower petals on Indian soldiers! 

" ... Contrary to the allegations made against the prime minister that he had bartered away in Washington the military victory that the troops were winning in Kargil, the PM brought to a rapid close costly military, diplomatic, and political losses in Kargil."

................................................................................................

"Could the international community have forced India to buckle under Kargil pressure?

"There were neither individual nor collective compulsions for key members of the international community to have even advised Delhi to enter into negotiations on any outstanding bilateral dispute. The question of any member, including Pakistan’s strategic ally China, to have even advised, leave aside forced, India to buckle under the pressure from Operation KP and enter into negotiations over Siachen etc. with Pakistan, did not arise. In fact, any move likely to culminate in a military confrontation between Pakistan and India, the two hostile neighbors who had recently acquired nuclear weapons, would make the international community panic. And Pakistan had made the move—which was also being interpreted as nuclear blackmail by Pakistan. ... There was complete consensus within the key members of the international community, including the US, EU states, the UN, and also Pakistan’s closest strategic ally, China, that Pakistan should not be rewarded for Operation Kargil. ... "

................................................................................................

"Did Pakistan plan to deploy nuclear weapons in an all-out war?

"There were neither individual nor collective compulsions for key members of the international community to have even advised Delhi to enter into negotiations on any outstanding bilateral dispute. The question of any member, including Pakistan’s strategic ally China, to have even advised, leave aside forced, India to buckle under the pressure from Operation KP and enter into negotiations over Siachen etc. with Pakistan, did not arise. In fact, any move likely to culminate in a military confrontation between Pakistan and India, the two hostile neighbors who had recently acquired nuclear weapons, would make the international community panic. ... "

Later, the then paki army chief made similar assertions after his coup, but he wasn't doing so without thought, and it was clear blackmail. 

" ... but was not backed by substantive evidence. ... "

When someone wielding a gun pointing at you is threatening to shoot to kill, and showing no sign of civilised conduct, it's a rare one who'd ask a prophet if the threat was intended to be carried out - or ask the gun wielding thug for proof of intentions by demonstration of performance. 

" ... Pakistan military’s high command had sabotaged the Lahore Summit and should not be rewarded. Pakistan had to be made to retreat unconditionally. ... "

" ... As a key member of the clique later recalled, they conveyed to the country’s elected leadership, ‘We are holding this. Now you take advantage, whatever you can, at military and political level.’[1156] However, the unfolding Kargil crisis proved the clique’s nuclear deterrence calculation flawed on two counts: Operation KP did turn into a military conflict and, while Washington and other Security Council members did exercise forceful diplomacy, it was to force Pakistan to retreat from Kargil, not to reward Pakistan’s operation. The spin-off of this clique’s brinkmanship (read nuclear blackmail) was immensely negative. It undid the diplomatic gains accrued to Pakistan for its mature diplomatic and political moves after the nuclear tests."

"Three factors point to deliberate manipulation. First, Pakistan was not in such a desperate military situation that it would have needed to opt for nuclear weapons. Secondly, and most importantly, Pakistan did not then have the capability to the deploy nuclear weapons[1158], nor had the Indians picked any intelligence on Pakistan readying nuclear weapons. Thirdly, the Americans deliberately chose an attitude of benign neglect and ignored Indian moves to ready its nuclear missiles for use.[1159] ... "

When a thug breaks in at midnight wielding a gun pointed at you, a policeman with any sense is likely to not ask if the gun is likely to fire or has a bullet, and what's more, would excuse the threatened victims of break-in - for arming and retaliation. 

Especially so in US.

................................................................................................

"Was there a pro-India tilt in Washington during Kargil?

"With the Kargil blunder, Pakistan provided the Clinton Administration a priceless opportunity to invest in strategic trust-building with India. Throughout the crisis, Washington’s key policy men opened multiple lines of communication with their Indian counterparts. It began with the 27 May call by Inderfurth, who called the India ambassador, Naresh Chandra, to inform him about what Pickering had told the Pakistanis. Subsequently, on 16 June, Inderfurth met with Brajesh Mishra in Cologne. After the 23 June Islamabad meetings between US CENTCOM Chief General Zinni and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and army chief General Musharraf, State Department official Lanpher went to brief Delhi on the Islamabad meetings. Similarly, during the crucial Sharif-Clinton summit on 4 July, in a manner unprecedented in summit diplomacy, Clinton would call Vajpayee to brief him of the summit talks. Similarly, the Indian NSA and External Affairs Minister were also updated on Sharif-Clinton talks by their counterparts, NSA Sandy Berger and Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. The sole purpose was to share with the Indians every aspect of their communications with Pakistan."

It's unclear if the above is realistic evaluation or a skewed perception. 

................................................................................................

"Was there a role for the backchannel?

"Washington’s decision to maintain complete transparency with Delhi on its diplomatic and political exchanges with Islamabad had left Islamabad with no negotiating space. Guaranteed for itself a bailout by Washington and for Islamabad an embarrassing retreat, Delhi was left with no motive to engage with Islamabad. The backchannel initiative was, thus, squeezed of any possibility of success."

Translated into normal honest words, there was no space left for duplicity, lies et al that's normal paki everyday language! 

They tried, and desperately so, especially in the most obvious lies maintained simultaneously in internal and international arena, despite the fraud being quite obvious to international community - of claiming publicly that the men invading india were not paki military, for one, while maintaining that their pm was aware of the Kargil invasion all along even as he was hosting the PM of India, for another - but then complain about these lies, once exposed, destroying any possibility of respect for pakis. 

Thus the claim and complaint about lack of equal treatment on par with that meted out to India. 

................................................................................................

"Was the Prime Minister’s Washington dash necessary? 

"As the country’s chief executive, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could have ordered withdrawal of Pakistani troops, bringing an end to Operation KP. In keeping with Islamabad’s public position that the Kashmiri Mujahideen and not the Pakistani troops had seized the heights, Sharif could have announced that Islamabad would use its goodwill to urge the Kashmiri Mujahideen to return from IOK. This would have been consistent with the farcical ‘Mujahideen’ position Pakistan had illogically and clumsily maintained since the beginning of Operation KP. The international community would have been relieved that the battle between two nuclear powers had drawn to a close. The prime minister, however, chose to engage the Clinton Administration because he had hoped that Washington would make a public statement of support for the Kashmiris and of facilitating a political resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Sharif and his close political aides also believed that American involvement at this withdrawal stage would make it more palatable for the army high command since the army chief had himself had sought Washington’s engagement. However, as subsequent developments showed, neither did the Clinton administration make any public statements supporting the Kashmir struggle, nor did the Sharif-Clinton 4 July encounter influence the post-Kargil tensions that surfaced between the elected prime minister and the army chief."

Here, and throughout the book on this point, author tries subterfuge to veil a lie. She claims that the Washington trip was for Kashmir. 

It wasn't. 

Plain truth is that, despite the lies to the contrary position proclaimed repeatedly by author, in reality pakis were being not only pounded relentlessly by India but couldn't take it, and the paki dash to Washington was the bully going crying to the police asking him to stop his intended victim bashing him up, something the bully hadn't expected - and this failed, since everyone in the international community was aware, via satellite footage, of who had invaded. 

................................................................................................

"Could the Prime Minister have Ordered an Inquiry Against The Kargil Planners, Especially the Army Chief?

"Immediately after 4 July, tensions began developing between Sharif and Musharraf, with each worried about his survival. Investigating the why, who, and how of Operation KP, to establish responsibility and to take action against those who had launched an operation that had ended in such a fiasco, was, however, far removed from the prime minister’s mind. Civil-military coordination remained generally smooth almost throughout the Kargil period. Some briefings for the PM were held at the 10 Corps Headquarters. Most, however, were held in the PM House, where the army brass would bring its maps, etc. Often, meetings would almost take the form of the DCC but hardly any decision-making took place in these. The prime minister had, in fact, left the decision-making process during Kargil in military hands. Although Sharif had the constitutional authority to directly lead decision-making, he did not ‘interfere’[1160] and had simply supported the army.

"The thought of holding an inquiry against Musharraf is unlikely to have occurred to a PM who had supported Operation KP. It is true that the PM was first briefed of the Operation only after it was a done deed. The PM had also declined Musharraf’s rhetorical mid-stream offer to withdraw his troops from Kargil. In fact, there was written evidence of the Parliament’s bipartisan Defense Committee’s positive support for Operation Kargil in a letter written by the Committee chairman in praise of the army chief’s presentation."

And, unlike the army chief with his openly thug mindset, Nawaz Sharif remained honest enough and decent enough to not turn immediately on someone when it was a fiasco, despite his own self having neither been aware nor initiated it, and never in control, of the assault, until he was required as the figurehead to get help from US to get India to stop! 

"In the overall asymmetric civil-military relations in Pakistan’s power structure, there have been only two incidences when elected prime ministers sought to hold army commanders to account. One was when, after the 1971 surrender at Dhaka and the breakup of Pakistan, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto formed the Hamoodur Rehman Commission to conduct an inquiry into the military debacle. His army chief, Zia ul-Haq overthrew him in a military coup and hanged him following legally dubious court proceedings. The second was in 1988, when Prime Minister Junejo ordered an inquiry into the deadly Ojri Camp ammunition disaster. No sooner had he announced the inquiry, the military President Zia ul-Haq sacked him."

And the post Kargil coup wasn't different, either. 

"In the absence of a political culture of holding the military accountable, the reactions of military men when held accountable, the complexities of the initiation and, indeed, of the termination of Operation KP, the fiercely anti-Nawaz mood of the political opposition, and the dominant claim of the time that Kashmiri Mujahideen had fought the Indians across the LOC while Pakistani troops fought mostly along the LOC: all these militated against Sharif conducting a Kargil inquiry. ... "

Again author is verbose in attempting to veil facts - namely, that pakis never have had a properly functioning government of any sort other than a military dictatorship, never any culture or education system other than one rooted in invader and looters mindset carrying heritage of history of hordes from Central and West Asia invading, looting and destroying India- which included until 1947 the very land pakis were given, torn out of India - and no other aim set for their very nation other than destruction of India, as a result of this choice of the heritage. 

The so-called nation, in reality is no more than a jihadist factory grown around a  military base, for West for freedom of expensive usage against Russia, conceived in this mindset of invading and looting, and aim of destruction of India now grown to destruction of the world, and born of deliberately perpetrated massacres of thousands of Hindus in 1946-47 that were intended to, and succeeded in, forcing India to let a piece be torn out. 

................................................................................................

"Beyond fear, the contradictions of the Operation, Kargil produced serious frictions even in the post-Kargil phase. For example, while maintain its insistence that Mujahideen had been fighting in Kargil, how could the army receive the bodies of the martyred soldiers? Similarly, while insisting that only Mujahideen fought in Kargil, how could major programmes honouring the martyrs of Kargil be organized by the Sharif government? ... The army sought widely publicized honouring of the Kargil martyrs and of those having returned alive from across the LOC."

"Throughout history, the acid test of generals at war or in military operations has been the victories they have piled up. No general is more successful than the outcome of the war he leads. In more complex situations, like those in South Asia in the second half of the twentieth century, the yardstick for assessment has to be what have the wars have achieved. History has examples of individual brilliance leading armies to victories and steering nations away from disaster. Outstanding military commanders, such as Alexander, Khalid bin Walid, Genghis Khan, Julius Caesar, Salahuddin Ayyubi, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Vo Nguyen Giap, were men who wrested victory from situations where deep imprints of defeat were written. Bin Walid became the legendary general who, despite the numerical superiority of battle-hardened adversaries like the Romans and the Sassanids, piled up victories for the Rashiddun Caliphate. Napoleon ‘inspired a ragged, mutinous, half-starved army and made it fight’[1161] like a winning combination that few would fight before or after. Salahuddin, with his less experienced army, reversed the Crusaders’ winning streak with his grand victory in the decisive Battle of Hattin in 1187. Julius Caesar, personally brave in battle, was creative in tactics and engineering. There was Alexander, another general facing most armies who outnumbered his own, but always remaining undefeated. Genghis Khan, a masterful general who, through excellent military intelligence and tactics and by uniting nomadic tribes and confederation and his strategic raids, became the founder of the Mongol Empire, the largest contiguous empire in history, which included most of Eurasia and substantial parts of Eastern Europe. In more recent times, the Viet Minh Commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap, who led his men to defeat a technologically superior adversary by perfecting and applying a unique war technique, which was the most important dimension of the Vietcong’s overall political, economic, and diplomatic strategy for defeating the Americans.

"In the Kargil operation, the performance of the clique of commanders, the quality of their strategic planning, and of their command, all tell a different story. Yet the power equation, absence of any accountability, the absence of censure when it mattered, and bravado minus logic or sound analysis, have ruled the day. Despite repeated blunders, the commanders in charge escaped accountability."

What author is either unable to perceive, or unable to say, is that the paki military is a bully who, thrashed outside, comes home to beat up his wife and children, old parents and helpless siblings. 

................................................................................................

" ... Major General Akbar Khan, the lead military man in Pakistan's first attempt to regain Kashmir, had readily accepted Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's label of ‘raiders’ for the Pakistani forces involved in the 1947–48 ‘Acquire Kashmir’ Operation. ... "

Kashmir had been free until invaded by pakis, and it wasn't Nehru but Jinnah who pretended thst it was tribals, not his military. 

" ... The former general, eulogising the Pakistani ‘raiders’, suggested, ‘We may perhaps also qualify for sitting in that distinguished gallery of personalities like Genghis Khan, Timur Lang, Mahmud of Ghazni, and even Alexander.’ Interestingly, Pakistan's senior-most general equated his own men with history’s prized military leaders, who had raided, ravaged, and even reigned over foreign lands in the pre-Westphalian world. ... "

No, he was far more specific, in his dream and desire to belong to the club that was all comprised of invaders each from elsewhere and attacked India, invaded and looted India, sought to destroy India. 

He included none of the tall figures that were from or of India, despite his own homeland having been a part of India for ever until then less than a year ago, and his own ancestral origins being in India, 

And that's the divide, of India- and those that seek to destroy India. 

" ... This voluntary characterization of a state's army as ‘raiders’, in the context especially of the Kashmir operation, flowed from the juxtaposition in this Pakistani soldier's mind, of the Pakistan Army as a force for right, dedicated to undoing the wrong committed at the time of Pakistan's creation. ... "

That's convoluted fraud seeking to justify invasions, massacres and loot, with fraudulent claims of rights. 

British had in fact given far too much land to pakis in the first place, when plebiscite would have denied them all but East Bengal, which alone had voted for partition. Sindh was evenly divided in vote. Punjab had voted for unionists and NWFP was determined to stay with India - as was Baluchistan. Brits rode roughshod over all of the provinces in handing over the land pakis got, because it was military base needed for use of West against Russia. 

What those raiders were identifying with was, has always been, identity of invaders, looters, destroyers and killers wreaking havoc against India. This isn't due to perceived rights but simply a mindset of a robber. 

And they certainly had no 'right' to Kashmir, which, until pakis attacked, was independent. 

Author does lie on level after level, not very differently from a rotten onion. 

................................................................................................

" ... India's  systematic role in being a mid-wife to the 1971 breakup of Pakistan ... "

Because East Bengal hadn't been subjected to racist discrimination and linguistic chauvinism of denying freedom of language, not to mention massacre of three million and mass gang rapes of half a million, by paki military? 

Or was it because India prevented pakis from massacring further millions? 

No, author simply lies through the rest of the paragraph along the lines. 

................................................................................................

"The period from Kargil to the Coup epitomizes the inherent and continuing problems that Pakistan faces in three specific areas. These include two policy areas Pakistan-US relations, relations with India including Kashmir. There is also the third structural issue of thorny civil-military relations. While on the two policy areas of India and Kashmir, there are external players that influence the nature of the challenges that Pakistan faces, Pakistan too as an interlocutor contributes to the dynamic of the relationship. Meanwhile the structural problem of civil-military relations, rooted in the process of State formation, and the unequal stature and authority of the political and the garrison entities, evolved into asymmetrical strengths of both. Within the ensuing power chemistry of Pakistan, the army acquired a dominant role, paving the way to military coups."

"The asymmetry of authority in the army’s favor has continued because of the inability of most elected governments, except for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, to bolster its Constitutional authority through institutional decision-making. ... "

Here author mentions a civilian government's head who was legally executed by a military dictator post coup, as an exception to paki history of "authority in the army’s favor"! 

What could be a better example of the fraudulent writing by the author?!

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

"A big thank you finally also to all those individuals in the various libraries and coffee shops in Pakistan and abroad, where I intermittently ‘resided’ over the years for very long hours to work on my manuscript. ... "

That pak has not only libraries, but coffee shops where women can sit and do reading, writing et al, without being punished as per an islamic law - that's news! 

Or are these strictly private facilities? Presumably for privileged few? 

" ... Whether it was the management and tea-providers at the library of the Institute of Strategic Studies or the program officer Jorge Espada and Holly Angell at the Harvard University’s Asia Center, their friendly demeanors energized me to work untiringly in solitude."

So this was a research project that was supported by Harvard, perhaps a thesis? 

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

"In recent years, across the Pakistan-India border and the Line of Control (LOC), guns have tended to converse more often than policy-makers. While the relationship between these two nuclear-armed states, Pakistan and India, influence the lives of almost one fifth of humanity, yet unfortunately hostility appears to be the only real durable factor in this inter-state relationship. This hostility rules out genuine cooperation while minimizing the possibility of resolving outstanding issues ranging from Siachen, Sir Creek, Kashmir, to water and trade disputes. Against the backdrop of this abiding antagonism South Asia remains the world’s least economically integrated region. Regional trade in South Asia accounts for only 5% of overall trade. The people of South Asia are confronted with grave environmental threats including global warming, rising water levels leading to water and food scarcity, displacement of large populations, and a rise in infectious disease epidemics."

Notice the polite pretension about it being all equal and mutual, ignoring the terrorists bred by paki military to deploy against India as they did against Afghanistan and other nations, including US, UK and many, many others. 

But then, what does one expect of a so-called nation whose genesis was in massacres of non-Muslims of India, perpetrated at orders of jinnah, and promised to go on without respite unless a piece of India was truncated for those who couldn't tolerate living in a democracy, a land which was turned into a nation whose very existence was one that's rooted in need of military bases for use of West against Russia, and has defrauded the very US of hundreds of billions of dollars by taking them in whatever base and splitting them into private pockets and terrorists support? 

................................................................................................

"Yet why is Pakistan-India peace elusive? 

"The 1999 Kargil battle, code-named Koh Paima (Operation KP), explains this well. Its events weave a story of repeated blunders, involving national and regional players that prevents genuine peace efforts from succeeding."

One, India doesn't forget the backstabbing that was paki attempts at fooling India with friendly handshake in Lahore while attacking in Kashmir at Kargil and other places, seeking to wrest off Kashmir. 

Two, that Pakistan have another name, (Operation KP), unlike India where its remembered as Kargil, shows that Pakistan had planned it as military operation even as Pakistan pretended to the last that the paki military had nothing to do with it, and that it was only some trials who had occupied territory of India. 

This pretense is routine from pakis, whether 1948 or 1965 or Kargil - or all those terrorists stealing in across the border, with paki currency and brand foods et al - so much so, at Kargil they refused to take back bodies of their dead soldiers. 

................................................................................................

" ... What should have been publicly known facts had turned into deep mysteries because the operation itself was a covert undertaking. For example: Who was actually fighting? Was Operation KP government approved? Was it across the LOC in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) or in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK)? ... "

One, it's J&K, a state in India that was legitimately signed accession of as every other state was, but with the difference that Kashmir might have been an independent nation if pakis had not attacked it in 1947-48, pretending it was only tribals. 

Two, pakis occupied a part thereof, which is denied both, equality and separate character, while the fraudulent epithet of 'free' is attached in name by pakis to it. 

Three, Jammu is ethnically far more non Muslim, apart from being completely in India, just as Ladakh is ethnically far more Buddhist and is completely in India. 

Four, pakis copied the Chinese trick in Tibet - or was it the other way around? - in denying that Gilgit and Baltistan are North Kashmir, which isn't even mentioned by this author in the context, but are integral part of Jammu and Kashmir. 

................................................................................................

"The end phase of Operation KP proved somewhat traumatic for Pakistan. ... "

"Somewhat"???? Northern Light Infantry was decimated! Or should one say, wiped out? 

It was families of those dead boys clamoring that finally led to an admission by administration, which had denied any role therein until then. 

" ... The prime minister suddenly left in the early hours of 4 July 1999 for Washington DC where a Clinton-Sharif meeting generated the Pakistan-US statement calling for the ‘withdrawal’ of troops. At home a fierce—if subdued—contestation began in civil, military, and public circles as to whether Pakistan had ‘gained’ or ‘lost’ from the operation. ... "

Wake up, guys, whether there's coffee to smell or otherwise - pakis have never but lost. 

"Pakistan had twice before experienced coups d’état. This time, however, it happened with the military chief in the air and key operation planners leading the coup! ... "

And, surprise surprise, another military dictator conducted the coup after losing yet another war to India, as per paki historical tradition. 

................................................................................................

"My chapter had covered Kargil from various angles, including civil-military relations, decision-making processes, ... "

Those are proper in India, a true democracy rooted in a spiritual treasure aligned with truth, science, thought and democracy, unlike the dictatorial abrahmic creeds. 

" ... comparisons between Operation KP and the 1965 Operation Gibraltar, ... "

Interesting, that name! Presumably a copy of an operation by axis powers to wrest it away from UK? Which had failed?

Do the pakis stay ignorant of history as much as of thry for of geopolitical facts, always? 

India recalls that only as 1965 war perpetrated by paki military, during which Indian military tanks were in Lahore - and could have taken it, had they not waited for orders and information. 

" ... the triangular Pakistan-US-India relations during the Op, and the impact of the nuclear factor on this kind of limited operation."

Funny, having taken a piece of land from India to make a fanatic home for a creed lacking tolerance amongst other things, why do pakis need to bring in US every time there's anything they want that belongs to India? Or has US, in this respect, merely replaced UK, the latter having given away those provinces to pakis that had not voted in favour of it, but of staying within India? 

................................................................................................

"Significance of Op KP

"However, given the broad canvas over which Operation KP was spread—ranging from Pakistan-India relations to civil-military relations and the decision-making process ... "

Surely that's true of every war, except in the detail of which countries are actually involved? 

"The facts of a controversial operation also needed to be revealed to a people who, in the past too, have had to pay heavily for the serious policy blunders of Pakistan’s policy-makers, including the ultimate price of the country’s breakup."

That was due to the same short-sighted thinking that was responsible for genesis of pak in the first place, and also for almost every decision involving deliberate inflictions of physical assaults, whether against India, or against nonmuslims within paki borders. 

" ... As a fellow at the Harvard University Asia Center, I was able to work in an undisturbed space and access excellent research facilities. In 2006, I was asked to teach a course at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC. All this meant time away from working on Operation KP."

................................................................................................

"Deviations and Information Collection

"The silver lining to these detours and writing spread over many years was that new information kept trickling in, particularly with respect to Operation KP. Information about the military aspect of the operation was especially a boon since initially hardly any first-hand accounts from field fighters were available. The key planner of the operation, General Javed Hassan, had talked about it in two extensive sittings as did a senior official from the Directorate of Military Operations (DMO) during multiple meetings. Over the years, moreover, several key field commanders were willing to share critical, field-level information regarding the operational aspects and progress of the operation. There was also open debate between recently retired generals on the merits and demerits of Operation KP. For example, responding to General Pervez Musharraf’s defense of Operation KP, the former Chief of General Staff (CGS), General Ali Kuli Khan, attacked the army chief for launching the operation. Similarly Lt. General Shahid Aziz, once Musharraf’s blue-eyed boy, wrote extensively about it. Another book by a then serving officer, Colonel (retd) Ashfaq Hussain,Witness to Blunder: Kargil Story Unfolds (Idara Matbuat-e-Sulemani, 2008), also deviated from the dominant narrative. This book had a different perspective from that of Dr Shireen Mazari’s book, The Kargil Conflict, 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction (Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003). Dr Mazari’s book details specific Indian military and diplomatic actions arguing that ‘Pakistan got sucked into an ever-widening conflict as a result of (these) pre-planned Indian actions’. ... "

Right, typical fraudulent propaganda by pakis there, blaming India for pre-planned assaults by and from pak against India! 

" ... All the above published information and the facts collected first-hand from active field commanders were especially valuable, given the army’s super-secrecy syndrome. An example of how this syndrome worked was my failure to get a copy of the pre and post-op curriculum of strategy courses taught at the Command and Staff College, Quetta. I wanted these documents because the former Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani had stated in an interview that as a result of the lessons from Operation KP, the strategy courses taught to military officers at the Command and Staff College had been changed. My repeated requests at the highest levels bore no fruit."

Safe bet, that changed strategy amounts to training and sending terrorists, nothing more or less. 

................................................................................................

"Beyond Pakistan’s Binary Debate

"Interestingly, much of Pakistan’s political and security debate has veered towards the civilian versus military binary. Pakistan’s political journey, with military rule spanning over more than half its history, lends itself to such an approach. In the mainstream debate, this promotes a flawed reading of decision-making, policies, and policy impacts. States and societies with a flawed understanding of policy matters can rarely become effective advocates for policy change. Acquiring consensus on Pakistan’s India policy has proved to be especially difficult, as official and public debate has tended to follow the civil-military binary path. ... "

In short, pakis never had any vision or cohesive culture, and if they stopped anti-India rhetoric or wars, the country would have no reason whatsoever to be separated from mainland and heartland that's India. 

" ... Extracting a consensus from what is a deeply divided narrative is often challenging, if not impossible. For example, on wars, the critical landmarks in Pakistan-India relations, the narratives have been influenced by this civil-military binary approach and are deeply divided as to who started which war, which political and diplomatic environment were the wars initiated in, what was achieved or lost, etc. In some cases, the passage of time has allowed a review of the original text on the wars. For example, the narrative of the 1948 and 1965 wars are now laced with a revisionist historiography frequently written by military generals. But this has not been the case with Operation KP, the most recent—albeit limited—Pakistan-India military encounter. As of now, very little comprehensive work on Kargil has been produced. The common narrations either eulogize the army while critiquing the civilians or extol the civilians while critiquing the army. The paucity of information from both civilian and military perspectives has also fed this situation."

In other words, lies about Kargil war perpetuation by paki military are too recent to be cleared with honest admissions. 

................................................................................................

"The Historical Context of Operation KP

"In June 1947, the Muslim League leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah had concluded that over 570 princely states, including Jammu and Kashmir, could remain independent while his Congress counterpart, Jawaharlal Nehru, had insisted that they could not be ‘allowed to claim independence’.[1] Jinnah had anticipated a far less complex challenge at Independence. ... "

One, Jinnah was being handed a seeming gift on a platter, for sake of permanently free availability of military bases for use of West against Russia, with provinces unwilling to separate from India forced into pakistan. 

Two, India voted overwhelmingly with congress, including in what was later given to pakis and they retain after 1971. 

So if Jinnah opined for freedom of states, it was only because he had nothing to do with most, with possible exception of less than half a dozen. 

Jinnah had his military attack Kashmir under guise of tribals in 1947-48, after Kashmir changed its decision, from a definite inclination to join him, to keeping independence. This change was brought about due to the then PM of Kashmir being treated with arrogance and disdain by Jinnah and paki PM both, and Kashmir PM realising that unlike the public propaganda, they had no intention of either democracy or equality but were intent on a feudal state. 

In the event that's exactly how paki state did develop, as per intention of its makers. 

As for India and states, it was Sardar Patel who had persuaded all but two, and if Nehru said something, that was only true state of affairs expressed in this context. The other two had people overwhelmingly in favour and need of rescue by India from the rulers and their intentions, a need not left to surmise. 

And Kashmir accession was signed finally to India due to attack by paki riffraff military pretending to be tribaks, as per orders by Jinnah. 

................................................................................................

" ... Closer to Partition, mindful perhaps only of the sentiment in the State including the anti-maharaja developments in Poonch, Jinnah predicted that ‘Kashmir will fall into our lap like a ripe fruit’.[2] Nevertheless, Jinnah had not registered Nehru’s political machinations over Kashmir. India’s historian-lawyer, A. G. Noorani, writes in his seminal essay Bilateral Negotiations on Kashmir: Unlearnt Lesson,[3] ‘Nehru and Vallabhai Patel, the deputy prime minister and the one appointed by Nehru to formulate the strategy to deal with the princely states, were fast sewing up arrangements for Kashmir’s accession to India even before Sheikh Abdullah’s release from prison on 29 September 1947 and well before the tribesmen from Pakistan entered Kashmir on 21 October.’ Elaborating this point, Noorani writes that as early as 28 May 1947, Patel had stated, ‘Kashmir remains within the Indian Union even if a division of India and partition of Punjab takes place.’[4] Subsequently, on 3 July 1947, Patel wrote to the Jammu and Kashmir Prime Minister, Ram Chandra Kak, ‘I realize the peculiar difficulties of Kashmir, but looking to its history and traditions it has, in my opinion, no other choice but to accede to India.’[5]

"Nehru, too, was single-minded on accession of Kashmir to India. Even to his friend and India’s High Commissioner to Pakistan, Sri Prakash, Nehru had admitted on 25 December 1947, ‘The fact is that Kashmir is of the most vital significance to India as well as to Pakistan. There lies the rub.’ He added: ‘Kashmir is going to be a drain on our resources but it is going to be a greater drain on Pakistan. In a military sense, we are stronger.’[6] Equally, Nehru’s 21 November 1947 exchange with Sheikh Abdullah lays bare the Indian prime minister’s true thinking on the accession issue: ‘Referendum and plebiscite are ill-advised but must only tactically be supported to avoid world criticism; that referendum is merely an academic issue and that after all for the Kashmiris, likely to be defeated in their “little war” against the State and the Indian forces, it would be absurd to want a referendum.’[7]"

Author quotes only a selective opinion and collection of selective facts that are a very small part of the history, pretty much to the tune of someone stopping at citing Munich to prove that UK was pro-nazi and had never any intention of opposing Hitler, at any cost. 

................................................................................................

"As early as 1951, Nehru was pulling back from the plebiscite option and from international mediation and calling instead for merely negotiating adjustments to the ceasefire line. ... "

His mistakes were along what was a Gandhian stance, of stopping Indian military when they were clearly in a position to take the rest, going to UN, and talking of a plebiscite at all. 

Look instead at Baluchistan, invaded, trampled, and denied freedom or independence. There's been no plebiscite, only loot, kidnappings, murders, and worse. 

................................................................................................

" ... Abdullah, his pro-India ‘winning card’, charge-sheeted Nehru for interference by Delhi in the state’s internal affairs and for not viewing the Instrument of Accession as a temporary arrangement before a permanent solution through a plebiscite could be attained.[9]"

Accession of Kashmir to India was permanent,  as it had been in every case, of well over five hundred states, into India. Abdullah’s twisting facts was for his own ambitions that were clearly misplaced, considering he would never have pakis either return POK nor refrain from attacking, Invading or occupying Kashmir, the way pakis had done to Baluchistan. 

................................................................................................

"Throughout the 1950s, India fudged on its own promise of plebiscite in Kashmir while also refusing Pakistan’s offer for a settlement on Kashmir. ... "

First condition set in UN charter for this plebiscite is complete withdrawal of paki troops from Kashmir and protection of Kashmir by Indian military until peace prevails and conditions are right for a plebiscite. 

This, clearly, neither in 1950s nor since, has ever happened nor is likely to happen if paki military can help it. 

................................................................................................

" ... The maximum that Nehru offered Pakistan was to convert the ceasefire line with ‘minor modifications’.[10] Significantly, while taking unconstitutional and unpopular steps in Jammu and Kashmir to fully integrate the disputed state into the Indian Union, and more crucially to deflect international attention from his actions, Nehru amplified his criticism of Pakistan’s entry into the Western security bloc. ... "

SEATO wasn't "Western security bloc", unless South East Asia is redefined as geographic West, exactly as Ukraine cannot be part of NATO a redefining of not only Baltic Sea but it's rivers as Atlantic Ocean. 

Inducting pak into SEATO was brainchild of a US politician who also thought Gurkha were muslims, because UK has retained a Gurkha regiment. 

................................................................................................

"Structure of the Book

"Operation KP can be divided broadly into the following six, somewhat overlapping phases: First, ‘the euphoria phase’ in which the Kargil clique, with an ominously euphoric mindset, planned Operation KP in complete secrecy. This euphoria of the Kargil clique emanated from several factors. First and foremost was the belief that Pakistan’s nuclear leverage had nullified a full-scale confrontation in the realm of possibilities. This thought, combined with a wishful fantasy of blocking NH-1, India’s lifeline to its troops in Leh, was expected to result in the withdrawal of Indian armed forces’ from the disputed territory of Siachen which Delhi had occupied in 1984. The secondary factors were that with their buddy, General Musharraf, as Chief of Army Staff (COAS), the Kargil clique could plan a surreptitious operation across the LOC—the rationale was that the Indians would never fight back based on these ‘supposedly irrefutable facts’. It was concluded that the military and diplomatic success of Operation KP was guaranteed.

"Second, ‘the excitement phase’, when its planners and its participants (soldiers) initiated the operation with no resistance from the adversary. The war theatre was almost empty and the only ‘adversity’ the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) troops encountered was an inhospitable terrain and inclement weather. Yet, as they trudged ahead with great physical difficulty, they found these uncontested vacant spaces highly alluring. In fact, Pakistan’s courageous men on a dare-devil mission interpreted this winter drawdown of Indian troops as a virtual walk-over opportunity. Weak aerial surveillance of the Kargil-Drass area was an added advantage. Back at the General Headquarters (GHQ) meetings, the Kargil clique, led by the operational commander Javed Hassan, boasted of having achieved a complete success."

What author doesn't mention is that until pakis played dirty by occupying infant posts on tops of peaks at Kargil et al, traditional conduct tacitly understood and mutually agreed upon had been that of winter standing down. 

................................................................................................

"Third, ‘the expansion phase’, in which due to the absence of Indian resistance in the war theatre, the Commanding Officers (COs) and their troops went beyond the original lines drawn for setting up of posts. In fact, for the first eight months on the move, Pakistani troops did not encounter a single Indian soldier despite the audacious setting up of 116 posts. "

What author implies, as insinuated by her informers, is that if you encounter a thief in your home at night, it's your fault for having allowed a possibility at all. 

"Fourth, ‘the encounter phase’, which began in early May with limited and indirect hostilities between Pakistani-Indian troops. These initial encounters had left both sides confused. The Kargil planners were unclear about the type and scale of the Indian military response to be expected. Meanwhile, within Pakistan the secret of Operation KP, hitherto a closely guarded secret within the clique of five generals, was now revealed to the wider military command and also to Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and to his cabinet. In India, the military command was divided about the scale and intent of the Pakistani presence and also did not consider it as significant enough to inform Delhi about it. By early June, however, the Pakistan-India encounter had snowballed into a battle in the mountains. Operation KP, planned as a smooth, unhindered military operation in IOK, had turned into a Pakistan-India mountain battle of attrition. The die had been cast. Op Kargil had turned into the Battle of Kargil."

Author isn't asking what business pakis had of planning a "smooth, unhindered military operation in" any part of Kashmir at all, much less in what oakis fraudulently label "IOK", when Kashmir had signed accession to India once and for all - unlike Baluchistan, which was invaded and occupied by force. 

................................................................................................

"Once there was clarity in Delhi as to the scale and depth of Pakistani intrusion in the Indian border, the Vajpayee government decided to hit back with overwhelming military and diplomatic might and political resolve. Combined with aggressive military retaliation, including heavy artillery and aerial attacks, Delhi stonewalled every Pakistani effort to extract strategic advantage from Operation KP. By early-June, although still holding on to the heights, Pakistani troops had come under tremendous physical and psychological pressure from both the Indian military offensive and from mostly disrupted supply routes. These iconic combatants——on hostile peaks in vicious weather with depleting supplies, deafening sorties, and unending mortar fire—were lodged in imperilled zones, but with no formula for victory . As stories from the war theatre trickled into the hallowed halls occupied by Kargil planners, concern, confusion, and even some bravado was their initial response. Their euphoria and excitement was no more. The spectrum of India-Pakistan encounters had extended to the diplomatic and political level. Delhi overruled every Pakistani effort for a bilateral political dialogue. On 12 June, the Indian foreign minister had categorically told his Pakistani counterpart, Sartaj Aziz, that India was willing to sit at the negotiations table only after Pakistani troop withdrawal to pre-Op KP positions. The message for the prime ministers from Beijing and Washington was no different. The reality slowly dawned in that Operation KP could result in no gains to Islamabad."

When a bully attacker expects a victim to surrender and beg, but is surprised instead by the victim retaliating, it's hardly expected that the victim would agree to compromise ot talk and hand over body parts grabbed by the bully. 

................................................................................................

"Fifth, ‘the exit phase’, began around mid-June. By then, it had become clear to the prime minister and to his key advisors that, with the depleting supplies for Pakistani troops, mounting Indian attacks, and a unified global demand that Pakistan immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Kargil, Islamabad had to make some hard decisions. Pakistan’s valiant soldiers continued to be under a determined and deadly Indian attack, ruling out all chances of any further operational success. At the 12 June meeting in Lahore, attended by all the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) members, the PM asked his FM to explore ways towards an honorable exit. These included engaging the Chinese and even working on a back-channel settlement attempt with Delhi. Finally, the PM opted to fly to Washington seeking withdrawal under a futile and controversial US cover."

Author isn't, for some reason, mentioning the then official position by pakis, which was that they'd fine nothing at all, it was only some local tribals who'd occupied the said positions. 

Hence the paki inability to supply either more men or food and ammo to those sitting on peaks. 

Hence also US refusal to get involved, when pakis went begging for help, trying to get US to tell India to let pakis have Kargil et al for free, like Nehrulet them have Gilgit, Baltistan and POK. 

................................................................................................

"Sixth, ‘the effect-phase,’ began once the 4 July Washington statement formally announced Pakistan’s exit from Kargil. The effect of the withdrawal statement in a battleground littered with peaks, ravines, and waterways was complex and staggered. Skirmishes between Pakistani-Indian troops continued beyond 4 July, and withdrawing Pakistani troops under Indian attacks suffered heavy casualties. Within Pakistan’s power structure, throughout its duration, Operation KP infused a deep distrust, resentment, and a latent antagonism between the elected leadership and the Kargil clique, thereby shaking the structure of the Sharif government. On the political front, the opposition used Operation KP to further bulldoze the Sharif government. Given Pakistan’s asymmetrical power structure combined with the army chief’s coup-making proclivities. Here was little surprise that the blundering Kargil clique[13]staged a coup against the elected prime minister."

Because the logic of paki military is, if you can't rob neighbour's or your own,mom, you turn around and best up your own wife, children, servants and livestock? 

................................................................................................

"The penultimate chapter is an analysis of Op KP against the backdrop of a prevailing national, regional and international environment and by using  planning principles for military operations established by classical military  stategists.  The chapter also proposes some answers to the questions that have persisted since the operation."

Questions such as did Pakistan ever have any civil government, or was it always a facade for the terrorist regime? 

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

"The Instrument of Accession and UN Involvement 

"Within days of the birth of Pakistan in 1947, it’s new government organized the tribals to ensure accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. Lord Mountbatten, the man responsible for the division of the subcontinent, had made last-minute changes to the original division, laying the foundations for antagonism between the two newly created states. In 1948, Pakistan’s regular forces went to war against India to undo the ‘wrong’ of the annexation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India. ... "

Author has it wrong. Accession of Kashmir to India only happened because paki military, pretending to be tribals, attacked; it was signed in Delhi when the so called tribals were hours away from Srinagar, having stopped on their way in to rape and murder nuns in a conventional. 

Mountbatten, in fact, was forcing Nehru to do nothing, despite accession being signed, opening that it was too late, despite contrary opinions from Indian military, ready to fly to Srinagar, waiting for orders. 

................................................................................................

" ... Subsequent developments reinforced the disputed status of the state. These included the Indian Governor-General’s acceptance of accession on the condition that “as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the state's accession should be settled by a reference to the people,''[18] a joint submission by India and Pakistan on 27 January 1948, of a draft proposal to the president of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the appropriate methods of solving the Kashmir dispute,[19] UNSC resolution 47[20], and the August 13, 1948 resolution passed by the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP)[21]."

Author emphasises the draft, omits mentioning that this is the gist of the UN resolution, and also omits mentioning that both nehru and Mountbatten were unnecessarily helping pakis against India. 

................................................................................................

"Two developments around the signing of the Instrument of Accession made it controversial. The first, Lord Mountbatten’s letter to the maharaja asserted that the final status had to be settled with reference to the wishes of the Kashmiri people. Subsequently, the Indian government accepted a UN-executed plebiscite as the means to finally determining the status of the Jammu and Kashmir State. Whatever qualifications that the Indian government on obtaining the accession of Kashmir an government subsequently added to its initial acceptance of a UN- held plebiscite, its initial acceptance of it had nullified the very Instrument of Accession that it later claimed as the basis of its narrative that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of the Indian Union."

One, no other state or province had had a referendum, especially not Baluchistan where everyone was against Pakistan - as were majority in NWFP. 

Two, accession was final in every case. 

Three, plebiscite was conditional, beginning with paki forces withdrawal, which never did happen. 

Four, India need not have stopped short of routing paki forces completely out of all of Kashmir. 

Five, were any of the eleven million Hindu and another few million Sikh people butchered in Pakistan asked about their opinion regarding their homeland? Or for that matter their families if any left alive, who were forced into an exodus across the border to the truncated India? 

Where were democratic principles regarding plebiscite where its about Baloch, or Hindus and Sikhs of Pakistan in 1947 who were butchered and forced out? 

And six, Pashtuns or Pathans of FATA still don't accept paki regime, and their home is Afghanistan, but they've been duped by UK. How about giving that land back? 

................................................................................................

" ... By granting Gurdaspur, a Muslim majority district in Punjab, to India, Pakistan believed the Boundary Commission had provided India its only road link to Jammu. ... "

If pakis were as principled regarding majority of population, and their wishes, pakis should have refused Lahore, a Hindu and Sikh majority city, even if forced by UK, instead of demanding it. 

................................................................................................

"For Pakistan, the broader question linked to its birth was the unfair attitude of the Indian State, detailed in a 15 January 1948 letter from Pakistani Foreign Minister Sir Zafarullah Khan.[24] Zafarullah Khan complained of India’s attempt to paralyze Pakistan; of the genocide of Indian Muslims ... "

Author follows it up by other fraudulent accusations in the said letter. 

Numbers according to sources, including Koenraad Elst, are - eleven million Hindus, and about five million Sikhs, were butchered in Pakistan around partition; the corresponding number of muslims killed is about one tenth that of Sikhs, according to the same sources including Koenraad Elst. 

These numbers do not include atrocities perpetrated against other minorities in pakistan, such as Jews, Parsi (Zorostrian), Buddhist or Jain. 

Pakistan not only had minorities reduced from over 20% to less than 2%, but subsequently went on to conduct a humongous genocide in East Bengal that was only exceeded in nazi holocaust perpetrated against jews, East European and other non German peoples. 

Pakistan followed this up with atrocities and genocide in Baluchistan. This is apart from its treatment of other minorities, such as Shia and Ahmediyya. They are being bombed in mosques on Fridays and generally being butchered, too. 

Reminds one of The Permanent Purge by Zbigniew Brzezinski. 

................................................................................................

"The ceasefire line, however, led to further instability and insecurity. There were three problems. One, no prominent and permanent demarcation line was drawn barring the fixing of poles in some areas. Two, in the areas that the poles were fixed, it was done leaving wide gaps in between. Finally, a major gap was left by not demarcating the line across the glacier areas. The assumption was that the highest, snow-clad rocky region in the world would be of ‘no interest’ to either Pakistan or India. Also given that the ceasefire by international law was a temporary divide, neither side considered the setting up of permanent division structures."

Author continues selective quoting, beginning now with that from a letter by US representatives in pak. 

" ... After identifying the list of Nehru’s reservations, Lewis reported to his secretary, “This is totally out of line with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of 21 April 1948.”[28]"

Notice that Lewis does not mention - or if he did, author omits quoting - paki non-compliance with the very first condition of the said "United Nations Security Council Resolution of 21 April 1948", namely, withdrawal of all paki forces from the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 

................................................................................................

"Lewis maintained that there were practical reasons why Pakistan “could not bow to the Commission’s judgment.” 

But again, neither Lewis nor author takes into account the horrendous genocides perpetrated against India and in India by invaders, whose heritage is born proudly by pakis, in words and in actions - and this strange omission is due to abrahmic bias against all and every non-abrahmic Creed, favoring extinction thereof, using every possible means including genocide and fraud. 

................................................................................................

" ... Lewis also raised the issue of the country’s cognizance that there was a broader threat. “It had not escaped them that the question has recently become a matter of far more importance than the mere question of the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, for if world opinion is to gain the impression that Pakistan has been the guilty and obstructive party that impression would inevitably and perhaps disastrously, affect the very existence of Pakistan should India avail itself of the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir, or avail itself of any other excuse, for waging war on this country. India’s press has always been far more effective then has the press of Pakistan. In the final analysis, therefore should India have aspirations in the direction indicated, Pakistan would be functioning not only at tremendous odds in terms of military potential but also in terms of world opinion.”[30]"

It's well to remember that at this time, US and its administration below presidential level was busy saving most war criminals of Europe, chiefly but not only Germans, from prosecution, giving sanctuary to a great many in US, while allowing their escape across South Atlantic in most serious cases, and resettlement in Germany et al in most cases, whether under their own names or new identities. 

This was not made known to either of the presidents, whether Truman or Eisenhower.  

................................................................................................

" ... The question of Kashmir stayed with the UN but India was determined to prevent, under any circumstances, the holding of the UN mandated plebiscite. Equally, India through its continuous and active non-cooperation with the UN’s Kashmir-related initiative, especially the United Nations Military Observer’s Group on India and Pakistan (UNGOMIP), rendered it ineffective. ... "

Again, author avoids the vital question of pakis never having withdrawn forces, a necessary and first condition for the plebiscite. 

Also, author omits all mention of Baluchistan and other regions where paki military wreaked havoc. 

................................................................................................

" ... The Soviet Union followed India. Furious at Pakistan’s decision to join US-sponsored alliances, it discarded its neutral stance on Pakistan-India disputes and threw its powerful weight behind India. To spite Pakistan, Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, during their visit to India in December 1955, referred to Kashmir as “one of the states of India”."

That's typical paki pose of seemingly megalomania but perhaps in reality due to an inferiority complex, imagining and pretending that it's equal in its relationship with US or Russia. In reality the treatment meted out since and now by China and Arabs tells quite the opposite story. 

................................................................................................

"Later in 1965 the Soviet Union intervened to facilitate the signing of the Tashkent Agreement. The primary aim of this agreement was to bring to a close the Pakistan-India war."

No, in fact it was to return the Indian territory - won in battles by Indian forces in and around Kashmir - to pakis, despite it being not legitimately but only forcefully under paki occupation since 1948. 

................................................................................................

"However the 1972 Pakistan-India engagement was the only one in which the question of Kashmir’s political future was recognized as an unresolved issue. Although the Simla Agreement followed the 1971 breakup of Pakistan held on to its UN-mandated position on Kashmir.[31] ... "

Notice the total bypassing of the horrendous genocide of over three military by paki military in East Bengal, including systematic rape of half a million women held in chains in groups so they couldn't kill themselves to escape the horror and were forced to endure the gang rapes, or usage as per need as paki generals termed it, reducing them to objects on par with bathroom facilities. 

Of course, in the process of omitting that, author also omits the then prevalent accusations against India, of having broken Pakistan into two - which ignored the fact, that if East Bengal really did not wish separation, there was nothing to stop them from uniting right back, except for the memories of the then recent genocides three million by paki military and the systematic rapes of half a million. 

................................................................................................

"Use of Force 

"The unsettled question of Jammu and Kashmir’s future with virtually no political routes available for a credible process of resolution had injected the use of force, so to speak, in the very DNA of the relationship of the two adversarial neighbors."

Author, like Pakistan, denies responsibility for the terrorist assaults and wars perpetrated by pakis, with an argument that is that of a thug, a rapist, a murderer - if you don't give everything he asks of you, you are provoking him to murder, rape, theft, and anything else he was going to find an excuse for via an unreasonable demand in any case. 

................................................................................................

"India for several reasons found itself in a more comfortable position. She occupied the bulk of the most valuable part of the territory Jammu and Kashmir and given that possession is nine-tenths of the law the international community exerted virtually no pressure on India to address the issue of Jammu and Kashmir’s future. Hence for India, ownership was easy to maintain while for the Kashmiris and for Pakistan ownership was difficult, if not impossible, to enforce."

That's as fraudulent as it gets, dance Gilgit and Baltistan are integral part of Jammu and Kashmir. 

................................................................................................

"India had subverted the established ‘rules of the game’ regarding the accession of the states of Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan first and India subsequently opted to use force as a means to settle disputes. Pakistan’s political and military leadership, which remained firmly committed to the right of the Kashmiris to accede to Pakistan also feared that its 1947 and 1948 gains on Kashmir were vulnerable to India’s extension and control in the major part of Jammu and Kashmir state."

Notice the consistent omission of the very name of Baluchistan? 

................................................................................................

" ... Hence it was not the circumstances of Pakistan’s birth, as some scholars have argued,[35] that locked the newly independent Indian state and the new-born Pakistani state in a confrontational mode. Instead it was the unresolved issue of Jammu and Kashmir."

Another fraudulent pose, since the very genesis of Pakistan was in massacres of Hindusand Sikhs, from over ten thousand Hindus in Calcutta in August 1946, to hundred and fifty thousand Hindus in Noakhali during subsequent biggest Hindu festivals that year, to eleven million Hindus and nearly five million Sikhs during partition in both parts of then Pakistan, with Pakistan government refusing to give adequate security to Gandhi if he visited northwest. 

................................................................................................

"Twenty years into Pakistan’s creation, cracks began appearing in the consensus among Pakistan’s civil and military elite on how to undo, what even the UNSC resolutions also affirmed, was an unlawful Jammu and Kashmir accession to India. ... "

Again fraudulent statement there. 

One, India need not have gone to UN at all, any more than Pakistan did about attacking Baluchistan. Nehru was expecting international community to treat his Gandhian gesture in manner that he and congress treated Gandhi's various strikes, and in this he was as wrong as in stopping India's forces from finishing off the problem once for all. 

Two, Kashmir accession was legal, and it happened despite Mountbatten wishing otherwise. He and other British officials on both sides were plotting desperately against India in this, and failed. 

................................................................................................

" ... Covert and overt forces worked in 1947 and 1948 when invasion by Pakistani troops helped roll-back Indian troops from a sector of Jammu and Kashmir territory."

Again fraudulent statement there. 

Indian forces stepped on Kashmir soil only several hours after accession had been signed in India, taking off after the order was given after accession was signed. 

And Kashmir accession was signed only because paki forces had attacked and were almost at doors of Srinagar, so Kashmir ruler was asking India for protection and Mountbatten was intent on preventing that.

It's not paki forces that cleared Indian military out of any part of Kashmir, but nehru stopped Indian military from chasing pakis all the way out of Kashmir, which they were about to do in the valley and could have easily enough in Northern parts. 

................................................................................................

"Pakistan’s 1965 Kashmir initiative, codenamed Operation Gibraltar, was planned in secret by a handful of military men encouraged by Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The Operation failed to enable Pakistan to take control of Jammu and Kashmir, sparking off the wider 1965 war with India, ... " 

Really? Every time Pakistan assaulted India, a quick takeover of a territory was expected, and India is to be blamed for preventing this? 

................................................................................................

"In 1971, after effectively exploiting the alienation and anger of East Pakistanis, India began a war in the eastern wing. ... "

India was suffering the horrendous onslaught of well over ten million refugees fleeing paki military atrocities and genocide, and it was strain enough to feed them. But the then PM of India waited for oakis to attack before going into a war mode, keeping forces in check until then. 

And pakis, being stupid enough, did give her thst excuse by attacking. 

" ... Pakistani Army decided to open a western front, resulting in India taking control of the strategic territory of Kargil, located on the Pakistani side of the LOC."

Typical of paki behavour, bully assaulting and then whining about being routed. 

................................................................................................

" ... Delhi proposed as a final settlement, the conversion of the existing LOC into a permanent border. ... "

What rubbish, calling that generous offer a proposal instead! 

India had 91,000 - or was it 93,000? - paki prisoners of war, surrendered to India for protection due to fear of backlash of wrath in East Bengal, avenging the genocide by pakis perpetrated there. 

There was no reason the then PM of India couldn't demand all of J&K territory surrender in exchange. 

Except an undue generosity towards an undeserving and separated part of Mother India under a genocide perpetrating regime. 

................................................................................................

"Beginnings of Protracted War for Glaciers and Passes: Roots of Kargil

" ... Because forces from neither side had ever ventured into the glacier zones that lay beyond point NJ9842, this extremely inhospitable north-eastern terrain had never been disputed."

" ... Beyond NJ9842, vague language identifying the CFL as ‘thence north to the glaciers,’ was used. ... "

" ... Even US agency maps showed Siachen as part of Pakistan. [42]"

That consists of an argument in favour of a piece of India which was separated from India due to usage of genocides perpetrated as an argument? 

................................................................................................

"Lieutenant General M. L. Chibber was then India’s Director of Military Operations.The mission scaled Teram Kangri at 24,297 feet. A subsequent expedition in 1980 went to Sia Kangri and Saltoro Kangri (24,500 feet) and to Sia Kangri (24,500 feet).[44] According to Colonel Narender Kumar who led the expedition, “We found labels from tin cans and cigarette packs with Pakistani names, German and Japanese equipment and it is this that convinced the appeared disproportionate to the findings since no evidence of Pakistan’s military presence in the area had been found. “There wasn’t a soul there,” Kumar had recalled.[45] Kumar was the first to scale the uncharted Siachen Glacier and he put the Indian flag at Siachen. Significantly Pakistan had no permanent physical presence in Siachen. 

"Nevertheless the Indian General Chibber subsequently maintained that he was alarmed to learn that the Pakistanis were accompanying mountaineers to the glacier and that maps printed in the West showed the Siachen area as part of Pakistan.[46] In the summer of 1981 India sent another seventy-man military team posing as a mountaineering expedition, on an eight weeks long mission. It comprehensively surveyed the area, climbing the Saltoro Kangri and the Sia Kangri-I. It hiked to the top of Indira Col and skied Bilafond La. Clearly, India had begun preparations to occupy the area east of the Saltoro Range."

One, if the terrain is mountainous, a military expedition would of necessity be hiking and climbing peaks. 

Two, they weren't pretending to not be members of military forces of India. 

Unlike the fraud perpetrated repeatedly by pakis sending military forces attacking India, especially in Kashmir but elsewhere as well, dressed in loose pajamas instead of military uniforms, just so paki regimes at the time could pretend that these were tribals that pakis knew nothing of, that it was emotional behaviour by locals! 

................................................................................................

"Through the winter of 1983, both Pakistan and India began preparations to occupy Siachen by the summer of 1984. Pakistan made ready for a combined SSG and Northern Light Infantry (NLI) mission. By early April, the Indians airlifted two platoons of Ladakh scouts to Siachen. Thus, when on 17 April, two Pakistani reconnaissance helicopters arrived at Siachen, they discovered the Indians.[57] ... "

"It was not until 1984 that the Indian Army successfully launched Operation Meghdoot[58] to occupy the territory.[59] India controls the forty-three mile long Siachen Glacier, Sia La, Bilafond La and the Gyong La, all three passes of the Saltoro Ridge located on the west of the glacier.[60] This area lay unoccupied before 1984."

" ... India now established control over all of the 70 kilometers long Siachen Glacier and all of its tributary glaciers, as well as the three main passes of the Saltoro Ridge immediately west of the glacier—Sia La, Bilafond La, and Gyong La. Pakistan controlled the glacial valleys immediately west of the Saltoro Ridge."

................................................................................................

" ... General Ziaul Haq, though publicly dismissive of Indian occupation of the glacier, instructed his forces to reclaim Siachen and met the army’s request for military equipment, French-made Lama Helicopters and training to launch a high altitude military operation. The army planned to reclaim Siachen the following year.[64] 

"However, the army would be forced to report that it had failed to recapture Siachen because India had ensured substantial troop presence there by April 1985.

"Another Plan B was also presented at the meeting. According to this, Pakistani troops could go unnoticed across the LOC and set up posts in Kargil sector on the Indian side of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistani forces could then block the main artery, the Srinagar to Leh Highway (National Highway-1) from its posts in Kargil. This would force the Indians to negotiate with Pakistan where Pakistan would demand unconditional Indian withdrawal from Kargil. General Ziaul Haq opposed this plan. The Indians, he argued, would opt for all-out war if Pakistan choked their main artery in the North. Zia rejected the B option. He believed India would attack Pakistan at the international border.[65] After 1985, Pakistan did not launch another similar operation to reclaim the Siachen area."

................................................................................................

" ... Significantly from the late seventies onwards, Pakistan had moved to limited and mostly covert military action, a shift in strategy from the launching of major military operations it had employed from the late forties through the early seventies. Overtly and covertly, well-prepared and ill-prepared, with the belief that they were being ‘wronged’ by India, an anxious Pakistan reciprocated by launching strikes across the LOC."

Author is avoiding the word terrorist, or jihadist, or even taliban. 

................................................................................................

"For example in April 1987, Pakistan launched a successful operation to gain control over some area of the Saltoro Ridge. Armed with ropes and ladders, a dozen commandos climbed a cliff to occupy a position at 21,000 feet, dominating Indian positions at Bilafond La. This post was called the Quaid post. However, within two months, on 25 June, after several attempts, and suffering heavy casualties, to recapture part of the Quaid post. The commandoes at Quaid post had run out of ammunition and they could not be resupplied since their logistics supply base had come under fire. 

"In September 1987, Pakistan lost the Quaid post, strategically located at considerable height, to the Indians. Subsequently, the Pakistan Army conducted the Dalunang (1988) and Chummik (1989) operations to occupy positions across the LOC. In the Dalunang operation, led by then FCNA commander Brigadier Aziz Khan, 23 posts were established across the LOC, which Pakistan still controls to this day.[67] This was in violation of the CFL agreement. By now neither side was abiding by any agreements. In 1988, India also established 12 posts in the Qamar sector."

................................................................................................

"The Origins of the Kargil Plan

"In 1986, the army chief asked the planning directorate at the GHQ to take the concept developed by Safdar during the war-gaming exercise and develop it as an operation. Brigadier Khalid Latif Mughal was put in charge. The planning directorate formulated a plan with three specific inputs. One, Kargil should be the location for the operation. Two, para-drops would be used in the operation, since there were no land routes to Kargil but Skardu airport was close to the planned area of the operation. Three, an entire battalion, approximately 4000 troops, would land in the Kargil area.

"Kargil was chosen as the operation area since it was in direct view of and close proximity to NH1, India’s main supply route to Siachen. The plan envisaged the battalion of para-drops to cut the NH1 through an undercover Operation. These troops would hold down the enemy and isolate Siachen long enough for the troops to launch a ground attack. The surprise factor in the Operation would feature paramilitary troops, including NLI and SSG commandoes, since radar would not capture their movements. . Deployment of regular troops would kill the surprise factor since Indian radar would detect their movements.

"Planners assessed the international environment from a Cold War prism. They concluded that Pakistan’s central role in the Afghan war put Pakistan in a good international position."

Ridiculous delusions of grandeur there. 

................................................................................................

"Pakistan’s army officers seemed to be divided over the plan, among the post and pre-1965 officers. The pre-1965 officers were battle-hardened but were cautious about undertaking risky operations. This category included the Director General ISI and the Chairman JS headquarters. Officers including Ali Quli Khan,Asif Nawaz, and Pervez Musharraf were from the post-1965 course and seemed to favor the plan."

Perhaps the important date author should have considered is, not 1965, but 1971, although pakis started the fight each time, and lost it both times. 

................................................................................................

"As the ISI chief from 1979 to 1987, Rehman oversaw the build-up of an elaborate apparatus for the world’s most heavily-financed US-funded covert war. As the Soviet pull-out drew closer, he often raised the question of how to use the force, the ‘muscle’, Pakistan had trained during the Afghan insurgency. The concern also was whether in the post-Afghan war scenario who would these trained and battle-hardened Afghan fighters fight...could it be Pakistan?

"Akhtar Abdur Rehman wrote a detailed note arguing that Pakistan should utilize the Mujahideen currently fighting in Afghanistan and also train Kashmiris for the operation in Kargil. Rehman recommended that the ISI lead the recruitment process to ensure no suspects come into the fray. Rehman suggested that as soon as there was a drawdown from the Afghan front of Pakistan’s manpower involvement they could be used for this operation. Pakistan had around 15,000 to 20,000 citizens involved in Afghanistan. The plan Rehman proposed was to train the Mujahideen in AJK and launch them in the Kargil sector through the land routes. As locals they would deal well with the environment. The plan was for them to conduct sabotage activities. Pakistan would only be involved in training in AJK, enter undercover in the Mujahideen group as decision-makers and leaders, and conduct the frontal attack in Siachen."

Author treats this terrorist factory activity as nonchalantly as if this were about potato farming in Punjab, rather than using non-military males (in civilian attire, mostly pajamas) trained to kill civilians in other countries. 

................................................................................................

" ... Zia ul Haq, the army chief and military ruler issued directives to his core team on which his handwritten notes queried why Pakistan was not using its success in Afghanistan and why Pakistan was not taking material advantage of a neutralized India. 

"In August 1988 a C-130 plane carrying Pakistan’s top military command crashed. There were no survivors."

Wasn't this the Zia whose large hall was usually littered with gunny sacks filled with dollars, supposedly for use of terrorists in Afghanistan?

................................................................................................

"Dusting off the Kargil Plan

"In 1989, Pakistan again turned towards Kashmir. ... Pakistan’s ISI began deploying its Afghan-trained muscle in the widespread and indigenous insurgency."

Pakis admit, there, the responsibility for terrorist attacks against India. 

................................................................................................

"Around 1996, a senior General within the ISI retrieved the Kargil plan. Keen to revive it, the General took the plan to his chief General Jehangir Karamat.[74] The chief put the plan on the assessment track within the GHQ, seeking input of its operational feasibility from relevant departments. The paper trail began. First it arrived at the planning directorate, from where it was sent to the director general military operations for his views. ISI too was involved. A little-noticed communication instructed the inter-services to conduct a comprehensive study of the plan. It had representatives from the air force, navy, SSG, and the army. The informally convened team actually traveled to the proposed area of the operation. Using Indian reconnaissance photographs, intelligence information, including intercepts, logistics, hard facts and a visit to the Pakistani side of the proposed operation area, the team conducted a comprehensive assessment of the Indian level of preparedness, intelligence capabilities, and response possibilities.

"The team identified problems. To begin with, the idea of training the Mujahideen was not a plausible one. It was not possible without compromising the surprise factor. It was deemed too difficult to keep a lid on all Mujahideen. The Indian penetration among the Mujahideen could also not be ruled out. The second problem was that regular troops would have to be infused into irregular troops creating unpredictable problems. Finally, the air force could not give ‘close’ air support to the military field units.

"The team underscored the contradiction between the proposed plan and official policy of improving relations with India. Its members feared that once the Mujahideen cover blew, the government would not be able to handle the backlash. A major flaw identified was lack of clarity in the steps that Pakistan would take after the Kargil peaks were occupied. The planners also questioned the assumption that Pakistan would have sufficient time to attain its objectives in Siachen between the time that NH1, India’s supply line to Siachen, was blocked and the time that the international community took notice."

Obviously, they went ahead anyway, despite flaws known. Hoping India would hand over all territory demanded, wished and dreamt of by pakis, who have been, especially on internet, posing as inheritors of invaders of India from Central and West Asia for centuries?

................................................................................................

"Against this backdrop, the report laid out the only two possibilities available to Pakistan; One that included both the blockade of NH-1 and the Siachen offensive and one that limited the operation to a blockade of NH-1. Including the blockade and the offensive would make it difficult for Pakistan to deny involvement in the former. The team ruled out both possibilities suggesting that the plan was not viable. They concluded that while the plan was tactically plausible, strategically it was a nightmare. The sealed report was formally presented to the ISI.

"Interestingly one general keen to implement the plan called in a team member that had assessed the environment and timing. Informally he reprimanded him, “You people come from abroad after studying and you think you can teach me strategy.” The general trashed the report. However the ISI as an institution did not consider as part of its mandate to execute this Kargil plan."

The last sentence is incomplete. 

................................................................................................

"While the DG ISI concluded that it was not the ISI’s mandate to conduct this operation, the plan was not shelved. For the determined backers of the plan, those keen to settle scores with India on Siachen, those who would point to India’s repeated back tracking on the Siachen negotiations and those who insisted that diplomacy alone was not the way forward, the operation remained enticing. Its backers had decided that the Siachen offensive could be dropped from the plan but dropping the operation in total, was ruled out. 

"Lt. General Aziz Khan was one such man."

Here, pakis tacitly admit intentions of never stopping attacking India whether with terrorism or otherwise, until India is no more. On the internet and on public television debates such intentions have been, repeatedly, avowed, by several pakis, of various stature. Siachen is as much of an excuse as Kashmir, and the real intention is the centuries old dream of wiping out all civilisation in name of a creed. 

Egypt, Persia and much else was thus wiped out in a century by the barbarians, whose deadly onslaught India suffered ever since, until era of European colonial centuries. India survived, despite a horror perpetrated through centuries, that was several times as deadly as the holocaust perpetrated by nazis. 

There's no other purpose for existence of Pakistan internally other than finishing off this war against civilisation by destroying India and her culture once for all. External support for its creation was, of course, for use as military bases against Russia. But as a nation it doesn't have any soul any more than East Germany did. The wall, however, isn't concrete. It's jihadist mindset out to destroy world civilisation. Hence 2001 on the attacks throughout the world, preparations for which were begun in 1960s with the then paki military supremo using religious terrorism as weapon against Afghanistan - used subsequently by US against Russia. 

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

"India Gifts Pakistan a Good Strategic Space 

"In May 1998, the world’s worst kept nuclear secret was out in the open. India and Pakistan, long known to be clandestine nuclear weapon states, had conducted bomb tests to openly establish their nuclear credentials. If there was a trigger that was needed to push the Pakistan-India relationship, already locked in distrust, constant covert hostility, and periodic open confrontation, further along the hostility path, it was provided by these May 1998 nuclear tests. 

"To prompt criticism by the global community, which had studiously ignored Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s 2 April letter, warning of India’s preparation for such tests, India conducted its nuclear explosions on 11 May and 13 May.[75] The tests, as India’s scientists verified were a “culmination of India’s weaponization programme.” US President Clinton said the tests were unjustified and they clearly created a dangerous new instability in the region.[76] His National Security Advisor Samuel Berger announced that the United States was "deeply disappointed" by the Indian decision to "test nuclear weapons." [77] Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl said the tests were “in a way a direct challenge to the neighboring countries."[78] China urged the international community to "adopt a unified stand and strongly demand that India immediately stop development of nuclear weapons." [79]"

Notice that, although paki tests followed within far too short a period - a week? - to be a coincidence, they weren't criticised on par, but instead, supported by US and of course, China. 

So the only possible inference or logical conclusion possible is that pakis were there already, US knew, and had planned to comment regarding deplorability thereof, but then armtwist India into abandoning any intentions, plans or thoughts thereof, forever making India subject to terror from pakis. The surprise India threw had them change the plans, and make pakis do theirs in a short period and promptly pretend that India was the sole reason pakis had to do it. 

Reality, as Tarek Fateh states, is that pakis have no reason to have nuclear capabilities ranging far beyond furthest reach of Indian territory from paki borders, since their intentions aren't about attacking China. (Or Australia for that matter.) 

Reality, he points out, is that the aim is Israel, and thus the perpetual tomtomming of paki weapons as, not paki, but islamic. It's not about survival of a small part of India separated as needed by West for military bases for use against Russia, but as 'homeland of islam' - not Muslims, but islam - aimed at destruction of all else, beginning with India and Israel. 

................................................................................................

"Another unlikely voice on the Indian nuclear tests was that of Osama bin Laden (OBL). The only one to publicly advocate that Pakistan conduct the nuclear tests, OBL urged “the Muslim nation and Pakistan” to prepare for a Jihad which should “include a nuclear force.”[80] ... "

You'd think this have grabbed attention, this pointed coming together of OBL, paki nuclear drvice and jihad as intentions thereof. 

Author promptly sidelines by throwing detailed information as dust storm deflecting real questions. 

" ... Even if this OBL advice slipped the attention of the White House and State Department’s men at Foggy Bottom, who were focused entirely on South Asia’s unfolding nuclear saga, it had grabbed the attention of the CIA’s Counter-Terrorist Center. Ever since this center’s late February alert memo on the OBL threat, it was sharply focused on Osama. They were keen to capture him, either with or without the help of Kabul’s Taliban government. ... " 

Which was terrorists trained by oakis and imposed on Afghanistan in name of jihad, incidentally, and funded - to yhe tune of billions of dollars, not incidentally - by US, until they bit US back. 

Any lessons there about raising a Rottweiler as a pet for use against neighbours, learned yet? 

" ... In February, the US Ambassador to the UN, Bill Richardson, was in Kabul asking the Taliban to handover Osama, telling them, “Look, bin Laden is in your territory...he’s a bad guy.[81] Richardson was aware of the connections that America’s oil giant Unocal was developing with the Taliban. ... " 

Notice pointed omissions there, of connections between Unocal and subsequent government leaders in US, in place in 2001. 

"After making several trips to Kabul and Kandahar in November 1997 Unocal invited a Taliban delegation to its headquarters. A spokesman for the company, Unocal, said the Taleban were expected to spend several days at the company's headquarters in California.[82] Unocal was competing with the Argentinean firm Bridasfor on a multi-billion project to construct a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan into Pakistan. With the raging civil war in Afghanistan, Unocal remained hopeful of pushing the project forward. In fact, by end 1997, the oil giant had already contracted the University of Nebraska to begin training of around 140 Afghans in technical skills for pipeline construction. The training, interestingly, was to be held in Kandahar, the ideological headquarters city of the Taliban."

Notice, again, pointed omissions there, of connections between Unocal and subsequent government leaders in US, in place in 2001. 

................................................................................................

"Washington’s engagement with Afghanistan proceeded on several not necessarily complementary, commercial, diplomatic, security, intelligence, and counter-terrorism tracks. In spring, the Counter-terrorist center had made plans with its Islamabad-based CIA case officers and Afghan tribals to capture OBL. Since February, OBL, along with the Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, was running the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders. The front was an international declaration of war against the United States.[83] America was identified as the “distant enemy” and al-Zawahiri advocated “the need to inflict the maximum casualties against the opponent, for this is the language understood by the West, no matter how much time and effort such operations take.”[84]Several militants from Egypt, Bangladesh, Kashmir, and Pakistan had signed the Front’s manifesto, authored by OBL and al-Zawahiri."

And yet it was ignored, including the vital point, which shouldn't have come as shock, but known all along, regarding deep connections between OBL, pakis or rather ISI, and jihad intended against the world, including especially US, despite the latter having funded jihadist activities in Afghanistan because it was useful against Russia?

................................................................................................

"Clinton’s attention was also divided. In Washington, alongside the nuclear issue, red lights were flashing on the OBL issue and the growing threat of terrorism. On both sides of the Potomac, dedicated individuals were bracing America against a threat of a hitherto unprecedented level. On 22 May, Clinton appointed a Counterterrorism Czar at the White House. He signed the Presidential Decision Directive-62 entitled ‘Protection Against Unconventional Threat to the Homeland and American Overseas’. A new group, the Counter-Terrorism Security Group,was formed with the heads of the counterterrorism departments of the CIA, FBI, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Departments of Defense, Justice, and State as core members. Across the Potomac River from Foggy Bottom, the CIA’s Counter-Terrorist Center at Langley, in April, had made an elaborate night attack plan to strike OBL’s known abode, the Tarnak Farms, located close to Kandahar airport. The area was scouted and satellite photographs taken as Islamabad-based CIA case officers worked on preparing the plan with Afghan assets and with tribal leaders. Finally, the plan was aborted for fear of collateral civilian casualties and a lack of legal cover.[85]

"Returning to the issue of nuclear tests, the widespread view in Pakistan was that India’s tests went unmonitored in Washington because of the US’s benign neglect of its new strategic ally’s activities. An agitated Additional Secretary at the Foreign Office had conveyed Pakistan’s resentment in undiplomatic words. Around midnight on 11 May, the US deputy chief of mission (DCM) was called and given a demarche. In the demarche Pakistan complained that India and the US were in fact in cahoots with each other. The DCM asked his Pakistani counterpart if he wanted him to send “this shit” to the US? Pakistan did.

"Leading British experts indicated that, given the every-thirty-minute coverage of the Indian nuclear site Pokhran by US satellites, their missing the early warnings of the tests was highly unlikely.[86]In Washington, several analysts explained the Clinton Administration’s late 1997 decision to strike a strategic alliance with India as a major cause for the Administration’s failure to read even the obvious signs pointing to imminent nuclear testing by India, which was “poised to become a new Asian tiger.”[87] Reflecting this, a senior State Department official said, "There wasn't a voice in the wilderness…there was nobody anywhere – no voices saying, 'Watch out!’”[88]"

No one willing to credit India with intelligence despite the home grown nature of the tests? 

................................................................................................

"Significantly, within India the news of the tests was received with both surprise and panic. The news landed in the parliament while the BJP government’s nuclear policy was under discussion. Indian lawmakers erupted in a shouting bout at the news. The blame game began. Former Prime Ministers I.K. Gujral and H.D. Deve-Gowda said that Pakistan's tests were a reaction to India's tests. Similarly, former Defense Minister and President of the Samajwadi Party, Mulayam Singh Yadav, condemned the BJP-led government for "provoking" Pakistan's tests. Addressing Vajpayee, the leader of the Communist Party of India-(Marxist), Somnath Chatterjee, said: "It is a nuclear arms race that you have started in this region."[92] 

"As if in support of Islamabad’s stance in Islamabad, the Congress pointedly blamed Vajpayee for “using incendiary rhetoric that set off a regional nuclear arms race.” In its statement, the Congress party said the tests were a "grave development". Fearing a regional nuclear arms race, they called for restraint by the Hindu nationalist-led government. But Vajpayee denied that India's action had forced Pakistan to respond. He, on the contrary, blamed Pakistan for prompting the Indian tests. Vajpayee said, “In fact, it was Pakistan's clandestine preparation that forced us to take the path of a nuclear deterrent.""

Despite being then much abused, despitehis open, candid, and learned persona, respect for the then PM of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, has only grown since then. 

His then opposition, meanwhile, has descended to new levels of falsehood and abusive speech, evident to a large extent even in these quotes above. 

................................................................................................

"India’s army chief V.P. Malik was measured in his reaction. "We are no more a soft state and we are not a push-over when it comes to national security concerns." He conceded "a situation of symmetry has finally been established among the country's neighbors now. If there was any ambiguity earlier about Pakistan's nuclear capability, it no longer exists.” On a realistic note, the general said, “Now it is known to the world and it is better this way."[93] ... "

Measured words from man wiser than all of the then opposition. 

................................................................................................

"Islamabad’s official mantra for its own May 28 nuclear tests was that Pakistan’s tests were “defensive and responsive.” The prime minister himself reassured the international community that Pakistan’s “nuclear weapon systems are meant only for self-defense.”[94] Addressing global disarmament concerns, he said Pakistan would “continue to support the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, especially in the Conference on Disarmament.”[95] Pakistan also would engage in a “constructive dialogue” with other countries “on ways and means to promoting these goals…” 

"To the Indian leadership, Sharif’s message was clear: “We are prepared to resume the Pakistan-India dialogue to address all outstanding issues including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as peace and security. These should include urgent steps for mutual restraint and equitable measures for nuclear stabilization.” He reiterated Pakistan’s earlier offer of a non-aggression pact to India “on the basis of a just settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.”"

This amounts clearly to a veiled threat of nuclear attack intended by pak against India, whether or not India hands over anything demanded promptly. 

But the assertions about self defence as sole intended use of paki nuclear weapons are falsified not merely by this threat delivered to India; it's far more so by the range pakis acquired, that went far beyond the furthest territory of India from paki borders. 

Paki device, labelled and tomtommed from beginning as 'islamic bomb' by pakis, is and always has been intended for jihad, which is against every nonmuslim by definition of the term.  

................................................................................................

"Seeking to stay clear of ideological and religious blocs, Pakistan had framed the tests solely as a defensive step forced on it by India. ... "

Every one of three parts of that is a lie. 

" ... Having had its nuclear program labeled as being dedicated to the making of an ‘Islamic bomb’, Pakistan was wary of linking any cause other than that of its own defense to its nuclear tests. As a testimony to its success in managing this, the Israelis understood to be the first target of any Islamic bomb, did not wave any red flag after Pakistan’s tests. Instead, a reassured Israeli Deputy Minister Silvan Shalom said that Israel “did not see the Pakistani nuclear tests as a threat to Israel.” In an interview to the Israel Defense Forces Radio, he explained, "We do not view Pakistan as our enemy. Pakistan has never been Israel's enemy, Pakistan has never threatened Israel.”[96] There were fears, but only to a negligible extent, of an ‘Islamic bomb’, or of Pakistan exporting technology to other Muslim countries; indeed, according to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a  former US Ambassador to India, “Pakistan’s Ghauri missile demonstrated Pakistan’s plan to re-establish Muslim rule over all of India.” [97]"

One, that Moynihan seeing that as reassuring says more about him and his likes, who prefer military juntas in most of nations except the few seen as their ancestral homes in Europe - specifically, England, France and Germany - and this has little to do with anything but racist abrahmic attitude. 

Two, Israel declaring not feeling threatened is as much falsified by paki furore over Palestinian concerns real or otherwise,  as by paki acquisition of long range nuclear capabilities far beyond furthest territory of India from paki borders, but enough to strike Israel. 

................................................................................................

" ... Clearly, for Bhutto this was the cumulative learning from the 1948 Pakistan-India encounter and the 1965 and 1971 defeats: Nuclear power was now indispensable. “We will eat grass if need be,” Bhutto had thundered. Similarly, Bhutto had said “we will fight a thousand years” to resist Indian hegemony."

It's quite well known who talked about "a thousand years" before him, and not too long before either, just a few decades. 

But in his stance of assaults against India for ever, this then PM of pak - who was hanged to death by paki regime subsequently - was, as most pakis do, only declaring intentions to carry on heritage of barbarians Invading and destroying India for most of last millennium and a half. 

................................................................................................

" ... However, ultimately, served by seasoned gurus like Shahis, twenty years later Pakistan stood vindicated."

Chiefly through theft of nuclear blueprints, and as if that blot wasn't enough, by dishonouring father of paki device for religious reasons - apart from stocking Chinese gifts of nuclear variety. 

................................................................................................

" ... Pakistan was sending trained militants, to keep an already restive Kashmir on the boil. The message from the Indian government’s most influential voice, its Home Minister and BJP’s former president, was clear: “Any further misadventure on Indian territory shall be dealt with on a proactive basis.” ... "

That's nth admission by author, sourced from pakis judging by wording, that Pakistan has perpetrated terrorism against India for decades. 

................................................................................................

" ... In fact, increased violence in Kashmir had further augmented global panic. ... "

If there were any truth in that, the said alarm would have set off in January 1990, when accelerated genocide of Kashmir nonmuslims forced their exodus out of the valley. 

So the so-called global panic was only the abrahmic onslaught against the sole ancient civilisation still living, unlike the rest of the world fallen prey to Abrahmic-II, Abrahmic-III or Abrahmic-IV, last bring communism, which has killed Buddhism in China and attempted that in Tibet, using genocides as well. 

................................................................................................

"With unusual candor, the daughter of Joseph Korbel, who had presented the best summation of the Kashmir problem in his book Danger in Kashmir (Princeton: 1954), addressed the Kashmir problem. On 3 June talking to press reporters, the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said of Kashmir, “It is a problem that came about the minute that the partition proposals came about ... "

True. 

Rest quoted is the garbage spiel that's paki excuse for terrorist activities, namely, religion. But if that excuse were valid, minorities in rest of India- at least muslims, if not others who werent killing Hindus -  should long ago have met exactly the same fate they did in pak in 1947, and pak forced in 1990 via terrorist attacks in Kashmir. 

Fact is, India has more muslims than pak, and this number - and proportion thereof in total population, as well - has grown since 1947, chiefly via not only the overpopulation tendencies gone completely unchecked, but also a deliberate inculcation of a doctrine of taking over India via simply growing in number while reducing that of Hindus by killings and rioting, and abduction of young girls via fraudulent representation. 

................................................................................................

"Within a week on 10 June, dismissing Indian agitation over the P-5 statement on Kashmir, US Assistant Secretary of State Karl Indurfurth said, “Kashmir issue is a fact of life in the region and cannot be wished away. We are absolutely convinced that it is time now for India and Pakistan to meet, to resume the dialogue and address the fundamental issue that had divided the two countries for 50 years.” ... "

That's another fraud perpetrated by pakis, nonstop. Inherent in the false representation is the reality that nothing short of a complete takeover of India and wiping out all non muslims, whether via massacres or conversions or abductions of all nonmuslim females, or all of the above, will stop pak from either attacking India with false accusations in global platforms or physically via terrorists, any more than hundreds of billions of dollars aid from US stopped pakis, from not only being party to attacks against West beginning 2001 but hiding OBL in a secure house more of a fortress, within a short distance of what US terms 'West Point of Pakistan'. 

Pakistan was conceived as a nation carrying heritage of barbaric invaders who attempted complete destruction of India and her civilisation of antiquity with all her treasure of knowledge, as Moynihan realised and said explicitly - however nonchalantly or even happily - and this aim has only grown to encompasses rest of the world, chiefly West, along with India, as targets. 

" ... The communiqué called on India and Pakistan to “avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, or other provocative acts.”[107]"

This relates far more to the thousands of terrorists trained and sent by pakis, however blandly equal it seems. 

................................................................................................

Author now spews not only false but fraudulent but total, complete garbage, having quoted various convenient statements from different sources, pushed chiefly by petrodollars. 

"In linking its nuclear weaponization to forcing through its own version of a resolution on Kashmir, India had clearly committed a diplomatic faux pas. Moreover, the Indian President’s letter to the US President linking Indian nuclear tests to the Chinese threat did not succeed in disrupting the Pakistan-India equation in global perception and thereby deny Pakistan justification for nuclear tests. Few countries accepted India’s original justification that the ‘China factor’ prompted its nuclear tests. All recognized that Pakistan-India relations were responsible for the beginning of a nuclear arms race in South Asia and the undermining of the non-proliferation regime. 

"The belligerence at display, by a section of India’s Hindu nationalist leadership, immediately after the nuclear tests was in contrast to Pakistan’s studied statements. Gandhi’s India, having consciously crafted its peace image since inception, had now taken to some reckless nuclear brandishing. India’s position, even for the US seeking a strategic alliance, was hard to defend. In fact, the US took the lead in pushing India’s skeleton from inside the closet, Kashmir, into a global limelight.

"By contrast, Pakistan was in a better diplomatic position. Even if grudgingly, and despite its statements to the contrary, the world was constrained to acknowledge that, after the Indian tests and clearly anti-Pakistan rhetoric,  the die had been cast for Pakistan, which was obliged to conduct the tests. Islamabad’s simultaneous dialogue offer to India, saying “no” to an arms race, and the renewed commitment to disarmament helped position Pakistan in a comfortable strategic space–of a  kind Pakistan had seldom experienced. India’s own follies had helped create this space."

Had any of that been true, it wouldn't have reversed quite so dramatically in quite so short a period of time, regardless of US president taking action regarding OBL. 

But fact is, pakis fraud was then exposed in a way that they can neither confirm nor deny, instead questioning US account by asking, repeatedly on internet, for a proof of the person of OBL being found and killed - "where's the body" - and generally going into a denial mode, not only about OBL but almost everything, with an "how do you know? Were you there?", whenever facts don't suit their own falsehoods but can't be denied. 

................................................................................................

"The world seemed to be where Pakistan wanted. It acknowledged the unresolved issue of Jammu and Kashmir as the root cause of India-Pakistan problems, acknowledged that the international community had a role in resolving the problem, and offered to do so. Hence, several factors conspired to position Pakistan in a better strategic space than it had been for a long time."

Until pakis were, once for all, exposed as fraudulent and cheats in general, by not only US discovering location of OBL but also the financial fraud by pakis regarding several hundred billion dollars in aid given by US that were not only unaccounted but, apart from going into various pockets, were discovered having been used to help terrorists attacking US forces. 

Hillary Clinton had openly stated to the effect that pakis are so used to lying, it's difficult to know if they know they are lying. 

................................................................................................

"The Peace-Makers

"In Vajpayee, Sharif had a serious partner for peace. Senior to Sharif in age and political experience, Vajpayee was a certified peace veteran. ... "

Author has a penchant for spewing venom regarding Hindus at every possible opportunity, and does do whenever she mentions the then PM of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. 

Also, she keeps mentioning South Block in a poisonous way, insinuating somehow that the bureaucracy in Government of India is responsible for Pakistan's problems. 

Reality is, despite hundreds of billions of dollars given freely by US in aid to pakis apart from other hundreds of billions of dollars for purposes of "fighting terror", pakis have not only shortage of fuel and other necessities but food, as well, repeatedly reported during last decade, apart from the lack of education and health. 

This is due, chiefly, to the said hundreds of billions of dollars having been spent partly on arming and training terrorists for assaults against nrighbouring countries India and Afghanistan, and rest having been simply stolen by paki military generals. 

................................................................................................

" ... The Sharif-Vajpayee 29 July meeting in Colombo, on the sidelines of the SAARC summit, was finalized.  Ahead of this meeting a preliminary political back channel was established. Nawaz Sharif deputed a PML Senator and former Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Akram Zaki, to meet with Vajpayee’s point man on National Security, the astute former diplomat-turned politician Brajesh Mishra in London. [116] Neither the Mishra-Zaki channel nor the foreign secretaries meeting helped bridge the gap at Colombo. The Indian military’s mood too was evident from the Indian defense minister’s 18 July  declaration that India “needs to hold on to Siachen, both for strategic reasons and wider security in the region."[117] ... "

That's the typical vicious trick, labeling realistic necessities of others as 'moods', apart from the insinuations of various similar and other kind about India and Hindus throughout the book. 

................................................................................................

"The two prime ministers first held a one-on-one meeting[123] at the Taj Samudra hotel followed by a delegation level meeting.[124] Vajpayee was keen for a joint statement on commitment to peace. ... "

Author makes a horrible mistake in the name of the Taj Samudra, whether typo or, deliberately, otherwise. 

" ... Vajpayee maintained that the primary issue was “Pakistan-supported cross-border terrorism.” The Pakistani team unsuccessfully urged the Indians that the unresolved Kashmir dispute be reflected as a central issue in the joint statement. The 90- minute Sharif-Vajpayee meetings in Colombo failed to produce a road map for further dialogue. Firstly after the first-ever meeting between the two prime ministers no joint statement came forth."

Is it possible for the author to visualise peace talks with a bully while being physically assaulted, with family members in the process of being killed? 

Or is that the only way pakis know, of holding 'peace talks'? By holding a knife to throat of others? As done in the countless conversions, whether via fraudulent marriages or otherwise, to their own religion? 

................................................................................................

" ... India linked dialogue on Kashmir with Pakistan ending support to Kashmiri freedom fighters."

There's the fraudulent language describing paki trained and armed terrorists as "Kashmiri freedom fighters".

Even in Afghanistan, Afghans know that the taliban are pakis, although they - and paki regime - lie, calling them Afghans. 

Locals know the difference. 

"Subsequent statements by Indian officials suggested the possibility of Indian attacks on “terrorist sanctuaries across the LOC.” Vajpayee warned Pakistan that his government will “fully back” the Indian Army to “repulse the nefarious designs.”[130] ... "

When, post 2014, this was done, pakis denied it, just as they had denied OBL had been found and neutralised by US forces in Abbottabad. 

" ... Meanwhile human rights organizations reported that Indian troops were responsible for raping, torturing, and executing Kashmiri people.[132]"

This is a double lie, on the style of those perpetrated repeatedly against Israel. One, it wasn't "human rights organizations" who "reported", but jihadists and pakis who propagated that lie; two, when investigations were carried out by global organisations, no such viilages or victims of atrocities were to be found. 

Similar lies, for example one regarding a ten year old Palestinian boy supposedly shot dead by Israeli forces but that, when investigated by a New York set of young students, in reality could only have been shot by Palestinians, have been propagated before. 

For that matter there was also the lie about mid 1980s killings in Beirut that were blamed on Israel, but subsequently that was discovered to have been a false accusation as well. 

" ... Sharif knew that continued operations by the militants in the Valley, which was infested with Indian security forces, was unlikely to resolve the Kashmir dispute. ... "

Notice the poisonous mindset, (author's in particular and paki in general), that pretends that paki trained terrorists exported to massacre in India are legitimate, while an ancient nation's security forces including Indian military are an "infestation". 

" ... For Kashmiris, the human rights conditions deteriorated ... "

"Deteriorated" is false unless the jihadist position, namely, that nonmuslim lives are of no account, is to be universally accepted, and a doctrine that teaches killing of all nonmuslims is to be not only lauded but necessary, is accepted by all the world. That is the jihadist aim. 

Else, it's impossible that the statement above by author can be said to have any validity if situation in Kashmir were compared with either January 1990 or in general with 1947, when, both times, several thousands of nonmuslims were massacred, forcing others to flee - if possible at all. 

In 1947 Nehru, the then PM of India, had refused to help Hindus attempting to save their own lives, as per Gandhi's wish that Hindus die happily murdered by Muslims but not flee; as a result, over a hundred thousand Hindus had been massacred in POK. 

In 1990, Hindus in Kashmir were helped to exodus instead of being left to be massacred, to the tune of half a million, by paki terrorists infiltrated in Kashmir from across the border. 

"By July, Nawaz Sharif’s government was dealing with a growing problem of sectarianism and militancy. To Strobe Talbot, US Deputy Secretary of State [133],Nawaz complained that his 1997 victory was not against Benazir Bhutto alone. He had won against the “right-wing radicals” whom he claimed had wanted an Iranian-style revolution in Pakistan."

" ... Nawaz would also raise the specter of the threat that was increasingly worrying Washington, the Islamic militant threat."

Not "specter", it was reality, begun by pak military dictator in 1960s onwards, and used by US for war against Russia, chiefly in Afghanistan, but also Chechnya. Now those victories won, the terrorists were confident of victory against India, and not only in one state of Jammu and Kashmir either. 

................................................................................................

"Just before Sharif left for Colombo, Talbot met him on 22 July to convince him of the need to sign up on the non-proliferation mechanisms. Part of the tool-kit Talbot carried with him, which he naively believed would help him ‘fix’ Pakistan’s position on non-proliferation, was a letter from his President. It did not work. Sharif was irked by Clinton’s reference to Pakistan’s nuclear test as a “mistake.” Sharif’s retort was political and convenient, not strategic and straightforward. “If I had not made the mistake, as the President calls it, someone else would be sitting in the Prime Minister’s House right now. That someone probably would be a fanatic. We have no dearth of those.”[134]  Adding more flair to perhaps his real fear, Pakistan’s prime minister added, “Either that, or the country would have gone to the dogs.”[135] ... "

That was realities of paki situation. 

" ... This kind of talk was clearly ‘conduct unbecoming’ for a country’s prime minister. Although militancy and sectarianism were on the rise in Pakistan, such comments by the country’s prime minister to a US official were highly inappropriate. Unsurprisingly recalling the conversation, the US official wrote, “I could not imagine hearing something similar in Delhi.”[136]"

Because it wouldn't be true of realities in India, unless pakis - beyond their dreams - succeeded in wiping out all nonmuslims. 

................................................................................................

"Emerging stress on the western front: CIA, OBL, Taliban, and the ISI

Look at the author's clubbing of CIA with "OBL, Taliban, and the ISI". 

Tells much about their perspective and thinking, doesn't it! That of the author in particular, and pakis in general, that is. 

"Militancy as a tool to flag the Kashmir issue was now boomeranging. For Pakistan too, the law of diminishing returns had kicked in. Pakistan generally and the ISI specifically, were being blamed for most militant activities in India ... " 

Including in Kashmir. 

" ... Kashmir. ISI-CIA’s principal partnership objective, of avenging the US defeat in Vietnam by defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan, had been achieved, with the monumental additional bonus of the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. ... "

Pakis haven't stopped bragging about this victory that they have considered personal, with "some help", "only money" from US; and this had brought them confidence they'd massacre all Hindus throughout India, before and after breaking up and/or conquering India. 

................................................................................................

" ... Essentially, the partnership had run its course. The former partners were now entering a conflict zone. The CIA watched with great apprehension the beginnings of triangular ties between the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the Kashmiri Mujahedeen. While the Clinton Administration itself engaged with the Taliban, it was the ISI, as principal mentors and patrons of the Taliban and the Kashmiri Mujahedeen, which the CIA viewed as being indirectly responsible for this three-way nexus. Increasingly, the CIA would expect the ISI to leverage its control and good will with the Taliban to rein in Osama bin Laden, the al-Qaeda chief. While Washington was not confrontational with bin Laden’s hosts, it was getting weary of them. The CIA’s Counter-terrorist Cell was expanding the focus of its operations to Pakistan’s borderlands."

Funny how abrahmic fellow-feeling blinkered them to reality. 

................................................................................................

"In early August, al-Qaeda struck and struck hard. On 7 August, it conducted signature attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam, leaving dozens dead. ... "

Notice the laudatory, almost exilarant, tone describing it - "struck and struck hard."; which isn't modified for the rest of the paragraph, at least. 

" ... The very next day, not in a connected but related development, on 8 August, al-Qaeda’s hosts, the Taliban, with support from the pro-Pakistan Mujahedeen group led by Gulbadin Hikmatyar, managed a decisive victory in Mazar-i-Sharif. US intelligence claimed that intercepts proved that members of a Pakistan-based sectarian group, Sipah-i-Sahaba, and Pakistan military men also participated in the offensive. ... "

It would only be idiotic or pretenders who'd act surprised at this. 

" ... A Hazara massacre followed the Taliban victory. ... "

This is racism of pakis and Afghans, exposed in not its worst, but its normal manifestation, not unlike killings of Hindus or Jewish people. 

Any doubts as to this racism, can be cleared by internet posts from pakis describing themselves as handsome unlike "short, dark and ugly Indians" - an attitude given its reply when a Tamil former Indian consul to Pakistan faces an average paki, frequently seen on public debates on TV, are noticed as to looks, after reading such posts by pakis. 

Alternatively, one can read the autobiography by Ms. (Tehmina?) Durrani, now a member of family of Sharif. 

" ... A Taliban attack on the Iranian Consulate, in which one journalist and seven intelligence officers were killed, prompted Washington’s counter-terrorism machinery to zero in on Pakistan for monitoring and countering bin Laden’s activities." 

Finally! 

Light dawns! 

................................................................................................

"Buoyed by their Mazar victory, the Taliban were gaining in self-confidence. Around the same time, Washington would seek their acquiescence in what was becoming the Clinton’s Administration immediate and primary security concern. Washington wanted Osama bin Laden, alive or dead. The intelligence chatter was that he had moved in the Pakistan-Afghan border areas. CIA Counter-terrorist Center planned the August strike. General Ralston visited the Pakistan Army General Jehangir Karamat to inform him of their Tomahawk missiles flying through Pakistan airspace lest he mistakes them for Indian missiles. Accordingly, through the hour of the planned attack, Ralston arranged to have dinner with the Pakistan Army chief to ensure there were no costly misunderstandings."

This is author preparing ground for tacit justification of NY attacks by terrorists. 

"The Cruise missiles were fired as planned. But it was an unsuccessful attack. Despite intelligence reports of bin Laden’s impending arrival, he never came. Eight men in al-Qaeda training camps were killed, probably men from a Pakistani sectarian outfit being trained to kill. For the reported Pakistani civilian deaths along the border, the US President wrote a letter of regret to the Pakistani prime minister. Later, the reports were proven incorrect. In the coming months, Washington intensified its trailing of Osama bin Laden."

Obviously unsuccessfully, since he was found in Abbottabad. 

Perhaps he'd been there, for decades,with Afghanistan being a ruse by pakis? 

"The matter of “sanctuaries” was also raised by Washington.  Announcing the Cruise missile strikes against several al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and an alleged chemical weapons facility in Sudan, Clinton told the Americans, “There will be no sanctuaries for terror. We will defend our people, our interests, and values.”[137] The issue of sanctuaries was to haunt Pakistan-US relations for almost two decades."

The said "Pakistan-US relations" were always pretended by pakis to have been a friendship between equals, despite the one way street of flow of hundreds of billions of dollars. 

................................................................................................

"Breakthrough at Durban

"For Pakistan-India relations, the 29 August to 3 September NAM summit in Durban proved the breakthrough event. The two peace-seeking prime ministers had ensured that the groundwork was done by their respective sides. Nawaz Sharif had inducted his Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz as the new Foreign Minister. Aziz replaced the former military Captain (and military ruler Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s son) Gohar Ayub. ... "

The father, incidentally, had proposed unification to Nehru, who was shortsighted enough to not only refuse, but do so expressing a thinking proved false soon enough by China attacking in 1962. 

" ... Sartaj Aziz, an economist, a former international bureaucrat, and two-time Finance Minister in Sharif’s government, was Nawaz Sharif’s trusted man."

" ... Prime Minister Vajpayee warned “third parties” to stay out of the dispute.[138] ... "

" ... Pakistan’s use of militancy to pressurize India and to draw global attention to the Kashmir question often drew criticism. ... "

Anyone else reminded of Sudetanland? UK had then openly pressured Czechoslovakia to give in, and that, instead of satisfying Hitler, had only snowballed - rather, fireballed - into WWII. 

And in this case, the current administration of US has offered Afghanistan, sacrificing females thereof, to taliban, a sham of a front for pakis. 

................................................................................................

" ... Transferring the Afghan Mujahedeen phenomenon onto the Kashmir context was backfiring. It was proving divisive for the Kashmiri struggle and was also alienating the non-violent movement. At home in Pakistan, its blowback was increased sectarian killings."

Yes, pile on the jihadists and racism, lack of forethought by paki regimes beyond exploiting "geostrategic location", everything onto india - including lack of education, health, and any industry other than terrorism. 

................................................................................................

" ... By announcing his dialogue offer, with the caveat that “the dialogue must be comprehensive and not just focused on Kashmir”[139], Vajpayee assured the Indians that his offer was conditional on Pakistan’s commitment to stop “cross-border terrorism.”"

" ... Kashmir, the Indian prime minister categorically stated, however, “was and would remain an integral part of India.” The "real problem" in Kashmir was one of cross-border terrorism."

Notice the denial by author, and presumably by her paki sources, that terrorists attacking India was a concern. 

So by paki logic, acquisition of territory for Islamic countries, chiefly for pak, supersedes terrorists trained killing civilians of those countries,which is in accord with foundations of jihadist ideology - namely, that nonmuslim lives not only for not matter, but must be finished off. 

................................................................................................

"Almost a decade into India’s failure to crush the Kashmiri freedom movement, for the international community Delhi was increasingly framing the movement as a terrorist movement. And with evidence of Pakistani men, munitions and military training aiding the indigenous freedom struggle Delhi believed it could superimpose the ‘terrorism’ problem upon the political struggle. Additionally, sections of the freedom movement had taken to violent ways, harming civilians and hence aiding  Indian propaganda."

Lies galore there. 

It is nothing but terrorism exported by pak from across birder via paki trained terrorists bearing weapons and ammo, stolen from what US provided for a US prescribed use in Afghanistan. 

"Indian strategy was to dovetail cross-border terrorism into the emerging global level concern regarding terrorism. Delhi began equating what it considered “cross-border terrorism” with the Taliban problem in Afghanistan. The concern about terrorism was fast spreading.  Washington had also attacked Sudan. India had argued that the common factor linking terrorism, the Taliban, and the cross-border terrorism it faced was Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI. At Durban, Vajpayee advocated a “concerted international action” against terrorism. In a veiled criticism of the United States ignoring India’s concerns, he said “terrorism could not be fought unilaterally or selectively.”"

Truth of what India said is found, not merely in common sense, but internet posts from pakis bragging about various victories using terrorism. 

But notice the author's twisting of language to make it seem that terrorism against India by pakis is only fair, and of no concern, especially to anyone not Indian, because Indian lives are of course - so is paki position - of no importance whatsoever, being considered not human if not muslim, as per islamic law. 

................................................................................................

"New York Bonding

" ... However, unknown to these two peace-partners, a sharply contrasting movement in a parallel universe was taking place. From the Himalayan peaks, a clique of senior Pakistani Generals had interpreted the post-May global concern for the settlement of Kashmir as an opportunity to ... force Delhi’s hand on Kashmir, or at least on Siachen. ... "

" ... It would take none less than the prime ministers to put behind them the chronic hostility and distrust that had virtually become part of the DNA of the Pakistan and Indian civil and military bureaucracy. ... "

If they weren't thwarted by paki military. 

................................................................................................

"New York Bonding

" ... However, unknown to these two peace-partners, a sharply contrasting movement in a parallel universe was taking place. From the Himalayan peaks, a clique of senior Pakistani Generals had interpreted the post-May global concern for the settlement of Kashmir as an opportunity to ... force Delhi’s hand on Kashmir, or at least on Siachen. ... "

" ... It would take none less than the prime ministers to put behind them the chronic hostility and distrust that had virtually become part of the DNA of the Pakistan and Indian civil and military bureaucracy. ... "

If they weren't thwarted by paki military. 

................................................................................................

" ... After the New York meeting, names of back-channel envoys were exchanged. India nominated former journalist R.K Misra.[148] Nawaz Sharif’s choice was his Principal Secretary Anwar Zahid.[149] However, Zahid died shortly after.[150]Niaz Naik,  a former Foreign Secretary, was the second choice.

"The seeds for the historic Lahore summit were sown in New York. At the lunch meeting that Sharif hosted for Vajpayee, he invited the Indian prime minister to visit Pakistan. And, when the two Prime Ministers agreed on starting a Delhi-Lahore bus service, Nawaz Sharif invited Vajpayee to travel on that bus. Vajpayee agreed."

" ... Pakistan was conditionally willing to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. First, it had to be in conditions “free from coercion and pressure”, which meant the international community had to remove the sanctions. Secondly, it was necessary that India also signed the CTBT. Both conditions were unlikely to be fulfilled."

Hence, precisely, the conditions? 

Of course.  

................................................................................................

"Vajpayee, meanwhile, detailed the nature of bilateral dialogue decided for October. He announced that the two sides had decided to end cross-LOC firing and discuss defense matters, including the question of deploying nuclear missiles, in the October dialogue. "A new era in Indo-Pakistani co-operation is being opened," a satisfied Vajpayee told the press.

"This was happening in less than a hundred days after having conducted the nuclear tests ... Hence within months of the nuclear tests, new vistas for peace and cooperation had opened up."

As if paki military and ISI would ever allow that! They, quite rightly, fear gor thror own existence, if there were peace, trade, goodwill and peace allowed to prevail across the border. 

A colleague had, some time in late eighties, remarked to the effect that the East Germany premiere wasn't happy about the developments towards German unification. 

"Of course", one could easily see why - "he's going to lose a job!" 

And that'd be true of those, too, who have been behind paki attacks against India, whichever state they were perpetrated in. 

................................................................................................

"Burdens of Patronage

"Important developments were taking place on the other side of Pakistan’s north-western borders. The US Vice President Al Gore telephoned the Saudi Intelligence chief Prince Turki Al-Faisal bin Abd Al-Aziz Al-Saud. Gore told Turki it was time to remind Mullah Umar of his June promise and facilitate possession of the man behind the US embassy bombings in Africa. Turki acquiesced to the UN Vice President’s request. He knew though that the Taliban leader had not responded to his messages about handing over bin Laden. Turki recalled that on several occasions the Taliban leader had agreed upon setting up a joint commission of Islamic scholars to decide the Islamic procedure for handing over bin Laden to the Saudis. On his June trip, the Saudi Minister for Religious Affairs, a ministry associated with various outfits which often made contributions to al-Qaeda, accompanied Turki as he arrived in Kandahar a worried man.

"Turki was mindful that Osama bin Laden was fast emerging as the Arab world’s Che Guevara. His followers across the entire Arab World would access his interviews and statements doled out to western media via dish antennas and satellites. As early as January 1998, the Saudi authorities were alerted by their own Saudi intelligence outfits to the al-Qaeda threat within the Kingdom. Bin Laden’s militant followers, in possession of deadly weapons, were arrested. By March, information on Saudi financiers of bin Laden was also uncovered. Saudi money from charitable organizations with Wahabi leanings was ending up with terrorist organizations, especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Turki believed his June trip had been successful. Recalling the trip, he told the prestigious German magazine Der Spiegel, “Incidentally, we had a rather friendly conversation in June 1998. I told Mullah Omar that it would be better to give us bin Laden, that is, if he had any interest in continuing his friendly relations with Saudi Arabia. He agreed, at least in principle. We agreed to set up a joint committee to arrange the details of bin Laden's extradition."[153]

................................................................................................

"Turki was somewhat more apprehensive about his subsequent September meeting with Mullah Umar. [154] Osama bin Laden, the shy, young Saudi financier and dedicated anti-Soviet fighter the Prince had first met in 1984 in Peshawar, had now declared war against the US. In August, bin Laden conducted deadly attacks on US embassies. Within days, American missiles had unsuccessfully targeted him on Afghan soil. Mullah Umar had ignored Turki’s repeated reminders of working out a mechanism for handing over bin Laden to the Saudis. The Saudi Intel chief knew that getting a helping hand from the Taliban’s Pakistani mentors could be a necessary move. He arrived in Islamabad in his special plane. Turki met the Pakistani prime minister. Nawaz Sharif exercised virtually no influence over the Taliban, whose operational mentors were located in the Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI), Pakistan’s key spy agency. As partners of the biggest covert war in US history, the ISI had moved from power to power in numbers, ranks and resources under US patronage.

"While the ISI was “sold on the Taliban”, Pakistan’s elected prime minister was wary of them. Pakistan’s Afghan policy was largely in the hands of the military and the ISI. For example, on 25 May 1997, the decision to recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan was made by the ISI chief. The PM was traveling on the Islamabad-Lahore motorway, and he was merely informed that Pakistan had recognized the Taliban government! In a hurry to acknowledge Taliban control of Mazar-i-Sharif on Sunday 25 May,[155] Pakistan extended recognition the same day.[156] It was a Sunday but the ISI, in acknowledgement of the Taliban’s Mazari-i-Sharif victory, decided recognition could not be delayed. At the Foreign Office, Director-General Afghanistan Iftikhar Murshid, who for nearly a decade had personally witnessed its political vicissitudes, opened shop on Sunday. At the Foreign Office, Murshid, along with Pakistan’s ambassador for Afghanistan, Aziz Khan, explained to selected foreign envoys Islamabad’s decision to recognize the Taliban government."

It wasn't only then, but later too, when there was a properly elected government in Afghanistan, pak kept pushing the taliban claim and insusting that the world recognise taliban as the de facto regime, because they made it impossible, via terrorist attacks, for anything to function in Afghanistan. 

Ultimately, after US had abandoned Afghanistan and its people, along with billions of dollars worth weaponry, equipment et al, to taliban, while pakis recognized it promptly, Afghans denied that they were Afghan taliban at all, insisting they were in fact paki. 

................................................................................................

" ... A Steering Committee was formed, with Taliban and Northern Alliance representation. It met in Islamabad from 26 April to 3 May. But, soon thereafter, the talks collapsed. This is the extent to which Pakistani civilians could exercise influence over the Taliban and broadly over the Afghan situation. Now, four months later, the Osama bin Laden factor had entered the already complex internal Afghan situation. By virtue of Pakistan being in the inner-most circle of influence within the Taliban set-up and the Saudis being aware of it, it was only normal for the Saudi intelligence chief to believe that the ISI chief could be helpful in convincing Mullah Umar. General Rana, the ISI chief, accompanied Turki.

"Interestingly, the other Pakistani official nominated by the civilian government to accompany Turki, Pakistan’s Ambassador at-large Aziz Khan , found himself boarding Air Force One, the Pakistan air chief’s dedicated airplane. Khan was tasked with delivering five Iranians, who had been captured in Mazar Sharif by the Taliban, to the Iranian authorities. After the capture of 20 Iranians, Tehran had condemned the Taliban but held Pakistan responsible. Accordingly, Tehran demanded that Pakistan ensure the release of its prisoners. Tehran’s threat to attack Afghanistan if its citizens were not released, combined with Pakistan’s intervention, helped to secure their release. Ambassador Aziz was now traveling in the Pakistan air chief’s plane to deliver the Iranian prisoners. Clearly, the burdens of patronage were now mounting on Pakistan.

................................................................................................

"Meanwhile, the Kandahar Mission had failed. Pakistan’s ISI chief was unable to convince Mullah Umar to hand over bin Laden. In Prince Turki’s own words, “I had come to pressure him to go ahead with the extradition, and I encountered a completely transformed Omar. He was extremely nervous, perspired, and even screamed at me. He denied that he had promised us he would extradite bin Laden, and wanted nothing to do with a joint committee. He wanted to know what had possessed us to want to arrest such an illustrious holy warrior as Osama bin Laden! And why didn’t we prefer to free the world of the infidels? He was furious. I could not help but think that he might have been taking drugs. When he continued to insult Saudi Arabia and the royal family, I ended the meeting.”[157] Pakistani diplomat Murshid described it no differently. He recalled how Mullah Umar left his room in a rage and poured water over his head, returned to the room, and in anger continued to blame the Saudis for being American lackeys. [158]

"The failed meeting triggered multiple speculations. For the Americans, with the alarm bells ringing in Langley on OBL’s next possible targets, the capture of OBL was a high priority. There were questions within Washington as to how sincere the Saudis actually were in convincing the Taliban to hand over OBL. In the Saudi camp, was there in fact sympathy for OBL, who after all was a Saudi son? Were the Saudis actually only seeking some guarantee for the protection of the Kingdom from OBL? As for the Pakistanis, there was skepticism in Washington over whether the ISI would make genuine efforts to convince the Taliban to hand over OBL to the Americans."

................................................................................................

"Peace Gets Going

" ... preparation of the Lahore Summit was overseen by the political leaders, the prime minister and the foreign ministers, and was not left to bureaucrats alone.

"Significantly, around this time, on 7 October, against the backdrop of continuous political unrest, the prime minister decided to send the Army chief General JehangirKaramat packing. The newspapers had carried front-page headlines that, during his lecture at the Naval War College, the army chief had recommended the setting up of a National Security Council to act as a joint civil-military arbiter of the nation's affairs.[159] A livid Nawaz Sharif, driving on his way to Murree, wanted the defense ministry to simply issue a notification announcing the army chief’s dismissal. Sharif‘s cool-headed Principal Secretary, the seasoned bureaucrat Saeed Mehdi, advised him to meet with General Karamat personally. The General was called in to meet the prime minister. The prime minister let him know he could not work with him. The army chief sent in his resignation. The civilian chatter was that the matter was “amicably settled.”

"Interestingly, General Karamat been put to the test for his commitment to the Constitution during the prime minister’s 1997 confrontation with the judiciary and the President Farooq Leghari. The general was called upon to act by all sides yet he acted strictly within Constitutional parameters. After the departure of the President, General (retd) Iftikhar Ali Khan, the former Chief of General Staff and then Defense Secretary, made a statement on behalf of the government generously complimenting the army’s role, stating, "After the removal of the 8th Amendment, the army has taken its orders from the prime minister and not the President… The army's positive (sic) role during the crisis would be remembered forever."[160] Such praise had seemed unnecessary yet not unprecedented.[161] Perhaps deep in trouble and swamped by endless criticism, Nawaz Sharif, like all politicians, was haunted by the fear of some military general lurking on the side planning his exit. ... "

Oh, is that what he foresaw? 

Would that be remarkable as a vision of future? 

Or not so, considering it's routine in pak? 

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"Karamat’s dismissal was not the first of a forces chief by Nawaz Sharif. In May 1997, after a probe into the controversial Agosta submarine deal had established the culpability of the Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Mansur ulHaq, the prime minister asked the then Secretary Defense H. R. Pasha to “advise” the naval chief to resign. The naval chief did resign. That earned Sharif praise from the media. A leading independent weekly wrote, “Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif deserves high praise for relieving Admiral MansoorulHaq of his duties. The navy chief embroiled his service in unbecoming controversy, gave it a bad name and undermined its morale.”[163]

"After sending General Karamat home, Prime Minister Sharif appointed General Pervez Musharraf, then serving as Corps Commander Mangla, as the new chief. Musharraf, who superseded two generals, was appointed on the recommendation of his key aide and Minister for Petroleum Chaudhary Nisar. Nisar’s brother Iftikhar Ali Khan, the Defense Secretary and a retired general, would vouch for Musharraf as a professional non-political general. Elected prime ministers always factored in these considerations, hoping they would prove a safety valve against coup-makers. The widespread chatter on possible reactions from the GHQ to the unprecedented removal of their chief soon died down. It appeared that the men in khaki would remain subservient to the orders of the elected prime minister."

In pak? 

Ha! 

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"Within days of his appointment the new army chief set about bringing his own men into key posts. In fact, within three days of his appointment, he had changed the commanders of the three strategic corps: the Lahore 4 Corps, Rawalpindi 10 Corps, and Karachi 5 Corps. While in doing so the new chief was exercising his institutional authority, yet this scale and haste in the shuffle drew comment from the media. After all, there was a history of repeated direct and indirect army coups that had overthrown constitutionally elected prime ministers. Some eyebrows were raised in the prime minister’s inner circle too.

"However, the only appointment in which the prime minister had a say was that of the chief of the ISI. Musharraf wanted to appoint General Aziz, the head of ISI’s Research & Analysis Wing, to the top slot at ISI and General Ziauddin Khawaja as the new Chief of General Staff at the GHQ. The prime minister, constitutionally authorized to appoint the country’s spy chief, declined the army chief’s request to promote General Aziz.   Nawaz Sharif interviewed both officers and selected Ziauddin as the DG ISI. Musharraf appointed Aziz as the Chief of General Staff.  The prime minister, constitutionally the reporting as well as the appointing authority for the ISI chief, picked Ziauddin for the post.  This general was serving as Adjutant General and before that had commanded the 30 Corps Gujranwala. The military talk was that Ziauddin, with only limited command experience, was not a strong candidate for either of the two positions. However, he was the new army chief’s close friend and also known to the prime minister’s family with especially close ties to his father.

"While Ziauddin held the top slot, the army chief ensured that his own trusted appointees filled all the strategic slots in the ISI. This included the second tier command positions at the ISI headquarters and in key cities, including Lahore, Karachi, and Quetta, Ziauddin, did not resist this.  The DG-Internal security was bound by rules to report to the army chief. Also, with eight to nine brigadiers serving under every section head, the ISI was operationally under GHQ control."

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" ... India’s four-point proposal presented at the talks called for a comprehensive ceasefire based on a freeze of "present ground positions", discussions on the modalities for implementing the ceasefire within an agreed time-frame, a "bilateral monitoring mechanism", and authentication of existing ground positions. ... "

" ... Rajiv Gandhi on 16 November 1989 referring to Operation Meghdoot ... on the hustings in Kolkata that "We have recovered about 5,000 square kilometers of area from occupied Kashmir in Siachen. We will not forgo one square kilometer of that."

"Indians also complained about Pakistani troops firing on Siachen.[166]It is possible the firing was taking place. The Kargil planners may have sought a way to engage Indian attention away from the Kargil area. Obviously unaware, the Pakistani delegation denied that their troops had carried out any such attack.[167]  The talks ended in a fiasco. There was an unraveling of the progress made during the earlier rounds. For the generals’ clique, in the Indian reiteration of its recalcitrance over Siachen, lay a sense of vindication."

Author now spends next paragraph blaming Delhi and the then PM of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, fir talks being a fiasco. 

Did author, and pakis, expect that they could shoot down Indian soldiers with impugnity, with not a word in protest? 

................................................................................................

" ... question of the accession of the princely State of Jammu Kashmir. Pakistan’s response to this had been the use of covert force. Larger in size, a confident Delhi did believe, it could violate explicit and implicit legal parameters. ... "

What world do the pakis, and the author, inhabit, where legitimately signed accession is considered illegal, and "use of covert force" legitimate? 

Obviously, it's a world where a female rape victim is accused of adultery by her assaulter who raped her, and as a consequence, is legally executed by stones pelted by a mob. 

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Author spends much of next part justifying pakis attacking India throughout the short history of existence of Pakistan, by claiming - not exactly explicitly, but via implications and roundabouts - that India's not ceding territory claimed and demanded by pakis justified every attack by and from pak against India, including not only all the wars but all the terrorist attacks as well,  over several decades. 

" ... Contrary to a politician’s response, influential sections within the army leadership believed covert use of force against India was an effective way to tackle the adversary. The military coup of the late seventies and the overall Pakistani institutional power balance tilted in the army’s favor allowed the military leadership to autonomously conduct policy. Moreover, the army’s partnership with the CIA in conducting the covert war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan further strengthened the Pakistani military as the principal policy-maker.

"By November 1998, two policy approaches towards India were in play. The constitutionally elected government had already opted for diplomacy and dialogue. While a small clique of army generals had, however, surreptitiously, set off on the path of covert war. And this clique must have received India’s recalcitrance over Siachen with a sense of vindication."

"The Kargil planners’ clique had troops crossing the LOC to pay back in kind to India for Siachen. Or so they had believed."

Oh, no they don't. Pakistan never did have any right to separate merely on basis of fanaticism in name of religion and massacres of eleven million Hindus and nearly five million Sikhs as the sole argument for this separation. It's about as justified as, say, a Confederate South claiming States' Rights for slavery. 

As for demanding even more extra territory than already conceded quite unreasonably in 1947 by UK, that's pakis copying Hitler at and after his Munich performance. 

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" ... The Kargil clique’s calculation was markedly opposed to the dialogue and détente policy with India that Pakistan’s elected political leadership was pursuing after the tests. ... "

Author makes them sound equally valid and legitimate, but that's falsehood. Reality is that the then PM of pak had no clue about what paki military was upto, much less having okayed it before PM of India visited. This is not only typical of the sham that pakis maintain in order to claim they are just as good as India and equally valid,  but the fact that the sham is maintained often enough shows pakis are ashamed of their own bragging about being inheritors of barbarians from Central and West Asia, the invaders and destroyers of India in name of a fanatic creed. 

This has led to a schizophrenia on national level in pak, whereby they tried to establish themselves as Arab, by claiming Arabic as national language, until they were laughing stock as far as Arabs went, for this pretension. Hassan Nisar tells this tale well, on his program, several years ago. 

"Pakistan had decided to reorient Pakistan’s Kashmir policy towards primarily providing diplomatic and moral support to the Kashmiris instead of military support. By contrast, a handful of top Pakistani generals had carved a divergent policy track. Anxious about the weakening of the insurgency inside ... Kashmir, these generals believed the nuclear card could be exploited. This operation was designed to directly undermine the elected prime minister’s agenda of continuing dialogue with India and to reorient Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. It was in the intoxicating yet unconstitutional autonomy in security matters that men in khaki enjoyed that lay the undoing of a policy that Pakistan’s political leadership sought to pursue with regards to India. As the elected government planned the historic Pakistan-India summit at Lahore, a generals’ clique had Pakistani soldiers climbing the hostile peaks of Kargil across the LOC."

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"Operation KP was launched by mid-October. The army chief had not formally approved the process. The elected chief executive of Pakistan, the prime minister, had no clue that hundreds of Pakistani troops had begun crossing the LOC. 

"But the Operation was underway."

"Soon after General Musharraf took over as the new army chief, a clique of senior generals began contemplating Operation KP. The members of this clique had all served in strategically important areas along the LOC and, within hours of taking over as the army chief on 7 October, 1998, Musharraf had appointed each of them to a key position. ... With these appointments Musharraf installed his men in the top command and staff positions directly dealing with the territory along the LOC including the 10 Corps and the GHQ. The only exception was the Commander, Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) Major General Javed Hasan. GHQ retained him as commander FCNA.

" ... Interestingly, after his stint in Washington, Hassan would argue with colleagues that the Americans would exercise benign neglect, if not actively support, a Pakistani military operation in Kashmir. The Americans did not believe Pakistan was serious about the Kashmir issue. He recalled they would tell him, “General, you have neither the will nor the wherewithal. Talk to us when you have the will and the wherewithal.”[175]

"Javed Hassan considered himself a geopolitical strategist. He interpreted most developments within Pakistan as an extension of the agenda of major powers. Indian moves in Siachen were also a result of Russia “asking India to do something against Pakistan because Pakistan is giving us trouble in Afghanistan.”[176] Likewise, he maintained, “The Americans got the anti-Zia Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) started to arm-twist general Zia over Afghanistan.” [177]"

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"Hassan, especially during Musharraf’s period, was widely regarded within the army High Command as the best mind on India. He advocated an aggressive posture towards India and often maintained that “Pakistan’s size and power should match, i.e. if Pakistan did not militarily and otherwise expand, they (India) will atrophy you”[178]

"As Director Military Operations, Hassan was actively involved in monitoring the Kashmiri insurgency in Indian Occupied Kashmir. ... "

That's tacit admission that he was training and arming terrorists and sending them across border into India, by thousands. 

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" ... In 1992-93, when Pakistan concluded that the “insurgency’s spirit was depleting,” to give the home-grown insurgency a fillip the army facilitated the induction of ‘mehman mujahideen’ (guest mujahids) in Indian Occupied Kashmir. ... "

This is admission that so called freedom fighters in Kashmir never had been local; calling some sent across border "guest mujahids" was only because they never could pretend to be Kashmir locals, because they were not even from West Punjab, the province that not only dominates pak but has replaced Kashmiris in POK. So the "guest mujahids" were, what, Africans? Surely not Iranian or Saudi or European, not those from wealthier countries such as gulf nations? 

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"Hence, with this orientation, soon after taking over as Commander FCNA in October 1997 and completing the reconnaissance of the area around the LOC, Javed Hassan’s general refrain to his officers was “get offensive, we have to cross the borders.”[180]

"Given Hassan’s inclinations, this approach was no surprise. This had also been the way of many of his predecessors. Often the FCNA Commander’s enthusiasm for aggressive conduct along the LOC translated into issuing aggressive directives, without always getting the requisite Corps Commander clearances, or not maintaining the required confidentiality or suitable discretion and restraint in the display of the enthusiasm on successful conduct of an operation."

Is this the authors way of admitting that paki military is unprofessional? 

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"For example, soon after taking over, Hassan wanted operations conducted to capture the Indian Hindu Observation Post (OP)[181] on the Marpola range. The commander 80 Brigade, responsible for the proposed operation, refused to conduct it as he had not received written instructions. FCNA Commander Javed Hassan hesitated to give written instructions because he had not received written instructions from his line of command, the Corps Commander.[182] Meanwhile, in early 1998, Domel, an LOC post just on the Indian side, was captured. Since the Commander had not got clearance for the operation from the Corps Commander, the Corps Commander ordered an inquiry against the Brigade Commander and ordered that the post be vacated."

"As he settled in his position, the FCNA commander gave instructions to Commanding Officer (CO) 6 Northern Light Infantry (NLI) Lt Col Mansoor Ahmad Tariq to prepare a plan for the capture of Drass. The CO NLI 6 also received the orders from his immediate commanding officer, Commander 80 Brigade. Clearly even before the new army chief took over, the FCNA Commander was planning cross-LOC operations, deeper into the Indian-Held territory than Pakistani army had planned ever since the Indian occupation of Siachen in 1984.

" ... While vastly different in strategy, calculation, and resource-deployment, the 1965 Operation was also launched by Pakistan, as in 1947, to wrest Kashmir from India ... "

"Significantly, the new Chief of General Staff, Lt. General Aziz Khan, who had successfully launched the important Dalunang Operation across the LOC in 1988 was a strong proponent of Pakistani troops crossing the LOC and occupying heights on the Indian side. During the Dalunang Operation, Pakistan had captured 28 peaks. Emphasizing his familiarity with the area, Aziz would often recall, “I have walked in the gaps along the LOC.” His juniors would recall that Aziz had flown across the gaps as a brigade commander. An old and experienced hand on Kashmir as a director in the country’s premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, Khan was also in charge of the agency’s operations in Kashmir and Afghanistan. An enthusiastic Khan had recommended to his chief General Jahangir Karamat that Pakistan occupy the heights that the Indians would vacate during winter. The army chief “did not want to deflate his enthusiasm and always suggested that we talk to other ministries, analyze the Indian response and assess our ability to deal with it before we take it any further.”[184] ... "

"And finally, to match Hasan, Mahmud, and Aziz’s orientation on Kashmir and the LOC, was the new army chief General Musharraf’s own orientation. Identical to the key line-up of commanders overseeing the 10 Corps area, extending to the LOC, he too believed that conventional military force would play the key role in resolving the Kashmir issue. In fact, this group of commanders was dismissive and distrusting of the role of diplomacy in the matter. ... "

................................................................................................

"A key arm of the FCNA was the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), with 11 battalions. The size of each battalion was 750 to 780 soldiers. They could be placed under any one of the three FCNA brigades, 62, 80 or 323. These Northern Areas-based NLI battalions consisted of officers, junior commissioned officers (JCOs) and paramilitary forces. The officers were posted from the army and their services were on loan to the NLI. The JCOs were from the NLI while the paramilitary second-line forces, similar to the Rangers and Scouts, were technically under the Ministry of Interior[189] but operationally under the army. The uniform of NLI forces was khaki, like that of the regular army."

" ... After the nuclear tests, these generals believed that a successful Operation KP would force the world powers to intervene to resolve the outstanding J & K issue. They were convinced that the global community, especially the United States, would have no tolerance for a confrontation between the two new and hostile nuclear powers. In the mental calculations of these men, there was also a measure of nuclear black-mail."

"The elected government was planning for the Pakistan-India summit in Lahore at the same time as a clique of generals was organizing a covert military operation. These two contradictory policies on India were set for a clash. ... "

That's what makes any claim regarding governance by pakis ridiculous. 

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" ... Hassan had since his arrival signaled his intention to lead his men across the LOC. Like many in the Pakistan Army, his refrain too was that Siachen had to be avenged and military pressure on India would force them to settle Kashmir."

"According to the plan, around 200 Pakistani troops would cross the LOC to dominate the Indian supply lines leading to the Northern Division of Kashmir,-essentially beginning from the Zojila pass and going up to the China border and from the River Chenab to the Himachal mountains. The troops would occupy the watershed. The map was presented to the Commander 10 Corps. He said, “It’s all approved.”"

" ... The GHQ, courtesy the CGS, was therefore aware of the hush-hush operation but in fact institutionally no one among the senior generals beyond the clique knew of its scope and intent. At best, it was being explained as an exercise which involved retaining the manning levels of the summer in the winter months, in some cases to ensure forward movement of the local reserves.[195] ... "

"While the field commanders involved in the Operation did initially knew of its scope, that it involved crossing the LOC and ingress into Indian Held territory, the soldiers initially believed they were involved in an exercise. The planners hoped this deliberate fog of confusion would be an effective way to cover up the reality of the Operation. This would also help to evade the issue of not getting clearance from the country’s chief executive. Also, projecting it as an exercise or a localized response to a perceived threat, meant that it did not require top political clearance. ... "

................................................................................................

"For the Operation, around 200 troops were to travel for months, mostly on foot, to reach the Drass sector. There, the troops would occupy posts at Toololong, thereby reducing their distance to NH-1 by almost three kilometers.

"From the Shaqma post on the Pakistani side of the LOC, the distance to NH-1A was about five kilometers. The task was to occupy the watershed. This Operation, using approximately 200 NLI troops, would position them for easy observation of all activities as well as interdiction of the Srinagar-Leh National Highway-1(NH-1A), India’s life-line[198] to its troops stationed in the whole of Ladakh region and in Siachen. This ‘life-line’ was used during the summer months to transport the critical supplies needed by the troops during the locked-in winter months. Indian troop presence in Ladakh and Siachen areas was of critical significance since India had territorial disputes over the two areas with its two largest neighbors, China and Pakistan.

"The NH-1 road was already vulnerable to some Pakistani interdiction since at some points the Indian troop movement was visible to Pakistani troops stationed at the Kaksar and Channigund posts in the Shaqma sector. From these posts, the closest points to NH-1, Pakistani troops could rain artillery fire onto NH-1. The alternate route was the barely jeepable 473- kilometer-long Manali-Leh track, passing over 16,000 feet heights, and open to traffic only from July to September.[199]"

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" ... Commander 10 Corps Lt. General Mahmud Ahmed. At his Corps headquarters, Mahmud’s core team first heard of an across-the LOC Operation.[200] It was after his return from the Northern Areas that Lt. General Mahmud took his core team in confidence. In an informal gathering, he informed them that a decision had been taken to go across the LOC. The talk at the Corp HQ was that the instructions to the troops were to “establish posts and duck down.” [201] The objective of the Operation, Mahmud’s team was told, was “bringing alive” the Kashmir issue. The Operation would involve Pakistani soldiers going across the LOC and occupying around 7 to 8 posts in the area of Drass and carrying out sabotage activities. Commander 80 Brigade Brigadier Masood Aslam, with about 100 soldiers, including 18 officers, was to execute the reconnaissance mission.

"The planned Operation was principally restricted to 80 Brigade; however, 62 Brigade was involved in reconnaissance for supplementary action. Commander 62 Brigade Nusrat Sial, based at Skardu, was asked to identify possible posts for engaging the Indians on a broader front, to spread them thin in case they reacted against the Pakistani posts at Kargil. After the reconnaissance, Brigadier Sayal (who died in a later air crash) said he could occupy 6 posts in Chorbatla, including Battalik[202]"

"Back at the FCNA, with the initial plan for Operation KP having been approved by the 10 Corps Commander Mahmud and by the Chief of General staff Aziz Khan in October, Pakistani troop movement across the LOC had begun by late-October. Headed for Drass, Brigade Commander Brigadier Masood Aslam was dropped from a helicopter in the Drass are, along with a lieutenant colonel and 10 soldiers, for reconnaissance. They found the Marpola and Tololong areas unoccupied for miles. Lt Col Mansoor, the Commanding Officer of NLI 6, then crossed the LOC and entered the Drass area with his troops to occupy posts vacated by the Indian troops and to set up new ones. A limited logistics operation accompanied the initially limited NLI movement, the troops having merely taken off with basic supplies in their bag packs. The planners were confident they would not be discovered before summer and that their camouflage would carry them unnoticed into winter.[204]"

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"Mission Creep 

"However, within two months of the start of the operation, the FCNA commander believed the opportunity existed to expand the operation. Around the areas where Pakistani troops ingressed, there were vast unoccupied areas across the LOC[205] with no Indian presence. In these areas, either the Indian posts had been vacated during winter or on those steep peaks they simply had no posts.[206] Stashed away in the harsh, remote and forbidding peaks, in the dead of winter, the commanders who were planning to enlarge their operation, foresaw no immediate counter-moves as the Indian forces were altogether absent.

"This expansion of the originally one-sector Kargil operation to five sectors was in response to the ‘opportunity’ that was discovered by the NLI command in the zone of operation. The expanded operation was, therefore neither war-gamed nor comprehensively planned. The planners had thought of occupying 10 or 12 posts but the expanded Operation ended with 140 posts. Hence, an operation that expanded on detection of military opportunity by military men at the planning and implementation stage, precluded comprehensive intra-institutional deliberations on the nature of this ‘opportunity’ and, more importantly, on the merits and demerits of an expanded operation. Although, within the restricted group of military commanders, questions related to India’s military, diplomatic, and political reaction and the international community’s diplomatic reaction were raised, the linear experience of that one institution combined with the personal proclivity of the individuals towards the Operation influenced their answers to these questions.

"There was excitement about the expansion, about undetected penetration into enemy territory. ... So they went into Mission Creep and by December 1998 the troops had begun to cross the LOC from seven directions. This included areas west of river Indus, east of river Shyok, from the top of Shyok Valley and from Shaqma. Primarily, NLI infantry troops were the ones involved in Operation KP. They continued establishing of posts undetected by the Indians and penetrated to approximately 14 kilometers into the Indian side of the LOC. Pakistani troops had ended up establishing 196 posts, which included bases and outposts. The daring men, on a victory prowl on the world’s highest battlefield and grasped by excitement and a sense of victory, were unaware of the very critical problems of logistical stretch this operational creep would soon generate. Equally, this deeper penetration into the Indian-controlled territory meant the greater risk of exposure to enemy troops and to the unpredictable enemy reaction."

But elsewhere author has asserted that pakis were overwhelmed by India's response taking the war to an extent that they had not wished for, their objective having been small and simple! So she, the author, has simply lied, and her meaning thereby is that, whatever pakis did, India should simply have surrendered whatever demanded by pakis, by whatever method? 

"The FCNA Commander Javed Hassan himself acknowledged that “we were there from October 1998 onwards but we did not know whether we will be discovered in summer or winter.”[207]"

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"Sharif took some significant decisions regarding the means Pakistan would opt for to achieve the goals of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Especially with the two neighbors, India and Afghanistan, diplomacy was to acquire primacy as a policy tool to achieve policy objectives including resolving bilateral issues. Sharif told the DCC participants including the military generals present, that Pakistan would gradually move towards discontinuing armed support for the Kashmiris. He instructed the foreign minister and the ISI chief to jointly implement the new policy. Their mandate was to facilitate the “broadening and deepening of APHC and to highlight the violations of the human rights and political rights by the Indians.” [208]"

" ... He stressed humanitarian, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiris would be increased. The prime minister was unaware that a clique of his senior-most generals had opted for unprecedented peace-time use of force against India, naively believing they would force India‘s hand on Kashmir."

"Similar decisions on Afghanistan and OBL were taken. But among the men in khaki at this DCC meeting, the prime minister’s words had fallen on deaf ear. The implementation of Sharif’s decision, that the Taliban be pressurized to stop providing a haven for sectarian killers from Pakistan, was directly dependent on the ISI. On the Afghan policy, although Pakistan’s seasoned ambassador Aziz Ahmed Khan assisted the government on diplomatic and political matters, the operational policy on all form of security cooperation and support was entirely under the ISI’s control. Hence, it was ISI that controlled the levers that Pakistan could use to force a change in Kabul’s behavior regarding protection of sectarian killers."

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" ... Indian team brought R.K.Mishra and Admiral Nayyar to Islamabad on 2 November. Vajpayee had personally cleared their trip. At the breakfast meeting with Nawaz Sharif, the Indian envoys conveyed Vajpayee’s message. India was willing to give one billion rupees in soft loans or three million tons of wheat as a loan to Pakistan.[214] This was Vajpayee’s goodwill gesture for an economically troubled Pakistan. Sharif asked his Additional Secretary, Tariq Fatimi, who was also present, to examine the offer. Fatimi told the prime minister that Pakistan had already taken care of its wheat requirements.[215] Given the history of their relationship, it was unthinkable for the Pakistani establishment, or even the political leadership, to let India “bail” them, no matter what its condition."

Not quite true. After the tsunami, pakis were willing to receive help India offered, if it came via US - that'd change labels as far as public perception went. 

But far more telling is the fact that, not only these offers have come from India after a history of pakis perpetrating deadly assaults against India whether terrorism or war, having pak genesis in massacres of several millions in India, but thst here author pretends the opposite, as if those assaults, massacres and murders were of no account, and paki demands of more and more territory to be wrested from India by hook or by crook were a just expectation, with use of terrorism as fair as diplomatic route and legal accession unjust. 

Author further takes pains to portray pakis as sort of nawab,  while reducing Indian envoys to minimal.  

"The other message that Sharif’s Indian guests carried from Vajpayee was that “cross-border terrorism” must stop. The prime minister moved three paces, away from Fatemi’s hearing, and according to his Indian guest said that Vajpayee should be told that Sharif had his own man in the ISI. And that in two or three months, Sharif will control the LOC situation situation and focus on dialogue.”[216]   During the breakfast meeting with his Indian guests, Sharif again repeated his idea of Vajpayee traveling to Lahore on the inaugural bus. An optimistic Sharif somewhat lightly said that if Vajpayee sat in the bus and came to Lahore, fifty percent of the problem would be resolved and, if he himself went in the bus to India, the remaining fifty percent would also be solved.[217] ... Nawaz Sharif believed it was time to reorient Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. He was also getting increasingly uneasy about continuing with Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy."

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In a strangely written paragraph author disqualifies the then paki PM first, before stating his good work and intentions that were quite unlike those of most paki regimes, making a reader wonder if those qualities precisely are what disqualifies him in paki view thst prefers illiterate marauders and barbaric invaders as their heritage. 

"Nawaz Sharif, was an unlikely candidate for possession of a coherent geostrategic vision; yet, forced by circumstances, guided by a professional team of diplomats in Islamabad and in Washington, and aided his own practical instincts he had focused on security issues critical for peace, stability, and economic progress in Pakistan.  Sharif’s general policy thrust of seeking peace with neighboring states, engaging in dialogue to work through problems, and remaining neutral between warring factions in Afghanistan had led Pakistan towards the beginning of a course correction. At the November DCC meeting, the prime minister communicated to the civilian bureaucracy and the military leadership the changes he was seeking in Pakistan’s foreign policy."

Author now lists his faults. 

"Significantly Sharif was initiating this needed foreign policy reorientation in a hostile domestic environment.  His policy blunders were multiplying; the 1997 battle with the judiciary, the bulldozing of laws through the parliament, the gagging of differences of opinion within his party, the passing of a less than credible Accountability Bill, a mounting failure to control rising sectarian killings, the accrual of financial benefits for family businesses, and finally a battle in 1998 with the media and the army."

It's unclear which, precisely, of those weren't shared by most, if not every, single despot that successfully ruled pak for much longer. But author isn't candid enough, or even honest enough, to admit that his failure was simply one, being more of a Shikoh although not quite as learned, and far less of the despot who murdered that prince along with all other brothers. 

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"Pakistan’s economy too was in a fairly difficult spot. This was contrary to the position in late 1997 when the government through legislative agenda had initiated political and economic reforms to restore the confidence of the business community. At that point, despite the sectarian and ethnic violence fanning out across Pakistan , especially in the country’s main commercial center in Karachi the business community’s confidence had been partially restored. According to the World Bank, “these reforms paid off and Pakistan judged by its economic indicators through May1998 showed increasing signs of economic growth and stability.”[218]Subsequently as the World Bank‘s report acknowledged “However events following Pakistan’s nuclear testing in May 1998 hampered the reform process and challenged political stability.”[219] Subsequently, given the fallout of nuclear tests Pakistan was forced to delay payments owed to FDIs and global confidence in Pakistan’s economy continued to spiral downwards."

Hence the adventure, with nothing expected to lose by paki generals who thought they could only gain - fame, territory, name, ... ?

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"Sharif in Washington Within weeks of the November 1998 DCC meeting, the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was in Washington DC on the invitation of US President Clinton. The prime minister of cash-strapped Pakistan led an unusually large delegation, comprising six ministers, a big media contingent, and several family members, wife and children. ... "

Shopping?

" ... Contrary to general practice, Sharif had no one from the armed forces on his team."

Obviously they were busy elsewhere. 

"Clinton hosted Sharif at Blair House and the meetings took place at the White House in the Oval Office. The room was a small one and Pakistan was told the seating would be limited to 1 + 5. However most members of the prime minister’s entourage wanted to go to the Oval office. Pakistani Ambassador Riaz Khokhar requested for additional seats on the Pakistani side. Although bin Laden was the key issue for Clinton, he attempted to dilute this focus by announcing at a presser just before the meeting began, that the two sides would focus on ending nuclear competition in South Asia, and on working with Pakistan to promote economic growth to support mutual US-Pakistan concerns to fight terrorism, alongside some of the other regional issues.”[220] Sharif, told his host in the presence of the global media that it was his “endeavor to remove all the misperceptions which are there in our bilateral relations.[221]"

So there were "misperceptions" in the State of Denmark?

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" ... Post-Bhutto Pakistan, under the military ruler Zia ul Haq,was totally immersed in an international jihad tailored to achieve the US objective of destroying the ‘Evil Empire’ of the USSR. Pakistan’s role as the main architect and facilitator of the international jihad led to Islamabad wanting a friendly government in Kabul."

Friendly???? More like puppets trained by pakis, but now lost control of, it'd seem after two decades. "

" ... Recalling his government’s cooperation, especially on bin Laden, he reminded his host that Pakistan had “been fighting terrorism, and you know that we’ve been cooperating with the United States of America also.” [224]"

Hilary Clinton had a better assessment, however - or perhaps so fid her husband, even then. 

After all, there were those unforgettable scenes from his visit to India, soon after, televised live for the whole world to watch - as he smiled when PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee affirmed India's position, as he met everyone crowding around before leaving, and as he got off his vehicle to dance with the villagers, en route to Jaipur!

................................................................................................

" ... Nawaz had arrived in Washington armed with hugely expensive gifts.[226] "

This from a reportedly well off businessman isn't worth mentioning, but author has been explicit in the two paragraphs ending above,mentioning details that would make it seem that pakis were grandiose to a US deserving of only shame. 

Nawaz Sharif being friendly to or friends with another similar person isn't surprising, considering his relationships with two very different leaders of India separated by a decade. 

He paid heavily, too, every time. 

"Nawaz and Clinton, aided by their teams, met for two hours at the Oval Office. They discussed non-proliferation, economic sanctions, relations with India, bin Laden, Afghanistan, and the F-16 issue. For Pakistan, the good news was Clinton’s commitment to settle the F-16 issue, which had become known in Pakistan as ‘highway robbery’ by the United States (Pakistan had paid the US $658 million for 28 F-16s. In 1991, after President George H.W. Bush withheld non-proliferation certification, Washington unilaterally aborted the sale and held back considerably more than half a billion dollars from cash-strapped Pakistan). while refusing to deliver the F16s.[227] Nawaz Sharif’s government decided to inform the Clinton Administration of its decision to take the matter to court. In Islamabad, Foreign Secretary Shamshad had strongly advocated the legal option and an American lawyer had already been engaged. He had already visited Islamabad for discussions. ... "

Hold on. Pakis paid US, millions of dollars? How? Isn't the flow usually other way, of aid? 

"For Clinton the bin Laden issue topped the agenda. At the meeting, his whereabouts were discussed. Sharif and his team maintained Pakistan could do little since bin Laden was in Afghanistan. None from Clinton’s team were convinced. Secretary of State Albright was particularly tough with the Pakistani prime minister. Sharif, to everyone’s surprise, at the conclusion of the meeting asked to meet Clinton separately. Clinton agreed. At the meeting, Sharif offered Pakistan’s help in abducting bin Laden. Pakistan’s prime minister proposed that the US train a Pakistani team to hunt for bin Laden. Clinton, beaten by the Lewinsky scandal, was very keen to achieve a breakthrough on bin Laden. He was tantalized by the offer. After the meeting, a delighted Clinton told US Ambassador to Pakistan Bill Milam and Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth about Sharif’s offer. Milam wondered how significant Sharif’s offer if he did not have Pakistan’s security apparatus on board. It was unclear if he did. Nonetheless, soon after the offer, the  CIA launched their Get-Osama operation. Men from the Special Forces Group arrived in Pakistan to train former Pakistani SSG commandos."

Perhaps this was why Nawaz Sharif was ousted and that too by someone who had attacked India without informing his PM - while the said PM was hosting PM of India for peace talks? 

And then not only lost the war hed started, but being thoroughly beaten as well? 

How did that loser get to conduct a coup and throw out a PM who was personally friendly with Clinton - unless the key was support by OBL? 

................................................................................................

"Interestingly, unlike Clinton, who immediately shared Sharif’s offer with his team, Sharif did not share his offer with his own team. Even his exceptionally alert and well-plugged-in ambassador to the US was unaware. In fact, the embassy was kept out of the loop. When a senior embassy official turned to the ISI chief for information about bin Laden’s whereabouts to vet the curiosity of his American hosts, he was told to tell the Americans that bin Laden was ill and suffering from a disease in which “he was growing taller and taller and would eventually die!” The ISI chief was of course aware of Sharif’s offer since his institution was to be the Pakistani executing agency for the Get-Osama plan.’

"Other than being unhappy about not being able to see the grizzly bears in their habitat at Yosemite Park, Sharif left the US satisfied. He believed Washington’s support was critical for him to successfully reorient policy. Some sanctions imposed after the nuclear tests were lifted, the F-16 matter was about to be settled, and World Bank loans had been approved. Clinton also supported Pakistan’s peace initiatives towards India and reconciliation between the Taliban and Northern Afghanistan. He also trusted Sharif’s commitment to help the Americans arrest bin Laden. Ambassador Milam, Clinton’s man familiar with civil-military relations in Pakistan, was unsure if Sharif’s proposal, unknown to the khakis, could actually be executed.

"It was a season of discontent with the Taliban. The international community was running out of patience with the Taliban as manifested by the UNSC resolution 1214 passed on December 8.[230] With escalating conflict posing a threat to international peace, mounting ethnic and religious conflicts, an increase in numbers of refugees streaming out of Afghanistan, a deteriorating human rights situation, and especially a stark discrimination against women and girls, the international community was running out of patience with them. This manifested itself on December 8 when the Security Council passed Resolution UNSC 1214.[231] The Taliban were condemned for the presence of terrorists in areas controlled by them. ... "

That's black comedy, criticizing terrorists for "the presence of terrorists in areas controlled by them."!!! 

" ... The Resolution also demanded that “outside interference in the country had to cease immediately.” ... "

Wasn't pakis, represented by taliban, the chief "outside interference in the country"?

" ... Pakistan, as the mentor and only supporter of the Taliban, clearly came under pressure as a consequence of increasing criticism of the Taliban.

................................................................................................

"Clinton personally pursued the bin Laden issue with Sharif. The US President had multi-sourced intelligence on bin Laden’s very imminent plan to attack American targets. The word was that bin Laden was aiding Saddam Hussain, who was under attack from the Americans. Hence, on 18 December a fortnight after Sharif’s Washington visit, Clinton called him. An acutely worried Clinton asked Sharif for his “personal help.” He told Sharif that he had “reliable intelligence” and “quite a lot of it that Osama bin Laden intends to strike a US target very soon, perhaps in 48 hours...and that operations are being orchestrated by bin Laden from within Afghanistan.” This coincided with the United States and Britain’s controversial Operation Desert Fox, a major four-day bombing campaign on Iraqi targets from 16-19 December.[232] The justification for these controversial strikes was Iraq's failure to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as their interference with the United Nations Special Commission inspectors. The US President faced criticism at home and abroad for undertaking military action at a time when he was under fire over his relations with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Meanwhile, there was an outpouring of Muslim street support for Iraqi President Saddam Hussain. But Clinton assured Sharif, “Now all I can tell you is that this is not a reaction to Iraq: he’s been working on this.”[233] Clinton was ruling out any linkage.

"Clinton told Sharif of his extreme worry regarding the consequences of such an attack by Bin Laden. He asked Sharif, “Do whatever you can to stop this immediately.” The Americans were contacting the Saudis for help too. Meanwhile Clinton reiterated what he considered as the Pakistan-Taliban-bin Laden link. He held the Taliban directly responsible for Bin Laden’s actions, given the latter was operating from Afghan territory. Additionally, Clinton stressed that bin Laden’s operations were directly undermining Pakistan’s goal of Taliban acceptability within the international community. He told Sharif, “I think Pakistan has a lot of stake in the Taliban being accepted in the international community, and if this (attack) happens it will become virtually impossible.”[234] Clinton was also reaching out to the Saudis but wanted Sharif to know “he was very very worried about it and consequences if it ( the operation) occurs.”

"An attentive and enthusiastic Sharif was, however, not hopeful. He reminded the US President of their Washington conversation that the “Taliban are very uncooperative people.” He also recalled how the Taliban were “very stubborn” over the bin laden issue in the Kandahar meeting between the Pakistanis, Mulla Omar, and Saudi Prince Turki. Sharif assured Clinton of sending his people the following day to meet the Taliban leadership to ”tell them this will not be in their interest and serve no purpose, that it will invite retaliation and a world reaction.” Clinton wanted Nawaz to explain to the Taliban that “being uncooperative and not giving him (bin Laden) up and allowing him to conduct operations are fundamentally different things.” Nawaz and Clinton’s thoughts fully converged on the bin Laden and Taliban issues but Sharif could hold out little hope for Clinton. The bin Laden-Taliban-ISI axis, even if somewhat unintended, did exist and Sharif had almost no leverage over it."

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"1998 Draws To A Close In Parallel Universes

"Nawaz Sharif worked closely with the civilian bureaucracy on foreign policy matters. Sharif was not educated in or knowledgeable about international affairs. He was no Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, hence no strategist. ... "

Wasn't it Bhutto who lost half of the country, because he didn't stop his military from a planned intention to "change the DNA" of the said othrr half via genocide of three million in East Bengal and mass rapes of half a million, before he threw a tantrum in UN? Wasn't he the only paki PM to be subsequently legally executed by pakis by hanging, for whatever charade passes as law in pak? 

" ... Instead, he worked with instincts and a street-sense of what was needed. ... "

Is this authors way of informing the readers, in different verbiage, that Bhutto was upper strata, educated in convents et al, while Nawaz Sharif is seen as middle strata who earn their living and hence are in paki and erstwhile UK caste system, rooted in middle ages feudal thinking looked down on, by those who never did have to worry about earning? 

" ... Beyond that, for policy formulation and policy articulation, the prime minister depended primarily on his team of diplomats. As his core team guided Nawaz Sharif within the parameters of the policy thrust that he himself identified, he rarely overruled their advice.[235] ... "

Whose advice exactly did Bhutto follow in allowing his generals to follow their explicitly declared intentions regarding a genocide and mass rape policy, which they had tomtommed before proceeding to sail around Sri Lanka to East Bengal?

"Similarly, the prime minister’s relationships with top foreign leaders, Indian, American and even Afghan, were guided by straight-forward personal interaction. Some were tutored by his Foreign Office team, and some were the outcome of his discussions with perhaps only his kitchen cabinet and his father. Often, Sharif would seek to have non-institutionalized, one-on-one interactions with foreign dignitaries, including heads of states. This would ensure no documented minutes of the meetings. ... " 

How did the much written Kargil policy favoured by conspiring generals succeed? 

" ... None of the generals, except the ISI head, was in Sharif’s inner circles."

Was that his chief crime for a nation that boasts of invader and destruction heritage, or was the less convent education the chief problem for a country that has more terrorist factories than hospitals or schools? 

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"In the post-nuclear test period, Pakistan’s foreign policy formulations were influenced by input from three different outlooks. The outlook of the prime minister, who was simply keen to improve relations with the country’s eastern and western neighbors and stay the track with the US. Working closely with the prime minister were his kitchen cabinet, his brother Shehbaz Sharif (Chief Minister of Punjab), and Chaudhri Nisar Ahmed (Minister for Petroleum). Then there was the new Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz. The third was the Foreign Office bureaucracy. Two parallel chains of commands operated at the FO. The bureaucracy found Aziz a ‘dove’ on India. ... "

Whereas pakis prefer those who'd rather butcher India, even if they only get their own young men butchered - by thousands? 

" ... While Aziz had indeed questioned the wisdom of conducting the nuclear tests because of the impact on the national economy, as foreign minister he saw a flexible conduct of policy vis-a-vis India as necessary to create space for negotiations with India and for improving bilateral relations. ... "

So pakis replaced them with loser butchers. 

"There was, of course, a fourth set of inputs, unknown to the country’s elected prime minister: a clique of men in khaki, seemingly with sufficient autonomy and sufficient resources available to them to be unaccountable to the chief executive."

Meaning the guys who went to war and denied it, lost it roundly, and so persecuted their own civil government instead? 

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"It was indeed a measure of the political atmosphere that the Indians even explored the possibility of a Non-Aggression Pact.[237] The bureaucrats went through with discussing the idea, putting their respective versions on paper. The Indians bureaucrats, with the blessing of their political leadership, were “testing the waters”[238] on how far the Pakistanis were willing to cover the friendship road and, more importantly, on what terms.

"Nawaz Sharif, now Prime Minister of the only nuclear state in the Muslim world was on course, implementing his decision to reorient Pakistan’s foreign policy. After the nuclear tests, he had decided to make good on his election promise of improving relations with India. Also in his December one-on-one Washington meeting with Bill Clinton, Sharif had assured the US President of finding ways to work together on nabbing OBL, responsible for attacks on US embassies in East Africa.

"Hence, as 1998 came to a close, three different strands of activities were underway, all very significant for Pakistan. First, the prime minister was on a course-correction path, generally, and specifically working overtime to normalize relations with India. After 28 years, a Pakistan-India summit in Pakistan had already been scheduled for February. Extensive preparations for the Nawaz-Vajpayee Summit in the historic city of Lahore were already underway. Second, a clique of four Pakistani generals had already dispatched hundreds of Pakistani troops across the LOC to occupy strategic heights in Indian-Held Kashmir. They believed such a covert operation, combined with the global anxiety of Kashmir becoming a possible ‘nuclear flashpoint’ would force India to resolve the Kashmir issue, or at least pull back from its 1984 occupation of Siachen. Third, Clinton’s CIA-led team was testing multiple permutations and combinations for a ‘snatch operation’ to get the dreaded enemy of the United States bin Laden. Pakistan’s prime minister in his December one-on-one meeting with Clinton had promised that ISI would help in capturing the al-Qaeda leader. While Nawaz had appointed his trusted man general Ziauddin Butt to lead the ISI, the operational tier of generals, including Lt. Generals Aziz Khan, Jamshed Gulzar, and Ghulam Ahmad, were effectively under the GHQ’s command and not under the ISI chief’s command. Moreover, the quadrangular cooperative setup of the early nineties, which included the ISI, CIA, Taliban, and OBL, were beginning to separate into adversarial groupings. The CIA’s sole focus was to capture or kill OBL and they expected nothing less than full cooperation in this from the Taliban and the ISI.

................................................................................................

"The Taliban, as Mulla Omar’s exchange with Saudi Prince Turki had clearly conveyed, were in no mood to handover their benefactor and now comrade to either the Saudis or to the Americans. As for the ISI, it continued to mentor the Taliban as Kabul’s rightful and pro-Pakistani government in Kabul. Another dimension of the Taliban-Pakistan link was now the Kashmir factor. Non-Kashmiri militants sent by Pakistan into ... Kashmir[239] were increasingly being trained in Afghanistan and often in bin Laden’s training camps.[240] Some of these militants were pursuing a dual agenda. ... they conducted sabotage activities targeting Indian forces and even moderate Kashmiris. Within Pakistan they pursued their own ideological agenda, targeting Pakistan’s Shia Muslim population."

Why does author avoid pointing out the ideology that had Malala, a teenager, for going to school, despite orders by taliban that females should be instead made available for providing every service to taliban? Malala shooting happened later, but it was only a copy of what Afghanistan women and girls suffered under taliban, as soon as Russia was forced to leave. 

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"In the November 9 DCC meeting, the elected government had already decided that it would take a tougher line with the Taliban, especially with regard to the protection the Taliban regime was providing to sectarian groups responsible for killing ShiaMuslims in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif, who was personally comfortable with the political leader of the Northern Alliance Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, also decided that his government would open lines of communications with Ahmad Shah Massoud of the Northern Alliance. This policy decision by the country’s chief executive was in opposition to the Pakistan military’s operational policy of protecting, supporting, and promoting the Taliban regime. On OBL the military took the position that he was “not Pakistan’s headache.”

"In Washington, the Pakistan military’s position did not cut any ice. Based on intercepts, human intelligence and other reporting sources, Washington was convinced of Pakistan’s deep links with al-Qaeda’s protectors, the Taliban. Hence, even though the CIA’s counter terrorism analysts acknowledged that the ISI had no truck with al-Qaeda’s international agenda targeting the Americans, they concluded ISI-Taliban nexus was indirectly protecting, promoting, and also expanding the al-Qaeda network. Another indirect ISI and al-Qaeda link was that the ISI-supported Pakistani sectarian groups, that conducted operations against the Indian force ... were trained in the al-Qaeda camps.

................................................................................................

Author seems yo have a skewed vision due perhaps to personal prejudices. 

"From Bhutto to Zia, Pakistan had presented a contrasting picture. Bhutto exhibited world-class diplomacy while Zia was of men trained to view the world in a dependent and derivative mode. On the global stage Bhutto had dragged a defeated nation with the power of his vision to impressive levels of self-confidence and expanding influence. Bhutto led the new world opening with South-West Asia, leadership in the strategically important Muslim world, structural bonding with China, engaging the Russian bear, and putting Pakistan on the immutable nuclear path."

Author isn't aware that, having sworn he eouldnt allow the elected leader Mujibur Rehman to not only step into office but on soil on the then Western half of the country, Bhutto had been the leader responsible for imprisonment of Mujibur Rehman, the paki military attack against its iwn Eastern half East Bengal, the genocide and mass rapes thst had been declared intentions of before the military set sail for East Bengal around Sri Lanka, and subsequently losing thst other half? 

"Zia, by contrast, had taken Pakistan into a covert war, in a subservient role, believing it to be autonomous. Nevertheless overlooking the damage his policies did to the Pakistani state, society and politics, many in the army credited Zia for the hardware he brought to the armed forces, including staying the course on the nuclear program. Zia also abandoned the nuances of diplomacy, he had entirely bought into the threat perceptions of the West. ... "

Wasn't he the guy US found useful since already begun jihadist attacks in Afghanistan, making Afghanistan regime ask Russia for help? 

................................................................................................

Author seems to be as much a fan of the losers of Kargil as she's a fan of losers of East Bengal. So she blames every wrongdoing of the Kargil fiasco on zia instead. 

" ... Pakistan’s state power and public peace were adrift.  Even worse was the divided picture that Pakistan’s institutions presented. For example the army chief versus the army, the ISI chief versus the rest, etc. Within the very architecture of state and governance, there was conflict and contest. The narratives were several and divided. It has resulted in a clash of power and narratives on the foreign policy and national security. Little wonder that often Pakistan did not present a cohesive game plan while engaging with interlocutors.  Sharif, at the close of 1998, was set to pull all this together."

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................................................................................................

"The confident clique of Kargil planners was satisfied with the progress of the operation. By the end of December, Pakistani forces had already infiltrated almost seven kilometers from seven directions which included  east of Shyok river outflank, from the top of Shyok Valley, from the western side of the river Indus, from Shakma. Pakistan Army troops from 13 NLI, 3 NLI, 5 NLI, 12 NLI and Sindh Regiment directly penetrated the seven areas. ... "

And yet pakis still lie on public television  kissing there were just a few tribals, no more than five hundred or so. 

" ... Although the army chief had given the nod, formal approval of the Operation was still needed. The revered day of Jumatul Wida, the last Friday of Ramadan, the sacred month of fasting, was picked for a formal approval of Operation Koh Paima. On 16 January, in the operations room of the Military Operations Directorate, Operation KP was approved although the bulk of the plan was already under way.. ... "

So the army was aware at the highest echelons, but civil government wasn't even informed, and general public was lied to. 

" ... The meeting, chaired by army chief General Musharraf, was attended by Lt. General Aziz Khan(Chief of General Staff), Lt. General Mahmud Ahmad  (Corps Commander 10 Corps), Lt. General Tauqir Zia (Director General Military Operations), Major General Javed Hasan (Commander FCNA),  Brigadier Masood Aslam (Commander 323 Brigade), Brigadier Nadeem Ahmad  (Director Military Operations) and Colonel Nisar Ahmad (GI Operations). Colonel Nisar Ahmad formally presented the tactical plan and its execution. The entire plan was spread over 15 pages and included a detailed map with logistics, ammunition, rations, and troops at posts set up across the LOC.

................................................................................................

"This general’s clique, assembled to fulfill a formality, hardly asked any questions. These were upbeat times. In the dead of winter, at more than a 16,000 foot climb, the battlefield was clear and apparently for Pakistan’s taking. The brave young men these generals had sent across the LOC to intimidate the Indians, were advancing. The generals were already slipping into class mission creep. Oblivious to whether their indispensable supply lines could match their advancing miles and heights, these dare-devil soldiers charged ahead. Their commanders, equally excited, overlooked the implications of this unplanned expansion. Such was the attitude of these top generals—securely ensconced in their own domains, away from the perilous battle-ground.

"Some perfunctory comments and questions followed, then the army chief’s approval. Significantly, this approval was a violation of the standard operating procedure (SOP), the preparation of A Note For Consideration (NFC) for the chief. ... For Operation KP, the approval came in a secret huddle, with no input from the intelligence agencies and no assessment by the MOD.

"The DG MOD, Tauqir Zia, was brought on at the last minute for the formal approval meeting. Zia was no planner but knew the operation was under way. He demonstrated his near disinterest in the matter by not raising any questions regarding the operation. Zia, whose mandate was to oversee the increasing requirements of troops and all logistics for all military operations, lounging in his chair, barely even moved from his slouching position. He was a new entrant in this clique.[242] Aziz, the lead among the Kargil clique, prompted him to ask some questions. Aziz had keenly watched the disinterested and somewhat baffled Zia during the meeting. Aziz needed him to be involved and interested. He wanted this key general to take ownership.

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"Perhaps the most poignant moment came when, after approving the operation, General Musharraf made a very prophetic query. “Tell me that the state of this operation will not be similar to that of India’s 1962 forward policy against China.” ... "

Author quotes paki lies there, terming 1962 Chinese attacks against India as exactly the opposite thereof. 

" ... Javed Hasan was quick to assure the chief that Pakistan’s positions were strongly established while the Indians were completely unprepared to respond. He then raised his hands to his throat and said, “If anything goes wrong, my neck is available.” His Commander, Mahmud, was quick to take responsibility. “Why yours? My neck will be on the line since I have cleared it.” As if taking the cue, in stepped the next man up in the hierarchy, the chief himself. “No, it would not be your neck, it would be my neck.”

"A three-neck offering had been announced in case of failure but history was to record a different trajectory. These words notwithstanding, for these generals the possibility of being held accountable in case of failure must have appeared distant. There was no precedence; the list of military blunders had not been matched by a corresponding list of penalties for those responsible for blunders.. ... "

No, indeed, on the contrary - paki generals, having lost war against India, then turned usually to coup against their own civil governments. 

" ... These men making decisions and giving approvals in hiding knew what they were doing. Their undertaking was hugely risky yet they had convinced themselves it was in the ‘national interest.’ The operation was baptized and given a name. Commander 10 Corps General Mahmud formally proposed Operation Koh Paima. The clique accepted it.[243]

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"The meeting dispersed as the plan was approved. But, even before this approval, using routes not known to the Indians, the FCNA troops had already crossed the LOC. They had gone several kilometers across and taken up dozens of posts in the Kargil-Drass area at point .5140. These were men who knew of the original Kargil plan that was conceived by their predecessors in the late eighties and the changes made to the original plan. They were also familiar with the criticisms but nursed the desire to punish India, especially for Siachen, by actually implementing the plan.

"Musharraf, who led the line to offer his neck, was suppose to have received hardly a fortnight earlier, from a special unit within the ISI, a document about the Kargil Operation[244] The document detailed the strategic disasters that the ongoing Kargil Op may trigger.

"The country’s chief executive, the prime minister, had neither cleared the operation, nor was he taken in the loop by the army chief. All SOPs had been ignored. On 16 January, when the generals convened to give clearance to the operation (already nearing completion), Musharraf was mindful of the worst, he had images of ‘necks on the line’ when he gave the approval in the meeting. Perhaps there was a Report from the ISI’s special unit after all did get to him and the information and analysis in the Report had left him immensely uncomfortable."

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"36 Days Apart

"The January 16 meeting took place less than five weeks before the Pakistani and Indian prime ministers signed the historic Lahore Declaration on 22 February. This meeting was reminiscent of the 13 May, 1965 meeting that took place between the military President Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan and the GOC 12 Division. The field Marshal was presented with the plan for Operation Gibraltar, which was jointly authored by the ISI and the Foreign Office. Gibraltar called for covert crossing of the Cease Fire Line and was presented around 48 days before the Rann of Kutch Agreement was to be signed. The agreement was signed by India and Pakistan on June 30 and each withdrew their troops from the international border areas. In the backdrop of this Agreement, Pakistan’s troops still crossed the then Cease Fire Line between 29 and 30 July. Operation Gibraltar was a grossly miscalculated plan. By September, it had provoked a war. Fifteen years later, Pakistan’s determination to stay the blundering course and diligently repeat our mistakes was phenomenal. In 1999, the generals’ clique had signed off to a repeat of Operation Gibraltar."

"Fifteen years later"?????

Between 1965 to Kargil was well over more than twice that long! 

"In Pakistan’s policy towards its critical neighbour India, an incredible feat was underway. ... "

"incredible feat" nothing, it was the usual Islamic barbarian horde tactic of begging for ceasefire, offering a hug and stabbing in back. 

"Diametrically opposed advances towards India were being made. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had invited the Indian Prime Minister to Lahore for the 20 February historic Pakistan-India Summit. Musharraf refused to obey the command of the elected prime minister to participate in the welcome ceremony for the Indian prime minister at Wagah border. He and other military men, hidden away from the country’s chief executive, were busy planning a comprehensive violation of that section of the Lahore Declaration that stated the two prime ministers “Recognize that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between them.” This was a near identical replay of the 35-year old Operation Gibraltar[245] with the only difference that in Kargil the civilians and the military were not on the same page. Civilians had moved beyond Gibraltar and had opted for diplomacy by charting new pathways to peace. Operation KP was an attempt by a group within the army to perpetuate old ways. It was subverting the new. The contrast could not have been starker."

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"Kargil clique’s calculations

" ... Kargil clique initially believed that India, under pressure, would be forced to give up Siachen."

" ... Certainly, the idea that the civilian leadership should make the decision to overhaul Pakistan’s Kashmir policy worried these generals. ... "

"The planners believed that an expanded operation would result in Pakistan’s control of a bigger chunk of the strategic heights across the LOC. The bigger the territory, the more diplomatic and political advantage would accrue to Pakistan in negotiations with India. [247] 

"Their calculation was simple. India would not be able to militarily dislodge the Pakistani forces from the strategic heights they had occupied before the onset of winter. India would be under pressure to enter into negotiations for two reasons. One, the Indians would be desperate to end the near siege of National Highway-1A (NH-1A). Two, the international community has no stomach for military conflict in South Asia, , and would encourage negotiation.

"The architects of the operation believed that these factors would put Pakistan in an advantageous position at the negotiating table.[248] In addition to preventing another Indian operation to further occupy territory across the LOC[249], they had calculated a minimum and maximum gain from the operation. The minimum gain would have been India’s withdrawal from the Siachen area. The maximum gain would have been an Indian commitment to enter into a “serious dialogue on Kashmir.” Also, Pakistan’s military operation would reinvigorate the Kashmiri political struggle."

................................................................................................

"Predicting an Indian Response

"Pakistan’s calculation was that, in the case of a localized Indian response failing to expel the Pakistani forces, “a second tier” Indian response would come into play with India opening additional fronts along the LOC across from the Pakistani towns of Murree and Chamb-Jaurian.[251] For this, India would require additional forces from outside of Jammu and Kashmir."

" ... The GHQ was certain that ... Indians did not have the force structure to execute an all-our offensive against Pakistan elsewhere. The planners moved with a linear calculation of an Indian response. As military men, they only focused on the military dimension."

................................................................................................

"In a meeting at the Corps Commander’s home, where the possible Indian response was being discussed, Kayani’s view differed from that of his colleagues. He believed India would not attack where Pakistan’s defense was the weakest. Instead Kayani believed India would attack directly at Kargil, which was strategically important for India.  In more restricted meetings, Kayani let his seniors know he believed the operation had conceptual flaws. Indian strategic capacity included its existing ammunition dumps, its two airfields, the National Highway, and the large Kargil Valley. On the Pakistani side, there was the smaller Minimarg Valley, the snow-clogged Burzil Pass, and the Deosai Plains. Added to this was the very hostile operation terrain, extending from Minimarg to Drass-Kargil, essentially a pack of formidable mountains, translating into communications barriers for the Pakistani soldiers. [252]

"Leading the charge for Operation Koh Paima were simplistic and patriotic mindsets.  Commander 10 Corps would tell his team that the aim was to occupy the heights undetected and then inflict heavy casualties on the Indians during summer. The Commander FCNA would say that the Indians would not know what hit them. They only talked of defensive battle and he did not believe they were even capable of that. In response to concerns expressed by other officers about a tough Indian response, Major General Javed Hasan’s unprofessional, prejudiced refrain was: “The timid Indian will never fight the battle.” Javed Hasan used to go to the battle headquarters but mostly not across the LOC, yet all the posts were established with his clearance."

Wonder if he - and his likes - learned? 

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"Lahore Summit: Seeking new pathways

"Given the many weeks of preparation, there were no surprise developments at the Lahore summit. Three important bilateral agreements were produced: a Declaration was signed by the two leaders, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was approved by the foreign secretaries, and a Joint Statement was issued. These were comprehensive documents which covered the entire range of bilateral interests, ranging from “commitment to intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir” to “condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations” and “undertaking national measures to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.” Pakistan hoped these Lahore agreements would overrule Simla as the framework for a multi-faceted peace process."

"The Jamaat-i-Islami, Pakistan’s right-wing political party, was the principal opponent of Nawaz Sharif’s India policy.[256] It organized violent demonstrations in Lahore, especially during the evenings. Young men armed with stones, sticks and batons attacked cars ferrying guests to the historic Lahore Fort for the state banquet. Not angry tough guys, these young fellows, fortified seemingly with deliberated and scripted agitation, were easy to discourage.[257] Hundreds of policemen ordered out by the Chief Minister of Punjab Shehbaz Sharif were handled firmly. Given the army’s strong reservations about Pakistan’s official India policy, it is not improbable that these scripted protests had input from the intelligence agencies. On India, especially, the Jamaat-i-Islami and the army had an ongoing nexus. This occasion, especially this orchestration of public opposition to the dialogue path, must have been particularly important for the authors of the clandestine Kargil operation.

"The absence of the three armed forces chiefs in the reception line at the Wagah border also fuelled rumours that the armed forces opposed Sharif’s policy towards India. They believed that the government’s proactive peace offensive with India would weaken diplomatically and politically undermine Pakistan’s position on Kashmir. ... "

" ... General Ved Malik, had been insistent that the text should carry a reference to terrorism.”[259]"

" ... Sharif was confident that, as a prime minister with a two-thirds majority, and as a Punjabi, his credentials as a peacemaker on Kashmir would be unchallengeable. He insisted that the key to forward the movement was a reasonable proposal by Vajpayee.[260] ... "

"But the spirit, the substance, and the follow-up of the Lahore Summit were all set for an inevitable clash with the advancing Kargil operation. And more than just the South Asians were to be surprised."

................................................................................................

"Operation KP was initially launched within special parameters. One, only a limited number of NLI paramilitary troops were to be used for the operation.[267] Two, primary and secondary gains had to be made. The primary ‘gain’ was to choke the Drass-Kargil sector. The secondary yet “auxiliary” gain was to lay siege around Indian troops stationed in the Kaksar and Batalik sector. The Zoji La pass was also snow-bound and would have blocked Indian troop movement along the Pass. [268] The other route, Leh-Manalee, was under construction and at an altitude of around 5000 meters and crossing through five mountain ranges, was not feasible for continuous traffic.[269]

"The original plan required a crossing of the LOC at Drass to acquire a post at Tololing, thereby acquiring vital proximity to NH1. From Tololing, the distance to NH1 would be only two kilometers whereas Pakistani troops stationed at the LOC were almost six kilometers away from the road. Excited, a member of the Kargil clique explained, “We could have placed an MP [270] on NH1!”

"Pakistani troops backed by logistical supplies, including ammunition, pre-fabricated igloos, and dry rations moved towards the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sectors. Between March and April they were in position, occupying 140 posts and pickets[271] across five areas. They occupied watersheds in these sectors across the LOC in Mushkoh, Drass, Kaksar, Batalik, and Turtok. (MAP) It was from their posts in the Drass sector that Pakistani troops could access for effective interdiction NH-1A, the life-line to Indian troops in Ladakh and Siachen.

................................................................................................

"Then began the hard, grueling wait for the troops. With no more than ten to fifteen troops at every post and five to six at pickets, there was virtually no communication with the outside world, as they kept vigil and lay in wait. Because these covert movements spread over several months went completely unnoticed by India, Pakistani troops had uninterrupted time to execute their military plans.

"Kargil was an unusual military Op, given the harsh mountainous terrain and weather, the extreme secrecy of the operation, and the Kargil clique’s calculation of only limited Indian military response and hence limited combat with the enemy. It combined elements of a guerrilla operation, a holding operation, a covert operation, a mountaineering expedition, and an expedition to test human endurance. The troops in the field, having to negotiate with one of the world’s harshest terrains and most vicious climates, were therefore far more in direct and constant combat with nature than with Indian troops.[272]

"For this operation, secrecy was valued above all else. No formal military channels for communication were used. For example, while the FCNA headquarters regularly talked on the telephone with field commanders across the LOC to get updates, this communication was a post-midnight activity. To maintain secrecy, no conversation could take place in the presence of the telephone operators. The GI Operations had to wait for them to leave their post. Despite Operation KP being covert, the practice of maintaining logs and writing reports was not abandoned. But in this covert operation all activities were susceptible to manipulation at many levels. It was planned and fought like a personal war, with ownership of all the critical men in the army’s command hierarchy. While it unfolded, with no transparency even institutionally, the operation was not being reviewed for success or viability."

In short, it was no different from ISI controlled terrorist attacks against Mumbai less than a decade later, killing guests at several top hotels apart from other attacks, exceptfor number of attackers. 

................................................................................................

"One proposal to counter a possible pushback by India was to consider launching a supplementary but aggressive military maneuver by the troops who had already crossed the LOC. The idea, floated by one in the innermost coterie of the Kargil planners, envisioned troops moving across the Zojila pass, descending about 25 kilometers and establishing positions towards the Amarnath cave. The proposal called for them to then deny potential Indian response and capture India’s undefended territory, ammunition, and communication controls. It involved positioning Pakistani troops still deeper into Indian-held territory to ensure that, upon India discovering Pakistani troops, even if pushed back they would have penetrated deep enough to threaten India’s supply lines.

"The lieutenant colonel in charge explained the plan to the corps commander, who rejected it. He agreed that militarily the plan was implementable and India could be under pressure in Kashmir. “So, then, why not?” the enthusiastic colonel asked, ”Isn’t that what we want?” “Well, what if India opens new fronts on the international border? Then Pakistan would be endangered,” was the commander’s response. For the colonel, the penny dropped. Stunned, he asked, “Then why did you get us to this point? Why the operation?” Angered, the colonel would later insist, Operation KP floundered because it was “structured in a way to defeat us. We were stopped at a position of weakness…”[274]"

................................................................................................

"Troops and Logistics 

"By March, additional troops were called in as FCNA troops had ventured deeper. Units were moved from Peshawar. At any given time, Pakistan had 600 to 700 troops across the LOC. One post or picket did not require more than 8 to10 soldiers and the rest were there to support the base, etc. However, with troop rotation, in total around 3000 to 4000 troops participated in the operation."

And yet, pakis lie on public television, claiming it was only a few hundred tribals. 

"Depending on where the troops were positioned, helicopters, human porters, and mule brigades were used for delivering supplies. For the 80 Brigade areas, army helicopters would ferry across supplies daily. For 12 NLI based in the easier terrain in the Mushkoh Valley, human porters were used. About 300 to 400 porters were used.

"Supplies for the troops came from the existing forward battalion supplies, dumped especially within the 80 Brigade area. The main logistics base from where supplies were transferred to different battalion headquarters was located at Jaglot, around 40 miles from Gilgit and 250 miles from Skardu. Undetected by the Indians, Lama helicopters were regularly flown across the LOC to drop food and limited medical supplies to feed the forward posts through summer months to last the many snow-bound months.[275]"

" ... Some contingents, including NLI 5, were not supplied. Even those who had food were unable to cook it, either because they were in the igloos or lighting fire raised the possibility of being tracked by the Indians. Troops in Indian-held territory would talk of going hungry for days or surviving only on honey. Home-bound troops would talk of having eaten grass for days."

................................................................................................

"Deceptive Briefings

"On 29 January in Skardu, they told Sharif the general thrust of their intentions while not revealing the plan in full. In order to give a boost to the Kashmir struggle, they said, they needed to become active along the LOC. Sharif was told that local level operations along the LOC were being undertaken. Though he still had no clue that Pakistani troops had already crossed the LOC, Sharif felt that small-scale operations could complement his political and diplomatic efforts to move forward on détente and peace with India. At the Skardu airport, the prime minister was told that, just as the Indians were interdicting our traffic in the Neelum Valley, the Pakistan army too would set up a couple of posts to interdict the main artery, the Srinagar-Leh NH-1A. The army chief mentioned setting up of a couple of posts across the LOC so that visual rather than the usual blind firing by Pakistan was conducted  to interdict NH-IA.[277]

"In the second briefing, on 13 March, the then ISI official Major General Jamshed Gulzar, in charge of Afghan and Kashmir policy, gave a presentation on Mujahideen activities. Gulzar’s presentation was completely unrelated to Operation KP. In fact, throughout the presentation, the Kargil Operation went unmentioned since neither General Gulzar nor any other official within the ISI were aware of it.  The prime minister, the army chief, the DG ISI, and commander 10 Corps were among the attendees.

"In his presentation, Gulzar informed the political and military leadership of the limitations within which the Mujahideen operated. They did not have the ability to inflict heavy damage on the Indian Army and make the environment conducive for the Pakistan Army to move in. Infiltration had also increased. The general said the Mujahideen were, however, capable of “imposing caution and casualties” on the Indian troops by laying ambushes, attacking isolated military posts, and blowing up bridges and culverts along the only route available for the movement of weapons, troops and supplies in the Srinagar and Leh area. During the question and answer session, it was suggested to Sharif at the briefing that scaling up the Mujahideen operations would positively impact Pakistan’s negotiating position. Musharraf proposed that Pakistan supply Stinger missiles to the Kashmiri Mujahideen, so they could inflict heavier losses on the Indian forces. The great success of the Stinger missiles, first introduced by the US to the Afghan Mujahideen for guerilla warfare against the Soviets, made the Stingers popular weapons among the Pakistan intelligence agencies.

"However, with diplomatic engagement now on a relatively positive track, the ministers present opposed delivering Stingers to the Mujahedeen. Former General Majeed Malik strongly objected to such a plan. “The proposal to provide Stinger missiles to the Mujahedeen will be treated by India as an act of war,” he argued. Moreover, providing Stingers was also opposed to Pakistan’s “basic stand that Kashmiris inside occupied Kashmir were waging their own struggle for self determination and Pakistan was only providing moral and diplomatic support,” [278] ... "

" ... Musharraf and his Kargil clique were on a different track. As if to justify his clique’s stance, Musharraf retorted, “We know the Indians. They will negotiate seriously only under maximum pressure.” Deceiving Sharif, he added that he “could not take responsibility for restraining Mujahedeen activity inside Occupied Kashmir.” He did, however, agree to “postpone” the plan to supply Stinger missiles."

................................................................................................

"Lotus Lakes and leisurely talks

" ... It was on 19 March, during the SAARC foreign minister’s retreat in Norellia at the Sri Lankan President’s summer home, that, after a long walk together in a huge garden with two lotus lakes, Jaswant Singh of India and Sartaj Azz of Pakistan sat down on a bench for a ninety-minute talk. It was about Kashmir. ... "

" ... The “Chenab formula” was discussed. All majority Muslim areas lay on the west of the river Chenab and the Hindu majority to the east of the Chenab. This formulation would at least convert the negotiations away from a communal discourse. The substance still involved different communities. ... "

"However, away from the gardens of Norellia, unbeknown to the Pakistani and Indian interlocutors, in the world’s highest battleground, the occupation of peaks was underway.  “We were not wanting territory, we just wanted to strengthen the hands of the prime minister,” was the refrain of the key architect of Kargil, General Aziz. How this linkage would work was anyone’s guess."

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

"‘Indians Do Not Fight’ 

"The Kargil plan was based on the belief that, once Pakistani troops would have successfully choked the lifeline of the Indian troops based in Leh and Siachen by interdicting NH1A and by setting up posts and pickets in the DrassKargil sectors, the Indian response would not be determined and decisive. In the minds of the Pakistani leadership, Delhi’s reaction of anger and panic would attract global attention. In the presence of nuclear overhang in South Asia, world powers would be forced to seek a quick political settlement. Pakistan would have a distinct advantage then, with its troops having cut-off the NH1A and planted themselves on the strategic peaks of DrassKargil, and would be able to dictate its terms for the settlement of Siachen and the Kashmir issue. 

"This belief of the Operation Koh Paima planners came under test in May."

Did pakis learn nothing in 1965, or even in 1971?

................................................................................................

"From Doubts and Suspicions to Zoo Construction 

"Ever since June 1998, several brigade commanders of India’s 15 Chinar Corps[283] had been raising the issue of infiltration from across the LOC with their higher authorities. The Chinar Corps with its headquarters in Srinagar is tasked to keep watch over the Line of Control. Senior commanders, including the Srinagarbased XV Corps Commander Lieutenant General Kishan Pal and XV Corps’ 3 Infantry Division Commander MajorGeneral V. S. Budwar, were on the receiving end of intelligence briefs, observations of field commanders, and conclusions from simulation exercises. All these had only one underlining theme: Pakistan’s offensive intents and plans. They also highlighted major weaknesses in the Indian defenses.[284] During June and August 1998, Indian Army High Command received warnings of heightened cross-LOC military activity, including troop deployments, ammunition dumping, and infiltration using “routes through valleys and nalas (stream beds)”[285] The top brass lacked the entire perspective of the facts but did have a rough foreshadowing of what was to emanate from across the LOC. In August 1998, during a briefing prepared by the Kargil-based military commanders for the perusal of the Indian Army chief, possible infiltration routes in the Drass-Kargil sectors were identified. These subordinate commanders also warned of “a push by militants across the LOC” with the possibility to “engage National Highway 1A” using air defense weapons.[286] Although this intelligence was spot-on in recognition of the threat, it was on the identity of the intruders that these assessments were off the mark. These reports were replete with the terms “Afghan militants,” “terrorists,” and “Pakistan-backed mujahedeen”, while some reports did mention words like arrival of “fresh troops,” “irregulars” and “ammunition dumping” across the LOC at forward positions. However, no concrete conclusions were drawn from this scanty information.

"A spate of reports on what was viewed as an enhanced threat perception were sent from the Kargil and Leh based military intelligence. The reports originated from brigade officers and intelligence bureau field officers. However, the top command of the Chinar Corps remained skeptical, if not entirely dismissive, of these reports. In his August 1998 briefing that Brigadier Surinder Singh had prepared for the 3 Infantry Division Commander, he had identified India’s specific vulnerabilities at the LOC, including unguarded potential infiltration routes such as Mushkoh Valley, From Doda to Panikar ,Yaldor and through nalas.[287] Subsequently, in January 1999, another Indian officer, Colonel Pushpinder Oberoi, had warned in a letter to his commander Budhwar of weak defenses against Pakistani infiltration in the Tiger Hill area. As Pakistani infiltrators had already crossed five to six kilometers in the the Mushkoh, Drass, and Batalik sectors, Oberoi’s assessment was correct. Yet with the Pakistani troops still hidden in the precarious folds of the frozen ridges, the 3 Infantry Commander rejected Oberoi’s assessment. The top guns of the Chinar Corps dismissed all assessments that underscored Indian vulnerability and a possible infiltration by Pakistani troops in a manner bordering on criminal negligence. In some cases the generals believed there were technical problems in interpreting the data while in other cases the readout was seen as exaggerated and alarmist. The existence of contrasting priorities between the top-level and mid-level commands was further illustrated in the June memo that went from General Budhwar’s office to the field commanders. The general’s priority project was building a zoo in Leh and the field commanders were instructed, “that various types of wild animals/birds are procured for zoo at Leh at your earliest.”[288]"

................................................................................................

"From gunfire to enemy bunker -- ‘Militants, guerrillas and terrorists’ 

"As early as 9 February, Indian troops of the 5 Para Regiment spotted unusual movement in the peaks across the LOC in the region south of Siachen. Later, in March, when Indian troops spotted eight to ten men removing snow from a bunker in the Chorbat La sector, an exchange of fire took place. That was the first actual firing that occurred between Indian and Pakistani troops during the Kargil operation. This did not alert the Indians, who passed it off as a localized militant action.

"The local shepherds in the Turtok sector first alerted the Indian military commanders in April about some “unusual movement by unfamiliar faces along the Kargil ridges.” However the Indian Army began discovering the intrusion only after it began its summer patrols in May. While weak aerial reconnaissance confirmed some infiltration, India floundered over its nature. The Indian soldiers, barely returned from their routine winter descent from the extremely treacherous and inhospitable terrain, were going to find the task difficult of identifying the infiltrators and getting their count right. Local media reports reflected the confusion of the army commanders.

"Similarly, in mid-April, incursions were detected in the Turtok sector after a firing incident on Indian troops. The retaliatory fire by Indians led to at least two Pakistani deaths. However, the local Indian commanders did not share the incident with anyone among the Indian military hierarchy beyond Batalik.[290] They believed some Mujahedeen had infiltrated across the LOC. On 3 May, one Tashi Namgyal of Gharkhun village and another shepherd, on the payroll of an intelligence unit of India’s Kargilbased 121 Brigade, reported unfamiliar faces ”digging in” and ”building sangars (bunkers)” in the mountainous areas of BatalikYaldor in Kargil.[291] It was on 3 May that a section of Pakistani troops occupying peaks in the Tololing area began their offensive. They first attacked an Indian reconnaissance group, then followed this with a major attack on 9 May, destroying huge Indian ammunition dumps in Kargil.[292] Indian retaliated on 4 May, firing from Yaldor in the Batalik sector, and an Indian battalion attacked a Pakistani company. Four died and several were injured. Pakistan also lost five officers in a precision-guided missile attack in the Yaldor area.

................................................................................................

"The Kargil planners had projected engagement in mid-June; this was several weeks earlier. After the Yaldor firing, the Kargil planners began an operational review. Pakistan Army chief Musharraf arrived in Gilgit, ostensibly on vacation, and on 6 May he was secretly given a comprehensive briefing in cottage number 3 of Skardu’s picturesque Shangri La resort hotel. The participants included the FCNA commander Javed Hasan, Commander 10 Corps General Mahmud, commander artillery, brigade commander and GI Operation Lt. Col Nisar.[293]"

Author quotes extensively from reports in Indian press. 

" ... The press also drew parallels with the surprise Chinese invasion of the Sum Durong Chu Valley in the Arunachal Pradesh attack in the mideighties. The Chinese caught the Indians “napping” and occupied the valley before the snows melted in MarchApril. By the time the Indian Army arrived, the Chinese had built bunkers all over the valley, which they still occupy.[300]"

" ... The Tribune reported more than 10 Indian troop casualties against 20 across the border.”[304]

"Reports from Jammu indicated that evacuation of the population in the Drass area of Kargil, 146 kilometers northeast of Srinagar, had been begun by the Indian Army. The Indian authorities explained the evacuation as a response to the “Pakistani troops heavy shelling in Drass area.”[305] 

"In the beginning of May, with the early opening of the Zoji La pass, the Indian Army patrols were also sent to the Drass and Kargil sectors to probe the presence of intruders. Supported by aerial reconnaissance missions, which began on 8 May, the “intruders” were spotted in several areas, on the Tololing Hill, about 5 kilometers from Drass, and a mere 2 kilometers from NHA1A.[306]

"Around 14 May, an Indian Army patrol party sent to the Kaksar area went missing.[307] Beginning 6 May when the Indian Lieutenant Saurabh Kalia's patrol party disappeared, most of the Indian reconnaissance missions sent into the area also went missing. Most became victims of attacks by Pakistani troops who were occupying the numerous strategic heights.[308]

"IAF reconnaissance aircraft also began surveillance of the area. Around May 17th a Pakistani helicopter flying on the Indian side of the LOC was detected. The Indian Army responded to this information by launching an attack on Pakistani troop pickets on Point 5353, the peak overlooking NH1A. The Indian Army discovered it was not easy to dislodge those attacking from the heights and within a day it called off its attempt. The Indians also only gradually discovered how well armed the intruders were. For example, on May 21 a surface-to-air missile hit an IAF aircraft on a photoreconnaissance mission.[309] The first reports on Kargil in the Indian press appeared on May 15. ... "

................................................................................................

"Meanwhile, during early May, from their posts and pickets at 16,000 to 18,000ft height, the Pakistani troops launched their offensives. ... "

" ... The problems began when by May the Indians began counter-attacking. Following the Indian retaliation in the early days of May, SSG commando battalions were brought in for attachment with or as reserves for existing units now sitting atop posts at 16,000 ft height."

"As June approached, India’s concerted action against Pakistani soldiers had begun depleting Pakistan’s ammunition. To address the issue, Pakistan sent additional NLI units across the LOC carrying ammunition. Having won the initial hand, Pakistan was in a relatively difficult situation where logistics were failing and troops were holed up on tops in a precarious situation"

................................................................................................

" ... On May 17, the Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan G. Parthasarthy repeated his country’s willingness to hold dialogue with Pakistan over Kashmir.[316]"

"By end of May Pakistani masterminds had realized that additional troops were required for Operation KP and its supply lines for logistics crucial for Pakistani troops would become the prime target of Indian artillery."

" ... It was war for the Indians. Lt General Hari Mohan Khanna, commanderinchief of the Northern command declared, “It is more or less war ...I am treating it as near war...”"

" ... The general consensus was that the intruders were in fact well armed Pakistanbacked militants “equipped with a panoply of modern weapons, sophisticated equipment and snow clothing...”[321]"

................................................................................................

"By 26 May, the Indian Air Force had entered the battle and on 27 May Operation Vijay began to take shape. The Indian Air Force was to bombard the infiltrators, hit out at their supply routes, and also initiate an unceasing freefall supply of ammunition to the Indian troops."

"The Pakistani troops, although perched on the sky-high peaks, were faced with problems once Indian’s retaliation began. Indian attacks were compromising the relatively lowlying supply lines transporting logistics to the Pakistani troops. Early problem areas identified for Op KP included compromised supply lines and shortage of ammunition. For example, the infantry commander who believed he had two months’ worth of artillery to help sustain the position at Tololing in the Dras sector, ran out of artillery 48 hours into the Indian attacks.[322]"

Author now quotes, extensively, paki lies claiming India had attacked.

"Sartaj Aziz spoke from ignorance. Nothing was adding up. For Pakistan’s civilian leadership, facts about Kargil still lay undiscovered. Barring the gang of four, even the Pakistan Army’s top command was unaware of Operation KP until May 16, when they got their first briefing. A day later, the detailed briefing on the operation was arranged at the Ojhri Camp, where the Air and Naval chiefs were taken into confidence. If the events on the ground had not provoked a near war, all this would have made for a bizarre comedy."

................................................................................................

"“Cock and Bull Story” 

"Meanwhile, Washington too entered the fray and called for troop withdrawal. Pakistan was asked to vacate immediately. Within a period of one week, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, seasoned diplomat Riaz Khokhar, was told four times to convey Washington’s concern to Islamabad over Pakistan’s violation of the LOC.[330] During his first meeting with the US Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering at the State Department Club, Khokhar was plainly told that the Clinton administration did not believe Islamabad’s “cock and bull story of freedom fighters”[331] fighting in Kargil with no Pakistani involvement. After his first meeting, a puzzled Khokhar called the Foreign Office in Islamabad to convey Washington’s message. However, the response to his queries on Kargil was that “all will be well, no need to worry!”

"The flip side of Washington’s message to Islamabad was the message that the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright conveyed to the Indians. On May 30, Albright called her Indian counterpart Jaswant Singh. She let him know that she had spoken to the Pakistani prime minister and assured Singh that “the United States knew fully well how the chain of events had started.”[332] A worried Albright had also suggested that “things could go out of control...it was important to commence the dialogue.”[333] Singh said he was not averse to a dialogue but wanted the “aggressor” to first end aggression against India.

"After it was known that Pakistani troops had crossed the LOC ... Pakistan earned widespread criticism. The criticism was simple: responsible nuclear states always stay away from |military confrontation. They do not undermine nuclear deterrence. They do not sabotage peace initiatives and especially the ones that they themselves initiate, like the Lahore summit. They do not opt for the confrontation path. Operation KP had landed Pakistan in an isolated space where criticism of the present overrode all else. ... "

Author attempts to justify pakis at this point claiming pakis claims were bring ignored. 

She forgets Russian claim to Alaska - leased to US for 99 years, never returned due to the document being lost during revolution - is far more genuine. 

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

"Around mid-May, when the Indians detected early signs of Op KP, the five-member Kargil clique in Pakistan was forced to take into confidence the elected government, including the senior civil-military bureaucracy. Hitherto, the army chief had neither discussed nor sought approval from the prime minister for Operation KP, which was not merely a battle for posts on the LOC but had involved ingress by Pakistani troops ... across the LOC. ... "

"On 29 January, the Prime Minister addressed the troops at a public meeting in Skardu. Contrary to general Musharraf’s assertion in his book In the Line of Fire,[336] there was no briefing on Kargil. According to a retired general who was present during Sharif’s Skardu trip, the visit was “just a face-showing, where not a word on Kargil was uttered.” [337]"

"In fact, until mid-May, even the military high command, including the intelligence chiefs, were kept out of the loop on Op KP."

" ... The iron-clad secrecy surrounding Op KP was nearly impossible for even critically located men within the military hierarchy to permeate.

"This level of secrecy ruled out the possibility of sound evaluation of Op KP. Lone voices from even within the GHQ’s Research and Analysis Wing[341] were easily dismissed. For example, around end-May, when questions of Pakistan’s cross-LOC actions began to surface internationally, a brigadier wrote a note recommending that Pakistani troops should vacate Kargil. As a diligent member of the research unit mandated to give input on a regular basis, the brigadier candidly noted that existing problems with the Op were likely to compound further, especially within the international context.  His note found its way to the army chief‘s desk. Written in green ink, the chief’s remarks in the margins read “I do not agree.”[342]"

" ... In 1965, the level of the secrecy was such that General Bakhtiar Rana[343], the Corps commander, who was responsible for looking after the geographical area, was not involved in the war planning. When General Rana came to the then Commander-in-Chief, General Muhammad Musa Khan, and asked him about the operation, the chief said, “No, no, It’s a secret,” and declined to tell him about the operation. [344] Even the then Pakistan Air Force chief was kept unaware. ... "

................................................................................................

"The majority of participants in the meeting appeared to accept what they were told. Only a few raised questions.[347] Inspector-General Frontier Corps Baluchistan Lt. General Abdul Qadir Baluch warned the Kargil planners that they had not correctly calculated the Indian reaction. Supporting Baluch, Major General Akram, GOC 35 Division, added that negative international reaction to any military tension between new nuclear powers had also not been factored in. Major General Rafiullah Khan Niazi too was very critical."

" ... Qadir asked the presenters at the meeting why the Indians would not be able to protect their vehicles from Pakistani firing from a distance of three kilometers. Qadir recalled that he was able to protect the construction workers from Indian fire from as close as only eight hundred meters."

" ... The army chief Musharraf also addressed the generals for about half an hour. He informed Pakistan’s top military commanders that the Indians were suffering heavy casualties. Pakistani soldiers occupying strategic heights were retaliating to Indian infantry attacks. The chief dismissed the idea that India would react forcefully and open any new fronts on the international border. He was categorical, “our positions were unassailable.” “Luck is always on the side of the bolder and hence it was on our side,” was the maverick chief’s dangerously naïve reassurance to the commanders. With his remarks “it’s a win-win situation[348] Musharraf called the meeting to a close. Everyone was asked to pray for the success of Op KP. With unanswered questions still worrying some among those present, all obeyed the chief. They raised their hands and prayed."

"But, significantly, the morning after the Kargil clique’s briefing to their own, the editorial in a leading Pakistan daily wrote that Pakistan’s own forces were fighting in Kargil.[349]"

................................................................................................

" ... Indian press reports claiming that ... Pakistani artillery fire could target India’s main supply route to Leh, the Srinagar-Leh Highway.[351] These reports had prompted the prime minister, linked in a high-stakes diplomatic engagement with his Indian counterpart, to ask for this briefing.[352] The Kargil planners were in an upbeat mood since Pakistan’s artillery shelling had blown up a bridge on India’s main supply route."

" ... The entire Kargil clique, including the army chief, the Chief of General Staff Lt. General Aziz Khan, Commander 10 Corps General Mahmud, and Commander FCNA Brigadier Javed Hassan, was present. Key men from the ISI in attendance included the DG ISI Lt Gen Ziauddin Butt, director analysis Major General Shahid Aziz, and ISI’s point-man for Afghanistan and Kashmir Major General Jamshed Gulzar. The prime minister, accompanied by the Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, the Finance Minister, the Minister for Northern Areas and Kashmir Affairs Lt. General Majeed Malik, the Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad, and his Principal Secretary Saeed Mehdi."

" ... LOC was not clearly demarcated on the map. Hence, during the presentation, when Pakistani and Indian positions were pointed out to the prime minister, he was unable to fully comprehend the locations of these posts. Instead, for him, the main focus of the briefing was the achievements of Pakistani troops. There were no mention of Pakistani troops crossing the LOC, nor of the Pakistani troop build-up five to ten kilometers beyond the LOC. One of the retired generals present recalled, “I saw scores of positions across the LOC in the Indian area across the LOC ... ”"

" ... The general predicted, that in phase five, the final phase, the Indians would be on their knees begging for talks and Pakistan could dictate its own terms.

................................................................................................

"The DGMO proceeded to share the four assumptions which, according to its planners, guaranteed the success of the five- phase Operation Koh Paima. First, each post being held was impregnable. Second, the Indians did not have the will or the determination to take on Pakistan in a fight and would not make any serious effort to regain the heights. Third, as far as the international context was concerned Pakistan need not worry because there would be no external pressure. Fourth, that the army recognized the economic crunch faced by the country and therefore the government would not be asked for any extra resources for the operation; the army would use its own sources to fulfill the financial requirements.

"The main thrust of the presentation was to inform the elected leadership of the army’s “achievements” along and across the LOC. The impression given was that the strategic heights lay somewhere in the un-demarcated zones. The DGMO informed the participants that Pakistan’s troops had occupied strategic heights that Indians would now find almost impossible to reoccupy. The army chief emphasized the irreversibility factor and said that, based on the wisdom and experience of his entire professional career, he could “guarantee the success of the operation.”[354]"

"Clearly, the masterminds of Kargil were not seeking permission for the operation they has already launched. The prime minister was presented with a fait accompli. With the cover of Operation Koh Paima having been nearly blown and diplomatic pressure imminent, the Kargil clique was seeking political and diplomatic cover for the Op. The prime minister was pointedly asked if he and his team could politically and diplomatically leverage their ‘unassailable’ military achievements to promote and project the Kashmir cause.[355] Following the DGMO, the CGS Lt. General Aziz Khan rose to flatter the prime minister. “Sir, Pakistan was created with the efforts of the Quaid and the Muslim League and they will always be remembered for creating Pakistan and now Allah has given you the opportunity and the chance to get ... Kashmir and your name will be written in golden letters,” he declared. The CGS Aziz also invoked the PM’s Kashmiri descent and lured him with the possibility that “after Quaid it is a unique opportunity to be remembered as the Fatah-i-Kashmir.”[356]"

................................................................................................

"Steadfast in their dedication to their institutional ethos all the men in uniform raised no questions at the presentation. As would later transpire, the top commanders in the ISI were all skeptical of, if not totally opposed to, Operation KP. Lt. General Gulzar would subsequently criticize the Op as a “blunder of Himalayan proportions,”[357] born of a temptation that every commander 10 Corps would face upon finding an “open space.” Emphasizing the point, the general would later recall, “When I took over the command of 10 Corps I had to put my troops on a leash because they would say we can move forward since we are at a height.”[358] Similarly, years later, the then head of the ISI’s analysis wing major general Shahid Aziz would write, “An unsound military plan based on invalid assumptions, launched with little preparation and in total disregard to the regional and international environment, was bound to fail. That may well have been the reason for its secrecy. It was a total disaster.”[359]"

" ... The foreign minister, however, expressed his reservations on two counts: one, that it was incongruent with the spirit of the Lahore summit and, two, that the U.S. would not support the operation. Sartaj Aziz pointedly asked his PM whether the plan the army had made was not contrary to the undertaking in the Lahore Declaration. ... "

Author claims paki PM was for KP. 

"The other obviously perturbed man in the room was Sharif’s Minister for Kashmir and Northern Areas (KANA) Majeed Malik. A retired general, Malik grilled the commander 10 Corps about the logistics for the forward troops. He interrogated how the supplies would reach the troops under “adverse weather conditions and in a hostile environment.” He recalled the hazardous terrain he had personally visited. Mahmud’s curt response was that times had changed and that “our troops are fully covered.” The retired general also asked the DGMO, “What if the Indians do not remove their troops from the Valley and instead induct air power in the conflict theatre?” Meanwhile, the silent worrier in the room, Sharif’s Defense Secretary, also a retired general, opted to not raise any questions. At the conclusion of the formal meeting, he merely whispered to other military officers, “The foreign office will never be able to handle this.” [362]"

" ... Based on whatever he understood regarding the operation, and factoring in the reservations expressed by his ministers, the elected prime minister opted to go along with the fait accompli presented to him by the military. ... The prime minister took well to the words of the CGS that for the PM “after the Quaid it is a unique opportunity to be remembered as the Fatah-i-Kashmir.”[364]"

................................................................................................

"Immediately after the meeting the defense secretary followed the prime minister in his car. It was about 9pm and Sharif was entering the lift in the Prime Minister’s House when Lt. General Iftikhar Ali Khan, hurriedly following him, said, “Sir, can I talk to you? It is important.” the nation’s chief executive asked him if he could wait till the next morning. The defense secretary persisted. He said he wanted to ask two questions. One: Did the military leadership get his permission to cross the LOC? The prime minister enquired whether the army had actually crossed the LOC. “Didn’t you note all that about ‘hundreds of posts’ and that NLI troops, not freedom fighters, have crossed the LOC.” Chaudhary continued, “Crossing the LOC, Mian Sahib, has implications for war.” In the middle of the night, the rather surprised prime minister said, “Why a war? And who has crossed the LOC?” He was told that about five to six hundred square kilometers of Indian territory and hundreds of posts had been occupied. The prime minister instructed the Defense Secretary to explain the situation to his Minister the next morning."

" ... The PM asked Musharraf, “Did you cross the LOC?” Musharraf responded, “Yes, sir, I did.” “And on whose authority?” queried the prime minister. The army chief was quick to respond, “On my own responsibility and if you now order, sir, I will order the troops’ withdrawal.” Nawaz Sharif turned to his Defense Secretary and said, “Did you see? He has accepted his responsibility!” Sharif, perhaps visualizing himself as the “liberator” of Kashmir, added, “Since the army is part of the government, from today onwards we will support the army.” After this rather brief meeting, the army was to get the complete support of the country’s leadership.[370]

"The public message at this stage from all stakeholders, in Islamabad, Rawalpindi and abroad, was identical: The international community must rein in India. The same day, the prime minister said Pakistan was committed to dialogue with India. On 19 May, the COAS General Pervez Musharraf said Indian violations of the LOC would be taken seriously. On 20 May, in Baku, at the Council of Ministers Conference, the Minister of State of Foreign Affairs, Siddiq Kanju, asked the world community to help resolve Kashmir. On 21 May, Pakistan’s newly appointed ambassador to France, Shahryar Khan, assured his hosts that Pakistan was involved in “serious talks” with India."

Author thus exposes paki lies and hypocrisy, but omits the label to that effect. 

................................................................................................

"Most of the civilian participants realized the scale of Operation Koh Paima for the first time. They asked probing questions regarding the objectives of the operation.[372] The army chief was asked about the objectives of Op KP and Pakistan military’s ability to retain the territory occupied across the LOC. The confident army chief’s response was, “We can defend every inch of our own territory and we are firmly entrenched in the positions we are holding in Kargil.”[373]

"There were many critics of the operation. For example, many questions came from Minister Majeed Malik, who had himself commanded this area as a Corps commander and earlier on as Div. Commander. He said that, if Pakistan had to interdict this road, it could have been done from lower heights instead of taking our troops to the Kargil peaks, where the weather would be their worst enemy. Malik pointed especially to the difficulty of maintaining supply lines for the troops. The worried elderly Minister for Religious Affairs Raja Zafarul Haq nearly reprimanded the Kargil planners for not taking others in the government into confidence if their objective was to highlight the Kashmir issue. All future action must now follow proper consultation, he emphasized.

"The consensus among senior navy and air force officers was that opening of new fronts by India could not be ruled out. They asked why they had not been consulted earlier since any defense plan in case of Indian retaliation had to be an integrated armed forces defense plan. Criticism kept piling up. The deputy air chief also wondered, “After all, what will we achieve from all this?” CGS Aziz’s response was that, by applying pressure on the main supply artery NH-1, India would be forced to the negotiating table on Kashmir.[374]"

................................................................................................

" ... The army insisted that the line was fuzzy and in some places the Mujahideen were also involved in the fighting. When asked by one of the foreign office officials how the Mujahideen could fight so valiantly against the well-equipped Indian army, the army spokesperson Rashid Qureshi said, “Because the Indians from the plains are not acclimatized and they die!” [378]"

" ... The defense attachés left the briefing with the understanding that these senior Pakistani military officials had acknowledged that Pakistani troops were involved and it was not a Mujahideen operation.[381] The western military attachés, including the American and the British, reported back to their embassies and subsequently to their headquarters that fighting was actually taking place on the Indian side of the LOC.[382] Publicly, however, Islamabad still maintained that only the Mujahideen were involved.[383] The media, based on western embassy backgrounders, reported that the DG MI had acknowledged that there were Pakistani troops across in the Indian side of the LOC. Interestingly, at this time Pakistan’s own diplomats, stationed even at the headquarters, were groping in the dark for information about the reported flare-up along the LOC.

"After the MI briefing, the US military attaché in the embassy informed his ambassador William Milam that fighting was going on the Indian side of LOC. The American information until then was that it was a group of Mujahideen. The military attaché had attended the briefing at the GHQ given by the DG MI and the DG MO.[384] Following the briefing, the attachés snooped around for more information. The military attaché met his counterpart while the political attaché met with retired military officers. With confirmation that Pakistani troops had crossed the LOC, the “really excited US diplomats” told Washington about it. The State Department responded by issuing its first statement, calling upon Pakistan to withdraw its troops. This statement prompted the Additional Secretary of the Foreign Office, Tariq Altaf, to call in Ambassador Milam and ask why Washington had accused Pakistan of fighting across the LOC. The US ambassador informed him that it was the Pakistan Army itself who had given them this information. Upon hearing Milan’s response, it seemed that “Altaf had been kicked and his faced fell.”[385] Following the Altaf-Milam exchange, Foreign Minister Aziz called the DG MI and complained about the embarrassing faux pas he had committed. The MI chief said he had been misquoted.[386] Nevertheless, the stories of the defense attaché regarding Pakistani troop presence remained in circulation."

................................................................................................

"Towards the end of May, the prime minister decided to take his cabinet into confidence on Op KP. He convened a cabinet meeting at which the director-general ISI Lt. General Ziauddin Butt was to present a briefing. Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad and Defense Secretary Iftikhar were also present. Although in his private meetings with the prime minister the DG ISI was critical about Op KP, at this cabinet meeting he presented broad details of the Op. ... Similarly, the foreign secretary, who had expressed some reservations about Op KP at earlier meetings, at this cabinet meeting opted to pick no holes. He gave no hint of the Op being a potential source of any diplomatic disadvantage for Pakistan, and, instead, indicated that some benefit could be derived from it.

"A barrage of hard questions followed Butt’s briefing. The majority present was pleased with the progress reported on Op KP. The Minister for Water and Power Gohar Ayub praised the army for doing a “great job” and advocated support for the operation. Minister of Culture, Sports, Tourism, and Youth Affairs, Sheikh Rashid Ahmad, also praised the army, while the Minister for Religious Affairs said, “The time is now ripe for jihad.” There were also critics of Op KP. These included Minister for Communications Raja Nadir Pervez and Minister for Health Makhdoom Javed Hashmi. The most vocal critic, however, was the secretary of defense. The retired general spoke for about twenty minutes, warning that Op KP would either end in all-out war or as a total military disaster for Pakistan. He alluded to what he believed was less than the whole truth that others before him, had spoken on Kargil. He especially alluded to the Director-General ISI Butt’s presentation.

"To support his own contention, Iftikhar discussed recent Indian troop movements. Indian divisions deployed at the Chinese borders had moved towards the Pakistani borders. India’s defensive formations had also moved to Pakistan’s borders in offensive posturing. The Indian navy too was moved from its eastern maritime borders to its western maritime borders, alongside Pakistan’s borders. His assessment was that the Op would not be restricted to Kargil but would lead to war. A worried Defense Secretary provided a comparative fact sheet on the two armies, navies and air forces. His assessment was that, in case of an all-out Pakistan-India war, Pakistan would be in a difficult situation. Implying that the army command had launched Op KP without clearance from the government, the Defense Secretary emphasized that the army was not an independent body and had to take orders from the government. He was also critical of placing jihad as a central element in Pakistan’s defense structure. He wondered, “Why have we after fifty-two years realized the importance of jihad?”[387] The Defense Secretary’s brother Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, the Minister for Petroleum, also raised hard questions. The thrust of Nisar’s remarks was that, based on his information, Pakistan was heading for a military disaster in Kargil-Drass. “Who had ordered the operation?” the minister rhetorically asked the military presenters. Nevertheless, Nisar’s caution was against an Op already underway."

" ... Meanwhile the Kargil planners, saw no reason to pay heed to any concerns expressed at the cabinet meeting."

................................................................................................

"The Contours of Denial 

"Throughout May, the army planners of the operation worked with a variety of themes to maintain deniability of the Pakistan Army’s involvement. These ranged from contentions that the Mujahideen were conducting the operation, to assertions that the Pakistan Army was not crossing the actual LOC. The decision to attribute the fictitious identity of the Mujahideen to the NLI was largely an unplanned one. It had been triggered by the wireless intercepts of exchanges between the Indian forces, which the ISI and the MI had picked up. The Indians were informing each other that the Afghan Mujahideen had crossed over the LOC. This Indian assessment was based on the wireless exchanges they had picked up between the NLI personnel recruited from Pakistan’s Pashto-speaking areas.[390] The Indians mistook them for Afghans.

"In fact, there was no Mujahideen participation at all. The Mujahideen, often physically hardy, were “essentially a rag-a-tag force wearing second hand clothes and PT shoes.” Incapable of fighting pitched battles, they were certainly not capable of supporting the Kargil operation. At best they could “apply pinpricks” to India using their very weak artillery and ammunition, including AK47 assault rifles, light motors, explosive devices.[391] They were capable of ambushes and of raiding posts. The Mujahideen “could not have operated in the Kargil area where even the eagles dare not fly.”[392]"

Author says "motors" where it should say 'mortar'.

................................................................................................

"Nevertheless, to ensure deniability, a decision was taken within the GHQ to “play along” with the Indian version that Afghan Mujahideen had entered the Kargil region.[393] By the third week of May, the FCNA commander got orders from the GHQ that the troops participating in the operation should “go in civvies” and to “remove their identity discs.” The FCNA found this order disturbing. The troops were to be identified as Mujahideen. Camouflaging their identity would affect their morale.[394] The broader implications of acquiring the fictitious identity were overlooked by the army generals. The participation of the Afghan Mujahideen in the Kargil area would establish their engagement with the Kashmir freedom struggle. Such a linkage would strengthen the Indian position that, in fact, Pakistan was involved in spreading the Taliban brand of extremism in the region and justify Delhi’s framing of the Kashmir movement within the Islamic international terrorism framework and link it to Osama Bin Laden and to al-Qaeda.[395]

"Closer to home, the Mujahideen leadership, agitated over Pakistan’s decision to project the Op as a Mujahideen operation, sought meetings with the Pakistan leadership. They complained to their ISI interlocutors that linking them to the Kargil Operation gave them “a bad name.”[396] In their meetings with the prime minister and the DG ISI they demanded that the projection of this linkage be discontinued. The prime minister pacified them and said their name was included in this national effort to liberate Kashmir and that the success of the operation would mean also the Mujahideen’s success.

"The planners of Operation Koh Paima continued with this fictitious identity till almost the very end of the Kargil operation. Notwithstanding, of course, the fact that during the mid-May GHQ briefing for the foreign military attachés, the ‘cat had been let out of the bag!’[397] By around 26 May, even the Indians publicly confirmed that it was the Pakistan Army and not the Mujahideen who were involved in the operation. Subsequently, international media reports, reflecting the perception of   foreign governments, also highlighted army and not Mujahideen involvement. Nevertheless, Pakistan official policy to the very end remained insistent that it was the Afghan and Kashmiri Mujahideen had crossed the LOC."

And those lies continue, but they - the lies - began in 1947 and were used in 1965 too, to the effect that it was never paki military, only local tribals; to this effect soldiers were sent dressed in pajamas. 

................................................................................................

"Beyond identity, on the question of having crossed the LOC, the Kargil clique had believed that, because the “LOC was marked on a quarter inch map and a thick line on the map can actually make the difference of two or three kilometers on the ground”, the Op would be “safe” and non-provocative. The commonly heard narration on LOC-crossing, especially by the army spokesperson, simply was that especially in the area of the operation “the LOC was not defined at all.”[398] This was also the thrust of the army’s briefings to the prime minister.[399] No one from the civilians authoritatively countered this rationale. Pakistan had occupied five areas each around 200 to 300 square kilometers. Indian retaliation was clearly inevitable.

"Within the army, any early reservations being expressed regarding the operation were rejected by the high command. For example, towards the end of May, when the international community began blaming Pakistan for the ratcheting up of tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, there were murmurings within the Evaluation, Analysis & Research Cell, mandated to provide regular input on the strategic environment.[400] Officers posted in this Cell were anxious. “We kept saying there is something wrong. Our input was that there are problems,” recalled one.[401]"

................................................................................................

"Through May, the Kargil planners were almost euphoric. They completely ruled out any possibility of reversals. For example, in late May, when major-general Jamshed Gulzar[406] from the ISI while visiting the FCNA headquarters wondered if the Pakistanis could hold on to the strategic heights, he was told that “there was no question of reversals.”[407] Typically, this depicted ‘a one scenario only’ mindset. On the ground, there were no major military reversals and the Op seemed to be moving according to plan. Having taken control of about 140 peaks across the LOC, having managed the surprise and secrecy from the Op KP’s launch, Pakistan was now in a commanding position. Through the seven-month period, from October until May, the Op had remained largely undetected by the Indians."

"By the end of May, the Indian prime minister was walking his hard talk. He called Nawaz Sharif on 24 May to complain about the Pakistani military operation. He bluntly told Sharif, “You have betrayed me”[410] and that “no intrusion will be allowed in our territory…all means will be used to clear our territory.” Sharif proposed that the two Directors-General Military Operations (DGMOs) talk to each other. On 25 May, the two DGMOs communicated. The Pakistani DGMO, Lt. General Tauqir Zia, decided to call the Indian DGMO again the following day with answers to his questions. But, before the DGMO could make the promised call, Delhi had launched Operation Vijay. At 6.30, am an attack formation of MIGs and MI-25 attack helicopters armed with rockets and laser guided bombs took off from the Srinagar airbase to destroy positions “atop Drass, Batalik, Kargil, and Mashkoh.”[411] In fact, hours before the beginning of Operation Vijay, the Indian prime minister publicly provided the justification. On 25 May, Vajpayee had told reporters in Pondicherry, “We are facing a new situation in Kargil. It is not just an intrusion that is taking place when the snow starts. This time the design is to occupy some territory and stay put there. Infiltrators are being helped by the armed forces.”[412] Vajpayee also signaled the use of airpower to “clear the Kargil area.”[413] ... "

" ... Meanwhile, Vajpayee’s strict orders to his military command that no cross-LOC military operations were to be carried out, also made the Pakistani planners believe Kargil was unfolding as they had contemplated. They misread Delhi’s deliberate tentativeness as disability and fear. This misjudgement by the Kargil clique also contributed to their bluster."

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

" ... Kargil clique had premised the entire Op on almost no response from the Indians. So now the clique had begun to alter their assessment?"

" ... Early on June 2, the prime minister attended a meeting at the 10 corps headquarters. At the briefing, Lt. general Mahmud reported “continued success and holding operations” plus troop pullback from forward positions. The prime minister asked why troops were pulling back from forward positions when they were in a winning situation. Mahmud maintained those were early warning posts meant to inform the Pakistanis of the approaching enemy and were no longer required. Although the commander of the Kargil Operation said the posts were no longer required, in fact his troops had been beaten back by the Indian air force and ground troop’s artillery onslaught."

" ... on 28 May, ... Nawaz Sharif called Vajpayee and the two had a twenty minute conversation. Nawaz Sharif offered to send his foreign minister for talks and urged for the settlement of the Kashmir issue. Vajpayee did not reject the dialogue offer but let his counterpart know that the first requirement was that Pakistan undo the violation of the LOC."

"Indian diplomacy was in high gear. Having signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Russia, Delhi-Moscow ties had been fortified. In Washington, the keenness to engage in a strategic relationship with India was unprecedented. The Jaswant-Talbot nuclear talks had expanded into a platform for evolving a common strategic outlook for the two powers.[433] Also significantly, the first trip in ten years by an Indian foreign minister to China was in the works. However, Pakistan, by contrast, was in a difficult strategic environment. Its Afghanistan policy was under criticism and it was blamed for facilitating “terrorism” and “Islamic militancy.” Following the nuclear tests, it had also come under economic pressure. Perhaps the only silver lining was the beginnings of détente with its eastern neighbour."

Which amounted to selling China land of Kashmir and Baluchistan of which neither ever did belong to pakis in the first place. 

................................................................................................

"By the closing days of May the Indian foreign minister had received “unequivocal” assurances from Washington, Moscow, London, and Paris that they accepted the Indian position that the infiltrators had been “pushed in by Pakistan.”[439] They were equally clear that Pakistan could neither be rewarded by United Nations mediation nor by any international pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir crisis. The issue was Kargil and the engagement would be bilateral."

"“A very, very dumb mistake!”

"By this time, several countries, including the US, had come to the conclusion that Pakistan had violated the LOC. Indian reports, information available in Pakistan to the foreign embassies, and the US’s own satellite sources had left no doubt in Washington that Pakistan had crossed the LOC. While the LOC was de jure not an international border between Pakistan and India, de facto it was considered a border dividing the state of Jammu and Kashmir ... Hence, excepting Pakistan’s strategic ally China, the international community had concluded that the crossing of the LOC by Pakistani troops amounted to Pakistan aggressing against India. For the Clinton Administration, this was an unacceptable development. ... "

"Around end May, Washington began its intensive contacts with Pakistan. By now, US Under-Secretary Pickering’s mid-May blunt “cock and bull” retort to Ambassador Khokhar’s claim that Kashmiri freedom fighters, not Pakistani troops, were fighting in Kargil, had become US policy.[440] The thinking within Washington’s policy-circles was that “Pakistan had made a very, very dumb mistake and it had set things way back, having a serious impact on Pakistan’s credibility with reference to India.”[441]"

"The Under Secretary of State for South Asia Karl Inderfurth’s message to Pakistan was blunt: “Clearly, the Indians are not going to cede this territory the militants have taken. They have to depart, and they will depart, either voluntarily or because the Indians take them out.”[450] Inderfurth’s thinking found its way to the Indian press and his blunt warning angered Islamabad. US ambassador Milam was summoned to the Foreign Office. Tariq Altaf, additional secretary, complained to Milam against Inderfurth’s factually incorrect assessment of the situation in Kargil. Milam told Altaf that the US statement was based on information provided in the GHQ briefing. Upon hearing Milam’s response it seemed that “Altaf had been kicked and his face fell.”[451] Washington’s unambiguous message to Islamabad was that the Kargil Op was having a “disastrous impact on the promise of Lahore”[452] and Pakistani troops must be immediately pulled back from across the LOC. No one in Washington was receptive to Islamabad’s position that US engage on Kashmir and not just on Kargil.[453]

"Meanwhile, Delhi’s position of de-linking Kargil from Kashmir was no different from Washington’s. While having grudgingly accepted Pakistan’s offer to send its envoy to Delhi, the India message was that the one-point dialogue agenda would be Kargil alone.[454] All other issues would have to wait for the resumption of the Composite Dialogue.[455] The Indian prime minister warned, “India faces a war-like situation in Kashmir and it would be better if Pakistan called back the infiltrators. Otherwise, we will force them to go back.”[456] A personally peeved Vajpayee said, “They are not just infiltrators, it is a kind of invasion. They are trying to change the boundary, trying to capture our land.”[457]"

................................................................................................

" ... Pakistan issued a tactical strategic warning. The Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad warned, “We will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity,”[458] implying that Pakistan will defend itself at all costs. Delhi issued its response, but knew the purpose of Shamshad’s statement. The Times of India captured the Delhi thinking: “Common sense suggested that the remark be discounted. A country resorting to nuclear blackmail is not likely to make its foreign secretary the mouthpiece for the threat.”[459] Washington’s ‘nuclear saints,’[460] however, who were already disposed towards concluding that a Muslim state was unworthy of possessing nuclear weapons, seized the opportunity. Many in Washington therefore concluded that Shamshad’s defensive statement alluded to the use of nuclear weapons.[461]

"The purpose of the Shamshad Ahmed statement was to deter India from crossing the LOC and also to leverage the international anxiety that the South Asian nuclear states would take the world towards a nuclear Armageddon. Accordingly, from mid-May onwards, Pakistan’s diplomatic corps, at home and abroad, advocated to all their foreign counterparts that the Kargil crisis had actually underscored the need to resolve the Kashmir dispute. They maintained that freedom fighters demanding an end to the Indian occupation of Kashmir had occupied the Kargil heights.[462]"

Author does lack courage and honesty to call a spade a spade, and admit pakis lied, as usual. 

................................................................................................

" ... Vajpayee was not about to buckle under the initial political and military pressure Op KP had exerted on India. Accordingly, an Indian military buildup was being planned to ensure forcible eviction of Pakistani troops. Vajpayee was clear: no dialogue with Pakistan unless Pakistani troops vacated Kargil."

"But, clearly, when one viewed Op KP beyond the context of Pakistan’s domestic dynamics, the Kargil planners had placed Pakistan in a difficult position."

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

"The month of June reinforced the military and political trends that had begun emerging in the closing days of May. ... Kargil clique’s claims of invincibility had begun to be spurned on the ground. In diplomatic terms, the international situation was turning unsympathetic to Pakistan, which was increasingly being viewed as the aggressor against India and also as an irresponsible state that had brought two nuclear powers to the brink of a catastrophic war."

"“A damn fool thing to do!” 

"In the steady correspondence that took place between U.S. President Clinton and the Pakistani prime minister, Clinton’s bottom line was: “It’s a damn fool thing to do. Get your people out.”[472] Pakistan sought support from China, but China was not prepared to give that support. Pakistan’s military planners remained unruffled because they continued to dominate the military picture. Confronted with an increasingly hostile diplomatic situation, the Pakistani political leadership was uneasy. Significantly, the first suggestion of Kargil turning into a nuclear conflagration came from US Under-Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth. He warned of “the ingredients for miscalculation and the possibility of events spinning out of control.”[473]"

Author makes plaintive complaints about international community and snide comments about India. 

" ... Delhi sought US involvement, but on its own terms; Delhi wanted direct US involvement to get Pakistan evicted from the Kargil area but would reject any US mediation towards dialogue. ... On June 6 the Democratic co-Chairman of the Congressional Caucus Gary Ackerman on India said that if Pakistan did not stop helping “Islamic terrorists in the Kargil and Drass area of Jammu and Kashmir and withdraws its forces from the region, the State Department must add Pakistan to its annual list of state sponsors of terrorism.”[474] For the US Executive, the State Department, and the Legislature, the time of discontent with the Taliban and their support for Osama bin Laden had already set in. Accordingly, the co-Chairman pushed the “right buttons.” He stated, “A large number of well-trained and heavily armed Afghan mercenaries and fundamentalist Mujahideen terrorists, allegedly with spiritual and other links to the Saudi fugitive Osama bin Laden and Harkat ul Mujahideen, have entered the Indian side of the LOC from Pakistan.”[475] ... "

Author continues to make plaintive complaints about international community and snide comments about India. 

................................................................................................

"On the ground, the projected accomplishment of the Kargil clique was turning into an acute crisis."

Author has a strange title for next section. 

"Military Fight-Back"

Considering paki attack was military, pretending they were stray terrorists, what other "Fight-Back" did author or any other paki expect? 

A ghazal duet? 

Certainly not a science Olympiad, where pakis couldn't begin to compete, or even perform! 

" ... Yet, by mid-June, adversity struck Pakistan’s young warriors perched on mountaintops. The wounded Indians of May had now returned in June with a vengeance and, above all, with a plan. The Pakistanis found themselves in a difficult military environment. The Pakistani posts that previously neither the Indian air force sorties could hit nor the Indian soldiers could scale alive, were now under continuous artillery attack. Their Bofor guns had done the trick for them. [481] Their maximum range of 30 kilometers enabled deep strikes on the enemy's gun positions, administrative installations, ammunition dumps, and headquarters, besides neutralizing forward positions held by the intruders. By moving up these guns, 105 mm field guns, 160 mm and 120 mm mortars and 122 mm GRAD BM 21 Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRLs) into forward positions, the Indians were capable of ‘direct’ fire on enemy localities - literally under the nose of the enemy[482] By early June, it became almost impossible to move logistics from the logistic base to the posts and pickets on the forward ridges via nullahs and mountains. Intense shelling and bombing destroyed Pakistan’s logistics network. If a hundred porters left, only ten could reach their destination.[483] The Indians planned their attacks using a map marking Pakistani deployments that Indian troops had picked up from the Tololing base they had captured around June 6,.

"In mid-June, the Indian air force struck at the Badar base, a logistics hub, set up by Pakistan in the Batalik sector, across the LOC, which was heavily stocked with ammunition.[484] The logistics crisis was now mounting for the Pakistanis with no easy or rapid route for replenishment. In the words of the Indian Commander Brigadier Bajwa, the commander of 192 Mountain Brigade, this is what the Pakistani men perched on Tiger Hill and running out of ammunition were confronting: “The sight of over one hundred guns pounding Tiger Hill... The fireballs of the explosions lit up … We closed in up to 40 meters of the shelling. The accuracy was so great that not one shell strayed from its target …” [485] The sustained, accurate and close up shooting, using Bofor guns on a vast scale, proved devastating for the Pakistanis."

Author has not a word for the brave soldiers of India fighting literally uphill, while bring rained death on by their own officially so-called terrorists sitting on top. She had plenty of praise gor the pakis climbing up unopposed, though. 

It'd seem that the all too frequent accusations by pakis against India, delivered on public TV and consisting of a single plaintive wail of Indians lacking a big heart (because India refuses to concede huge chunks of India's territory?), are in fact true of pakis, who behave as author does in descriptions of wars, battles etc al. 

................................................................................................

"By June 10th Indian Artillery regiment had amassed a large number of artillery units in extremely difficult terrain. On the military front this Indian artillery fire turned the tables on Pakistan. If the Indian infantry had suffered high casualties until early June, by mid-June it was raining fire and brimstone onto Pakistani troops occupying posts on the Tololing and Tiger Hills. Op KP was facing sharp military reversals and singularly on account of accurate and timely delivery of TNT. The Gunners’ fire assaults became the principle battle-winning factor. An Indian account of the intense and lethal use of artillery was thus: “The Indian artillery fired over 250,000 shells, bombs, and rockets during the Kargil conflict. Approximately 5,000 artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired daily from 300 guns, mortars and MBRLs while 9,000 shells were fired the day Tiger Hill was regained. During the peak period of assaults, on an average, each artillery battery fired over one round per minute for 17 days continuously.” [486] This intensive artillery firing sustained through the three weeks was uncommon, almost unparalleled in military history. 

"This intensity of artillery fire devastated both men and mountains. By June 10, India’s infantry was provided the solid backing it had lacked during May and early June. The Indian Artillery regiment had amassed a large number of fire units within a short period, in wet weather, and over very hostile terrain at extremely high altitudes. India’s point man on the ground GOC in C Southern Command and army chief designate acknowledged that, in Operation Vijay, “ (The) devastation caused by extremely accurate and timely fire assaults in most difficult and inhospitable terrain greatly facilitated the capture of key objectives…”[487]"

Again, that description is supposed to impress a reader subconsciously with lack of any fighting other than a raining of artillery fire by India, while author has repeatedly extolled Pakistan as brave for climbing up unopposed. 

Fact is, it was Indian soldiers who fought the uphill battle, at those impossible heights well over 10,000 feet, while the so-called terrorists (as pakis labeled their own soldiers) rained not only fire on them, but huge boulders downhill, killing Indian soldiers. 

Under those circumstances, the humongous achievement of India's soldiers was at least worthy of mention, even by a silly paki sitting in comfort of Harvard to compose this paen to paki terrorism. 

................................................................................................

"A Handicapped Sartaj

"With these facts unknown to him, it was a handicapped Sartaj that was taking off for Delhi. Far from the corridors of power in Islamabad and from the Ops room in the GHQ, where Op KP was still a success story, the Indians with massive firepower were targeting Pakistani troops perched on the peaks and slopes of the Drass and Kargil mountains. For the Pakistani troops, the military situation was turning nasty. Yet the Kargil planners were still heady with the self-created euphoria around Op KP. Reports of heavy Indian attacks were neither easily reaching them nor were being readily received even at the operational headquarters in Skardu. For example, around June 4, the first reports of Pakistani casualties and loss of the Pakistani-held position at Tololing lumbered into the FCNA Operations room, but were received with denial and frustration. In some cases, officers explained away troop injuries caused by Indian attacks as injuries from ricocheting bullets fired by Pakistani troops![488] ... "

That last bit belongs to choice paki pronouncements, such as one by redcap about white horses frightening India in 1965! 

"Even as adversity struck, with military pressure mounting on Pakistani troops, the commander FCNA lost his nerve. Although he knew it was not a hopeful position, he tried to paint rosy picture.” In a meeting Hasan implored the others, “Allah kay wasta mujheay ma’af kar do. Bohat ghalti ho ga’ee. Ab dua’aon [491]ka waqt hain.” (For God’s sake, forgive me. I have made a big mistake. Now is the time for prayers).[492]"

Funny, pakis seem to alternate between perpetrating terrorism and praying for terrorists, or their own soldiers whom they publicly labell terrorists, within pak and to world at large! 

................................................................................................

"To illustrate the faulty information flow, caused by individual fears and professional incompetence, a key staff officer at the FCNA headquarters recalled: “On June 4 around 3am, a brigade major of artillery called me and said we have lost Tololing. The brigade major had also been informed that Indian troops had mounted a counterattack and our troops had asked for on-site fire. However from the Ops room I contacted CO of 4NLI who assured me everything was OK. However by the morning the CO 4NLI informed Commander FCNA’s staff officer that the Tololing post had been lost. But the staff officer forgot to inform the Commander! Meanwhile I asked CO 6NLI if Tololing post had been lost and he confirmed. Subsequently Commander FCNA Javed Hasan called the Brigade Commander Masood Aslam who also confirmed that the post at Tololing had been lost but CO NLI6 continued to deny for at least three days, the loss of the post...”[493]"

The very existence of pak is founded in denial of Reality, so of course, it's rooted in their character- officially!

" ... Troubles for the Pakistani troops had mounted also because, contrary to Pakistan’s expectation that engagement with Indian troops would begin in mid-June, it had begun approximately six weeks earlier, around 5 May. Early opening of the Zojila pass was critical. Normally it would open late summer but in 1999 it opened end-April-early May, facilitating early return of the Indian Army. This early engagement was contrary to Op KP planners’ calculation that replenishment of ammunition and ration would be required by mid-June, when it would be managed through the Burzil Pass. However with engagement having started much earlier, and the Burzil Pass still not opened until mid-June, movement of artillery in the forward lines and supply lines replenishment became very difficult.[494] For example, at the 15000 feet high Tashfeen post, the small weapons with the troops had carbonized and could not be used.[495]"

Again, authors omission of chief reason why Pakistan couldn't support their so-called "terrorists" logistically, amounts to her lying. 

Fact is, having denied strenuously to world at large and to public at home that it was indeed a paki military operation, and gone around claiming that these attackers against India were independent terrorists, how could Pakistan supply them even food, never mind ammunition? 

It was, after all, US and other independent satellite records that had confirmed the truth about these having been officially paki military supported attackers, by whatever label; and now any effort or attempt to support them would forever blacken Pakistan as brazen liars no better than toddlers with face all chocolate, denying stealing. 

................................................................................................

"The Kargil clique did not share these early military difficulties with the prime minister and his team. The defense secretary, however, had by early June become wary of the military situation. He was being alerted by the battlefield accounts trickling in through junior army officers and by Indian Zee TV reports. By mid-June, it appeared that Pakistani troops were losing hold over several posts in the Batalik sector, at Points 5120 and 5203 in the area of Jabbar complex, plus posts in the Drass sector at 3 Pimple. The Defense Secretary shared this disturbing information with the prime minister’s kitchen cabinet. The prime minister too depended on his Defense Secretary for regular updates. For example, barely hours after Sharif had ended the 12 June meeting on Kargil, he was again on the phone with his Defense Secretary. The PM wanted him to check with the army chief if a critical peak on Tololing had fallen. Iftikhar called the DGMO who assured him that Pakistani forces had merely carried out “readjustments in the area.” The skeptical Iftikhar informed the PM that Tololing seems to have fallen but the army is not accepting it; instead, it is coining new terms. This misleading flow of information from the Operations room in Skardu confused the ground situation for the prime minister, his cabinet, and the generals."

Their own lies confusing their own selves, exactly as a very exasperated Hilary Clinton had later described pakis. 

Perhaps thats why author comments incorrectly about India, chiefly because she and Pakistani have no clue about truth, and power thereof, so she makes assumptions about India depending on international opinions as pakis do, instead. 

"In Delhi, by contrast, Sartaj Aziz’s counterpart had a clear picture of the ground situation. Accordingly, Jaswant Singh’s confidence in his meeting with Aziz told the tale of Delhi’s growing confidence on the military front complemented by its astute diplomatic strategy. India’s growing confidence in being able to resolve Kargil on its own terms was largely derived from the international community’s support to the Indian position. Delhi’s confidence was distinctly evident in its handling of the Pakistani foreign minister’s visit to Delhi. Accordingly in their 12 June meetings with Minister Sartaj Aziz the Indian prime minister and the foreign minister categorically stated that the only one-point formula for resolving Kargil was that “Pakistan vacate Indian territory.” [496] The fate of the Pakistan foreign minister’s 8-hour Delhi trip was sealed even before the talks began.[497] The body language of the Indian reception team conveyed the tone and tenor of the remaining trip. The Indian foreign minister accompanied by MEA officials and the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad G. Parthasarthy were present on the airport to receive their unwanted guest from Pakistan."

No, the confidence was based in strong foundation the then PM of India had, as the current PM of India has always had, in Truth. 

................................................................................................

"The ‘Shock’ Revelation 

"Waiting inside the airport lounge was the highly disturbed Press Counsellor of the Pakistan High Commission. He was armed with at least half a dozen leading dailies with bold headlines about the situation. The banner headlines were quotes from a telephone conversation between Pakistan’s Army chief General Pervez Musharraf, who was visiting Beijing, and the Chief of General Staff (CGS) Lt. General Aziz Khan[498] – a conversation between two leading members of the Kargil clique. The Indian foreign minister, on the eve of Sartaj Aziz’s arrival, had held a press conference to release the transcript of this conversation. Their discussion about Op KP was a huge self-indictment. It set the stage for the almost four-hour-long critical Sartaj Aziz visit.[499] The Pakistan Army chief’s master-stroke in recklessness, of holding a highly sensitive conversation with his CGS over an open line, made it easy for any interested agency to record the conversation. Most likely recorded by the CIA and shared with the Indians, this conversation publicly affirmed the central role of Pakistan’s top army command in the Kargil Op.[500]"

Overconfidence of an arrogant invader, a sword his solution to everything, is the key there. 

When pakis were caught stealing hundreds of billions of dollars of aid and not accounting for it, and US demanded accounts, this man had turned up in US and, instead of accounting apology - or even embarrassment, as expected of anyone with a shred of decency - he'd brazenly demanded drones for attacking India. 

................................................................................................

"Aziz arrived to a hostile Indian environment. His counterpart barely shook hands with him while, earlier in the day, his High Commission in Delhi had been nearly attacked by protestors. The foreign minister was completely stumped. He could only question the veracity of the newspaper reports.[501] Completely baffled, the accompanying Pakistani journalists wondered if it was an Indian ruse to put Pakistan on the defensive. The publication of the Musharraf-Aziz conversation, meanwhile, irrefutably vindicated India’s position that Pakistan was involved in the Op KP- a fact that Pakistan had continued to deny. Significantly, the tapes also strengthened the prevailing perception, especially among the Indians, that Pakistan’s prime minister did not directly contribute towards the planning and execution of the Kargil conflict and that he had been excluded from the Kargil mischief.

"After the first reports of the Kargil Op surfaced, the Indian defense minister and others in the Vajpayee cabinet had believed that the Pakistani prime minister did not know of the Kargil Operation.[502] The Musharraf-Aziz conversation established that the army chief was waiting to see how not only would Delhi react to the Operation but also how Pakistan’s elected prime minister would react, and “how would the whole thing really blow up.”[503]

"Nevertheless the tapes fiasco caused great embarrassment to the visiting foreign minister whose army too was now feeling the heat from the Bofors guns. Sartaj who had already expressed strong reservations against Op KP at the 17 May briefing knew he had landed in Delhi with a weak negotiating position."

................................................................................................

" ... Pakistan’s foreign minister ... carried the categorical position that Pakistan would not unconditionally withdraw from Kargil. However, after his meetings with the Indian prime minister and foreign minister, he was to carry back the equally unambiguous message that India would be unrelenting in the pursuit of its one-point demand that Pakistan must unconditionally vacate the Kargil heights."

" ... The Indians rejected Sartaj’s position that violations of the LOC did not begin with the Kargil crisis, that the causal trajectory of Kargil included the unresolved Kashmir problem, the military activity by both armies after the snows melted in an attempt to gain strategic positions along the LOC where there were problems on the ground since the “demarcation pillars were at some distance from each other.”[506]"

"India rejected Pakistan’s suggestion that after India de-escalates, Jaswant Singh would visit Pakistan to find a “diplomatic solution” to Kargil. Sartaj was told that, only if Pakistan accepted the Indian position that Pakistan vacate Kargil, would Singh visit Pakistan. Sartaj’s reiteration of Islamabad’s position that the Kashmiris fighting in Kargil were not in Pakistan’s control, met with stern rebuttals. Vajpayee maintained they could not have come without Pakistan’s blessing and active support and pointedly queried, “Have these people come without your control?” He added, “No one is in any doubt that the LOC in Kargil had been violated by Pakistan Army regulars and infiltrators.”[515] Singh asked Aziz to convey to his government that unless the status quo ante was restored in Kargil no bilateral discussions could take place."

"When Aziz emphasized Pakistan’s commitment to the Lahore process, ... "(the then PM of India) "Vajpayee wondered why Pakistan “had chosen to alter the situation after Lahore.” ... He bluntly told the Pakistani prime minister’s emissary that the planners of Kargil did not favor the Lahore process ... the ink had not dried on the Lahore Declaration and the Pakistani establishment had started making preparations for the Kargil incursions. India, he said had felt “betrayed and disappointed” by this.[516]"

Author's writing treats India in manner that's derogatory at best, and would be considered abusive on diplomatic level, making it difficult to quote without seemingly being in accord therewith. 

................................................................................................

" ... (Indian foreign minister) Jaswant Singh insisted that Pakistan could not use the dialogue to give legitimacy to the Kargil intrusion and neither could it be reduced to “your listing our faults and my listing your faults.”. ... The Indian message was, “The only one issue was Pakistan’s aggression and that could be rectified either physically by India or voluntarily by Pakistan.”[517]"

" ... Jaswant Singh urged Pakistan to end its “aggression” or India would “have the area cleared at all costs.” Without enlarging the theatre of conflict, he said, India would “employ all means to clear the aggression that was planned, engineered and launched by the Pakistan Army in the guise of infiltrators.”[518] ... "

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

" ... No dialogue with Pakistan would be resumed unless Pakistan withdrew its troops. ... The Vajpayee government was determined to dislodge, at all costs, the Pakistani troops perched on the Kargil heights. The strategic tackiness of Op KP was now taking its toll. Instead of providing, as envisaged by its planners, negotiating leverage for Pakistan, this linearly planned Op was turning into a liability for the Sharif government. At home, anxious cabinet members whispered that the Op must end. Abroad, friends and foes alike, were seeking Pakistan’s exit from Kargil. ... "

" ... Pakistan adopted the diplomatic and political positions that the Kargil planners had intended: These are not Pakistani troops, but freedom fighters; the LOC is not well-defined[523], we need to sit down and define it better; our troops are on our side of the LOC; the international community must encourage the Indians to resolve the Kashmir dispute; if the Indians agree on dialogue, we can ‘influence’ the freedom fighters to vacate Kargil. Interestingly the army and the civilian projections of Kargil were often contradictory. This represented more confusion than difference. Yet the army in its background briefings to the press sought to justify Kargil ... "

" ... In a candid recall of the Kargil crisis, the Minister explained, “ ... for a brief period in the summer time both sides sat on the perceived LOC and had a dialogue going between the two sides, exchanging cigarettes, etc. And come winter both sides went into the posts up in the mountains and that went on for 25 years between 1972 and 1999.”[526] Then, referring to Pakistan’s Kargil operation, he said, “And then one day someone decided to cheat against the ground rules.” ... "

" ... Pakistan was not successful in acquiring any diplomatic support, not even from its key allies. Sartaj Aziz’s June 11 ‘SOS trip’ to Beijing did not produce the expected support for Pakistan’s action in Kargil. Instead, Beijing opposed to military action pointedly told the foreign minister not to make Kashmir a “shooting claim.”[528] The Chinese categorically told Pakistan that the dispute had to be resolved bilaterally and that Pakistan must vacate Kargil. The Chinese leadership also conveyed to Pakistan that the Chinese had “no influence over India.”[529]"

Author next counts individual responses from various countries to paki efforts. 

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"Sino-Indian relations were then on the mend. Beijing clearly did not want to support Pakistan’s crossing of the LOC and cause a setback to its relations with India.[530] In fact, on the eve of the Pakistani foreign minister’s visit the Chinese had publicly conveyed their ‘neutral’ position on Kargil and their interest in improving relations with India. On the Kargil issue the Chinese position was that “the matter maybe discussed between Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan and the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan.”[531] And regarding the June 14 trip of the Indian foreign minister the Chinese maintained, “We are confident that, through the joint efforts of the two sides, relations between China and India will constantly improve and develop.”[532] ... "

" ... By now the European positions matched that of India and the US. ... "

"For example, in early June, the Secretary General of the French foreign office. Mounier Heineken, summoned the Pakistani ambassador to a meeting in which he was polite but firm. He maintained the French reading of Kargil was based on independent French sources and French intelligence from the region. Heinikin said that the status quo disturbed by Pakistan could lead to war. France, he said, “did not believe Pakistan’s version that the people gone to war are the Mujahideen.” The French maintained that given the strategic knowledge of the area of the men who occupied Kargil and given how they were armed and trained was evidence of the direct involvement by the Pakistan government and the army. Pakistan having upset the status quo was now responsible for reversing it. In case Islamabad failed to do so, Paris threatened to openly declare Pakistan the aggressor.[534]"

With very good reason, the chain of reasoning given explicitly by French to pakis summoned for the purpose, and quoted here above by author. 

"Washington, too, was making no concessions, accepting no false steps. Washington refused to accept Pakistan’s position that it was not involved in Kargil, especially after the Pakistani military had accepted that Pakistani troops were fighting in Kargil. In early June, on a Saturday, the Pakistani foreign minister handed a letter to the US Ambassador for Secretary of State Madeleine Albright from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Milam refused to accept the letter, complaining that it was not a serious communication as it claimed that Pakistan was not involved in Kargil. Subsequently, by that evening, the foreign minister called in the United States Ambassador again and handed him a different letter.[535]"

Author doesn't explain what letter, exactly, if it was accepted. 

................................................................................................

"“Two Cyclists Flashed Victory”

" ... two messages from air force centers in Delhi had been intercepted being sent, respectively, to the headquarters at Udhampur (near Jammu) and Bathinda (in Indian Punjab, near Bahawalnagar). The message to the command at the Udhampur base was that it should prepare to use all weapons under its command. Likewise, the message to Bathinda was to carry out air defense of the area. ... The participants focused on reading the implication of these intercepts; the army chief was convinced the messages indicated “something big is coming up.” The consensus was that the Indians had marked Udhampur base for carrying out air operations in Kargil. Bathinda was given a precautionary message in case air strikes across the international border were required. A worried Musharraf suggested they go and brief the PM, who was in Lahore. ... "

" ... Iftikhar questioned whether in Pakistan’s current economic situation Pakistan go to war and face the consequences. , He quoted the well-known saying that the armed forces fight a battle, but it is the nation that goes to war. In Pakistan’s case, the nation was “certainly not prepared.” The army chief claimed that many countries, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, were willing to give money to Pakistan. He was reminded that this would not be possible without US clearance. ... "

"The army chief was equally confident regarding national morale. At the JS Headquarters he insisted, “This nation can be prepared for war in no time. I will tell you that when I was coming from the army house to the JS headquarters that two cyclists flashed victory signs at me. I will request the PM to address two houses of the parliament so I can give points to the parliamentarians and they will spread it in the country side.”[536] Such simplistic talk would enter policy-making discussions in the absence of institutionalized decision-making. The simplistic thinking of powerfully placed individuals would raise the probability of flawed decision-making."

That last sentence is epitome of how author's tone hoes from salutary to forgiving when it comes to paki crimes - and as for "probability", it takes the whole lot of baked goods in West at Xmas!

................................................................................................

" ... Interestingly traveling in the same aircraft to Lahore, the naval and air chiefs, accompanied by the Defense Secretary, decided to tell the PM “the entire truth”. The PM, they believed, was still being misled that Pakistan was doing well, and that the Indians would not escalate and go to war. They were also concerned that the PM fully comprehended the risks involved in the situation."

Author seems to have omitted "had not" in "PM fully comprehended the risks involved in the situation". It should read "They were also concerned that the PM had not fully comprehended the risks involved in the situation". 

" ... The naval and air force chiefs criticized the operation and argued that it would compromise Pakistan’s overall security. The naval chief maintained that a naval blockade by India could not be ruled out, a position that the army chief contested. Similarly, the air chief opposed the army’s advice that air power should be inducted. The army was seeking deployment of air power[537] to not only curtail the damage inflicted on Pakistani troops from the Indian use of heavy artillery and hundreds of air sorties but also to inflict damage on the Indian troops locked up in tight, unprotected spaces.” The army ruled out a “full spectrum war” with India and argued that in a limited engagement like Kargil the Pakistan air force “would not be at a disadvantage.”[538] The air chief nevertheless opposed induction of air power, arguing that deploying air power could mean placing squadrons in Azad Kashmir and leaving Lahore and Karachi unprotected. Already, the air force had deployed extra radars in the North to observe Indian aircraft movement."

" ... Differences over the Kargil Operation were now being openly voiced in the cabinet meetings as well. The ISI chief, who had privately been critical of the operation, had taken a “military army line” during a mid-June cabinet meeting.[541] This prompted the Secretary Defense Iftikhar Ali Khan to raise specific questions regarding the viability of Operation KP. Cabinet Minister Gohar Ayub Khan wondered how the army’s views and those of General Iftikhar were at a tangent. At the same meeting, Chaudhry Nisar also asked who had ordered this operation. His thrust was that Pakistan was heading for a disaster in Kargil.[542] 

"He knew that the news from the battle-zone was not encouraging."

................................................................................................

Author titles a section "India’s Sledge & Hammer" to almost openly claim that Indian soldiers did no more than occupy posts emptied due chiefly to artillery and air strikes, having praised pakis repeatedly for climbing up peaks unopposed. 

This skewed perception and description would only explain heavy losses of paki military, but then, why do pakis boast repeatedly over past two decades snd more, about thousands of Indian soldiers killed by a handful of pakis? 

The two pictures don't match, and the disparity thereof only goes on to bolster the impression Hilary Clinton voiced, when she said that pakis lie so routinely, it's difficult to know if they are aware of it when they lie. 

Author ends the one-paragraph section with a giveaway. 

" ... Aerial reconnaissance, intel flow, and even possession of Pakistani maps showing Pakistan’s deployments, were captured from the fallen post at Tololing.[546]"

Were Author and pakis expecting Indian soldiers to avert glances from Intel left by enemy at captured post, and call them to hand the papers over? 

Notice that author doesn't criticise the arrogance of paki military in allowing this to happen at all in the first place, by having such information littering at the post - because they'd assumed, as author points out more than once in this work, that Indians don't fight. 

Author follows it up with more sledgehammering at India, with another section titled "Posts to Powder". A sample - 

" ... Following the high Indian casualties when their infantry troops had blindly and tentatively attempted to scale the Kargil-Drass mountains, in June they deliberately opted to use the “sledgehammer” approach “to save valuable lives of one’s troops while making the enemy cry out ’Uncle’.”[552] The preponderance of firepower now defined the continuing battle in the world’s highest war theatre. The Indian “sledgehammer” tactics, literally raining fire onto the exhausted yet still motivated Pakistanis soldiers, worked for the Indians. It incapacitated and killed the troops, already short in numbers, and disrupted supplies, ammunition, and logistics."

Were author and other pakis expecting rose bouquets rained on the men whom pakis had themselves labelled terrorists? 

................................................................................................

"June Reversals"

Another misleading title there, considering India had barely begun to be aware of attempted paki invasion in May; so June was only beginning, as far as war goes. 

"After making serious attempts on 3 June to retake the Tololing peak in Drass, Indian troops captured it on June 13. Several important heights in the Batalik sector were captured on 20 and 21 June; on June 23 several heights were captured around point 5203 and on June 30 strategic peaks closer to Tiger Hills.[553] The strategic Tiger Hill came under severe artillery attack. Around June 21, the Operation hit its lowest ebb for Pakistan, when the Indian troops, through fierce, ground, artillery and air attacks, recaptured Tololing complex. After Tololing fell, reports of Indian recapture flowed in daily as the Pakistani-held posts fell like ninepins. [554] The pressure was still on the Indians, given the scale of intrusion by the Pakistani troops.[555]The Indian Army chief himself conceded, “No time-frame could be fixed for vacating the incursions.”[556]"

"The Missing Mujahideen

"Significantly, the Mujahideen factor lagged behind at this critical juncture. The mainstay of Pakistan’s military strategy, since 1996-1997, was that through guerrilla-type ambushes targeting Indian troops in ... Kashmir, with full artillery support, bridges will be blown up, tracks uprooted, soldiers attacked, to prevent large scale offensive-induction of Indian troops. ... "

Some incorrect details, or deliberate lies, there. This strategy of so-called tribals oak is claimed were attacking, which author calls "guerrilla-type" here, was used by pakis in 1947 in attacking Kashmir, and again used by pakis in attack against India in 1965. 

Author mentions 1996-1997, but paki terrorists assaulting India had already begun in 1990, if not before.  

Exodus of nonmuslims enforced in Kashmir by the said terrorists, via genocide inflicted against Hindus and others in Kashmir in January 1990, is denied by pakis, as is hand of ISI behind terrorist attacks against Mumbai, but their phone conversations were intercepted and subsequently broadcast on public television. 

" ... Yet, keeping the Operation secret from the ISI meant that by the Pakistan Army’s own strategic calculations the pivot of such an operation, the Mujahideeen factor, men of the Kashmir Freedom struggle were left out of the calculus. The Kargil planners informed ISI after the Operation was underway, asking for upgrading the struggle in support of the Operation KP. “Too short a notice, we need at least one year to upgrade the movement,” was the ISI response. ISI needed presence inside the war zone to plan and execute. Neither was possible."

So while pakis officially went on claiming that the men attacking India were mujahedeen or tribals or anything but official soldiers of paki military - they were lying, not just largely, but completely! 

Hilary Clinton wouldn't be surprised. Nor would be anyone not blinded by abrahmic faiths. 

................................................................................................

"Logistics 

"By mid-June, men on the FDL posts required backups. There was a shortage of ammunition and supplies and troops were increasingly suffering from the pressures of a logistical stretch. But with Pakistan’s supply lines and the forward posts under attack from Indian artillery-fire and air sorties it was difficult to replenish depleting ammunition and rations, especially for the Forward Defense Lines (FDL) posts. As the snow melted and the Burzil pass opened, mule porters could ferry supplies only till the logistics bases. Base HQ was unable to respond timely to repeated logistics requests from FDLs on Tiger Hill and from other sectors.[557] At several posts, there was food shortage. At others, water too was not easily accessible for miles. In places where there was water, intensely heavy use of artillery had made it undrinkable. Ammunition too was fast depleting. Even the inadequate artillery was rendered ineffective because of wet, freezing weather conditions. Guns with sulphur deposits would stop firing after a thousand rounds. Yet maintenance of artillery in the freezing zones was not always possible."

None of this was expected, planned for, or even imagined, by the guys who planned and sent them up, which doesn't seem to occur to author as a point to mention, much less as the sole cause of the travails of the poor soldiers who were disowned by pakis officially. 

She seems to blame Indian shelling exclusively. 

Did she or pakis have an impression at any point in time that these guys had been invited for a royal honeymoon - or even a group tourism experience - by India? 

Funny, she makes fun of Indians for not realising the incursion and even for getting killed, but then blames them for retaliation of a war begun by pakis. No satisfying this one, is there! 

" ... As to how long could they hold on to their posts, the odds were heavily against them: terrible weather conditions, low supplies, no reinforcements, and positioned in posts confronted by major Indian numerical superiority in infantry and artillery."

Remember, India had to bury them too, if not caught alive - pak disowned them officially, even in death! 

................................................................................................

"Weapons & Communication 

"The Pakistani troops were equipped with standard infantry rifles. Typically, in a platoon, jawans had G-3 rifles, officers AK-47 rifles, and rocket launchers, and light machine Guns (LMGs) holder. Air defense units with Hatf battlefield range missiles and restored Stinger missiles were also positioned in several locations. Soldiers from the signals corps managed communications within the Ops area and with the brigade and battalion headquarters. They moved from post to post to keep the communication going using double TT and laying and protecting regular lines and managing the radio wireless communication in the Ops area. Wireless communication that could also help the troops listen in to Indian troop communication through frequency scanning and surfing was rightly dubbed ‘shikari det.’"

OK, they had all this, so they'd been killing Indian soldiers until India woke up to this being a huge paki invasion. 

What's unclear is, why's the author whining about Indians' retaliation with artillery, not after she brags about paki capabilities, but before, when it was pakis who began the whole thoughtless assault? 

Wouldn't it be proper to do so the other way around? 

It's a tad like she extolls a murderer for his bravery and exploits, after complaining about his being surrounded and shot dead by law enforcement. 

................................................................................................

" ... But the tables had turned. Only weeks ago, with adrenalin flowing, these daredevils had marched to high command’s orders and no less to their own resolve to punish the enemy. Now it was trouble-time. The Kargil clique’s calculation of a luke-warm Indian response was proving wrong."

"“No…Not Ours” 

"There were other painful offshoots that Pakistan’s policy of denying that Pakistani troops were conducting the Operations meant. Bodies of Pakistani soldiers could not be accepted. From mid-June onwards,   Pakistan’s Deputy Chief of Mission Jalil Abbas Jillani, whenever asked by his hosts to collect the bodies of Pakistani soldiers, would decline, saying these were not our boys. Resentfully, the Pakistani soldiers would watch the televised Muslim burial of the disowned bodies of their martyred comrades, conducted by the Indians with full honours and bodies wrapped in a Pakistani flag. According to a Brigadier who was witness to all this, “For many of us, the shame and the pain of watching all this happen to our colleagues, was killing.”[561]"

" ... Literally minute-by-minute news of the battlefront setbacks was passed to the commanders.[563]"

" ... The offensive operation had been planned with no defensive approach, no defensive layouts, and hence no fallback plans. Delusional thinking dominated the minds of the clique of Kargil planners ... "

"These generals planned operation KP, less as intelligent and accountable strategists, but as covert, unaccountable campaigners. ... "

In other - more realistic - words, as terrorists they send out against India for over three decades now, or as barbarian hordes invading India for well over a millennium until arrival of British. 

................................................................................................

"Lengthening Shadows

" ... Also, given Indian insistence on no bilateral dialogue without withdrawal from Kargil and the growing international pressure on Pakistan to vacate Kargil, it seemed increasingly unlikely that Pakistan could leverage its military achievements in Kargil for a “just settlement and time-bound settlement” of the Kashmir dispute.[564]"

What "military achievements"??? Like climbing peaks in winter when no one was likely to shoot at them? Like denying their own soldiers, in life and in death? 

"Additionally, another implicit assumption of the Kargil planners that India may not be willing to pay what it would take to recapture the Kargil heights was bring disproved. India not only deployed the requisite manpower and military force to reclaim Kargil ... "

"By mid June, the opening assumption of the architects of Operation Koh Paima that the military situation heavily favoring Pakistan was irreversible, was beginning to be proven wrong. With a fierce Indian response, on the military front, ... "

Author repeatedly accuses India of having used diplomacy as a weapon. 

Fact is no amount of lies from pak worked despite pakis doing diplomatic rounds, because international community aren't fools, and this was not 1947 but age of satellites. Everything supposedly done clandestinely by pakis had been seen, and not just by US, either. 

It wasn't india's diplomatic push, but the fact thst pakis did invade and lied, that went against them, as it must. 

" ... The fate of Op KP now squarely confronted the soldiers who had fervently volunteered to fight for their Homeland. ... "

There's a whopper of a lie by author. It's Kashmir that was invaded by pakis, and Kashmir had been signed accession of by its ruler to India in 1947 because, and after, pakis had then invaded it. "Homeland" it's not, not for any pakis. 

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

" ... Pakistan’s bureaucratic channel had become increasingly wary of Washington’s “pro-India” stance and was busy working the Mishra-Naik back channel[567], while the politicians believed the US could deliver a “respectable exit.”

"What gave Pakistan the space to work on mapping exits was that the massive deployment of force by India did not translate into a quick military turn around. The battlefield terrain had proved a leveller for the heavily asymmetrical assemblage of force. A few hundred soldiers on mountain peaks and ridges were aided by the strategic heights and were still targeting those in huge numbers, artillery, and airpower who were trying to scale those heights. ... "

" ... The Kargil clique’s objective of leveraging the Kargil, Drass, and Mushkoh peaks, for extracting concessions from India on Siachen or Kashmir, now seemed a pipe dream. These peaks and ridges, hitherto held by Pakistani troops, were slipping out of Pakistan’s control. Yet the government’s public posture that the Kashmiri Mujahedeen still controlled these peaks remained unchanged. ... "

" ... Sharif wanted the announcement of talks on Kashmir, to be followed by the withdrawal, so that he could hold up the fig-leaf of talks as Pakistani troops retreated from Kargil. Vajpayee, meanwhile, had made his position clear: vacate Indian territory and talks would follow. ... while Pakistan talked friendship in Lahore it was planning a war against India."

Author mentions that last bit as an allegation by opposition that the PM of India was trying to escape. That's silly. It's simply a fact that "while Pakistan talked friendship in Lahore it was planning a war against India", nothing less, except that the then paki PM wasn't aware of Kargil at the time of Lahore summit- and this much, not only about Sharif but about the civilian government of pak on general, was evident to India. But then, paki claims about existence of a civil government have not fooled almost anyone outside pak. 

................................................................................................

Author states that India sought help of US via diplomatic channels to force Pakistan to withdraw unilaterally. She forgets more than one previous assertion in this work by her to the effect that US was unwilling to believe pakis and Clinton told sharif he had to withdraw. If she's insinuating that this was India’s doing, she's living in cuckooland.

"In Pakistan, the diplomats were increasingly less sanguine about the Washington route for exit. Given Washington’s public stance about Pakistan’s ingress across the LOC, they merely responded to Washington’s queries about the Kargil crisis. In Washington, Ambassador Riaz Khokhar had half a dozen meetings with his Washington-based interlocutors. It was Nawaz Sharif’s kitchen cabinet[583] that considered Washington an important player for the end game. They believed that Sharif should use his personal rapport with Clinton[584] to manage the Kargil crisis on the domestic, Indian, and international fronts. Thus, through numerous letter exchanges and phone-calls, Nawaz was seeking Clinton's direct involvement in bringing Kargil to a close.[585] Pakistan’s army command was also keen to involve the US in Kargil’s end game. In fact, the army chief was the first to publicly mention the possibility of a Nawaz-Clinton meeting.[586] Significantly, by end-June, Musharraf himself had talked of positively of US intervention. [587]"

Author refers to terrorism exported by pakis resulting in genocide and subsequent exodus of Hindus as ordered by the said terrorists, ordered on loudspeakers of mosques. 

" ... Especially since the 1989 Kashmir Uprising ... "

They do have expertise at lying don't they, pakis! Fraudulent labels is part of it. 

................................................................................................

"Initially, the Sharif-Clinton communication culminated in a mutual agreement to meet mid-June in Europe, around the time of the of G-8 summit.[589] Sharif had proposed and Clinton had agreed to the meeting. However, the US Ambassador later conveyed to the Pakistan Foreign Office, the US President’s inability to proceed with a Clinton- Sharif meeting.[590] 

"In Washington, it had been concluded that Pakistan would have erroneously interpreted such a meeting as a sign of US support for Islamabad’s position on Kargil.[591] The National Security Council(NSC) and the State Department were sure that an unconditional exit was the only way forward and “unless a meeting would guarantee that outcome it wouldn’t be productive.” [592] The Talbott-Riedel-Inderfurth team was mindful of the challenge. Washington’s clear Kargil policy was not “anything but exercise restrain… Action we wanted out of Pakistan to get Pakistan to back down.” Nevertheless, there was a realization that “the Indians were extremely skeptical that we will succeed and suspicious about what we were doing…”[593] Any Pakistan-US meeting therefore that failed to induce a Pakistani withdrawal would have been resented in India and could have undermined Washington’s imminent strategic lock with Delhi. [594]"

Now author turns abusive against non-proliferation and peace seekers. 

"The Clinton administration also believed that Pakistan had not delivered on the earlier commitment that Nawaz Sharif would help in getting the Taliban to expel OBL.[595] Pakistan’s Foreign office team saw this as a reason for Clinton to subsequently “wriggle out of the meeting.”[596] The US State Department sought a different engagement with Pakistan. In Washington, the nuclear non-proliferation saints and the Indo-philes had also made common cause. They twinned the Kargil aggression with what the non-proliferation saints claimed was Pakistan’s plan to use nuclear weapons. They wanted the ‘riot act’ be read to Pakistan."

................................................................................................

"For India, no easy victory

"Even by end June, the Indians were not in a comfortable military position. Their army had not been able to displace the well-entrenched and strategically located Pakistani troops. ... "

Strange how author wants propaganda both ways. Through oast chapter it was repeated whining about how India brought in heavy artillery and air strikes, how pakis had a hard time, and so on. If Pakistan were still entrenched and killing Indians because the latter were fighting uphill, why the complaint about Indian shelling?

She quotes an article from a magazine of India, seemingly critical. 

" ... By end-June, a senior army official acknowledged, “Some of the heights they continue to occupy are impregnable. They occupy strategic posts on the ridge lines in Dras Kaksar Mushkoh Valley, Turtok, and Chorbatla.”[598]"

She continues quoting the magazine, and other press, remarking that they didnt sound like a nation on brink of an easy victory. 

Nobody said it was easy, at those heights and without any cover, fighting an uphill battle supposedly against terrorists. Indian soldiers fought not only bravely but an unprecedented hardship level, and the victory was a hard won. Which is why it impressed world community. 

"While the Indians had recaptured some front-line posts on Tololing and were heading towards the strategically important posts on Tiger Hill facing the NH-1A, the logistical lifeline for Indian troops stationed in Ladakh and Siachen, they had still not managed to achieve any major successes in their operations to recapture their lost posts.[604] In fact, it was not until beginning July that India was able to recapture Tiger hill which was in the farthest reaches, deep inside on the Indian side of the LOC, west of Marpola."

................................................................................................

"For Pakistan withdrawal inevitable

" ... They were continuously exposed to the Indian air and artillery pounding as hundreds of sorties dropped thousands of kilos of bombs.[609] On the ground, the young soldiers wondered why their own airpower was not being deployed. They felt “unnerved by the Indian airpower, in fact terrorized by the sound in the cold weather and those mountains’ ungodly heights.”[610] ... "

There, in a nutshell, is why Himaalaya belongs to India - no Indian would abuse it thus! Himaalaya is not only evered and loved, but seen as home of Gods and Goddesses - and very matter-of-factly so, throughout India. As is the very land of India, with all its rivers and mountains. Anyone who abuses it the way author does there, simply doesn't belong, and has no business being there. 

................................................................................................

Author repeats her "Indian soldiers did nothing brave, pakis did everything bravely, Indians only bombarded paki brave poor soldiers while Indians took advantage of diplomatic pressuring of international community, they sided only with India" lament. 

Ad infinitum, it'd seem, throughout the work. 

"Most importantly, after Tololing, India had begun re-taking the strategically located posts overlooking NH-1A. For Pakistan, holding onto the frontline posts was of actual strategic significance. These were furthermost from the LOC but closest to NH-1, the logistical lifeline for the Indian troops stationed in Ladakh and Siachen. Meanwhile, the mid-zone posts were in Pakistan’s control but with no access to India’s strategic roads. To what end, then, could or should Pakistan hold on to the mid-posts? Located in the middle of the rugged iced mountain terrain, these had no artillery access to any strategic Indian feature, such as a highway, a cantonment, ammunition dumps etc. ... "

There's the raison d'etre of - not only the Kargil war initiated by pakis, not only every such war (and always initiated by them), every terrorist attack perpetrated against India - but of the very existence the very genesis of pak, spelt out in clear terms. 

Author has admitted that pakis had no reason to begin Kargil war via this incursion, except to kill Indians. And that's true of the very existence, even genesis of pak. There's no reason for pak to exist, except to kill India, to destroy the very culture and the humongous treasures of knowledge of antiquity that's still loving India. 

" ... Also, Delhi’s political resolve of no talks until complete withdrawal appeared ironclad. And the international community fully supported India’s position."

And therein the failure of pakis, the inability to not only admit but see truth. That "the international community fully supported India’s position" was because it was true. 

................................................................................................

"Doubts set in 

"By end-June, the problem of a “logistical stretch”[612] was beginning to surface for the Pakistani troops. In addition to the disruption being caused by air strikes, the Pakistani supply lines and the supplies were becoming increasingly vulnerable to harsh weather and to Indian artillery attacks. The phenomenon of ‘Operation Creep’[613] had led to the unplanned increase in the demand for supplies.[614] The increasing demand for supplies in an expanding battle zone, where even maintaining existing bunkers and posts defensively was difficult, had begun to put pressure on the logistics. Launching and sustaining an operation of this scale would have been inconceivable. For example to maintain a force of fourteen hundred people, an additional ten thousand were needed to provide logistical support."

One, did they imagine otherwise when they planned, sent men up in winter, killed Indian soldiers from positions up the peaks, and generally were gleeful about expectations? It'd seem so. Did they, then, expect their own soldiers to establish self sustainable villages on mountain peaks, with farms and wells? 

No, pakis as usual had banked only on killing and looting Indians, nothing further. 

Two, did they expect love letters in response from India? Or free food supplied up to them? They'd theorised India not picking up the gauntlet, wrongly. 

................................................................................................

"With June becoming a month of heavy losses, the army chief found himself in a difficult situation. The confidence of the opening days, when the field was open and uncontested for his men, had begun eroding. Doubts had set in. The general had begun conceding in private conversations with members of the prime minister’s kitchen cabinet that some ‘operation creep’ had occurred. The Op had been expanded beyond the originally planned territorial limits. Within his close circles, the army chief was candid. He could see the reasons for his soldiers to return from the war theatre, to end the fighting.[615] But who would bell the cat? The chief, was supposed to have sent one of his friends, also appointed as an envoy in an African country, to convey a suggestion to the prime minister’s father. Known to be an exceptionally obedient son to his ’Abbaji‘, Sharif could never resist his father’s ‘advice.’ Accordingly, Musharraf decided that commanding a retreat in the midst of a hard-fought battle with many sacrifices rendered, could lead to discontent among the soldiers. Also, the army chief feared an Indian offensive on the retreating soldiers. Accordingly, he likely had a message conveyed to Sharif’s father that the PM be advised to recall the troops since continued or accelerated fighting could also mean the Indians might open other war fronts. The message was conveyed and the prime minister’s father agreed to do as advised. [616]"

The coward general wouldn't admit he'd been wrong, but went through an old man to pressure an obedient son, in short!!! 

"This difficult military situation was not filtering through in the public arena. Unlike India, where Kargil had turned into a media war, in Pakistan the refrain was that Mujahideen and Kashmiri freedom fighters were fighting Indian forces. Conflicting official statements trickled in. While the army chief was welcoming talks with the Americans, he was also saying that unilateral withdrawal was not on. As news of casualties and perhaps of possible retreat found its way into the chat rooms of influential people, including retired generals, they publicly demanded that pressure on the Indian Army must continue. Retired General Hameed Gul, for example, felt that the Indians should be sucked in in order to get messed up. After mid-June, there were no formal meetings held to consider options, to discuss possibilities, or to build scenarios for exiting from Kargil. Instead, the way out from the Kargil crisis, from this ‘symmetry of desperation,’ was discussed mostly in informal kitchen cabinet meetings with no sense of a collective decision-making."

That's typical pak - mess after blunders, as usual, and lies strictly, but no admission of facts. 

................................................................................................

Author now titles a section "Prime Minister Witness to Casualties", beginning with a long description of his journey to a valley presumably somewhere close to Kargil, but it's a deceptive title - it's not about his witnessing any deaths due to Indian shelling in process, rather his return to safety of Skardu and seeing wounded at a military hospital in next paragraph. The most he seems yo have been in danger would be of falling to death from a window sill where his army chief helped him up insisting that he speak to locals. 

"Throughout the return journey, the prime minister actively avoided any interaction with the army chief. True to his personal style, the incredulous policy-making ways, and above all the horrors of Op K that were now a fait accompli, he opted to not confront his army chief. The PM engaged with his State Minister on Investment Humayun Akhtar to finalize the government’s power investment policy. At one point during the journey, the army chief did manage to sit beside the Prime minister. Much to everyone’s shock, he did not ask for additional finances for either the wounded or the battlefront soldiers. Instead he requested that a recently retired general be appointed in a public corporation. The PM acceded to Musharraf’s request.

"After landing at Chaklala, ... He shared with them his anguish over what he had seen at the Skardu hospital. He was angry with the army chief and recalled Musharraf’s repeated, direct and indirect, requests to the prime minister to meet Clinton to plan a retreat from Kargil. ... "

So the army chief initiated the invasion without informing, much less with consent of, his own PM - and then made him a scapegoat internationally, expecting him to get the army out of the mess made by the army chief. 

As usual with pak, isn't that! 

................................................................................................

Author again fraudulently strives to make it seem that the two sides, invaders and India fighting back, were equal and no different, for most part. 

" ... On both sides, casualties were mounting and political support was depleting. Sharif and Vajpayee both wanted an early end. ... "

One, India wanted not "early end" but this to have never taken place, at all. 

But having been confronted with the horror thereof, what India wanted, and did achieve, was to clean the region of all invaders, with no compromises. As soon as possible, of course, it goes without saying. 

" ... Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front, having been widely censured by the international community, Islamabad’s political men, as well as the army chief, had faith that Washington could wrest a face-saver for Islamabad."

In other words - as termed by Tarek Fateh - they went crying to Clinton to beg him to tell India to stop fighting. Without admitting, nevertheless, that it was paki soldiers on peaks killing Indians, still pretending that it was terrorists not known to pak! 

Just so pakis could remain on peaks in comfort and keep on killing Indians, that is! 

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

Now author takes more to lying. 

................................................................................................

It's hard avoiding quoting paki lies of paki attitude veiling facts, but there's no point quoting lies. 

" ... In his June 16 meeting in Geneva with US National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, the Indian NSA Brajesh Mishra handed over Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s letter for Clinton. ... “India might have to attack Pakistan if Pakistan did not pull back troops who had seized Indian territories ... ” Sandy Berger told Clinton a probable Pak-India war threatened disaster. If India expanded the war, Pakistan would probably lose and inevitably turn to its nuclear arsenal.[617] ... "

................................................................................................

" ... Clinton’s involvement would convey to world capitals including Delhi, the importance Washington attached to the crisis and the urgency in resolving it. Clinton’s engagement also broadened the scope of policy instruments available to exert pressure on Pakistan. For example, in Cologne, the US President personally lobbied the G-8 leaders for a tough statement holding Pakistan responsible for creating the crisis and demanding that Pakistan defuse the crisis. Similarly, Clinton’s involvement, similar to that of the nuclear crisis period, enabled Washington to promptly send off CENTCOM chief General Anthony Zinni and State Department official Gib Lanpher to Pakistan. ... "

" ... Pakistan Foreign Office was not keen that Nawaz Sharif meet with Zinni. ... The Americans were told that Zinni’s rank did not qualify him for a meeting with the prime minister. Before Zinni departed the US, the State Department attempted to circumvent the Foreign Office. The US Consul-General in Lahore, Jeffory Pied, went to see the prime minister’s younger brother and Chief Minister Shehbaz Sharif and conveyed the Clinton administration’s desire that Nawaz Sharif meet with Zinni. Shehbaz Sharif called Nawaz Sharif to convince him to agree to a meeting with Zinni. The prime minister declined.[619]"

Author avoids saying what's plain here, intent on veiling truth with paki lies. Zinni was refused a meeting because it was obvious what would transpire, a demand that invaders withdraw. But pakis use invasion as the sole method of argument to assist their lies, as per the heritage they not only invoke but brag of, thst of barbarians who invaded India for well over a millennium and a half until British rule, and hence their travails - which must befall a lying invader intent on destruction of all civilisation. 

................................................................................................

" ... The decision to send Zinni to Pakistan was made after the Vajpayee letter was received by the US President in Geneva. This suggestion was the result of a series of face to face meetings involving the United States National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department. No elaborate inter-agency meetings were held. ... "

Author, keen on lying as pakis generally when facts don't suit their agenda, doesn't see the contradiction there between "This suggestion was the result of a series of face to face meetings involving the United States National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department" and "No elaborate inter-agency meetings were held." 

Or perhaps she lies knowing fully well that she's lying, but expecting to confuse readers. 

This is usually tactics from liars too. And this goes on. Facts given in physical terms but interpretation, lie. 

" ... Key individuals who framed United States Kargil policy included Thomas Pickering and Karl Inderfurth from the State Department and Sandy Berger and Bruce Riedel from the National Security Council.

"The exchange of letters between Clinton and Nawaz Sharif did not get Clinton any tangible commitment from the latter on withdrawing Pakistani troops from Kargil. A letter from Clinton addressed to the Pakistani prime minister was drafted in the State Department on Saturday on June 19[622] and sent to the White House. Clinton was then traveling in Europe. In the letter, Clinton specifically asked the Pakistani prime minister what steps he would take to get out of Kargil. Clinton wrote in that letter that he wanted the CENTCOM Chief General Anthony Zinni to meet with Sharif as well as with the Pakistani army chief General Musharraf to ensure a Pakistani withdrawal. Gib Lanpher[623] Deputy Assistant Secretary South Asian Affairs at the State Department met Zinni on June 21.  

"Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was attempting to reach Nawaz Sharif to let him know that Clinton was sending Zinni to meet with him and Musharraf. With Zinni’s plane on standby to fly them to Pakistan, the two waited for a reply from Islamabad. But no response was received on Monday. ... "

................................................................................................

Here's an example of the said paki lies used by author towards veiling hard facts. 

"Zinni’s departure also signaled that the US bureaucracy had successfully overruled their President’s inclination to be accommodating to his friend the Pakistani prime minister. ... The State Department wanted a Clinton-Sharif meeting be made contingent upon Pakistan first vacating Kargil. [627]"

Clinton, a well educated Rhodes scholar, is, was always, smart enough to do as he thought fit, and making him seem a prisoner of others in Washington is a lie. 

Others may have helped him tow the line of propriety in world diplomacy, if he needed such maneuvers. But that's routine in democratic and other good governance worlds, which a despotic country used only to invading and lying wouldn't know. 

Perhaps pakis are only used to falsehoods and resent the failure of such tactics. But this tactic can only go so far. 

It's run its course, beginning with Kargil, the stupidest idea yet executed by pakis at the time. It was merely another version of the stupid declaration by paki military in 1971 to "change the DNA" of East Bengal - via invasion, genocide and mass gang rapes. But having claimed heritage of barbarian invaders, pakis don't see the fact of their stupid choice in doing so. Or lying. 

................................................................................................

Author exposes, again, the lie pakis including the then paki PM told everyone outside the paki military. 

"Significantly, before the Zinni meeting, General Musharraf had flown with the prime minister to the forward areas from where the Kargil operation was launched.[628] The prime minister and the army chief visited the injured soldiers and met with the jawans. ... Yet it was not coincidental that this display of a unified civil-military stance on Kargil was planned for hours before the Zinni-Musharraf meeting."

So while pakis insisted on denying their own soldiers to everyone, so much so they were neither fed nor buried by pakis, those not bring shelled were encouraged with prayers and money to go right back up to kill Indians and be denied in turn! 

"In the meeting, Zinni told Musharraf that he had been specially sent by his President to talk about Kargil. Musharraf was told that the Kargil issue was “dangerously unwise and that Pakistan had no support for its Kargil operation.”[631] Clinton’s message was simple: “Just get out of there.” Musharraf, however, did not acknowledge that there were Pakistani soldiers in Kargil. Throughout the meeting, Musharraf maintained that Pakistan had no control over the Mujahideen who were in Kargil. ... "

"The meeting ended inconclusively. There was no agreement on the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army since Musharraf refused to acknowledge the presence of Pakistani troops.[633] ... "

"The following morning, on June 25, Zinni met with the prime minister. The army chief, DG ISI, and the senior Foreign Office team also participated in the meeting. ... Zinni also carried Clinton’s message to Nawaz Sharif that he would not meet the Pakistani prime minister “in the shadow of Kargil.” Finally, towards the end of the meeting, the prime minister took a deep breath and said, “What do you want me to do, General Zinni?” Nawaz Sharif then said, “We can talk to these people who are occupying the heights in Kargil and see whether we can do anything.”[637]"

Usual paki tactic, Jinnah in 1947-48 onwards. It's exactly what Jinnah had said to Mountbatten about the then paki military invasion of Kashmir pretending to be tribals. 

................................................................................................

"Interestingly, the Americans and the Pakistanis had different ‘takes’ on the meeting. The Pakistani camp was clear that the prime minister had been categorical that the “US should take a broader view of the problem - that Kargil was only one aspect of the larger problem of Jammu and Kashmir which must be addressed in it totality in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people.”[638] None of the Pakistani participants felt that Sharif had given Zinni a commitment to withdraw.[639] The Americans read almost the opposite. They believed that “not too long into the meeting the prime minister agreed to a withdrawal.”[640] They were relieved that they “did not have to wrestle Nawaz Sharif into the ground”[641] and had extracted a verbal agreement from Sharif to withdraw.[642] ... Lanpher argued with his colleagues that the Zinni mission got the green signal from Islamabad because the Pakistanis had decided to give him a positive response, not because they wanted to “slam the door in your face.” His conclusion was: “The Pakistanis, government officials, army officers and politicians were infinitely polite and these real gentlemen would not want to be rude to people, in contrast to the Indians who enjoyed being rude.” Lanpher based his expectation of a Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil on the Pakistani psychology of “wanting to please the Americans.” However, Zinni and Milam, both more familiar with the Pakistani working and particularly with Sharif and Musharraf, believed that Musharraf would not easily make his troops vacate Kargil.[644]"

Lanpher's reaction was the usual one - of someone inexperienced about behaviour differences between smiling liars versus upright honest, while the overall difference of perception there is the usual one when encountering pakis, nazis and similar liars. Chinese on the other hand are a slightly different matter only in that they don't admit to lying either, but know fully well what they do. 

................................................................................................

"Lampher later recalled, “We decided we had a success, that they would get them out even if not acknowledging they were Pakistani soldiers. We did not give anything on Kashmir and we did not rub their noses either, we could have insisted that they acknowledge they are Pakistanis but we know they had to save face.”[648] Meanwhile, Zinni had left with the ‘distinct impression’ that Nawaz Sharif had committed to withdrawing the troops.[649] Indian statements also refuted Zinni’s assertion that the meeting with Clinton was granted after Pakistan started withdrawing troops. As late as on 4 July, in his briefing, the Indian spokesman said that India had not seen the slightest indication that Islamabad was willing to withdraw its troops. He said, “There is not the slightest sign on the ground that Pakistan is taking the necessary steps that need to be taken for withdrawal and for restoration of the status quo.”[650] Upon arrival in Washington, Zinni and his commander-in-chief, the US President, waited for the Pakistanis to begin withdrawing.

"In Pakistan, the Zinni visit had left no doubt in the civilian camp, including the Prime Minister, that Washington wanted Pakistan to unconditionally withdraw from Kargil.[651] Zinni had merely reiterated the demand that the US administration had directly and repeatedly made to Islamabad two weeks into the Kargil crisis.[652] For Sharif, personally also, the fear of the possibility of a nuclear engagement was also driven home. Zinni had managed to convince him that a prolonged Kargil crisis could convert into an all-out nuclear war.[653] This further fuelled the uneasiness in Sharif’s camp over the Kargil crisis.

................................................................................................

"Meanwhile, though, there was disappointment in Washington that an immediate Pakistani troop withdrawal did not actually begin, following the Zinni visit, the Zinni-Lanpher trip was viewed as having facilitated achievement of the objectives Washington had set out for itself during Kargil. Recalling the Zinni mission, another senior National Security Council head, Bruce Riedel, said, “He did not get a commitment. When Nawaz Sharif came to the Blair House on 4 July we did not know of the outcome.”[654] Referring to Zinni’s claim in his book that he had got a commitment from Musharraf, Riedel said, “Zinni is overstating his case…”[655]

"Nevertheless, the State Department found the mission helpful on three specific counts. First, the Clinton Administration was satisfied that Zinni had candidly conveyed its concerns to Islamabad and had made it clear to General Musharraf that Pakistan was responsible for the present military flare-up along the LOC and Pakistan had to roll back.

"Secondly, in the management of the Zinni-Lanpher trip, Washington continued the practice of transparency in its diplomacy initiated during the Kargil crisis. Washington publicized and also shared with the Indians, both privately and publicly, the message conveyed to Islamabad. For example, Lanpher was deputed to inform India of the Zinni meetings in Islamabad. The transparency was more evident in the Washington-Islamabad communication relative to Washington-Delhi communication. On 4 July 4, Clinton made two calls to Vajpayee, one during and one after his meeting with Nawaz Sharif. General Zinni had an opportunity to candidly express the views of the US administration. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, “Zinni helped lay the ground work for the successful outcome of the 4 July Clinton-Nawaz meeting,”[656] during which Washington was able to ‘deliver’ India a unilateral Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil.[657] Musharraf, to the contrary, believed that Pakistan’s position on “no unilateral withdrawal” had been conveyed to the Americans. Infact, he found Zinni’s “body language positive and sympathetic towards Pakistan’s position.” The army chief in fact still believed a Clinton-Sharif meeting,[658]to facilitate a negotiated settlement of Kargil and Kashmir, would be possible."

Ever insistence of an arrogant invader, in lying about invading and getting away with it all, including lying, there. 

................................................................................................

"Whatever Sharif said during the Zinni meeting, he was an extremely worried man after what he had heard from Clinton’s envoy. The prime minister was convinced that a full-scale Pakistan-India war along the international border was likely and that could mean electronic devices with which India could jam Pakistan’s radars and signals. Zinni had also convinced the prime minister that a nuclear war was on the cards and that even his own army, the Pakistan Army, had begun deploying nuclear weapons.[659] He felt that, between electronic and nuclear warfare, it was a doomsday scenario for Pakistan. Hence, it can safely be presumed this was the definitive point at which the Pakistani prime minister had concluded that a war had to be avoided at all costs. The back-channel communications were on but now other avenues for ‘exit facilitation’ were to be sought: Beijing, Riyadh, and DC. However, Sharif played these cards close to his chest. For example, only his kitchen cabinet knew of his contacts with Washington and Riyadh. The Foreign Office team was working the Delhi and Beijing routes while the Defense Committee and the cabinet knew of neither. The contact with the Saudis was established in the last week of June. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, who was close to the Sharif family, was contacted seeking Saudi intervention with Washington for a Clinton-Sharif meeting."

Presumably his army chief was happy at prospect of playing with nukes. 

................................................................................................

"On June 27, Lanpher met with MEA officials and with the Principal Secretary to the Indian Prime Minister, Brajesh Mishra.[663]Lanpher briefed Mishra thoroughly “with a very candid description of those present in the meetings and what they said.” He gave Mishra news of a likely withdrawal by the Pakistani forces.[664] Lanpher repeated in detail his conversations with the Pakistanis to assure the Indians that “these guys (Pakistanis) will get out.” Still not completely trusting of the United States support for the Indian position, the Indians did not believe “how rough” Zinni had been with the Pakistanis. The Americans saw themselves doing a “front channel thing,” Lanpher providing the Indians complete details on the Zinni meeting with the Pakistani prime minister and COAS.[665]"

Author goes abusive here exponentially claiming Indians had been bloodied and caught with pants down. 

"Lanpher found Mishra skeptical about the possibility of a Pakistani withdrawal.[666] “Having been bloodied, totally embarrassed, and caught with their pants down, and suffering heavy casualties,”[667] the Indians tended not to trust Lanpher’s reading of the Pakistani intentions. ... "

Since she's repeatedly blamed Kargil on Siachen, it's unclear why this abusive description has been applied by her only to Indians. 

Unless it was a personal dream of her own that excludes pakis in particular and is strictly restricted for Indians. 

................................................................................................

" ... Indians tended not to trust Lanpher’s reading of the Pakistani intentions. Despite his “honest briefing”, the Indians were “very skeptical.” Mishra’s skepticism was understandable. Only a few hours before the Lanpher meeting, Naik, the Pakistani back-channel interlocutor, had stressed upon the impossibility of a unilateral withdrawal. He had categorically stated that a withdrawal would only follow the joint adoption and declaration of the four points."

" ... Lanpher carried the message to Delhi that Delhi must show restraint while Washington ensured that the sanctity of the LOC was restored to the pre-Kargil position. ... "

"One of the key objectives of Washington’s policy during Kargil was to deny Pakistan any strategic advantage accruing to it from its nuclear status. Washington was determined not to let Pakistan benefit from playing the ‘nuclear card.’ Hence Pakistan had to undo the violation of the LOC and not derive any political or diplomatic benefit from its Kargil adventure. Allowing any advantage to Pakistan which had banked on, to some degree, deriving advantage from nuclear blackmail, would set off a de-stabilizing precedent between the two nuclear states. Successful deployment of nuclear blackmail as a policy tool would have in fact undermined the only virtue that the deadly weapon possesses, that of deterrence. A nuclear armed South Asia could not have been encouraged to become a theatre for limited wars."

" ... In Delhi, Lanpher was convincing his Indian hosts that Washington had played its role in bringing about an imminent Pakistani withdrawal."

................................................................................................

Again, author sermonises about India in a stance of nothing so much as hypocrisy. 

" ... It is bad form to publicise private exchanges on the phone. It is worse to deceive the public. ... "

One, a paki saying this about India at any time is height of hypocrisy indeed. 

Two, this author saying it about India, while making no such comments about paki conduct in attacking India even as diplomats and civil governments were officially meeting and unaware of oaki attack against India, is height of fraud indeed. 

" ... On 19 July, Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmad revealed that R. K. Mishra had visited Pakistan as India's emissary at least five times during the crisis, while Niaz Naik also kept shuttling between Islamabad and New Delhi (The Hindu, 20 July)."

" ... The Pakistan Army chief claimed that during their June 26 meeting, Zinni “understood our position on Kashmir and agreed it was needed a quick solution.”[670] The army chief’s understanding, however, was in complete contrast with how the prime minister’s point man, the seasoned diplomat Tariq Fatemi, viewed Zinni’s attitude. “Zinni wanted us out immediately,”[671] Fatimi recalled. Zinni repeated the same on arrival in Washington. [672]"

................................................................................................

In the topsy-turvy world of what passes for thinking in pakis, US is abused in a resisted way, accused of taking advantage of Kargil failure of pak to get close to Delhi! 

"From Pakistan’s Kargil debacle, in cold statistical calculations, the Clinton administration’s key South Asian and non-proliferation experts wrested a strategic gain for Washington. The gain was winning Delhi’s trust and confidence it’s role in South Asia; that no other country’s interests, especially Pakistan’s, could trump Delhi’s interests. It was a classic act of gainful cunning that largely dictates State interaction."

And as every liar does, pakis too know it's necessary to throw some facts into their mix. 

" ... The Kargil clique’s secret launch of Op KP had inflicted a heavy military and diplomatic cost on the country. ... "

................................................................................................

"Now, during Kargil, Washington’s uneven policy between the two nuclearized South Asian neighbors again surfaced. The emphasis of the Clinton administration’s key men on Pakistan’s nuclear activity during Kargil, while completely ignoring what India may have been doing, was a mere continuation of Washington’s policy of the seventies. Strobe Talbott, Clinton’s personal friend and a journalist-turned diplomat, who documented his failure to convince India’s imposing Jaswant Singh to agree to Washington’s instruments for non-proliferation, appeared to have made much of very little in the Kargil days."

It's interesting to read this paragraph and it's accusations toned to seem indicative of grave moral lapse on part of US, and wonder where pakis get the moral or ethical ground for demanding equality, when they never practice it either internationally or at home. There's the racist treatment of East Bengal culminating in genocide and mass gang rapes organised by paki military in 1971, even if one were to go with the paki logic that genocide of eleven million Hindus and almost half as many Sikhs in pak in 1947 were an act of good deed as per the religion, repeated in genocide of Hindus in Kashmir in 1989-90. 

But where's this equality when pakis take money from US to send terrorists to Afghanistan to harass USSR out of Afghanistan, and subsequently, boast on internet for decades about having singlehandedly broken USSR into pieces? 

And if pakis haven't been dealing equally with others, why do they then expect equal treatment? 

No, their equality is one demanded by nawabs, strictly upwardly mobile but veiled in pretense. They are racist and communal, commit mass gang rapes and genocides and invade, but must be given everything they demand at asking, whether hundreds of billions of dollars without accounts from US or territory in huge chunks out of India. 

................................................................................................

" ... In Washington, other than the generic concern regarding military confrontation, the intelligence had its ear to the ground to especially monitor nuclear-related developments. Data flow from several satellite paths, various policy departments, including the Defense Department, the State Department’s South Asia section, CENTCOM, the CIA, and the NSC, now focused particularly on nuclear related information. Some intelligence officials claimed that the ground information picked up by US intelligence sources indicated movement of missiles and placement of warheads. The concern, however, about active deployment of nuclear weapons, especially by Pakistan, was not uniformly shared within the Clinton Administration. There was great divergence in interpreting this intelligence data."

" ... contrary assessments notwithstanding, from mid-June onwards the administration’s core group appears to have been possessed by “nuclear phobia.” They directly involved the US President into the Kargil diplomacy. They alerted him to their “concern” regarding Pakistan taking action to make its nuclear weapons capable.[687]"

Lack of trustworthiness of pakis must have impressed even the generously friendly US, eventually! 

................................................................................................

" ... In Washington, other than the generic concern regarding military confrontation, the intelligence had its ear to the ground to especially monitor nuclear-related developments. Data flow from several satellite paths, various policy departments, including the Defense Department, the State Department’s South Asia section, CENTCOM, the CIA, and the NSC, now focused particularly on nuclear related information. Some intelligence officials claimed that the ground information picked up by US intelligence sources indicated movement of missiles and placement of warheads. The concern, however, about active deployment of nuclear weapons, especially by Pakistan, was not uniformly shared within the Clinton Administration. There was great divergence in interpreting this intelligence data."

" ... contrary assessments notwithstanding, from mid-June onwards the administration’s core group appears to have been possessed by “nuclear phobia.” They directly involved the US President into the Kargil diplomacy. They alerted him to their “concern” regarding Pakistan taking action to make its nuclear weapons capable.[687]"

Lack of trustworthiness of pakis must have impressed even the generously friendly US, eventually! 

................................................................................................

"The growing Indo-US strategic relations were also at play in producing this nuclear phobia targeting Pakistan. Having discovered that in fact Pakistan regulars and not Mujahedeen were fighting in Kargil, and Pakistan therefore had control over them, the US weighed in heavily on to Pakistan to withdraw the troops. The US President wrote about six letters. The US Ambassador delivered the letters to the foreign minister. He had several meetings with the Pakistani prime minister and spent much of his time at the Prime Minister’s Secretariat with Additional Secretary Tariq Fatimi. He visited him almost daily with a constant barrage of escalating pressure on Pakistan to withdraw."

Author, in saying "Having discovered that in fact Pakistan regulars and not Mujahedeen were fighting in Kargil, and Pakistan therefore had control over them", omits mentioning that this amounted to in fact having caught pakis lying repeatedly,  and perhaps having known it all along. 

So of course she fails to connect it to US seemingly deciding for India, since it seems that in paki mind paki lies aren't lies but nawabs' pronouncements, to be honoured over and above truth! 

................................................................................................

"Targeting Nawaz Sharif 

"There appeared to be politics around the use of even this information on Pakistan, unverified by majority of the US intelligence bodies within the Clinton administration. Why did Washington hold back the information Washington claimed it had on Pakistan’s preparedness for the use of nuclear weapons? Why was the information only shared with the prime minister – and that too without his aides? It was used to first target the prime minister behind closed doors. Equally, General Zinni had opted to warn the prime minister in a classified and limited meeting about “electronic” and “finally nuclear warfare.” As late as June 26, Zinni decided against raising the risks of a nuclear war with the army chief, the man Washington believed had more control than the prime minister on Pakistan’s nuclear trigger. First, the CENTCOM chief sketched a deadly picture for him and subsequently, on 4 July, the information was brought in full throttle at the Clinton-Nawaz meeting. Pakistan’s prime minister was instructed to not bring in an aide. Clinton with Riedel, the man riled up about Pakistan’s deployment of nuclear weapons, insisted that unknown to the prime minister the Pakistan Army was preparing to use nuclear weapons!"

This whole accusation above can only be understood with the following explanation - not only Pakistan demand that their lies be accepted, preferably over facts known to everyone but at least on par with truth in name of equality, but they demand that paki charade of democracy be taken for exactly what it is, and while paki pm is treated as someone to successfully meet US president to make up the mind of the said president for him whenever paki army wishes, he - the said paki pm - only be treated as disdainfully as paki army treats him, and no serious matters be discussed with him, which would be seen as suspicious behaviour on part of another government. 

In short, it's a decorative position akin to that of a receptionist at an arms dealership. 

................................................................................................

" ... Pakistan military signaled its nuclear preparedness. On June 24, The News reported, “The prime minister has also been told that deployment of short and long range missiles with extremely effective warheads has been completed.”[690] Pakistani media reports also focused on Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. For example, one report was headlined, “Pakistan Developing Advanced versions of Ghauri, Shaheen”.[691] ... "

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

Author has been using certain terms that now acquire another connotation in view of her accusations against US government regarding meetings alone with paki pm excluding paki army. 

"On 25 June, R. K. Mishra,[700] Vajpayee’s point-man for the back-channel negotiations, flew in from Delhi ... "

To clear a normal perspective, if a man sent by PM of India arrives for diplomatic discussions with paki pm, it's not "back-channel"; India does not take active part in the charade that's paki structure of hierarchy, any more than US would, or then did. 

................................................................................................

Much of this chapter has a good deal of repetition and confusion thereby, more than usual for this author. 

" ... Mishra pointedly asked Sharif if he knew about Kargil but did not get a clear response. ... "

Author elaborates by stating paki demands and fraudulentlylabelling them an understandingbetweenthe two PMs. 

" ... Mishra showed the non-paper to Vajpayee, who was keen to insert as the second paragraph that Pakistan forces would withdraw from the Kargil heights"

" ... The Indian National Security Advisor was not to be easily convinced of Pakistan’s ‘good intentions”. On the insertion regarding Pakistan’s withdrawal from the Kargil heights, Naik indicated that it would create difficulties for Sharif. They had to wait for Vajpayee ... "

"On June 27, Naik met the Indian Prime Minister, Brajesh Mishra, and R. K. Mishra. Vajpayee welcomed Naik by asking him, “We started the journey from Lahore. How did we reach Kargil?” Naik’s response was, “We will see how we can come back from Kargil to Lahore.” Vajpayee continued, “Very simple. You should just withdraw.” He said that Nawaz Sharif should announce the withdrawal before leaving for China that evening and then follow by a meeting of the DGs Military Operations to make arrangements for the withdrawal. Naik said, “Military is not possible; it is completely political.” ... "

"Before departing for China, Sharif talked to Vajpayee. The Pakistan prime minister even called R. K. Mishra from China. Sharif had struck a special rapport with the man he had first met in October 1998. During the Kargil crisis, he had called Mishra virtually every day. Mishra claimed that Sharif had told him during one of his visits, “I will within three months punish those responsible for Kargil.”[701]"

"MEA was not comfortable with the way the back-channel negotiations were progressing and had used the policy tool of a ‘press leak’ to upset the negotiations."

................................................................................................

" ... American Administration had decided to make public evidence it had against Pakistan if Pakistan did not withdraw from Kargil-Drass. ... an editorial appeared in The Washington Post indicating that Islamabad may face difficulty in getting the next $100 million tranche released. On June 25 the State Department spokesman James Rubin said, “We want to see withdrawal of forces supported by Pakistan from the Indian side of the LOC.” ... "

" ... According to Vajpayee, he had clearly told Nawaz Sharif’s emissary Niaz Naik in their last meeting, “There can be no talks with Pakistan until the latter (Pakistan) withdraws its troops from Kargil.”[709]"

" ... Washington asked India to not attack elsewhere on the LoC or on the International border. Washington thought they had some hints about nuclear tipped missile movement. The United States Embassy in Islamabad believed that Pakistan’s missile movements were routine, undertaken by Pakistan once in a while."

" ... Frantic phone calls to Delhi were made to salvage the situation. Minutes before leaving for the airport, the Prime Minister met with his Foreign Office team to discuss the fall-out of the now botched up exit plan for Pakistani troop withdrawal from Kargil. Foremost in his mind was the absence of an exit plan for the Pakistan Army."

"Nawaz Sharif’s host, the Chinese Premier, was “very matter-of fact” with his Pakistani guest.[712] Zhu recalled Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation over Kargil. He repeated the known Chinese position[713] that Pakistan needed to resolve the Kashmir issue bilaterally with India and advised Pakistan to immediately end the Kargil crisis. China, Zhu said, had no influence over India and could not intercede with the Indians. Sharif was also cautioned against involving “other”[714] countries in the Kargil affair, urging Sharif to remain mindful of their tendency to exploit the situation to their own advantages."

................................................................................................

"Nawaz Sharif had left Beijing a disappointed man. Back-channel negotiations with India had drawn a blank. He had hoped the Chinese would mediate with India to work out an honorable exit for the Pakistani troops.[722] The Chinese and the Americans seemed to have been coordinating, even if loosely, on Kargil. Beijing and Washington appear to have been reading from the same page. While the Pakistani prime minister was in China, the State Department announced that Beijing and Washington coordinated their policies on Kargil."

" ... In Hong Kong, Sharif waited for a message from Washington regarding a confirmed meeting with Clinton. Instead of returning to Pakistan, he was prepared to fly straight off to Washington from Hong Kong.[724] No confirmation came through. The prime minister landed in Islamabad in the early hours of July 1."

"While the global consensus demanded that Pakistan vacate the Kargil heights, within Pakistan the ill-informed Opposition and the media were harping on a different tune. At the Islamabad Conference, the politicians condemned “Indian aggression on the LOC, violation of Pakistan’s airspace and Indian threats of war against Pakistan.”[727] The Convener, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, linked Pakistan’s isolation over Kargil to the government’s failure to “highlight Kashmir.” The Nawabzada said, “It appears that Pakistan had been isolated diplomatically and politically, which is evident from the statements of the US President, the European Union and the G-8 countries.”[728] The problem identification was correct, but not the diagnosis of the problem."

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

"The prime minister chaired the Defense Committee of the Cabinet meeting in the cabinet room of the Prime Minister’s House.[744] He had already made the decision to withdraw. He had already begun mapping possible exit routes. The presentations and discussions at this DCC meeting, Sharif had hoped, would validate his withdrawal decision. The atmosphere at the meeting was tense and sober. Reports of India reclaiming the Tololing Hill complex, consisting of several posts, were coming in. Nawaz Sharif’s kitchen cabinet, including the director general Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the defense secretary, a retired general, were critical of the military operation. The wisdom in the civilian camp, shared by the naval and air force chiefs, was that Op KP had not been thought through in terms of its strategic consequences. According to one Pakistan cabinet minister, “The army had climbed up a pole without considering how it would get down.”[745]" 

"Significantly, through meetings between the Defense Secretary and the Minister for Petroleum, Chaudhry Nisar, the informal communication lines were kept open between the prime minister’s camp and the army chief. Yet the issues floating within the formal meetings and through the print waves and Islamabad’s power-circles were raising fundamental questions about the Kargil operation. Who cleared the Kargil operation? What was its objective? How would Pakistan’s growing international isolation be handled? Are the Indian forces defeating the Pakistanis in Kargil? According to a key member of the Sharif kitchen cabinet, “The party view was not to embarrass the army leadership but to apportion responsibility.”[746] Major differences had surfaced between the services chiefs over Op KP. The naval chief feared an Indian naval blockade. The air chief was also apprehensive about Pakistan’s air force being pulled into an all-out war. The army chief believed the air force chief was a “scared man.” [747]"

" ... Presentations began with Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad. He sketched a bleak picture of Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation. He recounted the countless diplomatic efforts made by Pakistan in an increasingly hostile environment. Pakistan’s position had been projected using every diplomatic and political means possible. This included regular media briefings and contacts with the UNSG, OICSG, OIC members, EU and G-8 countries. Special envoys had been sent, and high level demarches had been made in the form of letters from the prime minister to his G-8 counterparts and from the FM to his EU and OIC counterparts. The world community, especially the G-8 and EU, did not accept Pakistan’s position and called for withdrawal."

................................................................................................

" ... Privately, when asked how come they were losing the heights, senior military men had conceded, “We never thought that this would happen, that India would play such high human price.”[750] Sharif also pointed out that Pakistan’s communication lines were being compromised and hence the sustenance for our troops was weakening.

"With the army still painting a positive picture, Finance Minister Ishaq Dar asked the army chief if, should they got the required funding, could they get Kashmir. Musharraf reminded Dar that the distance of Kashmir from where they were was a way off. “Will we be able to get Siachen?” Dar then asked.[751] Siachen, he was told, was not “economical” for Pakistan to hold onto. The army chief’s general refrain was, “We went in only to flag the issue.” Goal-posts set by the Kargil clique were vanishing under the Indian military pressure.

"The army chief said that, despite India’s intense bombing and capturing around 35 percent of the posts, Pakistani troops were still holding on to the rest. 

"When he was asked if they would be able to retain what was with them, Musharraf said that, because of weather conditions, by August or September Pakistan would have to vacate all the posts. It was already July!

"He explained that, despite the aerial bombing, the Pakistani troops controlling the remaining posts were in a strong position since, sitting at the heights, they could continue to attack the Indian supply lines. The conversation was bordering on the surreal. The dead bodies of young soldiers arriving home had already given lie to the Kargil clique’s May claim that “no one can evict us”[752], that “we are invincible.” [753]"

................................................................................................

"Musharraf maintained that 95% of the ingressed area was still intact with the Pakistani troops. Of the five main ingress points, the Indians had recaptured only one and a half peaks in the Tololing range. With three main peaks still in Pakistan’s control, the army chief was confident that the Indians may be able to regain control of some area but would not be able to remove the Pakistanis from Kargil. Pakistan, he explained, still had the trump card: the ability to block the Srinagar-Leh Highway. Pakistan, he said, had the Indians “by the jugular.” The army chief disagreed with the naval chief’s assessment regarding the possibility of an Indian naval blockade of Karachi port. Musharraf’s conclusion was that even if the Indians went for all-out war, it would merely be a stalemate. The Indians could never be victorious.

"Musharraf later recalled his presentation at the DCC meeting. The army chief said that he had made a “complete presentation” that was spread over an hour. According to Musharraf’s recollection, “He (Nawaz Sharif) kept asking me should we withdraw and I was avoiding giving an answer. I said it is the leader’s job to decide …I will give the military and strategic analysis. I explained whether there would be open war or not, why the military activity would be restricted only to Kashmir and would not go beyond…I gave a complete presentation.”[754] Musharraf recalled explaining to the DCC participants how far India could be tied down in Kashmir and said that the civilian leaders “better start talking on Kashmir.”[755]"

That sounds far less confident. 

................................................................................................

"This military assessment made by the architects of Kargil at the DCC meeting was also reflected in the media. For example,the daily Nation quoted the Inter-Services Public Relations spokesman, “Pakistan will hold on to its positions on the LOC at all costs.”[756] Significantly, only a day before the DCC, the paper reflected the position the army leadership was to take the following day at the DCC. The Nation’s editorial emphasized, “India is in a horrible bind. It has nearly two divisions in the Siachen sector, and three divisions in Ladakh against China, all of which are supplied only by the Srinagar–Leh road. If that road is interdicted by the freedom fighters upto mid-September, when it becomes snow bound, then India will not be able to provide Siachen and Ladakh garrisons sufficient supplies to last out the winter. While the troops are unlikely to starve, their combat capability will suffer enough for a Pakistani offensive in Siachen to have good chances of success. The pressure on the Pakistani side is that Kargil will not remain a vital choke point forever. Because of the recent operation, work has been speeded up on alternative road routes to Leh, which have been planned by the Indian government. While there are always construction delays, Pakistan cannot count on there being no alternative route next summer.” [757]

"At the DCC meeting, there were tense moments. As the military briefing continued, the thrust of the prime minister’s question was, “What you are now telling me, you should have told me earlier.” ... Shujaat insisted, “Whatever has happened has happened, and is not important any longer.” Instead, he suggested that a statement be “jointly” drafted sending a message of unity, of collective responsibility for what had happened, and a joint effort should be launched to manage the current situation. ... "

................................................................................................

"The meeting had been long but not decisive. The press reported, “Lengthy discussions on pros and cons, on policy options, but no final decision was taken. The meeting was informed that any premature step in either way may lead to some drastic developments and before taking a final decision it should be kept in mind.”[766] Reflecting perhaps the concerns of some of the DCC participants, one newspaper report suggested, “The so-called withdrawal from Kargil by Mujahideen will have serious repercussions.” It went on to argue, “First, the morale of the nation and armed forces personnel, two the political loss and the present government will have to suffer; three its impact on the freedom movement and the Mujahideen inside occupied Kashmir and four does it mean burying the liberation movements for many years to come; five what will happen to the Kashmir cause and who will guarantee that the Kashmir issue will be taken up in future talks with India.”[767] The same daily documented the consequences feared by some DCC participants of the continued military and diplomatic stand-off leading to a limited or full-scale war with India: “First neither Pakistan can afford any war with India; two the state of preparedness, three any spillover of the war may result in a disaster for the region; four where was Pakistan in the diplomatic community as international pressure is mounting for withdrawing the so-called infiltrators and the pressure of India to de-escalate..”[768]"

" ... Minister for Religious Affairs Zafarul Haq said, “The Back-channel is continuing and there is no question of withdrawal.” He briefed the meeting about his visit as a special envoy to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, and Bahrain.” The DCC had agreed to send some key ministers as “special envoys to various capitals” with the objective of “highlighting Pakistan’s position.” The Prime Minster also decided to brief the DCC members on the back-channel interlocutor Niaz Naik’s mission to Delhi.[770] Only three days earlier, the Foreign Office had insisted that Naik was in Delhi on a private visit."

" ... The civilians, who had earlier6 concluded that Pakistan had been led into disaster by its military leadership, now believed that high casualties plus the loss of Tololing and the Tiger Hills had also put the military under pressure."

"Interestingly, on the day the DCC met, two other Kargil-related developments also took place. In Washington, the US Congress passed a resolution with overwhelming majority asking Pakistan to vacate Kargil. The House International Relations Sub Committee on Asia passed the resolution by a 20 to 5 vote. The Committee Chairman Benjamin Gilman, a Republican from New York, said in his opening statement, “The government of Pakistan has previously supported terrorism in India. This latest incident, however, is far beyond the murder of innocent civilians on a train or at a wedding party…it is widely reported that Pakistan Army intelligence service and government have moved thousands of men and materials up to the Pakistan side of the LOC and sent hundreds of army regulars across the line. Pakistan is laying down artillery fire in support of the invaders and the leaders of Pakistan should now withdraw its forces.”[772] ... "

" ... Pakistan’s political leadership was more than ready to withdraw. Key foreign office officials were equally clear about the need to withdraw. Only the army chief, at the DCC meeting had insisted his forces had ‘staying power’ in Kargil. Musharraf had also claimed that the Kargil operation had accrued political and diplomatic advantages to Pakistan."

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

" ... Nawaz Sharif flew to his hometown Lahore for the weekend. His concerns were clear. His thinking process was not. He was playing his cards close to his chest. The chief of army staff, ostensibly satisfied with the military situation of his troops, went off with family and friends to a hill resort for the weekend. He believed that his troops had staying power but he was also beginning to note the international pressures that were being applied on Pakistan.[777]"

Notice the open, unthinking bias exhibited here by the author, presumably in favour of those in power as she wrote. That's typical paki. 

................................................................................................

" ... The service chiefs had also differed. They knew that the political leadership was keen to withdraw, but the Army seemed unclear. They believed, ‘The Army’s body language conveyed their wanting to withdraw too.’ However, Musharraf had made no such statement. The bureaucrats were not there to take decisions but they believed their input influenced decision-making. ... A section within the core Foreign Office group was unsure of the wisdom of withdrawal.[778]

"The Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary, Saeed Mehdi, called US Ambassador Milam to convey Sharif’s intention to talk to the US President. Milam relayed the request to the State Department. Shortly before this request, Clinton had also received a letter from Sharif asking to meet him. However, the letter, which had been drafted by Sharif’s Foreign Office team, had yet again linked the Kargil flare-up with the broader Kashmir problem. In Washington, the tone of this letter conveyed that ‘Sharif was wringing his hands … that he was looking for personal cover … he was not a man of great courage’.[779] Sharif had written in response to Clinton’s letter, written a few days after Zinni’s return to Washington. Clinton had thanked Sharif for receiving Zinni but had wondered why there was no action on Zinni’s report that Sharif was willing to withdraw troops from Kargil. By now, the bottom line message of Washington’s communication to Islamabad was: ‘Get out!’ Clinton himself, his envoy General Zinni, and the State Department had repeatedly told Sharif that negotiations over the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Kargil were out. This was now Washington’s and Delhi’s shared objective.

................................................................................................

"The PM telephoned from the Governor’s House in Lahore.[783] During the call, Sharif was not assisted by members of either his ‘kitchen cabinet’ or of the core Foreign Office group. In attendance were Saeed Mehdi and Iftikhar Ali Khan. The prime minister’s brother, Shehbaz, was at the family home in Raiwind. Chaudhry Nisar, his close confidante and a member of his ‘kitchen cabinet’, was two hundred miles away in his home town, Taxila. The Foreign Office team was at work in Islamabad. By contrast, at the White House, Clinton was surrounded by his key aides. He remained, therefore, within the parameters set by Washington’s primary objective of forcing an unconditional Pakistani withdrawal. During the telephone conversation, the US President sent no mixed signals to his Pakistani friend. 

"Sharif, once again, urged Clinton to play a role in defusing the Kargil crisis and in resolving the Kashmir dispute. He asked to see him. Clinton reminded Sharif of the precondition for a meeting. Sharif did not contest Clinton’s suggestion of a unilateral, unconditional withdrawal. Clinton told Sharif that he wanted to help him and to help Pakistan but Pakistani forces had to first withdraw. Clinton again rhetorically queried why Pakistan had done this. Sharif said he could give him ‘the entire scenario when we meet’. Clinton emphasized that time was of the essence and that they ‘are losing time’. According to Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Riaz Khokhar, Clinton agreed to receive Sharif because the Americans wanted that the prime minister to personally convey that the Pakistani troops would vacate Kargil. Clinton wanted to hear for himself from Sharif that he was willing to withdraw.[784]

................................................................................................

"The phone call had made it clear to the Clinton administration that ‘Sharif was looking for a political cover for withdrawing Pakistan’s forces’.[785] Equally, Clinton made it clear to Nawaz Sharif ‘that he could not provide cover and withdrawal had to proceed on its own merit’. Sharif insisted that they talk face-to-face. It was an unusual conversation between two heads of government. Clinton’s advisors saw it no differently. They had ‘never seen anything quite like that, i.e., you invite yourself, that it was a bizarre time to invite yourself’.[786]

"Clinton agreed that the beleaguered Sharif come the following day. It was a national holiday, US Independence Day, but Clinton agreed, sensing that the Pakistani prime minister was likely to concede unconditional withdrawal. In Islamabad, it was read differently. According to one of Sharif’s close confidantes, by inviting him on a holiday, Sharif was told by Clinton, ‘While we do not work on a national day, but this is a measure of the importance we give to this issue.’[787] The American account of this call also confirms that, detecting from Sharif’s conversation the willingness to withdraw troops from Kargil. Clinton conceded to an immediate meeting with the prime minister, who offered to arrive the next day.[788] A Sunday surprise was in the offing."

................................................................................................

" ... From Sharif, Washington needed a withdrawal as well as a commitment to help Washington find Osama Bin Laden.[789] The State Department laid out these demands on the one-page briefing paper it prepared for the US President for the 4 July meeting.[790]

"In Pakistan, there was no preparatory work that Nawaz Sharif sought from his core Foreign Office team, the cabinet members, or the Army. The focus was now on getting the logistics done for the Washington dash. Sharif knew that, in getting a meeting with Clinton, he had in fact proceeded ahead with his ‘kitchen cabinet’s’ consensus on involving the US.[791] According to a key member of the ‘kitchen cabinet’, ‘The call was made in line with the inner circle’s thinking about the need for an honorable withdrawal.’[792] He explained, ‘Since the Americans kept telling Nawaz Sharif there was a peaceful way of settling this issue, the idea was to suck them in to help settle Kargil peacefully.’ The ‘kitchen cabinet’ believed ‘it was preferable to talk to the US, not to the Indians, because talking to the Indians was like insulting the honest brokers [US]’.[793]

................................................................................................

"Sharif’s Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz, was not in this inner loop. He was not even remotely clued into his PM’s decision to explore the withdrawal option with Clinton. Therefore, when on arrival from Burkina Faso, when he was asked to comment on US Ambassador Milam’s statement that US ‘perceived flexibility’ in Pakistan’s position on the Kargil issue, Sartaj merely reaffirmed the existing position that the Kargil flare-up was not of Pakistan’s doing. He told reporters, ‘I think there is no flexibility or new position. Pakistan has always respected the LOC … The question is: What is the LOC? Who is sitting there? It needs verification and these violations on LOC, on either side, Pakistan side or Indian side, should be corrected. As far as Pakistan Army is concerned, it has not violated the LOC … We have invited UN observers that they should come and see where the LOC is. If anybody had violated it, it should be corrected.’[794]"

The paki lies, right there.

"At the prime minister’s family home in Raiwind, the prime minister, his father, and his younger brother, vigorously discussed the Sharif’s decision to go to Washington. At the DCC, there had been no discussion at all on a possible immediate Washington trip. It seems that major policy matters, which were not even brought up in constitutionally mandated forums, such as the DCC, were to be debated by the members of the ‘first family’ in their private home. The prime minister’s younger brother, a key political player and the chief minister of Punjab, vehemently opposed Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington. He opposed it ‘tooth and nail’. He argued that the PM’s attempt at closure would be portrayed by the Army as the squandering of a military victory by the civilians. The prime minister’s elderly father, Mian Mohammad Sharif, who often influenced key national decisions taken by his son, disagreed with the younger son. He supported the Nawaz Sharif’s decision to fly to Washington. He saw the Washington trip as ‘an effort to get Pakistan out of trouble’. Mian Mohammad believed that the developments in Kargil had landed the country, much like a family, in trouble and, therefore, it was required by the chief executive as head of the family to get the family out of trouble. Shehbaz was emphatic that, if the trip to Washington had to be made, it was important that the army chief be taken along for the 4 July meeting, so that the withdrawal agreement would not been seen as a ‘sell-out by the civilians’. The prime minister agreed. However, in subsequent conversations with his two close aides, Saeed Mehdi and Chaudhry Nisar, he became convinced otherwise. The prime minister felt that, if he, the elected prime minister, took the army chief along with him to Washington, the Clinton administration would conclude that, since the prime minister moved nowhere without the army chief, it would be better to cut Sharif out and directly deal with Musharraf.[795] Shehbaz’s suggestion to take along the army chief was torpedoed. The PM only went along with his brother’s decision to take the army chief ‘into confidence’. Sharif instructed his military secretary to later put a call through to Musharraf. The army chief was spending the weekend in the hills in Murree."

................................................................................................

"After the plan was made, phones started ringing. The prime minister was seeking attendance for an unusual meeting at the Islamabad airport. ... The participants of the ‘airport’ meeting were to be informed of the chief executive’s meeting with the US President. Actually, the finalization of Pakistan’s Kargil strategy was now to take place in Washington at the Sharif-Clinton meeting.

"In its 9pm news bulletin, Pakistan Television (PTV), the state-run television service, announced Sharif’s departure. The Foreign Office also issued a late night press statement. ... The Orwellian machine was at work. There was no mention of the word Kargil in the statement. ... "

................................................................................................

" ... A strong Congressional resolution censuring Pakistan had been passed. ... "

"Ambassador Milam was the next one to know about the trip. Late night on a holiday, Milam received a call from an unlikely caller with an unlikely request. The Foreign Office spokesman, Tariq Altaf, wanted US visas. Milam was obliging. ‘Sure, send your passport in on Monday,’ he told the FO spokesman. But Altaf wanted 30 visas right away so that the delegation could board the PM’s plane! That was the first Milam heard of his President’s meeting with the Pakistani prime minister. He was not in the loop. That evening, the US embassy issued visas to around 30 people accompanying Nawaz Sharif. But, before doing that, Milam called Karl Inderfurth and ‘screamed about not being told of Sharif’s visit’. Inderfurth too pleaded ignorance. The State Department too had not been informed in advance by the White House.[802]

" ... Sharif had planned his 4 July trip with the surprise and speed of a guerrilla operation. He planned the end of the Kargil Operation in the kind of secrecy in which it had been launched. ... "

Was he apprehensive of an assassination to prevent such an outcome? 

"Around 12:30am, the prime minister left Lahore for Islamabad. ... Upon meeting the prime minister, a surprised Musharraf had remarked that he had no clue about the trip. Sharif explained it had been suddenly planned. Musharraf supported the idea of including the Americans and, hence, the Sharif trip. Musharraf again reassured his commander-in-chief regarding the military situation. He said, ‘There is no pressure on us …we can sustain our position. So, please do not take any pressure.’"

" ... Sharif explained in the meeting that he had spoken to Clinton three times and that Clinton was keen to resolve the problem. The prime minister also said that the theatre of war would spread and, given that India and Pakistan were nuclear powers, it could be a disaster. ... The army chief urged the prime minister to ‘get the best deal’.[803] He was not opposed to Nawaz Sharif’s Washington trip. In fact, he supported the move to engage the Americans, whom he believed could help Pakistan leverage its hold over Kargil to extract a favorable commitment from India towards a Kashmir resolution. In fact, Musharraf’s 26 June statement that a Sharif-Clinton meeting may be on the cards had been widely reported in the local press.[804] After the PM’s plane took off, the army chief and the DG ISI left together for Murree."

................................................................................................

"The army chief’s reading of the military situation completely contrasted with that of the two military men in Nawaz Sharif’s inner circle: the defense secretary, a former general, and the DG ISI, a serving Engineers Corps general. These two believed that militarily India was beginning to gain the upper hand and that Tiger Hill had already been lost. Through formal and informal channels, they had begun informing the prime minister and his key cabinet members that the Pakistani forces had been pushed back from at least half the positions they had earlier occupied in the Operation.

"In the civilian political camp, there was no doubt left that Pakistan’s military operation in Kargil had to end. Withdrawal was the only option. The naval and air force chiefs also shared this view. The cumulative effect of the key developments during the last week of June had contributed to this conclusion. ... "

"In Washington, meanwhile, after the Sharif-Clinton telephone conversation, the White House announced the meeting. A White House statement noted, ‘All agreed that the situation is dangerous and could escalate if not resolved quickly. At the prime minister’s request the President will meet him at the Blair House ... to discuss how to resolve the immediate situation.’[805] ... "

................................................................................................

"While there were two kinds of views reflected in the media, the skeptical and the triumphal, it was the latter that had captured the public imagination. The expectation was that Pakistan would successfully pressurize Delhi into working on an early settlement of the Kashmir issue. Given the contradictory and contending assertions constantly made by different institutions, the majority of the reporters and commentators were unable to ascertain the facts of the situation. Most veered towards triumphalism. The average Pakistani mind was in the grip of official propaganda ... "

Author lies again, despite having given the facts clearly, in quoting from " ... Editorial, The Nation, 1 July 1999. ... ", including -

" ... Indian government which felt confident of its ability to suppress the freedom fighters, refused to talk at all. ... "

One, pakis were lying about the intruders being not paki military, and author has confirmed from beginning that it was paki military occupying the peaks in a move to cut off Kashmir into parts so pakis could, not only kill Indians via shelling, but by starving the Indian soldiers to death. 

Two, pakis lying regardless, it's no "freedom fighters" but terrorists that have been sent by pakis across border to inflict death and mayhem in India from Kashmir to South India. 

................................................................................................

Further lies quoted by author, for most of the next pages in the chapter, including abuse heaped on India due to pakis lying to everyone - a sample here. 

"‘It can be confirmed on the basis of sound evidence that not a single Pakistani soldier is present inside Kashmir across the LOC. Such allegations by India are patently absurd and an attempt to cover up her own designs. Pakistan would be insane in sending its soldiery into a highly disputed and disturbed area … Those opposing the Indian aggression in the Drass-Kargil area are the docile and peace-loving sons of the soil in Kashmir who have been driven to take up arms to defend their rights, honour, and dignity in the face of brutal Indian aggression ... The on-going Indian bellicosity is a matter of deep concern to the world … India has shut the diplomatic doors the way Hitler did in 1938–39.’ General (retd) Khalid Mahmud Arif in ‘What Realism Demands’, Dawn, 3 July 1999."

................................................................................................

" ... Some members, however, believed the prime minister should have held a cabinet meeting before leaving. Concern was expressed about the political orientation of the cabinet members accompanying the prime minister, specifically that, instead of all ‘doves’, some ‘hawks’ too should have been taken. Those worried about the developments in Kargil were supportive of Sharif’s decision to take ‘peace birds and not eagles’,[827] as he landed in Washington to avert what they believed was an impending disaster. 

"The public was less sanguine. The media was filled with reports of the Pakistan Army’s impregnable position in Kargil. The public was sensing a victory of sorts. Hence, the street talk over Kargil was expressed apprehensions that ‘what the military has gained in the lingering battle along the LOC may be given a serious jolt by the political leaders and diplomats’.[828] The news of Sharif’s departure had hit them hard. They wanted the prime minister to be ‘bold’ while in Washington. There was no constituency for war with India, only for peace. Nevertheless, they wanted a ‘historic lesson’ be given to India, in case it opted for aggression towards Pakistan. Kargil was seen as a provocation by India.[829]"

"The former army chief criticized the government for its ‘apologetic’ position, that its troops had not crossed the LOC, and that it was not supporting the Mujahedeen. Such a position, he argued, enabled India to plan ‘an all-pronged decisive encounter’ with the Mujahedeen to reverse the situation in its favor. ‘What indeed is ironic is that the Mujahedeen’s heroic success, which could have been channelized into strategic advantages, has been squandered away.’"

And the invader heritage is even more obvious in next. 

"Another commentator wrote, ‘Whatever the exact reason for the Washington dash by Nawaz Sharif, Pakistanis expect that decisions relating to national interest are made in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif needs to return from his Washington dash with his credentials intact as a man who stands firm on national security issues and does not cave in to external pressure. This will be possible if Nawaz Sharif manages either; (i) to get a public declaration from President Clinton that a settlement is only possible if India makes an American underwritten public commitment to resolving the Kashmir problem within a specific time frame and agree on increased UNMOGIP presence in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, or (ii) to publicly declare before leaving Washington that as a country committed to abiding by UN laws, resolutions and international treaties, Pakistan and the Mujahideen seek a solution to Kashmir issue, the basis for the Kargil eruption. In case India is not prepared, Pakistan and the Mujahideen are willing and capable of holding on to their positions in the Kargil-Drass area until it hurts the Indians enough to want to talk provided the military situation is not reversed.[832]"

................................................................................................

" ... As soon as flight PK 761 made its usual refuelling stop at Shannon, the prime minister called his trusted ambassador, Riaz Khokhar, to Washington. He wanted to know from his ambassador if a one-on-one meeting with Clinton had been fixed.[833] The answer was negative. Clearly, there were more than just policy matters that a worried Sharif was keen to discuss with Clinton, matters that he only wanted to discuss in complete confidentiality. Nawaz Sharif was seeking ‘political cover’ to deal with what he feared may be the domestic fallout of what he was about to agree to. Within the domestic context, it was the Army’s reaction that he was most concerned about. He realized that the Army was not keen to leave Kargil and felt that his decision to withdraw troops from there could threaten his survival as prime minister. He hoped Clinton would bail him out on the domestic front."

"The Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar, received the prime minister at the airport. Washington had sought Saudi ‘help’ to bring Kargil to a close. The Americans had found Nawaz Sharif trying till the end to extract some commitment, some concession, from the Americans on Kashmir as the quid pro quo for vacating Kargil. Washington’s response to this was to engineer compound pressure on the Pakistani prime minister to vacate Kargil immediately and unconditionally.[834] Pakistan’s key strategic ally Beijing had already been contacted. Beijing and Washington were in agreement that Pakistan had to withdraw unilaterally. However, it was Saudi Arabia, the provider ‘of usually discounted oil to Pakistan,’ which Washington believed would be most effective in ‘pushing Pakistan in the right direction’.[835]

"The United States government was represented by the US Chief of Protocol. The prime minister travelled to Blair House with Prince Bandar. In Washington, before delivering Nawaz Sharif to Blair House, Prince Bandar briefed Sharif on the mood in Washington and stressed that nothing less than an agreement to withdraw from Kargil was expected.[836]"

................................................................................................

Over and over, author portrays US as eager and desperate to please India! But such a slant on this affair, kargil, implies clearly that Pakistan not only think thst their lies must be taken at par with or higher than facts, but imagine that the whole world must agree with this position, unless they are trying to please India! 

" ... Americans realized that ‘Indians were extremely skeptical that we will succeed and suspicious about what we were doing’. Only a success would have convinced the Indians of what the Americans kept telling Delhi they were doing ‘to get Pakistan to back down’."

When do pakis plan to learn that a Rottweiler used at Auschwitz isn't an icon worshipped through the world! 

................................................................................................

" ... First the two met with their aides. Nawaz Sharif was joined by the Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz and Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed. Clinton was assisted by National Security advisor Sandy Burger, assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Karl F. Inderfurth and a senior National security council official handling South Asian affairs Bruce Riedel. This meeting with aides lasted for barely five to seven minutes. It was followed by an almost two-hour long meeting between Clinton and Nawaz. While Clinton was joined by Bruce Riedel as a note taker, Nawaz Sharif went in without one. He did not want one.[838] Unknowing of this fact the Pakistan Foreign Office team insisted that their prime minister be treated on an equal basis with the host and also be accompanied by his aide to the meeting. It lasted approximately two hours. Clinton began by telling Sharif why Kargil was a blunder and how two nuclear powers were almost at the brink of war. Clinton told Sharif that he had information that the Pakistan Army had begun preparation to use nuclear weapons. Sharif said he was unaware of any such move. As a nuclear power, Clinton said, the international community expected Pakistan to behave more responsibly. ... "

"In the plain talking during his meeting with the Pakistani prime minister, the US President also demanded his government’s full cooperation in capturing OBL. Clinton in his memoirs recalls, ‘On 4 July, I also told Sharif that unless he did more to help I would have to announce Pakistan was in effect supporting terrorism in Afghanistan.’[839] Clinton was basing his assertions on the information and analysis provided by CIA’s Counter-terrorist Center. Pakistan was identified as the principal supporter of the Taliban, the principal protectors of OBL. Significantly, on the very day of his meeting with the Pakistani prime minister, Clinton announced sanctions against the Taliban. He subsequently wrote, ‘On the day I met Sharif, I also signed an executive order placing economic sanctions on the Taliban, freezing its assets, and prohibiting commercial exchanges.’

"Significantly, there was no discussion between Nawaz Sharif and the Foreign Office team before the Clinton meeting regarding the formulation of the statement that he and Clinton would sign. The Foreign Office team had prepared a Pakistani version of a draft agreement. The Americans were determined to stay with their own version."

" ... Sharif carefully chose his words so as not to directly implicate anyone but kept saying that it was an operation that ‘got out of control’. He did, however, distance himself from the Operation. The striking contrast in the self-confidence of the two interlocutors could not have been lost. While one was backed by a unified and competently functioning government, the other was pretty much on a solo flight."

Perhaps the paragraph above was written so as to depict paki PM’s position as more sympathetic, but the result for any reader not schooled in lies by Pakistan is a disbelief at such an expectation. A democratic nation must function in a manner where the leader and the government function in tandem, not where the civilian leade us a mannequin in dressing window while owner is the terrorist in the back room. 

................................................................................................

Author has novel ways of lying, while seeming technically correct. 

"Nawaz Sharif was insisting that Clinton help him to get out of the crisis. An anxious Sharif’s long rambling on diplomacy with China and with Indian intermediaries was to establish his bona fides as a man in search of a solution. He was like a man who ‘wanted out’ off a train wreck approaching him. At one point, Sharif asked Clinton for a one-on-one meeting. Clinton declined. The Pakistani prime minister was told that the note-taker, Bruce Riedel, would not leave his President. US government rules made it obligatory upon Clinton to have this historic meeting documented. The President of the USA was not free to have his way. He could not act upon his whims."

The last two lines seem to imply that a US president refuses an unreasonable request by a terrorist nation only due to the said US president being "not free to have his way", and his whims must be nothing other than to please the said terrorist nation. 

Which is ridiculous. 

Clearly it was necessary for the US President to, not only follow protocol in this case, but be not seen as complicit with a terrorist nation invading a neighbour, or even be questioned subsequently as to veracity of his account, if pakis chose to lie for any reason. 

As to whims, there must have been a few million that the president could have indulged in at the time, and freely so, without any question of disturbing any protocol. 

................................................................................................

"During the break between the two sessions of the Sharif-Clinton meeting, Sharif’s team found him to be a ‘drained man’. He has been badgered by Clinton’s queries and hard talk on Kargil, OBL, etc. No less was the tension of what he was doing: giving a commitment for a Pakistani retreat from what the military was still publicly projecting as a successful occupation. In fact, during the meeting, the TV in the room was telecasting news of the fall of a strategically important peak, the Tiger Hill. During the break, the prime minister called his army chief to confirm news of the fall of the Tiger Hill.[841]"

" ... The Foreign Office team still ‘offered’ a few amendments to the draft. Sharif was extremely reluctant to take them to Clinton. He said he had been told it was a take it or leave it situation. His team still urged Sharif to ‘not give in’. They were all aware that their internal discussions were being monitored. The Americans knew what they were trying to convince Sharif to do, since the room they were sitting in was ‘not only bugged but also had cameras in it’. Sharif promised his team to make one last effort.

"The 4 July meeting was turned into a battle of nerves. Clinton was well prepared for this battle while the Pakistani prime minister had arrived in Washington having already lost his nerve, owing to what he believed were the Kargil reversals. Sharif had left Islamabad in panic and entered the Clinton meeting with a major psychological handicap. Clinton saw sitting before him a needy and desperate man, not a negotiator. The Americans too found Sharif nervous. In fact, they believed his decision to ‘invite himself at short notice and bringing the family along opened the possibility of his staying back in Washington in case the Army took over in his absence’.[843] ... "

................................................................................................

"Tough times test leadership mettle and a state’s collective institutional competence. Sharif’s mettle was being severely tested. He had opted to do mostly a lone act, nearly a personal operation, on the entire 4 July summit, from planning to execution. He had drawn on external wisdom and an external platform. He seemed to have banked on a major external power even for the political strength required for his 4 July decision. This bail-out operation, as Sharif saw it, of a medium-sized power by the major global power, was a page out of Wallerstein’s classic center-periphery relationship. The ‘comprador’ politician was at play, exposing so starkly the heavy interconnectedness between Pakistan’s internal power game and the global center, with the levers of control heavily tilted in the latter’s favor. Nothing could more acutely demonstrate Pakistan’s systemic weakness as a state run by those with scarce appreciation of institutional decision-making."

That's verbose rephrasing of a failed attempt by Pakistan to do another Munich, failed because they were pretending that they had a democracy and they weren't invading another neighbour after wrecking one, and they hadn't realised that such pretense doesn't wash in era of satellites observations of global goings-on. 

................................................................................................

"The meeting ended with the decision that Pakistan would withdraw its troops behind the LOC to the pre-Operation position. ... "

"The withdrawal discussion had not included any talk about safe passage for the withdrawing Pakistani forces. ... Sharif did not raise any question about safe passage for withdrawing troops.[846] Evidently, it was not an issue that had occupied his mind, nor was it part of the talking points that his Foreign Office team had prepared. This issue escaped their respective radars because the premise from which it would logically flow, the Pakistani forces actually battling in Kargil and now their withdrawal, did not exist in their articulated consciousness. This kind of denial meant major lapses in policy-making. ... "

"Clinton, as part of a premeditated strategy, used this moment of Sharif’s utter vulnerability to aggressively raise the issue of the Osama bin Laden and the alleged ISI connection.[850] Before Sharif sat the man who had been told that Pakistan was at the center of supporting the Taliban and by extension the OBL network. This network, according to the CIA, was functioning in 60 different countries and was directly responsible for attacks on American embassies. Clinton reminded Nawaz Sharif that he had ‘asked repeatedly for Pakistani help to bring Osama bin Laden to justice from Afghanistan’ and that Sharif had ‘promised often to do so, but had done nothing. Instead, the ISI worked with OBL and the Taliban to foment terrorism’. Sharif had made a personal commitment to Clinton in December 1998 to help the United States in capturing OBL, but had not followed through on it.[851] ... Clinton threatened to tell the world of Pakistan’s support to bin Laden if Pakistan’s help in capturing him was not forthcoming.[852] The Pakistani prime minister reassured the US President that he would now follow through on his earlier commitment. ... "

................................................................................................

"Around 3pm, the Sharif-Clinton meeting concluded. The Pakistani prime minister had agreed to sign a statement which amounted to a global broadcast and an irrevocable documentation by the government of Pakistan that the Kargil Operation had been a mistake."

"The Washington Statement had no legal value but it reflected the personal commitment, binding on the State of Pakistan, made by the prime minister to the global community. It was not a bilateral statement between two interlocutors directly engaged in conflict which would have made the undertaking in the agreement binding. Instead, it was a one-sided statement binding only one interlocutor to take action, committing itself to the actionable portion of the agreement. While Pakistan committed itself to unconditional withdrawal from Kargil, the other interlocutor, Bill Clinton, made a statement of non-statist personal intent regarding his involvement in trying to resolve the Kashmir dispute."

"Behind the scenes, US officials were making two supplementary points. The first was that, although the statement did not mention Pakistani troops, the Americans believed ‘Pakistani soldiers are directly involved in the conflict’. The second point was the need for quick action on Pakistan’s part. US officials publicly stated, ‘Our understanding is that there will be a withdrawal of the forces now … we want to see steps taken very quickly.’[859] The Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman, meanwhile, took the position that Pakistan had not agreed to call back anyone from Kargil. He had told the press corps in Washington, ‘There is neither mention of people, nor return of anything in the Joint Statement.’[860]

"When the prime minister returned to the hotel, Shehbaz Sharif called. Quite agitated, he told the prime minister that Punjab would just not take it and the people would be out on the streets. ... Experienced diplomats held that ‘Pakistan had been cornered and Nawaz Sharif had moved with alacrity’.[862] Its critics labelled it as a ‘political cover’[863] sought by the prime minister for regime survival."

" ... On the morning of 5 July, Sharif, his wife, and children toured the White House and had a photo op with the Clintons."

" ... By the evening, Nawaz Sharif and his family, accompanied by the Saudi Ambassador, Prince Bandar, left for London in the Saudi Ambassador’s airplane."

................................................................................................

"During the London stopover, the real newsmaker was Pakistan’s articulate Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz. In a BBC Hard Talk interview, Sartaj declared that the reference in the 4 July statement to ‘upholding the sanctity of the LOC’ also implied that India must vacate the Siachen Glacier it had illegally occupied in 1984. A rapid rebuttal from Washington stated that the 4 July Statement was only about Kargil, that the US believed in the sanctity of the entire LOC but of immediate interest was the resolution of the Kargil conflict."

" ... Admittedly, the overwhelming deployment of Indian artillery and air power could not have allowed Pakistani troops to hold the peaks for much longer ... "

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

Another lie by author. 

"Sharif’s Washington dash had earned him a statement with no face-saver for Pakistan. Sharif, in his pre-departure telephone conversation, had been clearly told by Clinton to expect no more and had seemed OK with that. In fact, he had cancelled the crucial meeting of the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) scheduled for July 5, whose agenda had been the Kargil Operation. With input of all stakeholders, the prime minister was to decide on how to draw curtains on Operation Koh Paima. However, at this crucial juncture in Pakistan’s history, Sharif had walked away from collective institutional decision-making. Instead, he headed to Washington."

Since Kargil invasion by paki army wasn't a collective decision, or even had the pm kept informed as in was executed, what is author blaming the pm for? He'd lost face internationally, if pakis as a nation ever had such a thing, for something that had been done without him being informed! If anything, he was more akin to a toddler of Munich blamed for Dachau! 

................................................................................................

" ... Only in private conversations did the army chief and others of the Kargil clique concede rising Pakistani casualties and logistical difficulties. Beginning mid-June, there was guarded conversation within the army command of the crisis of logistics, high casualties, and India’s very heavy force deployment. Reports about this alarming situation were trickling in from the front. Nevertheless, at the 2 July meeting the army chief had insisted that, despite rising Pakistani casualties, compromised logistical supplies, and India’s re-taking of the strategically located Tololing and Tiger Hill posts, it was not a militarily unsustainable position. No hard questioning or holistic discussion had followed. While moments of acrimony between the prime minister and the army chief did occur, the amiable Chaudhry Shujaat had intervened to cool off matters. Thus, policy matters had remained unsettled."

" ... disturbing questions may have crossed Sharif’s mind: what fate awaited him on his return to Pakistan? Would he be able to implement the 4 July statement? How would the army command respond to the 4 July statement? In a country in whose sixty-five year history the military had subverted the Constitution three times to remove an elected civilian ruler, ... In the White House, Clinton’s aide Bruce Riedel had made the dramatic deduction that the Pakistani prime minister had arrived in Washington with his family because, after agreeing on troop withdrawal from Kargil, he was hesitant to return to Pakistan because of fear of the army command."

Author isn't being explicit. After 1971, Bhutto, the pm of a leftover Pakistan, had been executed by an army chief after a coup, using what passes for law machinery of pak for the purpose. 

................................................................................................

"The general assumption was that the army command would resist unconditional withdrawal. All attention was riveted on the response of the individual and of the institution: the army chief, and the army. Without their support Sharif could not fulfill his commitment of an unconditional withdrawal from the Kargil heights. 

"In Pakistan, however, matters unfolded in many shades of grey. Even before the prime minister arrived in Islamabad, his army chief had publicly supported the prime minister’s Washington decision. Mindful of the untenable situation at the front, Musharraf had told the press, “There is complete harmony between the government and the armed forces."[876] He asserted a complete understanding between the government and army about the prime minister’s Washington mission.[877] ... "

" ... According to this official narrative the withdrawal mechanics involved the Cabinet requesting the supposed Kashmiri guerrillas who had occupied the Kargil heights to withdraw and the guerillas acceding to the withdrawal.[880] ... "

"On the question of safe withdrawal, the ISPR brigadier claimed incorrectly, “During the last 12 hours there has been no aerial activity and artillery fighting in the Kargil sector.”[883] And then came the inexplicable claim, ”They are fully capable of looking after themselves.”"

................................................................................................

" ... In the somewhat sullen silence that followed, one general did point out, “Sir, they (the Indians) are celebrating.” Many present in the room must have recalled the army chief’s 16 May assurance that Pakistan was in a “win-win” situation in Kargil as its positions were “unassailable.” Words did not matter. The original and vocal critics of Kargil, including commanders 1 Corps General Saleem Haider, Quetta corps General Tariq Pervez and other had been proven right.  Also, with restive troops and reports of low morale, especially of those who had participated in the Operation, the army chief had a huge task before him."

"It was going to be a hard sell, since government rhetoric had built a public perception since end May of victories for the Mujahedeen fighting Indian troops in the Kargil-Drass area. ... According to media reports based on official sources, Delhi was in a very difficult position since its troops were facing the danger of starvation in Siachen if the blockade of the Drass-Kargil Road continued. In fact, after the Washington agreement, the army spokesman said, “There is no change in ground realities as Drass-Kargil Road is still in range of Pakistani artillery fire…”"

" ... People drew a parallel with the 1965 events, when Pakistan was about to “liberate the whole of Kashmir...when Pakistani leaders succumbed to world pressure and stopped the military operation and we are facing a similar situation now...”[884] ... "

What is the author talking about, or just lies as usual by paki government to pakis? 

Indian tanks had been in centre of Lahore in 1965! 

................................................................................................

"Politicians fully capitalized on this anti-Nawaz mood. Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP), Pakistan’s leading opposition party, was critical of the prime minister for carrying out secret negotiations with Clinton. The MQM also opposed the Washington agreement as a ‘sell out of Kashmir.”[887] It demanded details of the Sharif-Clinton talks and said that an agreement on withdrawal “without a quid pro quo” would be a “a serious disappointment for the nation.”[888] The Jamaat-i-Islami, a right-wing party, who had protested in Lahore against the Lahore summit, was predictably critical of the prime minister. Its leader Munawar Hassan said the Washington statement was “treachery.” ... "

" ... PTI leader Abdus Sattar,[890] with forty years as Pakistan’s top diplomat behind him, predicted that Sharif “will be ousted from power like former rulers ... Regarding the 4 July agreement Sattar said while the army would carry out out orders of the political government in the given environment, the agreement applied to the Mujahideen, not to the Pakistan Army. Sattar merely repeated Pakistan’s official position as he claimed “they (the army) are on the LOC and you cannot ask them to vacate.”[893]"

" ... Gul warned the lawyers at the Lahore High Court Bar that the ... agreement dictated by the US. “We are not an American state…we should not follow American instructions blindly…”[899] He warned of a clash in case the Mujahedeen refused to withdraw from their positions in Kargil. ... "

Funny, he wasn't aware either, that it was all paki military in pajamas, asked to pretend they were terrorists - and disowned by pakis in life and death! 

"All the talk of Mujahideen disengaging or not was all fiction. The Mujahideen, were not involved. Op KP had no support by Hurriyat , ISI or the ongoing struggle in Kashmir creating rear area insecurity; a repeat of a Operation Gibraltar."

................................................................................................

"While the main thrust of all criticism targeting the Prime Minster was that he was responsible for Pakistan’s humiliation, some of Sharif’s cabinet members also rose to his defense. His close confidante, the Minister for Provincial Coordination and Political Affairs, was quick to retort to the critics, “The record of these generals is self-evident.” He reminded them that “in their period of leadership, the enemy occupied Siachen glacier. And so where was their military capability and patriotism then?” [908] The beginnings of a civil-military confrontation were discernable. A Sharif loyalist, General Javed Nasir, who had been appointed by Sharif as ISI chief, also supported the withdrawal. He wrote in Pakistan’s most widely read Urdu daily Jang, praising Sharif’s withdrawal decision, even though this former spy chief had equally vehemently supported the Kargil operation. In his Jang piece, he praised Sharif’s India policy and wrote that the prime minister had “spared no effort for the peace offensive, which he had launched on 21 February 1999 in the form of the Lahore Declaration. Privately, he has also been expressing the desire that we should enter the new millennium with pride and that Allah has ordained the Muslims to serve as an example worth following for the world.”[909] The spin did not work."

That last sentence betrays the author's own slant. 

................................................................................................

" ... The million-dollar question, raised in subdued tones since mid-June, was: “With whose permission was Kargil initiated?”"

"With ISPR the only source of all Kargil-related information their version of Kargil was the only reality the press knew. Hence, pressmen had not been privy to the ground situation, which had tilted in India’s favor. Having lost Tololing posts by the middle of June, Pakistani troops had also lost posts on the strategically located Tiger Hill. The Adjutant General branch at the GHQ had been getting reports of increasing casualties. Even the worried Kargil clique was deeply concerned over mounting deaths of senior colleagues.[910] Supply lines had come under enemy attack, making it difficult to maintain supplies to the posts. A catch-22 situation has been created. Neither was troop pullout possible nor was managing critical logistical supplies.

"The shortage of food had meant that some soldiers even had to resort to eating grass.[911] Ill-equipped, underfed, and frost-bitten, many soldiers had been surrounded by Indian infantry and come under artillery and aerial attacks. The inevitable question was: Where would this continued battle on the world’s highest and most vicious battleground have led? In the face of overwhelming force deployment by the Indians, the troops across the LOC would have either been killed or captured by the Indians."

Another lie there by author, in that "would have" bit. They were, in fact, killed or captured in quantities enough to inform India that they were paki soldiers being denied by pakis. 

................................................................................................

"The news of the prime minister’s effort to end the battle evoked a mixed response among those in the battle-zone. When the news of withdrawal blared from their wireless sets, it was received by many with a sense of relief. Most field commanders were not surprised. Some even prayed for Nawaz Sharif’s long life when they heard of the 4 July agreement.[912] They were losing their colleagues while India was beginning to succeed in reclaiming the peaks and ridges. They knew the balance of forces and numbers was heavily tilted in India’s favor.

"Nevertheless, fighting in the inhospitable terrain under terrible conditions, the question uppermost in the minds of many soldiers was: What had been the purpose of the Operation and of the battle that followed? If a unilateral withdrawal was the final outcome, why the sacrifices? At posts where the young and courageous soldiers had not experienced reversals, many were unable to understand the compulsion to withdraw. There was frustration. ... many could not understand why their country did not own them. Why were the dead bodies of their martyred colleagues not being received and honoured? Many also wondered why a seeming victory was being squandered and was turning into a surrender, and that too a globally broadcast surrender?"

"Predictably when the Kargil battle came to a close no official casualty figures were issued. The pretence of no Pakistani troop involvement also meant that accepting bodies of martyred soldiers would be difficult. Even during the withdrawal, the Indians claimed that they buried “army soldiers of 12 Northern Light Infantry, who had been killed at Point 4875” in the battle to reclaim posts in Drass sector.[926] Also, while several guesstimates were made, the government issued no official casualty figures. For example, in Pakistan, the military quoted the figure of around 500 deaths, while there was talk of an estimated one thousand Pakistani casualties. The prime minister claimed there were more than thousand casualties.[927] Senior military officers claimed the worried army chief had shared a figure of one thousand casualties.[928] The war martyrs issue and their number came up when the army chief sought a rehabilitation budget for families of martyrs and veterans."

" ... Towards end-July, however, the army command changed its policy on receiving bodies of their fallen men because of Colonel Sher Khan. ... "

................................................................................................

"Pakistan continued with its disingenuous approach of claiming that the Mujahedeen, not its army, were present in the mountains. ... "

Author invents words - or sentences, paragraphs - to label the paki lies. 

" ... Meanwhile, at the July 11 joint presser, while giving an update on the withdrawal along with the ISPR’s Brigadier Rashid, foreign minister Aziz claimed, “In the past few weeks the Mujahedeen action has been gloriously successful as the just and legitimate cause of Kashmir has engaged the international community’s undivided attention throughout the period.”[933] The brigadier also recounted the Mujahedeen’s military victories over the Indians, who, he claimed, were suffering from “sagging morale.” If the Indian morale was “sagging” and the Mujahiedeen were “gloriously successful, then why the 4 July agreement?"

Precisely. 

As Molotov, fed up with nazi lies about RAF never daring to bomb Berlin and Berlin being completely safe, had asked his host who'd hurried him from dinner to shelter,  due to a precisely timed RAF raid - "so why are we hiding in this shelter, and whose bombs are these that are falling around us?"

................................................................................................

Author extensively quotes statements then issued from various terrorist organisations, based in or supported by pak, and their mouthpieces or leaders. 

"These endless statements claiming Mujahedeen presence also clashed with the widely known facts about Pakistani soldiers fighting in Kargil. Pakistan continued to spin this bizarre narrative. While the prime minister’s trusted bureaucrat Tariq Fatemi told the Indians we are “rolling our beds” and the Pakistan and Indian DGMOs were in contact coordinating Pakistani troops withdrawal and the international community was also commenting on Pakistani troop withdrawal, Islamabad was making a parallel stream of statements claiming that Pakistan had in fact requested the Mujahedeen groups fighting in Kargil-Drass, to withdraw!"

" ... Finally, when he himself was President, Musharraf opted for full disclosure. He acknowledged in his book that “as few as five battalions in support of freedom fighter groups, were able to compel the Indians to employ more than four divisions…”[944] In fact, adding a new dimension, the former army chief also claimed it was the “Pakistani freedom fighters”[945] who had occupied the front-line positions."

................................................................................................

" ... Woven into the criticism was also the demand that Pakistan should not allow its territory to be used for action against the Taliban and bin Laden. ... "

" ... While the prime minister believed he had, through the Washington Statement, pulled the ‘chestnuts out of fire,’ the weaknesses of the Kargil Operation and the consequent strategic, diplomatic, and institutional costs to the State of Pakistan were evident. As noted earlier, at the 2 July DCC meeting, the prime minister had criticized the operation. Within the domestic context too Sharif wanted civilian leadership to formulate and project his government’s public policy on the Kargil and post-Kargil developments. On the external front, the civilian government had begun to determine ways to deal with the diplomatic and strategic fallout of Kargil. In the minds of the authors of Kargil, who were grudgingly cognizant of Sharif’s intentions while also being sensitive to the simmering resentment within their own institution, civil-military tension was inevitable. The army leadership was nervous about Sharif’s next move. There was apprehension that the army chief may be dismissed, as newspaper columnists close to the government were demanding."

" ... Despite the Sharif-Musharraf publicly stated common positions, the subtext of the khaki narrative was that Kargil, a great military victory was turned into a defeat. The Sharif government saw it as a khaki-authored disaster that Sharif’s 4 July Washington visit had helped to curtail."

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

"The Kargil blunder proved that there could be exceptions to the maxim ‘failure is an orphan’. As the country’s chief executive, it was Sharif who was left to deal with the fallout of the Kargil blunder. He publicly adopted the failed Operation KP as his own, while its actual architects were not only refusing to accept exclusive responsibility but were surreptitiously feeding the myth that it was a success and that, hence, the 4 July withdrawal decision was a wrong one. Against the backdrop of the multiple critiques of the Operation, its architects went into a veiled offensive defense mode. ... The almost surreal elements of the Operation itself included the government insistence that the Mujahideen had carried out the Operation, to Pakistan’s refusal to accept dead bodies of martyred soldiers, to the post-4 July announcement by the Pakistanis that the Mujahideen have been requested to climb down from the Kargil heights and then publicly complaining that India was attacking the withdrawing Pakistani soldiers. There were too many contradictions to be resolved. Amidst these vacillating positions, gallantry awards were announced for Pakistani soldiers who had fought in Kargil."

" ... While Sharif had bailed out the Army and had shown no inclination to hold the generals accountable for the disaster, the army leadership had decided to launch a systematic propaganda offensive against the prime minister.[959]"

" ... The prime minister recalled in a subsequent interview, ‘I kept asking General Musharraf: After all what did you have in mind when you planned such an Operation?’[964]"

" ... PM had no intention of taking any action against the army leadership. He never once mentioned the need to set up a Kargil Inquiry Commission targeting the army chief. ... Would the military leadership strike through a coup d’état or would the elected prime minister use his constitutional authority to do the unprecedented: fire the second army chief within a one year period. This was the million dollar question doing the rounds."

................................................................................................

"After the 4 July decision to withdraw the jolted morale of sections of the Army began to become apparent. In ways unknown to Pakistan’s highly disciplined Army, many began asking their seniors harsh and angry questions. Bottled up resentment across all ranks began to surface in senior command meetings and, in open forums, younger officers were raising uncomfortable questions. Trained in the elite training institutions to inquire and question, some among the inquisitive and now agitated minds were daring to ask uncomfortable questions.

"For many who participated in this Operation, which was launched secretively and never acknowledged publicly, it was one in which many nameless soldiers were also killed[966] and which had been ended in indecent haste. Many Pakistanis, both civilians and military men, who had not been privy to the facts at the time Nawaz Sharif left for Washington, believed that a military victory had been bartered away at the Washington meeting. The fact that the Indians had already reclaimed at least 50 per cent of the Pakistani occupied posts was not known to many. ‘Why did we go in?’ asked resentful younger soldiers, who were initially getting news of their colleagues occupying unchallenged hundreds of posts deep inside the Indian-held territory. Those who were yearning to go to the front, whose friends had fought and lost their lives, and who were told by their seniors that Operation KP had brought the Indians to their knees, wondered why the political leadership had crafted an ignominious end to the brave and bold winning efforts of their colleagues.

"By August, from within the cracks in the leaden walls of secrecy shrouding the Kargil Operation, sagas of suffering soldiers had started slipping through. Men sent in with backpacks bearing three-day supplies had gone hungry for days as there was minimal or no logistical support for them. Soldiers from 5 NLI had been sent hurriedly from the plains in June straight onto the deadly heights without getting themselves acclimatized and only with backpacks. Indian interdiction of Pakistan’s supply lines through air attacks had succeeded ... And yet Operation KP had extended beyond the original blue print, with men who had been given the green signal to press ahead beyond Koh Paima’s original blueprint to occupy the unprotected heights of Kargil. They faced major food shortages. Kargil veterans talked of surviving on stocks of Energile drink, clumps of grass, and by killing the odd ibex. ‘We were living under survival conditions,’ was how one major recalled their plight. ‘At times, there was even no food to eat. Some even had to eat grass. ... The cumulative blame for the appalling subsistence conditions, most among the troops believed, lay with the High Command, which was oblivious to their miserable plight and was found wanting in its professional responsibilities."

................................................................................................

" ... He mostly received cold, if not aggressive, receptions from the officers. For example, in the Quetta Garrison 41 Division auditorium, a captain asked the visiting army chief, ‘If you had to pull-out in exchange for a Nawaz Sharif and Clinton breakfast meeting, why did you go in?’ Another wanted to know why prime minister Nawaz Sharif had let them down. The Corps Commander Quetta, accompanying the army chief, had to intervene to ask his officers to take it easy. This resentment among the officers sprang from the widely held belief that, by calling off Operation KP when it was virtually impossible for the Indians to militarily dislodge Pakistani troops from their posts, the prime minister had committed a blunder.[969]"

" ... These young warriors had many hard questions. ‘Why did we conduct the Kargil Operation?’ ... The chief refrain was: ‘Who is responsible for this fiasco?’ And the young soldiers wanted to know.

"In rare cases, soldiers lying in delirious conditions on hospital beds even cursed at the commanders visiting the injured. According to one Kargil veteran who, after fighting at the Tiger Hill, lay injured in a hospital in Gilgit, another veteran on the bed next to his shouted and in abusive language cursed the military commanders as they came to visit the injured. ... Another injured brigadier, who had commanded an NLI brigade, was evacuated to Rawalpindi because it was not safe for him to be around the injured and extremely angry troops.[972]"

................................................................................................

"By such public expression of their angry emotions, the young officers and jawans of NLI had broken rigid institutional codes. This was particularly evident at the traditional Darbar gatherings convened by the NLI commander who had led the Kargil operation.

"The soldiers who returned home after almost being trapped in the world’s most inhospitable and treacherous battle field and having a close brush with death had expected heroes’ welcomes. Instead, they felt hurt and unappreciated. Many complained that the media ‘mistreated’ them and the people did not give them ‘the credit’ they deserved. And the withdrawal phase made matters even worse. Failure to ensure a proper scheme of withdrawal, to prevent the unnecessary loss of life to Indian artillery fire, had caused soldiers to feel badly let down. ... "

"In August, angrily weeping families had received Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the army chief in Gilgit with the demand that their sons, brothers, or husbands be brought back, dead or alive. Their anguish stemmed from the extraordinary circumstances. There was no declared war and their men had not announced they were going to the front, and there were dead bodies arriving and, worse, there were highly disturbing Indian media reports that the Pakistani authorities were refusing to accept many of the bodies of their soldiers.

"In July, Pakistan’s Political Counsellor in Delhi, Jalil Abbas Jillani, had received a call from his Indian counterpart asking him to receive the bodies of fallen Pakistani soldiers. Under instructions to refuse, Jillani told Vivek Katju, Additional Secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, that there were no Pakistani soldiers fighting in Kargil. The bodies Indian authorities wanted to handover included the body of captain Kernel Sher Khan who had been awarded the Nishan-i-Haider, the highest military award. By the end of July, these instructions to the Pakistan High Commission were changed and they had begun accepting the bodies. As Islamabad accused Delhi of torturing Pakistani soldiers, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesman offered to handover several Pakistani soldiers, captured in Kargil, to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[973]

................................................................................................

"The increasing resentment among the officers and the jawans was no secret. The army chief, keen to rebuild the troop morale and their esprit de corps, chose unique ways to do so. Musharraf ordered that a camp fire be organized for the troops where, sitting around the fire, they recounted their battle stories and sang songs. The chief also danced to some songs. At the conclusion of the campfire, Walkmans were distributed among about 450 soldiers.[974] 

"The army chief decided to be with the troops. As a special morale-boosting gesture in July, Musharraf spent a night with the SSG battalion. In three MI-17s helicopters, the battalion was flown to Chota Deosai. A campfire was arranged with music and food and the chief spent the night with soldiers from 12-NLI and 5-NLI. The commander 10 Corps and commander FCNA were also present as the army chief delivered his pep talk to the despondent troops. ‘I too am from the SSG,’ he told those present, ‘You must please be mindful of my respect.’[975]

"In the mini-mutiny that was being exhibited by the young soldiers, the commanders on the defensive had to compromise on matters of discipline. For example, while Commander FCNA Javed Hassan was keen to punish the soldiers who left their posts, his Corps Commander, General Mahmud, advised relieving them instead of court-martialling them. He feared punishing them would open up a Pandora’s Box.[976]"

................................................................................................

" ... Earlier in April 1998, Benazir and her husband were convicted on corruption charges. Deeply drawn battle lines all targeted Sharif’s corruption—his refusing to return billion of rupees of loans, his seeking to control the parliament by becoming Ameerul Momineen, his party workers’ attack on the Supreme Court, the controversy around the 4 July decision to withdraw: all these gave the Opposition another stick to seek government’s early removal. The ruling family’s loan scandals were snowballing into a major crisis. Interestingly, the Army, despite its huge and dangerous blunder in Kargil, was in a secure spot."

This has largely to do with paki caste system that sees conquering invaders as above all, despises traders as moneymaker and respects feudal system. Consequently army is owner of most of paki land and businesses, unlike most other - functioning - countries where business, military and land ownership do not mix. 

................................................................................................

" ... The PPP insisted that the government, and specifically the prime minister, had cleared the Kargil Operation. The religious parties criticized the withdrawal and the Sharif-led government’s re-engagement with India, as well as his decision to pull back support to the Taliban and enter into dialogue with the Northern Alliance. They consistently attacked the government for allowing US Special Forces to come to Pakistan to train Pakistanis involved in the ‘Capture bin Laden’ Operation. Through August, these protesting parties and sections of the media, who dominated popular discourse as well as public space, reiteratively popularized the narrative that Washington had stepped in to save India from a certain military defeat that the Mujahedeen had almost inflicted on India. The Washington Accord, for them, was a sell-out of the Kashmiri cause."

" ... The army chief in his meeting with the prime minister’s younger brother and Chief Minister of Punjab, Shehbaz Sharif, suggested that he must consider becoming the deputy prime minister in order to streamline the federal government’s performance![977] The younger Sharif, while having heard the army chief attentively, was clear that neither would his brother fancy such a suggestion coming from him and nor was his vacating Punjab, the fortress of Pakistan’s politics, a wise move. Meanwhile, the authors of the country’s biggest military debacle would call out the elected government on governance matters. The blundering group in khaki would hold the weak civilians accountable while they launched a campaign to discredit the elected government."

"In addition to the resentment within the rank and file, the army chief had to deal with internal rifts between his top military commanders, as their criticism of the Kargil Operation began to surface. They believed the ill-conceived Operation had caused embarrassment to the entire institution. Even the military’s own top spymasters and senior commanders were actively kept out of the loop. When they had picked up indicators of unusual troop movement, the existence of the Operation was denied. Others, who had questioned the viability of the Kargil plan during the early May Corp Commanders meeting but had their concerns dismissed by the architects of Kargil, were also talking. This, after 4 Jul many a hitherto tight-lipped and resentful commander was now more vocal in his indictment of the Operation.

"The public critique later by one of Pakistan’s most professional generals, Lt. General Ali Quli Khan,[979] best captured the views of Pakistan’s top commanders. Commenting on General Musharraf’s own conclusion on the Kargil Operations, ‘Considered in purely military terms, the Kargil Operations were a landmark in the history of the Pakistan Army,’[980] Khan, the former Chief of General Staff wrote, ‘I am totally amazed at such ostrich-like behavior when the whole world considers Kargil to be the worst debacle in Pakistan’s history and where countless innocent young lives were lost for nothing. Absolutely nothing!’ [981] He further added, ‘I regret to say that the conception and planning at the highest level had been poor—in fact, so poor that the only word which can adequately describe is it unprofessional. We all know that the main duty of the high command is to ensure that with their meticulous planning they create conditions whereby their junior combatants can fight easily. This was certainly not done at Kargil. It is also fairly obvious that the Kargil Operations was not conceived in its totality, with the result that apart from bringing ignominy to Pakistan it also caused unnecessary misery to a lot of innocent people.’[982] 

"Internally, within the institution, there was disquiet after the withdrawal. Instructions were that Kargil would not be discussed in any school of instruction, neither in any class nor in any study period. No courses would be taught at the NDC etc. The subject of Kargil was a ‘banned item’."

................................................................................................

"Criticism from beyond the borders also hit hard, especially when it floated in world capitals in form of the vicious, scathing criticism in the ‘Rogue Army’ advertisements campaign that targeted the Pakistan Army and multiplied the woes of the Kargil clique. Within days of the 4 July Sharif-Clinton Statement, the advertisement ran in leading US newspapers, including the New York Times. Musharraf wanted an official and very prominent rebuttal issued in the very papers in which the advertisement appeared. It was a matter of the troop morale, he asked a common friend to convey to the prime minister. The army chief also offered to pay for the rebuttal advertisement in case the government had funding problems.[983] The prime minister disagreed. Despite the intervention of his father and brother, Sharif was unrelenting. Only one article could be commissioned to counter the advertisement." 

Now, author returns to prevaricating. 

"Thus, the pressure from within the Army, the vocal criticism by the navy and the air force, and the general political chatter prompted the architects of Kargil to adopt an offensive defense posture. In August, deeper fault lines emerged between the civilian and military leadership’s approach to handling the post-Kargil period."

This is like death of a child due to physical assault by an adult blamed on those criticising the said assault. 

Does the author wish here to imply, or let reader infer, that those responsible for Kargil invasion against India and killing of Indians thereby, planned and executed, had been well-behaved, or well intentioned at any time? 

Had they not violated rvery norm, every protocol, in the process, of functioning of a proper military of a proper government, when invading Kargil - without informing their own government? 

Was their anything that could be termed proper in their conduct in their subsequent denial of their own soldiers, even to the extent of refusing the dead? 

................................................................................................

"The most public manifestation of this difference was over the question of decorating the Kargil heroes, martyrs and the living, with national awards for valor. Why this issue became a controversial one between the government and the Army was principally because the Army had publicly taken the position that it was not Pakistani soldiers but freedom fighters who had fought in Kargil. The prime minister had sustained this charade, begun initially by the Army during the Kargil Operation, even after the 4 July withdrawal. The army leadership now wanted the government to approve national awards for the ‘Kargil heroes.’

"The GHQ also wanted nationally broadcast television programmes honouring the heroes of Kargil. There was a reason why the Kargil clique now wanted to acknowledge and honour the brave and the best of the Army, earlier having opted to let them be projected as Mujahideen. The clique now detected the increasing anger and agitation of the troops caused towards their commanders, not only because of the debacle-like end of Kargil, but also in their role and sacrifices not having been acknowledged.

"Sitting in their secure garrisons, these were men of command and authority who must have silently been haunted by the calamitous Operation they had designed. More blood, their critics argued, of Pakistan’s brave soldiers had flowed in this calamity called Kargil, than put together in the two wars Pakistan fought in 1965 and 1971."

The claim about 1965, in view of the authors repeated ridicule of Indians ineffective and killed at Kargil, is debatable at best. 

But 1971? That's a horrible claim, considering the genocide perpetrated by paki military in East Bengal, accompanied by organised mass gang rapes they also perpetrated along with killings, in millions, comparable with and outdone by only nazis in WWII. 

The only way to reconcile that statement with reality is to not only deduce but accept a value system so racist that it had counted half its own citizens as not human. 

And the only reason that paki military did not have 93,000 of paki military dead in East Bengal was because India, instead of letting them be taken prisoners of war by the then new nation of Bangladesh, had instead returned them safe to the then remaining, truncated West Pakistan, which really had no right to retain the name because they'd lost 60% of their own erstwhile paki population, the Bengalis. 

................................................................................................

" ... Interestingly, although Pakistan’s public position was that Kashmiri Mujahideen, not Pakistani soldiers, were fighting the Indian Army in Kargil, yet, that night the Kargil clique, identified the recipients for the highest gallantry award, Nishan-i-Haider. Additionally, approximately 80 soldiers were given various other awards on General Javed Hassan’s recommendations. He insisted awards were necessary to raise the morale of the soldiers.

"The Awards ceremony, called Kargil kay Hero, was televised by PTV, but the Sharif-led government was keen to call off its broadcasting. The prime minister was trying to re-engage with the Indians. Thus, Nawaz Sharif and Shehbaz Sharif did not participate in the programme. While all the chief ministers participated, the Punjab chief minister avoided it."

It seems to have not occurred to the author that not everybody can sustain the doublespeak that paki army maintained, of both disclaming and awarding role of paki soldiers in Kargil simultaneously! 

If the then pm of pak had participated in such a televised spectacle, or his brother had, doesn't the author realise that the paki pm could then subsequently be questioned on the factual discrepancy, by world media, not to mention international diplomatic corps, and even various governments and their leaders, even officially? 

................................................................................................

" ... State Department spokesman, James Rubin, said that, even on Kashmir, the US could mediate only if Pakistan and India both sought mediation. Away from 4 July, Pakistan had to manage its own relationship with India."

Author returns to paki lies. 

" ... In Pakistan, civilian intelligence agencies had reports of sectarian killers finding safe havens in neighboring Afghanistan. ... "

Fact is taliban were the spectrum created in and by Pakistan, to take control of Afghanistan in name of religion - and it wreaked havoc in a society that had women professors until then, teaching at university! Thereafter pakis pretending that it was an Afghanistan problem is height of duplicity and fraud. 

................................................................................................

More lies, more fraud. 

"The actual implementation of the ‘Capture Osama’ plan also began in August. The Taliban remained committed to protecting the 41-year-old Saudi millionaire. They kept him ‘under the protection of a special security commission’.[991] The US President’s most unusual threat of 4 July that, unless Pakistan did more, he ‘would have to announce Pakistan was in effect supporting terrorism in Afghanistan’ had worked.[992] The plan to capture OBL was first proposed by the Pakistani prime minister himself in his 2 December 1998, Washington meeting. Economic sanctions on the Taliban were already in place. Around this time, with Sharif’s support, US officials also began to train 60 Pakistani troops as commandoes to go into Afghanistan to get bin Laden. ‘I was skeptical about the project; even if Sharif wanted to help, the Pakistan military was full of Taliban and al-Qaeda sympathizers. But I thought we had nothing to lose by exploring every option.’[993]"

In view of his eventual capture - in Abbottabad, within walking distance of what US terms "West Point of Pakistan", was he really ever in Afghanistan? 

Or had he been spirited away out of sight straight into protection of paki military even before Kargil? 

................................................................................................

" ... The CIA planned a ‘ring of kidnapping squads around Afghanistan to move in to capture OBL when required’.[994] 

"After his commitment with Clinton, Sharif personally led the effort to convince the Taliban government to handover OBL. In July, he met, along with the visiting the Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan, the Afghan Foreign Minister Mulla Mutawakil at the Punjab House in Islamabad. With the help of an interpreter, the Saudi Prince reminded Muttawakil, ‘We had helped you, we had recognized you, but you are ungrateful.’ The Taliban leader was reprimanded in ‘strong and humiliating term’. Muttawakil said they were grateful, that they wanted Saudi assistance to continue, but handing over OBL or ‘extraditing him’ was ‘impossible’. This blanket refusal annoyed the prime minister and his Saudi guest.[995] Clinton’s ‘Get OBL’ policy included use of force at multiple levels. The Taliban leader Mullah Omar was under attack. At the end of August, a saboteur’s bomb exploded near his home in Kandahar.

"The ‘Capture Osama’ Operation was being launched. The Americans were funding the construction of barracks, three miles south of Rawalpindi, for SSG commandoes. According to the plan, Pakistani commandoes, on intelligence information, would be infiltrated into Afghanistan to kidnap bin Laden. While the ISI chief, now reporting to the prime minister and following his instructions, went along with the plan, the top operational tier opposed it. Senior generals believed that ‘nothing could be more foolish’. OBL, they believed, was an ‘elusive target’ and looking for him was tantamount ‘to searching for a needle in a haystack’. ... While the US sent FBI officials to train the commandoes and to monitor the operation, senior officials were skeptical of the scheme. ‘We said to ourselves: Why do they need searchers for someone they are already aware of? Well, we played along,’ recalled one US official.[996]

" ... Pakistan began its shuttle diplomacy between Kandahar and the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, trying to get talks restarted between Ahmed Shah Masood and the Taliban.[998] While the Northern Alliance blamed Pakistani officials for, in reality, siding with the Taliban, Pakistani officials repeatedly spoke of their ‘peace agenda’ and for initiating the shuttle diplomacy in response to President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s request.[999] ... "

Author now openly takes sides - with the fraudulent and the invader - who'd failed, to boot. 

" ... Whatever were coup-maker Musharraf’s justifications at the time of the coup, years later, he was more truthful as he wrote in his book, ‘It was in dealing with Kargil that the prime minister exposed his mediocrity and set himself on a collision course with the Army and me.’[1001]"

" ... Caught between trying to pull Pakistan out of the Kargil debacle, reviving the dialogue process with India, containing the fallout in the military and political circles, and also dealing with the political pressures generated from his government’s incompetence, no inquiry was instituted against the army chief and other architects of Kargil. Instead, a campaign was launched against the civilians, the army leadership feeling ironically confident enough to hold the civilian leadership over issues of governance."

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

"The bonhomie of the prime minister and the army chief’s early September trip to the NLI headquarters in Skardu was short-lived. Although on Kashmiri rights, Sharif was unrelenting, calling for a UN-supervised plebiscite in Kashmir similar to East Timor[1002], the ghost of Kargil had sown distrust between Sharif and the military command. Behind closed doors, in the corridors of power, and in the homes of the powerful, subdued games were on. Some played for survival, others for reprimand and retribution. Tool bags for menacing games were thrown open. All was fair play: wiretapping, inspired media reports, surveillance, interpreting intercepts, spy men on the prowl, instigating anger, manufacturing street protests. The ghost of the Kargil debacle was haunting Pakistan’s corridors of power. The members of the Kargil clique, architects of the debacle, were fearful of being fired. Armed with institutional resources and experience at surreptitiously fighting civilian authority, they were all set to fight back.

"Sharif was in a difficult position. Unlike Sharif’s unbridled October 1998 reaction to a speech by Musharraf’s predecessor army chief general Jahangir Karamat, which led to latter’s dismissal, the post-Kargil situation was a very complex one. Pakistan had lost in martyrdom many of its brave young men yet internationally the country was being criticized. Pakistan’s credibility as a responsible nuclear State had received a serious setback. Yet the prime minister could not hold the army chief accountable for the debacle at Kargil. He was constrained by issues around his own public ownership of the Operation and of “national honor.” [1003]"

When do pakis plan to learn that neither killing nor giving one's own life is counted as praiseworthy (and nowhere outside of their own medieval creed, anyway), when in quest of world conquest, or simple looting of others, post medieval era - and, that, it's definitely no longer medieval era as of half a century ago, through most of the world? Calling those invaders martyrs is signatory of a creed of world conquest in name of a creed, but in every sensible process of thought, they were no more than oil thrown by those seeking to set fire to a neighbour's home. 

................................................................................................

" ... His Washington interlocutors were already aware of the real architects of Kargil. But, under siege from domestic troubles, with political opponents multiplying and unifying under the 19-party Grand Democratic Alliance[1004] banner, the prime minister seemed to have concluded that he was going to work silently on tackling the Kargil clique. Ouster of the army chief was unlikely. However, some form of reprimand was inevitable. The cumulative impact of all this was the rise of distrust and suspicion among Pakistan’s power players."

" ... In a heady moment during the landmark 17 May briefing, General Aziz, the Kargil kingpin, had prodded Pakistan’s prime minister to dream about being second only to Jinnah. ... As Chaudhry Nisar, his key aide, later argued, once the ball was set rolling, the Kargil Operation was ‘irreversible’, even if the Prime Minister had wanted to reverse it.[1006]

"In the media, a plethora of accusations surfaced, targeting the prime minister: that he had sold Kashmir, surrendered in Washington the victory won at Kargil; he had wasted the sacrifices of the brave soldiers at Kargil, had appeased the Americans, bowed before the Indians etc. With facts of the beginnings, the conduct, and the military outcome of this Operation little known, these accusations seemed plausible. Sharif’s dash to Washington had been widely publicized."

................................................................................................

" ... Pakistan’s chief executive was now under an extraordinary level of intelligence watch. The intelligence under the army’s high command maintained a close tab on the prime minister and his cabinet. The army intelligence picked up the Prime Minister House chatter. The army chief complained to a confidante that the PM’s intercepts had revealed that he would make Musharraf apologize publicly,[1007] claiming that the PM had promised this to the Indian Prime Minister! Considering that, ever since the cover was blown from the Kargil Operation plan, the PM had taken ownership of it and tried to extricate, in his calculation, Pakistan and its Army with honour, self-respect, and minimal diplomatic damage, such an undertaking seemed highly unlikely. ..."

"The army chief’s anger and nervousness persisted. The blame talk would just not end. There were complaints from within the army high command, chatter in Army messes, insinuations from the government’s men, and a few voices even within the media. He had requested the government several times to respond to news reports blaming the army chief for the debacle–indeed, even of conducting it unconstitutionally, i.e., without the chief executive’s permission."

In short, he wanted the lie and the cover, the pretense of it having been the civilian government decision to invade, to continue - along with the lies about no paki government involvement, it having been all independent terrorists.

................................................................................................

" ... Nervous and jumpy, the Kargil clique arranged to target its principal adversary, the prime minister himself, by weaving a two-front siege around him. They reached out to journalists to gauge the mood in the civilian quarters. Others were tasked to gauge the mood and reach out to the distraught Opposition parties and estranged politicians within the ruling party.

"The 14 September interview splashed by Pakistan’s most widely read Urdu daily, in which Sharif’s backchannel point-man Niaz A. Naik held the army responsible for sabotaging, what he claimed was, a time-bound plan that the two prime ministers had agreed upon for resolving the Kashmir dispute, deepened suspicion in the barracks. Naik had also asserted that Sharif had not been informed of the Kargil Operation, first hearing of it around 25 April. This contradicted Musharraf’s public statement of 16 July that ‘everyone was on board’.[1008] On 15 September, a prestigious English daily published ‘military source’s expectation that “some responsible functionary would remove the impression created by the former foreign secretary that the Army did not want resolution of the Kashmir dispute”’.[1009] The same day, Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz stepped in to more than clarify. In his Senate speech, he said that the armed forces had acted in the interests of Pakistan and it was ‘totally untrue’ that through the Kargil crisis the armed forces had undermined the Pakistan-India peace process.[1010] Nevertheless, the foreign minister seconded Naik’s claim that a time-bound approach to resolving Kashmir had been agreed upon. Sartaj’s speech also addressed the signing of the CTBT, a red herring issue in the hands of the political opposition. He was categorical that Pakistan ‘will not consider signing it till the time sanctions imposed by the US were removed’.[1011]

"Matters were in a flux. On 15 September, the Foreign Office spokesperson formally announced that the Prime minister had ‘no plans’ to attend the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session. The cancellation was unexpected. The reason that circulated in the press was that, because Pakistan had decided against signing the CTBT, the PM wanted to avoid the pressure he was likely to face at the UNGA, especially from the Clinton administration. However, less known was the fact that a close confidante of the army chief, who was also an intimate friend of the Sharif family with easy access to the prime minister’s father, contributed to the PM’s decision to miss the UNGA session. Musharraf, wary of what the PM might say about the Kargil clique, and especially about him, was keen that he not attend the UNGA.[1012] The confidante was therefore sent to Mian Sharif to convince him to dissuade his son from traveling to New York. Mian Sharif was convinced that, with trouble brewing at home, it was unwise for his son to travel. The PM did not travel."

Obviously, if it was that easy for the army to control the paki PM without subterfuge, the subsequent coup was merely making it official!

................................................................................................

"The angry chief’s words were interpreted by many as signalling a possible coup looming around the corner."

" ... Clinton administration had been sending messages through US Ambassador Milam, to send his envoy, so that Clinton could follow up with his 4 July promise of helping restart the Pakistan-India dialogue on Kashmir. ‘Do not send someone from the Foreign Office,’ was the message. In Islamabad, it was expected that the US would help Pakistan to continue with the Lahore process. ... ‘Trust’ was the key consideration for the prime minister. So, in the midst of raging political troubles, Nawaz Sharif sent off his brother Shehbaz Sharif as his special envoy to Washington."

" ... The State Department’s South Asia men had gauged Sharif’s political troubles. The Islamabad whispers of a possible coup or a likely Musharraf sacking were loud enough to reach Washington. They wanted to hear from Sharif’s emissary how deep the civil-military divide was. They were keen for facts on the follow-through on Pakistani troop withdrawal from Kargil and Islamabad’s re-engagement with India. Away from the India question, Islamabad and Washington were active partners in a ‘Get Osama’ Operation. This included both Islamabad directly persuading Mullah Omar to give up OBL and also the launch of a joint operation with the CIA to physically capture the al-Qaeda chief."

................................................................................................

"Shehbaz held a six-hour-long marathon session with Karl Inderfurth and Walter Anderson. The meeting took place at Washington’s historical Willard Hotel, where Shehbaz was staying. The Willard was where Abraham Lincoln had spent the night before his first inauguration as President in 1861. Before the Inderfurth-Shehbaz marathon session began, as an ice-breaker gesture, the otherwise frugal Inderfurth had spent $80 to buy his Pakistani guest The History of the Willard Hotel. 

"In Washington, Shehbaz Sharif’s concern about the possibility of a coup was apparent. Although he ‘never said he feared a coup but was beating around the bush’. There was very little discussion on how to advance the Lahore process. Some among the US side found that ‘the dialogue was sterile on Kashmir’.[1019]"

" ... On Kargil, Shehbaz Sharif informed them that troop movement was going according to plan. However, throughout the meeting, Shehbaz repeatedly expressed concern about ‘extra constitutional’ developments. He, in fact, referred to it 15 times. Yet, he did not once mention the word ‘military’ nor asked for US help in dealing with the military. His focus on ‘extra constitutional pressures on an elected government’, combined with what Washington was picking up from Islamabad, left no doubt among the Americans that trouble was brewing for the elected government that the Clinton administration would have rather seen in office. However, Sharif’s special envoy never said he feared a coup. He gave mixed signals and the Americans did not get candid answers on facts."

" ... In fact, as Talbott would later recall, ‘Shehbaz would not quite confirm, even in response to direct questions, that a military coup was brewing.’[1020] However, he added, ‘Shehbaz’s mannerisms, his mirthless smiles, long silences, and abrupt changes of subject when we asked about the situation at home, left us in no doubt that something was afoot.’[1021]"

" ... When Inderfurth pulled him to the side and asked him if Musharraf was alright, Shehbaz told him he was implementing the 4 July agreement and asked if he knew Musharraf.[1023] Inderfurth replied in the negative. ‘Why don’t you invite Musharraf?’ Shehbaz advised him."

................................................................................................

"They repeated their concerns: Pakistan supported cross-border activity, undermined the sanctity of the LOC, supported terrorism, and prevented the solution of Kashmir. Pakistan, they felt, was on the slippery slope of tension and war[1024] and complained of Pakistan’s non-cooperation on the CTBT. Shehbaz ... reiterated Pakistan’s position that the solution needed to be a win-win one and the US must play a role in finding it. Good on optics only, it was an unrealistic expectation.[1025]

"Within a week of their meetings with Shehbaz Sharif, the US officials were announcing at the New York UNGA that the ‘only appropriate role’ for Washington was ‘to support bilateral engagement between Delhi and Islamabad’.[1026] Pakistan’s request for a special envoy on Kashmir was opposed by Inderfurth since, ‘Washington saw no purpose to be served by a special envoy’.[1027] Secretary Of State Albright had also categorically said, ‘No US involvement.’[1028] ... "

"The meeting ended with the promise that the Pakistani government would prevent cross-border terrorism, respect the LOC, and pick up the threads of the Lahore process. ... "

" ... Clinton administration was interested in Nawaz Sharif’s survival in office because it knew that its own keenness to see resumption of Pakistan-India dialogue, the end of cross-LOC activities by militants, the end of all Pakistani support to Kashmiri freedom fighters and the Taliban, and the arrest of Osama bin Laden, were objectives the Sharif government was in fact pursuing. Hence, a pro-Sharif statement was in Washington’s own interest. Shehbaz welcomed such support, thinking as all Pakistani politicians had believed that it would prove an enabling factor for a civilian government attempting to assert its control."

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"A major American takeaway from the Shehbaz visit was that the Sharif-led government was in trouble at home. Senior US administration people like the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Pickering, saw Shehbaz as being ‘worried that they would have to pay for what they did (troop withdrawal)’.[1029] The US Administration then took an unusual step. From New York, where the Clinton team was attending the UNGA session, Karl Inderfurth issued a statement that called on the Pakistan Army not to try any ‘extra-constitutional method’ to remove the Nawaz Sharif-led government.[1030]"

" ... Washington was keen to extend support to Nawaz Sharif, the man Clinton trusted, the man who had already become a high-value friend after consenting to Washington’s Pak-US collaborative ‘Capture OBL’ Operation. US officials had hoped this statement would alter the prevailing power dynamics in Pakistan to Sharif’s advantage. Such an expectation suggested two problems. One, Washington was delusional about the power its mere word carried. Two, Washington was ignorant of the local dynamics at work in Pakistan."

Author stretches one single point inyo two there, or rather, hides one by doing so. Point really she makes is that crazy jihadist nation that Pakistan have been since inception - that'd be since caliphate movement supported by Gandhi that nevertheless ended with massacre of over 1,500 Hindus in Kerala (termed 'Moplah killings', ie, son-in-law killings, because of Arab traditions of Arab seafaring muslims marrying and keeping local wives in Kerala) - there's no trusting their word even if anyone, including US, pours hundreds of billions of dollars in aid; they'd behead a US citizen as and when they please, anyway, as they fid to Daniel Pearl, denying all responsibility to boot and pretending that the authorities were not aware of goings-on. 

Her first point really should be that US is mistaken in assuming that a beneficiary to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars can influence a thug that the terrorist factory in reality is, all it's always been and intends to remain, terrorising - and begging at gunpoint, in turn. 

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"It was the annual season of international diplomacy. The two foreign policy principals, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, had arrived in New York for the UNGA session. ... Jaswant Singh’s gift to Albright was United States and India, 1777 to 1996: Bridge over River Time with Albright reciprocating with Engaging India: U. S. Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy, a collection of essays on America’s strategic relations with India.[1036]  In a sign of growing cordiality between the two capitals, there were unprecedented ‘long, intensive discussions on Afghan developments’, on Clinton’s Delhi trip, the first in 21 years, and on possible counter-terrorism cooperation[1037].

"In New York generally, the Indians found themselves in a comfortable situation, with global focus being on terrorism and counter-terrorism, the very issues for which Delhi sought support. After decades of Washington-Delhi strategic dissonance, signs of strategic convergence were emerging. In fact, the US, Russia, and even Pakistan’s staunchest ally, China, all converged on sanctions against Kabul’s Taliban regime—hosts of  the terrorist mastermind OBL, who planned terrorist attacks against both American and Russian targets.[1038]"

Did the author have a delusion at any point that world - outside her own paki origin - can be comfortable with terrorists or terrorism? Why make it seem as if this, counterterrorism or disapproval of terrorism, was an agenda sold by a single nation that, until then and since, for decades, was victimised by this nothing but the terrorist factory that pakis have forever been?

................................................................................................

" ... Thousands of Kashmiris threatened to cross the LOC on 4 October. Delhi threatened to open fire on those crossing the LOC while Islamabad urged them to call off their march.[1044] While Islamabad, already reeling from the Kargil debacle, decided to let them go and cross over at Chhakoti, the Indian forces were to prevent the crossing in stages through a graduated application of forces.[1045]"

If there are any Kashmiris left in paki occupied parts of Kashmir valley region, they are far too repressed and terrorised to attempt a threat, the place having since paki occupation been completely flooded and dominated by those from Western Punjab, as indeed is everything in pak from army to every province, including East Bengal until 1971, when they fought back to independence. 

Any Kashmir original citizens who dream of independence are the delusional ones that are the pampered and coddled citizens of India who imagine that, while Pakistan exists, Kashmir could have an existence of any kind except a butchered and sold in pieces carcass, as Gilgit, Baltistan and Baluchistan have been since Pakistan occupied those by force. 

It was a Gandhian - mistaken - policy responsible for their travails, by Nehru who refused their accession until too late for Kashmir and more than late for Baluchistan or Nepal. 

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" ... the unstated consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council including Pakistan’s ‘all-weather friend’ and strategic partner China, was that Kargil was a diplomatic and political blunder that derailed the promising Lahore process. ... "

" ... Significantly, most anti-Sharif forces sought military intervention to remove the Sharif-led government."

" ... With Washington impatient for progress on tracking and nabbing bin Laden, the CIA’s counter-terrorism cell saw the ISI as a partner of last resort. In fact, the ISI was viewed as a Taliban and OBL sympathizer, but Ziauddin was not viewed as hard core ISI. Also, Clinton’s South Asia men were against getting directly involved in the Afghan battlefield or directly confronting Pakistan over Afghanistan. Instead, the policy decision was to use Pakistan’s influence with the Taliban to track OBL. During his Washington trip, Pickering sought a meeting with Pakistan’s top spy. Pickering urged Ziauddin to actively nudge Taliban head Mullah Omar to hand over bin Laden to the Americans. And Ziauddin did."

" ... Soon after his return from Washington, General Ziauddin arrived in Kandahar on 5 October. The head of the Afghanistan-Kashmir desk, Major General Jamshed Gulzar, accompanied him. They arrived in a special plane and met Mullah Omar at his abode, a small mosque in Kandahar. At this meeting, the Pakistani intelligence officials offered condolences over the death of his wife and child.[1057] The ISI officials then informed Omar of the reason for their trip. An agitated Omar’s response was, ‘Osama bin Laden is like a bone in my throat. Neither can I digest it nor can I cough him out ... My problem is that I have given him a commitment as an Afghan and I cannot get out.’ Omar continued, ‘I pray that I die or he dies.’ Omar was clear that he ‘will not extradite him but if he goes on his own he should go’. Omar then asked his guests, ‘Can you tell me a country where he could be given protection?’ His guests could not. ... "

Was this work a research thesis submitted before the guy was located, caught and killed in Abbottabad, within walking distance from what US terms 'West Point of' pak? 

Else, was the hiding him in plain sight in the fortress-like house in Abbottabad a subsequent plan? 

Or do pakis really honestly laim he lived there gorgeous years and they knew nothing? That ISI is indeed so incompetent as to never having noticed Obama living in Abbottabad? 

No, it's far more believable they lied. 

................................................................................................

Here's the extent of paki arrogance - 

"The CIA, in its effort to get OBL extradited, was in direct contact with it’s Pakistani counterpart, the ISI. Recalling the extent of the US desperation to get OBL, a senior ISI official said, ‘If I would have asked him to lick my feet, he would have.’[1060] The ISI, meanwhile, maintained a distance from CIA officials. For example, meetings with the CIA regional chief were held in ISI-run ‘safe houses’ instead of the ISI headquarters."

It's not just that the ISI guy said it, but that it got published with no concern regarding any repercussions. 

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" ... The whispering campaigns became louder. The one that greatly amplified existing distrust between the prime minister and the army chief was that the prime minister’s brother was in Washington to get clearance from the Americans to appoint the ISI chief as Pakistan’s new army chief. For Musharraf and the Kargil clique, there was plausibility in this story; they knew that Musharraf had no presence in Washington while Ziauddin was now in partnership with Washington on Washington’s top priority issue. Yet, the reality was different."

"Nevertheless, the growing insecurity of the army chief and his circle led them to practically work out an Operation Self-Survival. ... "

Author has gone to great lengths yo excuse the coup, just as she did to excuse the attacks against India. 

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"Essentially, the self-survival strategy that seemed to be at work was five-fold. One: Use the media to spread disinformation about Kargil. Hold back the facts of the military fiasco, the discontent within the Army, and instead train the guns on the prime minister. Paint him as pro-India, pro-US, and anti-Pakistan.

"Two: Encourage and, if needed, facilitate all the anti-government parties to work together on a common platform and demand the ouster of the government. Sections within the Jamaat-i-Islami were already against the Nawaz-led government and had led the Lahore agitations during the Sharif-Vajpayee Lahore Summit. It worked to the Army’s great advantage that the opposition was hitting out at Nawaz Sharif for the Washington Statement. It gave strength to the Opposition’s existing call for the government’s ouster. Similarly, the religopolitical parties and several of the guerrilla groups fighting in Kashmir, severely criticized the Washington statement and called for Sharif’s removal. The upcoming leader, cricket hero Imran Khan, had launched a major offensive against Nawaz Sharif. Sharif was friendless. The security agencies encouraged this situation. Significantly, all the anti-Sharif forces advocated military intervention. Numerous analysts also supported this position.

"Three: Widen the existing cracks within the PML leadership by working on those already alienated from the central leadership. Individuals like MNA Ejazul Haq were ready partners for Sharif’s ouster.

"Four: Be in a readiness mode to launch a coup d’état at short notice. This required the army chief to post his most trusted commanders in key posts and corps and finally also conduct actual drills of forces likely to be involved in staging a coup. Accordingly, through September, Musharraf posted his trusted men in key positions critical to successfully launching a coup. He assigned command of the traditional coup-maker brigade, the 111 Brigade, to his most trusted man, Brigadier Salauddin Satti. ... "

"Five: Develop special SOPs to deal with unusual developments, especially involving the removal of the army chief. The army chief feared that he could be called to the prime minister’s House and informed of his dismissal. Hence, any delay in the army chief’s return from a meeting with the prime minister would be interpreted as a danger signal. 

"By the end of September, the deployment of soldiers around the Prime Minister’s House had been increased beyond the normal one unit. Extra commando units were brought in and stationed in Rawalpindi. More sophisticated intelligence gadgets for transmitting information were also being used by the security. The prime minister was under full army intelligence watch. All incoming and outgoing communication from the Prime Minister’s House was monitored."

................................................................................................

" ... Musharraf feared that the PM had made definite plans for a new army chief as well. Musharraf raised these questions in his meeting with Shehbaz Sharif and wanted to specifically know if the PM was going to appoint an air force man in the chairman’s slot. A perturbed Musharraf told Shehbaz, and later the Defense Secretary as well, that his father had called from the US asking him if he was being fired. Twice, Musharraf had tried to reach the Defense Secretary, who was in Turkey.[1066] Musharraf also complained to Shehbaz that he felt that his and his commanders’ phones were being bugged. Shehbaz Sharif assured him to the contrary. ... Sharif’s father, with whom a Musharraf confidante had lobbied regarding Musharraf continuing as army chief, had also advised his son to retain him. That ended the uncertainty about Musharraf’s retention as army chief.

"Similarly, on the issue of the Quetta Corps commander, whom Musharraf wanted out because of his public criticism of the Kargil Operation, the reluctant prime minister gave in to the advice of his brother and key aide Chaudhry Nisar ... On 4 October, the army chief handed over to the Defense secretary the early retirement orders of the Quetta Corps Commander, Lt, General Tariq Pervez. ... "

Did atrocities against the Baloch and in Baluchistan get stepped up only subsequently, or were they always perpetrated but exponentially more hereafter? 

................................................................................................

" ... The naval chief had resigned. As he later claimed, he had resigned because he had learnt there was likelihood that Musharraf was planning a coup.[1070] ... "

" ... Influences stronger than the prime minister’s brother and his closest political confidante, including the US-befriended ISI chief Ziauddin, propelled the prime minister into a reactive mode. Ziauddin, overseeing the ‘Capture OBL’ Operation, had long been eyeing the army chief’s position. The historical civil-military distrust had also kicked in to prompt Nawaz Sharif to fire his army chief, the second time within a year. Meanwhile, given the civil-military divide over Kargil and the subsequent misgivings within the army regarding prime minister’s moves against its leadership, the Army had become prepared with countermoves to prevent it’s chief’s ouster."

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"Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was an agitated man.[1078] He believed he was not responsible for Kargil yet it was he who was taking the flak. He neither publicly blamed the army chief General Musharraf nor instituted an inquiry against him. Instead, goaded by his key advisors Shehbaz Sharif and Chaudhary Nisar and instructed by his authoritarian father, he had accommodated the army chief’s wishes on several scores. The family patriarch Mian Mohammad Sharif had also received the Musharrafs at the Sharif family home and had tried to defuse the palpable Nawaz-Musharraf tension. In the hope that it would bring about a ceasefire between the two, the senior Sharif had purposefully told Musharraf, Shehbaz, and Nawaz, “You three are my sons.”"

" ... On the morning of the 8th the day after the the removal of corps commander Quetta general Tariq Pervez, commonly known as TP, a national daily carried the story. According to the news story, TP had been removed for meeting the PM without seeking clearance from the army chief. His removal was one of the CBMs brokered by the Shehbaz-Nisar team and extended by the PM to the uneasy army chief.[1079] However, on being informed of the news report, the PM instructed his Principal Secretary to call the Defense Secretary to find out who provided the ‘facts’ for the story and who had it published. The PM instructed that GHQ should be asked to issue a rebuttal. ... "

" ... Quetta corps commander, also arrived in the capital the same day. He was en route to Murree to collect his family. The agitated ex-commander met with the Defense Secretary to protest against his dismissal. Unsuccessfully, the Defense Secretary tried to pacify him, promising an ambassadorial posting. Having just been forced to retire, the heavy built, loud-voiced TP, angry at Musharraf as the man who had demanded his dismissal, was challenging his retirement. TP’s man, his brother-in-law Minister Nadir Pervez, was part of Sharif’s inner circle and the PM was fully aware of his interpretation of what TP’s dismissal and the controversial news report signaled.

"The following morning, 9 October, the newspapers carried the rebuttal. The PM had wanted the rebuttal to come from an army institution. On that Saturday morning, around the time he left for his weekend visit to Lahore, in an interview to an Urdu daily, Tariq Pervez strongly criticized the decision to retire him. His tone was threatening. The same day, Raja Nadir Pervez, Minister for Communications, returned to Pakistan from a foreign tour and met with the PM in Lahore."

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"The next forty-eight hours proved to be critical in influencing the course of Pakistan’s history. ... setting was Jati Umra, the PM’s private family estate. Mian Muhammad Sharif, the PM’s father and the family’s patriarch, presided over these history-making events. ... Shehbaz arrived at the family gathering, only to receive hell from his father. He was reprimanded for advising the PM to dismiss Nadir Pervez’s brother in law, the Quetta corps commander. ... TP was considered the government’s ‘own man.’ Not only was he related to their Minister but he was also the only corps commander who had publicly criticized Op KP. Meanwhile, faced with this paternal anger, Shehbaz still insisted that there must have been some misunderstanding. Musharraf could not have had anything to do with the news report. The PM recalled that General Majeed Malik had said that, after this, no corps commander will listen to us. The agitated PM shared his decision to fire the army chief. The family patriarch listened as his younger son shot back to advise his older brother against such a move. “It will end in a coup,” was the Punjab chief minister’s refrain. ... Shehbaz argued that the time to remove Musharraf was early June when the naval and air chiefs were critical of the operation. The PM had no doubt that Musharraf had to go. However, he announced no final decision.

"On Sunday, he summoned his Military Secretary Brigadier Javed Iqbal to the Jatti Umra estate at Raiwind. ... The brigadier warned him of serious consequences. “Remember, Zia took Bhutto to the gallows,” he said. ... he did remind Sharif that Musharraf had the Kargil debacle in his closet, and would wrest power from Sharif rather than be charged with the blunder after being dismissed. The brigadier made it clear to the PM that the commander 10 Corps was bound to “hit back” in case of his chief’s removal. Nevertheless, as the half-hour garden chat ended, the PM had been assured that under all circumstances his MS would remain loyal to him."

" ... The PM’s decision to remove the army chief was final. He even gave his son Hussain Nawaz the task of writing the speech he planned to deliver while announcing Musharraf’s retirement. Hussain also penned down some of the speech ideas his father shared with him. However, it was a closely guarded secret, one he was unwilling to share with even his younger brother Shehbaz."

................................................................................................

" ... He had decided to tell the people that the army chief had kept him in the dark about Kargil, about Operation KP. That, in doing so, Musharraf had violated official trust and rules of business. Sharif would also share how he had tried, in the national interest, to work with Musharraf, but simply could not."

" ... DS then mentioned that, in case he wanted to discuss TP’s case, the matter was closed and the retirement orders have already been issued. Nawaz Sharif asked him to forget that case and said that he was taking him to PM House for something else. He told the DS that he had decided to retire Musharraf and to appoint Ziauddin as the new army chief. Taken aback, the DS said, “Sir, this is too serious a decision.” The PM’s response was, “General Sahib, I have already decided.” ... "

" ... DS said he could not issue retirement orders of the army chief unless he got “written orders from the PM.” The PM tauntingly said, “You are scared of the chief; you are a supporter of the chief.”"

"The new chief was summoned to the PM house. Ziauddin, the ISI chief, arrived with an unusually large contingent of armed men. He was surrounded by eighty to ninety former SSG troops trained by the army for the Get Osama force. These former SSG troops, carrying Uzi machine guns, periodically resorted to dramatic gun cocking gestures as a show of strength by the ISI chief."

" ... Around 5pm ... the news of Musharraf removal and Ziauddin’s appointment was announced.

"The PM had also instructed the new chief that, on arrival at Karachi, Musharraf was to be given the protocol due to a retired army chief. General Ziauddin called Corps commander 5 Corps, Lt. General Usmani, and informed him of his appointment. He asked Usmani to take Musharraf to the Corps Guest House. Usmani’s chief of staff also informed him that the army chief had been removed."

................................................................................................

" ... The newsroom at Pakistan Television (PTV) Islamabad, where the report of Musharraf’s “retirement” was prepared for broadcast, turned into the first scene, and perhaps the only venue, of a semblance of struggle between the prime minister’s men and the Pakistan Army. Around 5.30, the newsroom informed MD Beg that a dozen soldiers led by a major had entered the newsroom. The major had given instructions not to run the news of the army chief’s removal while continuing with the normal transmission. The MD made successive calls to the PM House to apprise the PM of the happenings inside the PTV studios. The PM was unavailable and his Principal Secretary urged the MD to run the news as instructed. The PM’s son Hussain was emphatic that the crisis was manageable. “It’s a colonel-level coup,” he assured the MD. “Do not worry. We have the army chief sitting with us and he will sort it all out.”

"Meanwhile, the Director News at PTV also called to inform the PM’s team of the troops’ arrival. The soldiers were physically preventing repeat broadcast of the news."

"When PTV MD Beg arrived at the newsroom, he saw the army major standing in the middle of the newsroom with his twelve accompanying soldiers surrounding him. Brigadier Javed was standing close to the major and ordered him to disarm. “Sir, I am under the command of the 111 Brigade, not under your command. And I am doing what I was ordered,” was the major’s response. The Brigadier pushed his pistol against the major’s side and in seconds the troops loaded their guns and pointed them towards the brigadier. There was pin drop silence as the petrified PTV staff looked on. The major ordered his troops to put down their guns. The troops were ordered by the major to disarm and a group of around 15 commando-trained Elite force militia collected the guns and locked the soldiers in a side room."

" ... Immediately after the weather bulletin, at around 6.20 pm, PTV in its English bulletin again flashed the news of the chief’s shuffle."

................................................................................................

" ... The army chief, traveling from Colombo to Karachi with 198 other passengers, was aboard the Airbus flight PK 805. The prime minister personally called the Director General Civil Aviation Authority (DGCAA) Aminullah and ordered him not to let the plane land at any airport in Pakistan. The PM’s instruction was that PK 805 had to proceed to Muscat. Sharif made another call and repeated his instruction to the chairman PIA Shahid Khaqan Abbasi was also brought into the loop. To ensure removal of Musharraf successfully, he wanted all his flanks covered; above all he wanted to render Musharraf, the man whose removal he had ordered, professionally ineffective.[1099] ... "

" ... The Secretary to the DG CAA, a Wing Commander, was working on closing down the Karachi airfield.[1103] The Inspector General Police for Sindh was gathering the police force at the airport to physically block the runways. By 6.29 pm, the airfield had been closed.

"From the Air Traffic Control (ATC) room, the ATCO passed the prime minister’s orders via intercom to the highly guarded radar room, one of the few locations with a communication link to all airborne flights. Accordingly, at 6.22pm, the radar room passed the orders to the flight Captain Sarwat Hussain, “Do not land at Karachi or at any other airport in Pakistan.” There were only around 20 minutes to PK 805’s touchdown."

" ... Captain Sarwat then called for someone from the army chief’s staff. Musharraf’s trusted ADC, Brigadier Nadeem Taj, came to the cockpit and was told that they had no permission to land at Karachi. He wanted to know the options. “In front of us, we have Rahimyar Khan. Behind us is the Arabian Sea. On our left is the Iranian city of Bandar Abbas and on the right is the Indian city of Ahmadabad,” was the Captain’s response. “India is out,” was Taj’s expected response. ... "

"In implementing the PM’s orders DGCAA Aminullah Chaudhary[1105] and Khaqan Abbasi adopted different routes. Abbasi checked with PIA Director Flight Operations Captain Shah Nawaz Dara if the plane could continue on to Muscat. Dara said the plane would not have sufficient fuel. DGCAA, meanwhile, took steps to physically block the Karachi run way to prevent PK 805 from landing in Karachi."

................................................................................................

" ... “The captain of PK 805 is reporting shortage of fuel and saying that the plane cannot fly to Muscat.” The prime minister told his MS to let the plane land at Karachi airport but ensure that it was parked in a remote and unlit corner of the airport. “No one,” instructed the PM, “should be allowed to leave the airplane.” [1106]After refuelling, he instructed, the plane should take off for Muscat. In a resigned tone, his Military Secretary muttered, “The army may have got to the airport by then.”"

"Around 6:40pm, the MD was informed by the PTV World team that two truckloads of soldiers had arrived and closed down the transmission. The Army instructed them to only play national/patriotic songs. Again, the MD called the PM. His PS, who came on line, was informed. Minutes later, Saeed Mehdi returned and said, “The PM says he has sent the local SHO police to look into the matter.” By this time, the Army had come and taken over the PTV Headquarters. The transmission was shut down from 8 pm to 11pm. For the first time in PTV’s history, there was no news bulletin at 9pm."

" ... In Karachi, Usmani ordered Brigadier Jabbar Bhatti to move in with troops to open the airport and end the blockade of the runway. 

"The brigadier ordered his troops, including units from Malir, to the airport. A few hundred troops arrived and surrounded the airport. They took control of the ATC complex and finally gained access to the secured radar room."

"Across the country, the army was on high alert. In Rawalpindi-Islamabad, troops had begun to move."

" ... By now, the Defense Secretary had also been informed that his home had been surrounded by troops."

................................................................................................

" ... The PM was surrounded by his brother Shehbaz Sharif, his most trusted friend Saifur Rehman, and the latter’s brother Mujeebur Rehman. Seeing the writing on the wall, Chaudhary Nisar had earlier left the PM House. Suddenly, the door was flung open and in walked General Mahmud and the Vice-chief of General Staff, MajorGeneral Mohammad Jan Orakzai. About two dozen soldiers followed.  Shehbaz Sharif was the first to speak. “Why so many people, general? This is a private lounge of the PM.” Mahmud asked the troops to leave. He then turned to the PM, “Sir, why did you have to do this?” The PM repeated what he had said a couple of hours earlier on hearing that army troops had arrived at the television station,“I was legally and constitutionally competent to do this.” The Commander 10 Corps, whose troops had executed the coup plans, sardonically replied to the all-but deposed PM, “What was constitutional and legal, we will now find out.” He further added, “I had always prayed I would never have to see this day..”"

" ... Mahmud and Orakzai escorted the PM and his brother Shehbaz Sharif to a Mercedes car parked outside. Mahmud accompanied them to the 10 Corps Annexe, essentially a VIP Mess. Saeed Mehdi was kept in the annexe of the PM House, Saif ur Rehman, and Mujeeb ur Rehman, accompanied by Orakzai, were taken to the corps headquarters in Chaklala. The PTV Chairman, Parvaiz Rasheed, was held in the PTV Headquarters till 1:30 am, then taken to his Parliamentary Lodge and kept under detention there.[1114]

"Away from the PM’s initial order of banning the landing of PK805 on Pakistani soil and the subsequent GHQ trashing of the Constitution, the theatre of the absurd continued. After the army take over was confirmed, the Governor Sindh Mamnoon Hussain called President Tarrar to inquire about the fate of the dinner he had invited him to. “The dinner must go on,” the President told his guest. And it did."

" ... The prevailing power dynamics had trumped constitutional clauses."

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

" ... Combined with its aggressive military retaliation, that included heavy artillery and aerial attacks, Delhi stonewalled every Pakistani effort to extract strategic advantage from Operation KP. By early June, although still holding on the heights, Pakistani troops had come under tremendous physical and psychological pressure from both the Indian military offensive and from the disruption of supply routes. ... The Euphoria and Excitement were no more. ... The reality slowly sank in that Operation KP could accrue no gains for Islamabad."

" ... Pakistani troops under Indian attack suffered heavy casualties. ... Given Pakistan’s asymmetrical power structure, it was no surprise that the blundering military clique of Kargil staged a coup against the elected prime minister."

"For the French general, Napoleon Bonaparte, whom Clausewitz called the ‘very god of war’[1127], the centrality of the planning principle for any military campaign meant looking at the ‘worst-case scenario’. This necessarily required that the campaign planner, irrespective of his record of battle successes, not operate from a point of confidence. Instead, as a critical aspect of the planning principle, Napoleon explained how the planner’s personal mindset is central in applying the ‘worst-case scenario’. According to Napoleon, while planning any military campaign, ‘There is no man more pusillanimous than I when I am planning a campaign. I purposely exaggerate all the dangers and all the calamities that the circumstances make possible. I am in a thoroughly painful state of agitation.’[1128] Rarely have world class generals uttered such words of caution and humility, as did Napoleon, thus, emphasizing the criticality of thoroughness of planning for any success in military campaigns.

"Bravado or overconfidence was, thus, unknown to this military genius who, at the age of 26, had commanded the armies of the French Republic against Lombardy (in present-day Italy) and demonstrated near-invincibility in battle.[1129]

"Clearly, most military theorists have not only emphasized the centrality of planning in war but have warned against letting a general’s personality traits and biases undermine his own planning. For example, Clausewitz[1130] especially underscores personality traits like vanity, ambition, and vindictiveness that can move a general from the very planning course that alone is critical to his success and the success of the battle he has planned.

"In contrast to the above mentioned approach of the world’s leading military theorists and military commanders, the Kargil planners were overtaken by enthusiasm and a sense of payback. They were so obsessed with settling historical scores that it never crossed their minds to factor in the worst-case scenario. When the junior officers at 10 Corps heard of the operation, some had muttered their concerns. A confidential document moved through GHQ pointed out, ‘Indians won’t be stupid enough to humiliate themselves by politicizing the conflict.’ On this, an intelligence officer had written, ‘What if they are?’ The officer got rebuked but the question was never answered. Finally, the army chief General Pervez Musharraf raised the question of the Indian response at the January meeting convened for final clearance. However, the Operation had already been launched two months earlier, in November.

"Thus, the foremost planning blunder committed by the Kargil clique was their absolute failure to even factor in, leave alone follow the Napoleonic principle of ‘exaggerating’, possible dangers and calamities that may have arisen during Operation KP. ... Implicit in the planning was the faulty notion that by the time India discovered Pakistani troops across the LOC and controlling India’s lifeline to its troops in Leh, Delhi would find itself locked in a virtual surrender mode with no option but to settle on terms dictated by Pakistan. In such an all-victorious projection for Operation KP, the Kargil planners had turned on its head the cardinal war planning principle of exaggerating your adversary’s response."

................................................................................................

"According to the Swiss army general and military theorist Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, strategy encompasses the entire theatre of operations and is defined as ‘the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theatre of operations’.[1132]Strategy outlines deployment and movement of troops to achieve war objectives. It goes beyond the simple relations between material and static factors like weapons, terrain, and predictable weather. Hence, strategy is the determining framework from which operational planning, tactics, and execution must flow."

"Beyond strategy and closer to the actual war theatre is the domain of tactics. Tactics detail troop positioning, logistics spread, communication coverage, medical, and engineering back-up, etc. Tactics, according to classic military philosophers, are described as ‘the use of military forces in combat’[1134] and ‘the art of posting troops upon the battlefield according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradiction to planning upon a map’.[1135] ... "

" ... Clausewitz observation: ‘The difficulty is not that erudition and great talent are needed … there is no art to devising a good plan of operations.’[1137] According to him, it was the actual waging of war that was difficult since the major challenge lay in the necessity ‘to remain faithful in action to the principles we have laid down for ourselves’.[1138] In action, principles can crumble when confronted with unanticipated realities."

" ... The massive artillery-fronted Indian response—proactive, aggressive, and unprovided for by the Kargil planners—made it impossible for the Pakistani troops to conduct a protracted offensive action against the Indian troops."

" ... Operation KP’s overall module, at the strategic and tactical level, was fundamentally faulty. The failure lay at the doorsteps of the planners who blundered while formulating strategy. Hence, they faltered at the all-encompassing level, at which ‘there is little or no difference between strategy, policy and statesmanship’.[1140] ... "

................................................................................................

" ... The first major Indian attack on the supplies targeted a key forward ammunition dump. Subsequent aerial bombing and heavy artillery attacks in the encounter and exit phases almost entirely disrupted the supply lines. The Indian counter-attack had effectively cut-off what the Kargil planners and, subsequently, the field commanders had established as the Pakistani perimeter within which Operation KP was to be conducted. This made it virtually impossible for men and mules to ply on the supply routes. ... "

" ... Expansion of the war theatre, a classic mission creep phenomenon, has serious implications for logistics, supply lines, and manpower. In Operation KP, the situation for the Pakistani foot soldiers was no different. Within two months of the Operation, they were lured by the vacant spaces and strategic heights in the Kargil area. They had calculated that deeper spread of Pakistani posts on the dominating heights meant greater strategic positioning to tackle Indian retaliation. For example, a platoon in a dominating position could destroy a battalion.

"The field commanders after communicating this ground scenario to the Commander FCNA were granted permission to increase the number of posts to be established across the LOC ... Hence, instead of the initial seven to eight posts, around 196 posts (including defensive centers and outposts) were established. These covered five sectors instead of the planned single sector. This mission creep had led Pakistani troops almost 10 to 15 km ... positioned across 500–600 km of Indian territory. Beyond strategic reasons, there was also the element of competitiveness and adventure among the soldiers that contributed to what had presented itself as classic mission creep.

"‘Rapid march … press on!’ Napoleon counselled men at war. In his seminal work on military operations, Napoleon explains, ‘The strength of an army is like the power in mechanics estimated by multiplying mass by rapidity; a rapid march augments the morale of an army and increases its means of victory.’ This obsession of Napoleon with rapid marches was the major pitfall in his flawed Russian campaign. Almost 200 years later, a similar lesson was manifested again at Kargil."

................................................................................................

"The Kargil planners launched Operation Kargil to exploit Indian vulnerability along the Srinagar-Leh Highway and to sufficiently weaken India so that Pakistan could literally, as Clausewitz would argue, ‘Impose conditions ... at the peace conference.’[1146] These conditions, which the Kargil clique had initially hoped to impose, related to getting Siachen vacated. Subsequently, they changed to seeking freedom for Kashmir, and then to ‘internationalizing’ the issue of Jammu and Kashmir."

" ... It was assumed that, with their Leh-based troops facing the prospect of receiving no supplies after Pakistan virtually blocked the Srinagar-Leh Highway, Delhi would be accommodating. The Kargil clique also believed that the global community would promptly intervene diplomatically to defuse a potentially war-like tension between the two new nuclear states.

"At several points, the planning clique’s half-baked and ill-conceived approach was exposed. There was talk that the planning and analysis wing of the ISI wrote a detailed report on the proposed operation when the plan reached its office but the COAS personally intervened with DG ISI to close down the study. In March, when a young team proposed opening new fronts in Kargil to increase the pressure on the Indians, they were warned that Pakistan could not risk destabilizing the relationship with India. Subsequently, the responses of the Kargil planners when, from May onwards they were in the dock, were muddled and confused. For example, in May, General Aziz, a key planner, had boasted of the Kargil Operation as providing an opportunity to the PM of becoming the Pakistani leader responsible for liberating Kashmiris. At the FO meeting that month, when asked by the deputy air chief what they wanted, the response was unclear. Similarly, at the 2 July DCC meeting, when Ishaq Dar asked what they wanted, the response was again ambiguous. Clarity of purpose, which is the first principle of all military planners, had vanished in a haze of euphoria and wishful thinking.

................................................................................................

"According to Napoleon, ‘Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.’"

Did India know of the paki incursion in November, when it happened, and waited to hit them in June, at leisure?

................................................................................................

" ... Abroad, this military adventure helped to reinforce the hostile image of Pakistan as an irresponsible nuclear state whose military generals could easily undermine the elected leadership and call the shots on Pakistan’s India policy."

" ... There was, however, no formal system of information flow from the battle zone to Sharif, the country’s chief executive and the final decision-maker. On occasion, revealing information on the Kargil clique’s thinking came from the Indians, who produced in their national newspapers the entire text of a discussion on Operation KP between the army chief and the CGS, the two senior-most members of the Kargil clique."

"From May onwards, the Prime Minister did activate several decision-making forums. These forums, however, had to function below the public radar because, even after the operation became public and the world community knew that Pakistani troops had conducted it, the Kargil clique still insisted that only the Kashmiri Mujahedeen were fighting in Kargil. Moreover, at home also, the ISPR was briefing the media about Kashmiri Mujahedeen presence across the LOC ... Accordingly, the prime minister avoided convening full cabinet meetings and sessions of Parliament, to either discuss Kargil or to get support for Pakistani troops fighting in Kargil. Instead, the government opted for a secretive decision-making approach through informal huddles."

" ... The army chief held a telephone discussion from Beijing with the CGS on Operation KP using an open unsecured line. ... MI acknowledging Pakistan troop presence in Drass-Kargil in briefings to defense attaches while the Pakistan government publicly denied Pakistani troop presence; ... "

"Pakistan’s key decision-makers and critical institutions were not positioned for responsible and clearheaded decision-making. There was distrust between decision-makers and fear of the other, as if there were an ongoing battle within. During the Operation’s planning stage, it was a complete secret. In the battle stage, reliable and regular information required for informed decision-making did not flow in. Equally, the institutional linkages were dysfunctional. No SOPs for information sharing and coordination existed. Even within the one critical institution, relevant commanders were not aware of Operation KP."

" ... There is ample evidence that the Kargil planners ignored, if not outright rejected, all questions raised by their junior officers regarding the domestic, Indian, and US responses to the Operation. ... "

"The generals, having blundered in the military battle at Kargil, won the political war in Islamabad. The government’s silence over whatever they knew about the Kargil Operation, including the military situation after heavy Indian artillery and aerial attack, had enabled the Kargil clique to craft and broadcast, virtually uncontested, its own version of ‘facts’. According to their version, the Mujahideen were militarily strangulating the Indians. It was no surprise, therefore, that in public perception, Sharif’s trip was interpreted as the prime minister arriving in Washington to barter away a Mujahideen victory in exchange for his own survival. The few voices in the media that pointed to the facts of the Kargil battle and raised valid questions remained buried under the dominant story of a sell-out in Washington."

................................................................................................

" ... It was no surprise that Beijing virtually read the Riot Act to Pakistan’s foreign minister when he arrived in China for an SOS trip on 11 June. Pakistan, he was told, had to vacate Kargil, Kashmir had to be resolved bilaterally, and Beijing had no influence on Indian dealings with Pakistan. Within three days of Aziz’s departure, the Indian foreign minister arrived in Beijing to a rousing welcome."

" ... Javed Hassan’s exchanges as defense attaché in Washington had left him believing, though utterly unfounded,[1148] that in case of a Pakistan-initiated military exchange with India, Washington would support Pakistan against India.

"The past occasions, when perception of movement of some kind of nuclear weapons from Kahuta, had rung alarm bells in Washington, the Kargil clique saw a potential for nuclear blackmail working to Pakistan’s advantage. They believed that a panicked world community, led by Washington, would instantly intervene after the impact of a successfully executed Operation KP was publicized and the newly nuclearized neighbors would be seen as being on the brink of war. India checkmated this calculation primarily by Delhi’s decision to restrict Indian military response restricted to the Kargil region and by not opening new fronts. Hence, a consensus emerged within the global community, especially in the US and the EU, that a nuclear Pakistan’s rash behavior, which involved forsaking of diplomatic engagement and opting for military engagement with traces of nuclear blackmail, would not be rewarded."

" ... The first trip in ten years by an Indian foreign minister to China was in the works. Pakistan, by contrast, was in a difficult strategic situation. Its Afghanistan policy was under criticism and it was blamed for facilitating ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamic militancy’. ... "

Using quote marks does not transform facts, definitely does not veil truth, into or by a lie. It merely exposes one making the ridiculous attempt to be not taken seriously due to the attempted clever lie. 

................................................................................................

"10) Answers to Critical and Abiding Questions About Operation Koh Paima:

"Did the military inform the Prime Minister about the Kargil Operation?

" ... Only in March, General Aziz had asked one of his staff officers to hand him a map that he would use to brief the PM. Such a briefing pre-17 May did not, however, take place. Subsequently, the May Musharraf-Aziz telephone recordings left no doubt that the Kargil clique had undertaken Operation KP without specific clearance from the prime minister.[1149]

"Beginning with the November 1998 DCC meeting[1150] ... it was unlikely that the Kargil clique would have reached out to the same prime minister to get his support and clearance for Operation KP. Equally, the clique would have known that getting the prime minister’s support for a major operation in contested territory, just when arrangements for the Lahore Summit were under way, was unlikely. The prime minister was viewed by a section of the army high command and hard line analysts as being overly committed to peace with India, to the extent of a failing. Nawaz Sharif was, therefore, the most unlikely candidate to play a double game with India."

................................................................................................

"Did Pakistan’s Intelligence Agencies Fail over Kargil?

"The two agencies mandated to pick up intelligence are the Military Intelligence and the ISI. In the case of Kargil, while individuals from within the ISI and the MI both appear to have attempted to investigate, both these agencies failed to pick up anything indicating unusual troop movements as leads to the covert yet unfolding Kargil Operation. The ISI’s failure meant that this cross-service agency, reporting directly to the PM, was unable to report the moves and the implications of the Kargil Operation to the government. Similarly, the MI’s failure ensured that, except for the gang of four, no one within the army top brass knew of the Operation. This dual institutional failure also raised broader questions regarding the effectiveness of Pakistan’s intelligence in monitoring stray and subversive Pakistani elements within the country’s own defense institutions. If the remoteness of the theatre of operations prevented the ISI and MI from monitoring the crossing of the LOC, the failure to pick up unusual military and paramilitary troop movements, either of the NLI troops or the 19 Division or of the SSG, was symptomatic of a deficient intelligence setup. The ISI’s defense was that it does not follow any movements, including internal troop movements; therefore, unless the army informs them about its operational plans, the ISIwill not know. Meanwhile, with ISI and MI both outside of the planning and execution loop of Operation KP, they also failed to report Indian preparations for force deployment, including troops and weapon systems, in the zone of conflict. Significantly, among other factors, this complete ‘intel blindness’ also ruled out all possibility of any early and pre-emptive course correction during Operation KP."

So - all they can do is send terrorists to burn hotels and kill people in India?

................................................................................................

"Was Pakistan militarily on a winning curve when the July fourth withdrawal decision was made?

"Pakistan remained on a winning curve only until the Encounter Phase, when in early May Indian troops first discovered Pakistani troops across the LOC. That initial encounter was marked by artillery exchanges and with Indian induction of aerial power. From early June onwards, after the Indian Army command began discovering the extent ... there began a graduated Indian military retaliation. Operation KP had turned into a battle. For the Indian government ... "

No, it always was war, inflicted by pakis on India. 

" ... As the Indians deployed massive air power, disrupting Pakistan’s supply lines, hitting logistic dumps, targeting soldiers, and generating severe psychological pressure on the Pakistani troops, the original advantage to the Pakistani troops, of being positioned at heights and enjoying lethal strategic advantage over the Indian troops climbing to attack them, began to erode. On 4 June, Pakistan lost Tololing, the first peak, to the Indians. Thereon, as they came under severe artillery and aerial attacks and faced deployment of the Bofors guns, Pakistani troops began to lose posts and pickets. Pakistani troop casualties were also on the rise. ... "

Author's insinuations against India continue here, against soldiers and government both, as she praises pakis (for sitting on peaks) killing Indian soldiers battling uphill (with boulders pushed down), she credits Indian victories to Indian artillery shelling - as if pakis were raining flower petals on Indian soldiers! 

" ... Contrary to the allegations made against the prime minister that he had bartered away in Washington the military victory that the troops were winning in Kargil, the PM brought to a rapid close costly military, diplomatic, and political losses in Kargil."

................................................................................................

"Could the international community have forced India to buckle under Kargil pressure?

"There were neither individual nor collective compulsions for key members of the international community to have even advised Delhi to enter into negotiations on any outstanding bilateral dispute. The question of any member, including Pakistan’s strategic ally China, to have even advised, leave aside forced, India to buckle under the pressure from Operation KP and enter into negotiations over Siachen etc. with Pakistan, did not arise. In fact, any move likely to culminate in a military confrontation between Pakistan and India, the two hostile neighbors who had recently acquired nuclear weapons, would make the international community panic. And Pakistan had made the move—which was also being interpreted as nuclear blackmail by Pakistan. ... There was complete consensus within the key members of the international community, including the US, EU states, the UN, and also Pakistan’s closest strategic ally, China, that Pakistan should not be rewarded for Operation Kargil. ... "

................................................................................................

"Did Pakistan plan to deploy nuclear weapons in an all-out war?

"There were neither individual nor collective compulsions for key members of the international community to have even advised Delhi to enter into negotiations on any outstanding bilateral dispute. The question of any member, including Pakistan’s strategic ally China, to have even advised, leave aside forced, India to buckle under the pressure from Operation KP and enter into negotiations over Siachen etc. with Pakistan, did not arise. In fact, any move likely to culminate in a military confrontation between Pakistan and India, the two hostile neighbors who had recently acquired nuclear weapons, would make the international community panic. ... "

Later, the then paki army chief made similar assertions after his coup, but he wasn't doing so without thought, and it was clear blackmail. 

" ... but was not backed by substantive evidence. ... "

When someone wielding a gun pointing at you is threatening to shoot to kill, and showing no sign of civilised conduct, it's a rare one who'd ask a prophet if the threat was intended to be carried out - or ask the gun wielding thug for proof of intentions by demonstration of performance. 

" ... Pakistan military’s high command had sabotaged the Lahore Summit and should not be rewarded. Pakistan had to be made to retreat unconditionally. ... "

" ... As a key member of the clique later recalled, they conveyed to the country’s elected leadership, ‘We are holding this. Now you take advantage, whatever you can, at military and political level.’[1156] However, the unfolding Kargil crisis proved the clique’s nuclear deterrence calculation flawed on two counts: Operation KP did turn into a military conflict and, while Washington and other Security Council members did exercise forceful diplomacy, it was to force Pakistan to retreat from Kargil, not to reward Pakistan’s operation. The spin-off of this clique’s brinkmanship (read nuclear blackmail) was immensely negative. It undid the diplomatic gains accrued to Pakistan for its mature diplomatic and political moves after the nuclear tests."

"Three factors point to deliberate manipulation. First, Pakistan was not in such a desperate military situation that it would have needed to opt for nuclear weapons. Secondly, and most importantly, Pakistan did not then have the capability to the deploy nuclear weapons[1158], nor had the Indians picked any intelligence on Pakistan readying nuclear weapons. Thirdly, the Americans deliberately chose an attitude of benign neglect and ignored Indian moves to ready its nuclear missiles for use.[1159] ... "

When a thug breaks in at midnight wielding a gun pointed at you, a policeman with any sense is likely to not ask if the gun is likely to fire or has a bullet, and what's more, would excuse the threatened victims of break-in - for arming and retaliation. 

Especially so in US.

................................................................................................

"Was there a pro-India tilt in Washington during Kargil?

"With the Kargil blunder, Pakistan provided the Clinton Administration a priceless opportunity to invest in strategic trust-building with India. Throughout the crisis, Washington’s key policy men opened multiple lines of communication with their Indian counterparts. It began with the 27 May call by Inderfurth, who called the India ambassador, Naresh Chandra, to inform him about what Pickering had told the Pakistanis. Subsequently, on 16 June, Inderfurth met with Brajesh Mishra in Cologne. After the 23 June Islamabad meetings between US CENTCOM Chief General Zinni and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and army chief General Musharraf, State Department official Lanpher went to brief Delhi on the Islamabad meetings. Similarly, during the crucial Sharif-Clinton summit on 4 July, in a manner unprecedented in summit diplomacy, Clinton would call Vajpayee to brief him of the summit talks. Similarly, the Indian NSA and External Affairs Minister were also updated on Sharif-Clinton talks by their counterparts, NSA Sandy Berger and Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. The sole purpose was to share with the Indians every aspect of their communications with Pakistan."

It's unclear if the above is realistic evaluation or a skewed perception. 

................................................................................................

"Was there a role for the backchannel?

"Washington’s decision to maintain complete transparency with Delhi on its diplomatic and political exchanges with Islamabad had left Islamabad with no negotiating space. Guaranteed for itself a bailout by Washington and for Islamabad an embarrassing retreat, Delhi was left with no motive to engage with Islamabad. The backchannel initiative was, thus, squeezed of any possibility of success."

Translated into normal honest words, there was no space left for duplicity, lies et al that's normal paki everyday language! 

They tried, and desperately so, especially in the most obvious lies maintained simultaneously in internal and international arena, despite the fraud being quite obvious to international community - of claiming publicly that the men invading india were not paki military, for one, while maintaining that their pm was aware of the Kargil invasion all along even as he was hosting the PM of India, for another - but then complain about these lies, once exposed, destroying any possibility of respect for pakis. 

Thus the claim and complaint about lack of equal treatment on par with that meted out to India. 

................................................................................................

"Was the Prime Minister’s Washington dash necessary? 

"As the country’s chief executive, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could have ordered withdrawal of Pakistani troops, bringing an end to Operation KP. In keeping with Islamabad’s public position that the Kashmiri Mujahideen and not the Pakistani troops had seized the heights, Sharif could have announced that Islamabad would use its goodwill to urge the Kashmiri Mujahideen to return from IOK. This would have been consistent with the farcical ‘Mujahideen’ position Pakistan had illogically and clumsily maintained since the beginning of Operation KP. The international community would have been relieved that the battle between two nuclear powers had drawn to a close. The prime minister, however, chose to engage the Clinton Administration because he had hoped that Washington would make a public statement of support for the Kashmiris and of facilitating a political resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Sharif and his close political aides also believed that American involvement at this withdrawal stage would make it more palatable for the army high command since the army chief had himself had sought Washington’s engagement. However, as subsequent developments showed, neither did the Clinton administration make any public statements supporting the Kashmir struggle, nor did the Sharif-Clinton 4 July encounter influence the post-Kargil tensions that surfaced between the elected prime minister and the army chief."

Here, and throughout the book on this point, author tries subterfuge to veil a lie. She claims that the Washington trip was for Kashmir. 

It wasn't. 

Plain truth is that, despite the lies to the contrary position proclaimed repeatedly by author, in reality pakis were being not only pounded relentlessly by India but couldn't take it, and the paki dash to Washington was the bully going crying to the police asking him to stop his intended victim bashing him up, something the bully hadn't expected - and this failed, since everyone in the international community was aware, via satellite footage, of who had invaded. 

................................................................................................

"Could the Prime Minister have Ordered an Inquiry Against The Kargil Planners, Especially the Army Chief?

"Immediately after 4 July, tensions began developing between Sharif and Musharraf, with each worried about his survival. Investigating the why, who, and how of Operation KP, to establish responsibility and to take action against those who had launched an operation that had ended in such a fiasco, was, however, far removed from the prime minister’s mind. Civil-military coordination remained generally smooth almost throughout the Kargil period. Some briefings for the PM were held at the 10 Corps Headquarters. Most, however, were held in the PM House, where the army brass would bring its maps, etc. Often, meetings would almost take the form of the DCC but hardly any decision-making took place in these. The prime minister had, in fact, left the decision-making process during Kargil in military hands. Although Sharif had the constitutional authority to directly lead decision-making, he did not ‘interfere’[1160] and had simply supported the army.

"The thought of holding an inquiry against Musharraf is unlikely to have occurred to a PM who had supported Operation KP. It is true that the PM was first briefed of the Operation only after it was a done deed. The PM had also declined Musharraf’s rhetorical mid-stream offer to withdraw his troops from Kargil. In fact, there was written evidence of the Parliament’s bipartisan Defense Committee’s positive support for Operation Kargil in a letter written by the Committee chairman in praise of the army chief’s presentation."

And, unlike the army chief with his openly thug mindset, Nawaz Sharif remained honest enough and decent enough to not turn immediately on someone when it was a fiasco, despite his own self having neither been aware nor initiated it, and never in control, of the assault, until he was required as the figurehead to get help from US to get India to stop! 

"In the overall asymmetric civil-military relations in Pakistan’s power structure, there have been only two incidences when elected prime ministers sought to hold army commanders to account. One was when, after the 1971 surrender at Dhaka and the breakup of Pakistan, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto formed the Hamoodur Rehman Commission to conduct an inquiry into the military debacle. His army chief, Zia ul-Haq overthrew him in a military coup and hanged him following legally dubious court proceedings. The second was in 1988, when Prime Minister Junejo ordered an inquiry into the deadly Ojri Camp ammunition disaster. No sooner had he announced the inquiry, the military President Zia ul-Haq sacked him."

And the post Kargil coup wasn't different, either. 

"In the absence of a political culture of holding the military accountable, the reactions of military men when held accountable, the complexities of the initiation and, indeed, of the termination of Operation KP, the fiercely anti-Nawaz mood of the political opposition, and the dominant claim of the time that Kashmiri Mujahideen had fought the Indians across the LOC while Pakistani troops fought mostly along the LOC: all these militated against Sharif conducting a Kargil inquiry. ... "

Again author is verbose in attempting to veil facts - namely, that pakis never have had a properly functioning government of any sort other than a military dictatorship, never any culture or education system other than one rooted in invader and looters mindset carrying heritage of history of hordes from Central and West Asia invading, looting and destroying India- which included until 1947 the very land pakis were given, torn out of India - and no other aim set for their very nation other than destruction of India, as a result of this choice of the heritage. 

The so-called nation, in reality is no more than a jihadist factory grown around a  military base, for West for freedom of expensive usage against Russia, conceived in this mindset of invading and looting, and aim of destruction of India now grown to destruction of the world, and born of deliberately perpetrated massacres of thousands of Hindus in 1946-47 that were intended to, and succeeded in, forcing India to let a piece be torn out. 

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"Beyond fear, the contradictions of the Operation, Kargil produced serious frictions even in the post-Kargil phase. For example, while maintain its insistence that Mujahideen had been fighting in Kargil, how could the army receive the bodies of the martyred soldiers? Similarly, while insisting that only Mujahideen fought in Kargil, how could major programmes honouring the martyrs of Kargil be organized by the Sharif government? ... The army sought widely publicized honouring of the Kargil martyrs and of those having returned alive from across the LOC."

"Throughout history, the acid test of generals at war or in military operations has been the victories they have piled up. No general is more successful than the outcome of the war he leads. In more complex situations, like those in South Asia in the second half of the twentieth century, the yardstick for assessment has to be what have the wars have achieved. History has examples of individual brilliance leading armies to victories and steering nations away from disaster. Outstanding military commanders, such as Alexander, Khalid bin Walid, Genghis Khan, Julius Caesar, Salahuddin Ayyubi, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Vo Nguyen Giap, were men who wrested victory from situations where deep imprints of defeat were written. Bin Walid became the legendary general who, despite the numerical superiority of battle-hardened adversaries like the Romans and the Sassanids, piled up victories for the Rashiddun Caliphate. Napoleon ‘inspired a ragged, mutinous, half-starved army and made it fight’[1161] like a winning combination that few would fight before or after. Salahuddin, with his less experienced army, reversed the Crusaders’ winning streak with his grand victory in the decisive Battle of Hattin in 1187. Julius Caesar, personally brave in battle, was creative in tactics and engineering. There was Alexander, another general facing most armies who outnumbered his own, but always remaining undefeated. Genghis Khan, a masterful general who, through excellent military intelligence and tactics and by uniting nomadic tribes and confederation and his strategic raids, became the founder of the Mongol Empire, the largest contiguous empire in history, which included most of Eurasia and substantial parts of Eastern Europe. In more recent times, the Viet Minh Commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap, who led his men to defeat a technologically superior adversary by perfecting and applying a unique war technique, which was the most important dimension of the Vietcong’s overall political, economic, and diplomatic strategy for defeating the Americans.

"In the Kargil operation, the performance of the clique of commanders, the quality of their strategic planning, and of their command, all tell a different story. Yet the power equation, absence of any accountability, the absence of censure when it mattered, and bravado minus logic or sound analysis, have ruled the day. Despite repeated blunders, the commanders in charge escaped accountability."

What author is either unable to perceive, or unable to say, is that the paki military is a bully who, thrashed outside, comes home to beat up his wife and children, old parents and helpless siblings. 

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" ... Major General Akbar Khan, the lead military man in Pakistan's first attempt to regain Kashmir, had readily accepted Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's label of ‘raiders’ for the Pakistani forces involved in the 1947–48 ‘Acquire Kashmir’ Operation. ... "

Kashmir had been free until invaded by pakis, and it wasn't Nehru but Jinnah who pretended thst it was tribals, not his military. 

" ... The former general, eulogising the Pakistani ‘raiders’, suggested, ‘We may perhaps also qualify for sitting in that distinguished gallery of personalities like Genghis Khan, Timur Lang, Mahmud of Ghazni, and even Alexander.’ Interestingly, Pakistan's senior-most general equated his own men with history’s prized military leaders, who had raided, ravaged, and even reigned over foreign lands in the pre-Westphalian world. ... "

No, he was far more specific, in his dream and desire to belong to the club that was all comprised of invaders each from elsewhere and attacked India, invaded and looted India, sought to destroy India. 

He included none of the tall figures that were from or of India, despite his own homeland having been a part of India for ever until then less than a year ago, and his own ancestral origins being in India, 

And that's the divide, of India- and those that seek to destroy India. 

" ... This voluntary characterization of a state's army as ‘raiders’, in the context especially of the Kashmir operation, flowed from the juxtaposition in this Pakistani soldier's mind, of the Pakistan Army as a force for right, dedicated to undoing the wrong committed at the time of Pakistan's creation. ... "

That's convoluted fraud seeking to justify invasions, massacres and loot, with fraudulent claims of rights. 

British had in fact given far too much land to pakis in the first place, when plebiscite would have denied them all but East Bengal, which alone had voted for partition. Sindh was evenly divided in vote. Punjab had voted for unionists and NWFP was determined to stay with India - as was Baluchistan. Brits rode roughshod over all of the provinces in handing over the land pakis got, because it was military base needed for use of West against Russia. 

What those raiders were identifying with was, has always been, identity of invaders, looters, destroyers and killers wreaking havoc against India. This isn't due to perceived rights but simply a mindset of a robber. 

And they certainly had no 'right' to Kashmir, which, until pakis attacked, was independent. 

Author does lie on level after level, not very differently from a rotten onion. 

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" ... India's systematic role in being a mid-wife to the 1971 breakup of Pakistan ... "

Because East Bengal hadn't been subjected to racist discrimination and linguistic chauvinism of denying freedom of language, not to mention massacre of three million and mass gang rapes of half a million, by paki military? 

Or was it because India prevented pakis from massacring further millions? 

No, author simply lies through the rest of the paragraph along the lines. 

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"The period from Kargil to the Coup epitomizes the inherent and continuing problems that Pakistan faces in three specific areas. These include two policy areas Pakistan-US relations, relations with India including Kashmir. There is also the third structural issue of thorny civil-military relations. While on the two policy areas of India and Kashmir, there are external players that influence the nature of the challenges that Pakistan faces, Pakistan too as an interlocutor contributes to the dynamic of the relationship. Meanwhile the structural problem of civil-military relations, rooted in the process of State formation, and the unequal stature and authority of the political and the garrison entities, evolved into asymmetrical strengths of both. Within the ensuing power chemistry of Pakistan, the army acquired a dominant role, paving the way to military coups."

"The asymmetry of authority in the army’s favor has continued because of the inability of most elected governments, except for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, to bolster its Constitutional authority through institutional decision-making. ... "

Here author mentions a civilian government's head who was legally executed by a military dictator post coup, as an exception to paki history of "authority in the army’s favor"! 

What could be a better example of the fraudulent writing by the author?!

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CONTENTS 

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

INTRODUCTION: WHY KARGIL? 

CHAPTER 1: THE ROOTS OF CONFRONTATION 

CHAPTER 2: THE KARGIL OPERATION: CONTEXT AND CONTRADICTIONS 

CHAPTER 3: DIVERGENT TRACKS:  DIALOGUE VS. OPERATION KOH PAIMA 

CHAPTER 4: NECKS ON THE LINE AND THE LOTUS LAKE 

CHAPTER 5: KARGIL UNCOVERED 

CHAPTER 6: BOLT FROM THE BLUE 

CHAPTER 7: IN THE FIRING LINE 

CHAPTER 8: FIGHT BACK 

CHAPTER 9: MYTH-MAKING AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 

CHAPTER 10: MAPPING EXITS 

CHAPTER 11: NUCLEAR CARD AND WASHINGTON’S GAINS 

CHAPTER 12: ALL FALLS APART 

CHAPTER 13: THE 2 JULY DCC MEETING 

CHAPTER 14: THE END GAME 

CHAPTER 15: IN THE EYE OF STORM 

CHAPTER 16: THE AUGUST QUADRANGLE 

CHAPTER 17: A BRIDGE TOO FAR 

CHAPTER 18: THE COUP 

CHAPTER 19: READING KARGIL 

CHAPTER 20: CONCLUSION 

END NOTES 

SOURCES OF PRIMARY DATA (INTERVIEWS CONVERSATIONS AND WRITTEN EXCHANGES) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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REVIEW 

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

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"At the core of this undertaking are the many courageous and conscientious officers of the Pakistan Army without whose cooperation the story of Operation Koh Paima could not have been reconstructed. It included, among others the former army Chief General Parvez Musharraf, Lt. General (retd) Nadeem Ahmad, Lt. General (retd) Gulzar Kiani, Lt. General (retd) Javed Hassan, Lt. General (retd) Amjad Shuaib, Brigadier (retd) Syed Azhar Raza, Brigadier (retd) Khalid Nazir. While some officers have been named many opted to remain anonymous. Some even reached out to me to tell the incredible story that they were part of.

"Other central figures including Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad, Additional Foreign Secretary Tariq Fatemi, Secretary Defense retired general Iftikhar Ali Khan, Minister of Petroleum Chaudhry Nisar , Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, involved in formulating Pakistan’s policy response to Operation Koh Paima, generously shared their experience and understanding of critical events during May to October."

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"Beyond primary sources my research was mainly dependent on newspaper and journals. Nasir Zaidi, the star researcher at the Institute of Regional Studies in Islamabad provided me the gold mine of Indian and Pakistani newspapers, critical to reconstructing the events from Kargil to the coup. Faheem Z. Khan also helped with this project. At the Harvard University libraries, many unnamed individuals also pulled out microfiche copies of newspaper reports and journal articles. Their ‘giving’ attitudes made my research task truly gratifying."

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"A big thank you finally also to all those individuals in the various libraries and coffee shops in Pakistan and abroad, where I intermittently ‘resided’ over the years for very long hours to work on my manuscript. ... "

That pak has not only libraries, but coffee shops where women can sit and do reading, writing et al, without being punished as per an islamic law - that's news! 

Or are these strictly private facilities? Presumably for privileged few? 

" ... Whether it was the management and tea-providers at the library of the Institute of Strategic Studies or the program officer Jorge Espada and Holly Angell at the Harvard University’s Asia Center, their friendly demeanors energized me to work untiringly in solitude."

So this was a research project that was supported by Harvard, perhaps a thesis? 

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"A big thank you finally also to all those individuals in the various libraries and coffee shops in Pakistan and abroad, where I intermittently ‘resided’ over the years for very long hours to work on my manuscript. ... "

That pak has not only libraries, but coffee shops where women can sit and do reading, writing et al, without being punished as per an islamic law - that's news! 

Or are these strictly private facilities? Presumably for privileged few? 

" ... Whether it was the management and tea-providers at the library of the Institute of Strategic Studies or the program officer Jorge Espada and Holly Angell at the Harvard University’s Asia Center, their friendly demeanors energized me to work untiringly in solitude."

So this was a research project that was supported by Harvard, perhaps a thesis? 

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October 22, 2022 - October 22, 2022. 

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INTRODUCTION: WHY KARGIL? 

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"In recent years, across the Pakistan-India border and the Line of Control (LOC), guns have tended to converse more often than policy-makers. While the relationship between these two nuclear-armed states, Pakistan and India, influence the lives of almost one fifth of humanity, yet unfortunately hostility appears to be the only real durable factor in this inter-state relationship. This hostility rules out genuine cooperation while minimizing the possibility of resolving outstanding issues ranging from Siachen, Sir Creek, Kashmir, to water and trade disputes. Against the backdrop of this abiding antagonism South Asia remains the world’s least economically integrated region. Regional trade in South Asia accounts for only 5% of overall trade. The people of South Asia are confronted with grave environmental threats including global warming, rising water levels leading to water and food scarcity, displacement of large populations, and a rise in infectious disease epidemics."

Notice the polite pretension about it being all equal and mutual, ignoring the terrorists bred by paki military to deploy against India as they did against Afghanistan and other nations, including US, UK and many, many others. 

But then, what does one expect of a so-called nation whose genesis was in massacres of non-Muslims of India, perpetrated at orders of jinnah, and promised to go on without respite unless a piece of India was truncated for those who couldn't tolerate living in a democracy, a land which was turned into a nation whose very existence was one that's rooted in need of military bases for use of West against Russia, and has defrauded the very US of hundreds of billions of dollars by taking them in whatever base and splitting them into private pockets and terrorists support? 

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"Yet why is Pakistan-India peace elusive? 

"The 1999 Kargil battle, code-named Koh Paima (Operation KP), explains this well. Its events weave a story of repeated blunders, involving national and regional players that prevents genuine peace efforts from succeeding."

One, India doesn't forget the backstabbing that was paki attempts at fooling India with friendly handshake in Lahore while attacking in Kashmir at Kargil and other places, seeking to wrest off Kashmir. 

Two, that Pakistan have another name, (Operation KP), unlike India where its remembered as Kargil, shows that Pakistan had planned it as military operation even as Pakistan pretended to the last that the paki military had nothing to do with it, and that it was only some trials who had occupied territory of India. 

This pretense is routine from pakis, whether 1948 or 1965 or Kargil - or all those terrorists stealing in across the border, with paki currency and brand foods et al - so much so, at Kargil they refused to take back bodies of their dead soldiers. 

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" ... What should have been publicly known facts had turned into deep mysteries because the operation itself was a covert undertaking. For example: Who was actually fighting? Was Operation KP government approved? Was it across the LOC in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) or in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK)? ... "

One, it's J&K, a state in India that was legitimately signed accession of as every other state was, but with the difference that Kashmir might have been an independent nation if pakis had not attacked it in 1947-48, pretending it was only tribals. 

Two, pakis occupied a part thereof, which is denied both, equality and separate character, while the fraudulent epithet of 'free' is attached in name by pakis to it. 

Three, Jammu is ethnically far more non Muslim, apart from being completely in India, just as Ladakh is ethnically far more Buddhist and is completely in India. 

Four, pakis copied the Chinese trick in Tibet - or was it the other way around? -  in denying that Gilgit and Baltistan are North Kashmir, which isn't even mentioned by this author in the context, but are integral part of Jammu and Kashmir. 

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"The end phase of Operation KP proved somewhat traumatic for Pakistan. ... "

"Somewhat"???? Northern Light Infantry was decimated! Or should one say, wiped out? 

It was families of those dead boys clamoring that finally led to an admission by administration, which had denied any role therein until then. 

" ... The prime minister suddenly left in the early hours of 4 July 1999 for Washington DC where a Clinton-Sharif meeting generated the Pakistan-US statement calling for the ‘withdrawal’ of troops. At home a fierce—if subdued—contestation began in civil, military, and public circles as to whether Pakistan had ‘gained’ or ‘lost’ from the operation. ... "

Wake up, guys, whether there's coffee to smell or otherwise - pakis have never but lost. 

"Pakistan had twice before experienced coups d’état. This time, however, it happened with the military chief in the air and key operation planners leading the coup! ... "

And, surprise surprise, another military dictator conducted the coup after losing yet another war to India, as per paki historical tradition. 

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"My chapter had covered Kargil from various angles, including civil-military relations, decision-making processes, ... "

Those are proper in India, a true democracy rooted in a spiritual treasure aligned with truth, science, thought and democracy, unlike the dictatorial abrahmic creeds. 

" ... comparisons between Operation KP and the 1965 Operation Gibraltar, ... "

Interesting, that name! Presumably a copy of an operation by axis powers to wrest it away from UK? Which had failed?

Do the pakis stay ignorant of history as much as of thry for of geopolitical facts, always? 

India recalls that only as 1965 war perpetrated by paki military, during which Indian military tanks were in Lahore - and could have taken it, had they not waited for orders and information. 

" ... the triangular Pakistan-US-India relations during the Op, and the impact of the nuclear factor on this kind of limited operation."

Funny, having taken a piece of land from India to make a fanatic home for a creed lacking tolerance amongst other things, why do pakis need to bring in US every time there's anything they want that belongs to India? Or has US, in this respect, merely replaced UK, the latter having given away those provinces to pakis that had not voted in favour of it,  but of staying within India? 

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"In my original chapter on Operation KP, there was some new information on most of these issues. I had written on the operation in real time with access to key Pakistani decision-makers. Later, in 2002, I also met key Indian decision-makers. However, it was not until the end-phase of the operation that I had begun to grasp the facts about it. Until then, I had believed the official narrative that the Mujahideen were the ones doing the fighting in Kargil. After it ended, I occasionally wrote about the facts of the operation, but nothing comprehensive."

Candid admission. 

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"Significance of Op KP

"However, given the broad canvas over which Operation KP was spread—ranging from Pakistan-India relations to civil-military relations and the decision-making process ... "

Surely that's true of every war, except in the detail of which countries are actually involved? 

"The facts of a controversial operation also needed to be revealed to a people who, in the past too, have had to pay heavily for the serious policy blunders of Pakistan’s policy-makers, including the ultimate price of the country’s breakup."

That was due to the same short-sighted thinking that was responsible for genesis of pak in the first place, and also for almost every decision involving deliberate inflictions of physical assaults, whether against India, or against nonmuslims within paki borders. 

" ... As a fellow at the Harvard University Asia Center, I was able to work in an undisturbed space and access excellent research facilities. In 2006, I was asked to teach a course at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC. All this meant time away from working on Operation KP."

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"Deviations and Information Collection

"The silver lining to these detours and writing spread over many years was that new information kept trickling in, particularly with respect to Operation KP. Information about the military aspect of the operation was especially a boon since initially hardly any first-hand accounts from field fighters were available. The key planner of the operation, General Javed Hassan, had talked about it in two extensive sittings as did a senior official from the Directorate of Military Operations (DMO) during multiple meetings. Over the years, moreover, several key field commanders were willing to share critical, field-level information regarding the operational aspects and progress of the operation. There was also open debate between recently retired generals on the merits and demerits of Operation KP. For example, responding to General Pervez Musharraf’s defense of Operation KP, the former Chief of General Staff (CGS), General Ali Kuli Khan, attacked the army chief for launching the operation. Similarly Lt. General Shahid Aziz, once Musharraf’s blue-eyed boy, wrote extensively about it. Another book by a then serving officer, Colonel (retd) Ashfaq Hussain,Witness to Blunder: Kargil Story Unfolds (Idara Matbuat-e-Sulemani, 2008), also deviated from the dominant narrative. This book had a different perspective from that of Dr Shireen Mazari’s book, The Kargil Conflict, 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction (Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003). Dr Mazari’s book details specific Indian military and diplomatic actions arguing that ‘Pakistan got sucked into an ever-widening conflict as a result of (these) pre-planned Indian actions’. ... "

Right, typical fraudulent propaganda by pakis there, blaming India for pre-planned assaults by and from pak against India! 

" ... All the above published information and the facts collected first-hand from active field commanders were especially valuable, given the army’s super-secrecy syndrome. An example of how this syndrome worked was my failure to get a copy of the pre and post-op curriculum of strategy courses taught at the Command and Staff College, Quetta. I wanted these documents  because the former Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani had stated in an interview that as a result of the lessons from Operation KP, the strategy courses taught to military officers at the Command and Staff College had been changed. My repeated requests at the highest levels bore no fruit."

Safe bet, that changed strategy amounts to training and sending terrorists, nothing more or less. 

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"Beyond Pakistan’s Binary Debate

"Interestingly, much of Pakistan’s political and security debate has veered towards the civilian versus military binary. Pakistan’s political journey, with military rule spanning over more than half its history, lends itself to such an approach. In the mainstream debate, this promotes a flawed reading of decision-making, policies, and policy impacts. States and societies with a flawed understanding of policy matters can rarely become effective advocates for policy change. Acquiring consensus on Pakistan’s India policy has proved to be especially difficult, as official and public debate has tended to follow the civil-military binary path. ... "

In short, pakis never had any vision or cohesive culture, and if they stopped anti-India rhetoric or wars, the country would have no reason whatsoever to be separated from mainland and heartland that's India. 

" ... Extracting a consensus from what is a deeply divided narrative is often challenging, if not impossible. For example, on wars, the critical landmarks in Pakistan-India relations, the narratives have been influenced by this civil-military binary approach and are deeply divided as to who started which war, which political and diplomatic environment were the wars initiated in, what was achieved or lost, etc. In some cases, the passage of time has allowed a review of the original text on the wars. For example, the narrative of the 1948 and 1965 wars are now laced with a revisionist historiography frequently written  by military generals. But this has not been the case with Operation KP, the most recent—albeit limited—Pakistan-India military encounter. As of now, very little comprehensive work on Kargil has been produced. The common narrations either eulogize the army while critiquing the civilians or extol the civilians while critiquing the army. The paucity of information from both civilian and military perspectives has also fed this situation."

In other words, lies about Kargil war perpetuation by paki military are too recent to be cleared with honest admissions. 

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"The Historical Context of Operation KP

"In June 1947, the Muslim League leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah had concluded that over 570 princely states, including Jammu and Kashmir, could remain independent while his Congress counterpart, Jawaharlal Nehru, had insisted that they could not be ‘allowed to claim independence’.[1] Jinnah had anticipated a far less complex challenge at Independence. ... "

One, Jinnah was being handed a seeming gift on a platter, for sake of permanently free availability of military bases for use of West against Russia, with provinces unwilling to separate from India forced into pakistan. 

Two, India voted overwhelmingly with congress, including in what was later given to pakis and they retain after 1971. 

So if Jinnah opined for freedom of states, it was only because he had nothing to do with most, with possible exception of less than half a dozen. 

Jinnah had his military attack Kashmir under guise of tribals in 1947-48, after Kashmir changed its decision, from a definite inclination to join him, to keeping independence. This change was brought about due to the then PM of Kashmir being treated with arrogance and disdain by Jinnah and paki PM both, and Kashmir PM realising that unlike the public propaganda, they had no intention of either democracy or equality but were intent on a feudal state. 

In the event that's exactly how paki state did develop, as per intention of its makers. 

As for India and states, it was Sardar Patel who had persuaded all but two, and if Nehru said something, that was only true state of affairs expressed in this context. The other two had people overwhelmingly in favour and need of rescue by India from the rulers and their intentions, a need not left to surmise. 

And Kashmir accession was signed finally to India due to attack by paki riffraff military pretending to be tribaks, as per orders by Jinnah. 

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" ... Closer to Partition, mindful perhaps only of the sentiment in the State including the anti-maharaja developments in Poonch, Jinnah predicted that ‘Kashmir will fall into our lap like a ripe fruit’.[2] Nevertheless, Jinnah had not registered Nehru’s political machinations over Kashmir. India’s historian-lawyer, A. G. Noorani, writes in his seminal essay Bilateral Negotiations on Kashmir: Unlearnt Lesson,[3] ‘Nehru and Vallabhai Patel, the deputy prime minister and the one appointed by Nehru to formulate the strategy to deal with the princely states, were fast sewing up arrangements for Kashmir’s accession to India even before Sheikh Abdullah’s release from prison on 29 September 1947 and well before the tribesmen from Pakistan entered Kashmir on 21 October.’ Elaborating this point, Noorani writes that as early as 28 May 1947, Patel had stated, ‘Kashmir remains within the Indian Union even if a division of India and partition of Punjab takes place.’[4] Subsequently, on 3 July 1947, Patel wrote to the Jammu and Kashmir Prime Minister, Ram Chandra Kak, ‘I realize the peculiar difficulties of Kashmir, but looking to its history and traditions it has, in my opinion, no other choice but to accede to India.’[5]

"Nehru, too, was single-minded on accession of Kashmir to India. Even to his friend and India’s High Commissioner to Pakistan, Sri Prakash, Nehru had admitted on 25 December 1947, ‘The fact is that Kashmir is of the most vital significance to India as well as to Pakistan. There lies the rub.’ He added: ‘Kashmir is going to be a drain on our resources but it is going to be a greater drain on Pakistan. In a military sense, we are stronger.’[6] Equally, Nehru’s 21 November 1947 exchange with Sheikh Abdullah lays bare the Indian prime minister’s true thinking on the accession issue: ‘Referendum and plebiscite are ill-advised but must only tactically be supported to avoid world criticism; that referendum is merely an academic issue and that after all for the Kashmiris, likely to be defeated in their “little war” against the State and the Indian forces, it would be absurd to want a referendum.’[7]"

Author quotes only a selective opinion and collection of selective facts that are a very small part of the history, pretty much to the tune of someone stopping at citing Munich to prove that UK was pro-nazi and had never any intention of opposing Hitler, at any cost. 

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"As early as 1951, Nehru was pulling back from the plebiscite option and from international mediation and calling instead for merely negotiating adjustments to the ceasefire line. ... "

His mistakes were along what was a Gandhian stance, of stopping Indian military when they were clearly in a position to take the rest, going to UN, and talking of a plebiscite at all. 

Look instead at Baluchistan, invaded, trampled, and denied freedom or independence. There's been no plebiscite, only loot, kidnappings, murders, and worse. 

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" ... Abdullah, his pro-India ‘winning card’, charge-sheeted Nehru for interference by Delhi in the state’s internal affairs and for not viewing the Instrument of Accession as a temporary arrangement before a permanent solution through a plebiscite could be attained.[9]"

Accession of Kashmir to India was permanent, as it had been in every case, of well over five hundred states, into India. Abdullah’s twisting facts was for his own ambitions that were clearly misplaced, considering he would never have pakis either return POK nor refrain from attacking, Invading or occupying Kashmir, the way pakis had done to Baluchistan. 

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"Throughout the 1950s, India fudged on its own promise of plebiscite in Kashmir while also refusing Pakistan’s offer for a settlement on Kashmir. ... "

First condition set in UN charter for this plebiscite is complete withdrawal of paki troops from Kashmir and protection of Kashmir by Indian military until peace prevails and conditions are right for a plebiscite. 

This, clearly, neither in 1950s nor since, has ever happened nor is likely to happen if paki military can help it. 

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" ... The maximum that Nehru offered Pakistan was to convert the ceasefire line with ‘minor modifications’.[10] Significantly, while taking unconstitutional and unpopular steps in Jammu and Kashmir to fully integrate the disputed state into the Indian Union, and more crucially to deflect international attention from his actions, Nehru amplified his criticism of Pakistan’s entry into the Western security bloc. ... "

SEATO wasn't "Western security bloc", unless South East Asia is redefined as geographic West, exactly as Ukraine cannot be part of NATO a redefining of not only Baltic Sea but it's rivers as Atlantic Ocean. 

Inducting pak into SEATO was brainchild of a US politician who also thought Gurkha were muslims, because UK has retained a Gurkha regiment. 

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"Structure of the Book

"Operation KP can be divided broadly into the following six, somewhat overlapping phases: First, ‘the euphoria phase’ in which the Kargil clique, with an ominously euphoric mindset, planned Operation KP in complete secrecy. This euphoria of the Kargil clique emanated from several factors. First and foremost was the belief that Pakistan’s nuclear leverage had nullified a full-scale confrontation in the realm of possibilities. This thought, combined with a wishful fantasy of blocking NH-1, India’s lifeline to its troops in Leh, was expected to result in the withdrawal of Indian armed forces’ from the disputed territory of Siachen which Delhi had occupied in 1984. The secondary factors were that with their buddy, General Musharraf, as Chief of Army Staff (COAS), the Kargil clique could plan a surreptitious operation across the LOC—the rationale was that the Indians would never fight back based on these ‘supposedly irrefutable facts’. It was concluded that the military and diplomatic success of Operation KP was guaranteed.

"Second, ‘the excitement phase’, when its planners and its participants (soldiers) initiated the operation with no resistance from the adversary. The war theatre was almost empty and the only ‘adversity’ the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) troops encountered was an inhospitable terrain and  inclement weather. Yet, as they trudged ahead with great physical difficulty, they found these uncontested vacant spaces highly alluring. In fact, Pakistan’s courageous men on a dare-devil mission interpreted this winter drawdown of Indian troops as a virtual walk-over opportunity. Weak aerial surveillance of the Kargil-Drass area was an added advantage. Back at the General Headquarters (GHQ) meetings, the Kargil clique, led by the operational commander Javed Hassan, boasted of having achieved a complete success."

What author doesn't mention is that until pakis played dirty by occupying infant posts on tops of peaks at Kargil et al, traditional conduct tacitly understood and mutually agreed upon had been that of winter standing down. 

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"Third, ‘the expansion phase’, in which due to the absence of Indian resistance in the war theatre, the Commanding Officers (COs) and their troops went beyond the original lines drawn for setting up of posts. In fact, for the first eight months on the move, Pakistani troops did not encounter a single Indian soldier despite the audacious setting up of 116 posts. "

What author implies, as insinuated by her informers, is that if you encounter a thief in your home at night, it's your fault for having allowed a possibility at all. 

"Fourth, ‘the encounter phase’, which began in early May with limited and indirect hostilities between Pakistani-Indian troops. These initial encounters had left both sides confused. The Kargil planners were unclear about the type and scale of the Indian military response to be expected. Meanwhile, within Pakistan the secret of Operation KP, hitherto a closely guarded secret within the clique of five generals, was now revealed to the wider military command and also to Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and to his cabinet. In India, the military command was divided about the scale and intent of the Pakistani presence and also did not consider it as significant enough to inform Delhi about it. By early June, however, the Pakistan-India encounter had snowballed into a battle in the mountains. Operation KP, planned as a smooth, unhindered military operation in IOK, had turned into a Pakistan-India mountain battle of attrition. The die had been cast. Op Kargil had turned into the Battle of Kargil."

Author isn't asking what business pakis had of planning a "smooth, unhindered military operation in" any part of Kashmir at all, much less in what oakis fraudulently label "IOK", when Kashmir had signed accession to India once and for all - unlike Baluchistan, which was invaded and occupied by force. 

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"Once there was clarity in Delhi as to the scale and depth of Pakistani intrusion in the Indian border, the Vajpayee government decided to hit back with overwhelming military and diplomatic might and political resolve. Combined with aggressive military retaliation, including heavy artillery and aerial attacks, Delhi stonewalled every Pakistani effort to extract strategic advantage from Operation KP. By early-June, although still holding on to the heights, Pakistani troops had come under tremendous physical and psychological pressure from both the Indian military offensive and from mostly disrupted supply routes. These iconic combatants——on hostile peaks in vicious weather with depleting supplies, deafening sorties, and unending mortar fire—were lodged in imperilled zones, but with no formula for victory . As stories from the war theatre trickled into the hallowed halls occupied by Kargil planners, concern, confusion, and even some bravado was their initial response. Their euphoria and excitement was no more. The spectrum of India-Pakistan encounters had extended to the diplomatic and political level. Delhi overruled every Pakistani effort for a bilateral political dialogue. On 12 June, the Indian foreign minister had categorically told his Pakistani counterpart, Sartaj Aziz, that India was willing to sit at the negotiations table only after Pakistani troop withdrawal to pre-Op KP positions. The message for the prime ministers from Beijing and Washington was no different. The reality slowly dawned in that Operation KP could result in no gains to Islamabad."

When a bully attacker expects a victim to surrender and beg, but is surprised instead by the victim retaliating, it's hardly expected that the victim would agree to compromise ot talk and hand over body parts grabbed by the bully. 

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"Fifth, ‘the exit phase’, began around mid-June. By then, it had become clear to the prime minister and to his key advisors that, with the depleting supplies for Pakistani troops, mounting Indian attacks, and a unified global demand that Pakistan immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Kargil, Islamabad had to make some hard decisions. Pakistan’s valiant soldiers continued to be under a determined and deadly Indian attack, ruling out all chances of any further operational success. At the 12 June meeting in Lahore, attended by all the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) members, the PM asked his FM to explore ways towards an honorable exit. These included engaging the Chinese and even working on a back-channel settlement attempt with Delhi. Finally, the PM opted to fly to Washington seeking withdrawal under a futile and controversial US cover."

Author isn't, for some reason, mentioning the then official position by pakis, which was that they'd fine nothing at all, it was only some local tribals who'd occupied the said positions. 

Hence the paki inability to supply either more men or food and ammo to those sitting on peaks. 

Hence also US refusal to get involved, when pakis went begging for help, trying to get US to tell India to let pakis have Kargil et al for free, like Nehrulet them have Gilgit, Baltistan and POK. 

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"Sixth, ‘the effect-phase,’ began once the 4 July Washington statement formally announced Pakistan’s exit from Kargil. The effect of the withdrawal statement in a battleground littered with peaks, ravines, and waterways was complex and staggered. Skirmishes between Pakistani-Indian troops continued beyond 4 July, and withdrawing Pakistani troops under Indian attacks suffered heavy casualties. Within Pakistan’s power structure, throughout its duration, Operation KP infused a deep distrust, resentment, and a latent antagonism between the elected leadership and the Kargil clique, thereby shaking the structure of the Sharif government. On the political front, the opposition used Operation KP to further bulldoze the Sharif government. Given Pakistan’s asymmetrical power structure combined with the army chief’s coup-making proclivities. Here was little surprise that the blundering Kargil clique[13]staged a coup against the elected prime minister."

Because the logic of paki military is, if you can't rob neighbour's or your own,mom, you turn around and best up your own wife, children, servants and livestock? 

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"The penultimate chapter is an analysis of Op KP against the backdrop of a prevailing national, regional and international environment and by using planning principles for military operations established by classical military stategists. The chapter also proposes some answers to the questions that have persisted since the operation."

Questions such as did Pakistan ever have any civil government, or was it always a facade for the terrorist regime? 

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October 22, 2022 - October 23, 2022. 

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CHAPTER 1: THE ROOTS OF CONFRONTATION 

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"The Instrument of Accession and UN Involvement 

"Within days of the birth of Pakistan in 1947, it’s new government organized the tribals to ensure accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. Lord Mountbatten, the man responsible for the division of the subcontinent, had made last-minute changes to the original division, laying the foundations for antagonism between the two newly created states. In 1948, Pakistan’s regular forces went to war against India to undo the ‘wrong’ of the annexation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India. ... "

Author has it wrong. Accession of Kashmir to India only happened because paki military, pretending to be tribals, attacked; it was signed in Delhi when the so called tribals were hours away from Srinagar, having stopped on their way in to rape and murder nuns in a conventional. 

Mountbatten, in fact, was forcing Nehru to do nothing, despite accession being signed, opening that it was too late, despite contrary opinions from Indian military, ready to fly to Srinagar, waiting for orders. 

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" ... Subsequent developments reinforced the disputed status of the state. These included the Indian Governor-General’s acceptance of accession on the condition that  “as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the state's accession should be settled by a reference to the people,''[18] a joint submission by India and Pakistan on 27 January 1948,  of a draft proposal to the president of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the appropriate methods of solving the Kashmir dispute,[19] UNSC resolution 47[20], and the August 13, 1948  resolution passed by the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP)[21]."

Author emphasises the draft, omits mentioning that this is the gist of the UN resolution, and also omits mentioning that both nehru and Mountbatten were unnecessarily helping pakis against India. 

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"Two developments around the signing of the Instrument of Accession made it controversial. The first, Lord Mountbatten’s letter to the maharaja asserted that the final status had to be settled with reference to the wishes of the Kashmiri people. Subsequently, the Indian government accepted a UN-executed plebiscite as the means to finally determining the status of the Jammu and Kashmir State. Whatever qualifications that the Indian government on obtaining the accession of Kashmir an government subsequently added to its initial acceptance of a UN- held plebiscite, its initial acceptance of it had nullified the very Instrument of Accession that it later claimed as the basis of its narrative that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of the Indian Union."

One, no other state or province had had a referendum, especially not Baluchistan where everyone was against Pakistan - as were majority in NWFP. 

Two, accession was final in every case. 

Three, plebiscite was conditional, beginning with paki forces withdrawal, which never did happen. 

Four, India need not have stopped short of routing paki forces completely out of all of Kashmir. 

Five, were any of the eleven million Hindu and another few million Sikh people butchered in Pakistan asked about their opinion regarding their homeland? Or for that matter their families if any left alive, who were forced into an exodus across the border to the truncated India? 

Where were democratic principles regarding plebiscite where its about Baloch, or Hindus and Sikhs of Pakistan in 1947 who were butchered and forced out? 

And six, Pashtuns or Pathans of FATA still don't accept paki regime, and their home is Afghanistan, but they've been duped by UK. How about giving that land back? 

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" ... By granting Gurdaspur, a Muslim majority district in Punjab, to India, Pakistan believed the Boundary Commission had provided India its only road link to Jammu. ... "

If pakis were as principled regarding majority of population, and their wishes, pakis should have refused Lahore, a Hindu and Sikh majority city, even if forced by UK, instead of demanding it. 

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"For Pakistan, the broader question linked to its birth was the unfair attitude of the Indian State, detailed in a 15 January 1948 letter from Pakistani Foreign Minister Sir Zafarullah Khan.[24]  Zafarullah Khan complained of India’s attempt to paralyze Pakistan; of the genocide of Indian Muslims ... "

Author follows it up by other fraudulent accusations in the said letter. 

Numbers according to sources, including Koenraad Elst, are - eleven million Hindus, and about five million Sikhs, were butchered in Pakistan around partition; the corresponding number of muslims killed is about one tenth that of Sikhs, according to the same sources including Koenraad Elst. 

These numbers do not include atrocities perpetrated against other minorities in pakistan, such as Jews, Parsi (Zorostrian), Buddhist or Jain. 

Pakistan not only had minorities reduced from over 20% to less than 2%, but subsequently went on to conduct a humongous genocide in East Bengal that was only exceeded in nazi holocaust perpetrated against jews, East European and other non German peoples. 

Pakistan followed this up with atrocities and genocide in Baluchistan. This is apart from its treatment of other minorities, such as Shia and Ahmediyya. They are being bombed in mosques on Fridays and generally being butchered, too. 

Reminds one of The Permanent Purge by Zbigniew Brzezinski. 

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"The ceasefire line, however, led to further instability and insecurity. There were three problems. One, no prominent and permanent demarcation line was drawn barring the fixing of poles in some areas. Two, in the areas that the poles were fixed, it was done leaving wide gaps in between. Finally, a major gap was left by not demarcating the line across the glacier areas. The assumption was that the highest, snow-clad rocky region in the world would be of ‘no interest’ to either Pakistan or India. Also given that the ceasefire by international law was a temporary divide, neither side considered the setting up of permanent division structures."

Author continues selective quoting, beginning now with that from a letter by US representatives in pak. 

" ... After identifying the list of Nehru’s reservations, Lewis reported to his secretary, “This is totally out of line with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of 21 April 1948.”[28]"

Notice that Lewis does not mention - or if he did, author omits quoting -  paki non-compliance with the very first condition of the said "United Nations Security Council Resolution of 21 April 1948", namely, withdrawal of all paki forces from the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 

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"Lewis maintained that there were practical reasons why Pakistan “could not bow to the Commission’s judgment.” 

But again, neither Lewis nor author takes into account the horrendous genocides perpetrated against India and in India by invaders, whose heritage is born proudly by pakis, in words and in actions - and this strange omission is due to abrahmic bias against all and every non-abrahmic Creed, favoring extinction thereof, using every possible means including genocide and fraud. 

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" ... Lewis also raised the issue of the country’s cognizance that there was a broader threat. “It had not escaped them that the question has recently become a matter of far more importance than the mere question of the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, for if world opinion is to gain the impression that Pakistan has been the guilty and obstructive party that impression would inevitably and perhaps disastrously, affect the very existence of Pakistan should India avail itself of the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir, or avail itself of any other excuse, for waging war on this country. India’s press has always been far more effective then has the press of Pakistan. In the final analysis, therefore should India have aspirations in the direction indicated, Pakistan would be functioning not only at tremendous odds in terms of military potential but also in terms of world opinion.”[30]"

It's well to remember that at this time, US and its administration below presidential level was busy saving most war criminals of Europe, chiefly but not only Germans, from prosecution, giving sanctuary to a great many in US, while allowing their escape across South Atlantic in most serious cases, and resettlement in Germany et al in most cases, whether under their own names or new identities. 

This was not made known to either of the presidents, whether Truman or Eisenhower.  

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" ... The question of Kashmir stayed with the UN but India was determined to prevent, under any circumstances, the holding of the UN mandated plebiscite. Equally, India through its continuous and active non-cooperation with the UN’s Kashmir-related initiative, especially the United Nations Military Observer’s Group on India and Pakistan (UNGOMIP), rendered it ineffective. ... "

Again, author avoids the vital question of pakis never having withdrawn forces, a necessary and first condition for the plebiscite. 

Also, author omits all mention of Baluchistan and other regions where paki military wreaked havoc. 

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" ... The Soviet Union followed India.  Furious at Pakistan’s decision to join US-sponsored alliances, it discarded its neutral stance on Pakistan-India disputes and threw its powerful weight behind India. To spite Pakistan, Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, during their visit to India in December 1955, referred to Kashmir as “one of the states of India”."

That's typical paki pose of seemingly megalomania but perhaps in reality due to an inferiority complex, imagining and pretending that it's equal in its relationship with US or Russia. In reality the treatment meted out since and now by China and Arabs tells quite the opposite story. 

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"Later in 1965 the Soviet Union intervened to facilitate the signing of the Tashkent Agreement. The primary aim of this agreement was to bring to a close the Pakistan-India war."

No, in fact it was to return the Indian territory - won in battles by Indian forces in and around Kashmir - to pakis, despite it being not legitimately but only forcefully under paki occupation since 1948. 

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"However the 1972 Pakistan-India engagement was the only one in which the question of Kashmir’s political future was recognized as an unresolved issue. Although the Simla Agreement followed the 1971  breakup of Pakistan held on to its UN-mandated position on Kashmir.[31] ... "

Notice the total bypassing of the horrendous genocide of over three military by paki military in East Bengal, including systematic rape of half a million women held in chains in groups so they couldn't kill themselves to escape the horror and were forced to endure the gang rapes, or usage as per need as paki generals termed it, reducing them to objects on par with bathroom facilities. 

Of course, in the process of omitting that, author also omits the then prevalent accusations against India, of having broken Pakistan into two - which ignored the fact, that if East Bengal really did not wish separation, there was nothing to stop them from uniting right back, except for the memories of the then recent genocides three million by paki military and the systematic rapes of half a million. 

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"Use of Force 

"The unsettled question of Jammu and Kashmir’s future with virtually no political routes available for a credible process of resolution had injected the use of force, so to speak, in the very DNA of the relationship of the two adversarial neighbors."

Author, like Pakistan, denies responsibility for the terrorist assaults and wars perpetrated by pakis, with an argument that is that of a thug, a rapist, a murderer - if you don't give everything he asks of you, you are provoking him to murder, rape, theft, and anything else he was going to find an excuse for via an unreasonable demand in any case. 

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"India for several reasons found itself in a more comfortable position. She occupied the bulk of the most valuable part of the territory Jammu and Kashmir and given that possession is nine-tenths of the law the international community exerted virtually no pressure on India to address the issue of Jammu and Kashmir’s future. Hence for India, ownership was easy to maintain while for the Kashmiris and for Pakistan ownership was difficult, if not impossible, to enforce."

That's as fraudulent as it gets, dance Gilgit and Baltistan are integral part of Jammu and Kashmir. 

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"India had subverted the established ‘rules of the game’ regarding the accession of the states of Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan first and India subsequently opted to use force as a means to settle disputes. Pakistan’s political and military leadership, which remained firmly committed to the right of the Kashmiris to accede to Pakistan also feared that its 1947 and 1948 gains on Kashmir were vulnerable to India’s extension and control in the major part of Jammu and Kashmir state."

Notice the consistent omission of the very name of Baluchistan? 

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" ... Hence it was not the circumstances of Pakistan’s birth, as some scholars have argued,[35] that locked the newly independent Indian state and the new-born Pakistani state in a confrontational mode. Instead it was the unresolved issue of Jammu and Kashmir."

Another fraudulent pose, since the very genesis of Pakistan was in massacres of Hindusand Sikhs, from over ten thousand Hindus in Calcutta in August 1946, to hundred and fifty thousand Hindus in Noakhali during subsequent biggest Hindu festivals that year, to eleven million Hindus and nearly five million Sikhs during partition in both parts of then Pakistan, with Pakistan government refusing to give adequate security to Gandhi if he visited northwest. 

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"Twenty years into Pakistan’s creation, cracks began appearing in the consensus among Pakistan’s civil and military elite on how to undo, what even the UNSC resolutions also affirmed, was an unlawful Jammu and Kashmir accession to India. ... "

Again fraudulent statement there. 

One, India need not have gone to UN at all, any more than Pakistan did about attacking Baluchistan. Nehru was expecting international community to treat his Gandhian gesture in manner that he and congress treated Gandhi's various strikes, and in this he was as wrong as in stopping India's forces from finishing off the problem once for all. 

Two, Kashmir accession was legal, and it happened despite Mountbatten wishing otherwise. He and other British officials on both sides were plotting desperately against India in this, and failed. 

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" ... Covert and overt forces worked in 1947 and 1948 when invasion by Pakistani troops helped roll-back Indian troops from a sector of Jammu and Kashmir territory."

Again fraudulent statement there. 

Indian forces stepped on Kashmir soil only several hours after accession had been signed in India, taking off after the order was given after accession was signed. 

And Kashmir accession was signed only because paki forces had attacked and were almost at doors of Srinagar, so Kashmir ruler was asking India for protection and Mountbatten was intent on preventing that.

It's not paki forces that cleared Indian military out of any part of Kashmir, but nehru stopped Indian military from chasing pakis all the way out of Kashmir, which they were about to do in the valley and could have easily enough in Northern parts. 

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"Pakistan’s 1965 Kashmir initiative, codenamed Operation Gibraltar, was planned in secret by a handful of military men encouraged by Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The Operation failed to enable Pakistan to take control of Jammu and Kashmir, sparking off the wider 1965 war with India, ... " 

Really? Every time Pakistan assaulted India, a quick takeover of a territory was expected, and India is to be blamed for preventing this? 

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"In 1971, after effectively exploiting the alienation and anger of East Pakistanis, India began a war in the eastern wing. ... "

India was suffering the horrendous onslaught of well over ten million refugees fleeing paki military atrocities and genocide, and it was strain enough to feed them. But the then PM of India waited for oakis to attack before going into a war mode, keeping forces in check until then. 

And pakis, being stupid enough, did give her thst excuse by attacking. 

" ... Pakistani Army decided to open a western front, resulting in India taking control of the strategic territory of Kargil, located on the Pakistani side of the LOC."

Typical of paki behavour, bully assaulting and then whining about being routed. 

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" ... Delhi proposed as a final settlement, the conversion of the existing LOC into a permanent border. ... "

What rubbish, calling that generous offer a proposal instead! 

India had 91,000 - or was it 93,000? - paki prisoners of war, surrendered to India for protection due to fear of backlash of wrath in East Bengal, avenging the genocide by pakis perpetrated there. 

There was no reason the then PM of India couldn't demand all of J&K territory surrender in exchange. 

Except an undue generosity towards an undeserving and separated part of Mother India under a genocide perpetrating regime. 

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"Beginnings of Protracted War for Glaciers and Passes: Roots of Kargil

" ... Because forces from neither side had ever ventured into the glacier zones that lay beyond point NJ9842, this extremely inhospitable north-eastern terrain had never been disputed."

" ... Beyond NJ9842, vague language identifying the CFL as ‘thence north to the glaciers,’ was used. ... "

" ... Even US agency maps showed Siachen as part of Pakistan. [42]"

That consists of an argument in favour of a piece of India which was separated from India due to usage of genocides perpetrated as an argument? 

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"Lieutenant General M. L. Chibber was then India’s Director of Military Operations.The mission scaled Teram Kangri at 24,297 feet. A subsequent expedition in 1980 went to Sia Kangri and Saltoro Kangri (24,500 feet) and to Sia Kangri (24,500 feet).[44] According to Colonel Narender Kumar who led the expedition, “We found labels from tin cans and cigarette packs with Pakistani names, German and Japanese equipment and it is this that convinced the appeared disproportionate to the findings since no evidence of Pakistan’s military presence in the area had been found. “There wasn’t a soul there,” Kumar had recalled.[45] Kumar was the first to scale the uncharted Siachen Glacier and he put the Indian flag at Siachen. Significantly Pakistan had no permanent physical presence in Siachen. 

"Nevertheless the Indian General Chibber subsequently maintained that he was alarmed to learn that the Pakistanis were accompanying mountaineers to the glacier and that maps printed in the West showed the Siachen area as part of Pakistan.[46] In the summer of 1981 India sent another seventy-man military team posing as a mountaineering expedition, on an eight weeks long mission. It comprehensively surveyed the area, climbing the Saltoro Kangri and the Sia Kangri-I. It hiked to the top of Indira Col and skied Bilafond La. Clearly, India had begun preparations to occupy the area east of the Saltoro Range."

One, if the terrain is mountainous, a military expedition would of necessity be hiking and climbing peaks. 

Two, they weren't pretending to not be members of military forces of India. 

Unlike the fraud perpetrated repeatedly by pakis sending military forces attacking India, especially in Kashmir but elsewhere as well, dressed in loose pajamas instead of military uniforms, just so paki regimes at the time could pretend that these were tribals that pakis knew nothing of, that it was emotional behaviour by locals! 

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"Through the winter of 1983, both Pakistan and India began preparations to occupy Siachen by the summer of 1984. Pakistan made ready for a combined SSG and Northern Light Infantry (NLI) mission. By early April, the Indians airlifted two platoons of Ladakh scouts to Siachen. Thus, when on 17 April, two Pakistani reconnaissance helicopters arrived at Siachen, they discovered the Indians.[57] ... "

"It was not until 1984 that the Indian Army successfully launched Operation Meghdoot[58] to occupy the territory.[59] India controls the forty-three mile long Siachen Glacier, Sia La, Bilafond La and the Gyong La, all three passes of the Saltoro Ridge located on the west of the glacier.[60] This area lay unoccupied before 1984."

" ... India now established control over all of the 70 kilometers long Siachen Glacier and all of its tributary glaciers, as well as the three main passes of the Saltoro Ridge immediately west of the glacier—Sia La, Bilafond La, and Gyong La. Pakistan controlled the glacial valleys immediately west of the Saltoro Ridge."

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" ... General Ziaul Haq, though publicly dismissive of Indian occupation of the glacier, instructed his forces to reclaim Siachen and met the army’s request for military equipment, French-made Lama Helicopters and training to launch a high altitude military operation. The army planned to reclaim Siachen the following year.[64] 

"However, the army would be forced to report that it had failed to recapture Siachen because India had ensured substantial troop presence there by April 1985.

"Another Plan B was also presented at the meeting. According to this, Pakistani troops could go unnoticed across the LOC and set up posts in Kargil sector on the Indian side of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistani forces could then block the main artery, the Srinagar to Leh Highway (National Highway-1) from its posts in Kargil. This would force the Indians to negotiate with Pakistan where Pakistan would demand unconditional Indian withdrawal from Kargil. General Ziaul Haq opposed this plan. The Indians, he argued, would opt for all-out war if Pakistan choked their main artery in the North. Zia rejected the B option. He believed India would attack Pakistan at the international border.[65] After 1985, Pakistan did not launch another similar operation to reclaim the Siachen area."

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" ... Significantly from the late seventies onwards, Pakistan had moved to limited and mostly covert military action, a shift in strategy from the launching of major military operations it had employed from the late forties through the early seventies. Overtly and covertly, well-prepared and ill-prepared, with the belief that they were being ‘wronged’ by India, an anxious Pakistan reciprocated by launching strikes across the LOC."

Author is avoiding the word terrorist, or jihadist, or even taliban. 

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"For example in April 1987, Pakistan launched a successful operation to gain control over some area of the Saltoro Ridge. Armed with ropes and ladders, a dozen commandos climbed a cliff to occupy a position at 21,000 feet, dominating Indian positions at Bilafond La. This post was called the Quaid post. However, within two months, on 25 June, after several attempts, and suffering heavy casualties, to recapture part of the Quaid post. The commandoes at Quaid post had run out of ammunition and they could not be resupplied since their logistics supply base had come under fire. 

"In September 1987, Pakistan lost the Quaid post, strategically located at considerable height, to the Indians. Subsequently, the Pakistan Army conducted the Dalunang (1988) and Chummik (1989) operations to occupy positions across the LOC. In the Dalunang operation, led by then FCNA commander Brigadier Aziz Khan, 23 posts were established across the LOC, which Pakistan still controls to this day.[67] This was in violation of the CFL agreement. By now neither side was abiding by any agreements. In 1988, India also established 12 posts in the Qamar sector."

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"The Origins of the Kargil Plan

"In 1986, the army chief asked the planning directorate at the GHQ to take the concept developed by Safdar during the war-gaming exercise and develop it as an operation. Brigadier Khalid Latif Mughal was put in charge. The planning directorate formulated a plan with three specific inputs. One, Kargil should be the location for the operation. Two, para-drops would be used in the operation, since there were no land routes to Kargil but Skardu airport was close to the planned area of the operation. Three, an entire battalion, approximately 4000 troops, would land in the Kargil area.

"Kargil was chosen as the operation area since it was in direct view of and close proximity to NH1, India’s main supply route to Siachen. The plan envisaged the battalion of para-drops to cut the NH1 through an undercover Operation. These troops would hold down the enemy and isolate Siachen long enough for the troops to launch a ground attack. The surprise factor in the Operation would feature paramilitary troops, including NLI and SSG commandoes, since radar would not capture their movements. . Deployment of regular troops would kill the surprise factor since Indian radar would detect their movements.

"Planners assessed the international environment from a Cold War prism. They concluded that Pakistan’s central role in the Afghan war put Pakistan in a good international position."

Ridiculous delusions of grandeur there. 

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"Pakistan’s army officers seemed to be divided over the plan, among the post and pre-1965 officers. The pre-1965 officers were battle-hardened but were cautious about undertaking risky operations. This category included the Director General ISI and  the Chairman JS headquarters. Officers including Ali Quli Khan,Asif Nawaz, and Pervez Musharraf were from the post-1965 course and seemed to favor the plan."

Perhaps the important date author should have considered is, not 1965, but 1971, although pakis started the fight each time, and lost it both times. 

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"As the ISI chief from 1979 to 1987, Rehman oversaw the build-up of an elaborate apparatus for the world’s most heavily-financed US-funded covert war. As the Soviet pull-out drew closer, he often raised the question of how to use the force, the ‘muscle’, Pakistan had trained during the Afghan insurgency. The concern also was whether in the post-Afghan war scenario who would these trained and battle-hardened Afghan fighters fight...could it be Pakistan?

"Akhtar Abdur Rehman wrote a detailed note arguing that Pakistan should utilize the Mujahideen currently fighting in Afghanistan and also train Kashmiris for the operation in Kargil. Rehman recommended that the ISI lead the recruitment process to ensure no suspects come into the fray. Rehman suggested that as soon as there was a drawdown from the Afghan front of Pakistan’s manpower involvement they could be used for this operation. Pakistan had around 15,000 to 20,000 citizens involved in Afghanistan. The plan Rehman proposed was to train the Mujahideen in AJK and launch them in the Kargil sector through the land routes. As locals they would deal well with the environment. The plan was for them to conduct sabotage activities. Pakistan would only be involved in training in AJK, enter undercover in the Mujahideen group as decision-makers and leaders, and conduct the frontal attack in Siachen."

Author treats this terrorist factory activity as nonchalantly as if this were about potato farming in Punjab, rather than using non-military males (in civilian attire, mostly pajamas) trained to kill civilians in other countries. 

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" ... Zia ul Haq, the army chief and military ruler issued directives to his core team on which his handwritten notes queried why Pakistan was not using its success in Afghanistan and why Pakistan was not taking material advantage of a neutralized India. 

"In August 1988 a C-130 plane carrying Pakistan’s top military command crashed. There were no survivors."

Wasn't this the Zia whose large hall was usually littered with gunny sacks filled with dollars, supposedly for use of terrorists in Afghanistan?

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"Dusting off the Kargil Plan

"In 1989, Pakistan again turned towards Kashmir. ... Pakistan’s ISI began deploying its Afghan-trained muscle in the widespread and indigenous insurgency."

Pakis admit, there, the responsibility for terrorist attacks against India. 

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"Around 1996, a senior General within the ISI retrieved the Kargil plan. Keen to revive it, the General took the plan to his chief General Jehangir Karamat.[74] The chief put the plan on the assessment track within the GHQ, seeking input of its operational feasibility from relevant departments. The paper trail began. First it arrived at the planning directorate, from where it was sent to the director general military operations for his views.  ISI too was involved. A little-noticed communication instructed the inter-services to conduct a comprehensive study of the plan. It had representatives from the air force, navy, SSG, and the army. The informally convened team actually traveled to the proposed area of the operation. Using Indian reconnaissance photographs, intelligence information, including intercepts, logistics, hard facts and a visit to the Pakistani side of the proposed operation area, the team conducted a comprehensive assessment of the Indian level of preparedness, intelligence capabilities, and response possibilities.

"The team identified problems. To begin with, the idea of training the Mujahideen was not a plausible one. It was not possible without compromising the surprise factor. It was deemed too difficult to keep a lid on all Mujahideen. The Indian penetration among the Mujahideen could also not be ruled out. The second problem was that regular troops would have to be infused into irregular troops creating unpredictable problems.  Finally, the air force could not give ‘close’ air support to the military field units.

"The team underscored the contradiction between the proposed plan and official policy of improving relations with India. Its members feared that once the Mujahideen cover blew, the government would not be able to handle the backlash. A major flaw identified was lack of clarity in the steps that Pakistan would take after the Kargil peaks were occupied. The planners also questioned the assumption that Pakistan would have sufficient time to attain its objectives in Siachen between the time that NH1, India’s supply line to Siachen, was blocked and the time that the international community took notice."

Obviously, they went ahead anyway, despite flaws known. Hoping India would hand over all territory demanded, wished and dreamt of by pakis, who have been, especially on internet, posing as inheritors of invaders of India from Central and West Asia for centuries?

................................................................................................

"Against this backdrop, the report laid out the only two possibilities available to Pakistan; One that included both the blockade of NH-1 and the Siachen offensive and one that limited the operation to a blockade of NH-1. Including the blockade and the offensive would make it difficult for Pakistan to deny involvement in the former. The team ruled out both possibilities suggesting that the plan was not viable. They concluded that while the plan was tactically plausible, strategically it was a nightmare. The sealed report was formally presented to the ISI.

"Interestingly one general keen to implement the plan called in a team member that had assessed the environment and timing. Informally he reprimanded him, “You people come from abroad after studying and you think you can teach me strategy.” The general trashed the report. However the ISI as an institution did not consider as part of its mandate to execute this Kargil plan."

The last sentence is incomplete. 

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"While the DG ISI concluded that it was not the ISI’s mandate to conduct this operation, the plan was not shelved. For the determined backers of the plan, those keen to settle scores with India on Siachen, those who would point to India’s repeated back tracking on the Siachen negotiations and those who insisted that diplomacy alone was not the way forward, the operation remained enticing. Its backers had decided that the Siachen offensive could be dropped from the plan but dropping the operation in total, was ruled out. 

"Lt. General Aziz Khan was one such man."

Here, pakis tacitly admit intentions of never stopping attacking India whether with terrorism or otherwise, until India is no more. On the internet and on public television debates such intentions have been, repeatedly, avowed, by several pakis, of various stature. Siachen is as much of an excuse as Kashmir, and the real intention is the centuries old dream of wiping out all civilisation in name of a creed. 

Egypt, Persia and much else was thus wiped out in a century by the barbarians, whose deadly onslaught India suffered ever since, until era of European colonial centuries. India survived, despite a horror perpetrated through centuries, that was several times as deadly as the holocaust perpetrated by nazis. 

There's no other purpose for existence of Pakistan internally other than finishing off this war against civilisation by destroying India and her culture once for all. External support for its creation was, of course, for use as military bases against Russia. But as a nation it doesn't have any soul any more than East Germany did. The wall, however, isn't concrete. It's jihadist mindset out to destroy world civilisation. Hence 2001 on the attacks throughout the world, preparations for which were begun in 1960s with the then paki military supremo using religious terrorism as weapon against Afghanistan - used subsequently by US against Russia. 

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October 23, 2022 - October 24, 2022. 

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CHAPTER 2: THE KARGIL OPERATION: CONTEXT AND CONTRADICTIONS 

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................................................................................................

"India Gifts Pakistan a Good Strategic Space 

"In May 1998, the world’s worst kept nuclear secret was out in the open. India and Pakistan, long known to be clandestine nuclear weapon states, had conducted bomb tests to openly establish their nuclear credentials. If there was a trigger that was needed to push the Pakistan-India relationship, already locked in distrust, constant covert hostility, and periodic open confrontation, further along the hostility path, it was provided by these May 1998 nuclear tests. 

"To prompt criticism by the global community, which had studiously ignored Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s 2 April letter, warning of India’s preparation for such tests, India conducted its nuclear explosions on 11 May and 13 May.[75] The tests, as India’s scientists verified were a “culmination of India’s weaponization programme.” US President Clinton said the tests were unjustified and they clearly created a dangerous new instability in the region.[76]  His National Security Advisor Samuel Berger announced that the United States was "deeply disappointed" by the Indian decision to "test nuclear weapons." [77] Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl said the tests were “in a way a direct challenge to the neighboring countries."[78] China urged the international community to "adopt a unified stand and strongly demand that India immediately stop development of nuclear weapons." [79]"

Notice that, although paki tests followed within far too short a period - a week? - to be a coincidence, they weren't criticised on par, but instead, supported by US and of course, China. 

So the only possible inference or logical conclusion possible is that pakis were there already, US knew, and had planned to comment regarding deplorability thereof, but then armtwist India into abandoning any intentions, plans or thoughts thereof, forever making India subject to terror from pakis. The surprise India threw had them change the plans, and make pakis do theirs in a short period and promptly pretend that India was the sole reason pakis had to do it. 

Reality, as Tarek Fateh states, is that pakis have no reason to have nuclear capabilities ranging far beyond furthest reach of Indian territory from paki borders, since their intentions aren't about attacking China. (Or Australia for that matter.) 

Reality, he points out, is that the aim is Israel, and thus the perpetual tomtomming of paki weapons as, not paki, but islamic. It's not about survival of a small part of India separated as needed by West for military bases for use against Russia, but as 'homeland of islam' - not Muslims, but islam - aimed at destruction of all else, beginning with India and Israel. 

................................................................................................

"Another unlikely voice on the Indian nuclear tests was that of Osama bin Laden (OBL). The only one to publicly advocate that Pakistan conduct the nuclear tests, OBL urged “the Muslim nation and Pakistan” to prepare for a Jihad which should “include a nuclear force.”[80] ... "

You'd think this have grabbed attention, this pointed coming together of OBL, paki nuclear drvice and jihad as intentions thereof. 

Author promptly sidelines by throwing detailed information as dust storm deflecting real questions. 

" ... Even if this OBL advice slipped the attention of the White House and State Department’s men at Foggy Bottom, who were focused entirely on South Asia’s unfolding nuclear saga, it had grabbed the attention of the CIA’s Counter-Terrorist Center. Ever since this center’s late February alert memo on the OBL threat, it was sharply focused on Osama. They were keen to capture him, either with or without the help of Kabul’s Taliban government. ... " 

Which was terrorists trained by oakis and imposed on Afghanistan in name of jihad, incidentally, and funded - to yhe tune of billions of dollars, not incidentally - by US, until they bit US back. 

Any lessons there about raising a Rottweiler as a pet for use against neighbours, learned yet? 

" ... In February, the US Ambassador to the UN, Bill Richardson, was in Kabul asking the Taliban to handover Osama, telling them, “Look, bin Laden is in your territory...he’s a bad guy.[81] Richardson was aware of the connections that America’s oil giant Unocal was developing with the Taliban. ... " 

Notice pointed omissions there, of connections between Unocal and subsequent government leaders in US, in place in 2001. 

"After making several trips to Kabul and Kandahar in November 1997 Unocal invited a Taliban delegation to its headquarters. A spokesman for the company, Unocal, said the Taleban were expected to spend several days at the company's headquarters in California.[82] Unocal was competing with the Argentinean firm Bridasfor on a multi-billion project to construct a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan into Pakistan. With the raging civil war in Afghanistan, Unocal remained hopeful of pushing the project forward. In fact, by end 1997, the oil giant had already contracted the University of Nebraska to begin training of around 140 Afghans in technical skills for pipeline construction. The training, interestingly, was to be held in Kandahar, the ideological headquarters city of the Taliban."

Notice, again, pointed omissions there, of connections between Unocal and subsequent government leaders in US, in place in 2001. 

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"Washington’s engagement with Afghanistan proceeded on several not necessarily complementary, commercial, diplomatic, security, intelligence, and counter-terrorism tracks. In spring, the Counter-terrorist center had made plans with its Islamabad-based CIA case officers and Afghan tribals to capture OBL. Since February, OBL, along with the Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, was running the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders. The front was an international declaration of war against the United States.[83] America was identified as the “distant enemy” and al-Zawahiri advocated “the need to inflict the maximum casualties against the opponent, for this is the language understood by the West, no matter how much time and effort such operations take.”[84]Several militants from Egypt, Bangladesh, Kashmir, and Pakistan had signed the Front’s manifesto, authored by OBL and al-Zawahiri."

And yet it was ignored, including the vital point, which shouldn't have come as shock, but known all along, regarding deep connections between OBL, pakis or rather ISI, and jihad intended against the world, including especially US, despite the latter having funded jihadist activities in Afghanistan because it was useful against Russia?

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"Clinton’s attention was also divided. In Washington, alongside the nuclear issue, red lights were flashing on the OBL issue and the growing threat of terrorism. On both sides of the Potomac, dedicated individuals were bracing America against a threat of a hitherto unprecedented level. On 22 May, Clinton appointed a Counterterrorism Czar at the White House. He signed the Presidential Decision Directive-62 entitled ‘Protection Against Unconventional Threat to the Homeland and American Overseas’. A new group, the Counter-Terrorism Security Group,was formed with the heads of the counterterrorism departments of the CIA, FBI, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Departments of Defense, Justice, and State as core members. Across the Potomac River from Foggy Bottom, the CIA’s Counter-Terrorist Center at Langley, in April, had made an elaborate night attack plan to strike OBL’s known abode, the Tarnak Farms, located close to Kandahar airport. The area was scouted and satellite photographs taken as Islamabad-based CIA case officers worked on preparing the plan with Afghan assets and with tribal leaders. Finally, the plan was aborted for fear of collateral civilian casualties and a lack of legal cover.[85]

"Returning to the issue of nuclear tests, the widespread view in Pakistan was that India’s tests went unmonitored in Washington because of the US’s benign neglect of its new strategic ally’s activities. An agitated Additional Secretary at the Foreign Office had conveyed Pakistan’s resentment in undiplomatic words. Around midnight on 11 May, the US deputy chief of mission (DCM) was called and given a demarche. In the demarche Pakistan complained that India and the US were in fact in cahoots with each other. The DCM asked his Pakistani counterpart if he wanted him to send “this shit” to the US? Pakistan did.

"Leading British experts indicated that, given the every-thirty-minute coverage of the Indian nuclear site Pokhran by US satellites, their missing the early warnings of the tests was highly unlikely.[86]In Washington, several analysts explained the Clinton Administration’s late 1997 decision to strike a strategic alliance with India as a major cause for the Administration’s failure to read even the obvious signs pointing to imminent nuclear testing by India, which was “poised to become a new Asian tiger.”[87] Reflecting this, a senior State Department official said, "There wasn't a voice in the wilderness…there was nobody anywhere – no voices saying, 'Watch out!’”[88]"

No one willing to credit India with intelligence despite the home grown nature of the tests? 

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"Significantly, within India the news of the tests was received with both surprise and panic. The news landed in the parliament while the BJP government’s nuclear policy was under discussion. Indian lawmakers erupted in a shouting bout at the news. The blame game began. Former Prime Ministers I.K. Gujral and H.D. Deve-Gowda said that Pakistan's tests were a reaction to India's tests. Similarly, former Defense Minister and President of the Samajwadi Party, Mulayam Singh Yadav, condemned the BJP-led government for "provoking" Pakistan's tests. Addressing Vajpayee, the leader of the Communist Party of India-(Marxist), Somnath Chatterjee, said: "It is a nuclear arms race that you have started in this region."[92] 

"As if in support of Islamabad’s stance in Islamabad, the Congress pointedly blamed Vajpayee for “using incendiary rhetoric that set off a regional nuclear arms race.” In its statement, the Congress party said the tests were a "grave development". Fearing a regional nuclear arms race, they called for restraint by the Hindu nationalist-led government.  But Vajpayee denied that India's action had forced Pakistan to respond. He, on the contrary, blamed Pakistan for prompting the Indian tests. Vajpayee said, “In fact, it was Pakistan's clandestine preparation that forced us to take the path of a nuclear deterrent.""

Despite being then much abused, despitehis open, candid, and learned persona, respect for the then PM of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, has only grown since then. 

His then opposition, meanwhile, has descended to new levels of falsehood and abusive speech, evident to a large extent even in these quotes above. 

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"India’s army chief V.P. Malik was measured in his reaction. "We are no more a soft state and we are not a push-over when it comes to national security concerns." He conceded "a situation of symmetry has finally been established among the country's neighbors now. If there was any ambiguity earlier about Pakistan's nuclear capability, it no longer exists.” On a realistic note, the general said, “Now it is known to the world and it is better this way."[93] ... "

Measured words from man wiser than all of the then opposition. 

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"Islamabad’s official mantra for its own May 28 nuclear tests was that Pakistan’s tests were “defensive and responsive.” The prime minister himself reassured the international community that Pakistan’s “nuclear weapon systems are meant only for self-defense.”[94] Addressing global disarmament concerns, he said Pakistan would “continue to support the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, especially in the Conference on Disarmament.”[95] Pakistan also would engage in a “constructive dialogue” with other countries “on ways and means to promoting these goals…” 

"To the Indian leadership, Sharif’s message was clear: “We are prepared to resume the Pakistan-India dialogue to address all outstanding issues including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as peace and security. These should include urgent steps for mutual restraint and equitable measures for nuclear stabilization.” He reiterated Pakistan’s earlier offer of a non-aggression pact to India “on the basis of a just settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.”"

This amounts clearly to a veiled threat of nuclear attack intended by pak against India, whether or not India hands over anything demanded promptly. 

But the assertions about self defence as sole intended use of paki nuclear weapons are falsified not merely by this threat delivered to India; it's far more so by the range pakis acquired, that went far beyond the furthest territory of India from paki borders. 

Paki device, labelled and tomtommed from beginning as 'islamic bomb' by pakis, is and always has been intended for jihad, which is against every nonmuslim by definition of the term.  

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"Seeking to stay clear of ideological and religious blocs, Pakistan had framed the tests solely as a defensive step forced on it by India. ... "

Every one of three parts of that is a lie. 

" ... Having had its nuclear program labeled as being dedicated to the making of an ‘Islamic bomb’, Pakistan was wary of linking any cause other than that of its own defense to its nuclear tests. As a testimony to its success in managing this, the Israelis understood to be the first target of any Islamic bomb, did not wave any red flag after Pakistan’s tests. Instead, a reassured Israeli Deputy Minister Silvan Shalom said that Israel “did not see the Pakistani nuclear tests as a threat to Israel.” In an interview to the Israel Defense Forces Radio, he explained, "We do not view Pakistan as our enemy. Pakistan has never been Israel's enemy, Pakistan has never threatened Israel.”[96] There were fears, but only to a negligible extent, of an ‘Islamic bomb’, or of Pakistan exporting technology to other Muslim countries; indeed, according to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a  former US Ambassador to India, “Pakistan’s Ghauri missile demonstrated Pakistan’s plan to re-establish Muslim rule over all of India.” [97]"

One, that Moynihan seeing that as reassuring says more about him and his likes, who prefer military juntas in most of nations except the few seen as their ancestral homes in Europe - specifically, England, France and Germany - and this has little to do with anything but racist abrahmic attitude. 

Two, Israel declaring not feeling threatened is as much falsified by paki furore over Palestinian concerns real or otherwise,  as by paki acquisition of long range nuclear capabilities far beyond furthest territory of India from paki borders, but enough to strike Israel. 

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" ... Clearly, for Bhutto this was the cumulative learning from the 1948 Pakistan-India encounter and the 1965 and 1971 defeats: Nuclear power was now indispensable. “We will eat grass if need be,” Bhutto had thundered. Similarly, Bhutto had said “we will fight a thousand years” to resist Indian hegemony."

It's quite well known who talked about "a thousand years" before him, and not too long before either, just a few decades. 

But in his stance of assaults against India for ever, this then PM of pak - who was hanged to death by paki regime subsequently - was, as most pakis do, only declaring intentions to carry on heritage of barbarians Invading and destroying India for most of last millennium and a half. 

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" ... However, ultimately, served by seasoned gurus like Shahis, twenty years later Pakistan stood vindicated."

Chiefly through theft of nuclear blueprints, and as if that blot wasn't enough, by dishonouring father of paki device for religious reasons - apart from stocking Chinese gifts of nuclear variety. 

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" ... Pakistan was sending trained militants, to keep an already restive Kashmir on the boil. The message from the Indian government’s most influential voice, its Home Minister and BJP’s former president, was clear: “Any further misadventure on Indian territory shall be dealt with on a proactive basis.” ... "

That's nth admission by author, sourced from pakis judging by wording, that Pakistan has perpetrated terrorism against India for decades. 

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" ... In fact, increased violence in Kashmir had further augmented global panic. ... "

If there were any truth in that, the said alarm would have set off in January 1990, when accelerated genocide of Kashmir nonmuslims forced their exodus out of the valley. 

So the so-called global panic was only the abrahmic onslaught against the sole ancient civilisation still living, unlike the rest of the world fallen prey to Abrahmic-II, Abrahmic-III or Abrahmic-IV, last bring communism, which has killed Buddhism in China and attempted that in Tibet, using genocides as well. 

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"With unusual candor, the daughter of Joseph Korbel, who had presented the best summation of the Kashmir problem in his book Danger in Kashmir (Princeton: 1954), addressed the Kashmir problem. On 3 June talking to press reporters, the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said of Kashmir, “It is a problem that came about the minute that the partition proposals came about ... "

True. 

Rest quoted is the garbage spiel that's paki excuse for terrorist activities, namely, religion. But if that excuse were valid, minorities in rest of India- at least muslims, if not others who werent killing Hindus -  should long ago have met exactly the same fate they did in pak in 1947, and pak forced in 1990 via terrorist attacks in Kashmir. 

Fact is, India has more muslims than pak, and this number - and proportion thereof in total population, as well - has grown since 1947, chiefly via not only the overpopulation tendencies gone completely unchecked, but also a deliberate inculcation of a doctrine of taking over India via simply growing in number while reducing that of Hindus by killings and rioting, and abduction of young girls via fraudulent representation. 

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"Within a week on 10 June, dismissing Indian agitation over the P-5 statement on Kashmir, US Assistant Secretary of State Karl Indurfurth said, “Kashmir issue is a fact of life in the region and cannot be wished away. We are absolutely convinced that it is time now for India and Pakistan to meet, to resume the dialogue and address the fundamental issue that had divided the two countries for 50 years.” ... "

That's another fraud perpetrated by pakis, nonstop. Inherent in the false representation is the reality that nothing short of a complete takeover of India and wiping out all non muslims, whether via massacres or conversions or abductions of all nonmuslim females, or all of the above, will stop pak from either attacking India with false accusations in global platforms or physically via terrorists, any more than hundreds of billions of dollars aid from US stopped pakis, from not only being party to attacks against West beginning 2001 but hiding OBL in a secure house more of a fortress, within a short distance of what US terms 'West Point of Pakistan'. 

Pakistan was conceived as a nation carrying heritage of barbaric invaders who attempted complete destruction of India and her civilisation of antiquity with all her treasure of knowledge, as Moynihan realised and said explicitly - however nonchalantly or even happily - and this aim has only grown to encompasses rest of the world, chiefly West, along with India, as targets. 

" ... The communiqué called on India and Pakistan to “avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, or other provocative acts.”[107]"

This relates far more to the thousands of terrorists trained and sent by pakis, however blandly equal it seems. 

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Author now spews not only false but fraudulent but total, complete garbage, having quoted various convenient statements from different sources, pushed chiefly by petrodollars. 

"In linking its nuclear weaponization to forcing through its own version of a resolution on Kashmir, India had clearly committed a diplomatic faux pas. Moreover, the Indian President’s letter to the US President linking Indian nuclear tests to the Chinese threat did not succeed in disrupting the Pakistan-India equation in global perception and thereby deny Pakistan justification for nuclear tests. Few countries accepted India’s original justification that the ‘China factor’ prompted its nuclear tests. All recognized that Pakistan-India relations were responsible for the beginning of a nuclear arms race in South Asia and the undermining of the non-proliferation regime. 

"The belligerence at display, by a section of India’s Hindu nationalist leadership, immediately after the nuclear tests was in contrast to Pakistan’s studied statements. Gandhi’s India, having consciously crafted its peace image since inception, had now taken to some reckless nuclear brandishing. India’s position, even for the US seeking a strategic alliance, was hard to defend. In fact, the US took the lead in pushing India’s skeleton from inside the closet, Kashmir, into a global limelight.

"By contrast, Pakistan was in a better diplomatic position. Even if grudgingly, and despite its statements to the contrary, the world was constrained to acknowledge that, after the Indian tests and clearly anti-Pakistan rhetoric,  the die had been cast for Pakistan, which was obliged to conduct the tests. Islamabad’s simultaneous dialogue offer to India, saying “no” to an arms race, and the renewed commitment to disarmament helped position Pakistan in a comfortable strategic space–of a  kind Pakistan had seldom experienced. India’s own follies had helped create this space."

Had any of that been true, it wouldn't have reversed quite so dramatically in quite so short a period of time, regardless of US president taking action regarding OBL. 

But fact is, pakis fraud was then exposed in a way that they can neither confirm nor deny, instead questioning US account by asking, repeatedly on internet, for a proof of the person of OBL being found and killed - "where's the body" - and generally going into a denial mode, not only about OBL but almost everything, with an "how do you know? Were you there?", whenever facts don't suit their own falsehoods but can't be denied. 

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"The world seemed to be where Pakistan wanted. It acknowledged the unresolved issue of Jammu and Kashmir as the root cause of India-Pakistan problems, acknowledged that the international community had a role in resolving the problem, and offered to do so. Hence, several factors conspired to position Pakistan in a better strategic space than it had been for a long time."

Until pakis were, once for all, exposed as fraudulent and cheats in general, by not only US discovering location of OBL but also the financial fraud by pakis regarding several hundred billion dollars in aid given by US that were not only unaccounted but, apart from going into various pockets, were discovered having been used to help terrorists attacking US forces. 

Hillary Clinton had openly stated to the effect that pakis are so used to lying, it's difficult to know if they know they are lying. 

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"The Peace-Makers

"In Vajpayee, Sharif had a serious partner for peace. Senior to Sharif in age and political experience, Vajpayee was a certified peace veteran. ... "

Author has a penchant for spewing venom regarding Hindus at every possible opportunity, and does do whenever she mentions the then PM of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. 

Also, she keeps mentioning South Block in a poisonous way, insinuating somehow that the bureaucracy in Government of India is responsible for Pakistan's problems. 

Reality is, despite hundreds of billions of dollars given freely by US in aid to pakis apart from other hundreds of billions of dollars for purposes of "fighting terror", pakis have not only shortage of fuel and other necessities but food, as well, repeatedly reported during last decade, apart from the lack of education and health. 

This is due, chiefly, to the said hundreds of billions of dollars having been spent partly on arming and training terrorists for assaults against nrighbouring countries India and Afghanistan, and rest having been simply stolen by paki military generals. 

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" ... The Sharif-Vajpayee 29 July meeting in Colombo, on the sidelines of the SAARC summit, was finalized.  Ahead of this meeting a preliminary political back channel was established. Nawaz Sharif deputed a PML Senator and former Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Akram Zaki, to meet with Vajpayee’s point man on National Security, the astute former diplomat-turned politician Brajesh Mishra in London. [116] Neither the Mishra-Zaki channel nor the foreign secretaries meeting helped bridge the gap at Colombo. The Indian military’s mood too was evident from the Indian defense minister’s 18 July  declaration that India “needs to hold on to Siachen, both for strategic reasons and wider security in the region."[117] ... "

That's the typical vicious trick, labeling realistic necessities of others as 'moods', apart from the insinuations of various similar and other kind about India and Hindus throughout the book. 

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"The two prime ministers first held a one-on-one meeting[123] at the Taj Samudra hotel followed by a delegation level meeting.[124] Vajpayee was keen for a joint statement on commitment to peace. ... "

Author makes a horrible mistake in the name of the Taj Samudra, whether typo or, deliberately, otherwise. 

" ... Vajpayee maintained that the primary issue was “Pakistan-supported cross-border terrorism.” The Pakistani team unsuccessfully urged the Indians that the unresolved Kashmir dispute be reflected as a central issue in the joint statement. The 90- minute Sharif-Vajpayee meetings in Colombo failed to produce a road map for further dialogue. Firstly after the first-ever meeting between the two prime ministers no joint statement came forth."

Is it possible for the author to visualise peace talks with a bully while being physically assaulted, with family members in the process of being killed? 

Or is that the only way pakis know, of holding 'peace talks'? By holding a knife to throat of others? As done in the countless conversions, whether via fraudulent marriages or otherwise, to their own religion? 

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" ... India linked dialogue on Kashmir with Pakistan ending support to Kashmiri freedom fighters."

There's the fraudulent language describing paki trained and armed terrorists as "Kashmiri freedom fighters".

Even in Afghanistan, Afghans know that the taliban are pakis, although they - and paki regime - lie, calling them Afghans. 

Locals know the difference. 

"Subsequent statements by Indian officials suggested the possibility of Indian attacks on “terrorist sanctuaries across the LOC.” Vajpayee warned Pakistan that his government will “fully back” the Indian Army to “repulse the nefarious designs.”[130] ... "

When, post 2014, this was done, pakis denied it, just as they had denied OBL had been found and neutralised by US forces in Abbottabad. 

" ... Meanwhile human rights organizations reported that Indian troops were responsible for raping, torturing, and executing Kashmiri people.[132]"

This is a double lie, on the style of those perpetrated repeatedly against Israel. One, it wasn't "human rights organizations" who "reported", but jihadists and pakis who propagated that lie; two, when investigations were carried out by global organisations, no such viilages or victims of atrocities were to be found. 

Similar lies, for example one regarding a ten year old Palestinian boy supposedly shot dead by Israeli forces but that, when investigated by a New York set of young students, in reality could only have been shot by Palestinians, have been propagated before. 

For that matter there was also the lie about mid 1980s killings in Beirut that were blamed on Israel, but subsequently that was discovered to have been a false accusation as well. 

" ... Sharif knew that continued operations by the militants in the Valley, which was infested with Indian security forces, was unlikely to resolve the Kashmir dispute. ... "

Notice the poisonous mindset, (author's in particular and paki in general), that pretends that paki trained terrorists exported to massacre in India are legitimate, while an ancient nation's security forces including Indian military are an "infestation". 

" ... For Kashmiris, the human rights conditions deteriorated ... "

"Deteriorated" is false unless the jihadist position, namely, that nonmuslim lives are of no account, is to be universally accepted, and a doctrine that teaches killing of all nonmuslims is to be not only lauded but necessary, is accepted by all the world. That is the jihadist aim. 

Else, it's impossible that the statement above by author can be said to have any validity if situation in Kashmir were compared with either January 1990 or in general with 1947, when, both times, several thousands of nonmuslims were massacred, forcing others to flee - if possible at all. 

In 1947 Nehru, the then PM of India, had refused to help Hindus attempting to save their own lives, as per Gandhi's wish that Hindus die happily murdered by Muslims but not flee; as a result, over a hundred thousand Hindus had been massacred in POK. 

In 1990, Hindus in Kashmir were helped to exodus instead of being left to be massacred, to the tune of half a million, by paki terrorists infiltrated in Kashmir from across the border. 

"By July, Nawaz Sharif’s government was dealing with a growing problem of sectarianism and militancy. To Strobe Talbot, US Deputy Secretary of State [133],Nawaz complained that his 1997 victory was not against Benazir Bhutto alone. He had won against the “right-wing radicals” whom he claimed had wanted an Iranian-style revolution in Pakistan."

" ... Nawaz would also raise the specter of the threat that was increasingly worrying Washington, the Islamic militant threat."

Not "specter", it was reality, begun by pak military dictator in 1960s onwards, and used by US for war against Russia, chiefly in Afghanistan, but also Chechnya. Now those victories won, the terrorists were confident of victory against India, and not only in one state of Jammu and Kashmir either. 

................................................................................................

"Just before Sharif left for Colombo, Talbot met him on 22 July to convince him of the need to sign up on the non-proliferation mechanisms. Part of the tool-kit Talbot carried with him, which he naively believed would help him ‘fix’ Pakistan’s position on non-proliferation, was a letter from his President. It did not work. Sharif was irked by Clinton’s reference to Pakistan’s nuclear test as a “mistake.” Sharif’s retort was political and convenient, not strategic and straightforward. “If I had not made the mistake, as the President calls it, someone else would be sitting in the Prime Minister’s House right now. That someone probably would be a fanatic. We have no dearth of those.”[134]  Adding more flair to perhaps his real fear, Pakistan’s prime minister added, “Either that, or the country would have gone to the dogs.”[135] ... "

That was realities of paki situation. 

" ... This kind of talk was clearly ‘conduct unbecoming’ for a country’s prime minister. Although militancy and sectarianism were on the rise in Pakistan, such comments by the country’s prime minister to a US official were highly inappropriate. Unsurprisingly recalling the conversation, the US official wrote, “I could not imagine hearing something similar in Delhi.”[136]"

Because it wouldn't be true of realities in India, unless pakis - beyond their dreams - succeeded in wiping out all nonmuslims. 

................................................................................................

"Emerging stress on the western front: CIA, OBL, Taliban, and the ISI

Look at the author's clubbing of CIA with "OBL, Taliban, and the ISI". 

Tells much about their perspective and thinking, doesn't it! That of the author in particular, and pakis in general, that is. 

"Militancy as a tool to flag the Kashmir issue was now boomeranging. For Pakistan too, the law of diminishing returns had kicked in. Pakistan generally and the ISI specifically, were being blamed for most militant activities in India ... " 

Including in Kashmir. 

" ... Kashmir. ISI-CIA’s principal partnership objective, of avenging the US defeat in Vietnam by defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan, had been achieved, with the monumental additional bonus of the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. ... "

Pakis haven't stopped bragging about this victory that they have considered personal, with "some help", "only money" from US; and this had brought them confidence they'd massacre all Hindus throughout India, before and after breaking up and/or conquering India. 

................................................................................................

" ... Essentially, the partnership had run its course. The former partners were now entering a conflict zone. The CIA watched with great apprehension the beginnings of triangular ties between the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the Kashmiri Mujahedeen. While the Clinton Administration itself engaged with the Taliban, it was the ISI, as principal mentors and patrons of the Taliban and the Kashmiri Mujahedeen, which the CIA viewed as being indirectly responsible for this three-way nexus. Increasingly, the CIA would expect the ISI to leverage its control and good will with the Taliban to rein in Osama bin Laden, the al-Qaeda chief. While Washington was not confrontational with bin Laden’s hosts, it was getting weary of them. The CIA’s Counter-terrorist Cell was expanding the focus of its operations to Pakistan’s borderlands."

Funny how abrahmic fellow-feeling blinkered them to reality. 

................................................................................................

"In early August, al-Qaeda struck and struck hard. On 7 August, it conducted signature attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam, leaving dozens dead. ... "

Notice the laudatory, almost exilarant, tone describing it - "struck and struck hard."; which isn't modified for the rest of the paragraph, at least. 

" ... The very next day, not in a connected but related development, on 8 August, al-Qaeda’s hosts, the Taliban, with support from the pro-Pakistan Mujahedeen group led by Gulbadin Hikmatyar, managed a decisive victory in Mazar-i-Sharif. US intelligence claimed that intercepts proved that members of a Pakistan-based sectarian group, Sipah-i-Sahaba, and Pakistan military men also participated in the offensive. ... "

It would only be idiotic or pretenders who'd act surprised at this. 

" ... A Hazara massacre followed the Taliban victory. ... "

This is racism of pakis and Afghans, exposed in not its worst, but its normal manifestation, not unlike killings of Hindus or Jewish people. 

Any doubts as to this racism, can be cleared by internet posts from pakis describing themselves as handsome unlike "short, dark and ugly Indians" - an attitude given its reply when a Tamil former Indian consul to Pakistan faces an average paki, frequently seen on public debates on TV, are noticed as to looks, after reading such posts by pakis. 

Alternatively, one can read the autobiography by Ms. (Tehmina?) Durrani, now a member of family of Sharif. 

" ... A Taliban attack on the Iranian Consulate, in which one journalist and seven intelligence officers were killed, prompted Washington’s counter-terrorism machinery to zero in on Pakistan for monitoring and countering bin Laden’s activities."

Finally! 

Light dawns. 

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"Buoyed by their Mazar victory, the Taliban were gaining in self-confidence. Around the same time, Washington would seek their acquiescence in what was becoming the Clinton’s Administration immediate and primary security concern. Washington wanted Osama bin Laden, alive or dead. The intelligence chatter was that he had moved in the Pakistan-Afghan border areas. CIA Counter-terrorist Center planned the August strike. General Ralston visited the Pakistan Army General Jehangir Karamat to inform him of their Tomahawk missiles flying through Pakistan airspace lest he mistakes them for Indian missiles. Accordingly, through the hour of the planned attack, Ralston arranged to have dinner with the Pakistan Army chief to ensure there were no costly misunderstandings."

This is author preparing ground for tacit justification of NY attacks by terrorists. 

"The Cruise missiles were fired as planned. But it was an unsuccessful attack. Despite intelligence reports of bin Laden’s impending arrival, he never came. Eight men in al-Qaeda training camps were killed, probably men from a Pakistani sectarian outfit being trained to kill. For the reported Pakistani civilian deaths along the border, the US President wrote a letter of regret to the Pakistani prime minister. Later, the reports were proven incorrect. In the coming months, Washington intensified its trailing of Osama bin Laden."

Obviously unsuccessfully, since he was found in Abbottabad. 

Perhaps he'd been there, for decades,with Afghanistan being a ruse by pakis? 

"The matter of “sanctuaries” was also raised by Washington.  Announcing the Cruise missile strikes against several al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and an alleged chemical weapons facility in Sudan, Clinton told the Americans, “There will be no sanctuaries for terror. We will defend our people, our interests, and values.”[137] The issue of sanctuaries was to haunt Pakistan-US relations for almost two decades."

The said "Pakistan-US relations" were always pretended by pakis to have been a friendship between equals, despite the one way street of flow of hundreds of billions of dollars. 

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"Breakthrough at Durban

"For Pakistan-India relations, the 29 August to 3 September NAM summit in Durban proved the breakthrough event. The two peace-seeking prime ministers had ensured that the groundwork was done by their respective sides. Nawaz Sharif had inducted his Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz as the new Foreign Minister. Aziz replaced the former military Captain (and military ruler Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s son) Gohar Ayub. ... "

The father, incidentally, had proposed unification to Nehru, who was shortsighted enough to not only refuse, but do so expressing a thinking proved false soon enough by China attacking in 1962. 

" ... Sartaj Aziz, an economist, a former international bureaucrat, and two-time Finance Minister in Sharif’s government, was Nawaz Sharif’s trusted man."

" ... Prime Minister Vajpayee warned “third parties” to stay out of the dispute.[138] ... "

" ... Pakistan’s use of militancy to pressurize India and to draw global attention to the Kashmir question often drew criticism. ... "

Anyone else reminded of Sudetanland? UK had then openly pressured Czechoslovakia to give in, and that, instead of satisfying Hitler, had only snowballed - rather, fireballed - into WWII. 

And in this case, the current administration of US has offered Afghanistan, sacrificing females thereof, to taliban, a sham of a front for pakis. 

................................................................................................

" ... Transferring the Afghan Mujahedeen phenomenon onto the Kashmir context was backfiring. It was proving divisive for the Kashmiri struggle and was also alienating the non-violent movement. At home in Pakistan, its blowback was increased sectarian killings."

Yes, pile on the jihadists and racism, lack of forethought by paki regimes beyond exploiting "geostrategic location", everything onto india - including lack of education, health, and any industry other than terrorism. 

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" ... By announcing his dialogue offer, with the caveat that “the dialogue must be comprehensive and not just focused on Kashmir”[139], Vajpayee assured the Indians that his offer was conditional on Pakistan’s commitment to stop “cross-border terrorism.”"

" ... Kashmir, the Indian prime minister categorically stated, however, “was and would remain an integral part of India.” The "real problem" in Kashmir was one of cross-border terrorism."

Notice the denial by author, and presumably by her paki sources, that terrorists attacking India was a concern. 

So by paki logic, acquisition of territory for Islamic countries, chiefly for pak, supersedes terrorists trained killing civilians of those countries,which is in accord with foundations of jihadist ideology - namely, that nonmuslim lives not only for not matter, but must be finished off. 

................................................................................................

"Almost a decade into India’s failure to crush the Kashmiri freedom movement, for the international community Delhi was increasingly framing the movement as a terrorist movement. And with evidence of Pakistani men, munitions and military training aiding the indigenous freedom struggle Delhi believed it could superimpose the ‘terrorism’ problem upon the political struggle. Additionally, sections of the freedom movement had taken to violent ways, harming civilians and hence aiding  Indian propaganda."

Lies galore there. 

It is nothing but terrorism exported by pak from across birder via paki trained terrorists bearing weapons and ammo, stolen from what US provided for a US prescribed use in Afghanistan. 

"Indian strategy was to dovetail cross-border terrorism into the emerging global level concern regarding terrorism. Delhi began equating what it considered “cross-border terrorism” with the Taliban problem in Afghanistan. The concern about terrorism was fast spreading.  Washington had also attacked Sudan. India had argued that the common factor linking terrorism, the Taliban, and the cross-border terrorism it faced was Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI. At Durban, Vajpayee advocated a “concerted international action” against terrorism. In a veiled criticism of the United States ignoring India’s concerns, he said “terrorism could not be fought unilaterally or selectively.”"

Truth of what India said is found, not merely in common sense, but internet posts from pakis bragging about various victories using terrorism. 

But notice the author's twisting of language to make it seem that terrorism against India by pakis is only fair, and of no concern, especially to anyone not Indian, because Indian lives are of course - so is paki position - of no importance whatsoever, being considered not human if not muslim, as per islamic law. 

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"New York Bonding

" ... However, unknown to these two peace-partners, a sharply contrasting movement in a parallel universe was taking place. From the Himalayan peaks, a clique of senior Pakistani Generals had interpreted the post-May global concern for the settlement of Kashmir as an opportunity to ... force Delhi’s hand on Kashmir, or at least on Siachen. ... "

" ... It would take none less than the prime ministers to put behind them the chronic hostility and distrust that had virtually become part of the DNA of the Pakistan and Indian civil and military bureaucracy. ... "

If they weren't thwarted by paki military. 

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" ... After the New York meeting, names of back-channel envoys were exchanged. India nominated former journalist R.K Misra.[148] Nawaz Sharif’s choice was his Principal Secretary Anwar Zahid.[149] However, Zahid died shortly after.[150]Niaz Naik,  a former Foreign Secretary, was the second choice.

"The seeds for the historic Lahore summit were sown in New York. At the lunch meeting that Sharif hosted for Vajpayee, he invited the Indian prime minister to visit Pakistan. And, when the two Prime Ministers agreed on starting a Delhi-Lahore bus service, Nawaz Sharif invited Vajpayee to travel on that bus. Vajpayee agreed."

" ... Pakistan was conditionally willing to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. First, it had to be in conditions “free from coercion and pressure”, which meant the international community had to remove the sanctions. Secondly, it was necessary that India also signed the CTBT. Both conditions were unlikely to be fulfilled."

Hence, precisely, the conditions? 

Of course.  

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"Vajpayee, meanwhile, detailed the nature of bilateral dialogue decided for October. He announced that the two sides had decided to end cross-LOC firing and discuss defense matters, including the question of deploying nuclear missiles, in the October dialogue. "A new era in Indo-Pakistani co-operation is being opened," a satisfied Vajpayee told the press.

"This was happening in less than a hundred days after having conducted the nuclear tests ... Hence within months of the nuclear tests, new vistas for peace and cooperation had opened up."

As if paki military and ISI would ever allow that! They, quite rightly, fear gor thror own existence, if there were peace, trade, goodwill and peace allowed to prevail across the border. 

A colleague had, some time in late eighties, remarked to the effect that the East Germany premiere wasn't happy about the developments towards German unification. 

"Of course", one could easily see why - "he's going to lose a job!" 

And that'd be true of those, too, who have been behind paki attacks against India, whichever state they were perpetrated in. 

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"Burdens of Patronage

"Important developments were taking place on the other side of Pakistan’s north-western borders. The US Vice President Al Gore telephoned the Saudi Intelligence chief Prince Turki Al-Faisal bin Abd Al-Aziz Al-Saud. Gore told Turki it was time to remind Mullah Umar of his June promise and facilitate possession of the man behind the US embassy bombings in Africa. Turki acquiesced to the UN Vice President’s request. He knew though that the Taliban leader had not responded to his messages about handing over bin Laden.  Turki recalled that on several occasions the Taliban leader had agreed upon setting up a joint commission of Islamic scholars to decide the Islamic procedure for handing over bin Laden to the Saudis. On his June trip, the Saudi Minister for Religious Affairs, a ministry associated with various outfits which often made contributions to al-Qaeda, accompanied Turki as he arrived in Kandahar a worried man.

"Turki was mindful that Osama bin Laden was fast emerging as the Arab world’s Che Guevara. His followers across the entire Arab World would access his interviews and statements doled out to western media via dish antennas and satellites. As early as January 1998, the Saudi authorities were alerted by their own Saudi intelligence outfits to the al-Qaeda threat within the Kingdom. Bin Laden’s militant followers, in possession of deadly weapons, were arrested. By March, information on Saudi financiers of bin Laden was also uncovered. Saudi money from charitable organizations with Wahabi leanings was ending up with terrorist organizations, especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Turki believed his June trip had been successful. Recalling the trip, he told the prestigious German magazine Der Spiegel, “Incidentally, we had a rather friendly conversation in June 1998. I told Mullah Omar that it would be better to give us bin Laden, that is, if he had any interest in continuing his friendly relations with Saudi Arabia. He agreed, at least in principle. We agreed to set up a joint committee to arrange the details of bin Laden's extradition."[153]

................................................................................................

"Turki was somewhat more apprehensive about his subsequent September meeting with Mullah Umar. [154] Osama bin Laden, the shy, young Saudi financier and dedicated anti-Soviet fighter the Prince had first met in 1984 in Peshawar, had now declared war against the US. In August, bin Laden conducted deadly attacks on US embassies. Within days, American missiles had unsuccessfully targeted him on Afghan soil.  Mullah Umar had ignored Turki’s repeated reminders of working out a mechanism for handing over bin Laden to the Saudis. The Saudi Intel chief knew that getting a helping hand from the Taliban’s Pakistani mentors could be a necessary move. He arrived in Islamabad in his special plane. Turki met the Pakistani prime minister. Nawaz Sharif exercised virtually no influence over the Taliban, whose operational mentors were located in the Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI), Pakistan’s key spy agency. As partners of the biggest covert war in US history, the ISI had moved from power to power in numbers, ranks and resources under US patronage.

"While the ISI was “sold on the Taliban”, Pakistan’s elected prime minister was wary of them. Pakistan’s Afghan policy was largely in the hands of the military and the ISI. For example, on 25 May 1997, the decision to recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan was made by the ISI chief. The PM was traveling on the Islamabad-Lahore motorway, and he was merely informed that Pakistan had recognized the Taliban government!  In a hurry to acknowledge Taliban control of Mazar-i-Sharif on Sunday 25 May,[155] Pakistan extended recognition the same day.[156]  It was a Sunday but the ISI, in acknowledgement of the Taliban’s Mazari-i-Sharif victory, decided recognition could not be delayed. At the Foreign Office, Director-General Afghanistan Iftikhar Murshid, who for nearly a decade had personally witnessed its political vicissitudes, opened shop on Sunday. At the Foreign Office, Murshid, along with Pakistan’s ambassador for Afghanistan, Aziz Khan, explained to selected foreign envoys Islamabad’s decision to recognize the Taliban government."

It wasn't only then, but later too, when there was a properly elected government in Afghanistan, pak kept pushing the taliban claim and insusting that the world recognise taliban as the de facto regime, because they made it impossible, via terrorist attacks, for anything to function in Afghanistan. 

Ultimately, after US had abandoned Afghanistan and its people, along with billions of dollars worth weaponry, equipment et al, to taliban, while pakis recognized it promptly, Afghans denied that they were Afghan taliban at all, insisting they were in fact paki. 

................................................................................................

" ... A Steering Committee was formed, with Taliban and Northern Alliance representation. It met in Islamabad from 26 April to 3 May. But, soon thereafter, the talks collapsed. This is the extent to which Pakistani civilians could exercise influence over the Taliban and broadly over the Afghan situation.  Now, four months later, the Osama bin Laden factor had entered the already complex internal Afghan situation. By virtue of Pakistan being in the inner-most circle of influence within the Taliban set-up and the Saudis being aware of it, it was only normal for the Saudi intelligence chief to believe that the ISI chief could be helpful in convincing Mullah Umar. General Rana, the ISI chief, accompanied Turki.

"Interestingly, the other Pakistani official nominated by the civilian government to accompany Turki, Pakistan’s Ambassador at-large Aziz Khan , found himself boarding Air Force One, the Pakistan air chief’s dedicated airplane. Khan was tasked with delivering five Iranians, who had been captured in Mazar Sharif by the Taliban, to the Iranian authorities. After the capture of 20 Iranians, Tehran had condemned the Taliban but held Pakistan responsible. Accordingly, Tehran demanded that Pakistan ensure the release of its prisoners. Tehran’s threat to attack Afghanistan if its citizens were not released, combined with Pakistan’s intervention, helped to secure their release. Ambassador Aziz was now traveling in the Pakistan air chief’s plane to deliver the Iranian prisoners. Clearly, the burdens of patronage were now mounting on Pakistan.

................................................................................................

"Meanwhile, the Kandahar Mission had failed. Pakistan’s ISI chief was unable to convince Mullah Umar to hand over bin Laden. In Prince Turki’s own words, “I had come to pressure him to go ahead with the extradition, and I encountered a completely transformed Omar. He was extremely nervous, perspired, and even screamed at me. He denied that he had promised us he would extradite bin Laden, and wanted nothing to do with a joint committee. He wanted to know what had possessed us to want to arrest such an illustrious holy warrior as Osama bin Laden! And why didn’t we prefer to free the world of the infidels? He was furious. I could not help but think that he might have been taking drugs. When he continued to insult Saudi Arabia and the royal family, I ended the meeting.”[157] Pakistani diplomat Murshid described it no differently. He recalled how Mullah Umar left his room in a rage and poured water over his head, returned to the room, and in anger continued to blame the Saudis for being American lackeys. [158]

"The failed meeting triggered multiple speculations. For the Americans, with the alarm bells ringing in Langley on OBL’s next possible targets, the capture of OBL was a high priority. There were questions within Washington as to how sincere the Saudis actually were in convincing the Taliban to hand over OBL. In the Saudi camp, was there in fact sympathy for OBL, who after all was a Saudi son? Were the Saudis actually only seeking some guarantee for the protection of the Kingdom from OBL? As for the Pakistanis, there was skepticism in Washington over whether the ISI would make genuine efforts to convince the Taliban to hand over OBL to the Americans."

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"Peace Gets Going

" ... preparation of the Lahore Summit was overseen by the political leaders, the prime minister and the foreign ministers, and was not left to bureaucrats alone.

"Significantly, around this time, on 7 October, against the backdrop of continuous political unrest, the prime minister decided to send the Army chief General JehangirKaramat packing. The newspapers had carried front-page headlines that, during his lecture at the Naval War College, the army chief had recommended the setting up of a National Security Council to act as a joint civil-military arbiter of the nation's affairs.[159] A livid Nawaz Sharif, driving on his way to Murree, wanted the defense ministry to simply issue a notification announcing the army chief’s dismissal. Sharif‘s cool-headed Principal Secretary, the seasoned bureaucrat Saeed Mehdi, advised him to meet with General Karamat personally. The General was called in to meet the prime minister. The prime minister let him know he could not work with him. The army chief sent in his resignation. The civilian chatter was that the matter was “amicably settled.”

"Interestingly, General Karamat been put to the test for his commitment to the Constitution during the prime minister’s 1997 confrontation with the judiciary and the President Farooq Leghari. The general was called upon to act by all sides yet he acted strictly within Constitutional parameters. After the departure of the President, General (retd) Iftikhar Ali Khan, the former Chief of General Staff and then Defense Secretary, made a statement on behalf of the government generously complimenting the army’s role, stating, "After the removal of the 8th Amendment, the army has taken its orders from the prime minister and not the President… The army's positive (sic) role during the crisis would be remembered forever."[160] Such praise had seemed unnecessary yet not unprecedented.[161] Perhaps deep in trouble and swamped by endless criticism, Nawaz Sharif, like all politicians, was haunted by the fear of some military general lurking on the side planning his exit. ... "

Oh, is that what he foresaw? 

Would that be remarkable as a vision of future? 

Or not so, considering it's routine in pak? 

................................................................................................

"Karamat’s dismissal was not the first of a forces chief by Nawaz Sharif. In May 1997, after a probe into the controversial Agosta submarine deal had established the culpability of the Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Mansur ulHaq, the prime minister asked the then Secretary Defense H. R. Pasha to “advise” the naval chief to resign. The naval chief did resign. That earned Sharif praise from the media. A leading independent weekly wrote, “Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif deserves high praise for relieving Admiral MansoorulHaq of his duties. The navy chief embroiled his service in unbecoming controversy, gave it a bad name and undermined its morale.”[163]

"After sending General Karamat home, Prime Minister Sharif appointed General Pervez Musharraf, then serving as Corps Commander Mangla, as the new chief.  Musharraf, who superseded two generals, was appointed on the recommendation of his key aide and Minister for Petroleum Chaudhary Nisar.  Nisar’s brother Iftikhar Ali Khan, the Defense Secretary and a retired general, would vouch for Musharraf as a professional non-political general.  Elected prime ministers always factored in these considerations, hoping they would prove a safety valve against coup-makers. The widespread chatter on possible reactions from the GHQ to the unprecedented removal of their chief soon died down. It appeared that the men in khaki would remain subservient to the orders of the elected prime minister."

In pak? 

Ha! 

................................................................................................

"Within days of his appointment the new army chief set about bringing his own men into key posts. In fact, within three days of his appointment, he had changed the commanders of the three strategic corps: the Lahore 4 Corps, Rawalpindi 10 Corps, and Karachi 5 Corps. While in doing so the new chief was exercising his institutional authority, yet this scale and haste in the shuffle drew comment from the media. After all, there was a history of repeated direct and indirect army coups that had overthrown constitutionally elected prime ministers. Some eyebrows were raised in the prime minister’s inner circle too.

"However, the only appointment in which the prime minister had a say was that of the chief of the ISI. Musharraf wanted to appoint General Aziz, the head of ISI’s Research & Analysis Wing, to the top slot at ISI and General Ziauddin Khawaja as the new Chief of General Staff at the GHQ. The prime minister, constitutionally authorized to appoint the country’s spy chief, declined the army chief’s request to promote General Aziz.   Nawaz Sharif interviewed both officers and selected Ziauddin as the DG ISI. Musharraf appointed Aziz as the Chief of General Staff.  The prime minister, constitutionally the reporting as well as the appointing authority for the ISI chief, picked Ziauddin for the post.  This general was serving as Adjutant General and before that had commanded the 30 Corps Gujranwala. The military talk was that Ziauddin, with only limited command experience, was not a strong candidate for either of the two positions. However, he was the new army chief’s close friend and also known to the prime minister’s family with especially close ties to his father.

"While Ziauddin held the top slot, the army chief ensured that his own trusted appointees filled all the strategic slots in the ISI. This included the second tier command positions at the ISI headquarters and in key cities, including Lahore, Karachi, and Quetta, Ziauddin, did not resist this.  The DG-Internal security was bound by rules to report to the army chief. Also, with eight to nine brigadiers serving under every section head, the ISI was operationally under GHQ control."

................................................................................................

" ... India’s four-point proposal presented at the talks called for a comprehensive ceasefire based on a freeze of "present ground positions", discussions on the modalities for implementing the ceasefire within an agreed time-frame, a "bilateral monitoring mechanism", and authentication of existing ground positions. ... "

" ... Rajiv Gandhi on 16 November 1989 referring to Operation Meghdoot ... on the hustings in Kolkata that "We have recovered about 5,000 square kilometers of area from occupied Kashmir in Siachen. We will not forgo one square kilometer of that."

"Indians also complained about Pakistani troops firing on Siachen.[166]It is possible the firing was taking place. The Kargil planners may have sought a way to engage Indian attention away from the Kargil area. Obviously unaware, the Pakistani delegation denied that their troops had carried out any such attack.[167]  The talks ended in a fiasco. There was an unraveling of the progress made during the earlier rounds. For the generals’ clique, in the Indian reiteration of its recalcitrance over Siachen, lay a sense of vindication."

Author now spends next paragraph blaming Delhi and the then PM of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, fir talks being a fiasco. 

Did author, and pakis, expect that they could shoot down Indian soldiers with impugnity, with not a word in protest? 

................................................................................................

" ... question of the accession of the princely State of Jammu Kashmir. Pakistan’s response to this had been the use of covert force. Larger in size, a confident Delhi did believe, it could violate explicit and implicit legal parameters. ... "

What world do the pakis, and the author, inhabit, where legitimately signed accession is considered illegal, and "use of covert force" legitimate? 

Obviously, it's a world where a female rape victim is accused of adultery by her assaulter who raped her, and as a consequence, is legally executed by stones pelted by a mob. 

................................................................................................

Author spends much of next part justifying pakis attacking India throughout the short history of existence of Pakistan, by claiming - not exactly explicitly, but via implications and roundabouts - that India's not ceding territory claimed and demanded by pakis justified every attack by and from pak against India, including not only all the wars but all the terrorist attacks as well,  over several decades. 

" ... Contrary to a politician’s response, influential sections within the army leadership believed covert use of force against India was an effective way to tackle the adversary. The military coup of the late seventies and the overall Pakistani institutional power balance tilted in the army’s favor allowed the military leadership to autonomously conduct policy. Moreover, the army’s partnership with the CIA in conducting the covert war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan further strengthened the Pakistani military as the principal policy-maker.

"By November 1998, two policy approaches towards India were in play. The constitutionally elected government had already opted for diplomacy and dialogue. While a small clique of army generals had, however, surreptitiously, set off on the path of covert war. And this clique must have received India’s recalcitrance over Siachen with a sense of vindication."

"The Kargil planners’ clique had troops crossing the LOC to pay back in kind to India for Siachen. Or so they had believed."

Oh, no they don't. Pakistan never did have any right to separate merely on basis of fanaticism in name of religion and massacres of eleven million Hindus and nearly five million Sikhs as the sole argument for this separation. It's about as justified as, say, a Confederate South claiming States' Rights for slavery. 

As for demanding even more extra territory than already conceded quite unreasonably in 1947 by UK, that's pakis copying Hitler at and after his Munich performance. 

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October 24, 2022 - October 25, 2022. 

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CHAPTER 3: DIVERGENT TRACKS:  DIALOGUE VS. OPERATION KOH PAIMA 

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" ... The Kargil clique’s calculation was markedly opposed to the dialogue and détente policy with India that Pakistan’s elected political leadership was pursuing after the tests. ... "

Author makes them sound equally valid and legitimate, but that's falsehood. Reality is that the then PM of pak had no clue about what paki military was upto, much less having okayed it before PM of India visited. This is not only typical of the sham that pakis maintain in order to claim they are just as good as India and equally valid,  but the fact that the sham is maintained often enough shows pakis are ashamed of their own bragging about being inheritors of barbarians from Central and West Asia, the invaders and destroyers of India in name of a fanatic creed. 

This has led to a schizophrenia on national level in pak, whereby they tried to establish themselves as Arab, by claiming Arabic as national language, until they were laughing stock as far as Arabs went, for this pretension. Hassan Nisar tells this tale well, on his program, several years ago. 

"Pakistan had decided to reorient Pakistan’s Kashmir policy towards primarily providing diplomatic and moral support to the Kashmiris instead of military support.  By contrast, a handful of top Pakistani generals had carved a divergent policy track.  Anxious about the weakening of the insurgency inside ... Kashmir, these generals believed the nuclear card could be exploited. This operation was designed to directly undermine the elected prime minister’s agenda of continuing dialogue with India and to reorient Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. It was in the intoxicating yet unconstitutional autonomy in security matters that men in khaki enjoyed that lay the undoing of a policy that Pakistan’s political leadership sought to pursue with regards to India. As the elected government planned the historic Pakistan-India summit at Lahore, a generals’ clique had Pakistani soldiers climbing the hostile peaks of Kargil across the LOC."

................................................................................................

"Operation KP was launched by mid-October. The army chief had not formally approved the process. The elected chief executive of Pakistan, the prime minister, had no clue that hundreds of Pakistani troops had begun crossing the LOC. 

"But the Operation was underway."

"Soon after General Musharraf took over as the new army chief, a clique of senior generals began contemplating Operation KP. The members of this clique had all served in strategically important areas along the LOC and, within hours of taking over as the army chief on 7 October, 1998, Musharraf had appointed each of them to a key position. ... With these appointments Musharraf installed his men in the top command and staff positions directly dealing with the territory along the LOC including the 10 Corps and the GHQ.  The only exception was the Commander, Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) Major General Javed Hasan. GHQ retained him as commander FCNA.

" ... Interestingly, after his stint in Washington, Hassan would argue with colleagues that the Americans would exercise benign neglect, if not actively support, a Pakistani military operation in Kashmir. The Americans did not believe Pakistan was serious about the Kashmir issue. He recalled they would tell him, “General, you have neither the will nor the wherewithal. Talk to us when you have the will and the wherewithal.”[175]

"Javed Hassan considered himself a geopolitical strategist. He interpreted most developments within Pakistan as an extension of the agenda of major powers. Indian moves in Siachen were also a result of Russia “asking India to do something against Pakistan because Pakistan is giving us trouble in Afghanistan.”[176] Likewise, he maintained, “The Americans got the anti-Zia Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) started to arm-twist general Zia over Afghanistan.” [177]"

................................................................................................

"Hassan, especially during Musharraf’s period, was widely regarded within the army High Command as the best mind on India. He advocated an aggressive posture towards India and often maintained that “Pakistan’s size and power should match, i.e. if Pakistan did not militarily and otherwise expand, they (India) will atrophy you”[178]

"As Director Military Operations, Hassan was actively involved in monitoring the Kashmiri insurgency in Indian Occupied Kashmir. ... "

That's tacit admission that he was training and arming terrorists and sending them across border into India, by thousands. 

................................................................................................

" ... In 1992-93, when Pakistan concluded that the “insurgency’s spirit was depleting,” to give the home-grown insurgency a fillip the army facilitated the induction of ‘mehman mujahideen’ (guest mujahids) in Indian Occupied Kashmir. ... "

This is admission that so called freedom fighters in Kashmir never had been local; calling some sent across border "guest mujahids" was only because they never could pretend to be Kashmir locals, because they were not even from West Punjab, the province that not only dominates pak but has replaced Kashmiris in POK. So the "guest mujahids" were, what, Africans? Surely not Iranian or Saudi or European, not those from wealthier countries such as gulf nations? 

................................................................................................

"Hence, with this orientation, soon after taking over as Commander FCNA in October 1997 and completing the reconnaissance of the area around the LOC, Javed Hassan’s general refrain to his officers was “get offensive, we have to cross the borders.”[180]

"Given Hassan’s inclinations, this approach was no surprise. This had also been the way of many of his predecessors. Often the FCNA Commander’s enthusiasm for aggressive conduct along the LOC translated into issuing aggressive directives, without always getting the requisite Corps Commander clearances, or not maintaining the required confidentiality or suitable discretion and restraint in the display of the enthusiasm on successful conduct of an operation."

Is this the authors way of admitting that paki military is unprofessional? 

................................................................................................

"For example, soon after taking over, Hassan wanted operations conducted to capture the Indian Hindu Observation Post (OP)[181] on the Marpola range. The commander 80 Brigade, responsible for the proposed operation, refused to conduct it as he had not received written instructions. FCNA Commander Javed Hassan hesitated to give written instructions because he had not received written instructions from his line of command, the Corps Commander.[182] Meanwhile, in early 1998, Domel, an LOC post just on the Indian side, was captured. Since the Commander had not got clearance for the operation from the Corps Commander, the Corps Commander ordered an inquiry against the Brigade Commander and ordered that the post be vacated."

"As he settled in his position, the FCNA commander gave instructions to Commanding Officer (CO) 6 Northern Light Infantry (NLI) Lt Col Mansoor  Ahmad Tariq to prepare a plan for the capture of Drass. The CO NLI 6 also received the orders from his immediate commanding officer, Commander 80 Brigade. Clearly even before the new army chief took over, the FCNA Commander was planning cross-LOC operations, deeper into the Indian-Held territory than Pakistani army had planned ever since the Indian occupation of Siachen in 1984.

" ... While vastly different in strategy, calculation, and resource-deployment, the 1965 Operation was also launched by Pakistan, as in 1947, to wrest Kashmir from India ... "

"Significantly, the new Chief of General Staff, Lt. General Aziz Khan, who had successfully launched the important Dalunang Operation across the LOC in 1988 was a strong proponent of Pakistani troops crossing the LOC and occupying heights on the Indian side. During the Dalunang Operation, Pakistan had captured 28 peaks. Emphasizing his familiarity with the area, Aziz would often recall, “I have walked in the gaps along the LOC.” His juniors would recall that Aziz had flown across the gaps as a brigade commander. An old and experienced hand on Kashmir as a director in the country’s premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, Khan was also in charge of the agency’s operations in Kashmir and Afghanistan. An enthusiastic Khan had recommended to his chief General Jahangir Karamat that Pakistan occupy the heights that the Indians would vacate during winter. The army chief “did not want to deflate his enthusiasm and always suggested that we talk to other ministries, analyze the Indian response and assess our ability to deal with it before we take it any further.”[184] ... "

"And finally, to match Hasan, Mahmud, and Aziz’s orientation on Kashmir and the LOC, was the new army chief General Musharraf’s own orientation. Identical to the key line-up of commanders overseeing the 10 Corps area, extending to the LOC, he too believed that conventional military force would play the key role in resolving the Kashmir issue. In fact, this group of commanders was dismissive and distrusting of the role of diplomacy in the matter. ... "

................................................................................................

"A key arm of the FCNA was the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), with 11 battalions. The size of each battalion was 750 to 780 soldiers. They could be placed under any one of the three FCNA brigades, 62, 80 or 323. These Northern Areas-based NLI battalions consisted of officers, junior commissioned officers (JCOs) and paramilitary forces. The officers were posted from the army and their services were on loan to the NLI. The JCOs were from the NLI while the paramilitary second-line forces, similar to the Rangers and Scouts, were technically under the Ministry of Interior[189] but operationally under the army. The uniform of NLI forces was khaki, like that of the regular army."

" ... After the nuclear tests, these generals believed that a successful Operation KP would force the world powers to intervene to resolve the outstanding J & K issue. They were convinced that the global community, especially the United States, would have no tolerance for a confrontation between the two new and hostile nuclear powers. In the mental calculations of these men, there was also a measure of nuclear black-mail."

"The elected government was planning for the Pakistan-India summit in Lahore at the same time as a clique of generals was organizing a covert military operation. These two contradictory policies on India were set for a clash. ... "

That's what makes any claim regarding governance by pakis ridiculous. 

................................................................................................

" ... Hassan had since his arrival signaled his intention to lead his men across the LOC. Like many in the Pakistan Army, his refrain too was that Siachen had to be avenged and military pressure on India would force them to settle Kashmir."

"According to the plan, around 200 Pakistani troops would cross the LOC to dominate the Indian supply lines leading to the Northern Division of Kashmir,-essentially beginning from the Zojila pass and going up to the China border and from the River Chenab to the Himachal mountains.  The troops would occupy the watershed. The map was presented to the Commander 10 Corps. He said, “It’s all approved.”"

" ... The GHQ, courtesy the CGS, was therefore aware of the hush-hush operation but in fact institutionally no one among the senior generals beyond the clique knew of its scope and intent. At best, it was being explained as an exercise which involved retaining the manning levels of the summer in the winter months, in some cases to ensure forward movement of the local reserves.[195] ... "

"While the field commanders involved in the Operation did initially knew of its scope, that it involved crossing the LOC and ingress into Indian Held territory, the soldiers initially believed they were involved in an exercise.  The planners hoped this deliberate fog of confusion would be an effective way to cover up the reality of the Operation.  This would also help to evade the issue of not getting clearance from the country’s chief executive. Also, projecting it as an exercise or a localized response to a perceived threat, meant that it did not require top political clearance. ... "

................................................................................................

"For the Operation, around 200 troops were to travel for months, mostly on foot, to reach the Drass sector. There, the troops would occupy posts at Toololong, thereby reducing their distance to NH-1 by almost three kilometers.

"From the Shaqma post on the Pakistani side of the LOC, the distance to NH-1A was about five kilometers. The task was to occupy the watershed. This Operation, using approximately 200 NLI troops, would position them for easy observation of all activities as well as interdiction of the Srinagar-Leh National Highway-1(NH-1A), India’s life-line[198] to its troops stationed in the whole of Ladakh region and in Siachen. This ‘life-line’ was used during the summer months to transport the critical supplies needed by the troops during the locked-in winter months. Indian troop presence in Ladakh and Siachen areas was of critical significance since India had territorial disputes over the two areas with its two largest neighbors, China and Pakistan.

"The NH-1 road was already vulnerable to some Pakistani interdiction since at some points the Indian troop movement was visible to Pakistani troops stationed at the Kaksar and Channigund posts in the Shaqma sector. From these posts, the closest points to NH-1, Pakistani troops could rain artillery fire onto NH-1. The alternate route was the barely jeepable 473- kilometer-long Manali-Leh track, passing over 16,000 feet heights, and open to traffic only from July to September.[199]"

................................................................................................

" ... Commander 10 Corps Lt. General Mahmud Ahmed. At his Corps headquarters, Mahmud’s core team first heard of an across-the LOC Operation.[200] It was after his return from the Northern Areas that Lt. General Mahmud took his core team in confidence. In an informal gathering, he informed them that a decision had been taken to go across the LOC. The talk at the Corp HQ was that the instructions to the troops were to “establish posts and duck down.” [201] The objective of the Operation, Mahmud’s team was told, was “bringing alive” the Kashmir issue. The Operation would involve Pakistani soldiers going across the LOC and occupying around 7 to 8 posts in the area of Drass and carrying out sabotage activities. Commander 80 Brigade Brigadier Masood Aslam, with about 100 soldiers, including 18 officers, was to execute the reconnaissance mission.

"The planned Operation was principally restricted to 80 Brigade; however, 62 Brigade was involved in reconnaissance for supplementary action. Commander 62 Brigade Nusrat Sial, based at Skardu, was asked to identify possible posts for engaging the Indians on a broader front, to spread them thin in case they reacted against the Pakistani posts at Kargil. After the reconnaissance, Brigadier Sayal (who died in a later air crash) said he could occupy 6 posts in Chorbatla, including Battalik[202]"

"Back at the FCNA, with the initial plan for Operation KP having been approved by the 10 Corps Commander Mahmud and by the Chief of General staff Aziz Khan in October, Pakistani troop movement across the LOC had begun by late-October. Headed for Drass, Brigade Commander Brigadier Masood Aslam was dropped from a helicopter in the Drass are, along with a lieutenant colonel and 10 soldiers, for reconnaissance. They found the Marpola and Tololong areas unoccupied for miles. Lt Col Mansoor, the Commanding Officer of NLI 6, then crossed the LOC and entered the Drass area with his troops to occupy posts vacated by the Indian troops and to set up new ones. A limited logistics operation accompanied the initially limited NLI movement, the troops having merely taken off with basic supplies in their bag packs.  The planners were confident they would not be discovered before summer and that their camouflage would carry them unnoticed into winter.[204]"

................................................................................................

"Mission Creep 

"However, within two months of the start of the operation, the FCNA commander believed the opportunity existed to expand the operation. Around the areas where Pakistani troops ingressed, there were vast unoccupied areas across the LOC[205] with no Indian presence. In these areas, either the Indian posts had been vacated during winter or on those steep peaks they simply had no posts.[206] Stashed away in the harsh, remote and forbidding peaks, in the dead of winter, the commanders who were planning to enlarge their operation, foresaw no immediate counter-moves as the Indian forces were altogether absent.

"This expansion of the originally one-sector Kargil operation to five sectors was in response to the ‘opportunity’ that was discovered by the NLI command in the zone of operation. The expanded operation was, therefore neither war-gamed nor comprehensively planned. The planners had thought of occupying 10 or 12 posts but the expanded Operation ended with 140 posts. Hence, an operation that expanded on detection of military opportunity by military men at the planning and implementation stage, precluded comprehensive intra-institutional deliberations on the nature of this ‘opportunity’ and, more importantly, on the merits and demerits of an expanded operation. Although, within the restricted group of military commanders, questions related to India’s military, diplomatic, and political reaction and the international community’s diplomatic reaction were raised, the linear experience of that one institution combined with the personal proclivity of the individuals towards the Operation influenced their answers to these questions.

"There was excitement about the expansion, about undetected penetration into enemy territory. ... So they went into Mission Creep and by December 1998 the troops had begun to cross the LOC from seven directions. This included areas west of river Indus, east of river Shyok, from the top of Shyok Valley and from Shaqma. Primarily, NLI infantry troops were the ones involved in Operation KP.  They continued establishing of posts undetected by the Indians and penetrated to approximately 14 kilometers into the Indian side of the LOC. Pakistani troops had ended up establishing 196 posts, which included bases and outposts. The daring men, on a victory prowl on the world’s highest battlefield and grasped by excitement and a sense of victory, were unaware of the very critical problems of logistical stretch this operational creep would soon generate. Equally, this deeper penetration into the Indian-controlled territory meant the greater risk of exposure to enemy troops and to the unpredictable enemy reaction."

But elsewhere author has asserted that pakis were overwhelmed by India's response taking the war to an extent that they had not wished for, their objective having been small and simple! So she, the author, has simply lied, and her meaning thereby is that, whatever pakis did, India should simply have surrendered whatever demanded by pakis, by whatever method? 

"The FCNA Commander Javed Hassan himself acknowledged that “we were there from October 1998 onwards but we did not know whether we will be discovered in summer or winter.”[207]"

................................................................................................

"Sharif took some significant decisions regarding the means Pakistan would opt for to achieve the goals of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Especially with the two neighbors, India and Afghanistan, diplomacy was to acquire primacy as a policy tool to achieve policy objectives including resolving bilateral issues. Sharif told the DCC participants including the military generals present, that Pakistan would gradually move towards discontinuing armed support for the Kashmiris.  He instructed the foreign minister and the ISI chief to jointly implement the new policy. Their mandate was to facilitate the “broadening and deepening of APHC and to highlight the violations of the human rights and political rights by the Indians.” [208]"

" ... He stressed humanitarian, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiris would be increased. The prime minister was unaware that a clique of his senior-most generals had opted for unprecedented peace-time use of force against India, naively believing they would force India‘s hand on Kashmir."

"Similar decisions on Afghanistan and OBL were taken.  But among the men in khaki at this DCC meeting, the prime minister’s words had fallen on deaf ear. The implementation of Sharif’s decision, that the Taliban be pressurized to stop providing a haven for sectarian killers from Pakistan, was directly dependent on the ISI. On the Afghan policy, although Pakistan’s seasoned ambassador Aziz Ahmed Khan assisted the government on diplomatic and political matters, the operational policy on all form of security cooperation and support was entirely under the ISI’s control. Hence, it was ISI that controlled the levers that Pakistan could use to force a change in Kabul’s behavior regarding protection of sectarian killers."

................................................................................................

" ... Indian team brought R.K.Mishra and Admiral Nayyar to Islamabad on 2 November. Vajpayee had personally cleared their trip. At the breakfast meeting with Nawaz Sharif, the Indian envoys conveyed Vajpayee’s message. India was willing to give one billion rupees in soft loans or three million tons of wheat as a loan to Pakistan.[214] This was Vajpayee’s goodwill gesture for an economically troubled Pakistan. Sharif asked his Additional Secretary, Tariq Fatimi, who was also present, to examine the offer. Fatimi told the prime minister that Pakistan had already taken care of its wheat requirements.[215] Given the history of their relationship, it was unthinkable for the Pakistani establishment, or even the political leadership, to let India “bail” them, no matter what its condition."

Not quite true. After the tsunami, pakis were willing to receive help India offered, if it came via US - that'd change labels as far as public perception went. 

But far more telling is the fact that, not only these offers have come from India after a history of pakis perpetrating deadly assaults against India whether terrorism or war, having pak genesis in massacres of several millions in India, but thst here author pretends the opposite, as if those assaults, massacres and murders were of no account, and paki demands of more and more territory to be wrested from India by hook or by crook were a just expectation, with use of terrorism as fair as diplomatic route and legal accession unjust. 

Author further takes pains to portray pakis as sort of nawab,  while reducing Indian envoys to minimal.  

"The other message that Sharif’s Indian guests carried from Vajpayee was that “cross-border terrorism” must stop. The prime minister moved three paces, away from Fatemi’s hearing, and according to his Indian guest said that Vajpayee should be told that Sharif had his own man in the ISI. And that in two or three months, Sharif will control the LOC situation situation and focus on dialogue.”[216]   During the breakfast meeting with his Indian guests, Sharif again repeated his idea of Vajpayee traveling to Lahore on the inaugural bus. An optimistic Sharif somewhat lightly said that if Vajpayee sat in the bus and came to Lahore, fifty percent of the problem would be resolved and, if he himself went in the bus to India, the remaining fifty percent would also be solved.[217] ... Nawaz Sharif believed it was time to reorient Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. He was also getting increasingly uneasy about continuing with Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy."

................................................................................................

In a strangely written paragraph author disqualifies the then paki PM first, before stating his good work and intentions that were quite unlike those of most paki regimes, making a reader wonder if those qualities precisely are what disqualifies him in paki view thst prefers illiterate marauders and barbaric invaders as their heritage. 

"Nawaz Sharif, was an unlikely candidate for possession of a coherent geostrategic vision; yet, forced by circumstances, guided by a professional team of diplomats in Islamabad and in Washington, and aided his own practical instincts he had focused on security issues critical for peace, stability, and economic progress in Pakistan.  Sharif’s general policy thrust of seeking peace with neighboring states, engaging in dialogue to work through problems, and remaining neutral between warring factions in Afghanistan had led Pakistan towards the beginning of a course correction. At the November DCC meeting, the prime minister communicated to the civilian bureaucracy and the military leadership the changes he was seeking in Pakistan’s foreign policy."

Author now lists his faults. 

"Significantly Sharif was initiating this needed foreign policy reorientation in a hostile domestic environment.  His policy blunders were multiplying; the 1997 battle with the judiciary, the bulldozing of laws through the parliament, the gagging of differences of opinion within his party, the passing of a less than credible Accountability Bill, a mounting failure to control rising sectarian killings, the accrual of financial benefits for family businesses, and finally a battle in 1998 with the media and the army."

It's unclear which, precisely, of those weren't shared by most, if not every, single despot that successfully ruled pak for much longer. But author isn't candid enough, or even honest enough, to admit that his failure was simply one, being more of a Shikoh although not quite as learned, and far less of the despot who murdered that prince along with all other brothers. 

................................................................................................

"Pakistan’s economy too was in a fairly difficult spot. This was contrary to the position in late 1997 when the government through legislative agenda had initiated political and economic reforms to restore the confidence of the business community. At that point, despite the sectarian and ethnic violence fanning out across Pakistan , especially in the country’s main commercial center in Karachi the business community’s confidence had been partially restored. According to the World Bank, “these reforms paid off and Pakistan judged by its economic indicators through May1998 showed increasing signs of economic growth and stability.”[218]Subsequently as the World Bank‘s report acknowledged “However events following Pakistan’s nuclear testing in May 1998 hampered the reform process and challenged political stability.”[219] Subsequently, given the fallout of nuclear tests Pakistan was forced to delay payments owed to FDIs and global confidence in Pakistan’s economy continued to spiral downwards."

Hence the adventure, with nothing expected to lose by paki generals who thought they could only gain - fame, territory, name, ... ?

................................................................................................

"Sharif in Washington Within weeks of the November 1998 DCC meeting, the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was in Washington DC on the invitation of US President Clinton. The prime minister of cash-strapped Pakistan led an unusually large delegation, comprising six ministers, a big media contingent, and several family members, wife and children. ... "

Shopping?

" ... Contrary to general practice, Sharif had no one from the armed forces on his team."

Obviously they were busy elsewhere. 

"Clinton hosted Sharif at Blair House and the meetings took place at the White House in the Oval Office. The room was a small one and Pakistan was told the seating would be limited to 1 + 5. However most members of the prime minister’s entourage wanted to go to the Oval office. Pakistani Ambassador Riaz Khokhar requested for additional seats on the Pakistani side. Although bin Laden was the key issue for Clinton, he attempted to dilute this focus by announcing at a presser just before the meeting began, that the two sides would focus on ending nuclear competition in South Asia, and on working with Pakistan to promote economic growth to support mutual US-Pakistan concerns to fight terrorism, alongside some of the other regional issues.”[220] Sharif, told his host in the presence of the global media that it was his “endeavor to remove all the misperceptions which are there in our bilateral relations.[221]"

So there were "misperceptions" in the State of Denmark?

................................................................................................

" ... Post-Bhutto Pakistan, under the military ruler Zia ul Haq,was totally immersed in an international jihad tailored to achieve the US objective of destroying the ‘Evil Empire’ of the USSR. Pakistan’s role as the main architect and facilitator of the international jihad led to Islamabad wanting a friendly government in Kabul."

Friendly???? More like puppets trained by pakis, but now lost control of, it'd seem after two decades. "

" ... Recalling his government’s cooperation, especially on bin Laden, he reminded his host that Pakistan had “been fighting terrorism, and you know that we’ve been cooperating with the United States of America also.” [224]"

Hilary Clinton had a better assessment, however - or perhaps so fid her husband, even then. 

After all, there were those unforgettable scenes from his visit to India, soon after, televised live for the whole world to watch - as he smiled when PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee affirmed India's position, as he met everyone crowding around before leaving, and as he got off his vehicle to dance with the villagers, en route to Jaipur!

................................................................................................

" ... Nawaz had arrived in Washington armed with hugely expensive gifts.[226] "

This from a reportedly well off businessman isn't worth mentioning, but author has been explicit in the two paragraphs ending above,mentioning details that would make it seem that pakis were grandiose to a US deserving of only shame. 

Nawaz Sharif being friendly to or friends with another similar person isn't surprising, considering his relationships with two very different leaders of India separated by a decade. 

He paid heavily, too, every time. 

"Nawaz and Clinton, aided by their teams, met for two hours at the Oval Office. They discussed non-proliferation, economic sanctions, relations with India, bin Laden, Afghanistan, and the F-16 issue. For Pakistan, the good news was Clinton’s commitment to settle the F-16 issue, which had become known in Pakistan as ‘highway robbery’ by the United States (Pakistan had paid the US $658 million for 28 F-16s. In 1991, after President George H.W. Bush withheld non-proliferation certification, Washington unilaterally aborted the sale and held back considerably more than half a billion dollars from cash-strapped Pakistan). while refusing to deliver the F16s.[227] Nawaz Sharif’s government decided to inform the Clinton Administration of its decision to take the matter to court. In Islamabad, Foreign Secretary Shamshad had strongly advocated the legal option and an American lawyer had already been engaged. He had already visited Islamabad for discussions. ... "

Hold on. Pakis paid US, millions of dollars? How? Isn't the glow usually other way, of aid? 

"For Clinton the bin Laden issue topped the agenda. At the meeting, his whereabouts were discussed. Sharif and his team maintained Pakistan could do little since bin Laden was in Afghanistan. None from Clinton’s team were convinced. Secretary of State Albright was particularly tough with the Pakistani prime minister. Sharif, to everyone’s surprise, at the conclusion of the meeting asked to meet Clinton separately. Clinton agreed. At the meeting, Sharif offered Pakistan’s help in abducting bin Laden. Pakistan’s prime minister proposed that the US train a Pakistani team to hunt for bin Laden. Clinton, beaten by the Lewinsky scandal, was very keen to achieve a breakthrough on bin Laden. He was tantalized by the offer. After the meeting, a delighted Clinton told US Ambassador to Pakistan Bill Milam and Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth about Sharif’s offer. Milam wondered how significant Sharif’s offer if he did not have Pakistan’s security apparatus on board. It was unclear if he did. Nonetheless, soon after the offer, the  CIA launched their Get-Osama operation. Men from the Special Forces Group arrived in Pakistan to train former Pakistani SSG commandos."

Perhaps this was why Nawaz Sharif was ousted and that too by someone who had attacked India without informing his PM - while the said PM was hosting PM of India for peace talks? 

And then not only lost the war hed started, but being thoroughly beaten as well? 

How did that loser get to conduct a coup and throw out a PM who was personally friendly with Clinton - unless the key was support by OBL? 

................................................................................................

"Interestingly, unlike Clinton, who immediately shared Sharif’s offer with his team, Sharif did not share his offer with his own team. Even his exceptionally alert and well-plugged-in ambassador to the US was unaware. In fact, the embassy was kept out of the loop. When a senior embassy official turned to the ISI chief for information about bin Laden’s whereabouts to vet the curiosity of his American hosts, he was told to tell the Americans that bin Laden was ill and suffering from a disease in which “he was growing taller and taller and would eventually die!” The ISI chief was of course aware of Sharif’s offer since his institution was to be the Pakistani executing agency for the Get-Osama plan.’

"Other than being unhappy about not being able to see the grizzly bears in their habitat at Yosemite Park, Sharif left the US satisfied. He believed Washington’s support was critical for him to successfully reorient policy. Some sanctions imposed after the nuclear tests were lifted, the F-16 matter was about to be settled, and World Bank loans had been approved. Clinton also supported Pakistan’s peace initiatives towards India and reconciliation between the Taliban and Northern Afghanistan. He also trusted Sharif’s commitment to help the Americans arrest bin Laden. Ambassador Milam, Clinton’s man familiar with civil-military relations in Pakistan, was unsure if Sharif’s proposal, unknown to the khakis, could actually be executed.

"It was a season of discontent with the Taliban. The international community was running out of patience with the Taliban as manifested by the UNSC resolution 1214 passed on December 8.[230] With escalating conflict posing a threat to international peace, mounting ethnic and religious conflicts, an increase in numbers of refugees streaming out of Afghanistan, a deteriorating human rights situation, and especially a stark discrimination against women and girls, the international community was running out of patience with them.  This manifested itself on December 8 when the Security Council passed Resolution UNSC 1214.[231]  The Taliban were condemned for the presence of terrorists in areas controlled by them. ... "

That's black comedy, criticizing terrorists for "the presence of terrorists in areas controlled by them."!!! 

" ... The Resolution also demanded that “outside interference in the country had to cease immediately.” ... "

Wasn't pakis, represented by taliban, the chief "outside interference in the country"?

" ... Pakistan, as the mentor and only supporter of the Taliban, clearly came under pressure as a consequence of increasing criticism of the Taliban.

................................................................................................

"Clinton personally pursued the bin Laden issue with Sharif. The US President had multi-sourced intelligence on bin Laden’s very imminent plan to attack American targets. The word was that bin Laden was aiding Saddam Hussain, who was under attack from the Americans. Hence, on 18 December a fortnight after Sharif’s Washington visit, Clinton called him. An acutely worried Clinton asked Sharif for his “personal help.” He told Sharif that he had “reliable intelligence” and “quite a lot of it that Osama bin Laden intends to strike a US target very soon, perhaps in 48 hours...and that operations are being orchestrated by bin Laden from within Afghanistan.”  This coincided with the United States and Britain’s controversial Operation Desert Fox, a major four-day bombing campaign on Iraqi targets from 16-19 December.[232] The justification for these controversial strikes was Iraq's failure to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as their interference with the United Nations Special Commission inspectors. The US President faced criticism at home and abroad for undertaking military action at a time when he was under fire over his relations with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Meanwhile, there was an outpouring of Muslim street support for Iraqi President Saddam Hussain. But Clinton assured Sharif, “Now all I can tell you is that this is not a reaction to Iraq: he’s been working on this.”[233] Clinton was ruling out any linkage.

"Clinton told Sharif of his extreme worry regarding the consequences of such an attack by Bin Laden. He asked Sharif, “Do whatever you can to stop this immediately.” The Americans were contacting the Saudis for help too. Meanwhile Clinton reiterated what he considered as the Pakistan-Taliban-bin Laden link. He held the Taliban directly responsible for Bin Laden’s actions, given the latter was operating from Afghan territory. Additionally, Clinton stressed that bin Laden’s operations were directly undermining Pakistan’s goal of Taliban acceptability within the international community. He told Sharif, “I think Pakistan has a lot of stake in the Taliban being accepted in the international community, and if this (attack) happens it will become virtually impossible.”[234] Clinton was also reaching out to the Saudis but wanted Sharif to know “he was very very worried about it and consequences if it ( the operation) occurs.”

"An attentive and enthusiastic Sharif was, however, not hopeful. He reminded the US President of their Washington conversation that the “Taliban are very uncooperative people.” He also recalled how the Taliban were “very stubborn” over the bin laden issue in the Kandahar meeting between the Pakistanis, Mulla Omar, and Saudi Prince Turki. Sharif assured Clinton of sending his people the following day to meet the Taliban leadership to ”tell them this will not be in their interest and serve no purpose, that it will invite retaliation and a world reaction.” Clinton wanted Nawaz to explain to the Taliban that “being uncooperative and not giving him (bin Laden) up and allowing him to conduct operations are fundamentally different things.” Nawaz and Clinton’s thoughts fully converged on the bin Laden and Taliban issues but Sharif could hold out little hope for Clinton. The bin Laden-Taliban-ISI axis, even if somewhat unintended, did exist and Sharif had almost no leverage over it."

................................................................................................

"1998 Draws To A Close In Parallel Universes

"Nawaz Sharif worked closely with the civilian bureaucracy on foreign policy matters. Sharif was not educated in or knowledgeable about international affairs. He was no Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, hence no strategist. ... "

Wasn't it Bhutto who lost half of the country, because he didn't stop his military from a planned intention to "change the DNA" of the said othrr half via genocide of three million in East Bengal and mass rapes of half a million, before he threw a tantrum in UN? Wasn't he the only paki PM to be subsequently legally executed by pakis by hanging, for whatever charade passes as law in pak? 

" ... Instead, he worked with instincts and a street-sense of what was needed. ... "

Is this authors way of informing the readers, in different verbiage, that Bhutto was upper strata, educated in convents et al, while Nawaz Sharif is seen as middle strata who earn their living and hence are in paki and erstwhile UK caste system, rooted in middle ages feudal thinking looked down on, by those who never did have to worry about earning? 

" ... Beyond that, for policy formulation and policy articulation, the prime minister depended primarily on his team of diplomats. As his core team guided Nawaz Sharif within the parameters of the policy thrust that he himself identified, he rarely overruled their advice.[235] ... "

Whose advice exactly did Bhutto follow in allowing his generals to follow their explicitly declared intentions regarding a genocide and mass rape policy, which they had tomtommed before proceeding to sail around  Sri Lanka to East Bengal?

"Similarly, the prime minister’s relationships with top foreign leaders, Indian, American and even Afghan, were guided by straight-forward personal interaction. Some were tutored by his Foreign Office team, and some were the outcome of his discussions with perhaps only his kitchen cabinet and his father. Often, Sharif would seek to have non-institutionalized, one-on-one interactions with foreign dignitaries, including heads of states. This would ensure no documented minutes of the meetings. ... " 

How did the much written Kargil policy favoured by conspiring generals succeed? 

" ... None of the generals, except the ISI head, was in Sharif’s inner circles."

Was that his chief crime for a nation that boasts of invader and destruction heritage, or was the less convent education the chief problem for a country that has more terrorist factories than hospitals or schools? 

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"In the post-nuclear test period, Pakistan’s foreign policy formulations were influenced by input from three different outlooks. The outlook of the prime minister, who was simply keen to improve relations with the country’s eastern and western neighbors and stay the track with the US.  Working closely with the prime minister were his kitchen cabinet, his brother Shehbaz Sharif (Chief Minister of Punjab), and Chaudhri Nisar Ahmed (Minister for Petroleum).  Then there was the new Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz. The third was the Foreign Office bureaucracy. Two parallel chains of commands operated at the FO.  The bureaucracy found Aziz a ‘dove’ on India. ... "

Whereas pakis prefer those who'd rather butcher India, even if they only get their own young men butchered - by thousands? 

" ... While Aziz had indeed questioned the wisdom of conducting the nuclear tests because of the impact on the national economy, as foreign minister he saw a flexible conduct of policy vis-a-vis India as necessary to create space for negotiations with India and for improving bilateral relations. ... "

So pakis replaced them with loser butchers. 

"There was, of course, a fourth set of inputs, unknown to the country’s elected prime minister: a clique of men in khaki, seemingly with sufficient autonomy and sufficient resources available to them to be unaccountable to the chief executive."

Meaning the guys who went to war and denied it, lost it roundly, and so persecuted their own civil government instead? 

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"It was indeed a measure of the political atmosphere that the Indians even explored the possibility of a Non-Aggression Pact.[237] The bureaucrats went through with discussing the idea, putting their respective versions on paper. The Indians bureaucrats, with the blessing of their political leadership, were “testing the waters”[238] on how far the Pakistanis were willing to cover the friendship road and, more importantly, on what terms.

"Nawaz Sharif, now Prime Minister of the only nuclear state in the Muslim world was on course, implementing his decision to reorient Pakistan’s foreign policy. After the nuclear tests, he had decided to make good on his election promise of improving relations with India. Also in his December one-on-one Washington meeting with Bill Clinton, Sharif  had assured the US President of finding ways to work together on nabbing OBL, responsible for attacks on US embassies in East Africa.

"Hence, as 1998 came to a close, three different strands of activities were underway, all very significant for Pakistan. First, the prime minister was on a course-correction path, generally, and specifically working overtime to normalize relations with India. After 28 years, a Pakistan-India summit in Pakistan had already been scheduled for February. Extensive preparations for the Nawaz-Vajpayee Summit in the historic city of Lahore were already underway. Second, a clique of four Pakistani generals had already dispatched hundreds of Pakistani troops across the LOC to occupy strategic heights in Indian-Held Kashmir. They believed such a covert operation, combined with the global anxiety of Kashmir becoming a possible ‘nuclear flashpoint’ would force India to resolve the Kashmir issue, or at least pull back from its 1984 occupation of Siachen. Third, Clinton’s CIA-led team was testing multiple permutations and combinations for a ‘snatch operation’ to get the dreaded enemy of the United States bin Laden. Pakistan’s prime minister in his December one-on-one meeting with Clinton had promised that ISI would help in capturing the al-Qaeda leader.  While Nawaz had appointed his trusted man general Ziauddin Butt to lead the ISI, the operational tier of generals, including Lt. Generals Aziz Khan, Jamshed Gulzar, and Ghulam Ahmad, were effectively under the GHQ’s command and not under the ISI chief’s command. Moreover, the quadrangular cooperative setup of the early nineties, which included the ISI, CIA, Taliban, and OBL, were beginning to separate into adversarial groupings. The CIA’s sole focus was to capture or kill OBL and they expected nothing less than full cooperation in this from the Taliban and the ISI.

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"The Taliban, as Mulla Omar’s exchange with Saudi Prince Turki had clearly conveyed, were in no mood to handover their benefactor and now comrade to either the Saudis or to the Americans. As for the ISI, it continued to mentor the Taliban as Kabul’s rightful and pro-Pakistani government in Kabul. Another dimension of the Taliban-Pakistan link was now the Kashmir factor. Non-Kashmiri militants sent by Pakistan into ... Kashmir[239] were increasingly being trained in Afghanistan and often in bin Laden’s training camps.[240] Some of these militants were pursuing a dual agenda. ... they conducted sabotage activities targeting Indian forces and even moderate Kashmiris. Within Pakistan they pursued their own ideological agenda, targeting Pakistan’s Shia Muslim population."

Why does author avoid pointing out the ideology that had Malala, a teenager, for going to school, despite orders by taliban that females should be instead made available for providing every service to taliban? Malala shooting happened later, but it was only a copy of what Afghanistan women and girls suffered under taliban, as soon as Russia was forced to leave. 

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"In the November 9 DCC meeting, the elected government had already decided that it would take a tougher line with the Taliban, especially with regard to the protection the Taliban regime was providing to sectarian groups responsible for killing ShiaMuslims in Pakistan.  Nawaz Sharif, who was personally comfortable with the political leader of the Northern Alliance Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, also decided that his government would open lines of communications with Ahmad Shah Massoud of the Northern Alliance. This policy decision by the country’s chief executive was in opposition to the Pakistan military’s operational policy of protecting, supporting, and promoting the Taliban regime. On OBL the military took the position that he was “not Pakistan’s headache.”

"In Washington, the Pakistan military’s position did not cut any ice.  Based on intercepts, human intelligence and other reporting sources, Washington was convinced of Pakistan’s deep links with al-Qaeda’s protectors, the Taliban. Hence, even though the CIA’s counter terrorism analysts acknowledged that the ISI had no truck with al-Qaeda’s international agenda targeting the Americans, they concluded ISI-Taliban nexus was indirectly protecting, promoting, and also expanding the al-Qaeda network. Another indirect ISI  and al-Qaeda link was that the ISI-supported Pakistani sectarian groups, that conducted operations against the Indian force ... were trained in the al-Qaeda camps.

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Author seems yo have a skewed vision due perhaps to personal prejudices. 

"From Bhutto to Zia, Pakistan had presented a contrasting picture. Bhutto exhibited world-class diplomacy while Zia was of men trained to view the world in a dependent and derivative mode. On the global stage Bhutto had dragged a defeated nation with the power of his vision to impressive levels of self-confidence and expanding influence. Bhutto led the new world opening with South-West Asia, leadership in the strategically important Muslim world, structural bonding with China, engaging the Russian bear, and putting Pakistan on the immutable nuclear path."

Author isn't aware that, having sworn he eouldnt allow the elected leader Mujibur Rehman to not only step into office but on soil on the then Western half of the country, Bhutto had been the leader responsible for imprisonment of Mujibur Rehman, the paki military attack against its iwn Eastern half East Bengal, the genocide and mass rapes thst had been declared intentions of before the military set sail for East Bengal around Sri Lanka, and subsequently losing thst other half? 

"Zia, by contrast, had taken Pakistan into a covert war, in a subservient role, believing it to be autonomous. Nevertheless overlooking the damage his policies did to the Pakistani state, society and politics, many in the army credited Zia for the hardware he brought to the armed forces, including staying the course on the nuclear program. Zia also abandoned the nuances of diplomacy, he had entirely bought into the threat perceptions of the West. ... "

Wasn't he the guy US found useful since already begun jihadist attacks in Afghanistan, making Afghanistan regime ask Russia for help? 

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Author seems to be as much a fan of the losers of Kargil as she's a fan of losers of East Bengal. So she blames every wrongdoing of the Kargil fiasco on zia instead. 

" ... Pakistan’s state power and public peace were adrift.  Even worse was the divided picture that Pakistan’s institutions presented. For example the army chief versus the army, the ISI chief versus the rest, etc. Within the very architecture of state and governance, there was conflict and contest. The narratives were several and divided. It has resulted in a clash of power and narratives on the foreign policy and national security. Little wonder that often Pakistan did not present a cohesive game plan while engaging with interlocutors.  Sharif, at the close of 1998, was set to pull all this together."

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October 25, 2022 - October 27, 2022. 

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CHAPTER 4: NECKS ON THE LINE AND THE LOTUS LAKE 

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"The confident clique of Kargil planners was satisfied with the progress of the operation. By the end of December, Pakistani forces had already infiltrated almost seven kilometers from seven directions which included  east of Shyok river outflank, from the top of Shyok Valley, from the western side of the river Indus, from Shakma. Pakistan Army troops from 13 NLI, 3 NLI, 5 NLI, 12 NLI and Sindh Regiment directly penetrated the seven areas. ... "

And yet pakis still lie on public television  kissing there were just a few tribals, no more than five hundred or so. 

" ... Although the army chief had given the nod, formal approval of the Operation was still needed. The revered day of Jumatul Wida, the last Friday of Ramadan, the sacred month of fasting, was picked for a formal approval of Operation Koh Paima. On 16 January, in the operations room of the Military Operations Directorate, Operation KP was approved although the bulk of the plan was already under way.. ... "

So the army was aware at the highest echelons, but civil government wasn't even informed, and general public was lied to. 

" ... The meeting, chaired by army chief General Musharraf, was attended by Lt. General Aziz Khan(Chief of General Staff), Lt. General Mahmud Ahmad  (Corps Commander 10 Corps), Lt. General Tauqir Zia (Director General Military Operations), Major General Javed Hasan (Commander FCNA),  Brigadier Masood Aslam (Commander 323 Brigade), Brigadier Nadeem Ahmad  (Director Military Operations) and Colonel Nisar Ahmad (GI Operations). Colonel Nisar Ahmad formally presented the tactical plan and its execution. The entire plan was spread over 15 pages and included a detailed map with logistics, ammunition, rations, and troops at posts set up across the LOC.

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"This general’s clique, assembled to fulfill a formality, hardly asked any questions. These were upbeat times. In the dead of winter, at more than a 16,000 foot climb, the battlefield was clear and apparently for Pakistan’s taking. The brave young men these generals had sent across the LOC to intimidate the Indians, were advancing. The generals were already slipping into class mission creep. Oblivious to whether their indispensable supply lines could match their advancing miles and heights, these dare-devil soldiers charged ahead. Their commanders, equally excited, overlooked the implications of this unplanned expansion. Such was the attitude of these top generals—securely ensconced in their own domains, away from the perilous battle-ground.

"Some perfunctory comments and questions followed, then the army chief’s approval. Significantly, this approval was a violation of the standard operating procedure (SOP), the preparation of A Note For Consideration (NFC) for the chief. ... For Operation KP, the approval came in a secret huddle, with no input from the intelligence agencies and no assessment by the MOD.

"The DG MOD, Tauqir Zia, was brought on at the last minute for the formal approval meeting. Zia was no planner but knew the operation was under way. He demonstrated his near disinterest in the matter by not raising any questions regarding the operation. Zia, whose mandate was to oversee the increasing requirements of troops and all logistics for all military operations, lounging in his chair, barely even moved from his slouching position. He was a new entrant in this clique.[242] Aziz, the lead among the Kargil clique, prompted him to ask some questions. Aziz had keenly watched the disinterested and somewhat baffled Zia during the meeting. Aziz needed him to be involved and interested. He wanted this key general to take ownership.

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"Perhaps the most poignant moment came when, after approving the operation, General Musharraf made a very prophetic query. “Tell me that the state of this operation will not be similar to that of India’s 1962 forward policy against China.” ... "

Author quotes paki lies there, terming 1962 Chinese attacks against India as exactly the opposite thereof. 

" ... Javed Hasan was quick to assure the chief that Pakistan’s positions were strongly established while the Indians were completely unprepared to respond. He then raised his hands to his throat and said, “If anything goes wrong, my neck is available.” His Commander, Mahmud, was quick to take responsibility.  “Why yours? My neck will be on the line since I have cleared it.”  As if taking the cue, in stepped the next man up in the hierarchy, the chief himself. “No, it would not be your neck, it would be my neck.”

"A three-neck offering had been announced in case of failure but history was to record a different trajectory.  These words notwithstanding, for these generals the possibility of being held accountable in case of failure must have appeared distant. There was no precedence; the list of military blunders had not been matched by a corresponding list of penalties for those responsible for blunders.. ... "

No, indeed, on the contrary  - paki generals, having lost war against India, then turned usually to coup against their own civil governments. 

" ... These men making decisions and giving approvals in hiding knew what they were doing. Their undertaking was hugely risky yet they had convinced themselves it was in the ‘national interest.’ The operation was baptized and given a name. Commander 10 Corps General Mahmud formally proposed Operation Koh Paima. The clique accepted it.[243]

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"The meeting dispersed as the plan was approved. But, even before this approval, using routes not known to the Indians, the FCNA troops had already crossed the LOC. They had gone several kilometers across and taken up dozens of posts in the Kargil-Drass area at point .5140. These were men who knew of the original Kargil plan that was conceived by their predecessors in the late eighties and the changes made to the original plan. They were also familiar with the criticisms but nursed the desire to punish India, especially for Siachen, by actually implementing the plan.

"Musharraf, who led the line to offer his neck,  was suppose to have received hardly a fortnight earlier, from a special unit within the ISI, a document about the Kargil Operation[244] The document  detailed the strategic disasters  that the ongoing Kargil Op may trigger.

"The country’s chief executive, the prime minister, had neither cleared the operation, nor was he taken in the loop by the army chief.  All SOPs had been ignored. On 16 January, when the generals convened to give clearance to the operation (already nearing completion), Musharraf was mindful of the worst, he had images of ‘necks on the line’ when he gave the approval in the meeting. Perhaps there was a Report from the ISI’s special unit after all did get to him and the information and analysis in the Report had left him immensely uncomfortable."

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"36 Days Apart

"The January 16 meeting took place less than five weeks before the Pakistani and Indian prime ministers signed the historic Lahore Declaration on 22 February. This meeting was reminiscent of the 13 May, 1965 meeting that took place between the military President Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan and the GOC 12 Division. The field Marshal was presented with the plan for Operation Gibraltar, which was jointly authored by the ISI and the Foreign Office. Gibraltar called for covert crossing of the Cease Fire Line and was presented around 48 days before the Rann of Kutch Agreement was to be signed. The agreement was signed by India and Pakistan on June 30 and each withdrew their troops from the international border areas. In the backdrop of this Agreement, Pakistan’s troops still crossed the then Cease Fire Line between 29 and 30 July.  Operation Gibraltar was a grossly miscalculated plan. By September, it had provoked a war. Fifteen years later, Pakistan’s determination to stay the blundering course and diligently repeat our mistakes was phenomenal. In 1999, the generals’ clique had signed off to a repeat of Operation Gibraltar."

"Fifteen years later"?????

Between 1965 to Kargil was well over more than twice that long! 

"In Pakistan’s policy towards its critical neighbour India, an incredible feat was underway. ... "

"incredible feat" nothing, it was the usual Islamic barbarian horde tactic of begging for ceasefire, offering a hug and stabbing in back. 

"Diametrically opposed advances towards India were being made. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had invited the Indian Prime Minister to Lahore for the 20 February historic Pakistan-India Summit.  Musharraf refused to obey the command of the elected prime minister to participate in the welcome ceremony for the Indian prime minister at Wagah border. He and other military men, hidden away from the country’s chief executive, were busy planning a comprehensive violation of that section of the Lahore Declaration that stated the two prime ministers “Recognize that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between them.” This was a near identical replay of the 35-year old Operation Gibraltar[245] with the only difference that in Kargil the civilians and the military were not on the same page. Civilians had moved beyond Gibraltar and had opted for diplomacy by charting new pathways to peace. Operation KP was an attempt by a group within the army to perpetuate old ways. It was subverting the new. The contrast could not have been starker."

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"Kargil clique’s calculations

" ... Kargil clique initially believed that India, under pressure, would be forced to give up Siachen."

" ... Certainly, the idea that the civilian leadership should make the decision to overhaul Pakistan’s Kashmir policy worried these generals. ... "

"The planners believed that an expanded operation would result in Pakistan’s control of a bigger chunk of the strategic heights across the LOC. The bigger the territory, the more diplomatic and political advantage would accrue to Pakistan in negotiations with India. [247] 

"Their calculation was simple. India would not be able to militarily dislodge the Pakistani forces from the strategic heights they had occupied before the onset of winter. India would be under pressure to enter into negotiations for two reasons. One, the Indians would be desperate to end the near siege of National Highway-1A (NH-1A). Two, the international community has no stomach for military conflict in South Asia, , and would encourage negotiation.

"The architects of the operation believed that these factors would put Pakistan in an advantageous position at the negotiating table.[248] In addition to preventing another Indian operation to further occupy territory across the LOC[249], they had calculated a minimum and maximum gain from the operation. The minimum gain would have been India’s withdrawal from the Siachen area. The maximum gain would have been an Indian commitment to enter into a “serious dialogue on Kashmir.” Also, Pakistan’s military operation would reinvigorate the Kashmiri political struggle."

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"Predicting an Indian Response

"Pakistan’s calculation was that, in the case of a localized Indian response failing to expel the Pakistani forces, “a second tier” Indian response would come into play with India opening additional fronts along the LOC across from the Pakistani towns of Murree and Chamb-Jaurian.[251] For this, India would require additional forces from outside of Jammu and Kashmir."

" ... The GHQ was certain that ... Indians did not have the force structure to execute an all-our offensive against Pakistan elsewhere. The planners moved with a linear calculation of an Indian response. As military men, they only focused on the military dimension."

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"Lahore Summit: Seeking new pathways

"Given the many weeks of preparation, there were no surprise developments at the Lahore summit. Three important bilateral agreements were produced: a Declaration was signed by the two leaders, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was approved by the foreign secretaries, and a Joint Statement was issued. These were comprehensive documents which covered the entire range of bilateral interests, ranging from “commitment to intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir” to “condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations” and “undertaking national measures to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.” Pakistan hoped these Lahore agreements would overrule Simla as the framework for a multi-faceted peace process."

"The Jamaat-i-Islami, Pakistan’s right-wing political party, was the principal opponent of Nawaz Sharif’s India policy.[256] It organized violent demonstrations in Lahore, especially during the evenings. Young men armed with stones, sticks and batons attacked cars ferrying guests to the historic Lahore Fort for the state banquet. Not angry tough guys, these young fellows, fortified seemingly with deliberated and scripted agitation, were easy to discourage.[257] Hundreds of policemen ordered out by the Chief Minister of Punjab Shehbaz Sharif were handled firmly. Given the army’s strong reservations about Pakistan’s official India policy, it is not improbable that these scripted protests had input from the intelligence agencies. On India, especially, the Jamaat-i-Islami and the army had an ongoing nexus. This occasion, especially this orchestration of public opposition to the dialogue path, must have been particularly important for the authors of the clandestine Kargil operation.

"The absence of the three armed forces chiefs in the reception line at the Wagah border also fuelled rumours that the armed forces opposed Sharif’s policy towards India. They believed that the government’s proactive peace offensive with India would weaken diplomatically and politically undermine Pakistan’s position on Kashmir. ... "

" ... General Ved Malik, had been insistent that the text should carry a reference to terrorism.”[259]"

" ... Sharif was confident that, as a prime minister with a two-thirds majority, and as a Punjabi, his credentials as a peacemaker on Kashmir would be unchallengeable. He insisted that the key to forward the movement was a reasonable proposal by Vajpayee.[260] ... "

"But the spirit, the substance, and the follow-up of the Lahore Summit were all set for an inevitable clash with the advancing Kargil operation. And more than just the South Asians were to be surprised."

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"Operation KP was initially launched within special parameters. One, only a limited number of NLI paramilitary troops were to be used for the operation.[267] Two, primary and secondary gains had to be made. The primary ‘gain’ was to choke the Drass-Kargil sector. The secondary yet “auxiliary” gain was to lay siege around Indian troops stationed in the Kaksar and Batalik sector. The Zoji La pass was also snow-bound and would have blocked Indian troop movement along the Pass. [268] The other route, Leh-Manalee, was under construction and at an altitude of around 5000 meters and crossing through five mountain ranges, was not feasible for continuous traffic.[269]

"The original plan required a crossing of the LOC at Drass to acquire a post at Tololing, thereby acquiring vital proximity to NH1. From Tololing, the distance to NH1 would be only two kilometers whereas Pakistani troops stationed at the LOC were almost six kilometers away from the road.  Excited, a member of the Kargil clique explained, “We could have placed an MP [270] on NH1!”

"Pakistani troops backed by logistical supplies, including ammunition, pre-fabricated igloos, and dry rations moved towards the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sectors.  Between March and April they were in position, occupying 140 posts and pickets[271] across five areas. They occupied watersheds in these sectors across the LOC in Mushkoh, Drass, Kaksar, Batalik, and Turtok. (MAP) It was from their posts in the Drass sector that Pakistani troops could access for effective interdiction NH-1A, the life-line to Indian troops in Ladakh and Siachen.

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"Then began the hard, grueling wait for the troops.  With no more than ten to fifteen troops at every post and five to six at pickets, there was virtually no communication with the outside world, as they kept vigil and lay in wait.  Because these covert movements spread over several months went completely unnoticed by India, Pakistani troops had uninterrupted time to execute their military plans.

"Kargil was an unusual military Op, given the harsh mountainous terrain and weather, the extreme secrecy of the operation, and the Kargil clique’s calculation of only limited Indian military response and hence limited combat with the enemy. It combined elements of a guerrilla operation, a holding operation, a covert operation, a mountaineering expedition, and an expedition to test human endurance. The troops in the field, having to negotiate with one of the world’s harshest terrains and most vicious climates, were therefore far more in direct and constant combat with nature than with Indian troops.[272]

"For this operation, secrecy was valued above all else. No formal military channels for communication were used. For example, while the FCNA headquarters regularly talked on the telephone with field commanders across the LOC to get updates, this communication was a post-midnight activity. To maintain secrecy, no conversation could take place in the presence of the telephone operators. The GI Operations had to wait for them to leave their post. Despite Operation KP being covert, the practice of maintaining logs and writing reports was not abandoned. But in this covert operation all activities were susceptible to manipulation at many levels. It was planned and fought like a personal war, with ownership of all the critical men in the army’s command hierarchy. While it unfolded, with no transparency even institutionally, the operation was not being reviewed for success or viability."

In short, it was no different from ISI controlled terrorist attacks against Mumbai less than a decade later, killing guests at several top hotels apart from other attacks, exceptfor number of attackers. 

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"One proposal to counter a possible pushback by India was to consider launching a supplementary but aggressive military maneuver by the troops who had already crossed the LOC. The idea, floated by one in the innermost coterie of the Kargil planners, envisioned troops moving across the Zojila pass, descending about 25 kilometers and establishing positions towards the Amarnath cave. The proposal called for them to then deny potential Indian response and capture India’s undefended territory, ammunition, and communication controls. It involved positioning Pakistani troops still deeper into Indian-held territory to ensure that, upon India discovering Pakistani troops, even if pushed back they would have penetrated deep enough to threaten India’s supply lines.

"The lieutenant colonel in charge explained the plan to the corps commander, who rejected it. He agreed that militarily the plan was implementable and India could be under pressure in Kashmir. “So, then, why not?” the enthusiastic colonel asked, ”Isn’t that what we want?” “Well, what if India opens new fronts on the international border? Then Pakistan would be endangered,” was the commander’s response. For the colonel, the penny dropped. Stunned, he asked, “Then why did you get us to this point? Why the operation?” Angered, the colonel would later insist, Operation KP floundered because it was “structured in a way to defeat us. We were stopped at a position of weakness…”[274]"

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"Troops and Logistics 

"By March, additional troops were called in as FCNA troops had ventured deeper. Units were moved from Peshawar. At any given time, Pakistan had 600 to 700 troops across the LOC.  One post or picket did not require more than 8 to10 soldiers and the rest were there to support the base, etc. However, with troop rotation, in total around 3000 to 4000 troops participated in the operation."

And yet, pakis lie on public television, claiming it was only a few hundred tribals. 

"Depending on where the troops were positioned, helicopters, human porters, and mule brigades were used for delivering supplies. For the 80 Brigade areas, army helicopters would ferry across supplies daily. For 12 NLI based in the easier terrain in the Mushkoh Valley, human porters were used. About 300 to 400 porters were used.

"Supplies for the troops came from the existing forward battalion supplies, dumped especially within the 80 Brigade area. The main logistics base from where supplies were transferred to different battalion headquarters was located at Jaglot, around 40 miles from Gilgit and 250 miles from Skardu. Undetected by the Indians, Lama helicopters were regularly flown across the LOC to drop food and limited medical supplies to feed the forward posts through summer months to last the many snow-bound months.[275]"

" ... Some contingents, including NLI 5, were not supplied. Even those who had food were unable to cook it, either because they were in the igloos or lighting fire raised the possibility of being tracked by the Indians. Troops in Indian-held territory would talk of going hungry for days or surviving only on honey. Home-bound troops would talk of having eaten grass for days."

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"Deceptive Briefings

"On 29 January in Skardu, they told Sharif the general thrust of their intentions while not revealing the plan in full. In order to give a boost to the Kashmir struggle, they said, they needed to become active along the LOC. Sharif was told that local level operations along the LOC were being undertaken. Though he still had no clue that Pakistani troops had already crossed the LOC, Sharif felt that small-scale operations could complement his political and diplomatic efforts to move forward on détente and peace with India. At the Skardu airport, the prime minister was told that, just as the Indians were interdicting our traffic in the Neelum Valley, the Pakistan army too would set up a couple of posts to interdict the main artery, the Srinagar-Leh NH-1A. The army chief mentioned setting up of a couple of posts across the LOC so that visual rather than the usual blind firing by Pakistan was conducted  to interdict NH-IA.[277]

"In the second briefing, on 13 March, the then ISI official Major General Jamshed Gulzar, in charge of Afghan and Kashmir policy, gave a presentation on Mujahideen activities. Gulzar’s presentation was completely unrelated to Operation KP. In fact, throughout the presentation, the Kargil Operation went unmentioned since neither General Gulzar nor any other official within the ISI were aware of it.  The prime minister, the army chief, the DG ISI, and commander 10 Corps were among the attendees.

"In his presentation, Gulzar informed the political and military leadership of the limitations within which the Mujahideen operated. They did not have the ability to inflict heavy damage on the Indian Army and make the environment conducive for the Pakistan Army to move in. Infiltration had also increased. The general said the Mujahideen were, however, capable of “imposing caution and casualties” on the Indian troops by laying ambushes, attacking isolated military posts, and blowing up bridges and culverts along the only route available for the movement of weapons, troops and supplies in the Srinagar and Leh area. During the question and answer session, it was suggested to Sharif at the briefing that scaling up the Mujahideen operations would positively impact Pakistan’s negotiating position. Musharraf proposed that Pakistan supply Stinger missiles to the Kashmiri Mujahideen, so they could inflict heavier losses on the Indian forces. The great success of the Stinger missiles, first introduced by the US to the Afghan Mujahideen for guerilla warfare against the Soviets, made the Stingers popular weapons among the Pakistan intelligence agencies.

"However, with diplomatic engagement now on a relatively positive track, the ministers present opposed delivering Stingers to the Mujahedeen. Former General Majeed Malik strongly objected to such a plan. “The proposal to provide Stinger missiles to the Mujahedeen will be treated by India as an act of war,” he argued. Moreover, providing Stingers was also opposed to Pakistan’s “basic stand that Kashmiris inside occupied Kashmir were waging their own struggle for self determination and Pakistan was only providing moral and diplomatic support,” [278] ... "

" ... Musharraf and his Kargil clique were on a different track. As if to justify his clique’s stance, Musharraf retorted, “We know the Indians. They will negotiate seriously only under maximum pressure.” Deceiving Sharif, he added that he “could not take responsibility for restraining Mujahedeen activity inside Occupied Kashmir.” He did, however, agree to “postpone” the plan to supply Stinger missiles."

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"Lotus Lakes and leisurely talks

" ... It was on 19 March, during the SAARC foreign minister’s retreat in Norellia at the Sri Lankan President’s summer home, that, after a long walk together in a huge garden with two lotus lakes, Jaswant Singh of India and Sartaj Azz of Pakistan sat down on a bench for a ninety-minute talk. It was about Kashmir. ... "

" ... The “Chenab formula” was discussed. All majority Muslim areas lay on the west of the river Chenab and the Hindu majority to the east of the Chenab. This formulation would at least convert the negotiations away from a communal discourse. The substance still involved different communities. ... "

"However, away from the gardens of Norellia, unbeknown to the Pakistani and Indian interlocutors, in the world’s highest battleground, the occupation of peaks was underway.  “We were not wanting territory, we just wanted to strengthen the hands of the prime minister,” was the refrain of the key architect of Kargil, General Aziz. How this linkage would work was anyone’s guess."

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October 26, 2022 - November 04 , 2022. 

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CHAPTER 5: KARGIL UNCOVERED 

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"‘Indians Do Not Fight’ 

"The Kargil plan was based on the belief that, once Pakistani troops would have successfully choked the lifeline of the Indian troops based in Leh and Siachen by interdicting NH1A and by setting up posts and pickets in the DrassKargil sectors, the Indian response would not be determined and decisive. In the minds of the Pakistani leadership, Delhi’s reaction of anger and panic would attract global attention. In the presence of nuclear overhang in South Asia, world powers would be forced to seek a quick political settlement. Pakistan would have a distinct advantage then, with its troops having cut-off the NH1A and planted themselves on the strategic peaks of DrassKargil, and would be able to dictate its terms for the settlement of Siachen and the Kashmir issue. 

"This belief of the Operation Koh Paima planners came under test in May."

Did pakis learn nothing in 1965, or even in 1971?

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"From Doubts and Suspicions to Zoo Construction 

"Ever since June 1998, several brigade commanders of India’s 15 Chinar Corps[283] had been raising the issue of infiltration from across the LOC with their higher authorities. The Chinar Corps with its headquarters in Srinagar is tasked to keep watch over the Line of Control. Senior commanders, including the Srinagarbased XV Corps Commander Lieutenant General Kishan Pal and XV Corps’ 3 Infantry Division Commander MajorGeneral V. S. Budwar, were on the receiving end of intelligence briefs, observations of field commanders, and conclusions from simulation exercises. All these had only one underlining theme:  Pakistan’s offensive intents and plans. They also highlighted major weaknesses in the Indian defenses.[284] During June and August 1998, Indian Army High Command received warnings of heightened cross-LOC military activity, including troop deployments, ammunition dumping, and infiltration using “routes through valleys and nalas (stream beds)”[285] The top brass lacked the entire perspective of the facts but did have a rough foreshadowing of what was to emanate from across the LOC. In August 1998, during a briefing prepared by the Kargil-based military commanders for the perusal of the Indian Army chief, possible infiltration routes in the Drass-Kargil sectors were identified. These subordinate commanders also warned of “a push by militants across the LOC” with the possibility to “engage National Highway 1A” using air defense weapons.[286] Although this intelligence was spot-on in recognition of the threat, it was on the identity of the intruders that these assessments were off the mark. These reports were replete with the terms “Afghan militants,” “terrorists,” and “Pakistan-backed mujahedeen”, while some reports did mention words like arrival of “fresh troops,” “irregulars” and “ammunition dumping” across the LOC at forward positions. However, no concrete conclusions were drawn from this scanty information.

"A spate of reports on what was viewed as an enhanced threat perception were sent from the Kargil and Leh based military intelligence. The reports originated from brigade officers and intelligence bureau field officers. However, the top command of the Chinar Corps remained skeptical, if not entirely dismissive, of these reports. In his August 1998 briefing that Brigadier Surinder Singh had prepared for the 3 Infantry Division Commander, he had identified India’s specific vulnerabilities at the LOC, including unguarded potential infiltration routes such as Mushkoh Valley, From Doda to Panikar ,Yaldor and through nalas.[287] Subsequently, in January 1999, another Indian officer, Colonel Pushpinder Oberoi, had warned in a letter to his commander Budhwar of weak defenses against Pakistani infiltration in the Tiger Hill area. As Pakistani infiltrators had already crossed five to six kilometers in the the Mushkoh, Drass, and Batalik sectors, Oberoi’s assessment was correct. Yet with the Pakistani troops still hidden in the precarious folds of the frozen ridges, the 3 Infantry Commander rejected Oberoi’s assessment. The top guns of the Chinar Corps dismissed all assessments that underscored Indian vulnerability and a possible infiltration by Pakistani troops in a manner bordering on criminal negligence. In some cases the generals believed there were technical problems in interpreting the data while in other cases the readout was seen as exaggerated and alarmist. The existence of contrasting priorities between the top-level and mid-level commands was further illustrated in the June memo that went from General Budhwar’s office to the field commanders. The general’s priority project was building a zoo in Leh and the field commanders were instructed, “that various types of wild animals/birds are procured for zoo at Leh at your earliest.”[288]"

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"From gunfire to enemy bunker -- ‘Militants, guerrillas and terrorists’ 

"As early as 9 February, Indian troops of the 5 Para Regiment spotted unusual movement in the peaks across the LOC in the region south of Siachen. Later, in March, when Indian troops spotted eight to ten men removing snow from a bunker in the Chorbat La sector, an exchange of fire took place. That was the first actual firing that occurred between Indian and Pakistani troops during the Kargil operation. This did not alert the Indians, who passed it off as a localized militant action.

"The local shepherds in the Turtok sector first alerted the Indian military commanders in April about some “unusual movement by unfamiliar faces along the Kargil ridges.” However the Indian Army began discovering the intrusion only after it began its summer patrols in May. While weak aerial reconnaissance confirmed some infiltration, India floundered over its nature. The Indian soldiers, barely returned from their routine winter descent from the extremely treacherous and inhospitable terrain, were going to find the task difficult of identifying the infiltrators and getting their count right. Local media reports reflected the confusion of the army commanders.

"Similarly, in mid-April, incursions were detected in the Turtok sector after a firing incident on Indian troops. The retaliatory fire by Indians led to at least two Pakistani deaths. However, the local Indian commanders did not share the incident with anyone among the Indian military hierarchy beyond Batalik.[290] They believed some Mujahedeen had infiltrated across the LOC. On 3 May, one Tashi Namgyal of Gharkhun village and another shepherd, on the payroll of an intelligence unit of India’s Kargilbased 121 Brigade, reported unfamiliar faces ”digging in” and ”building sangars (bunkers)” in the mountainous areas of BatalikYaldor in Kargil.[291] It was on 3 May that a section of Pakistani troops occupying peaks in the Tololing area began their offensive. They first attacked an Indian reconnaissance group, then followed this with a major attack on 9 May, destroying huge Indian ammunition dumps in Kargil.[292] Indian retaliated on 4 May, firing from Yaldor in the Batalik sector, and an Indian battalion attacked a Pakistani company. Four died and several were injured. Pakistan also lost five officers in a precision-guided missile attack in the Yaldor area.

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"The Kargil planners had projected engagement in mid-June; this was several weeks earlier. After the Yaldor firing, the Kargil planners began an operational review. Pakistan Army chief Musharraf arrived in Gilgit, ostensibly on vacation, and on 6 May he was secretly given a comprehensive briefing in cottage number 3 of Skardu’s  picturesque Shangri La resort hotel. The participants included the FCNA commander Javed Hasan, Commander 10 Corps General Mahmud, commander artillery, brigade commander and GI Operation Lt. Col Nisar.[293]"

Author quotes extensively from reports in Indian press. 

" ... The press also drew parallels with the surprise Chinese invasion of the Sum Durong Chu Valley in the Arunachal Pradesh attack in the mideighties. The Chinese caught the Indians “napping” and occupied the valley before the snows melted in MarchApril. By the time the Indian Army arrived, the Chinese had built bunkers all over the valley, which they still occupy.[300]"

" ... The Tribune reported more than 10 Indian troop casualties against 20 across the border.”[304]

"Reports from Jammu indicated that evacuation of the population in the Drass area of Kargil, 146 kilometers northeast of Srinagar, had been begun by the Indian Army. The Indian authorities explained the evacuation as a response to the “Pakistani troops heavy shelling in Drass area.”[305] 

"In the beginning of May, with the early opening of the Zoji La pass, the Indian Army patrols were also sent to the Drass and Kargil sectors to probe the presence of intruders. Supported by aerial reconnaissance missions, which began on 8 May, the “intruders” were spotted in several areas, on the Tololing Hill, about 5 kilometers from Drass, and a mere 2 kilometers from NHA1A.[306]

"Around 14 May, an Indian Army patrol party sent to the Kaksar area went missing.[307] Beginning 6 May when the Indian Lieutenant Saurabh Kalia's patrol party disappeared, most of the Indian reconnaissance missions sent into the area also went missing. Most became victims of attacks by Pakistani troops who were occupying the numerous strategic heights.[308]

"IAF reconnaissance aircraft also began surveillance of the area. Around May 17th a Pakistani helicopter flying on the Indian side of the LOC was detected. The Indian Army responded to this information by launching an attack on Pakistani troop pickets on Point 5353, the peak overlooking NH1A. The Indian Army discovered it was not easy to dislodge those attacking from the heights and within a day it called off its attempt. The Indians also only gradually discovered how well armed the intruders were. For example, on May 21 a surface-to-air missile hit an IAF aircraft on a photoreconnaissance mission.[309] The first reports on Kargil in the Indian press appeared on May 15. ... "

................................................................................................

"Meanwhile, during early May, from their posts and pickets at 16,000 to 18,000ft height, the Pakistani troops launched their offensives. ... "

" ... The problems began when by May the Indians began counter-attacking. Following the Indian retaliation in the early days of May, SSG commando battalions were brought in for attachment with or as reserves for existing units now sitting atop posts at 16,000 ft height."

"As June approached, India’s concerted action against Pakistani soldiers had begun depleting Pakistan’s ammunition. To address the issue, Pakistan sent additional NLI units across the LOC carrying ammunition. Having won the initial hand, Pakistan was in a relatively difficult situation where logistics were failing and troops were holed up on tops in a precarious situation"

................................................................................................

" ... On May 17, the Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan G. Parthasarthy repeated his country’s willingness to hold dialogue with Pakistan over Kashmir.[316]"

"By end of May Pakistani masterminds had realized that additional troops were required for Operation KP and its supply lines for logistics crucial for Pakistani troops would become the prime target of Indian artillery."

" ... It was war for the Indians. Lt General Hari Mohan Khanna, commanderinchief of the Northern command declared, “It is more or less war ...I am treating it as near war...”"

" ... The general consensus was that the intruders were in fact well armed Pakistanbacked militants “equipped with a panoply of modern weapons, sophisticated equipment and snow clothing...”[321]"

................................................................................................

"By 26 May, the Indian Air Force had entered the battle and on 27 May Operation Vijay began to take shape. The Indian Air Force was to bombard the infiltrators, hit out at their supply routes, and also initiate an unceasing freefall supply of ammunition to the Indian troops."

"The Pakistani troops, although perched on the sky-high peaks, were faced with problems once Indian’s retaliation began. Indian attacks were compromising the relatively lowlying supply lines transporting logistics to the Pakistani troops. Early problem areas identified for Op KP included compromised supply lines and shortage of ammunition. For example, the infantry commander who believed he had two months’ worth of artillery to help sustain the position at Tololing in the Dras sector, ran out of artillery 48 hours into the Indian attacks.[322]"

Author now quotes, extensively, paki lies claiming India had attacked.

"Sartaj Aziz spoke from ignorance. Nothing was adding up. For Pakistan’s civilian leadership, facts about Kargil still lay undiscovered. Barring the gang of four, even the Pakistan Army’s top command was unaware of Operation KP until May 16, when they got their first briefing. A day later, the detailed briefing on the operation was arranged at the Ojhri Camp, where the Air and Naval chiefs were taken into confidence. If the events on the ground had not provoked a near war, all this would have made for a bizarre comedy."

................................................................................................

"“Cock and Bull Story” 

"Meanwhile, Washington too entered the fray and called for troop withdrawal. Pakistan was asked to vacate immediately. Within a period of one week, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, seasoned diplomat Riaz Khokhar, was told four times to convey Washington’s concern to Islamabad over Pakistan’s violation of the LOC.[330] During his first meeting with the US Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering at the State Department Club, Khokhar was plainly told that the Clinton administration did not believe Islamabad’s “cock and bull story of freedom fighters”[331] fighting in Kargil with no Pakistani involvement. After his first meeting, a puzzled Khokhar called the Foreign Office in Islamabad to convey Washington’s message. However, the response to his queries on Kargil was that “all will be well, no need to worry!”

"The flip side of Washington’s message to Islamabad was the message that the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright conveyed to the Indians. On May 30, Albright called her Indian counterpart Jaswant Singh. She let him know that she had spoken to the Pakistani prime minister and assured Singh that “the United States knew fully well how the chain of events had started.”[332] A worried Albright had also suggested that “things could go out of control...it was important to commence the dialogue.”[333] Singh said he was not averse to a dialogue but wanted the “aggressor” to first end aggression against India.

"After it was known that Pakistani troops had crossed the LOC ... Pakistan earned widespread criticism. The criticism was simple: responsible nuclear states always stay away from |military confrontation. They do not undermine nuclear deterrence. They do not sabotage peace initiatives and especially the ones that they themselves initiate, like the Lahore summit. They do not opt for the confrontation path. Operation KP had landed Pakistan in an isolated space where criticism of the present overrode all else. ... "

Author attempts to justify pakis at this point claiming pakis claims were bring ignored. 

She forgets Russian claim to Alaska - leased to US for 99 years, never returned due to the document being lost during revolution - is far more genuine. 

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November 04 , 2022 - November 04 , 2022. 

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CHAPTER 6: BOLT FROM THE BLUE 

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"Around mid-May, when the Indians detected early signs of Op KP, the five-member Kargil clique in Pakistan was forced to take into confidence the elected government, including the senior civil-military bureaucracy. Hitherto, the army chief had neither discussed nor sought approval from the prime minister for Operation KP, which was not merely a battle for posts on the LOC but had involved ingress by Pakistani troops ... across the LOC. ... "

"On 29 January, the Prime Minister addressed the troops at a public meeting in Skardu. Contrary to general Musharraf’s assertion in his book In the Line of Fire,[336] there was no briefing on Kargil. According to a retired general who was present during Sharif’s Skardu trip, the visit was “just a face-showing, where not a word on Kargil was uttered.” [337]"

"In fact, until mid-May, even the military high command, including the intelligence chiefs, were kept out of the loop on Op KP."

" ... The iron-clad secrecy surrounding Op KP was nearly impossible for even critically located men within the military hierarchy to permeate.

"This level of secrecy ruled out the possibility of sound evaluation of Op KP. Lone voices from even within the GHQ’s Research and Analysis Wing[341] were easily dismissed. For example, around end-May, when questions of Pakistan’s cross-LOC actions began to surface internationally, a brigadier wrote a note recommending that Pakistani troops should vacate Kargil. As a diligent member of the research unit mandated to give input on a regular basis, the brigadier candidly noted that existing problems with the Op were likely to compound further, especially within the international context.  His note found its way to the army chief‘s desk. Written in green ink, the chief’s remarks in the margins read “I do not agree.”[342]"

" ... In 1965, the level of the secrecy was such that General Bakhtiar Rana[343], the Corps commander, who was responsible for looking after the geographical area, was not involved in the war planning. When General Rana came to the then Commander-in-Chief, General Muhammad Musa Khan, and asked him about the operation, the chief said, “No, no, It’s a secret,” and declined to tell him about the operation. [344] Even the then Pakistan Air Force chief was kept unaware. ... "

................................................................................................

"The majority of participants in the meeting appeared to accept what they were told. Only a few raised questions.[347] Inspector-General Frontier Corps Baluchistan Lt. General Abdul Qadir Baluch warned the Kargil planners that they had not correctly calculated the Indian reaction. Supporting Baluch, Major General Akram, GOC 35 Division, added that negative international reaction to any military tension between new nuclear powers had also not been factored in. Major  General Rafiullah Khan Niazi too was very critical."

" ... Qadir asked the presenters at the meeting why the Indians would not be able to protect their vehicles from Pakistani firing from a distance of three kilometers. Qadir recalled that he was able to protect the construction workers from Indian fire from as close as only eight hundred meters."

" ... The army chief Musharraf also addressed the generals for about half an hour. He informed Pakistan’s top military commanders that the Indians were suffering heavy casualties. Pakistani soldiers occupying strategic heights were retaliating to Indian infantry attacks. The chief dismissed the idea that India would react forcefully and open any new fronts on the international border. He was categorical, “our positions were unassailable.” “Luck is always on the side of the bolder and hence it was on our side,” was the maverick chief’s dangerously naïve reassurance to the commanders. With his remarks “it’s a win-win situation[348] Musharraf called the meeting to a close. Everyone was asked to pray for the success of Op KP.  With unanswered questions still worrying some among those present, all obeyed the chief. They raised their hands and prayed."

"But, significantly, the morning after the Kargil clique’s briefing to their own, the editorial in a leading Pakistan daily wrote that Pakistan’s own forces were fighting in Kargil.[349]"

................................................................................................

" ... Indian press reports claiming that ... Pakistani artillery fire could target India’s main supply route to Leh, the Srinagar-Leh Highway.[351] These reports had prompted the prime minister, linked in a high-stakes diplomatic engagement with his Indian counterpart, to ask for this briefing.[352] The Kargil planners were in an upbeat mood since Pakistan’s artillery shelling had blown up a bridge on India’s main supply route."

" ... The entire Kargil clique, including the army chief, the Chief of General Staff Lt. General Aziz Khan, Commander 10 Corps General Mahmud, and Commander FCNA Brigadier Javed Hassan, was present. Key men from the ISI in attendance included the DG ISI Lt Gen Ziauddin Butt, director analysis Major General Shahid Aziz, and ISI’s point-man for Afghanistan and Kashmir Major General Jamshed Gulzar. The prime minister, accompanied by the Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, the Finance Minister, the Minister for Northern Areas and Kashmir Affairs Lt. General Majeed Malik, the Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad, and his Principal Secretary Saeed Mehdi."

" ... LOC was not clearly demarcated on the map. Hence, during the presentation, when Pakistani and Indian positions were pointed out to the prime minister, he was unable to fully comprehend the locations of these posts. Instead, for him, the main focus of the briefing was the achievements of Pakistani troops. There were no mention of Pakistani troops crossing the LOC, nor of the Pakistani troop build-up five to ten kilometers beyond the LOC. One of the retired generals present recalled, “I saw scores of positions across the LOC in the Indian area across the LOC ... ”"

" ... The general predicted, that in phase five, the final phase, the Indians would be on their knees begging for talks and Pakistan could dictate its own terms.

................................................................................................

"The DGMO proceeded to share the four assumptions which, according to its planners, guaranteed the success of the five- phase Operation Koh Paima. First, each post being held was impregnable. Second, the Indians did not have the will or the determination to take on Pakistan in a fight and would not make any serious effort to regain the heights. Third, as far as the international context was concerned Pakistan need not worry because there would be no external pressure. Fourth, that the army recognized the economic crunch faced by the country and therefore the government would not be asked for any extra resources for the operation; the army would use its own sources to fulfill the financial requirements.

"The main thrust of the presentation was to inform the elected leadership of the army’s “achievements” along and across the LOC. The impression given was that the strategic heights lay somewhere in the un-demarcated zones. The DGMO informed the participants that Pakistan’s troops had occupied strategic heights that Indians would now find almost impossible to reoccupy. The army chief emphasized the irreversibility factor and said that, based on the wisdom and experience of his entire professional career, he could “guarantee the success of the operation.”[354]"

"Clearly, the masterminds of Kargil were not seeking permission for the operation they has already launched. The prime minister was presented with a fait accompli. With the cover of Operation Koh Paima having been nearly blown and diplomatic pressure imminent, the Kargil clique was seeking political and diplomatic cover for the Op. The prime minister was pointedly asked if he and his team could politically and diplomatically leverage their ‘unassailable’ military achievements to promote and project the Kashmir cause.[355] Following the DGMO, the CGS Lt. General Aziz Khan rose to flatter the prime minister. “Sir, Pakistan was created with the efforts of the Quaid and the Muslim League and they will always be remembered for creating Pakistan and now Allah has given you the opportunity and the chance to get ... Kashmir and your name will be written in golden letters,” he declared. The CGS Aziz also invoked the PM’s Kashmiri descent and lured him with the possibility that “after Quaid it is a unique opportunity to be remembered as the Fatah-i-Kashmir.”[356]"

................................................................................................

"Steadfast in their dedication to their institutional ethos all the men in uniform raised no questions at the presentation. As would later transpire, the top commanders in the ISI were all skeptical of, if not totally opposed to, Operation KP. Lt. General Gulzar would subsequently criticize the Op as a “blunder of Himalayan proportions,”[357] born of a temptation that every commander 10 Corps would face upon finding an “open space.” Emphasizing the point, the general would later recall, “When I took over the command of 10 Corps I had to put my troops on a leash because they would say we can move forward since we are at a height.”[358]  Similarly, years later, the then head of the ISI’s analysis wing major general Shahid Aziz would write, “An unsound military plan based on invalid assumptions, launched with little preparation and in total disregard to the regional and international environment, was bound to fail. That may well have been the reason for its secrecy. It was a total disaster.”[359]"

" ... The foreign minister, however, expressed his reservations on two counts: one, that it was incongruent with the spirit of the Lahore summit and, two, that the U.S. would not support the operation. Sartaj Aziz pointedly asked his PM whether the plan the army had made was not contrary to the undertaking in the Lahore Declaration. ... "

Author claims paki PM was for KP. 

"The other obviously perturbed man in the room was Sharif’s Minister for Kashmir and Northern Areas (KANA) Majeed Malik. A retired general, Malik grilled the commander 10 Corps about the logistics for the forward troops. He interrogated how the supplies would reach the troops under “adverse weather conditions and in a hostile environment.” He recalled the hazardous terrain he had personally visited. Mahmud’s curt response was that times had changed and that “our troops are fully covered.”  The retired general also asked the DGMO, “What if the Indians do not remove their troops from the Valley and instead induct air power in the conflict theatre?”  Meanwhile, the silent worrier in the room, Sharif’s Defense Secretary, also a retired general, opted to not raise any questions. At the conclusion of the formal meeting, he merely whispered to other military officers, “The foreign office will never be able to handle this.” [362]"

" ... Based on whatever he understood regarding the operation, and factoring in the reservations expressed by his ministers, the elected prime minister opted to go along with the fait accompli presented to him by the military. ... The prime minister took well to the words of the CGS that for the PM “after the Quaid it is a unique opportunity to be remembered as the Fatah-i-Kashmir.”[364]"

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"Immediately after the meeting the defense secretary followed the prime minister in his car. It was about 9pm and Sharif was entering the lift in the Prime Minister’s House when Lt. General Iftikhar Ali Khan, hurriedly following him, said, “Sir, can I talk to you? It is important.” the nation’s chief executive asked him if he could wait till the next morning. The defense secretary persisted. He said he wanted to ask two questions. One: Did the military leadership get his permission to cross the LOC? The prime minister enquired whether the army had actually crossed the LOC. “Didn’t you note all that about ‘hundreds of posts’ and that NLI troops, not freedom fighters, have crossed the LOC.” Chaudhary continued, “Crossing the LOC, Mian Sahib, has implications for war.” In the middle of the night, the rather surprised prime minister said, “Why a war? And who has crossed the LOC?” He was told that about five to six hundred square kilometers of Indian territory and hundreds of posts had been occupied. The prime minister instructed the Defense Secretary to explain the situation to his Minister the next morning."

" ... The PM asked Musharraf, “Did you cross the LOC?” Musharraf responded, “Yes, sir, I did.” “And on whose authority?” queried the prime minister. The army chief was quick to respond, “On my own responsibility and if you now order, sir, I will order the troops’ withdrawal.” Nawaz Sharif turned to his Defense Secretary and said, “Did you see? He has accepted his responsibility!”  Sharif, perhaps visualizing himself as the “liberator” of Kashmir, added, “Since the army is part of the government, from today onwards we will support the army.” After this rather brief meeting, the army was to get the complete support of the country’s leadership.[370]

"The public message at this stage from all stakeholders, in Islamabad, Rawalpindi and abroad, was identical: The international community must rein in India. The same day, the prime minister said Pakistan was committed to dialogue with India. On 19 May, the COAS General Pervez Musharraf said Indian violations of the LOC would be taken seriously. On 20 May, in Baku, at the Council of Ministers Conference, the Minister of State of Foreign Affairs, Siddiq Kanju, asked the world community to help resolve Kashmir. On 21 May, Pakistan’s newly appointed ambassador to France, Shahryar Khan, assured his hosts that Pakistan was involved in “serious talks” with India."

Author thus exposes paki lies and hypocrisy, but omits the label to that effect. 

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"Most of the civilian participants realized the scale of Operation Koh Paima for the first time. They asked probing questions regarding the objectives of the operation.[372] The army chief was asked about the objectives of Op KP and Pakistan military’s ability to retain the territory occupied across the LOC. The confident army chief’s response was, “We can defend every inch of our own territory and we are firmly entrenched in the positions we are holding in Kargil.”[373]

"There were many critics of the operation. For example, many questions came from Minister Majeed Malik, who had himself commanded this area as a Corps commander and earlier on as Div. Commander. He said that, if Pakistan had to interdict this road, it could have been done from lower heights instead of taking our troops to the Kargil peaks, where the weather would be their worst enemy. Malik pointed especially to the difficulty of maintaining supply lines for the troops. The worried elderly Minister for Religious Affairs Raja Zafarul Haq nearly reprimanded the Kargil planners for not taking others in the government into confidence if their objective was to highlight the Kashmir issue. All future action must now follow proper consultation, he emphasized.

"The consensus among senior navy and air force officers was that opening of new fronts by India could not be ruled out. They asked why they had not been consulted earlier since any defense plan in case of Indian retaliation had to be an integrated armed forces defense plan. Criticism kept piling up. The deputy air chief also wondered, “After all, what will we achieve from all this?” CGS Aziz’s response was that, by applying pressure on the main supply artery NH-1, India would be forced to the negotiating table on Kashmir.[374]"

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" ... The army insisted that the line was fuzzy and in some places the Mujahideen were also involved in the fighting. When asked by one of the foreign office officials how the Mujahideen could fight so valiantly against the well-equipped Indian army, the army spokesperson Rashid Qureshi said, “Because the Indians from the plains are not acclimatized and they die!” [378]"

" ... The defense attachés left the briefing with the understanding that these senior Pakistani military officials had acknowledged that Pakistani troops were involved and it was not a Mujahideen operation.[381] The western military attachés, including the American and the British, reported back to their embassies and subsequently to their headquarters that fighting was actually taking place on the Indian side of the LOC.[382] Publicly, however, Islamabad still maintained that only the Mujahideen were involved.[383] The media, based on western embassy backgrounders, reported that the DG MI had acknowledged that there were Pakistani troops across in the Indian side of the LOC. Interestingly, at this time Pakistan’s own diplomats, stationed even at the headquarters, were groping in the dark for information about the reported flare-up along the LOC.

"After the MI briefing, the US military attaché in the embassy informed his ambassador William Milam that fighting was going on the Indian side of LOC. The American information until then was that it was a group of Mujahideen. The military attaché had attended the briefing at the GHQ given by the DG MI and the DG MO.[384] Following the briefing, the attachés snooped around for more information. The military attaché met his counterpart while the political attaché met with retired military officers. With confirmation that Pakistani troops had crossed the LOC, the “really excited US diplomats” told Washington about it. The State Department responded by issuing its first statement, calling upon Pakistan to withdraw its troops. This statement prompted the Additional Secretary of the Foreign Office, Tariq Altaf, to call in Ambassador Milam and ask why Washington had accused Pakistan of fighting across the LOC. The US ambassador informed him that it was the Pakistan Army itself who had given them this information. Upon hearing Milan’s response, it seemed that “Altaf had been kicked and his faced fell.”[385] Following the Altaf-Milam exchange, Foreign Minister Aziz called the DG MI and complained about the embarrassing faux pas he had committed. The MI chief said he had been misquoted.[386] Nevertheless, the stories of the defense attaché regarding Pakistani troop presence remained in circulation."

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"Towards the end of May, the prime minister decided to take his cabinet into confidence on Op KP. He convened a cabinet meeting at which the director-general ISI Lt. General Ziauddin Butt was to present a briefing. Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad and Defense Secretary Iftikhar were also present. Although in his private meetings with the prime minister the DG ISI was critical about Op KP, at this cabinet meeting he presented broad details of the Op. ... Similarly, the foreign secretary, who had expressed some reservations about Op KP at earlier meetings, at this cabinet meeting opted to pick no holes. He gave no hint of the Op being a potential source of any diplomatic disadvantage for Pakistan, and, instead, indicated that some benefit could be derived from it.

"A barrage of hard questions followed Butt’s briefing. The majority present was pleased with the progress reported on Op KP. The Minister for Water and Power Gohar Ayub praised the army for doing a “great job” and advocated support for the operation. Minister of Culture, Sports, Tourism, and Youth Affairs, Sheikh Rashid Ahmad, also praised the army, while the Minister for Religious Affairs said, “The time is now ripe for jihad.” There were also critics of Op KP. These included Minister for Communications Raja Nadir Pervez and Minister for Health Makhdoom Javed Hashmi. The most vocal critic, however, was the secretary of defense. The retired general spoke for about twenty minutes, warning that Op KP would either end in all-out war or as a total military disaster for Pakistan. He alluded to what he believed was less than the whole truth that others before him, had spoken on Kargil. He especially alluded to the Director-General ISI Butt’s presentation.

"To support his own contention, Iftikhar discussed recent Indian troop movements. Indian divisions deployed at the Chinese borders had moved towards the Pakistani borders. India’s defensive formations had also moved to Pakistan’s borders in offensive posturing. The Indian navy too was moved from its eastern maritime borders to its western maritime borders, alongside Pakistan’s borders. His assessment was that the Op would not be restricted to Kargil but would lead to war. A worried Defense Secretary provided a comparative fact sheet on the two armies, navies and air forces. His assessment was that, in case of an all-out Pakistan-India war, Pakistan would be in a difficult situation. Implying that the army command had launched Op KP without clearance from the government, the Defense Secretary emphasized that the army was not an independent body and had to take orders from the government. He was also critical of placing jihad as a central element in Pakistan’s defense structure. He wondered, “Why have we after fifty-two years realized the importance of jihad?”[387] The Defense Secretary’s brother Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, the Minister for Petroleum, also raised hard questions. The thrust of Nisar’s remarks was that, based on his information, Pakistan was heading for a military disaster in Kargil-Drass. “Who had ordered the operation?” the minister rhetorically asked the military presenters. Nevertheless, Nisar’s caution was against an Op already underway."

" ... Meanwhile the Kargil planners, saw no reason to pay heed to any concerns expressed at the cabinet meeting."

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"The Contours of Denial 

"Throughout May, the army planners of the operation worked with a variety of themes to maintain deniability of the Pakistan Army’s involvement. These ranged from contentions that the Mujahideen were conducting the operation, to assertions that the Pakistan Army was not crossing the actual LOC. The decision to attribute the fictitious identity of the Mujahideen to the NLI was largely an unplanned one. It had been triggered by the wireless intercepts of exchanges between the Indian forces, which the ISI and the MI had picked up. The Indians were informing each other that the Afghan Mujahideen had crossed over the LOC. This Indian assessment was based on the wireless exchanges they had picked up between the NLI personnel recruited from Pakistan’s Pashto-speaking areas.[390] The Indians mistook them for Afghans.

"In fact, there was no Mujahideen participation at all. The Mujahideen, often physically hardy, were “essentially a rag-a-tag force wearing second hand clothes and PT shoes.” Incapable of fighting pitched battles, they were certainly not capable of supporting the Kargil operation.  At best they could “apply pinpricks” to India using their very weak artillery and ammunition, including AK47 assault rifles, light motors, explosive devices.[391] They were capable of ambushes and of raiding posts. The Mujahideen “could not have operated in the Kargil area where even the eagles dare not fly.”[392]"

Author says "motors" where it should say 'mortar'.

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"Nevertheless, to ensure deniability, a decision was taken within the GHQ to “play along” with the Indian version that Afghan Mujahideen had entered the Kargil region.[393] By the third week of May, the FCNA commander got orders from the GHQ that the troops participating in the operation should “go in civvies” and to “remove their identity discs.” The FCNA found this order disturbing. The troops were to be identified as Mujahideen. Camouflaging their identity would affect their morale.[394] The broader implications of acquiring the fictitious identity were overlooked by the army generals. The participation of the Afghan Mujahideen in the Kargil area would establish their engagement with the Kashmir freedom struggle. Such a linkage would strengthen the Indian position that, in fact, Pakistan was involved in spreading the Taliban brand of extremism in the region and justify Delhi’s framing of the Kashmir movement within the Islamic international terrorism framework and link it to Osama Bin Laden and to al-Qaeda.[395]

"Closer to home, the Mujahideen leadership, agitated over Pakistan’s decision to project the Op as a Mujahideen operation, sought meetings with the Pakistan leadership. They complained to their ISI interlocutors that linking them to the Kargil Operation gave them “a bad name.”[396] In their meetings with the prime minister and the DG ISI they demanded that the projection of this linkage be discontinued. The prime minister pacified them and said their name was included in this national effort to liberate Kashmir and that the success of the operation would mean also the Mujahideen’s success.

"The planners of Operation Koh Paima continued with this fictitious identity till almost the very end of the Kargil operation. Notwithstanding, of course, the fact that during the mid-May GHQ briefing for the foreign military attachés, the ‘cat had been let out of the bag!’[397] By around 26 May, even the Indians publicly confirmed that it was the Pakistan Army and not the Mujahideen who were involved in the operation. Subsequently, international media reports, reflecting the perception of   foreign governments, also highlighted army and not Mujahideen involvement. Nevertheless, Pakistan official policy to the very end remained insistent that it was the Afghan and Kashmiri Mujahideen had crossed the LOC."

And those lies continue, but they - the lies - began in 1947 and were used in 1965 too, to the effect that it was never paki military, only local tribals; to this effect soldiers were sent dressed in pajamas. 

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"Beyond identity, on the question of having crossed the LOC, the Kargil clique had believed that, because the “LOC was marked on a quarter inch map and a thick line on the map can actually make the difference of two or three kilometers on the ground”, the Op would be “safe” and non-provocative.  The commonly heard narration on LOC-crossing, especially by the army spokesperson, simply was that especially in the area of the operation “the LOC was not defined at all.”[398] This was also the thrust of the army’s briefings to the prime minister.[399] No one from the civilians authoritatively countered this rationale. Pakistan had occupied five areas each around 200 to 300 square kilometers. Indian retaliation was clearly inevitable.

"Within the army, any early reservations being expressed regarding the operation were rejected by the high command. For example, towards the end of May, when the international community began blaming Pakistan for the ratcheting up of tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, there were murmurings within the Evaluation, Analysis & Research Cell, mandated to provide regular input on the strategic environment.[400] Officers posted in this Cell were anxious. “We kept saying there is something wrong. Our input was that there are problems,” recalled one.[401]"

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"Through May, the Kargil planners were almost euphoric. They completely ruled out any possibility of reversals. For example, in late May, when major-general Jamshed Gulzar[406] from the ISI while visiting the FCNA headquarters wondered if the Pakistanis could hold on to the strategic heights, he was told that “there was no question of reversals.”[407] Typically, this depicted ‘a one scenario only’ mindset. On the ground, there were no major military reversals and the Op seemed to be moving according to plan. Having taken control of about 140 peaks across the LOC, having managed the surprise and secrecy from the Op KP’s launch, Pakistan was now in a commanding position. Through the seven-month period, from October until May, the Op had remained largely undetected by the Indians."

"By the end of May, the Indian prime minister was walking his hard talk. He called Nawaz Sharif on 24 May to complain about the Pakistani military operation. He bluntly told Sharif, “You have betrayed me”[410] and that “no intrusion will be allowed in our territory…all means will be used to clear our territory.” Sharif proposed that the two Directors-General Military Operations (DGMOs) talk to each other. On 25 May, the two DGMOs communicated. The Pakistani DGMO, Lt. General Tauqir Zia, decided to call the Indian DGMO again the following day with answers to his questions. But, before the DGMO could make the promised call, Delhi had launched Operation Vijay. At 6.30, am an attack formation of MIGs and MI-25 attack helicopters armed with rockets and laser guided bombs took off from the Srinagar airbase to destroy positions “atop Drass, Batalik, Kargil, and Mashkoh.”[411]  In fact, hours before the beginning of Operation Vijay, the Indian prime minister publicly provided the justification. On 25 May, Vajpayee had told reporters in Pondicherry, “We are facing a new situation in Kargil. It is not just an intrusion that is taking place when the snow starts. This time the design is to occupy some territory and stay put there. Infiltrators are being helped by the armed forces.”[412] Vajpayee also signaled the use of airpower to “clear the Kargil area.”[413] ... "

" ... Meanwhile, Vajpayee’s strict orders to his military command that no cross-LOC military operations were to be carried out, also made the Pakistani planners believe Kargil was unfolding as they had contemplated. They misread Delhi’s deliberate tentativeness as disability and fear. This misjudgement by the Kargil clique also contributed to their bluster."

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November 04 , 2022 - November 05 , 2022. 

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CHAPTER 7: IN THE FIRING LINE 

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" ... Kargil clique had premised the entire Op on almost no response from the Indians. So now the clique had begun to alter their assessment?"

" ... Early on June 2, the prime minister attended a meeting at the 10 corps headquarters. At the briefing, Lt. general Mahmud reported “continued success and holding operations” plus troop pullback from forward positions. The prime minister asked why troops were pulling back from forward positions when they were in a winning situation. Mahmud maintained those were early warning posts meant to inform the Pakistanis of the approaching enemy and were no longer required. Although the commander of the Kargil Operation said the posts were no longer required, in fact his troops had been beaten back by the Indian air force and ground troop’s artillery onslaught."

" ... on 28 May, ...  Nawaz Sharif called Vajpayee and the two had a twenty minute conversation. Nawaz Sharif offered to send his foreign minister for talks and urged for the settlement of the Kashmir issue. Vajpayee did not reject the dialogue offer but let his counterpart know that the first requirement was that Pakistan undo the violation of the LOC."

"Indian diplomacy was in high gear. Having signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Russia, Delhi-Moscow ties had been fortified. In Washington, the keenness to engage in a strategic relationship with India was unprecedented. The Jaswant-Talbot nuclear talks had expanded into a platform for evolving a common strategic outlook for the two  powers.[433] Also significantly, the first trip in ten years by an Indian foreign minister to China was in the works. However, Pakistan, by contrast, was in a difficult strategic environment. Its Afghanistan policy was under criticism and it was blamed for facilitating “terrorism” and “Islamic militancy.” Following the nuclear tests, it had also come under economic pressure. Perhaps the only silver lining was the beginnings of détente with its eastern neighbour."

Which amounted to selling China land of Kashmir and Baluchistan of which neither ever did belong to pakis in the first place. 

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"By the closing days of May the Indian foreign minister had received “unequivocal” assurances from Washington, Moscow, London, and Paris that they accepted the Indian position that the infiltrators had been “pushed in by Pakistan.”[439] They were equally clear that Pakistan could neither be rewarded by United Nations mediation nor by any international pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir crisis. The issue was Kargil and the engagement would be bilateral."

"“A very, very dumb mistake!”

"By this time, several countries, including the US, had come to the conclusion that Pakistan had violated the LOC. Indian reports, information available in Pakistan to the foreign embassies, and the US’s own satellite sources had left no doubt in Washington that Pakistan had crossed the LOC. While the LOC was de jure not an international border between Pakistan and India, de facto it was considered a border dividing the state of Jammu and Kashmir ... Hence, excepting Pakistan’s strategic ally China, the international community had concluded that the crossing of the LOC by Pakistani troops amounted to Pakistan aggressing against India. For the Clinton Administration, this was an unacceptable development. ... "

"Around end May, Washington began its intensive contacts with Pakistan. By now, US Under-Secretary Pickering’s mid-May blunt “cock and bull” retort to Ambassador Khokhar’s claim that Kashmiri freedom fighters, not Pakistani troops, were fighting in Kargil, had become US policy.[440] The thinking within Washington’s policy-circles was that “Pakistan had made a very, very dumb mistake and it had set things way back, having a serious impact on Pakistan’s credibility with reference to India.”[441]"

"The Under Secretary of State for South Asia Karl Inderfurth’s message to Pakistan was blunt: “Clearly, the Indians are not going to cede this territory the militants have taken. They have to depart, and they will depart, either voluntarily or because the Indians take them out.”[450] Inderfurth’s thinking found its way to the Indian press and his blunt warning angered Islamabad. US ambassador Milam was summoned to the Foreign Office. Tariq Altaf, additional secretary, complained to Milam against Inderfurth’s factually incorrect assessment of the situation in Kargil. Milam told Altaf that the US statement was based on information provided in the GHQ briefing. Upon hearing Milam’s response it seemed that “Altaf had been kicked and his face fell.”[451] Washington’s unambiguous message to Islamabad was that the Kargil Op was having a “disastrous impact on the promise of Lahore”[452] and Pakistani troops must be immediately pulled back from across the LOC. No one in Washington was receptive to Islamabad’s position that US engage on Kashmir and not just on Kargil.[453]

"Meanwhile, Delhi’s position of de-linking Kargil from Kashmir was no different from Washington’s. While having grudgingly accepted Pakistan’s offer to send its envoy to Delhi, the India message was that the one-point dialogue agenda would be Kargil alone.[454] All other issues would have to wait for the resumption of the Composite Dialogue.[455] The Indian prime minister warned, “India faces a war-like situation in Kashmir and it would be better if Pakistan called back the infiltrators. Otherwise, we will force them to go back.”[456] A personally peeved Vajpayee said, “They are not just infiltrators, it is a kind of invasion. They are trying to change the boundary, trying to capture our land.”[457]"

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" ... Pakistan issued a tactical strategic warning. The Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad warned, “We will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity,”[458] implying that Pakistan will defend itself at all costs. Delhi issued its response, but knew the purpose of Shamshad’s statement. The Times of India captured the Delhi thinking: “Common sense suggested that the remark be discounted. A country resorting to nuclear blackmail is not likely to make its foreign secretary the mouthpiece for the threat.”[459] Washington’s ‘nuclear saints,’[460] however, who were already disposed towards concluding that a Muslim state was unworthy of possessing nuclear weapons, seized the opportunity. Many in Washington therefore concluded that Shamshad’s defensive statement alluded to the use of nuclear weapons.[461]

"The purpose of the Shamshad Ahmed statement was to deter India from crossing the LOC and also to leverage the international anxiety that the South Asian nuclear states would take the world towards a nuclear Armageddon. Accordingly, from mid-May onwards, Pakistan’s diplomatic corps, at home and abroad, advocated to all their foreign counterparts that the Kargil crisis had actually underscored the need to resolve the Kashmir dispute. They maintained that freedom fighters demanding an end to the Indian occupation of Kashmir had occupied the Kargil heights.[462]"

Author does lack courage and honesty to call a spade a spade, and admit pakis lied, as usual. 

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" ... Vajpayee was not about to buckle under the initial political and military pressure Op KP had exerted on India. Accordingly, an Indian military buildup was being planned to ensure forcible eviction of Pakistani troops. Vajpayee was clear: no dialogue with Pakistan unless Pakistani troops vacated Kargil."

"But, clearly, when one viewed Op KP beyond the context of Pakistan’s domestic dynamics, the Kargil planners had placed Pakistan in a difficult position."

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November 05 , 2022 - November 05 , 2022. 

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CHAPTER 8: FIGHT BACK 

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"The month of June reinforced the military and political trends that had begun emerging in the closing days of May. ... Kargil clique’s claims of invincibility had begun to be spurned on the ground.  In diplomatic terms, the international situation was turning unsympathetic to Pakistan, which was increasingly being viewed as the aggressor against India and also as an irresponsible state that had brought two nuclear powers to the brink of a catastrophic war."

"“A damn fool thing to do!” 

"In the steady correspondence that took place between U.S. President Clinton and the Pakistani prime minister, Clinton’s bottom line was: “It’s a damn fool thing to do. Get your people out.”[472] Pakistan sought support from China, but China was not prepared to give that support. Pakistan’s military planners remained unruffled because they continued to dominate the military picture. Confronted with an increasingly hostile diplomatic situation, the Pakistani political leadership was uneasy. Significantly, the first suggestion of Kargil turning into a nuclear conflagration came from US Under-Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth. He warned of “the ingredients for miscalculation and the possibility of events spinning out of control.”[473]"

Author makes plaintive complaints about international community and snide comments about India. 

" ... Delhi sought US involvement, but on its own terms; Delhi wanted direct US involvement to get Pakistan evicted from the Kargil area but would reject any US mediation towards dialogue. ... On June 6 the Democratic co-Chairman of the Congressional Caucus Gary Ackerman on India said that if Pakistan did not stop helping “Islamic terrorists in the Kargil and Drass area of Jammu and Kashmir and withdraws its forces from the region, the State Department must add Pakistan to its annual list of state sponsors of terrorism.”[474]   For the US Executive, the State Department, and the Legislature, the time of discontent with the Taliban and their support for Osama bin Laden had already set in. Accordingly, the co-Chairman pushed the “right buttons.” He stated, “A large number of well-trained and heavily armed Afghan mercenaries and fundamentalist Mujahideen terrorists, allegedly with spiritual and other links to the Saudi fugitive Osama bin Laden and Harkat ul Mujahideen, have entered the Indian side of the LOC from Pakistan.”[475] ... "

Author continues to make plaintive complaints about international community and snide comments about India. 

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"On the ground, the projected accomplishment of the Kargil clique was turning into an acute crisis."

Author has a strange title for next section. 

"Military Fight-Back"

Considering paki attack was military, pretending they were stray terrorists, what other "Fight-Back" did author or any other paki expect? 

A ghazal duet? 

Certainly not a science Olympiad, where pakis couldn't begin to compete, or even perform! 

" ... Yet, by mid-June, adversity struck Pakistan’s young warriors perched on mountaintops. The wounded Indians of May had now returned in June with a vengeance and, above all, with a plan. The Pakistanis found themselves in a difficult military environment.  The Pakistani posts that previously neither the Indian air force sorties could hit nor the Indian soldiers could scale alive, were now under continuous artillery attack.  Their Bofor guns had done the trick for them. [481] Their maximum range of 30 kilometers enabled deep strikes on the enemy's gun positions, administrative installations, ammunition dumps, and headquarters, besides neutralizing forward positions held by the intruders. By moving up these guns, 105 mm field guns, 160 mm and 120 mm mortars and 122 mm GRAD BM 21 Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRLs) into forward positions, the Indians were capable of ‘direct’ fire on enemy localities - literally under the nose of the enemy[482] By early June, it became almost impossible to move logistics from the logistic base to the posts and pickets on the forward ridges via nullahs and mountains. Intense shelling and bombing destroyed Pakistan’s logistics network.  If a hundred porters left, only ten could reach their destination.[483] The Indians planned their attacks using a map marking Pakistani deployments that Indian troops had picked up from the Tololing base they had captured around June 6,.

"In mid-June, the Indian air force struck at the Badar base, a logistics hub, set up by Pakistan in the Batalik sector, across the LOC, which was heavily stocked with ammunition.[484] The logistics crisis was now mounting for the Pakistanis with no easy or rapid route for replenishment. In the words of the Indian Commander Brigadier Bajwa, the commander of 192 Mountain Brigade, this is what the Pakistani men perched on Tiger Hill and running out of ammunition were confronting: “The sight of over one hundred guns pounding Tiger Hill... The fireballs of the explosions lit up … We closed in up to 40 meters of the shelling. The accuracy was so great that not one shell strayed from its target …” [485] The sustained, accurate and close up shooting, using Bofor guns on a vast scale, proved devastating for the Pakistanis."

Author has not a word for the brave soldiers of India fighting literally uphill, while bring rained death on by their own officially so-called terrorists sitting on top. She had plenty of praise gor the pakis climbing up unopposed, though. 

It'd seem that the all too frequent accusations by pakis against India, delivered on public TV and consisting of a single plaintive wail of Indians lacking a big heart (because India refuses to concede huge chunks of India's territory?), are in fact true of pakis, who behave as author does in descriptions of wars, battles etc al. 

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"By June 10th Indian Artillery regiment had amassed a large number of artillery units in extremely difficult terrain. On the military front this Indian artillery fire turned the tables on Pakistan. If the Indian infantry had suffered high casualties until early June, by mid-June it was raining fire and brimstone onto Pakistani troops occupying posts on the Tololing and Tiger Hills. Op KP was facing sharp military reversals and singularly on account of accurate and timely delivery of TNT. The Gunners’ fire assaults became the principle battle-winning factor. An Indian account of the intense and lethal use of artillery was thus: “The Indian artillery fired over 250,000 shells, bombs, and rockets during the Kargil conflict. Approximately 5,000 artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired daily from 300 guns, mortars and MBRLs while 9,000 shells were fired the day Tiger Hill was regained. During the peak period of assaults, on an average, each artillery battery fired over one round per minute for 17 days continuously.” [486] This intensive artillery firing sustained through the three weeks was uncommon, almost unparalleled in military history. 

"This intensity of artillery fire devastated both men and mountains. By June 10, India’s infantry was provided the solid backing it had lacked during May and early June.  The Indian Artillery regiment had amassed a large number of fire units within a short period, in wet weather, and over very hostile terrain at extremely high altitudes. India’s point man on the ground GOC in C Southern Command and army chief designate acknowledged that, in Operation Vijay, “ (The) devastation caused by extremely accurate and timely fire assaults in most difficult and inhospitable terrain greatly facilitated the capture of key objectives…”[487]"

Again, that description is supposed to impress a reader subconsciously with lack of any fighting other than a raining of artillery fire by India, while author has repeatedly extolled Pakistan as brave for climbing up unopposed. 

Fact is, it was Indian soldiers who fought the uphill battle, at those impossible heights well over 10,000 feet, while the so-called terrorists (as pakis labeled their own soldiers) rained not only fire on them, but huge boulders downhill, killing Indian soldiers. 

Under those circumstances, the humongous achievement of India's soldiers was at least worthy of mention, even by a silly paki sitting in comfort of Harvard to compose this paen to paki terrorism. 

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"A Handicapped Sartaj

"With these facts unknown to him, it was a handicapped Sartaj that was taking off for Delhi. Far from the corridors of power in Islamabad and from the Ops room in the GHQ, where Op KP was still a success story, the Indians with massive firepower were targeting Pakistani troops perched on the peaks and slopes of the Drass and Kargil mountains. For the Pakistani troops, the military situation was turning nasty. Yet the Kargil planners were still heady with the self-created euphoria around Op KP. Reports of heavy Indian attacks were neither easily reaching them nor were being readily received even at the operational headquarters in Skardu. For example, around June 4, the first reports of Pakistani casualties and loss of the Pakistani-held position at Tololing lumbered into the FCNA Operations room, but were received with denial and frustration. In some cases, officers explained away troop injuries caused by Indian attacks as injuries from ricocheting bullets fired by Pakistani troops![488] ... "

That last bit belongs to choice paki pronouncements, such as one by redcap about white horses frightening India in 1965! 

"Even as adversity struck, with military pressure mounting on Pakistani troops, the commander FCNA lost his nerve. Although he knew it was not a hopeful position, he tried to paint rosy picture.” In a meeting Hasan implored the others, “Allah kay wasta mujheay ma’af kar do. Bohat ghalti ho ga’ee. Ab dua’aon [491]ka waqt hain.” (For God’s sake, forgive me. I have made a big mistake. Now is the time for prayers).[492]"

Funny, pakis seem to alternate between perpetrating terrorism and praying for terrorists, or their own soldiers whom they publicly labell terrorists, within pak and to world at large! 

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"To illustrate the faulty information flow, caused by individual fears and professional incompetence, a key staff officer at the FCNA headquarters recalled: “On June 4 around 3am, a brigade major of artillery called me and said we have lost Tololing. The brigade major had also been informed that Indian troops had mounted a counterattack and our troops had asked for on-site fire. However from the Ops room I contacted CO of 4NLI who assured me everything was OK. However by the morning the CO 4NLI informed Commander FCNA’s staff officer that the Tololing post had been lost. But the staff officer forgot to inform the Commander! Meanwhile I asked CO 6NLI if Tololing post had been lost and he confirmed. Subsequently Commander FCNA Javed Hasan called the Brigade Commander Masood Aslam who also confirmed that the post at Tololing had been lost but CO NLI6 continued to deny for at least three days, the loss of the post...”[493]"

The very existence of pak is founded in denial of Reality, so of course, it's rooted in their character- officially!

" ... Troubles for the Pakistani troops had mounted also because, contrary to Pakistan’s expectation that engagement with Indian troops would begin in mid-June, it had begun approximately six weeks earlier, around 5 May. Early opening of the Zojila pass was critical. Normally it would open late summer but in 1999 it opened end-April-early May, facilitating early return of the Indian Army. This early engagement was contrary to Op KP planners’ calculation that replenishment of ammunition and ration would be required by mid-June, when it would be managed through the Burzil Pass. However with engagement having started much earlier, and the Burzil Pass still not opened until mid-June, movement of artillery in the forward lines and supply lines replenishment became very difficult.[494] For example, at the 15000 feet high Tashfeen post, the small weapons with the troops had carbonized and could not be used.[495]"

Again, authors omission of chief reason why Pakistan couldn't support their so-called "terrorists" logistically, amounts to her lying. 

Fact is, having denied strenuously to world at large and to public at home that it was indeed a paki military operation, and gone around claiming that these attackers against India were independent terrorists, how could Pakistan supply them even food, never mind ammunition? 

It was, after all, US and other independent satellite records that had confirmed the truth about these having been officially paki military supported attackers, by whatever label; and now any effort or attempt to support them would forever blacken Pakistan as brazen liars no better than toddlers with face all chocolate, denying stealing. 

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"The Kargil clique did not share these early military difficulties with the prime minister and his team. The defense secretary, however, had by early June become wary of the military situation. He was being alerted by the battlefield accounts trickling in through junior army officers and by Indian Zee TV reports. By mid-June, it appeared that Pakistani troops were losing hold over several posts in the Batalik sector, at Points 5120 and 5203 in the area of Jabbar complex, plus posts in the Drass sector at 3 Pimple. The Defense Secretary shared this disturbing information with the prime minister’s kitchen cabinet. The prime minister too depended on his Defense Secretary for regular updates.  For example, barely hours after Sharif had ended the 12 June meeting on Kargil, he was again on the phone with his Defense Secretary. The PM wanted him to check with the army chief if a critical peak on Tololing had fallen. Iftikhar called the DGMO who assured him that Pakistani forces had merely carried out “readjustments in the area.” The skeptical Iftikhar informed the PM that Tololing seems to have fallen but the army is not accepting it; instead, it is coining new terms. This misleading flow of information from the Operations room in Skardu confused the ground situation for the prime minister, his cabinet, and the generals."

Their own lies confusing their own selves, exactly as a very exasperated Hilary Clinton had later described pakis. 

Perhaps thats why author comments incorrectly about India, chiefly because she and Pakistani have no clue about truth, and power thereof, so she makes assumptions about India depending on international opinions as pakis do, instead. 

"In Delhi, by contrast, Sartaj Aziz’s counterpart had a clear picture of the ground situation. Accordingly, Jaswant Singh’s confidence in his meeting with Aziz told the tale of Delhi’s growing confidence on the military front complemented by its astute diplomatic strategy.  India’s growing confidence in being able to resolve Kargil on its own terms was largely derived from the international community’s support to the Indian position. Delhi’s confidence was distinctly evident in its handling of the Pakistani foreign minister’s visit to Delhi. Accordingly in their 12 June meetings with Minister Sartaj Aziz the Indian prime minister and the foreign minister categorically stated that the only one-point formula for resolving Kargil was that “Pakistan vacate Indian territory.” [496] The fate of the Pakistan foreign minister’s 8-hour Delhi trip was sealed even before the talks began.[497] The body language of the Indian reception team conveyed the tone and tenor of the remaining trip. The Indian foreign minister accompanied by MEA officials and the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad G. Parthasarthy were present on the airport to receive their unwanted guest from Pakistan."

No, the confidence was based in strong foundation the then PM of India had, as the current PM of India has always had, in Truth. 

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"The ‘Shock’ Revelation 

"Waiting inside the airport lounge was the highly disturbed Press Counsellor of the Pakistan High Commission. He was armed with at least half a dozen leading dailies with bold headlines about the situation. The banner headlines were quotes from a telephone conversation between Pakistan’s Army chief General Pervez Musharraf, who was visiting Beijing, and the Chief of General Staff (CGS) Lt. General Aziz Khan[498] – a conversation between two leading members of the Kargil clique.  The Indian foreign minister, on the eve of Sartaj Aziz’s arrival, had held a press conference to release the transcript of this conversation.  Their discussion about Op KP was a huge self-indictment. It set the stage for the almost four-hour-long critical Sartaj Aziz visit.[499] The Pakistan Army chief’s master-stroke in recklessness, of holding a highly sensitive conversation with his CGS over an open line, made it easy for any interested agency to record the conversation. Most likely recorded by the CIA and shared with the Indians, this conversation publicly affirmed the central role of Pakistan’s top army command in the Kargil Op.[500]"

Overconfidence of an arrogant invader, a sword his solution to everything, is the key there. 

When pakis were caught stealing hundreds of billions of dollars of aid and not accounting for it, and US demanded accounts, this man had turned up in US and, instead of accounting apology - or even embarrassment,  as expected of anyone with a shred of decency - he'd brazenly demanded drones for attacking India. 

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"Aziz arrived to a hostile Indian environment. His counterpart barely shook hands with him while, earlier in the day, his High Commission in Delhi had been nearly attacked by protestors.  The foreign minister was completely stumped. He could only question the veracity of the newspaper reports.[501] Completely baffled, the accompanying Pakistani journalists wondered if it was an Indian ruse to put Pakistan on the defensive. The publication of the Musharraf-Aziz conversation, meanwhile, irrefutably vindicated India’s position that Pakistan was involved in the Op KP- a fact that Pakistan had continued to deny. Significantly, the tapes also strengthened the prevailing perception, especially among the Indians, that Pakistan’s prime minister did not directly contribute towards the planning and execution of the Kargil conflict and that he had been excluded from the Kargil mischief.

"After the first reports of the Kargil Op surfaced, the Indian defense minister and others in the Vajpayee cabinet had believed that the Pakistani prime minister did not know of the Kargil Operation.[502] The Musharraf-Aziz conversation established that the army chief was waiting to see how not only would Delhi react to the Operation but also how Pakistan’s elected prime minister would react, and  “how would the whole thing really blow up.”[503]

"Nevertheless the tapes fiasco caused great embarrassment to the visiting foreign minister whose army too was now feeling the heat from the Bofors guns. Sartaj who had already expressed strong reservations against Op KP at the 17 May briefing knew he had landed in Delhi with a weak negotiating position."

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" ... Pakistan’s foreign minister ... carried the categorical position that Pakistan would not unconditionally withdraw from Kargil. However, after his meetings with the Indian prime minister and foreign minister, he was to carry back the equally unambiguous message that India would be unrelenting in the pursuit of its one-point demand that Pakistan must unconditionally vacate the Kargil heights."

" ... The Indians rejected Sartaj’s position that violations of the LOC did not begin with the Kargil crisis, that the causal trajectory of Kargil included the unresolved Kashmir problem, the military activity by both armies after the snows melted in an attempt to gain strategic positions along the LOC where there were problems on the ground since the “demarcation pillars were at some distance from each other.”[506]"

"India rejected Pakistan’s suggestion that after India de-escalates, Jaswant Singh would visit Pakistan to find a “diplomatic solution” to Kargil. Sartaj was told that, only if Pakistan accepted the Indian position that Pakistan vacate Kargil, would Singh visit Pakistan. Sartaj’s reiteration of Islamabad’s position that the Kashmiris fighting in Kargil were not in Pakistan’s control, met with stern rebuttals. Vajpayee maintained they could not have come without Pakistan’s blessing and active support and pointedly queried, “Have these people come without your control?” He added, “No one is in any doubt that the LOC in Kargil had been violated by Pakistan Army regulars and infiltrators.”[515] Singh asked Aziz to convey to his government that unless the status quo ante was restored in Kargil no bilateral discussions could take place."

"When Aziz emphasized Pakistan’s commitment to the Lahore process, ... "(the then PM of India) "Vajpayee wondered why Pakistan “had chosen to alter the situation after Lahore.” ... He bluntly told the Pakistani prime minister’s emissary that the planners of Kargil did not favor the Lahore process ... the ink had not dried on the Lahore Declaration and the Pakistani establishment had started making preparations for the Kargil incursions. India, he said had felt “betrayed and disappointed” by this.[516]"

Author's writing treats India in manner that's derogatory at best, and would be considered abusive on diplomatic level, making it difficult to quote without seemingly being in accord therewith. 

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" ... (Indian foreign minister) Jaswant Singh insisted that Pakistan could not use the dialogue to give legitimacy to the Kargil intrusion and neither could it be reduced to “your listing our faults and my listing your faults.”. ... The Indian message was, “The only one issue was Pakistan’s aggression and that could be rectified either physically by India or voluntarily by Pakistan.”[517]"

" ... Jaswant Singh urged Pakistan to end its “aggression” or India would “have the area cleared at all costs.” Without enlarging the theatre of conflict, he said, India would “employ all means to clear the aggression that was planned, engineered and launched by the Pakistan Army in the guise of infiltrators.”[518] ... "

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November 05 , 2022 - November 05 , 2022. 

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CHAPTER 9: MYTH-MAKING AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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" ... No dialogue with Pakistan would be resumed unless Pakistan withdrew its troops. ... The Vajpayee government was determined to dislodge, at all costs, the Pakistani troops perched on the Kargil heights. The strategic tackiness of Op KP was now taking its toll. Instead of providing, as envisaged by its planners, negotiating leverage for Pakistan, this linearly planned Op was turning into a liability for the Sharif government. At home, anxious cabinet members whispered that the Op must end. Abroad, friends and foes alike, were seeking Pakistan’s exit from Kargil. ... "

" ... Pakistan adopted the diplomatic and political positions that the Kargil planners had intended: These are not Pakistani troops, but freedom fighters; the LOC is not well-defined[523], we need to sit down and define it better; our troops are on our side of the LOC; the international community must encourage the Indians to resolve the Kashmir dispute; if the Indians agree on dialogue, we can ‘influence’ the freedom fighters to vacate Kargil. Interestingly the army and the civilian projections of Kargil were often contradictory. This represented more confusion than difference. Yet the army in its background briefings to the press sought to justify Kargil ... "

" ... In a candid recall of the Kargil crisis, the Minister explained, “ ... for a brief period in the summer time both sides sat on the perceived LOC and had a dialogue going between the two sides, exchanging cigarettes, etc. And come winter both sides went into the posts up in the mountains and that went on for 25 years between 1972 and 1999.”[526] Then, referring to Pakistan’s Kargil operation, he said, “And then one day someone decided to cheat against the ground rules.” ... "

" ... Pakistan was not successful in acquiring any diplomatic support, not even from its key allies. Sartaj Aziz’s June 11 ‘SOS trip’ to Beijing did not produce the expected support for Pakistan’s action in Kargil. Instead, Beijing opposed to military action pointedly told the foreign minister not to make Kashmir a “shooting claim.”[528] The Chinese categorically told Pakistan that the dispute had to be resolved bilaterally and that Pakistan must vacate Kargil. The Chinese leadership also conveyed to Pakistan that the Chinese had “no influence over India.”[529]"

Author next counts individual responses from various countries to paki efforts. 

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"Sino-Indian relations were then on the mend. Beijing clearly did not want to support Pakistan’s crossing of the LOC and cause a setback to its relations with India.[530] In fact, on the eve of the Pakistani foreign minister’s visit the Chinese had publicly conveyed their ‘neutral’ position on Kargil and their interest in improving relations with India. On the Kargil issue the Chinese position was that “the matter maybe discussed between Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan and the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan.”[531] And regarding the June 14 trip of the Indian foreign minister the Chinese maintained, “We are confident that, through the joint efforts of the two sides, relations between China and India will constantly improve and develop.”[532] ... "

" ... By now the European positions matched that of India and the US. ... "

"For example, in early June, the Secretary General of the French foreign office. Mounier Heineken, summoned the Pakistani ambassador to a meeting in which he was polite but firm. He maintained the French reading of Kargil was based on independent French sources and French intelligence from the region. Heinikin said that the status quo disturbed by Pakistan could lead to war. France, he said, “did not believe Pakistan’s version that the people gone to war are the Mujahideen.”  The French maintained that given the strategic knowledge of the area of the men who occupied Kargil and given how they were armed and trained was evidence of the direct involvement by the Pakistan government and the army. Pakistan having upset the status quo was now responsible for reversing it. In case Islamabad failed to do so, Paris threatened to openly declare Pakistan the aggressor.[534]"

With very good reason, the chain of reasoning given explicitly by French to pakis summoned for the purpose, and quoted here above by author. 

"Washington, too, was making no concessions, accepting no false steps. Washington refused to accept Pakistan’s position that it was not involved in Kargil, especially after the Pakistani military had accepted that Pakistani troops were fighting in Kargil. In early June, on a Saturday, the Pakistani foreign minister handed a letter to the US Ambassador for Secretary of State Madeleine Albright from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Milam refused to accept the letter, complaining that it was not a serious communication as it claimed that Pakistan was not involved in Kargil. Subsequently, by that evening, the foreign minister called in the United States Ambassador again and handed him a different letter.[535]"

Author doesn't explain what letter, exactly, if it was accepted. 

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"“Two Cyclists Flashed Victory”

" ... two messages from air force centers in Delhi had been intercepted being sent, respectively, to the headquarters at Udhampur (near Jammu) and Bathinda (in Indian Punjab, near Bahawalnagar). The message to the command at the Udhampur base was that it should prepare to use all weapons under its command. Likewise, the message to Bathinda was to carry out air defense of the area. ... The participants focused on reading the implication of these intercepts; the army chief was convinced the messages indicated “something big is coming up.” The consensus was that the Indians had marked Udhampur base for carrying out air operations in Kargil. Bathinda was given a precautionary message in case air strikes across the international border were required. A worried Musharraf suggested they go and brief the PM, who was in Lahore. ... "

" ... Iftikhar questioned whether in Pakistan’s current economic situation Pakistan go to war and face the consequences. , He quoted the well-known saying that the armed forces fight a battle, but it is the nation that goes to war. In Pakistan’s case, the nation was “certainly not prepared.” The army chief claimed that many countries, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, were willing to give money to Pakistan. He was reminded that this would not be possible without US clearance. ... "

"The army chief was equally confident regarding national morale. At the JS Headquarters he insisted, “This nation can be prepared for war in no time. I will tell you that when I was coming from the army house to the JS headquarters that two cyclists flashed victory signs at me. I will request the PM to address two houses of the parliament so I can give points to the parliamentarians and they will spread it in the country side.”[536] Such simplistic talk would enter policy-making discussions in the absence of institutionalized decision-making. The simplistic thinking of powerfully placed individuals would raise the probability of flawed decision-making."

That last sentence is epitome of how author's tone hoes from salutary to forgiving when it comes to paki crimes - and as for "probability", it takes the whole lot of baked goods in West at Xmas!

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" ... Interestingly traveling in the same aircraft to Lahore, the naval and air chiefs, accompanied by the Defense Secretary, decided to tell the PM “the entire truth”. The PM, they believed, was still being misled that Pakistan was doing well, and that the Indians would not escalate and go to war. They were also concerned that the PM fully comprehended the risks involved in the situation."

Author seems to have omitted "had not" in "PM fully comprehended the risks involved in the situation". It should read "They were also concerned that the PM had not fully comprehended the risks involved in the situation". 

" ... The naval and air force chiefs criticized the operation and argued that it would compromise Pakistan’s overall security. The naval chief maintained that a naval blockade by India could not be ruled out, a position that the army chief contested. Similarly, the air chief opposed the army’s advice that air power should be inducted. The army was seeking deployment of air power[537] to not only curtail the damage inflicted on Pakistani troops from the Indian use of heavy artillery and hundreds of air sorties but also to inflict damage on the Indian troops locked up in tight, unprotected spaces.” The army ruled out a “full spectrum war” with India and argued that in a limited engagement like Kargil the Pakistan air force “would not be at a disadvantage.”[538] The air chief nevertheless opposed induction of air power, arguing that deploying air power could mean placing squadrons in Azad Kashmir and leaving Lahore and Karachi unprotected. Already, the air force had deployed extra radars in the North to observe Indian aircraft movement."

" ... Differences over the Kargil Operation were now being openly voiced in the cabinet meetings as well. The ISI chief, who had privately been critical of the operation, had taken a “military army line” during a mid-June cabinet meeting.[541] This prompted the Secretary Defense Iftikhar Ali Khan to raise specific questions regarding the viability of Operation KP. Cabinet Minister Gohar Ayub Khan wondered how the army’s views and those of General Iftikhar were at a tangent. At the same meeting, Chaudhry Nisar also asked who had ordered this operation. His thrust was that Pakistan was heading for a disaster in Kargil.[542] 

"He knew that the news from the battle-zone was not encouraging."

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Author titles a section "India’s Sledge & Hammer" to almost openly claim that Indian soldiers did no more than occupy posts emptied due chiefly to artillery and air strikes, having praised pakis repeatedly for climbing up peaks unopposed. 

This skewed perception and description would only explain heavy losses of paki military, but then, why do pakis boast repeatedly over past two decades snd more, about thousands of Indian soldiers killed by a handful of pakis? 

The two pictures don't match, and the disparity thereof only goes on to bolster the impression Hilary Clinton voiced, when she said that pakis lie so routinely, it's difficult to know if they are aware of it when they lie. 

Author ends the one-paragraph section with a giveaway. 

" ... Aerial reconnaissance, intel flow, and even possession of Pakistani maps showing Pakistan’s deployments, were captured from the fallen post at Tololing.[546]"

Were Author and pakis expecting Indian soldiers to avert glances from Intel left by enemy at captured post, and call them to hand the papers over? 

Notice that author doesn't criticise the arrogance of paki military in allowing this to happen at all in the first place, by having such information littering at the post - because they'd assumed, as author points out more than once in this work, that Indians don't fight. 

Author follows it up with more sledgehammering at India, with another section titled "Posts to Powder". A sample - 

" ... Following the high Indian casualties when their infantry troops had blindly and tentatively attempted to scale the Kargil-Drass mountains, in June they deliberately opted to use the “sledgehammer” approach “to save valuable lives of one’s troops while making the enemy cry out ’Uncle’.”[552] The preponderance of firepower now defined the continuing battle in the world’s highest war theatre. The Indian “sledgehammer” tactics, literally raining fire onto the exhausted yet still motivated Pakistanis soldiers, worked for the Indians. It incapacitated and killed the troops, already short in numbers, and disrupted supplies, ammunition, and logistics."

Were author and other pakis expecting rose bouquets rained on the men whom pakis had themselves labelled terrorists? 

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"June Reversals"

Another misleading title there, considering India had barely begun to be aware of attempted paki invasion in May; so June was only beginning, as far as war goes. 

"After making serious attempts on 3 June to retake the Tololing peak in Drass, Indian troops captured it on June 13. Several important heights in the Batalik sector were captured on 20 and 21 June; on June 23 several heights were captured around point 5203 and on June 30 strategic peaks closer to Tiger Hills.[553] The strategic Tiger Hill came under severe artillery attack. Around June 21, the Operation hit its lowest ebb for Pakistan, when the Indian troops, through fierce, ground, artillery and air attacks, recaptured Tololing complex. After Tololing fell, reports of Indian recapture flowed in daily as the Pakistani-held posts fell like ninepins. [554] The pressure was still on the Indians, given the scale of intrusion by the Pakistani troops.[555]The Indian Army chief himself conceded, “No time-frame could be fixed for vacating the incursions.”[556]"

"The Missing Mujahideen

"Significantly, the Mujahideen factor lagged behind at this critical juncture. The mainstay of Pakistan’s military strategy, since 1996-1997, was that through guerrilla-type ambushes targeting Indian troops in ... Kashmir, with full artillery support, bridges will be blown up, tracks uprooted, soldiers attacked, to prevent large scale offensive-induction of Indian troops. ... "

Some incorrect details, or deliberate lies, there. This strategy of so-called tribals oak is claimed were attacking, which author calls "guerrilla-type" here, was used by pakis in 1947 in attacking Kashmir, and again used by pakis in attack against India in 1965. 

Author mentions 1996-1997, but paki terrorists assaulting India had already begun in 1990, if not before.  

Exodus of nonmuslims enforced in Kashmir by the said terrorists, via genocide inflicted against Hindus and others in Kashmir in January 1990, is denied by pakis, as is hand of ISI behind terrorist attacks against Mumbai, but their phone conversations were intercepted and subsequently broadcast on public television. 

" ... Yet, keeping the Operation secret from the ISI meant that by the Pakistan Army’s own strategic calculations the pivot of such an operation, the Mujahideeen factor, men of the Kashmir Freedom struggle were left out of the calculus. The Kargil planners informed ISI after the Operation was underway, asking for upgrading the struggle in support of the Operation KP. “Too short a notice, we need at least one year to upgrade the movement,” was the ISI response. ISI needed presence inside the war zone to plan and execute. Neither was possible."

So while pakis officially went on claiming that the men attacking India were mujahedeen or tribals or anything but official soldiers of paki military - they were lying, not just largely, but completely! 

Hilary Clinton wouldn't be surprised. Nor would be anyone not blinded by abrahmic faiths. 

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"Logistics 

"By mid-June, men on the FDL posts required backups. There was a shortage of ammunition and supplies and troops were increasingly suffering from the pressures of a logistical stretch. But with Pakistan’s supply lines and the forward posts under attack from Indian artillery-fire and air sorties it was difficult to replenish depleting ammunition and rations, especially for the Forward Defense Lines (FDL) posts. As the snow melted and the Burzil pass opened, mule porters could ferry supplies only till the logistics bases. Base HQ was unable to respond timely to repeated logistics requests from FDLs on Tiger Hill and from other sectors.[557] At several posts, there was food shortage. At others, water too was not easily accessible for miles. In places where there was water, intensely heavy use of artillery had made it undrinkable. Ammunition too was fast depleting. Even the inadequate artillery was rendered ineffective because of wet, freezing weather conditions. Guns with sulphur deposits would stop firing after a thousand rounds. Yet maintenance of artillery in the freezing zones was not always possible."

None of this was expected, planned for, or even imagined, by the guys who planned and sent them up, which doesn't seem to occur to author as a point to mention, much less as the sole cause of the travails of the poor soldiers who were disowned by pakis officially. 

She seems to blame Indian shelling exclusively. 

Did she or pakis have an impression at any point in time that these guys had been invited for a royal honeymoon - or even a group tourism experience - by India? 

Funny, she makes fun of Indians for not realising the incursion and even for getting killed, but then blames them for retaliation of a war begun by pakis. No satisfying this one, is there! 

" ... As to how long could they hold on to their posts, the odds were heavily against them: terrible weather conditions, low supplies, no reinforcements, and positioned in posts confronted by major Indian numerical superiority in infantry and artillery."

Remember, India had to bury them too, if not caught alive - pak disowned them officially, even in death! 

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"Weapons & Communication 

"The Pakistani troops were equipped with standard infantry rifles. Typically, in a platoon, jawans had G-3 rifles, officers AK-47 rifles, and rocket launchers, and light machine Guns (LMGs) holder. Air defense units with Hatf battlefield range missiles and restored Stinger missiles were also positioned in several locations. Soldiers from the signals corps managed communications within the Ops area and with the brigade and battalion headquarters. They moved from post to post to keep the communication going using double TT and laying and protecting regular lines and managing the radio wireless communication in the Ops area. Wireless communication that could also help the troops listen in to Indian troop communication through frequency scanning and surfing was rightly dubbed ‘shikari det.’"

OK, they had all this, so they'd been killing Indian soldiers until India woke up to this being a huge paki invasion. 

What's unclear is, why's the author whining about Indians' retaliation with artillery, not after she brags about paki capabilities, but before, when it was pakis who began the whole thoughtless assault? 

Wouldn't it be proper to do so the other way around? 

It's a tad like she extolls a murderer for his bravery and exploits, after complaining about his being surrounded and shot dead by law enforcement. 

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" ... But the tables had turned. Only weeks ago, with adrenalin flowing, these daredevils had marched to high command’s orders and no less to their own resolve to punish the enemy. Now it was trouble-time. The Kargil clique’s calculation of a luke-warm Indian response was proving wrong."

"“No…Not Ours” 

"There were other painful offshoots that Pakistan’s policy of denying that Pakistani troops were conducting the Operations meant. Bodies of Pakistani soldiers could not be accepted. From mid-June onwards,   Pakistan’s Deputy Chief of Mission Jalil Abbas Jillani, whenever asked by his hosts to collect the bodies of Pakistani soldiers, would decline, saying these were not our boys. Resentfully, the Pakistani soldiers would watch the televised Muslim burial of the disowned bodies of their martyred comrades, conducted by the Indians with full honours and bodies wrapped in a Pakistani flag. According to a Brigadier who was witness to all this, “For many of us, the shame and the pain of watching all this happen to our colleagues, was killing.”[561]"

" ... Literally minute-by-minute news of the battlefront setbacks was passed to the commanders.[563]"

" ... The offensive operation had been planned with no defensive approach, no defensive layouts, and hence no fallback plans. Delusional thinking dominated the minds of the clique of Kargil planners ... "

"These generals planned operation KP, less as intelligent and accountable strategists, but as covert, unaccountable campaigners. ... "

In other - more realistic - words, as terrorists they send out against India for over three decades now, or as barbarian hordes invading India for well over a millennium until arrival of British. 

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"Lengthening Shadows

" ... Also, given Indian insistence on no bilateral dialogue without withdrawal from Kargil and the growing international pressure on Pakistan to vacate Kargil, it seemed increasingly unlikely that Pakistan could leverage its military achievements in Kargil for a “just settlement and time-bound settlement” of the Kashmir dispute.[564]"

What "military achievements"??? Like climbing peaks in winter when no one was likely to shoot at them? Like denying their own soldiers, in life and in death? 

"Additionally, another implicit assumption of the Kargil planners that India may not be willing to pay what it would take to recapture the Kargil heights was bring disproved. India not only deployed the requisite manpower and military force to reclaim Kargil ... "

"By mid June, the opening assumption of the architects of Operation Koh Paima that the military situation heavily favoring Pakistan was irreversible, was beginning to be proven wrong. With a fierce Indian response, on the military front, ... "

Author repeatedly accuses India of having used diplomacy as a weapon. 

Fact is no amount of lies from pak worked despite pakis doing diplomatic rounds, because international community aren't fools, and this was not 1947 but age of satellites. Everything supposedly done clandestinely by pakis had been seen, and not just by US, either. 

It wasn't india's diplomatic push, but the fact thst pakis did invade and lied, that went against them, as it must. 

" ... The fate of Op KP now squarely confronted the soldiers who had fervently volunteered to fight for their Homeland. ... "

There's a whopper of a lie by author. It's Kashmir that was invaded by pakis, and Kashmir had been signed accession of by its ruler to India in 1947 because, and after, pakis had then invaded it. "Homeland" it's not, not for any pakis. 

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November 05 , 2022 - November 05 , 2022. 

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CHAPTER 10: MAPPING EXITS 

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" ... Pakistan’s bureaucratic channel had become increasingly wary of Washington’s “pro-India” stance and was busy working the Mishra-Naik back channel[567], while the politicians believed the US could deliver a “respectable exit.”

"What gave Pakistan the space to work on mapping exits was that the massive deployment of force by India did not translate into a quick military turn around. The battlefield terrain had proved a leveller for the heavily asymmetrical assemblage of force. A few hundred soldiers on mountain peaks and ridges were aided by the strategic heights and were still targeting those in huge numbers, artillery, and airpower who were trying to scale those heights. ... "

" ... The Kargil clique’s objective of leveraging the Kargil, Drass, and Mushkoh peaks, for extracting concessions from India on Siachen or Kashmir, now seemed a pipe dream. These peaks and ridges, hitherto held by Pakistani troops, were slipping out of Pakistan’s control. Yet the government’s public posture that the Kashmiri Mujahedeen still controlled these peaks remained unchanged. ... "

" ... Sharif wanted the announcement of talks on Kashmir, to be followed by the withdrawal, so that he could hold up the fig-leaf of talks as Pakistani troops retreated from Kargil. Vajpayee, meanwhile, had made his position clear: vacate Indian territory and talks would follow. ... while Pakistan talked friendship in Lahore it was planning a war against India."

Author mentions that last bit as an allegation by opposition that the PM of India was trying to escape. That's silly. It's simply a fact that "while Pakistan talked friendship in Lahore it was planning a war against India", nothing less, except that the then paki PM wasn't aware of Kargil at the time of Lahore summit- and this much, not only about Sharif but about the civilian government of pak on general, was evident to India. But then, paki claims about existence of a civil government have not fooled almost anyone outside pak.  

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Author states that India sought help of US via diplomatic channels to force Pakistan to withdraw unilaterally. She forgets more than one previous assertion in this work by her to the effect that US was unwilling to believe pakis and Clinton told sharif he had to withdraw. If she's insinuating that this was India’s doing, she's living in cuckooland.

"In Pakistan, the diplomats were increasingly less sanguine about the Washington route for exit. Given Washington’s public stance about Pakistan’s ingress across the LOC, they merely responded to Washington’s queries about the Kargil crisis. In Washington, Ambassador Riaz Khokhar had half a dozen meetings with his Washington-based interlocutors. It was Nawaz Sharif’s kitchen cabinet[583] that considered Washington an important player for the end game. They believed that Sharif should use his personal rapport with Clinton[584] to manage the Kargil crisis on the domestic, Indian, and international fronts. Thus, through numerous letter exchanges and phone-calls, Nawaz was seeking Clinton's direct involvement in bringing Kargil to a close.[585] Pakistan’s army command was also keen to involve the US in Kargil’s end game. In fact, the army chief was the first to publicly mention the possibility of a Nawaz-Clinton meeting.[586] Significantly, by end-June, Musharraf himself had talked of positively of US intervention. [587]"

Author refers to terrorism exported by pakis resulting in genocide and subsequent exodus of Hindus as ordered by the said terrorists, ordered on loudspeakers of mosques. 

" ... Especially since the 1989 Kashmir Uprising ... "

They do have expertise at lying don't they, pakis! Fraudulent labels is part of it. 

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"Initially, the Sharif-Clinton communication culminated in a mutual agreement to meet mid-June in Europe, around the time of the of G-8 summit.[589] Sharif had proposed and Clinton had agreed to the meeting. However, the US Ambassador later conveyed to the Pakistan Foreign Office, the US President’s inability to proceed with a Clinton- Sharif meeting.[590] 

"In Washington, it had been concluded that Pakistan would have erroneously interpreted such a meeting as a sign of US support for Islamabad’s position on Kargil.[591] The National Security Council(NSC) and the State Department were sure that an unconditional exit was the only way forward and “unless a meeting would guarantee that outcome it wouldn’t be productive.” [592] The Talbott-Riedel-Inderfurth team was mindful of the challenge. Washington’s clear Kargil policy was not “anything but exercise restrain… Action we wanted out of Pakistan to get Pakistan to back down.” Nevertheless, there was a realization that “the Indians were extremely skeptical that we will succeed and suspicious about what we were doing…”[593] Any Pakistan-US meeting therefore that failed to induce a Pakistani withdrawal would have been resented in India and could have undermined Washington’s imminent strategic lock with Delhi. [594]"

Now author turns abusive against non-proliferation and peace seekers. 

"The Clinton administration also believed that Pakistan had not delivered on the earlier commitment that Nawaz Sharif would help in getting the Taliban to expel OBL.[595] Pakistan’s Foreign office team saw this as a reason for Clinton to subsequently “wriggle out of the meeting.”[596] The US State Department sought a different engagement with Pakistan. In Washington, the nuclear non-proliferation saints and the Indo-philes had also made common cause. They twinned the Kargil aggression with what the non-proliferation saints claimed was Pakistan’s plan to use nuclear weapons. They wanted the ‘riot act’ be read to Pakistan."

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"For India, no easy victory

"Even by end June, the Indians were not in a comfortable military position. Their army had not been able to displace the well-entrenched and strategically located Pakistani troops. ... "

Strange how author wants propaganda both ways. Through oast chapter it was repeated whining about how India brought in heavy artillery and air strikes, how pakis had a hard time, and so on. If Pakistan were still entrenched and killing Indians because the latter were fighting uphill, why the complaint about Indian shelling?

She quotes an article from a magazine of India, seemingly critical. 

" ... By end-June, a senior army official acknowledged, “Some of the heights they continue to occupy are impregnable. They occupy strategic posts on the ridge lines in Dras Kaksar Mushkoh Valley, Turtok, and Chorbatla.”[598]"

She continues quoting the magazine, and other press, remarking that they didnt sound like a nation on brink of an easy victory. 

Nobody said it was easy, at those heights and without any cover, fighting an uphill battle supposedly against terrorists. Indian soldiers fought not only bravely but an unprecedented hardship level, and the victory was a hard won. Which is why it impressed world community. 

"While the Indians had recaptured some front-line posts on Tololing and were heading towards the strategically important posts on Tiger Hill facing the NH-1A, the logistical lifeline for Indian troops stationed in Ladakh and Siachen, they had still not managed to achieve any major successes in their operations to recapture their lost posts.[604] In fact, it was not until beginning July that India was able to recapture Tiger hill which was in the farthest reaches, deep inside on the Indian side of the LOC, west of Marpola."

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"For Pakistan withdrawal inevitable

" ... They were continuously exposed to the Indian air and artillery pounding as hundreds of sorties dropped thousands of kilos of bombs.[609] On the ground, the young soldiers wondered why their own airpower was not being deployed. They felt “unnerved by the Indian airpower, in fact terrorized by the sound in the cold weather and those mountains’ ungodly heights.”[610] ... "

There, in a nutshell, is why Himaalaya belongs to India - no Indian would abuse it thus! Himaalaya is not only evered and loved, but seen as home of Gods and Goddesses - and very matter-of-factly so, throughout India. As is the very land of India, with all its rivers and mountains. Anyone who abuses it the way author does there, simply doesn't belong, and has no business being there. 

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Author repeats her "Indian soldiers did nothing brave, pakis did everything bravely, Indians only bombarded paki brave poor soldiers while Indians took advantage of diplomatic pressuring of international community, they sided only with India" lament. 

Ad infinitum, it'd seem, throughout the work. 

"Most importantly, after Tololing, India had begun re-taking the strategically located posts overlooking NH-1A. For Pakistan, holding onto the frontline posts was of actual strategic significance. These were furthermost from the LOC but closest to NH-1, the logistical lifeline for the Indian troops stationed in Ladakh and Siachen. Meanwhile, the mid-zone posts were in Pakistan’s control but with no access to India’s strategic roads. To what end, then, could or should Pakistan hold on to the mid-posts? Located in the middle of the rugged iced mountain terrain, these had no artillery access to any strategic Indian feature, such as a highway, a cantonment, ammunition dumps etc. ... "

There's the raison d'etre of - not only the Kargil war initiated by pakis, not only every such war (and always initiated by them), every terrorist attack perpetrated against India - but of the very existence the very genesis of pak, spelt out in clear terms. 

Author has admitted that pakis had no reason to begin Kargil war via this incursion, except to kill Indians. And that's true of the very existence, even genesis of pak. There's no reason for pak to exist, except to kill India, to destroy the very culture and the humongous treasures of knowledge of antiquity that's still loving India. 

" ... Also, Delhi’s political resolve of no talks until complete withdrawal appeared ironclad. And the international community fully supported India’s position."

And therein the failure of pakis, the inability to not only admit but see truth. That "the international community fully supported India’s position" was because it was true. 

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"Doubts set in 

"By end-June, the problem of a “logistical stretch”[612] was beginning to surface for the Pakistani troops. In addition to the disruption being caused by air strikes, the Pakistani supply lines and the supplies were becoming increasingly vulnerable to harsh weather and to Indian artillery attacks. The phenomenon of ‘Operation Creep’[613] had led to the unplanned increase in the demand for supplies.[614] The increasing demand for supplies in an expanding battle zone, where even maintaining existing bunkers and posts defensively was difficult, had begun to put pressure on the logistics. Launching and sustaining an operation of this scale would have been inconceivable. For example to maintain a force of fourteen hundred people, an additional ten thousand were needed to provide logistical support."

One, did they imagine otherwise when they planned, sent men up in winter, killed Indian soldiers from positions up the peaks, and generally were gleeful about expectations? It'd seem so. Did they, then, expect their own soldiers to establish self sustainable villages on mountain peaks, with farms and wells? 

No, pakis as usual had banked only on killing and looting Indians, nothing further. 

Two, did they expect love letters in response from India? Or free food supplied up to them? They'd theorised India not picking up the gauntlet, wrongly. 

................................................................................................

"With June becoming a month of heavy losses, the army chief found himself in a difficult situation. The confidence of the opening days, when the field was open and uncontested for his men, had begun eroding. Doubts had set in. The general had begun conceding in private conversations with members of the prime minister’s kitchen cabinet that some ‘operation creep’ had occurred. The Op had been expanded beyond the originally planned territorial limits. Within his close circles, the army chief was candid. He could see the reasons for his soldiers to return from the war theatre, to end the fighting.[615] But who would bell the cat? The chief, was supposed to have sent one of his friends, also appointed as an envoy in an African country, to convey a suggestion to the prime minister’s father. Known to be an exceptionally obedient son to his ’Abbaji‘, Sharif could never resist his father’s ‘advice.’ Accordingly, Musharraf decided that commanding a retreat in the midst of a hard-fought battle with many sacrifices rendered, could lead to discontent among the soldiers. Also, the army chief feared an Indian offensive on the retreating soldiers. Accordingly, he likely had a message conveyed to Sharif’s father that the PM be advised to recall the troops since continued or accelerated fighting could also mean the Indians might open other war fronts. The message was conveyed and the prime minister’s father agreed to do as advised. [616]"

The coward general wouldn't admit he'd been wrong, but went through an old man to pressure an obedient son, in short!!! 

"This difficult military situation was not filtering through in the public arena. Unlike India, where Kargil had turned into a media war, in Pakistan the refrain was that Mujahideen and Kashmiri freedom fighters were fighting Indian forces. Conflicting official statements trickled in. While the army chief was welcoming talks with the Americans, he was also saying that unilateral withdrawal was not on. As news of casualties and perhaps of possible retreat found its way into the chat rooms of influential people, including retired generals, they publicly demanded that pressure on the Indian Army must continue. Retired General Hameed Gul, for example, felt that the Indians should be sucked in in order to get messed up. After mid-June, there were no formal meetings held to consider options, to discuss possibilities, or to build scenarios for exiting from Kargil. Instead, the way out from the Kargil crisis, from this ‘symmetry of desperation,’ was discussed mostly in informal kitchen cabinet meetings with no sense of a collective decision-making."

That's typical pak - mess after blunders, as usual, and lies strictly, but no admission of facts. 

................................................................................................

Author now titles a section "Prime Minister Witness to Casualties", beginning with a long description of his journey to a valley presumably somewhere close to Kargil, but it's a deceptive title - it's not about his witnessing any deaths due to Indian shelling in process, rather his return to safety of Skardu and seeing wounded at a military hospital in next paragraph. The most he seems yo have been in danger would be of falling to death from a window sill where his army chief helped him up insisting that he speak to locals. 

"Throughout the return journey, the prime minister actively avoided any interaction with the army chief. True to his personal style, the incredulous policy-making ways, and above all the horrors of Op K that were now a fait accompli, he opted to not confront his army chief. The PM engaged with his State Minister on Investment Humayun Akhtar to finalize the government’s power investment policy. At one point during the journey, the army chief did manage to sit beside the Prime minister. Much to everyone’s shock, he did not ask for additional finances for either the wounded or the battlefront soldiers. Instead he requested that a recently retired general be appointed in a public corporation. The PM acceded to Musharraf’s request.

"After landing at Chaklala, ... He shared with them his anguish over what he had seen at the Skardu hospital. He was angry with the army chief and recalled Musharraf’s repeated, direct and indirect, requests to the prime minister to meet Clinton to plan a retreat from Kargil. ... "

So the army chief initiated the invasion without informing, much less with consent of, his own PM - and then made him a scapegoat internationally, expecting him to get the army out of the mess made by the army chief. 

As usual with pak, isn't that! 

................................................................................................

Author again fraudulently strives to make it seem that the two sides, invaders and India fighting back, were equal and no different, for most part. 

" ... On both sides, casualties were mounting and political support was depleting.  Sharif and Vajpayee both wanted an early end. ... "

One, India wanted not "early end" but this to have never taken place, at all. 

But having been confronted with the horror thereof, what India wanted, and did achieve, was to clean the region of all invaders, with no compromises. As soon as possible, of course, it goes without saying. 

" ... Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front, having been widely censured by the international community, Islamabad’s political men, as well as the army chief, had faith that Washington could wrest a face-saver for Islamabad."

In other words - as termed by Tarek Fateh - they went crying to Clinton to beg him to tell India to stop fighting. Without admitting, nevertheless, that it was paki soldiers on peaks killing Indians, still pretending that it was terrorists not known to pak! 

Just so pakis could remain on peaks in comfort and keep on killing Indians, that is! 

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November 05 , 2022 - November 06 , 2022. 

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CHAPTER 11: NUCLEAR CARD AND WASHINGTON’S GAINS 

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Now author takes more to lying. 

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" ... In his June 16 meeting in Geneva with US National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, the Indian NSA Brajesh Mishra handed over Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s letter for Clinton. ... “India might have to attack Pakistan if Pakistan did not pull back troops who had seized Indian territories ... ” Sandy Berger told Clinton a probable Pak-India war threatened disaster. If India expanded the war, Pakistan would probably lose and inevitably turn to its nuclear arsenal.[617] ... "

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It's hard avoiding quoting paki lies of paki attitude veiling facts, but there's no point quoting lies. 

" ... Clinton’s involvement would convey to world capitals including Delhi, the importance Washington attached to the crisis and the urgency in resolving it. Clinton’s engagement also broadened the scope of policy instruments available to exert pressure on Pakistan. For example, in Cologne, the US President personally lobbied the G-8 leaders for a tough statement holding Pakistan responsible for creating the crisis and demanding that Pakistan defuse the crisis. Similarly, Clinton’s involvement, similar to that of the nuclear crisis period, enabled Washington to promptly send off CENTCOM chief General Anthony Zinni and State Department official Gib Lanpher to Pakistan. ... "

" ... Pakistan Foreign Office was not keen that Nawaz Sharif meet with Zinni. ... The Americans were told that Zinni’s rank did not qualify him for a meeting with the prime minister. Before Zinni departed the US, the State Department attempted to circumvent the Foreign Office. The US Consul-General in Lahore, Jeffory Pied, went to see the prime minister’s younger brother and Chief Minister Shehbaz Sharif and conveyed the Clinton administration’s desire that Nawaz Sharif meet with Zinni. Shehbaz Sharif called Nawaz Sharif to convince him to agree to a meeting with Zinni. The prime minister declined.[619]"

Author avoids saying what's plain here, intent on veiling truth with paki lies. Zinni was refused a meeting because it was obvious what would transpire, a demand that invaders withdraw. But pakis use invasion as the sole method of argument to assist their lies, as per the heritage they not only invoke but brag of, that of barbarians who invaded India for well over a millennium and a half until British rule, and hence their travails - which must befall a lying invader intent on destruction of all civilisation. 

................................................................................................

" ... The decision to send Zinni to Pakistan was made after the Vajpayee letter was received by the US President in Geneva. This suggestion was the result of a series of face to face meetings involving the United States National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department. No elaborate inter-agency meetings were held. ... "

Author, keen on lying as pakis generally when facts don't suit their agenda, doesn't see the contradiction there between "This suggestion was the result of a series of face to face meetings involving the United States National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department" and "No elaborate inter-agency meetings were held." 

Or perhaps she lies knowing fully well that she's lying, but expecting to confuse readers. 

This is usually tactics from liars too. And this goes on. Facts given in physical terms but interpretation, lie. 

" ... Key individuals who framed United States Kargil policy included Thomas Pickering and Karl Inderfurth from the State Department and Sandy Berger and Bruce Riedel from the National Security Council.

"The exchange of letters between Clinton and Nawaz Sharif did not get Clinton any tangible commitment from the latter on withdrawing Pakistani troops from Kargil. A letter from Clinton addressed to the Pakistani prime minister was drafted in the State Department on Saturday on June 19[622] and sent to the White House. Clinton was then traveling in Europe. In the letter, Clinton specifically asked the Pakistani prime minister what steps he would take to get out of Kargil. Clinton wrote in that letter that he wanted the CENTCOM Chief General Anthony Zinni to meet with Sharif as well as with the Pakistani army chief General Musharraf to ensure a Pakistani withdrawal. Gib Lanpher[623] Deputy Assistant Secretary South Asian Affairs at the State Department met Zinni on June 21.  

"Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was attempting to reach Nawaz Sharif to let him know that Clinton was sending Zinni to meet with him and Musharraf. With Zinni’s plane on standby to fly them to Pakistan, the two waited for a reply from Islamabad. But no response was received on Monday. ... "

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Here's an example of the said paki lies used by author towards veiling hard facts. 

"Zinni’s departure also signaled that the US bureaucracy had successfully overruled their President’s inclination to be accommodating to his friend the Pakistani prime minister. ... The State Department wanted a Clinton-Sharif meeting be made contingent upon Pakistan first vacating Kargil. [627]"

Clinton, a well educated Rhodes scholar, is, was always, smart enough to do as he thought fit, and making him seem a prisoner of others in Washington is a lie. 

Others may have helped him tow the line of propriety in world diplomacy, if he needed such maneuvers. But that's routine in democratic and other good governance worlds, which a despotic country used only to invading and lying wouldn't know. 

Perhaps pakis are only used to falsehoods and resent the failure of such tactics. But this tactic can only go so far. 

It's run its course, beginning with Kargil, the stupidest idea yet executed by pakis at the time. It was merely another version of the stupid declaration by paki military in 1971 to "change the DNA" of East Bengal - via invasion, genocide and mass gang rapes. But having claimed heritage of barbarian invaders, pakis don't see the fact of their stupid choice in doing so. Or lying. 

................................................................................................

Author exposes, again, the lie pakis including the then paki PM told everyone outside the paki military. 

"Significantly, before the Zinni meeting, General Musharraf had flown with the prime minister to the forward areas from where the Kargil operation was launched.[628]  The prime minister and the army chief visited the injured soldiers and met with the jawans. ... Yet it was not coincidental that this display of a unified civil-military stance on Kargil was planned for hours before the Zinni-Musharraf meeting."

So while pakis insisted on denying their own soldiers to everyone, so much so they were neither fed nor buried by pakis, those not bring shelled were encouraged with prayers and money to go right back up to kill Indians and be denied in turn! 

"In the meeting, Zinni told Musharraf that he had been specially sent by his President to talk about Kargil. Musharraf was told that the Kargil issue was “dangerously unwise and that Pakistan had no support for its Kargil operation.”[631] Clinton’s message was simple: “Just get out of there.” Musharraf, however, did not acknowledge that there were Pakistani soldiers in Kargil. Throughout the meeting, Musharraf maintained that Pakistan had no control over the Mujahideen who were in Kargil. ... "

"The meeting ended inconclusively. There was no agreement on the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army since Musharraf refused to acknowledge the presence of Pakistani troops.[633] ... "

"The following morning, on June 25, Zinni met with the prime minister. The army chief, DG ISI, and the senior Foreign Office team also participated in the meeting. ... Zinni also carried Clinton’s message to Nawaz Sharif that he would not meet the Pakistani prime minister “in the shadow of Kargil.” Finally, towards the end of the meeting, the prime minister took a deep breath and said, “What do you want me to do, General Zinni?” Nawaz Sharif then said, “We can talk to these people who are occupying the heights in Kargil and see whether we can do anything.”[637]"

Usual paki tactic, Jinnah in 1947-48 onwards. It's exactly what Jinnah had said to Mountbatten about the then paki military invasion of Kashmir pretending to be tribals. 

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"Interestingly, the Americans and the Pakistanis had different ‘takes’ on the meeting. The Pakistani camp was clear that the prime minister had been categorical that the “US should take a broader view of the problem - that Kargil was only one aspect of the larger problem of Jammu and Kashmir which must be addressed in it totality in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people.”[638] None of the Pakistani participants felt that Sharif had given Zinni a commitment to withdraw.[639] The Americans read almost the opposite. They believed that “not too long into the meeting the prime minister agreed to a withdrawal.”[640] They were relieved that they “did not have to wrestle Nawaz Sharif into the ground”[641] and had extracted a verbal agreement from Sharif to withdraw.[642] ... Lanpher argued with his colleagues that the Zinni mission got the green signal from Islamabad because the Pakistanis had decided to give him a positive response, not because they wanted to “slam the door in your face.” His conclusion was: “The Pakistanis, government officials, army officers and politicians were infinitely polite and these real gentlemen would not want to be rude to people, in contrast to the Indians who enjoyed being rude.” Lanpher based his expectation of a Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil on the Pakistani psychology of “wanting to please the Americans.” However, Zinni and Milam, both more familiar with the Pakistani working and particularly with Sharif and Musharraf, believed that Musharraf would not easily make his troops vacate Kargil.[644]"

Lanpher's reaction was the usual one - of someone inexperienced about behaviour differences between smiling liars versus upright honest, while the overall difference of perception there is the usual one when encountering pakis, nazis and similar liars. Chinese on the other hand are a slightly different matter only in that they don't admit to lying either, but know fully well what they do. 

................................................................................................

"Lampher later recalled, “We decided we had a success, that they would get them out even if not acknowledging they were Pakistani soldiers. We did not give anything on Kashmir and we did not rub their noses either, we could have insisted that they acknowledge they are Pakistanis but we know they had to save face.”[648]  Meanwhile, Zinni had left with the ‘distinct impression’ that Nawaz Sharif had committed to withdrawing the troops.[649] Indian statements also refuted Zinni’s assertion that the meeting with Clinton was granted after Pakistan started withdrawing troops. As late as on 4 July, in his briefing, the Indian spokesman said that India had not seen the slightest indication that Islamabad was willing to withdraw its troops. He said, “There is not the slightest sign on the ground that Pakistan is taking the necessary steps that need to be taken for withdrawal and for restoration of the status quo.”[650] Upon arrival in Washington, Zinni and his commander-in-chief, the US President, waited for the Pakistanis to begin withdrawing.

"In Pakistan, the Zinni visit had left no doubt in the civilian camp, including the Prime Minister, that Washington wanted Pakistan to unconditionally withdraw from Kargil.[651] Zinni had merely reiterated the demand that the US administration had directly and repeatedly made to Islamabad two weeks into the Kargil crisis.[652] For Sharif, personally also, the fear of the possibility of a nuclear engagement was also driven home. Zinni had managed to convince him that a prolonged Kargil crisis could convert into an all-out nuclear war.[653] This further fuelled the uneasiness in Sharif’s camp over the Kargil crisis.

................................................................................................

"Meanwhile, though, there was disappointment in Washington that an immediate Pakistani troop withdrawal did not actually begin, following the Zinni visit, the Zinni-Lanpher trip was viewed as having facilitated achievement of the objectives Washington had set out for itself during Kargil. Recalling the Zinni mission, another senior National Security Council head, Bruce Riedel, said, “He did not get a commitment. When Nawaz Sharif came to the Blair House on 4 July we did not know of the outcome.”[654] Referring to Zinni’s claim in his book that he had got a commitment from Musharraf, Riedel said, “Zinni is overstating his case…”[655]

"Nevertheless, the State Department found the mission helpful on three specific counts.  First, the Clinton Administration was satisfied that Zinni had candidly conveyed its concerns to Islamabad and had made it clear to General Musharraf that Pakistan was responsible for the present military flare-up along the LOC and Pakistan had to roll back.

"Secondly, in the management of the Zinni-Lanpher trip, Washington continued the practice of transparency in its diplomacy initiated during the Kargil crisis. Washington publicized and also shared with the Indians, both privately and publicly, the message conveyed to Islamabad. For example, Lanpher was deputed to inform India of the Zinni meetings in Islamabad. The transparency was more evident in the Washington-Islamabad communication relative to Washington-Delhi communication. On 4 July 4, Clinton made two calls to Vajpayee, one during and one after his meeting with Nawaz Sharif. General Zinni had an opportunity to candidly express the views of the US administration. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, “Zinni helped lay the ground work for the successful outcome of the 4 July Clinton-Nawaz meeting,”[656] during which Washington was able to ‘deliver’ India a unilateral Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil.[657] Musharraf, to the contrary, believed that Pakistan’s position on “no unilateral withdrawal” had been conveyed to the Americans. Infact, he found Zinni’s “body language positive and sympathetic towards Pakistan’s position.” The army chief in fact still believed a Clinton-Sharif meeting,[658]to facilitate a negotiated settlement of Kargil and Kashmir, would be possible."

Ever insistence of an arrogant invader, in lying about invading and getting away with it all, including lying, there. 

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"Whatever Sharif said during the Zinni meeting, he was an extremely worried man after what he had heard from Clinton’s envoy. The prime minister was convinced that a full-scale Pakistan-India war along the international border was likely and that could mean electronic devices with which India could jam Pakistan’s radars and signals. Zinni had also convinced the prime minister that a nuclear war was on the cards and that even his own army, the Pakistan Army, had begun deploying nuclear weapons.[659] He felt that, between electronic and nuclear warfare, it was a doomsday scenario for Pakistan. Hence, it can safely be presumed this was the definitive point at which the Pakistani prime minister had concluded that a war had to be avoided at all costs. The back-channel communications were on but now other avenues for ‘exit facilitation’ were to be sought: Beijing, Riyadh, and DC. However, Sharif played these cards close to his chest. For example, only his kitchen cabinet knew of his contacts with Washington and Riyadh. The Foreign Office team was working the Delhi and Beijing routes while the Defense Committee and the cabinet knew of neither. The contact with the Saudis was established in the last week of June. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, who was close to the Sharif family, was contacted seeking Saudi intervention with Washington for a Clinton-Sharif meeting."

Presumably his army chief was happy at prospect of playing with nukes. 

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"On June 27, Lanpher met with MEA officials and with the Principal Secretary to the Indian Prime Minister, Brajesh Mishra.[663]Lanpher briefed Mishra thoroughly “with a very candid description of those present in the meetings and what they said.” He gave Mishra news of a likely withdrawal by the Pakistani forces.[664] Lanpher repeated in detail his conversations with the Pakistanis to assure the Indians that “these guys (Pakistanis) will get out.” Still not completely trusting of the United States support for the Indian position, the Indians did not believe “how rough” Zinni had been with the Pakistanis. The Americans saw themselves doing a “front channel thing,” Lanpher providing the Indians complete details on the Zinni meeting with the Pakistani prime minister and COAS.[665]"

Author goes abusive here exponentially claiming Indians had been bloodied and caught with pants down. 

"Lanpher found Mishra skeptical about the possibility of a Pakistani withdrawal.[666] “Having been bloodied, totally embarrassed, and caught with their pants down, and suffering heavy casualties,”[667] the Indians tended not to trust Lanpher’s reading of the Pakistani intentions. ... "

Since she's repeatedly blamed Kargil on Siachen, it's unclear why this abusive description has been applied by her only to Indians. 

Unless it was a personal dream of her own that excludes pakis in particular and is strictly restricted for Indians.  

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" ... Indians tended not to trust Lanpher’s reading of the Pakistani intentions. Despite his “honest briefing”, the Indians were “very skeptical.” Mishra’s skepticism was understandable. Only a few hours before the Lanpher meeting, Naik, the Pakistani back-channel interlocutor, had stressed upon the impossibility of a unilateral withdrawal. He had categorically stated that a withdrawal would only follow the joint adoption and declaration of the four points."

" ... Lanpher carried the message to Delhi that Delhi must show restraint while Washington ensured that the sanctity of the LOC was restored to the pre-Kargil position. ... "

"One of the key objectives of Washington’s policy during Kargil was to deny Pakistan any strategic advantage accruing to it from its nuclear status. Washington was determined not to let Pakistan benefit from playing the ‘nuclear card.’ Hence Pakistan had to undo the violation of the LOC and not derive any political or diplomatic benefit from its Kargil adventure. Allowing any advantage to Pakistan which had banked on, to some degree, deriving advantage from nuclear blackmail, would set off a de-stabilizing precedent between the two nuclear states. Successful deployment of nuclear blackmail as a policy tool would have in fact undermined the only virtue that the deadly weapon possesses, that of deterrence. A nuclear armed South Asia could not have been encouraged to become a theatre for limited wars."

" ... In Delhi, Lanpher was convincing his Indian hosts that Washington had played its role in bringing about an imminent Pakistani withdrawal."

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Again, author sermonises about India in a stance of nothing so much as hypocrisy. 

" ... It is bad form to publicise private exchanges on the phone. It is worse to deceive the public. ... "

One, a paki saying this about India at any time is height of hypocrisy indeed. 

Two, this author saying it about India, while making no such comments about paki conduct in attacking India even as diplomats and civil governments were officially meeting and unaware of oaki attack against India, is height of fraud indeed. 

" ... On 19 July, Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmad revealed that R. K. Mishra had visited Pakistan as India's emissary at least five times during the crisis, while Niaz Naik also kept shuttling between Islamabad and New Delhi (The Hindu, 20 July)."

" ... The Pakistan Army chief claimed that during their June 26 meeting, Zinni “understood our position on Kashmir and agreed it was needed a quick solution.”[670] The army chief’s understanding, however, was in complete contrast with how the prime minister’s point man, the seasoned diplomat Tariq Fatemi, viewed Zinni’s attitude. “Zinni wanted us out immediately,”[671] Fatimi recalled. Zinni repeated the same on arrival in Washington. [672]"

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In the topsy-turvy world of what passes for thinking in pakis, US is abused in a resisted way, accused of taking advantage of Kargil failure of pak to get close to Delhi! 

"From Pakistan’s Kargil debacle, in cold statistical calculations, the Clinton administration’s key South Asian and non-proliferation experts wrested a strategic gain for Washington. The gain was winning Delhi’s trust and confidence it’s role in South Asia; that no other country’s interests, especially Pakistan’s, could trump Delhi’s interests. It was a classic act of gainful cunning that largely dictates State interaction."

And as every liar does, pakis too know it's necessary to throw some facts into their mix. 

" ... The Kargil clique’s secret launch of Op KP had inflicted a heavy military and diplomatic cost on the country. ... "

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"Now, during Kargil, Washington’s uneven policy between the two nuclearized South Asian neighbors again surfaced. The emphasis of the Clinton administration’s key men on Pakistan’s nuclear activity during Kargil, while completely ignoring what India may have been doing, was a mere continuation of Washington’s policy of the seventies. Strobe Talbott, Clinton’s personal friend and a journalist-turned diplomat, who documented his failure to convince India’s imposing Jaswant Singh to agree to Washington’s instruments for non-proliferation, appeared to have made much of very little in the Kargil days."

It's interesting to read this paragraph and it's accusations toned to seem indicative of grave moral lapse on part of US, and wonder where pakis get the moral or ethical ground for demanding equality, when they never practice it either internationally or at home. There's the racist treatment of East Bengal culminating in genocide and mass gang rapes organised by paki military in 1971, even if one were to go with the paki logic that genocide of eleven million Hindus and almost half as many Sikhs in pak in 1947 were an act of good deed as per the religion, repeated in genocide of Hindus in Kashmir in 1989-90. 

But where's this equality when pakis take money from US to send terrorists to Afghanistan to harass USSR out of Afghanistan, and subsequently, boast on internet for decades about having singlehandedly broken USSR into pieces? 

And if pakis haven't been dealing equally with others, why do they then expect equal treatment? 

No, their equality is one demanded by nawabs, strictly upwardly mobile but veiled in pretense. They are racist and communal, commit mass gang rapes and genocides and invade, but must be given everything they demand at asking, whether hundreds of billions of dollars without accounts from US  or territory in huge chunks out of India. 

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" ... In Washington, other than the generic concern regarding military confrontation, the intelligence had its ear to the ground to especially monitor nuclear-related developments. Data flow from several satellite paths, various policy departments, including the Defense Department, the State Department’s South Asia section, CENTCOM, the CIA, and the NSC, now focused particularly on nuclear related information. Some intelligence officials claimed that the ground information picked up by US intelligence sources indicated movement of missiles and placement of warheads. The concern, however, about active deployment of nuclear weapons, especially by Pakistan, was not uniformly shared within the Clinton Administration. There was great divergence in interpreting this intelligence data."

" ... contrary assessments notwithstanding, from mid-June onwards the administration’s core group appears to have been possessed by “nuclear phobia.” They directly involved the US President into the Kargil diplomacy. They alerted him to their “concern” regarding Pakistan taking action to make its nuclear weapons capable.[687]"

Lack of trustworthiness of pakis must have impressed even the generously friendly US, eventually! 

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"The growing Indo-US strategic relations were also at play in producing this nuclear phobia targeting Pakistan. Having discovered that in fact Pakistan regulars and not Mujahedeen were fighting in Kargil, and Pakistan therefore had control over them, the US weighed in heavily on to Pakistan to withdraw the troops. The US President wrote about six letters. The US Ambassador delivered the letters to the foreign minister. He had several meetings with the Pakistani prime minister and spent much of his time at the Prime Minister’s Secretariat with Additional Secretary Tariq Fatimi. He visited him almost daily with a constant barrage of escalating pressure on Pakistan to withdraw."

Author, in saying "Having discovered that in fact Pakistan regulars and not Mujahedeen were fighting in Kargil, and Pakistan therefore had control over them", omits mentioning that this amounted to in fact having caught pakis lying repeatedly,  and perhaps having known it all along. 

So of course she fails to connect it to US seemingly deciding for India, since it seems that in paki mind paki lies aren't lies but nawabs' pronouncements, to be honoured over and above truth! 

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"Targeting Nawaz Sharif 

"There appeared to be politics around the use of even this information on Pakistan, unverified by majority of the US intelligence bodies within the Clinton administration. Why did Washington hold back the information Washington claimed it had on Pakistan’s preparedness for the use of nuclear weapons? Why was the information only shared with the prime minister – and that too without his aides? It was used to first target the prime minister behind closed doors. Equally, General Zinni had opted to warn the prime minister in a classified and limited meeting about “electronic” and “finally nuclear warfare.” As late as June 26, Zinni decided against raising the risks of a nuclear war with the army chief, the man Washington believed had more control than the prime minister on Pakistan’s nuclear trigger. First, the CENTCOM chief sketched a deadly picture for him and subsequently, on 4 July, the information was brought in full throttle at the Clinton-Nawaz meeting. Pakistan’s prime minister was instructed to not bring in an aide. Clinton with Riedel, the man riled up about Pakistan’s deployment of nuclear weapons, insisted that unknown to the prime minister the Pakistan Army was preparing to use nuclear weapons!"

This whole accusation above can only be understood with the following explanation - not only Pakistan demand that their lies be accepted, preferably over facts known to everyone but at least on par with truth in name of equality, but they demand that paki charade of democracy be taken for exactly what it is, and while paki pm is treated as someone to successfully meet US president to make up the mind of the said president for him whenever paki army wishes, he - the said paki pm - only be treated as disdainfully as paki army treats him, and no serious matters be discussed with him, which would be seen as suspicious behaviour on part of another government. 

In short, it's a decorative position akin to that of a receptionist at an arms dealership. 

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" ... Pakistan military signaled its nuclear preparedness. On June 24, The News reported, “The prime minister has also been told that deployment of short and long range missiles with extremely effective warheads has been completed.”[690] Pakistani media reports also focused on Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. For example, one report was headlined, “Pakistan Developing Advanced versions of Ghauri, Shaheen”.[691] ... "

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November 06 , 2022 - November 07, 2022 

- November 11, 2022. 

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CHAPTER 12: ALL FALLS APART 

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Author has been using certain terms that now acquire another connotation in view of her accusations against US government regarding meetings alone with paki pm excluding paki army. 

"On 25 June, R. K. Mishra,[700] Vajpayee’s point-man for the back-channel negotiations, flew in from Delhi ... "

To clear a normal perspective, if a man sent by PM of India arrives for diplomatic discussions with paki pm, it's not "back-channel"; India does not take active part in the charade that's paki structure of hierarchy, any more than US would, or then did. 

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Much of this chapter has a good deal of repetition and confusion thereby, more than usual for this author. 

" ... Mishra pointedly asked Sharif if he knew about Kargil but did not get a clear response. ... "

Author elaborates by stating paki demands and fraudulentlylabelling them an understandingbetweenthe two PMs. 

" ... Mishra showed the non-paper to Vajpayee, who was keen to insert as the second paragraph that Pakistan forces would withdraw from the Kargil heights"

" ... The Indian National Security Advisor was not to be easily convinced of Pakistan’s ‘good intentions”. On the insertion regarding Pakistan’s withdrawal from the Kargil heights, Naik indicated that it would create difficulties for Sharif. They had to wait for Vajpayee ... "

"On June 27, Naik met the Indian Prime Minister, Brajesh Mishra, and R. K. Mishra. Vajpayee welcomed Naik by asking him, “We started the journey from Lahore. How did we reach Kargil?” Naik’s response was, “We will see how we can come back from Kargil to Lahore.” Vajpayee continued, “Very simple. You should just withdraw.” He said that Nawaz Sharif should announce the withdrawal before leaving for China that evening and then follow by a meeting of the DGs Military Operations to make arrangements for the withdrawal. Naik said, “Military is not possible; it is completely political.” ... "

"Before departing for China, Sharif talked to Vajpayee. The Pakistan prime minister even called R. K. Mishra from China. Sharif had struck a special rapport with the man he had first met in October 1998. During the Kargil crisis, he had called Mishra virtually every day. Mishra claimed that Sharif had told him during one of his visits, “I will within three months punish those responsible for Kargil.”[701]"

"MEA was not comfortable with the way the back-channel negotiations were progressing and had used the policy tool of a ‘press leak’ to upset the negotiations."

................................................................................................

" ... American Administration had decided to make public evidence it had against Pakistan if Pakistan did not withdraw from Kargil-Drass. ... an editorial appeared in The Washington Post indicating that Islamabad may face difficulty in getting the next $100 million tranche released. On June 25 the State Department spokesman James Rubin said, “We want to see withdrawal of forces supported by Pakistan from the Indian side of the LOC.” ... "

" ... According to Vajpayee, he had clearly told Nawaz Sharif’s emissary Niaz Naik in their last meeting, “There can be no talks with Pakistan until the latter (Pakistan) withdraws its troops from Kargil.”[709]"

" ... Washington asked India to not attack elsewhere on the LoC or on the International border. Washington thought they had some hints about nuclear tipped missile movement. The United States Embassy in Islamabad believed that Pakistan’s missile movements were routine, undertaken by Pakistan once in a while."

" ... Frantic phone calls to Delhi were made to salvage the situation. Minutes before leaving for the airport, the Prime Minister met with his Foreign Office team to discuss the fall-out of the now botched up exit plan for Pakistani troop withdrawal from Kargil. Foremost in his mind was the absence of an exit plan for the Pakistan Army."

"Nawaz Sharif’s host, the Chinese Premier, was “very matter-of fact” with his Pakistani guest.[712] Zhu recalled Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation over Kargil. He repeated the known Chinese position[713] that Pakistan needed to resolve the Kashmir issue bilaterally with India and advised Pakistan to immediately end the Kargil crisis. China, Zhu said, had no influence over India and could not intercede with the Indians. Sharif was also cautioned against involving “other”[714] countries in the Kargil affair, urging Sharif to remain mindful of their tendency to exploit the situation to their own advantages."

................................................................................................

"Nawaz Sharif had left Beijing a disappointed man. Back-channel negotiations with India had drawn a blank. He had hoped the Chinese would mediate with India to work out an honorable exit for the Pakistani troops.[722] The Chinese and the Americans seemed to have been coordinating, even if loosely, on Kargil. Beijing and Washington appear to have been reading from the same page. While the Pakistani prime minister was in China, the State Department announced that Beijing and Washington coordinated their policies on Kargil."

" ... In Hong Kong, Sharif waited for a message from Washington regarding a confirmed meeting with Clinton. Instead of returning to Pakistan, he was prepared to fly straight off to Washington from Hong Kong.[724] No confirmation came through. The prime minister landed in Islamabad in the early hours of July 1."

"While the global consensus demanded that Pakistan vacate the Kargil heights, within Pakistan the ill-informed Opposition and the media were harping on a different tune. At the Islamabad Conference, the politicians condemned “Indian aggression on the LOC, violation of Pakistan’s airspace and Indian threats of war against Pakistan.”[727] The Convener, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, linked Pakistan’s isolation over Kargil to the government’s failure to “highlight Kashmir.” The Nawabzada said, “It appears that Pakistan had been isolated diplomatically and politically, which is evident from the statements of the US President, the European Union and the G-8 countries.”[728] The problem identification was correct, but not the diagnosis of the problem."

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November 11, 2022 - November 12, 2022. 

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CHAPTER 13: THE 2 JULY DCC MEETING 

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"The prime minister chaired the Defense Committee of the Cabinet meeting in the cabinet room of the Prime Minister’s House.[744] He had already made the decision to withdraw. He had already begun mapping possible exit routes. The presentations and discussions at this DCC meeting, Sharif had hoped, would validate his withdrawal decision. The atmosphere at the meeting was tense and sober. Reports of India reclaiming the Tololing Hill complex, consisting of several posts, were coming in. Nawaz Sharif’s kitchen cabinet, including the director general Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the defense secretary, a retired general, were critical of the military operation. The wisdom in the civilian camp, shared by the naval and air force chiefs, was that Op KP had not been thought through in terms of its strategic consequences. According to one Pakistan cabinet minister, “The army had climbed up a pole without considering how it would get down.”[745]" 

"Significantly, through meetings between the Defense Secretary and the Minister for Petroleum, Chaudhry Nisar, the informal communication lines were kept open between the prime minister’s camp and the army chief. Yet the issues floating within the formal meetings and through the print waves and Islamabad’s power-circles were raising fundamental questions about the Kargil operation. Who cleared the Kargil operation? What was its objective? How would Pakistan’s growing international isolation be handled? Are the Indian forces defeating the Pakistanis in Kargil? According to a key member of the Sharif kitchen cabinet, “The party view was not to embarrass the army leadership but to apportion responsibility.”[746] Major differences had surfaced between the services chiefs over Op KP. The naval chief feared an Indian naval blockade. The air chief was also apprehensive about Pakistan’s air force being pulled into an all-out war. The army chief believed the air force chief was a “scared man.” [747]"

" ... Presentations began with Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad. He sketched a bleak picture of Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation. He recounted the countless diplomatic efforts made by Pakistan in an increasingly hostile environment. Pakistan’s position had been projected using every diplomatic and political means possible. This included regular media briefings and contacts with the UNSG, OICSG, OIC members, EU and G-8 countries. Special envoys had been sent, and high level demarches had been made in the form of letters from the prime minister to his G-8 counterparts and from the FM to his EU and OIC counterparts. The world community, especially the G-8 and EU, did not accept Pakistan’s position and called for withdrawal."

................................................................................................

" ... Privately, when asked how come they were losing the heights, senior military men had conceded, “We never thought that this would happen, that India would play such high human price.”[750]  Sharif also pointed out that Pakistan’s communication lines were being compromised and hence the sustenance for our troops was weakening.

"With the army still painting a positive picture, Finance Minister Ishaq Dar asked the army chief if, should they got the required funding, could they get Kashmir. Musharraf reminded Dar that the distance of Kashmir from where they were was a way off. “Will we be able to get Siachen?” Dar then asked.[751] Siachen, he was told, was not “economical” for Pakistan to hold onto. The army chief’s general refrain was, “We went in only to flag the issue.” Goal-posts set by the Kargil clique were vanishing under the Indian military pressure.

"The army chief said that, despite India’s intense bombing and capturing around 35 percent of the posts, Pakistani troops were still holding on to the rest. 

"When he was asked if they would be able to retain what was with them, Musharraf said that, because of weather conditions, by August or September Pakistan would have to vacate all the posts. It was already July!

"He explained that, despite the aerial bombing, the Pakistani troops controlling the remaining posts were in a strong position since, sitting at the heights, they could continue to attack the Indian supply lines. The conversation was bordering on the surreal. The dead bodies of young soldiers arriving home had already given lie to the Kargil clique’s May claim that “no one can evict us”[752], that “we are invincible.” [753]"

................................................................................................

"Musharraf maintained that 95% of the ingressed area was still intact with the Pakistani troops. Of the five main ingress points, the Indians had recaptured only one and a half peaks in the Tololing range. With three main peaks still in Pakistan’s control, the army chief was confident that the Indians may be able to regain control of some area but would not be able to remove the Pakistanis from Kargil. Pakistan, he explained, still had the trump card: the ability to block the Srinagar-Leh Highway. Pakistan, he said, had the Indians “by the jugular.” The army chief disagreed with the naval chief’s assessment regarding the possibility of an Indian naval blockade of Karachi port. Musharraf’s conclusion was that even if the Indians went for all-out war, it would merely be a stalemate. The Indians could never be victorious.

"Musharraf later recalled his presentation at the DCC meeting. The army chief said that he had made a “complete presentation” that was spread over an hour. According to Musharraf’s recollection, “He (Nawaz Sharif) kept asking me should we withdraw and I was avoiding giving an answer. I said it is the leader’s job to decide …I will give the military and strategic analysis. I explained whether there would be open war or not, why the military activity would be restricted only to Kashmir and would not go beyond…I gave a complete presentation.”[754] Musharraf recalled explaining to the DCC participants how far India could be tied down in Kashmir and said that the civilian leaders “better start talking on Kashmir.”[755]"

That sounds far less confident. 

................................................................................................

"This military assessment made by the architects of Kargil at the DCC meeting was also reflected in the media. For example,the daily Nation quoted the Inter-Services Public Relations spokesman, “Pakistan will hold on to its positions on the LOC at all costs.”[756] Significantly, only a day before the DCC, the paper reflected the position the army leadership was to take the following day at the DCC. The Nation’s editorial emphasized, “India is in a horrible bind. It has nearly two divisions in the Siachen sector, and three divisions in Ladakh against China, all of which are supplied only by the Srinagar–Leh road. If that road is interdicted by the freedom fighters upto mid-September, when it becomes snow bound, then India will not be able to provide Siachen and Ladakh garrisons sufficient supplies to last out the winter. While the troops are unlikely to starve, their combat capability will suffer enough for a Pakistani offensive in Siachen to have good chances of success. The pressure on the Pakistani side is that Kargil will not remain a vital choke point forever. Because of the recent operation, work has been speeded up on alternative road routes to Leh, which have been planned by the Indian government. While there are always construction delays, Pakistan cannot count on there being no alternative route next summer.” [757]

"At the DCC meeting, there were tense moments. As the military briefing continued, the thrust of the prime minister’s question was, “What you are now telling me, you should have told me earlier.” ... Shujaat insisted, “Whatever has happened has happened, and is not important any longer.” Instead, he suggested that a statement be “jointly” drafted sending a message of unity, of collective responsibility for what had happened, and a joint effort should be launched to manage the current situation. ... "

................................................................................................

"The meeting had been long but not decisive. The press reported, “Lengthy discussions on pros and cons, on policy options, but no final decision was taken. The meeting was informed that any premature step in either way may lead to some drastic developments and before taking a final decision it should be kept in mind.”[766]  Reflecting perhaps the concerns of some of the DCC participants, one newspaper report suggested, “The so-called withdrawal from Kargil by Mujahideen will have serious repercussions.” It went on to argue, “First, the morale of the nation and armed forces personnel, two the political loss and the present government will have to suffer; three its impact on the freedom movement and the Mujahideen inside occupied Kashmir and four does it mean burying the liberation movements for many years to come; five what will happen to the Kashmir cause and who will guarantee that the Kashmir issue will be taken up in future talks with India.”[767] The same daily documented the consequences feared by some DCC participants of the continued military and diplomatic stand-off leading to a limited or full-scale war with India: “First neither Pakistan can afford any war with India; two the state of preparedness, three any spillover of the war may result in a disaster for the region; four where was Pakistan in the diplomatic community as international pressure is mounting for withdrawing the so-called infiltrators and the pressure of India to de-escalate..”[768]"

" ... Minister for Religious Affairs Zafarul Haq said, “The Back-channel is continuing and there is no question of withdrawal.” He briefed the meeting about his visit as a special envoy to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, and Bahrain.” The DCC had agreed to send some key ministers as “special envoys to various capitals” with the objective of “highlighting Pakistan’s position.” The Prime Minster also decided to brief the DCC members on the back-channel interlocutor Niaz Naik’s mission to Delhi.[770] Only three days earlier, the Foreign Office had insisted that Naik was in Delhi on a private visit."

" ... The civilians, who had earlier concluded that Pakistan had been led into disaster by its military leadership, now believed that high casualties plus the loss of Tololing and the Tiger Hills had also put the military under pressure."

"Interestingly, on the day the DCC met, two other Kargil-related developments also took place. In Washington, the US Congress passed a resolution with overwhelming majority asking Pakistan to vacate Kargil. The House International Relations Sub Committee on Asia passed the resolution by a 20 to 5 vote. The Committee Chairman Benjamin Gilman, a Republican from New York, said in his opening statement, “The government of Pakistan has previously supported terrorism in India. This latest incident, however, is far beyond the murder of innocent civilians on a train or at a wedding party…it is widely reported that Pakistan Army intelligence service and government have moved thousands of men and materials up to the Pakistan side of the LOC and sent hundreds of army regulars across the line. Pakistan is laying down artillery fire in support of the invaders and the leaders of Pakistan should now withdraw its forces.”[772] ... "

" ... Pakistan’s political leadership was more than ready to withdraw. Key foreign office officials were equally clear about the need to withdraw. Only the army chief, at the DCC meeting had insisted his forces had ‘staying power’ in Kargil. Musharraf had also claimed that the Kargil operation had accrued political and diplomatic advantages to Pakistan."

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November 12, 2022 - November 12, 2022. 

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CHAPTER 14: THE END GAME 

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" ... Nawaz Sharif flew to his hometown Lahore for the weekend. His concerns were clear. His thinking process was not. He was playing his cards close to his chest. The chief of army staff, ostensibly satisfied with the military situation of his troops, went off with family and friends to a hill resort for the weekend. He believed that his troops had staying power but he was also beginning to note the international pressures that were being applied on Pakistan.[777]"

Notice the open, unthinking bias exhibited here by the author, presumably in favour of those in power as she wrote. That's typical paki. 

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" ... The service chiefs had also differed. They knew that the political leadership was keen to withdraw, but the Army seemed unclear. They believed, ‘The Army’s body language conveyed their wanting to withdraw too.’ However, Musharraf had made no such statement. The bureaucrats were not there to take decisions but they believed their input influenced decision-making. ... A section within the core Foreign Office group was unsure of the wisdom of withdrawal.[778]

"The Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary, Saeed Mehdi, called US Ambassador Milam to convey Sharif’s intention to talk to the US President. Milam relayed the request to the State Department. Shortly before this request, Clinton had also received a letter from Sharif asking to meet him. However, the letter, which had been drafted by Sharif’s Foreign Office team, had yet again linked the Kargil flare-up with the broader Kashmir problem. In Washington, the tone of this letter conveyed that ‘Sharif was wringing his hands … that he was looking for personal cover … he was not a man of great courage’.[779] Sharif had written in response to Clinton’s letter, written a few days after Zinni’s return to Washington. Clinton had thanked Sharif for receiving Zinni but had wondered why there was no action on Zinni’s report that Sharif was willing to withdraw troops from Kargil. By now, the bottom line message of Washington’s communication to Islamabad was: ‘Get out!’ Clinton himself, his envoy General Zinni, and the State Department had repeatedly told Sharif that negotiations over the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Kargil were out. This was now Washington’s and Delhi’s shared objective.

................................................................................................

"The PM telephoned from the Governor’s House in Lahore.[783] During the call, Sharif was not assisted by members of either his ‘kitchen cabinet’ or of the core Foreign Office group. In attendance were Saeed Mehdi and Iftikhar Ali Khan. The prime minister’s brother, Shehbaz, was at the family home in Raiwind. Chaudhry Nisar, his close confidante and a member of his ‘kitchen cabinet’, was two hundred miles away in his home town, Taxila. The Foreign Office team was at work in Islamabad. By contrast, at the White House, Clinton was surrounded by his key aides. He remained, therefore, within the parameters set by Washington’s primary objective of forcing an unconditional Pakistani withdrawal. During the telephone conversation, the US President sent no mixed signals to his Pakistani friend. 

"Sharif, once again, urged Clinton to play a role in defusing the Kargil crisis and in resolving the Kashmir dispute. He asked to see him.  Clinton reminded Sharif of the precondition for a meeting. Sharif did not contest Clinton’s suggestion of a unilateral, unconditional withdrawal. Clinton told Sharif that he wanted to help him and to help Pakistan but Pakistani forces had to first withdraw. Clinton again rhetorically queried why Pakistan had done this. Sharif said he could give him ‘the entire scenario when we meet’. Clinton emphasized that time was of the essence and that they ‘are losing time’. According to Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Riaz Khokhar, Clinton agreed to receive Sharif because the Americans wanted that the prime minister to personally convey that the Pakistani troops would vacate Kargil. Clinton wanted to hear for himself from Sharif that he was willing to withdraw.[784]

................................................................................................

"The phone call had made it clear to the Clinton administration that ‘Sharif was looking for a political cover for withdrawing Pakistan’s forces’.[785] Equally, Clinton made it clear to Nawaz Sharif ‘that he could not provide cover and withdrawal had to proceed on its own merit’. Sharif insisted that they talk face-to-face. It was an unusual conversation between two heads of government. Clinton’s advisors saw it no differently. They had ‘never seen anything quite like that, i.e., you invite yourself, that it was a bizarre time to invite yourself’.[786]

"Clinton agreed that the beleaguered Sharif come the following day. It was a national holiday, US Independence Day, but Clinton agreed, sensing that the Pakistani prime minister was likely to concede unconditional withdrawal. In Islamabad, it was read differently. According to one of Sharif’s close confidantes, by inviting him on a holiday, Sharif was told by Clinton, ‘While we do not work on a national day, but this is a measure of the importance we give to this issue.’[787] The American account of this call also confirms that, detecting from Sharif’s conversation the willingness to withdraw troops from Kargil. Clinton conceded to an immediate meeting with the prime minister, who offered to arrive the next day.[788] A Sunday surprise was in the offing."

................................................................................................

" ... From Sharif, Washington needed a withdrawal as well as a commitment to help Washington find Osama Bin Laden.[789] The State Department laid out these demands on the one-page briefing paper it prepared for the US President for the 4 July meeting.[790]

"In Pakistan, there was no preparatory work that Nawaz Sharif sought from his core Foreign Office team, the cabinet members, or the Army. The focus was now on getting the logistics done for the Washington dash. Sharif knew that, in getting a meeting with Clinton, he had in fact proceeded ahead with his ‘kitchen cabinet’s’ consensus on involving the US.[791] According to a key member of the ‘kitchen cabinet’, ‘The call was made in line with the inner circle’s thinking about the need for an honorable withdrawal.’[792] He explained, ‘Since the Americans kept telling Nawaz Sharif there was a peaceful way of settling this issue, the idea was to suck them in to help settle Kargil peacefully.’ The ‘kitchen cabinet’ believed ‘it was preferable to talk to the US, not to the Indians, because talking to the Indians was like insulting the honest brokers [US]’.[793]

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"Sharif’s Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz, was not in this inner loop. He was not even remotely clued into his PM’s decision to explore the withdrawal option with Clinton. Therefore, when on arrival from Burkina Faso, when he was asked to comment on US Ambassador Milam’s statement that US ‘perceived flexibility’ in Pakistan’s position on the Kargil issue, Sartaj merely reaffirmed the existing position that the Kargil flare-up was not of Pakistan’s doing. He told reporters, ‘I think there is no flexibility or new position. Pakistan has always respected the LOC … The question is: What is the LOC? Who is sitting there? It needs verification and these violations on LOC, on either side, Pakistan side or Indian side, should be corrected. As far as Pakistan Army is concerned, it has not violated the LOC … We have invited UN observers that they should come and see where the LOC is. If anybody had violated it, it should be corrected.’[794]"

The paki lies, right there.

"At the prime minister’s family home in Raiwind, the prime minister, his father, and his younger brother, vigorously discussed the Sharif’s decision to go to Washington. At the DCC, there had been no discussion at all on a possible immediate Washington trip. It seems that major policy matters, which were not even brought up in constitutionally mandated forums, such as the DCC, were to be debated by the members of the ‘first family’ in their private home. The prime minister’s younger brother, a key political player and the chief minister of Punjab, vehemently opposed Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington. He opposed it ‘tooth and nail’. He argued that the PM’s attempt at closure would be portrayed by the Army as the squandering of a military victory by the civilians. The prime minister’s elderly father, Mian Mohammad Sharif, who often influenced key national decisions taken by his son, disagreed with the younger son. He supported the Nawaz Sharif’s decision to fly to Washington. He saw the Washington trip as ‘an effort to get Pakistan out of trouble’. Mian Mohammad believed that the developments in Kargil had landed the country, much like a family, in trouble and, therefore, it was required by the chief executive as head of the family to get the family out of trouble. Shehbaz was emphatic that, if the trip to Washington had to be made, it was important that the army chief be taken along for the 4 July meeting, so that the withdrawal agreement would not been seen as a ‘sell-out by the civilians’. The prime minister agreed. However, in subsequent conversations with his two close aides, Saeed Mehdi and Chaudhry Nisar, he became convinced otherwise. The prime minister felt that, if he, the elected prime minister, took the army chief along with him to Washington, the Clinton administration would conclude that, since the prime minister moved nowhere without the army chief, it would be better to cut Sharif out and directly deal with Musharraf.[795] Shehbaz’s suggestion to take along the army chief was torpedoed. The PM only went along with his brother’s decision to take the army chief ‘into confidence’. Sharif instructed his military secretary to later put a call through to Musharraf. The army chief was spending the weekend in the hills in Murree."

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"After the plan was made, phones started ringing. The prime minister was seeking attendance for an unusual meeting at the Islamabad airport. ... The participants of the ‘airport’ meeting were to be informed of the chief executive’s meeting with the US President. Actually, the finalization of Pakistan’s Kargil strategy was now to take place in Washington at the Sharif-Clinton meeting.

"In its 9pm news bulletin, Pakistan Television (PTV), the state-run television service, announced Sharif’s departure. The Foreign Office also issued a late night press statement. ... The Orwellian machine was at work. There was no mention of the word Kargil in the statement. ... "

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" ... A strong Congressional resolution censuring Pakistan had been passed. ... "

"Ambassador Milam was the next one to know about the trip. Late night on a holiday, Milam received a call from an unlikely caller with an unlikely request. The Foreign Office spokesman, Tariq Altaf, wanted US visas. Milam was obliging. ‘Sure, send your passport in on Monday,’ he told the FO spokesman. But Altaf wanted 30 visas right away so that the delegation could board the PM’s plane! That was the first Milam heard of his President’s meeting with the Pakistani prime minister. He was not in the loop. That evening, the US embassy issued visas to around 30 people accompanying Nawaz Sharif. But, before doing that, Milam called Karl Inderfurth and ‘screamed about not being told of Sharif’s visit’. Inderfurth too pleaded ignorance. The State Department too had not been informed in advance by the White House.[802]

" ... Sharif had planned his 4 July trip with the surprise and speed of a guerrilla operation. He planned the end of the Kargil Operation in the kind of secrecy in which it had been launched. ... "

Was he apprehensive of an assassination to prevent such an outcome? 

"Around 12:30am, the prime minister left Lahore for Islamabad. ... Upon meeting the prime minister, a surprised Musharraf had remarked that he had no clue about the trip. Sharif explained it had been suddenly planned. Musharraf supported the idea of including the Americans and, hence, the Sharif trip. Musharraf again reassured his commander-in-chief regarding the military situation. He said, ‘There is no pressure on us …we can sustain our position. So, please do not take any pressure.’"

" ... Sharif explained in the meeting that he had spoken to Clinton three times and that Clinton was keen to resolve the problem. The prime minister also said that the theatre of war would spread and, given that India and Pakistan were nuclear powers, it could be a disaster. ... The army chief urged the prime minister to ‘get the best deal’.[803] He was not opposed to Nawaz Sharif’s Washington trip. In fact, he supported the move to engage the Americans, whom he believed could help Pakistan leverage its hold over Kargil to extract a favorable commitment from India towards a Kashmir resolution. In fact, Musharraf’s 26 June statement that a Sharif-Clinton meeting may be on the cards had been widely reported in the local press.[804] After the PM’s plane took off, the army chief and the DG ISI left together for Murree."

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"The army chief’s reading of the military situation completely contrasted with that of the two military men in Nawaz Sharif’s inner circle: the defense secretary, a former general, and the DG ISI, a serving Engineers Corps general. These two believed that militarily India was beginning to gain the upper hand and that Tiger Hill had already been lost. Through formal and informal channels, they had begun informing the prime minister and his key cabinet members that the Pakistani forces had been pushed back from at least half the positions they had earlier occupied in the Operation.

"In the civilian political camp, there was no doubt left that Pakistan’s military operation in Kargil had to end. Withdrawal was the only option. The naval and air force chiefs also shared this view. The cumulative effect of the key developments during the last week of June had contributed to this conclusion. ... "

"In Washington, meanwhile, after the Sharif-Clinton telephone conversation, the White House announced the meeting. A White House statement noted, ‘All agreed that the situation is dangerous and could escalate if not resolved quickly. At the prime minister’s request the President will meet him at the Blair House ... to discuss how to resolve the immediate situation.’[805] ... "

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"While there were two kinds of views reflected in the media, the skeptical and the triumphal, it was the latter that had captured the public imagination. The expectation was that Pakistan would successfully pressurize Delhi into working on an early settlement of the Kashmir issue. Given the contradictory and contending assertions constantly made by different institutions, the majority of the reporters and commentators were unable to ascertain the facts of the situation. Most veered towards triumphalism. The average Pakistani mind was in the grip of official propaganda ... "

Author lies again, despite having given the facts clearly, in quoting from " ... Editorial, The Nation, 1 July 1999. ... ", including -

" ... Indian government which felt confident of its ability to suppress the freedom fighters, refused to talk at all. ... "

One, pakis were lying about the intruders being not paki military, and author has confirmed from beginning that it was paki military occupying the peaks in a move to cut off Kashmir into parts so pakis could, not only kill Indians via shelling, but by starving the Indian soldiers to death. 

Two, pakis lying regardless, it's no "freedom fighters" but terrorists that have been sent by pakis across border to inflict death and mayhem in India from Kashmir to South India. 

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Further lies quoted by author, for most of the next pages in the chapter, including abuse heaped on India due to pakis lying to everyone - a sample here. 

"‘It can be confirmed on the basis of sound evidence that not a single Pakistani soldier is present inside Kashmir across the LOC. Such allegations by India are patently absurd and an attempt to cover up her own designs. Pakistan would be insane in sending its soldiery into a highly disputed and disturbed area … Those opposing the Indian aggression in the Drass-Kargil area are the docile and peace-loving sons of the soil in Kashmir who have been driven to take up arms to defend their rights, honour, and dignity in the face of brutal Indian aggression ... The on-going Indian bellicosity is a matter of deep concern to the world … India has shut the diplomatic doors the way Hitler did in 1938–39.’ General (retd) Khalid Mahmud Arif in ‘What Realism Demands’, Dawn, 3 July 1999."

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" ... Some members, however, believed the prime minister should have held a cabinet meeting before leaving. Concern was expressed about the political orientation of the cabinet members accompanying the prime minister, specifically that, instead of all ‘doves’, some ‘hawks’ too should have been taken. Those worried about the developments in Kargil were supportive of Sharif’s decision to take ‘peace birds and not eagles’,[827] as he landed in Washington to avert what they believed was an impending disaster. 

"The public was less sanguine. The media was filled with reports of the Pakistan Army’s impregnable position in Kargil. The public was sensing a victory of sorts. Hence, the street talk over Kargil was expressed apprehensions that ‘what the military has gained in the lingering battle along the LOC may be given a serious jolt by the political leaders and diplomats’.[828] The news of Sharif’s departure had hit them hard. They wanted the prime minister to be ‘bold’ while in Washington. There was no constituency for war with India, only for peace. Nevertheless, they wanted a ‘historic lesson’ be given to India, in case it opted for aggression towards Pakistan. Kargil was seen as a provocation by India.[829]"

"The former army chief criticized the government for its ‘apologetic’ position, that its troops had not crossed the LOC, and that it was not supporting the Mujahedeen. Such a position, he argued, enabled India to plan ‘an all-pronged decisive encounter’ with the Mujahedeen to reverse the situation in its favor. ‘What indeed is ironic is that the Mujahedeen’s heroic success, which could have been channelized into strategic advantages, has been squandered away.’"

And the invader heritage is even more obvious in next. 

"Another commentator wrote, ‘Whatever the exact reason for the Washington dash by Nawaz Sharif, Pakistanis expect that decisions relating to national interest are made in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif needs to return from his Washington dash with his credentials intact as a man who stands firm on national security issues and does not cave in to external pressure. This will be possible if Nawaz Sharif manages either; (i) to get a public declaration from President Clinton that a settlement is only possible if India makes an American underwritten public commitment to resolving the Kashmir problem within a specific time frame and agree on increased UNMOGIP presence in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, or (ii) to publicly declare before leaving Washington that as a country committed to abiding by UN laws, resolutions and international treaties, Pakistan and the Mujahideen seek a solution to Kashmir issue, the basis for the Kargil eruption. In case India is not prepared, Pakistan and the Mujahideen are willing and capable of holding on to their positions in the Kargil-Drass area until it hurts the Indians enough to want to talk provided the military situation is not reversed.[832]"

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" ... As soon as flight PK 761 made its usual refuelling stop at Shannon, the prime minister called his trusted ambassador, Riaz Khokhar, to Washington. He wanted to know from his ambassador if a one-on-one meeting with Clinton had been fixed.[833] The answer was negative. Clearly, there were more than just policy matters that a worried Sharif was keen to discuss with Clinton, matters that he only wanted to discuss in complete confidentiality. Nawaz Sharif was seeking ‘political cover’ to deal with what he feared may be the domestic fallout of what he was about to agree to. Within the domestic context, it was the Army’s reaction that he was most concerned about. He realized that the Army was not keen to leave Kargil and felt that his decision to withdraw troops from there could threaten his survival as prime minister. He hoped Clinton would bail him out on the domestic front."

"The Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar, received the prime minister at the airport. Washington had sought Saudi ‘help’ to bring Kargil to a close. The Americans had found Nawaz Sharif trying till the end to extract some commitment, some concession, from the Americans on Kashmir as the quid pro quo for vacating Kargil. Washington’s response to this was to engineer compound pressure on the Pakistani prime minister to vacate Kargil immediately and unconditionally.[834] Pakistan’s key strategic ally Beijing had already been contacted. Beijing and Washington were in agreement that Pakistan had to withdraw unilaterally. However, it was Saudi Arabia, the provider ‘of usually discounted oil to Pakistan,’ which Washington believed would be most effective in ‘pushing Pakistan in the right direction’.[835]

"The United States government was represented by the US Chief of Protocol. The prime minister travelled to Blair House with Prince Bandar. In Washington, before delivering Nawaz Sharif to Blair House, Prince Bandar briefed Sharif on the mood in Washington and stressed that nothing less than an agreement to withdraw from Kargil was expected.[836]"

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Over and over, author portrays US as eager and desperate to please India! But such a slant on this affair, kargil, implies clearly that Pakistan not only think thst their lies must be taken at par with or higher than facts, but imagine that the whole world must agree with this position, unless they are trying to please India! 

" ... Americans realized that ‘Indians were extremely skeptical that we will succeed and suspicious about what we were doing’. Only a success would have convinced the Indians of what the Americans kept telling Delhi they were doing ‘to get Pakistan to back down’."

When do pakis plan to learn that a Rottweiler used at Auschwitz isn't an icon worshipped through the world! 

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" ... First the two met with their aides. Nawaz Sharif was joined by the Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz and Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed. Clinton was assisted by National Security advisor Sandy Burger, assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Karl F. Inderfurth and a senior National security council official handling South Asian affairs Bruce Riedel. This meeting with aides lasted for barely five to seven minutes. It was followed by an almost two-hour long meeting between Clinton and Nawaz. While Clinton was joined by Bruce Riedel as a note taker, Nawaz Sharif went in without one. He did not want one.[838] Unknowing of this fact the Pakistan Foreign Office team insisted that their prime minister be treated on an equal basis with the host and also be accompanied by his aide to the meeting. It lasted approximately two hours. Clinton began by telling Sharif why Kargil was a blunder and how two nuclear powers were almost at the brink of war. Clinton told Sharif that he had information that the Pakistan Army had begun preparation to use nuclear weapons. Sharif said he was unaware of any such move. As a nuclear power, Clinton said, the international community expected Pakistan to behave more responsibly. ... "

"In the plain talking during his meeting with the Pakistani prime minister, the US President also demanded his government’s full cooperation in capturing OBL. Clinton in his memoirs recalls, ‘On 4 July, I also told Sharif that unless he did more to help I would have to announce Pakistan was in effect supporting terrorism in Afghanistan.’[839] Clinton was basing his assertions on the information and analysis provided by CIA’s Counter-terrorist Center. Pakistan was identified as the principal supporter of the Taliban, the principal protectors of OBL. Significantly, on the very day of his meeting with the Pakistani prime minister, Clinton announced sanctions against the Taliban. He subsequently wrote, ‘On the day I met Sharif, I also signed an executive order placing economic sanctions on the Taliban, freezing its assets, and prohibiting commercial exchanges.’

"Significantly, there was no discussion between Nawaz Sharif and the Foreign Office team before the Clinton meeting regarding the formulation of the statement that he and Clinton would sign. The Foreign Office team had prepared a Pakistani version of a draft agreement. The Americans were determined to stay with their own version."

" ... Sharif carefully chose his words so as not to directly implicate anyone but kept saying that it was an operation that ‘got out of control’. He did, however, distance himself from the Operation.  The striking contrast in the self-confidence of the two interlocutors could not have been lost. While one was backed by a unified and competently functioning government, the other was pretty much on a solo flight."

Perhaps the paragraph above was written so as to depict paki PM’s position as more sympathetic, but the result for any reader not schooled in lies by Pakistan is a disbelief at such an expectation. A democratic nation must function in a manner where the leader and the government function in tandem, not where the civilian leade us a mannequin in dressing window while owner is the terrorist in the back room. 

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Author has novel ways of lying, while seeming technically correct. 

"Nawaz Sharif was insisting that Clinton help him to get out of the crisis. An anxious Sharif’s long rambling on diplomacy with China and with Indian intermediaries was to establish his bona fides as a man in search of a solution. He was like a man who ‘wanted out’ off a train wreck approaching him. At one point, Sharif asked Clinton for a one-on-one meeting. Clinton declined. The Pakistani prime minister was told that the note-taker, Bruce Riedel, would not leave his President. US government rules made it obligatory upon Clinton to have this historic meeting documented. The President of the USA was not free to have his way. He could not act upon his whims."

The last two lines seem to imply that a US president refuses an unreasonable request by a terrorist nation only due to the said US president being "not free to have his way", and his whims must be nothing other than to please the said terrorist nation. 

Which is ridiculous. 

Clearly it was necessary for the US President to, not only follow protocol in this case, but be not seen as complicit with a terrorist nation invading a neighbour, or even be questioned subsequently as to veracity of his account, if pakis chose to lie for any reason. 

As to whims, there must have been a few million that the president could have indulged in at the time, and freely so, without any question of disturbing any protocol. 

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"During the break between the two sessions of the Sharif-Clinton meeting, Sharif’s team found him to be a ‘drained man’. He has been badgered by Clinton’s queries and hard talk on Kargil, OBL, etc. No less was the tension of what he was doing: giving a commitment for a Pakistani retreat from what the military was still publicly projecting as a successful occupation. In fact, during the meeting, the TV in the room was telecasting news of the fall of a strategically important peak, the Tiger Hill. During the break, the prime minister called his army chief to confirm news of the fall of the Tiger Hill.[841]"

" ... The Foreign Office team still ‘offered’ a few amendments to the draft. Sharif was extremely reluctant to take them to Clinton. He said he had been told it was a take it or leave it situation. His team still urged Sharif to ‘not give in’. They were all aware that their internal discussions were being monitored. The Americans knew what they were trying to convince Sharif to do, since the room they were sitting in was ‘not only bugged but also had cameras in it’. Sharif promised his team to make one last effort.

"The 4 July meeting was turned into a battle of nerves. Clinton was well prepared for this battle while the Pakistani prime minister had arrived in Washington having already lost his nerve, owing to what he believed were the Kargil reversals. Sharif had left Islamabad in panic and entered the Clinton meeting with a major psychological handicap. Clinton saw sitting before him a needy and desperate man, not a negotiator. The Americans too found Sharif nervous. In fact, they believed his decision to ‘invite himself at short notice and bringing the family along opened the possibility of his staying back in Washington in case the Army took over in his absence’.[843] ... "

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"Tough times test leadership mettle and a state’s collective institutional competence. Sharif’s mettle was being severely tested. He had opted to do mostly a lone act, nearly a personal operation, on the entire 4 July summit, from planning to execution. He had drawn on external wisdom and an external platform. He seemed to have banked on a major external power even for the political strength required for his 4 July decision. This bail-out operation, as Sharif saw it, of a medium-sized power by the major global power, was a page out of Wallerstein’s classic center-periphery relationship. The ‘comprador’ politician was at play, exposing so starkly the heavy interconnectedness between Pakistan’s internal power game and the global center, with the levers of control heavily tilted in the latter’s favor. Nothing could more acutely demonstrate Pakistan’s systemic weakness as a state run by those with scarce appreciation of institutional decision-making."

That's verbose rephrasing of a failed attempt by Pakistan to do another Munich, failed because they were pretending that they had a democracy and they weren't invading another neighbour after wrecking one, and they hadn't realised that such pretense doesn't wash in era of satellites observations of global goings-on. 

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"The meeting ended with the decision that Pakistan would withdraw its troops behind the LOC to the pre-Operation position. ... "

"The withdrawal discussion had not included any talk about safe passage for the withdrawing Pakistani forces. ... Sharif did not raise any question about safe passage for withdrawing troops.[846] Evidently, it was not an issue that had occupied his mind, nor was it part of the talking points that his Foreign Office team had prepared.  This issue escaped their respective radars because the premise from which it would logically flow, the Pakistani forces actually battling in Kargil and now their withdrawal, did not exist in their articulated consciousness. This kind of denial meant major lapses in policy-making. ... "

"Clinton, as part of a premeditated strategy, used this moment of Sharif’s utter vulnerability to aggressively raise the issue of the Osama bin Laden and the alleged ISI connection.[850] Before Sharif sat the man who had been told that Pakistan was at the center of supporting the Taliban and by extension the OBL network. This network, according to the CIA, was functioning in 60 different countries and was directly responsible for attacks on American embassies. Clinton reminded Nawaz Sharif that he had ‘asked repeatedly for Pakistani help to bring Osama bin Laden to justice from Afghanistan’ and that Sharif had ‘promised often to do so, but had done nothing. Instead, the ISI worked with OBL and the Taliban to foment terrorism’. Sharif had made a personal commitment to Clinton in December 1998 to help the United States in capturing OBL, but had not followed through on it.[851] ... Clinton threatened to tell the world of Pakistan’s support to bin Laden if Pakistan’s help in capturing him was not forthcoming.[852] The Pakistani prime minister reassured the US President that he would now follow through on his earlier commitment. ... "

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"Around 3pm, the Sharif-Clinton meeting concluded. The Pakistani prime minister had agreed to sign a statement which amounted to a global broadcast and an irrevocable documentation by the government of Pakistan that the Kargil Operation had been a mistake."

"The Washington Statement had no legal value but it reflected the personal commitment, binding on the State of Pakistan, made by the prime minister to the global community. It was not a bilateral statement between two interlocutors directly engaged in conflict which would have made the undertaking in the agreement binding. Instead, it was a one-sided statement binding only one interlocutor to take action, committing itself to the actionable portion of the agreement. While Pakistan committed itself to unconditional withdrawal from Kargil, the other interlocutor, Bill Clinton, made a statement of non-statist personal intent regarding his involvement in trying to resolve the Kashmir dispute."

"Behind the scenes, US officials were making two supplementary points. The first was that, although the statement did not mention Pakistani troops, the Americans believed ‘Pakistani soldiers are directly involved in the conflict’. The second point was the need for quick action on Pakistan’s part. US officials publicly stated, ‘Our understanding is that there will be a withdrawal of the forces now … we want to see steps taken very quickly.’[859] The Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman, meanwhile, took the position that Pakistan had not agreed to call back anyone from Kargil. He had told the press corps in Washington, ‘There is neither mention of people, nor return of anything in the Joint Statement.’[860]

"When the prime minister returned to the hotel, Shehbaz Sharif called. Quite agitated, he told the prime minister that Punjab would just not take it and the people would be out on the streets. ... Experienced diplomats held that ‘Pakistan had been cornered and Nawaz Sharif had moved with alacrity’.[862] Its critics labelled it as a ‘political cover’[863] sought by the prime minister for regime survival."

" ... On the morning of 5 July, Sharif, his wife, and children toured the White House and had a photo op with the Clintons."

" ... By the evening, Nawaz Sharif and his family, accompanied by the Saudi Ambassador, Prince Bandar, left for London in the Saudi Ambassador’s airplane."

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"During the London stopover, the real newsmaker was Pakistan’s articulate Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz. In a BBC Hard Talk interview, Sartaj declared that the reference in the 4 July statement to ‘upholding the sanctity of the LOC’ also implied that India must vacate the Siachen Glacier it had illegally occupied in 1984. A rapid rebuttal from Washington stated that the 4 July Statement was only about Kargil, that the US believed in the sanctity of the entire LOC but of immediate interest was the resolution of the Kargil conflict."

" ... Admittedly, the overwhelming deployment of Indian artillery and air power could not have allowed Pakistani troops to hold the peaks for much longer ... "

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November 13, 2022 - November 13, 2022. 

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CHAPTER 15: IN THE EYE OF STORM 

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Another lie by author. 

"Sharif’s Washington dash had earned him a statement with no face-saver for Pakistan. Sharif, in his pre-departure telephone conversation, had been clearly told by Clinton to expect no more and had seemed OK with that. In fact, he had cancelled the crucial meeting of the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) scheduled for July 5, whose agenda had been the Kargil Operation. With input of all stakeholders, the prime minister was to decide on how to draw curtains on Operation Koh Paima. However, at this crucial juncture in Pakistan’s history, Sharif had walked away from collective institutional decision-making. Instead, he headed to Washington."

Since Kargil invasion by paki army wasn't a collective decision, or even had the pm kept informed as in was executed, what is author blaming the pm for? He'd lost face internationally, if pakis as a nation ever had such a thing, for something that had been done without him being informed! If anything, he was more akin to a toddler of Munich blamed for Dachau! 

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" ... Only in private conversations did the army chief and others of the Kargil clique concede rising Pakistani casualties and logistical difficulties. Beginning mid-June, there was guarded conversation within the army command of the crisis of logistics, high casualties, and India’s very heavy force deployment. Reports about this alarming situation were trickling in from the front. Nevertheless, at the 2 July meeting the army chief had insisted that, despite rising Pakistani casualties, compromised logistical supplies, and India’s re-taking of the strategically located Tololing and Tiger Hill posts, it was not a militarily unsustainable position. No hard questioning or holistic discussion had followed. While moments of acrimony between the prime minister and the army chief did occur, the amiable Chaudhry Shujaat had intervened to cool off matters. Thus, policy matters had remained unsettled."

" ... disturbing questions may have crossed Sharif’s mind: what fate awaited him on his return to Pakistan? Would he be able to implement the 4 July statement? How would the army command respond to the 4 July statement? In a country in whose sixty-five year history the military had subverted the Constitution three times to remove an elected civilian ruler, ... In the White House, Clinton’s aide Bruce Riedel had made the dramatic deduction that the Pakistani prime minister had arrived in Washington with his family because, after agreeing on troop withdrawal from Kargil, he was hesitant to return to Pakistan because of fear of the army command."

Author isn't being explicit. After 1971, Bhutto, the pm of a leftover Pakistan, had been executed by an army chief after a coup, using what passes for law machinery of pak for the purpose. 

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"The general assumption was that the army command would resist unconditional withdrawal. All attention was riveted on the response of the individual and of the institution: the army chief, and the army. Without their support Sharif could not fulfill his commitment of an unconditional withdrawal from the Kargil heights. 

"In Pakistan, however, matters unfolded in many shades of grey. Even before the prime minister arrived in Islamabad, his army chief had publicly supported the prime minister’s Washington decision. Mindful of the untenable situation at the front, Musharraf had told the press, “There is complete harmony between the government and the armed forces."[876] He asserted a complete understanding between the government and army about the prime minister’s Washington mission.[877] ... "

" ... According to this official narrative the withdrawal mechanics involved the Cabinet requesting the supposed Kashmiri guerrillas who had occupied the Kargil heights to withdraw and the guerillas acceding to the withdrawal.[880] ... "

"On the question of safe withdrawal, the ISPR brigadier claimed incorrectly, “During the last 12 hours there has been no aerial activity and artillery fighting in the Kargil sector.”[883] And then came the inexplicable claim, ”They are fully capable of looking after themselves.”"

................................................................................................

" ... In the somewhat sullen silence that followed, one general did point out, “Sir, they (the Indians) are celebrating.” Many present in the room must have recalled the army chief’s 16 May assurance that Pakistan was in a “win-win” situation in Kargil as its positions were “unassailable.” Words did not matter. The original and vocal critics of Kargil, including commanders 1 Corps General Saleem Haider, Quetta corps General Tariq Pervez and other had been proven right.  Also, with restive troops and reports of low morale, especially of those who had participated in the Operation, the army chief had a huge task before him."

"It was going to be a hard sell, since government rhetoric had built a public perception since end May of victories for the Mujahedeen fighting Indian troops in the Kargil-Drass area. ... According to media reports based on official sources, Delhi was in a very difficult position since its troops were facing the danger of starvation in Siachen if the blockade of the Drass-Kargil Road continued. In fact, after the Washington agreement, the army spokesman said, “There is no change in ground realities as Drass-Kargil Road is still in range of Pakistani artillery fire…”"

" ... People drew a parallel with the 1965 events, when Pakistan was about to “liberate the whole of Kashmir...when Pakistani leaders succumbed to world pressure and stopped the military operation and we are facing a similar situation now...”[884] ... "

What is the author talking about, or just lies as usual by paki government to pakis? 

Indian tanks had been in centre of Lahore in 1965! 

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"Politicians fully capitalized on this anti-Nawaz mood. Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP), Pakistan’s leading opposition party, was critical of the prime minister for carrying out secret negotiations with Clinton. The MQM also opposed the Washington agreement as a ‘sell out of Kashmir.”[887] It demanded details of the Sharif-Clinton talks and said that an agreement on withdrawal “without a quid pro quo” would be a “a serious disappointment for the nation.”[888] The Jamaat-i-Islami, a right-wing party, who had protested in Lahore against the Lahore summit, was predictably critical of the prime minister. Its leader Munawar Hassan said the Washington statement was “treachery.” ... "

" ... PTI leader Abdus Sattar,[890] with forty years as Pakistan’s top diplomat behind him, predicted that Sharif “will be ousted from power like former rulers ... Regarding the 4 July agreement Sattar said while the army would carry out out orders of the political government in the given environment, the agreement applied to the Mujahideen, not to the Pakistan Army. Sattar merely repeated Pakistan’s official position as he claimed “they (the army) are on the LOC and you cannot ask them to vacate.”[893]"

" ... Gul warned the lawyers at the Lahore High Court Bar that the ... agreement dictated by the US. “We are not an American state…we should not follow American instructions blindly…”[899] He warned of a clash in case the Mujahedeen refused to withdraw from their positions in Kargil. ... "

Funny, he wasn't aware either, that it was all paki military in pajamas, asked to pretend they were terrorists - and disowned by pakis in life and death! 

"All the talk of Mujahideen disengaging or not was all fiction. The Mujahideen, were not involved. Op KP had no support by Hurriyat , ISI or the ongoing struggle in Kashmir creating rear area insecurity; a repeat of a Operation Gibraltar."

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"While the main thrust of all criticism targeting the Prime Minster was that he was responsible for Pakistan’s humiliation, some of Sharif’s cabinet members also rose to his defense. His close confidante, the Minister for Provincial Coordination and Political Affairs, was quick to retort to the critics, “The record of these generals is self-evident.” He reminded them that “in their period of leadership, the enemy occupied Siachen glacier. And so where was their military capability and patriotism then?” [908] The beginnings of a civil-military confrontation were discernable. A Sharif loyalist, General Javed Nasir, who had been appointed by Sharif as ISI chief, also supported the withdrawal. He wrote in Pakistan’s most widely read Urdu daily Jang, praising Sharif’s withdrawal decision, even though this former spy chief had equally vehemently supported the Kargil operation. In his Jang piece, he praised Sharif’s India policy and wrote that the prime minister had “spared no effort for the peace offensive, which he had launched on 21 February 1999 in the form of the Lahore Declaration. Privately, he has also been expressing the desire that we should enter the new millennium with pride and that Allah has ordained the Muslims to serve as an example worth following for the world.”[909] The spin did not work."

That last sentence betrays the author's own slant. 

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" ... The million-dollar question, raised in subdued tones since mid-June, was: “With whose permission was Kargil initiated?”"

"With ISPR the only source of all Kargil-related information their version of Kargil was the only reality the press knew. Hence, pressmen had not been privy to the ground situation, which had tilted in India’s favor. Having lost Tololing posts by the middle of June, Pakistani troops had also lost posts on the strategically located Tiger Hill. The Adjutant General branch at the GHQ had been getting reports of increasing casualties. Even the worried Kargil clique was deeply concerned over mounting deaths of senior colleagues.[910] Supply lines had come under enemy attack, making it difficult to maintain supplies to the posts. A catch-22 situation has been created. Neither was troop pullout possible nor was managing critical logistical supplies.

"The shortage of food had meant that some soldiers even had to resort to eating grass.[911] Ill-equipped, underfed, and frost-bitten, many soldiers had been surrounded by Indian infantry and come under artillery and aerial attacks. The inevitable question was: Where would this continued battle on the world’s highest and most vicious battleground have led? In the face of overwhelming force deployment by the Indians, the troops across the LOC would have either been killed or captured by the Indians."

Another lie there by author, in that "would have" bit. They were, in fact, killed or captured in quantities enough to inform India that they were paki soldiers being denied by pakis. 

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"The news of the prime minister’s effort to end the battle evoked a mixed response among those in the battle-zone. When the news of withdrawal blared from their wireless sets, it was received by many with a sense of relief. Most field commanders were not surprised. Some even prayed for Nawaz Sharif’s long life when they heard of the 4 July agreement.[912] They were losing their colleagues while India was beginning to succeed in reclaiming the peaks and ridges. They knew the balance of forces and numbers was heavily tilted in India’s favor.

"Nevertheless, fighting in the inhospitable terrain under terrible conditions, the question uppermost in the minds of many soldiers was: What had been the purpose of the Operation and of the battle that followed? If a unilateral withdrawal was the final outcome, why the sacrifices? At posts where the young and courageous soldiers had not experienced reversals, many were unable to understand the compulsion to withdraw. There was frustration. ... many could not understand why their country did not own them. Why were the dead bodies of their martyred colleagues not being received and honoured? Many also wondered why a seeming victory was being squandered and was turning into a surrender, and that too a globally broadcast surrender?"

"Predictably when the Kargil battle came to a close no official casualty figures were issued. The pretence of no Pakistani troop involvement also meant that accepting bodies of martyred soldiers would be difficult. Even during the withdrawal, the Indians claimed that they buried “army soldiers of 12 Northern Light Infantry, who had been killed at Point 4875” in the battle to reclaim posts in Drass sector.[926]  Also, while several guesstimates were made, the government issued no official casualty figures. For example, in Pakistan, the military quoted the figure of around 500 deaths, while there was talk of an estimated one thousand Pakistani casualties. The prime minister claimed there were more than thousand casualties.[927] Senior military officers claimed the worried army chief had shared a figure of one thousand casualties.[928] The war martyrs issue and their number came up when the army chief sought a rehabilitation budget for families of martyrs and veterans."

" ... Towards end-July, however, the army command changed its policy on receiving bodies of their fallen men because of Colonel Sher Khan. ... "

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"Pakistan continued with its disingenuous approach of claiming that the Mujahedeen, not its army, were present in the mountains. ... "

Author invents words - or sentences, paragraphs - to label the paki lies. 

" ... Meanwhile, at the July 11 joint presser, while giving an update on the withdrawal along with the ISPR’s Brigadier Rashid, foreign minister Aziz claimed, “In the past few weeks the Mujahedeen action has been gloriously successful as the just and legitimate cause of Kashmir has engaged the international community’s undivided attention throughout the period.”[933] The brigadier also recounted the Mujahedeen’s military victories over the Indians, who, he claimed, were suffering from “sagging morale.” If the Indian morale was “sagging” and the Mujahiedeen were “gloriously successful, then why the 4 July agreement?"

Precisely. 

As Molotov, fed up with nazi lies about RAF never daring to bomb Berlin and Berlin being completely safe, had asked his host who'd hurried him from dinner to shelter,  due to a precisely timed RAF raid - "so why are we hiding in this shelter, and whose bombs are these that are falling around us?"

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Author extensively quotes statements then issued from various terrorist organisations, based in or supported by pak, and their mouthpieces or leaders. 

"These endless statements claiming Mujahedeen presence also clashed with the widely known facts about Pakistani soldiers fighting in Kargil. Pakistan continued to spin this bizarre narrative. While the prime minister’s trusted bureaucrat Tariq Fatemi told the Indians we are “rolling our beds” and the Pakistan and Indian DGMOs were in contact coordinating Pakistani troops withdrawal and the international community was also commenting on Pakistani troop withdrawal, Islamabad was making a parallel stream of statements claiming that Pakistan had in fact requested the Mujahedeen groups fighting in Kargil-Drass, to withdraw!"

" ... Finally, when he himself was President, Musharraf opted for full disclosure. He acknowledged in his book that “as few as five battalions in support of freedom fighter groups, were able to compel the Indians to employ more than four divisions…”[944] In fact, adding a new dimension, the former army chief also claimed it was the “Pakistani freedom fighters”[945] who had occupied the front-line positions."

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" ... Woven into the criticism was also the demand that Pakistan should not allow its territory to be used for action against the Taliban and bin Laden. ... "

" ... While the prime minister believed he had, through the Washington Statement, pulled the ‘chestnuts out of fire,’ the weaknesses of the Kargil Operation and the consequent strategic, diplomatic, and institutional costs to the State of Pakistan were evident. As noted earlier, at the 2 July DCC meeting, the prime minister had criticized the operation. Within the domestic context too Sharif wanted civilian leadership to formulate and project his government’s public policy on the Kargil and post-Kargil developments. On the external front, the civilian government had begun to determine ways to deal with the diplomatic and strategic fallout of Kargil. In the minds of the authors of Kargil, who were grudgingly cognizant of Sharif’s intentions while also being sensitive to the simmering resentment within their own institution, civil-military tension was inevitable.  The army leadership was nervous about Sharif’s next move.  There was apprehension that the army chief may be dismissed, as newspaper columnists close to the government were demanding."

" ... Despite the Sharif-Musharraf publicly stated common positions, the subtext of the khaki narrative was that Kargil, a great military victory was turned into a defeat. The Sharif government saw it as a khaki-authored disaster that Sharif’s 4 July Washington visit had helped to curtail."

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November 13, 2022 - November 13, 2022. 

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CHAPTER 16: THE AUGUST QUADRANGLE 

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"The Kargil blunder proved that there could be exceptions to the maxim ‘failure is an orphan’. As the country’s chief executive, it was Sharif who was left to deal with the fallout of the Kargil blunder. He publicly adopted the failed Operation KP as his own, while its actual architects were not only refusing to accept exclusive responsibility but were surreptitiously feeding the myth that it was a success and that, hence, the 4 July withdrawal decision was a wrong one. Against the backdrop of the multiple critiques of the Operation, its architects went into a veiled offensive defense mode. ... The almost surreal elements of the Operation itself included the government insistence that the Mujahideen had carried out the Operation, to Pakistan’s refusal to accept dead bodies of martyred soldiers, to the post-4 July announcement by the Pakistanis that the Mujahideen have been requested to climb down from the Kargil heights and then publicly complaining that India was attacking the withdrawing Pakistani soldiers. There were too many contradictions to be resolved. Amidst these vacillating positions, gallantry awards were announced for Pakistani soldiers who had fought in Kargil."

" ... While Sharif had bailed out the Army and had shown no inclination to hold the generals accountable for the disaster, the army leadership had decided to launch a systematic propaganda offensive against the prime minister.[959]"

" ... The prime minister recalled in a subsequent interview, ‘I kept asking General Musharraf: After all what did you have in mind when you planned such an Operation?’[964]"

" ... PM had no intention of taking any action against the army leadership. He never once mentioned the need to set up a Kargil Inquiry Commission targeting the army chief. ... Would the military leadership strike through a coup d’état or would the elected prime minister use his constitutional authority to do the unprecedented: fire the second army chief within a one year period. This was the million dollar question doing the rounds."

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"After the 4 July decision to withdraw the jolted morale of sections of the Army began to become apparent. In ways unknown to Pakistan’s highly disciplined Army, many began asking their seniors harsh and angry questions. Bottled up resentment across all ranks began to surface in senior command meetings and, in open forums, younger officers were raising uncomfortable questions. Trained in the elite training institutions to inquire and question, some among the inquisitive and now agitated minds were daring to ask uncomfortable questions.

"For many who participated in this Operation, which was launched secretively and never acknowledged publicly, it was one in which many nameless soldiers were also killed[966] and which had been ended in indecent haste. Many Pakistanis, both civilians and military men, who had not been privy to the facts at the time Nawaz Sharif left for Washington, believed that a military victory had been bartered away at the Washington meeting. The fact that the Indians had already reclaimed at least 50 per cent of the Pakistani occupied posts was not known to many. ‘Why did we go in?’ asked resentful younger soldiers, who were initially getting news of their colleagues occupying unchallenged hundreds of posts deep inside the Indian-held territory. Those who were yearning to go to the front, whose friends had fought and lost their lives, and who were told by their seniors that Operation KP had brought the Indians to their knees, wondered why the political leadership had crafted an ignominious end to the brave and bold winning efforts of their colleagues.

"By August, from within the cracks in the leaden walls of secrecy shrouding the Kargil Operation, sagas of suffering soldiers had started slipping through. Men sent in with backpacks bearing three-day supplies had gone hungry for days as there was minimal or no logistical support for them. Soldiers from 5 NLI  had been sent hurriedly from the plains in June straight onto the deadly heights without getting themselves acclimatized and only with backpacks. Indian interdiction of Pakistan’s supply lines through air attacks had succeeded ... And yet Operation KP had extended beyond the original blue print, with men who had been given the green signal to press ahead beyond Koh Paima’s original blueprint to occupy the unprotected heights of Kargil. They faced major food shortages. Kargil veterans talked of surviving on stocks of Energile drink, clumps of grass, and by killing the odd ibex. ‘We were living under survival conditions,’ was how one major recalled their plight. ‘At times, there was even no food to eat. Some even had to eat grass. ... The cumulative blame for the appalling subsistence conditions, most among the troops believed, lay with the High Command, which was oblivious to their miserable plight and was found wanting in its professional responsibilities."

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" ... He mostly received cold, if not aggressive, receptions from the officers. For example, in the Quetta Garrison 41 Division auditorium, a captain asked the visiting army chief, ‘If you had to pull-out in exchange for a Nawaz Sharif and Clinton breakfast meeting, why did you go in?’ Another wanted to know why prime minister Nawaz Sharif had let them down. The Corps Commander Quetta, accompanying the army chief, had to intervene to ask his officers to take it easy. This resentment among the officers sprang from the widely held belief that, by calling off Operation KP when it was virtually impossible for the Indians to militarily dislodge Pakistani troops from their posts, the prime minister had committed a blunder.[969]"

" ... These young warriors had many hard questions. ‘Why did we conduct the Kargil Operation?’ ... The chief refrain was: ‘Who is responsible for this fiasco?’ And the young soldiers wanted to know.

"In rare cases, soldiers lying in delirious conditions on hospital beds even cursed at the commanders visiting the injured. According to one Kargil veteran who, after fighting at the Tiger Hill, lay injured in a hospital in Gilgit, another veteran on the bed next to his shouted and in abusive language cursed the military commanders as they came to visit the injured. ... Another injured brigadier, who had commanded an NLI brigade, was evacuated to Rawalpindi because it was not safe for him to be around the injured and extremely angry troops.[972]"

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"By such public expression of their angry emotions, the young officers and jawans of NLI had broken rigid institutional codes. This was particularly evident at the traditional Darbar gatherings convened by the NLI commander who had led the Kargil operation.

"The soldiers who returned home after almost being trapped in the world’s most inhospitable and treacherous battle field and having a close brush with death had expected heroes’ welcomes. Instead, they felt hurt and unappreciated. Many complained that the media ‘mistreated’ them and the people did not give them ‘the credit’ they deserved. And the withdrawal phase made matters even worse. Failure to ensure a proper scheme of withdrawal, to prevent the unnecessary loss of life to Indian artillery fire, had caused soldiers to feel badly let down. ... "

"In August, angrily weeping families had received Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the army chief in Gilgit with the demand that their sons, brothers, or husbands be brought back, dead or alive. Their anguish stemmed from the extraordinary circumstances. There was no declared war and their men had not announced they were going to the front, and there were dead bodies arriving and, worse, there were highly disturbing Indian media reports that the Pakistani authorities were refusing to accept many of the bodies of their soldiers.

"In July, Pakistan’s Political Counsellor in Delhi, Jalil Abbas Jillani, had received a call from his Indian counterpart asking him to receive the bodies of fallen Pakistani soldiers. Under instructions to refuse, Jillani told Vivek Katju, Additional Secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, that there were no Pakistani soldiers fighting in Kargil. The bodies Indian authorities wanted to handover included the body of captain Kernel Sher Khan who had been awarded the Nishan-i-Haider, the highest military award. By the end of July, these instructions to the Pakistan High Commission were changed and they had begun accepting the bodies. As Islamabad accused Delhi of torturing Pakistani soldiers, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesman offered to handover several Pakistani soldiers, captured in Kargil, to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[973]

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"The increasing resentment among the officers and the jawans was no secret. The army chief, keen to rebuild the troop morale and their esprit de corps, chose unique ways to do so. Musharraf ordered that a camp fire be organized for the troops where, sitting around the fire, they recounted their battle stories and sang songs. The chief also danced to some songs. At the conclusion of the campfire, Walkmans were distributed among about 450 soldiers.[974] 

"The army chief decided to be with the troops. As a special morale-boosting gesture in July, Musharraf spent a night with the SSG battalion. In three MI-17s helicopters, the battalion was flown to Chota Deosai. A campfire was arranged with music and food and the chief spent the night with soldiers from 12-NLI and 5-NLI. The commander 10 Corps and commander FCNA were also present as the army chief delivered his pep talk to the despondent troops. ‘I too am from the SSG,’ he told those present, ‘You must please be mindful of my respect.’[975]

"In the mini-mutiny that was being exhibited by the young soldiers, the commanders on the defensive had to compromise on matters of discipline. For example, while Commander FCNA Javed Hassan was keen to punish the soldiers who left their posts, his Corps Commander, General Mahmud, advised relieving them instead of court-martialling them. He feared punishing them would open up a Pandora’s Box.[976]"

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" ... Earlier in April 1998, Benazir and her husband were convicted on corruption charges. Deeply drawn battle lines all targeted Sharif’s corruption—his refusing to return billion of rupees of loans, his seeking to control the parliament by becoming Ameerul Momineen, his party workers’ attack on the Supreme Court, the controversy around the 4 July decision to withdraw: all these gave the Opposition another stick to seek government’s early removal. The ruling family’s loan scandals were snowballing into a major crisis. Interestingly, the Army, despite its huge and dangerous blunder in Kargil, was in a secure spot."

This has largely to do with paki caste system that sees conquering invaders as above all, despises traders as moneymaker and respects feudal system. Consequently army is owner of most of paki land and businesses, unlike most other - functioning - countries where business, military and land ownership do not mix. 

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" ... The PPP insisted that the government, and specifically the prime minister, had cleared the Kargil Operation. The religious parties criticized the withdrawal and the Sharif-led government’s re-engagement with India, as well as his decision to pull back support to the Taliban and enter into dialogue with the Northern Alliance. They consistently attacked the government for allowing US Special Forces to come to Pakistan to train Pakistanis involved in the ‘Capture bin Laden’ Operation. Through August, these protesting parties and sections of the media, who dominated popular discourse as well as public space, reiteratively popularized the narrative that Washington had stepped in to save India from a certain military defeat that the Mujahedeen had almost inflicted on India. The Washington Accord, for them, was a sell-out of the Kashmiri cause."

" ... The army chief in his meeting with the prime minister’s younger brother and Chief Minister of Punjab, Shehbaz Sharif, suggested that he must consider becoming the deputy prime minister in order to streamline the federal government’s performance![977] The younger Sharif, while having heard the army chief attentively, was clear that neither would his brother fancy such a suggestion coming from him and nor was his vacating Punjab, the fortress of Pakistan’s politics, a wise move. Meanwhile, the authors of the country’s biggest military debacle would call out the elected government on governance matters. The blundering group in khaki would hold the weak civilians accountable while they launched a campaign to discredit the elected government."

"In addition to the resentment within the rank and file, the army chief had to deal with internal rifts between his top military commanders, as their criticism of the Kargil Operation began to surface. They believed the ill-conceived Operation had caused embarrassment to the entire institution.  Even the military’s own top spymasters and senior commanders were actively kept out of the loop. When they had picked up indicators of unusual troop movement, the existence of the Operation was denied. Others, who had questioned the viability of the Kargil plan during the early May Corp Commanders meeting but had their concerns dismissed by the architects of Kargil, were also talking. This, after 4 Jul  many a hitherto tight-lipped and resentful commander was now more vocal in his indictment of the Operation.

"The public critique later by one of Pakistan’s most professional generals, Lt. General Ali Quli Khan,[979] best captured the views of Pakistan’s top commanders. Commenting on General Musharraf’s own conclusion on the Kargil Operations, ‘Considered in purely military terms, the Kargil Operations were a landmark in the history of the Pakistan Army,’[980] Khan, the former Chief of General Staff wrote, ‘I am totally amazed at such ostrich-like behavior when the whole world considers Kargil to be the worst debacle in Pakistan’s history and where countless innocent young lives were lost for nothing. Absolutely nothing!’ [981] He further added, ‘I regret to say that the conception and planning at the highest level had been poor—in fact, so poor that the only word which can adequately describe is it unprofessional. We all know that the main duty of the high command is to ensure that with their meticulous planning they create conditions whereby their junior combatants can fight easily. This was certainly not done at Kargil. It is also fairly obvious that the Kargil Operations was not conceived in its totality, with the result that apart from bringing ignominy to Pakistan it also caused unnecessary misery to a lot of innocent people.’[982] 

"Internally, within the institution, there was disquiet after the withdrawal. Instructions were that Kargil would not be discussed in any school of instruction, neither in any class nor in any study period. No courses would be taught at the NDC etc. The subject of Kargil was a ‘banned item’."

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"Criticism from beyond the borders also hit hard, especially when it floated in world capitals in form of the vicious, scathing criticism in the ‘Rogue Army’ advertisements campaign that targeted the Pakistan Army and multiplied the woes of the Kargil clique. Within days of the 4 July Sharif-Clinton Statement, the advertisement ran in leading US newspapers, including the New York Times. Musharraf wanted an official and very prominent rebuttal issued in the very papers in which the advertisement appeared. It was a matter of the troop morale, he asked a common friend to convey to the prime minister. The army chief also offered to pay for the rebuttal advertisement in case the government had funding problems.[983] The prime minister disagreed. Despite the intervention of his father and brother, Sharif was unrelenting. Only one article could be commissioned to counter the advertisement." 

Now, author returns to prevaricating. 

"Thus, the pressure from within the Army, the vocal criticism by the navy and the air force, and the general political chatter prompted the architects of Kargil to adopt an offensive defense posture. In August, deeper fault lines emerged between the civilian and military leadership’s approach to handling the post-Kargil period."

This is like death of a child due to physical assault by an adult blamed on those criticising the said assault. 

Does the author wish here to imply, or let reader infer, that those responsible for Kargil invasion against India and killing of Indians thereby, planned and executed, had been well-behaved, or well intentioned at any time? 

Had they not violated rvery norm, every protocol, in the process, of functioning of a proper military of a proper government, when invading Kargil - without informing their own government? 

Was their anything that could be termed proper in their conduct in their subsequent denial of their own soldiers, even to the extent of refusing the dead? 

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"The most public manifestation of this difference was over the question of decorating the Kargil heroes, martyrs and the living, with national awards for valor. Why this issue became a controversial one between the government and the Army was principally because the Army had publicly taken the position that it was not Pakistani soldiers but freedom fighters who had fought in Kargil. The prime minister had sustained this charade, begun initially by the Army during the Kargil Operation, even after the 4 July withdrawal. The army leadership now wanted the government to approve national awards for the ‘Kargil heroes.’

"The GHQ also wanted nationally broadcast television programmes honouring the heroes of Kargil. There was a reason why the Kargil clique now wanted to acknowledge and honour the brave and the best of the Army, earlier having opted to let them be projected as Mujahideen. The clique now detected the increasing anger and agitation of the troops caused towards their commanders, not only because of the debacle-like end of Kargil, but also in their role and sacrifices not having been acknowledged.

"Sitting in their secure garrisons, these were men of command and authority who must have silently been haunted by the calamitous Operation they had designed. More blood, their critics argued, of Pakistan’s brave soldiers had flowed in this calamity called Kargil, than put together in the two wars Pakistan fought in 1965 and 1971."

The claim about 1965, in view of the authors repeated ridicule of Indians ineffective and killed at Kargil, is debatable at best. 

But 1971? That's a horrible claim, considering the genocide perpetrated by paki military in East Bengal, accompanied by organised mass gang rapes they also perpetrated along with killings, in millions, comparable with and outdone by only nazis in WWII. 

The only way to reconcile that statement with reality is to not only deduce but accept a value system so racist that it had counted half its own citizens as not human. 

And the only reason that paki military did not have 93,000 of paki military dead in East Bengal was because India, instead of letting them be taken prisoners of war by the then new nation of Bangladesh, had instead returned them safe to the then remaining, truncated West Pakistan, which really had no right to retain the name because they'd lost 60% of their own erstwhile paki population, the Bengalis. 

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" ... Interestingly, although Pakistan’s public position was that Kashmiri Mujahideen, not Pakistani soldiers, were fighting the Indian Army in Kargil, yet, that night the Kargil clique, identified the recipients for the highest gallantry award, Nishan-i-Haider. Additionally, approximately 80 soldiers were given various other awards on General Javed Hassan’s recommendations. He insisted awards were necessary to raise the morale of the soldiers.

"The Awards ceremony, called Kargil kay Hero, was televised by PTV, but the Sharif-led government was keen to call off its broadcasting. The prime minister was trying to re-engage with the Indians. Thus, Nawaz Sharif and Shehbaz Sharif did not participate in the programme. While all the chief ministers participated, the Punjab chief minister avoided it."

It seems to have not occurred to the author that not everybody can sustain the doublespeak that paki army maintained, of both disclaming and awarding role of paki soldiers in Kargil simultaneously! 

If the then pm of pak had participated in such a televised spectacle, or his brother had, doesn't the author realise that the paki pm could then subsequently be questioned on the factual discrepancy, by world media, not to mention international diplomatic corps,  and even various governments and their leaders, even officially? 

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" ... State Department spokesman, James Rubin, said that, even on Kashmir, the US could mediate only if Pakistan and India both sought mediation. Away from 4 July, Pakistan had to manage its own relationship with India."

Author returns to paki lies. 

" ... In Pakistan, civilian intelligence agencies had reports of sectarian killers finding safe havens in neighboring Afghanistan. ... "

Fact is taliban were the spectrum created in and by Pakistan, to take control of Afghanistan in name of religion - and it wreaked havoc in a society that had women professors until then, teaching at university! Thereafter pakis pretending that it was an Afghanistan problem is height of duplicity and fraud. 

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More lies, more fraud. 

"The actual implementation of the ‘Capture Osama’ plan also began in August. The Taliban remained committed to protecting the 41-year-old Saudi millionaire. They kept him ‘under the protection of a special security commission’.[991] The US President’s most unusual threat of 4 July that, unless Pakistan did more, he ‘would have to announce Pakistan was in effect supporting terrorism in Afghanistan’ had worked.[992] The plan to capture OBL was first proposed by the Pakistani prime minister himself in his 2 December 1998, Washington meeting. Economic sanctions on the Taliban were already in place. Around this time, with Sharif’s support, US officials also began to train 60 Pakistani troops as commandoes to go into Afghanistan to get bin Laden. ‘I was skeptical about the project; even if Sharif wanted to help, the Pakistan military was full of Taliban and al-Qaeda sympathizers. But I thought we had nothing to lose by exploring every option.’[993]"

In view of his eventual capture - in Abbottabad, within walking distance of what US terms "West Point of Pakistan", was he really ever in Afghanistan? 

Or had he been spirited away out of sight straight into protection of paki military even before Kargil? 

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" ... The CIA planned a ‘ring of kidnapping squads around Afghanistan to move in to capture OBL when required’.[994] 

"After his commitment with Clinton, Sharif personally led the effort to convince the Taliban government to handover OBL. In July, he met, along with the visiting the Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan, the Afghan Foreign Minister Mulla Mutawakil at the Punjab House in Islamabad. With the help of an interpreter, the Saudi Prince reminded Muttawakil, ‘We had helped you, we had recognized you, but you are ungrateful.’ The Taliban leader was reprimanded in ‘strong and humiliating term’. Muttawakil said they were grateful, that they wanted Saudi assistance to continue, but handing over OBL or ‘extraditing him’ was ‘impossible’. This blanket refusal annoyed the prime minister and his Saudi guest.[995] Clinton’s ‘Get OBL’ policy included use of force at multiple levels. The Taliban leader Mullah Omar was under attack. At the end of August, a saboteur’s bomb exploded near his home in Kandahar.

"The ‘Capture Osama’ Operation was being launched. The Americans were funding the construction of barracks, three miles south of Rawalpindi, for SSG commandoes. According to the plan, Pakistani commandoes, on intelligence information, would be infiltrated into Afghanistan to kidnap bin Laden. While the ISI chief, now reporting to the prime minister and following his instructions, went along with the plan, the top operational tier opposed it. Senior generals believed that ‘nothing could be more foolish’. OBL, they believed, was an ‘elusive target’ and looking for him was tantamount ‘to searching for a needle in a haystack’. ... While the US sent FBI officials to train the commandoes and to monitor the operation, senior officials were skeptical of the scheme. ‘We said to ourselves: Why do they need searchers for someone they are already aware of? Well, we played along,’ recalled one US official.[996]

" ... Pakistan began its shuttle diplomacy between Kandahar and the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, trying to get talks restarted between Ahmed Shah Masood and the Taliban.[998] While the Northern Alliance blamed Pakistani officials for, in reality, siding with the Taliban, Pakistani officials repeatedly spoke of their ‘peace agenda’ and for initiating the shuttle diplomacy in response to President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s request.[999] ... "

Author now openly takes sides - with the fraudulent and the invader - who'd failed, to boot. 

" ... Whatever were coup-maker Musharraf’s justifications at the time of the coup, years later, he was more truthful as he wrote in his book, ‘It was in dealing with Kargil that the prime minister exposed his mediocrity and set himself on a collision course with the Army and me.’[1001]"

" ... Caught between trying to pull Pakistan out of the Kargil debacle, reviving the dialogue process with India, containing the fallout in the military and political circles, and also dealing with the political pressures generated from his government’s incompetence, no inquiry was instituted against the army chief and other architects of Kargil. Instead, a campaign was launched against the civilians, the army leadership feeling ironically confident enough to hold the civilian leadership over issues of governance."

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November 13, 2022 - November 14, 2022. 

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CHAPTER 17: A BRIDGE TOO FAR 

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"The bonhomie of the prime minister and the army chief’s early September trip to the NLI headquarters in Skardu was short-lived. Although on Kashmiri rights, Sharif was unrelenting, calling for a UN-supervised plebiscite in Kashmir similar to East Timor[1002], the ghost of Kargil had sown distrust between Sharif and the military command. Behind closed doors, in the corridors of power, and in the homes of the powerful, subdued games were on. Some played for survival, others for reprimand and retribution. Tool bags for menacing games were thrown open. All was fair play: wiretapping, inspired media reports, surveillance, interpreting intercepts, spy men on the prowl, instigating anger, manufacturing street protests. The ghost of the Kargil debacle was haunting Pakistan’s corridors of power. The members of the Kargil clique, architects of the debacle, were fearful of being fired. Armed with institutional resources and experience at surreptitiously fighting civilian authority, they were all set to fight back.

"Sharif was in a difficult position. Unlike Sharif’s unbridled October 1998 reaction to a speech by Musharraf’s predecessor army chief general Jahangir Karamat, which led to latter’s dismissal, the post-Kargil situation was a very complex one. Pakistan had lost in martyrdom many of its brave young men yet internationally the country was being criticized. Pakistan’s credibility as a responsible nuclear State had received a serious setback. Yet the prime minister could not hold the army chief accountable for the debacle at Kargil. He was constrained by issues around his own public ownership of the Operation and of “national honor.” [1003]"

When do pakis plan to learn that neither killing nor giving one's own life is counted as praiseworthy (and nowhere outside of their own medieval creed, anyway), when in quest of world conquest, or simple looting of others, post medieval era - and, that, it's definitely no longer medieval era as of half a century ago, through most of the world? Calling those invaders martyrs is signatory of a creed of world conquest in name of a creed, but in every sensible process of thought, they were no more than oil thrown by those seeking to set fire to a neighbour's home. 

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" ... His Washington interlocutors were already aware of the real architects of Kargil. But, under siege from domestic troubles, with political opponents multiplying and unifying under the 19-party Grand Democratic Alliance[1004] banner, the prime minister seemed to have concluded that he was going to work silently on tackling the Kargil clique. Ouster of the army chief was unlikely. However, some form of reprimand was inevitable. The cumulative impact of all this was the rise of distrust and suspicion among Pakistan’s power players."

" ... In a heady moment during the landmark 17 May briefing, General Aziz, the Kargil kingpin, had prodded Pakistan’s prime minister to dream about being second only to Jinnah. ... As Chaudhry Nisar, his key aide, later argued, once the ball was set rolling, the Kargil Operation was ‘irreversible’, even if the Prime Minister had wanted to reverse it.[1006]

"In the media, a plethora of accusations surfaced, targeting the prime minister: that he had sold Kashmir, surrendered in Washington the victory won at Kargil; he had wasted the sacrifices of the brave soldiers at Kargil, had appeased the Americans, bowed before the Indians etc. With facts of the beginnings, the conduct, and the military outcome of this Operation little known, these accusations seemed plausible. Sharif’s dash to Washington had been widely publicized."

................................................................................................

" ... Pakistan’s chief executive was now under an extraordinary level of intelligence watch. The intelligence under the army’s high command maintained a close tab on the prime minister and his cabinet. The army intelligence picked up the Prime Minister House chatter. The army chief complained to a confidante that the PM’s intercepts had revealed that he would make Musharraf apologize publicly,[1007] claiming that the PM had promised this to the Indian Prime Minister! Considering that, ever since the cover was blown from the Kargil Operation plan, the PM had taken ownership of it and tried to extricate, in his calculation, Pakistan and its Army with honour, self-respect, and minimal diplomatic damage, such an undertaking seemed highly unlikely. ..."

"The army chief’s anger and nervousness persisted. The blame talk would just not end. There were complaints from within the army high command, chatter in Army messes, insinuations from the government’s men, and a few voices even within the media. He had requested the government several times to respond to news reports blaming the army chief for the debacle–indeed, even of conducting it unconstitutionally, i.e., without the chief executive’s permission."

In short, he wanted the lie and the cover, the pretense of it having been the civilian government decision to invade, to continue - along with the lies about no paki government involvement, it having been all independent terrorists.

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" ... Nervous and jumpy, the Kargil clique arranged to target its principal adversary, the prime minister himself, by weaving a two-front siege around him. They reached out to journalists to gauge the mood in the civilian quarters. Others were tasked to gauge the mood and reach out to the distraught Opposition parties and estranged politicians within the ruling party.

"The 14 September interview splashed by Pakistan’s most widely read Urdu daily, in which Sharif’s backchannel point-man Niaz A. Naik held the army responsible for sabotaging, what he claimed was, a time-bound plan that the two prime ministers had agreed upon for resolving the Kashmir dispute, deepened suspicion in the barracks. Naik had also asserted that Sharif had not been informed of the Kargil Operation, first hearing of it around 25 April. This contradicted Musharraf’s public statement of 16 July that ‘everyone was on board’.[1008] On 15 September, a prestigious English daily published ‘military source’s expectation that “some responsible functionary would remove the impression created by the former foreign secretary that the Army did not want resolution of the Kashmir dispute”’.[1009] The same day, Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz stepped in to more than clarify. In his Senate speech, he said that the armed forces had acted in the interests of Pakistan and it was ‘totally untrue’ that through the Kargil crisis the armed forces had undermined the Pakistan-India peace process.[1010] Nevertheless, the foreign minister seconded Naik’s claim that a time-bound approach to resolving Kashmir had been agreed upon. Sartaj’s speech also addressed the signing of the CTBT, a red herring issue in the hands of the political opposition. He was categorical that Pakistan ‘will not consider signing it till the time sanctions imposed by the US were removed’.[1011]

"Matters were in a flux. On 15 September, the Foreign Office spokesperson formally announced that the Prime minister had ‘no plans’ to attend the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session. The cancellation was unexpected. The reason that circulated in the press was that, because Pakistan had decided against signing the CTBT, the PM wanted to avoid the pressure he was likely to face at the UNGA, especially from the Clinton administration. However, less known was the fact that a close confidante of the army chief, who was also an intimate friend of the Sharif family with easy access to the prime minister’s father, contributed to the PM’s decision to miss the UNGA session. Musharraf, wary of what the PM might say about the Kargil clique, and especially about him, was keen that he not attend the UNGA.[1012] The confidante was therefore sent to Mian Sharif to convince him to dissuade his son from traveling to New York. Mian Sharif was convinced that, with trouble brewing at home, it was unwise for his son to travel. The PM did not travel."

Obviously, if it was that easy for the army to control the paki PM without subterfuge, the subsequent coup was merely making it official!

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"The angry chief’s words were interpreted by many as signalling a possible coup looming around the corner."

" ... Clinton administration had been sending messages through US Ambassador Milam, to send his envoy, so that Clinton could follow up with his 4 July promise of helping restart the Pakistan-India dialogue on Kashmir. ‘Do not send someone from the Foreign Office,’ was the message. In Islamabad, it was expected that the US would help Pakistan to continue with the Lahore process. ... ‘Trust’ was the key consideration for the prime minister. So, in the midst of raging political troubles, Nawaz Sharif sent off his brother Shehbaz Sharif as his special envoy to Washington."

" ... The State Department’s South Asia men had gauged Sharif’s political troubles. The Islamabad whispers of a possible coup or a likely Musharraf sacking were loud enough to reach Washington. They wanted to hear from Sharif’s emissary how deep the civil-military divide was. They were keen for facts on the follow-through on Pakistani troop withdrawal from Kargil and Islamabad’s re-engagement with India. Away from the India question, Islamabad and Washington were active partners in a ‘Get Osama’ Operation. This included both Islamabad directly persuading Mullah Omar to give up OBL and also the launch of a joint operation with the CIA to physically capture the al-Qaeda chief."

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"Shehbaz held a six-hour-long marathon session with Karl Inderfurth and Walter Anderson. The meeting took place at Washington’s historical Willard Hotel, where Shehbaz was staying. The Willard was where Abraham Lincoln had spent the night before his first inauguration as President in 1861. Before the Inderfurth-Shehbaz marathon session began, as an ice-breaker gesture, the otherwise frugal Inderfurth had spent $80 to buy his Pakistani guest The History of the Willard Hotel. 

"In Washington, Shehbaz Sharif’s concern about the possibility of a coup was apparent. Although he ‘never said he feared a coup but was beating around the bush’. There was very little discussion on how to advance the Lahore process. Some among the US side found that ‘the dialogue was sterile on Kashmir’.[1019]"

" ... On Kargil, Shehbaz Sharif informed them that troop movement was going according to plan. However, throughout the meeting, Shehbaz repeatedly expressed concern about ‘extra constitutional’ developments. He, in fact, referred to it 15 times. Yet, he did not once mention the word ‘military’ nor asked for US help in dealing with the military. His focus on ‘extra constitutional pressures on an elected government’, combined with what Washington was picking up from Islamabad, left no doubt among the Americans that trouble was brewing for the elected government that the Clinton administration would have rather seen in office. However, Sharif’s special envoy never said he feared a coup. He gave mixed signals and the Americans did not get candid answers on facts."

" ... In fact, as Talbott would later recall, ‘Shehbaz would not quite confirm, even in response to direct questions, that a military coup was brewing.’[1020] However, he added, ‘Shehbaz’s mannerisms, his mirthless smiles, long silences, and abrupt changes of subject when we asked about the situation at home, left us in no doubt that something was afoot.’[1021]"

" ... When Inderfurth pulled him to the side and asked him if Musharraf was alright, Shehbaz told him he was implementing the 4 July agreement and asked if he knew Musharraf.[1023] Inderfurth replied in the negative. ‘Why don’t you invite Musharraf?’ Shehbaz advised him."

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"They repeated their concerns: Pakistan supported cross-border activity, undermined the sanctity of the LOC, supported terrorism, and prevented the solution of Kashmir. Pakistan, they felt, was on the slippery slope of tension and war[1024] and complained of Pakistan’s non-cooperation on the CTBT. Shehbaz ... reiterated Pakistan’s position that the solution needed to be a win-win one and the US must play a role in finding it. Good on optics only, it was an unrealistic expectation.[1025]

"Within a week of their meetings with Shehbaz Sharif, the US officials were announcing at the New York UNGA that the ‘only appropriate role’ for Washington was ‘to support bilateral engagement between Delhi and Islamabad’.[1026] Pakistan’s request for a special envoy on Kashmir was opposed by Inderfurth since, ‘Washington saw no purpose to be served by a special envoy’.[1027] Secretary Of State Albright had also categorically said, ‘No US involvement.’[1028] ... "

"The meeting ended with the promise that the Pakistani government would prevent cross-border terrorism, respect the LOC, and pick up the threads of the Lahore process. ... "

" ... Clinton administration was interested in Nawaz Sharif’s survival in office because it knew that its own keenness to see resumption of Pakistan-India dialogue, the end of cross-LOC activities by militants, the end of all Pakistani support to Kashmiri freedom fighters and the Taliban, and the arrest of Osama bin Laden, were objectives the Sharif government was in fact pursuing. Hence, a pro-Sharif statement was in Washington’s own interest. Shehbaz welcomed such support, thinking as all Pakistani politicians had believed that it would prove an enabling factor for a civilian government attempting to assert its control."

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"A major American takeaway from the Shehbaz visit was that the Sharif-led government was in trouble at home. Senior US administration people like the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Pickering, saw Shehbaz as being ‘worried that they would have to pay for what they did (troop withdrawal)’.[1029]  The US Administration then took an unusual step. From New York, where the Clinton team was attending the UNGA session, Karl Inderfurth issued a statement that called on the Pakistan Army not to try any ‘extra-constitutional method’ to remove the Nawaz Sharif-led government.[1030]"

" ... Washington was keen to extend support to Nawaz Sharif, the man Clinton trusted, the man who had already become a high-value friend after consenting to Washington’s Pak-US collaborative ‘Capture OBL’ Operation. US officials had hoped this statement would alter the prevailing power dynamics in Pakistan to Sharif’s advantage. Such an expectation suggested two problems. One, Washington was delusional about the power its mere word carried. Two, Washington was ignorant of the local dynamics at work in Pakistan."

Author stretches one single point inyo two there, or rather, hides one by doing so. Point really she makes is that crazy jihadist nation that Pakistan have been since inception - that'd be since caliphate movement supported by Gandhi that nevertheless ended with massacre of over 1,500 Hindus in Kerala (termed 'Moplah killings', ie, son-in-law killings, because of Arab traditions of Arab seafaring muslims marrying and keeping local wives in Kerala) - there's no trusting their word even if anyone, including US, pours hundreds of billions of dollars in aid; they'd behead a US citizen as and when they please, anyway, as they fid to Daniel Pearl, denying all responsibility to boot and pretending that the authorities were not aware of goings-on. 

Her first point really should be that US is mistaken in assuming that a beneficiary to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars can influence a thug that the terrorist factory in reality is, all it's always been and intends to remain, terrorising - and begging at gunpoint, in turn. 

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"It was the annual season of international diplomacy. The two foreign policy principals, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, had arrived in New York for the UNGA session. ... Jaswant Singh’s gift to Albright was United States and India, 1777 to 1996: Bridge over River Time with Albright reciprocating with Engaging India: U. S. Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy, a collection of essays on America’s strategic relations with India.[1036]  In a sign of growing cordiality between the two capitals, there were unprecedented ‘long, intensive discussions on Afghan developments’, on Clinton’s Delhi trip, the first in 21 years, and on possible counter-terrorism cooperation[1037].

"In New York generally, the Indians found themselves in a comfortable situation, with global focus being on terrorism and counter-terrorism, the very issues for which Delhi sought support. After decades of Washington-Delhi strategic dissonance, signs of strategic convergence were emerging. In fact, the US, Russia, and even Pakistan’s staunchest ally, China, all converged on sanctions against Kabul’s Taliban regime—hosts of  the terrorist mastermind OBL, who planned terrorist attacks against both American and Russian targets.[1038]"

Did the author have a delusion at any point that world - outside her own paki origin - can be comfortable with terrorists or terrorism? Why make it seem as if this, counterterrorism or disapproval of terrorism, was an agenda sold by a single nation that, until then and since, for decades, was victimised by this nothing but the terrorist factory that pakis have forever been?

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" ... Thousands of Kashmiris threatened to cross the LOC on 4 October. Delhi threatened to open fire on those crossing the LOC while Islamabad urged them to call off their march.[1044] While Islamabad, already reeling from the Kargil debacle, decided to let them go and cross over at Chhakoti, the Indian forces were to prevent the crossing in stages through a graduated application of forces.[1045]"

If there are any Kashmiris left in paki occupied parts of Kashmir valley region, they are far too repressed and terrorised to attempt a threat, the place having since paki occupation been completely flooded and dominated by those from Western Punjab, as indeed is everything in pak from army to every province, including East Bengal until 1971, when they fought back to independence. 

Any Kashmir original citizens who dream of independence are the delusional ones that are the pampered and coddled citizens of India who imagine that, while Pakistan exists, Kashmir could have an existence of any kind except a butchered and sold in pieces carcass, as Gilgit, Baltistan and Baluchistan have been since Pakistan occupied those by force. 

It was a Gandhian - mistaken - policy responsible for their travails, by Nehru who refused their accession until too late for Kashmir and more than late for Baluchistan or Nepal. 

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" ... the unstated consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council including Pakistan’s ‘all-weather friend’ and strategic partner China, was that Kargil was a diplomatic and political blunder that derailed the promising Lahore process. ... "

" ... Significantly, most anti-Sharif forces sought military intervention to remove the Sharif-led government."

" ... With Washington impatient for progress on tracking and nabbing bin Laden, the CIA’s counter-terrorism cell saw the ISI as a partner of last resort. In fact, the ISI was viewed as a Taliban and OBL sympathizer, but Ziauddin was not viewed as hard core ISI. Also, Clinton’s South Asia men were against getting directly involved in the Afghan battlefield or directly confronting Pakistan over Afghanistan. Instead, the policy decision was to use Pakistan’s influence with the Taliban to track OBL. During his Washington trip, Pickering sought a meeting with Pakistan’s top spy. Pickering urged Ziauddin to actively nudge Taliban head Mullah Omar to hand over bin Laden to the Americans. And Ziauddin did."

" ... Soon after his return from Washington, General Ziauddin arrived in Kandahar on 5 October. The head of the Afghanistan-Kashmir desk, Major General Jamshed Gulzar, accompanied him. They arrived in a special plane and met Mullah Omar at his abode, a small mosque in Kandahar. At this meeting, the Pakistani intelligence officials offered condolences over the death of his wife and child.[1057] The ISI officials then informed Omar of the reason for their trip. An agitated Omar’s response was, ‘Osama bin Laden is like a bone in my throat. Neither can I digest it nor can I cough him out ... My problem is that I have given him a commitment as an Afghan and I cannot get out.’ Omar continued, ‘I pray that I die or he dies.’ Omar was clear that he ‘will not extradite him but if he goes on his own he should go’. Omar then asked his guests, ‘Can you tell me a country where he could be given protection?’ His guests could not. ... "

Was this work a research thesis submitted before the guy was located, caught and killed in Abbottabad, within walking distance from what US terms 'West Point of' pak? 

Else, was the hiding him in plain sight in the fortress-like house in Abbottabad a subsequent plan? 

Or do pakis really honestly  laim he lived there gorgeous years and they knew nothing? That ISI is indeed so incompetent as to never having noticed Obama living in Abbottabad? 

No, it's far more believable they lied. 

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Here's the extent of paki arrogance - 

"The CIA, in its effort to get OBL extradited, was in direct contact with it’s Pakistani counterpart, the ISI. Recalling the extent of the US desperation to get OBL, a senior ISI official said, ‘If I would have asked him to lick my feet, he would have.’[1060] The ISI, meanwhile, maintained a distance from CIA officials. For example, meetings with the CIA regional chief were held in ISI-run ‘safe houses’ instead of the ISI headquarters."

It's not just that the ISI guy said it, but that it got published with no concern regarding any repercussions. 

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" ... The whispering campaigns became louder. The one that greatly amplified existing distrust between the prime minister and the army chief was that the prime minister’s brother was in Washington to get clearance from the Americans to appoint the ISI chief as Pakistan’s new army chief. For Musharraf and the Kargil clique, there was plausibility in this story; they knew that Musharraf had no presence in Washington while Ziauddin was now in partnership with Washington on Washington’s top priority issue. Yet, the reality was different."

"Nevertheless, the growing insecurity of the army chief and his circle led them to practically work out an Operation Self-Survival. ... "

Author has gone to great lengths yo excuse the coup, just as she did to excuse the attacks against India. 

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"Essentially, the self-survival strategy that seemed to be at work was five-fold. One: Use the media to spread disinformation about Kargil. Hold back the facts of the military fiasco, the discontent within the Army, and instead train the guns on the prime minister. Paint him as pro-India, pro-US, and anti-Pakistan.

"Two: Encourage and, if needed, facilitate all the anti-government parties to work together on a common platform and demand the ouster of the government. Sections within the Jamaat-i-Islami were already against the Nawaz-led government and had led the Lahore agitations during the Sharif-Vajpayee Lahore Summit. It worked to the Army’s great advantage that the opposition was hitting out at Nawaz Sharif for the Washington Statement. It gave strength to the Opposition’s existing call for the government’s ouster. Similarly, the religopolitical parties and several of the guerrilla groups fighting in Kashmir, severely criticized the Washington statement and called for Sharif’s removal. The upcoming leader, cricket hero Imran Khan, had launched a major offensive against Nawaz Sharif. Sharif was friendless. The security agencies encouraged this situation. Significantly, all the anti-Sharif forces advocated military intervention. Numerous analysts also supported this position.

"Three: Widen the existing cracks within the PML leadership by working on those already alienated from the central leadership. Individuals like MNA Ejazul Haq were ready partners for Sharif’s ouster.

"Four: Be in a readiness mode to launch a coup d’état at short notice. This required the army chief to post his most trusted commanders in key posts and corps and finally also conduct actual drills of forces likely to be involved in staging a coup. Accordingly, through September, Musharraf posted his trusted men in key positions critical to successfully launching a coup. He assigned command of the traditional coup-maker brigade, the 111 Brigade, to his most trusted man, Brigadier Salauddin Satti. ... "

"Five: Develop special SOPs to deal with unusual developments, especially involving the removal of the army chief. The army chief feared that he could be called to the prime minister’s House and informed of his dismissal. Hence, any delay in the army chief’s return from a meeting with the prime minister would be interpreted as a danger signal. 

"By the end of September, the deployment of soldiers around the Prime Minister’s House had been increased beyond the normal one unit. Extra commando units were brought in and stationed in Rawalpindi. More sophisticated intelligence gadgets for transmitting information were also being used by the security. The prime minister was under full army intelligence watch. All incoming and outgoing communication from the Prime Minister’s House was monitored."

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" ... Musharraf feared that the PM had made definite plans for a new army chief as well. Musharraf raised these questions in his meeting with Shehbaz Sharif and wanted to specifically know if the PM was going to appoint an air force man in the chairman’s slot. A perturbed Musharraf told Shehbaz, and later the Defense Secretary as well, that his father had called from the US asking him if he was being fired. Twice, Musharraf had tried to reach the Defense Secretary, who was in Turkey.[1066] Musharraf also complained to Shehbaz that he felt that his and his commanders’ phones were being bugged. Shehbaz Sharif assured him to the contrary. ... Sharif’s father, with whom a Musharraf confidante had lobbied regarding Musharraf continuing as army chief, had also advised his son to retain him. That ended the uncertainty about Musharraf’s retention as army chief.

"Similarly, on the issue of the Quetta Corps commander, whom Musharraf wanted out because of his public criticism of the Kargil Operation, the reluctant prime minister gave in to the advice of his brother and key aide Chaudhry Nisar ... On 4 October, the army chief handed over to the Defense secretary the early retirement orders of the Quetta Corps Commander, Lt, General Tariq Pervez. ... "

Did atrocities against the Baloch and in Baluchistan get stepped up only subsequently, or were they always perpetrated but exponentially more hereafter? 

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" ... The naval chief had resigned. As he later claimed, he had resigned because he had learnt there was likelihood that Musharraf was planning a coup.[1070] ... "

" ... Influences stronger than the prime minister’s brother and his closest political confidante, including the US-befriended ISI chief Ziauddin, propelled the prime minister into a reactive mode. Ziauddin, overseeing the ‘Capture OBL’ Operation, had long been eyeing the army chief’s position. The historical civil-military distrust had also kicked in to prompt Nawaz Sharif to fire his army chief, the second time within a year. Meanwhile, given the civil-military divide over Kargil and the subsequent misgivings within the army regarding prime minister’s moves against its leadership, the Army had become prepared with countermoves to prevent it’s chief’s ouster."

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November 18, 2022 - November 18, 2022. 

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CHAPTER 18: THE COUP 

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"Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was an agitated man.[1078] He believed he was not responsible for Kargil yet it was he who was taking the flak. He neither publicly blamed the army chief General Musharraf nor instituted an inquiry against him. Instead, goaded by his key advisors Shehbaz Sharif and Chaudhary Nisar and instructed by his authoritarian father, he had accommodated the army chief’s wishes on several scores. The family patriarch Mian Mohammad Sharif had also received the Musharrafs at the Sharif family home and had tried to defuse the palpable Nawaz-Musharraf tension. In the hope that it would bring about a ceasefire between the two, the senior Sharif had purposefully told Musharraf, Shehbaz, and Nawaz, “You three are my sons.”"

" ... On the morning of the 8th the day after the the removal of corps commander Quetta general Tariq Pervez, commonly known as TP, a national daily carried the story. According to the news story, TP had been removed for meeting the PM without seeking clearance from the army chief. His removal was one of the CBMs brokered by the Shehbaz-Nisar team and extended by the PM to the uneasy army chief.[1079] However, on being informed of the news report, the PM instructed his Principal Secretary to call the Defense Secretary to find out who provided the ‘facts’ for the story and who had it published. The PM instructed that GHQ should be asked to issue a rebuttal. ... "

" ... Quetta corps commander, also arrived in the capital the same day. He was en route to Murree to collect his family. The agitated ex-commander met with the Defense Secretary to protest against his dismissal. Unsuccessfully, the Defense Secretary tried to pacify him, promising an ambassadorial posting. Having just been forced to retire, the heavy built, loud-voiced TP, angry at Musharraf as the man who had demanded his dismissal, was challenging his retirement. TP’s man, his brother-in-law Minister Nadir Pervez, was part of Sharif’s inner circle and the PM was fully aware of his interpretation of what TP’s dismissal and the controversial news report signaled.

"The following morning, 9 October, the newspapers carried the rebuttal. The PM had wanted the rebuttal to come from an army institution. On that Saturday morning, around the time he left for his weekend visit to Lahore, in an interview to an Urdu daily, Tariq Pervez strongly criticized the decision to retire him. His tone was threatening. The same day, Raja Nadir Pervez, Minister for Communications, returned to Pakistan from a foreign tour and met with the PM in Lahore."

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"The next forty-eight hours proved to be critical in influencing the course of Pakistan’s history. ... setting was Jati Umra, the PM’s private family estate. Mian Muhammad Sharif, the PM’s father and the family’s patriarch, presided over these history-making events. ... Shehbaz arrived at the family gathering, only to receive hell from his father. He was reprimanded for advising the PM to dismiss Nadir Pervez’s brother in law, the Quetta corps commander. ... TP was considered the government’s ‘own man.’ Not only was he related to their Minister but he was also the only corps commander who had publicly criticized Op KP. Meanwhile, faced with this paternal anger, Shehbaz still insisted that there must have been some misunderstanding. Musharraf could not have had anything to do with the news report. The PM recalled that General Majeed Malik had said that, after this, no corps commander will listen to us. The agitated PM shared his decision to fire the army chief. The family patriarch listened as his younger son shot back to advise his older brother against such a move. “It will end in a coup,” was the Punjab chief minister’s refrain. ... Shehbaz argued that the time to remove Musharraf was early June when the naval and air chiefs were critical of the operation. The PM had no doubt that Musharraf had to go. However, he announced no final decision.

"On Sunday, he summoned his Military Secretary Brigadier Javed Iqbal to the Jatti Umra estate at Raiwind. ... The brigadier warned him of serious consequences. “Remember, Zia took Bhutto to the gallows,” he said. ... he did remind Sharif that Musharraf had the Kargil debacle in his closet, and would wrest power from Sharif rather than be charged with the blunder after being dismissed. The brigadier made it clear to the PM that the commander 10 Corps was bound to “hit back” in case of his chief’s removal. Nevertheless, as the half-hour garden chat ended, the PM had been assured that under all circumstances his MS would remain loyal to him."

" ... The PM’s decision to remove the army chief was final. He even gave his son Hussain Nawaz the task of writing the speech he planned to deliver while announcing Musharraf’s retirement. Hussain also penned down some of the speech ideas his father shared with him. However, it was a closely guarded secret, one he was unwilling to share with even his younger brother Shehbaz."

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" ... He had decided to tell the people that the army chief had kept him in the dark about Kargil, about Operation KP. That, in doing so, Musharraf had violated official trust and rules of business. Sharif would also share how he had tried, in the national interest, to work with Musharraf, but simply could not."

" ... DS then mentioned that, in case he wanted to discuss TP’s case, the matter was closed and the retirement orders have already been issued. Nawaz Sharif asked him to forget that case and said that he was taking him to PM House for something else. He told the DS that he had decided to retire Musharraf and to appoint Ziauddin as the new army chief. Taken aback, the DS said, “Sir, this is too serious a decision.” The PM’s response was, “General Sahib, I have already decided.” ... "

" ... DS said he could not issue retirement orders of the army chief unless he got “written orders from the PM.”  The PM tauntingly said, “You are scared of the chief; you are a supporter of the chief.”"

"The new chief was summoned to the PM house. Ziauddin, the ISI chief, arrived with an unusually large contingent of armed men. He was surrounded by eighty to ninety former SSG troops trained by the army for the Get Osama force. These former SSG troops, carrying Uzi machine guns, periodically resorted to dramatic gun cocking gestures as a show of strength by the ISI chief."

" ... Around 5pm ... the news of Musharraf removal and Ziauddin’s appointment was announced.

"The PM had also instructed the new chief that, on arrival at Karachi, Musharraf  was to be given the protocol due to a retired army chief. General Ziauddin called Corps commander 5 Corps, Lt. General Usmani, and informed him of his appointment. He asked Usmani to take Musharraf to the Corps Guest House. Usmani’s chief of staff also informed him that the army chief had been removed."

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" ... The newsroom at Pakistan Television (PTV) Islamabad, where the report of Musharraf’s “retirement” was prepared for broadcast, turned into the first scene, and perhaps the only venue, of a semblance of struggle between the prime minister’s men and the Pakistan Army.  Around 5.30, the newsroom informed MD Beg that a dozen soldiers led by a major had entered the newsroom. The major had given instructions not to run the news of the army chief’s removal while continuing with the normal transmission. The MD made successive calls to the PM House to apprise the PM of the happenings inside the PTV studios. The PM was unavailable and his Principal Secretary urged the MD to run the news as instructed. The PM’s son Hussain was emphatic that the crisis was manageable. “It’s a colonel-level coup,” he assured the MD. “Do not worry. We have the army chief sitting with us and he will sort it all out.”

"Meanwhile, the Director News at PTV also called to inform the PM’s team of the troops’ arrival. The soldiers were physically preventing repeat broadcast of the news."

"When PTV MD Beg arrived at the newsroom, he saw the army major standing in the middle of the newsroom with his twelve accompanying soldiers surrounding him. Brigadier Javed was standing close to the major and ordered him to disarm. “Sir, I am under the command of the 111 Brigade, not under your command. And I am doing what I was ordered,” was the major’s response. The Brigadier pushed his pistol against the major’s side and in seconds the troops loaded their guns and pointed them towards the brigadier. There was pin drop silence as the petrified PTV staff looked on. The major ordered his troops to put down their guns. The troops were ordered by the major to disarm and a group of around 15 commando-trained Elite force militia collected the guns and locked the soldiers in a side room."

" ... Immediately after the weather bulletin, at around 6.20 pm, PTV in its English bulletin again flashed the news of the chief’s shuffle."

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" ... The army chief, traveling from Colombo to Karachi with 198 other passengers, was aboard the Airbus flight PK 805. The prime minister personally called the Director General Civil Aviation Authority (DGCAA) Aminullah and ordered him not to let the plane land at any airport in Pakistan. The PM’s instruction was that PK 805 had to proceed to Muscat. Sharif made another call and repeated his instruction to the chairman PIA Shahid Khaqan Abbasi was also brought into the loop. To ensure removal of Musharraf successfully, he wanted all his flanks covered; above all he wanted to render Musharraf, the man whose removal he had ordered, professionally ineffective.[1099] ... "

" ... The Secretary to the DG CAA, a Wing Commander, was working on closing down the Karachi airfield.[1103] The Inspector General Police for Sindh was gathering the police force at the airport to physically block the runways. By 6.29 pm, the airfield had been closed.

"From the Air Traffic Control (ATC) room, the ATCO passed the prime minister’s orders via intercom to the highly guarded radar room, one of the few locations with a communication link to all airborne flights. Accordingly, at 6.22pm, the radar room passed the orders to the flight Captain Sarwat Hussain, “Do not land at Karachi or at any other airport in Pakistan.” There were only around 20 minutes to PK 805’s touchdown."

" ... Captain Sarwat then called for someone from the army chief’s staff. Musharraf’s trusted ADC, Brigadier Nadeem Taj, came to the cockpit and was told that they had no permission to land at Karachi. He wanted to know the options. “In front of us, we have Rahimyar Khan. Behind us is the Arabian Sea. On our left is the Iranian city of Bandar Abbas and on the right is the Indian city of Ahmadabad,” was the Captain’s response. “India is out,” was Taj’s expected response. ... "

"In implementing the PM’s orders DGCAA Aminullah Chaudhary[1105] and Khaqan Abbasi adopted different routes. Abbasi checked with PIA Director Flight Operations Captain Shah Nawaz Dara if the plane could continue on to Muscat. Dara said the plane would not have sufficient fuel. DGCAA, meanwhile, took steps to physically block the Karachi run way to prevent PK 805 from landing in Karachi."

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" ... “The captain of PK 805 is reporting shortage of fuel and saying that the plane cannot fly to Muscat.” The prime minister told his MS to let the plane land at Karachi airport but ensure that it was parked in a remote and unlit corner of the airport. “No one,” instructed the PM, “should be allowed to leave the airplane.” [1106]After refuelling, he instructed, the plane should take off for Muscat. In a resigned tone, his Military Secretary muttered, “The army may have got to the airport by then.”"

"Around 6:40pm, the MD was informed by the PTV World team that two truckloads of soldiers had arrived and closed down the transmission. The Army instructed them to only play national/patriotic songs. Again, the MD called the PM. His PS, who came on line, was informed. Minutes later, Saeed Mehdi returned and said, “The PM says he has sent the local SHO police to look into the matter.” By this time, the Army had come and taken over the PTV Headquarters. The transmission was shut down from 8 pm to 11pm. For the first time in PTV’s history, there was no news bulletin at 9pm."

" ... In Karachi, Usmani ordered Brigadier Jabbar Bhatti to move in with troops to open the airport and end the blockade of the runway. 

"The brigadier ordered his troops, including units from Malir, to the airport. A few hundred troops arrived and surrounded the airport. They took control of the ATC complex and finally gained access to the secured radar room."

"Across the country, the army was on high alert. In Rawalpindi-Islamabad, troops had begun to move."

" ... By now, the Defense Secretary had also been informed that his home had been surrounded by troops."

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" ... The PM was surrounded by his brother Shehbaz Sharif, his most trusted friend Saifur Rehman, and the latter’s brother Mujeebur Rehman. Seeing the writing on the wall, Chaudhary Nisar had earlier left the PM House. Suddenly, the door was flung open and in walked General Mahmud and the Vice-chief of General Staff, MajorGeneral Mohammad Jan Orakzai. About two dozen soldiers followed.  Shehbaz Sharif was the first to speak. “Why so many people, general? This is a private lounge of the PM.” Mahmud asked the troops to leave. He then turned to the PM, “Sir, why did you have to do this?” The PM repeated what he had said a couple of hours earlier on hearing that army troops had arrived at the television station,“I was legally and constitutionally competent to do this.” The Commander 10 Corps, whose troops had executed the coup plans, sardonically replied to the all-but deposed PM, “What was constitutional and legal, we will now find out.” He further added, “I had always prayed I would never have to see this day..”"

" ... Mahmud and Orakzai escorted the PM and his brother Shehbaz Sharif to a Mercedes car parked outside. Mahmud accompanied them to the 10 Corps Annexe, essentially a VIP Mess. Saeed Mehdi was kept in the annexe of the PM House, Saif ur Rehman, and Mujeeb ur Rehman, accompanied by Orakzai, were taken to the corps headquarters in Chaklala. The PTV Chairman, Parvaiz Rasheed, was held in the PTV Headquarters till 1:30 am, then taken to his Parliamentary Lodge and kept under detention there.[1114]

"Away from the PM’s initial order of banning the landing of PK805 on Pakistani soil and the subsequent GHQ trashing of the Constitution, the theatre of the absurd continued. After the army take over was confirmed, the Governor Sindh Mamnoon Hussain called President Tarrar to inquire about the fate of the dinner he had invited him to. “The dinner must go on,” the President told his guest. And it did."

" ... The prevailing power dynamics had trumped constitutional clauses."

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November 18, 2022 - November 18, 2022. 

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CHAPTER 19: READING KARGIL 

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" ... Combined with its aggressive military retaliation, that included heavy artillery and aerial attacks, Delhi stonewalled every Pakistani effort to extract strategic advantage from Operation KP. By early June, although still holding on the heights, Pakistani troops had come under tremendous physical and psychological pressure from both the Indian military offensive and from the disruption of supply routes. ... The Euphoria and Excitement were no more. ... The reality slowly sank in that Operation KP could accrue no gains for Islamabad."

" ... Pakistani troops under Indian attack suffered heavy casualties. ... Given Pakistan’s asymmetrical power structure, it was no surprise that the blundering military clique of Kargil staged a coup against the elected prime minister."

"For the French general, Napoleon Bonaparte, whom Clausewitz called the ‘very god of war’[1127], the centrality of the planning principle for any military campaign meant looking at the ‘worst-case scenario’. This necessarily required that the campaign planner, irrespective of his record of battle successes, not operate from a point of confidence. Instead, as a critical aspect of the planning principle, Napoleon explained how the planner’s personal mindset is central in applying the ‘worst-case scenario’. According to Napoleon, while planning any military campaign, ‘There is no man more pusillanimous than I when I am planning a campaign. I purposely exaggerate all the dangers and all the calamities that the circumstances make possible. I am in a thoroughly painful state of agitation.’[1128] Rarely have world class generals uttered such words of caution and humility, as did Napoleon, thus, emphasizing the criticality of thoroughness of planning for any success in military campaigns.

"Bravado or overconfidence was, thus, unknown to this military genius who, at the age of 26, had commanded the armies of the French Republic against Lombardy (in present-day Italy) and demonstrated near-invincibility in battle.[1129]

"Clearly, most military theorists have not only emphasized the centrality of planning in war but have warned against letting a general’s personality traits and biases undermine his own planning. For example, Clausewitz[1130] especially underscores personality traits like vanity, ambition, and vindictiveness that can move a general from the very planning course that alone is critical to his success and the success of the battle he has planned.

"In contrast to the above mentioned approach of the world’s leading military theorists and military commanders, the Kargil planners were overtaken by enthusiasm and a sense of payback. They were so obsessed with settling historical scores that it never crossed their minds to factor in the worst-case scenario. When the junior officers at 10 Corps heard of the operation, some had muttered their concerns. A confidential document moved through GHQ pointed out, ‘Indians won’t be stupid enough to humiliate themselves by politicizing the conflict.’ On this, an intelligence officer had written, ‘What if they are?’ The officer got rebuked but the question was never answered. Finally, the army chief General Pervez Musharraf raised the question of the Indian response at the January meeting convened for final clearance. However, the Operation had already been launched two months earlier, in November.

"Thus, the foremost planning blunder committed by the Kargil clique was their absolute failure to even factor in, leave alone follow the Napoleonic principle of ‘exaggerating’, possible dangers and calamities that may have arisen during Operation KP. ... Implicit in the planning was the faulty notion that by the time India discovered Pakistani troops across the LOC and controlling India’s lifeline to its troops in Leh, Delhi would find itself locked in a virtual surrender mode with no option but to settle on terms dictated by Pakistan. In such an all-victorious projection for Operation KP, the Kargil planners had turned on its head the cardinal war planning principle of exaggerating your adversary’s response."

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"According to the Swiss army general and military theorist Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, strategy encompasses the entire theatre of operations and is defined as ‘the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theatre of operations’.[1132]Strategy outlines deployment and movement of troops to achieve war objectives. It goes beyond the simple relations between material and static factors like weapons, terrain, and predictable weather. Hence, strategy is the determining framework from which operational planning, tactics, and execution must flow."

"Beyond strategy and closer to the actual war theatre is the domain of tactics. Tactics detail troop positioning, logistics spread, communication coverage, medical, and engineering back-up, etc. Tactics, according to classic military philosophers, are described as ‘the use of military forces in combat’[1134] and ‘the art of posting troops upon the battlefield according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradiction to planning upon a map’.[1135] ... "

" ... Clausewitz observation: ‘The difficulty is not that erudition and great talent are needed … there is no art to devising a good plan of operations.’[1137] According to him, it was the actual waging of war that was difficult since the major challenge lay in the necessity ‘to remain faithful in action to the principles we have laid down for ourselves’.[1138] In action, principles can crumble when confronted with unanticipated realities."

" ... The massive artillery-fronted Indian response—proactive, aggressive, and unprovided for by the Kargil planners—made it impossible for the Pakistani troops to conduct a protracted offensive action against the Indian troops."

" ... Operation KP’s overall module, at the strategic and tactical level, was fundamentally faulty. The failure lay at the doorsteps of the planners who blundered while formulating strategy. Hence, they faltered at the all-encompassing level, at which ‘there is little or no difference between strategy, policy and statesmanship’.[1140] ... "

................................................................................................

" ... The first major Indian attack on the supplies targeted a key forward ammunition dump. Subsequent aerial bombing and heavy artillery attacks in the encounter and exit phases almost entirely disrupted the supply lines. The Indian counter-attack had effectively cut-off what the Kargil planners and, subsequently, the field commanders had established as the Pakistani perimeter within which Operation KP was to be conducted. This made it virtually impossible for men and mules to ply on the supply routes. ... "

" ... Expansion of the war theatre, a classic mission creep phenomenon, has serious implications for logistics, supply lines, and manpower. In Operation KP, the situation for the Pakistani foot soldiers was no different. Within two months of the Operation, they were lured by the vacant spaces and strategic heights in the Kargil area. They had calculated that deeper spread of Pakistani posts on the dominating heights meant greater strategic positioning to tackle Indian retaliation. For example, a platoon in a dominating position could destroy a battalion.

"The field commanders after communicating this ground scenario to the Commander FCNA were granted permission to increase the number of posts to be established across the LOC ... Hence, instead of the initial seven to eight posts, around 196 posts (including defensive centers and outposts) were established. These covered five sectors instead of the planned single sector. This mission creep had led Pakistani troops almost 10 to 15 km ... positioned across 500–600 km of Indian territory. Beyond strategic reasons, there was also the element of competitiveness and adventure among the soldiers that contributed to what had presented itself as classic mission creep.

"‘Rapid march … press on!’ Napoleon counselled men at war. In his seminal work on military operations, Napoleon explains, ‘The strength of an army is like the power in mechanics estimated by multiplying mass by rapidity; a rapid march augments the morale of an army and increases its means of victory.’ This obsession of Napoleon with rapid marches was the major pitfall in his flawed Russian campaign. Almost 200 years later, a similar lesson was manifested again at Kargil."

................................................................................................

"The Kargil planners launched Operation Kargil to exploit Indian vulnerability along the Srinagar-Leh Highway and to sufficiently weaken India so that Pakistan could literally, as Clausewitz would argue, ‘Impose conditions ... at the peace conference.’[1146] These conditions, which the Kargil clique had initially hoped to impose, related to getting Siachen vacated. Subsequently, they changed to seeking freedom for Kashmir, and then to ‘internationalizing’ the issue of Jammu and Kashmir."

" ... It was assumed that, with their Leh-based troops facing the prospect of receiving no supplies after Pakistan virtually blocked the Srinagar-Leh Highway, Delhi would be accommodating. The Kargil clique also believed that the global community would promptly intervene diplomatically to defuse a potentially war-like tension between the two new nuclear states.

"At several points, the planning clique’s half-baked and ill-conceived approach was exposed. There was talk that the planning and analysis wing of the ISI wrote a detailed report on the proposed operation when the plan reached its office but the COAS personally intervened with DG ISI to close down the study. In March, when a young team proposed opening new fronts in Kargil to increase the pressure on the Indians, they were warned that Pakistan could not risk destabilizing the relationship with India. Subsequently, the responses of the Kargil planners when, from May onwards they were in the dock, were muddled and confused. For example, in May, General Aziz, a key planner, had boasted of the Kargil Operation as providing an opportunity to the PM of becoming the Pakistani leader responsible for liberating Kashmiris. At the FO meeting that month, when asked by the deputy air chief what they wanted, the response was unclear. Similarly, at the 2 July DCC meeting, when Ishaq Dar asked what they wanted, the response was again ambiguous. Clarity of purpose, which is the first principle of all military planners, had vanished in a haze of euphoria and wishful thinking.

................................................................................................

"According to Napoleon, ‘Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.’"

Did India know of the paki incursion in November, when it happened, and waited to hit them in June, at leisure?

................................................................................................

" ... Abroad, this military adventure helped to reinforce the hostile image of Pakistan as an irresponsible nuclear state whose military generals could easily undermine the elected leadership and call the shots on Pakistan’s India policy."

" ... There was, however, no formal system of information flow from the battle zone to Sharif, the country’s chief executive and the final decision-maker. On occasion, revealing information on the Kargil clique’s thinking came from the Indians, who produced in their national newspapers the entire text of a discussion on Operation KP between the army chief and the CGS, the two senior-most members of the Kargil clique."

"From May onwards, the Prime Minister did activate several decision-making forums. These forums, however, had to function below the public radar because, even after the operation became public and the world community knew that Pakistani troops had conducted it, the Kargil clique still insisted that only the Kashmiri Mujahedeen were fighting in Kargil. Moreover, at home also, the ISPR was briefing the media about Kashmiri Mujahedeen presence across the LOC ... Accordingly, the prime minister avoided convening full cabinet meetings and sessions of Parliament, to either discuss Kargil or to get support for Pakistani troops fighting in Kargil. Instead, the government opted for a secretive decision-making approach through informal huddles."

" ... The army chief held a telephone discussion from Beijing with the CGS on Operation KP using an open unsecured line. ... MI acknowledging Pakistan troop presence in Drass-Kargil in briefings to defense attaches while the Pakistan government publicly denied Pakistani troop presence; ... "

"Pakistan’s key decision-makers and critical institutions were not positioned for responsible and clearheaded decision-making. There was distrust between decision-makers and fear of the other, as if there were an ongoing battle within. During the Operation’s planning stage, it was a complete secret. In the battle stage, reliable and regular information required for informed decision-making did not flow in. Equally, the institutional linkages were dysfunctional. No SOPs for information sharing and coordination existed. Even within the one critical institution, relevant commanders were not aware of Operation KP."

" ... There is ample evidence that the Kargil planners ignored, if not outright rejected, all questions raised by their junior officers regarding the domestic, Indian, and US responses to the Operation. ... "

"The generals, having blundered in the military battle at Kargil, won the political war in Islamabad. The government’s silence over whatever they knew about the Kargil Operation, including the military situation after heavy Indian artillery and aerial attack, had enabled the Kargil clique to craft and broadcast, virtually uncontested, its own version of ‘facts’. According to their version, the Mujahideen were militarily strangulating the Indians. It was no surprise, therefore, that in public perception, Sharif’s trip was interpreted as the prime minister arriving in Washington to barter away a Mujahideen victory in exchange for his own survival. The few voices in the media that pointed to the facts of the Kargil battle and raised valid questions remained buried under the dominant story of a sell-out in Washington."

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" ... It was no surprise that Beijing virtually read the Riot Act to Pakistan’s foreign minister when he arrived in China for an SOS trip on 11 June. Pakistan, he was told, had to vacate Kargil, Kashmir had to be resolved bilaterally, and Beijing had no influence on Indian dealings with Pakistan. Within three days of Aziz’s departure, the Indian foreign minister arrived in Beijing to a rousing welcome."

" ... Javed Hassan’s exchanges as defense attaché in Washington had left him believing, though utterly unfounded,[1148] that in case of a Pakistan-initiated military exchange with India, Washington would support Pakistan against India.

"The past occasions, when perception of movement of some kind of nuclear weapons from Kahuta, had rung alarm bells in Washington, the Kargil clique saw a potential for nuclear blackmail working to Pakistan’s advantage. They believed that a panicked world community, led by Washington, would instantly intervene after the impact of a successfully executed Operation KP was publicized and the newly nuclearized neighbors would be seen as being on the brink of war. India checkmated this calculation primarily by Delhi’s decision to restrict Indian military response restricted to the Kargil region and by not opening new fronts. Hence, a consensus emerged within the global community, especially in the US and the EU, that a nuclear Pakistan’s rash behavior, which involved forsaking of diplomatic engagement and opting for military engagement with traces of nuclear blackmail, would not be rewarded."

" ... The first trip in ten years by an Indian foreign minister to China was in the works. Pakistan, by contrast, was in a difficult strategic situation. Its Afghanistan policy was under criticism and it was blamed for facilitating ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamic militancy’. ... "

Using quote marks does not transform facts, definitely does not veil truth, into or by a lie. It merely exposes one making the ridiculous attempt to be not taken seriously due to the attempted clever lie. 

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"10) Answers to Critical and Abiding Questions About Operation Koh Paima:

"Did the military inform the Prime Minister about the Kargil Operation?

" ... Only in March, General Aziz had asked one of his staff officers to hand him a map that he would use to brief the PM. Such a briefing pre-17 May did not, however, take place. Subsequently, the May Musharraf-Aziz telephone recordings left no doubt that the Kargil clique had undertaken Operation KP without specific clearance from the prime minister.[1149]

"Beginning with the November 1998 DCC meeting[1150] ... it was unlikely that the Kargil clique would have reached out to the same prime minister to get his support and clearance for Operation KP. Equally, the clique would have known that getting the prime minister’s support for a major operation in contested territory, just when arrangements for the Lahore Summit were under way, was unlikely. The prime minister was viewed by a section of the army high command and hard line analysts as being overly committed to peace with India, to the extent of a failing. Nawaz Sharif was, therefore, the most unlikely candidate to play a double game with India."

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"Did Pakistan’s Intelligence Agencies Fail over Kargil?

"The two agencies mandated to pick up intelligence are the Military Intelligence and the ISI. In the case of Kargil, while individuals from within the ISI and the MI both appear to have attempted to investigate, both these agencies failed to pick up anything indicating unusual troop movements as leads to the covert yet unfolding Kargil Operation. The ISI’s failure meant that this cross-service agency, reporting directly to the PM, was unable to report the moves and the implications of the Kargil Operation to the government. Similarly, the MI’s failure ensured that, except for the gang of four, no one within the army top brass knew of the Operation. This dual institutional failure also raised broader questions regarding the effectiveness of Pakistan’s intelligence in monitoring stray and subversive Pakistani elements within the country’s own defense institutions. If the remoteness of the theatre of operations prevented the ISI and MI from monitoring the crossing of the LOC, the failure to pick up unusual military and paramilitary troop movements, either of the NLI troops or the 19 Division or of the SSG, was symptomatic of a deficient intelligence setup. The ISI’s defense was that it does not follow any movements, including internal troop movements; therefore, unless the army informs them about its operational plans, the ISIwill not know. Meanwhile, with ISI and MI both outside of the planning and execution loop of Operation KP, they also failed to report Indian preparations for force deployment, including troops and weapon systems, in the zone of conflict. Significantly, among other factors, this complete ‘intel blindness’ also ruled out all possibility of any early and pre-emptive course correction during Operation KP."

So - all they can do is send terrorists to burn hotels and kill people in India?

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"Was Pakistan militarily on a winning curve when the July fourth withdrawal decision was made?

"Pakistan remained on a winning curve only until the Encounter Phase, when in early May Indian troops first discovered Pakistani troops across the LOC. That initial encounter was marked by artillery exchanges and with Indian induction of aerial power. From early June onwards, after the Indian Army command began discovering the extent ... there began a graduated Indian military retaliation. Operation KP had turned into a battle. For the Indian government ... "

No, it always was war, inflicted by pakis on India. 

" ... As the Indians deployed massive air power, disrupting Pakistan’s supply lines, hitting logistic dumps, targeting soldiers, and generating severe psychological pressure on the Pakistani troops, the original advantage to the Pakistani troops, of being positioned at heights and enjoying lethal strategic advantage over the Indian troops climbing to attack them, began to erode. On 4 June, Pakistan lost Tololing, the first peak, to the Indians. Thereon, as they came under severe artillery and aerial attacks and faced deployment of the Bofors guns, Pakistani troops began to lose posts and pickets. Pakistani troop casualties were also on the rise. ... "

Author's insinuations against India continue here, against soldiers and government both, as she praises pakis (for sitting on peaks) killing Indian soldiers battling uphill (with boulders pushed down), she credits Indian victories to Indian artillery shelling - as if pakis were raining flower petals on Indian soldiers! 

" ... Contrary to the allegations made against the prime minister that he had bartered away in Washington the military victory that the troops were winning in Kargil, the PM brought to a rapid close costly military, diplomatic, and political losses in Kargil."

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"Could the international community have forced India to buckle under Kargil pressure?

"There were neither individual nor collective compulsions for key members of the international community to have even advised Delhi to enter into negotiations on any outstanding bilateral dispute. The question of any member, including Pakistan’s strategic ally China, to have even advised, leave aside forced, India to buckle under the pressure from Operation KP and enter into negotiations over Siachen etc. with Pakistan, did not arise. In fact, any move likely to culminate in a military confrontation between Pakistan and India, the two hostile neighbors who had recently acquired nuclear weapons, would make the international community panic. And Pakistan had made the move—which was also being interpreted as nuclear blackmail by Pakistan. ... There was complete consensus within the key members of the international community, including the US, EU states, the UN, and also Pakistan’s closest strategic ally, China, that Pakistan should not be rewarded for Operation Kargil. ... "

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"Did Pakistan plan to deploy nuclear weapons in an all-out war?

"There were neither individual nor collective compulsions for key members of the international community to have even advised Delhi to enter into negotiations on any outstanding bilateral dispute. The question of any member, including Pakistan’s strategic ally China, to have even advised, leave aside forced, India to buckle under the pressure from Operation KP and enter into negotiations over Siachen etc. with Pakistan, did not arise. In fact, any move likely to culminate in a military confrontation between Pakistan and India, the two hostile neighbors who had recently acquired nuclear weapons, would make the international community panic. ... "

Later, the then paki army chief made similar assertions after his coup, but he wasn't doing so without thought, and it was clear blackmail. 

" ... but was not backed by substantive evidence. ... "

When someone wielding a gun pointing at you is threatening to shoot to kill, and showing no sign of civilised conduct, it's a rare one who'd ask a prophet if the threat was intended to be carried out - or ask the gun wielding thug for proof of intentions by demonstration of performance. 

" ... Pakistan military’s high command had sabotaged the Lahore Summit and should not be rewarded. Pakistan had to be made to retreat unconditionally. ... "

" ... As a key member of the clique later recalled, they conveyed to the country’s elected leadership, ‘We are holding this. Now you take advantage, whatever you can, at military and political level.’[1156] However, the unfolding Kargil crisis proved the clique’s nuclear deterrence calculation flawed on two counts: Operation KP did turn into a military conflict and, while Washington and other Security Council members did exercise forceful diplomacy, it was to force Pakistan to retreat from Kargil, not to reward Pakistan’s operation. The spin-off of this clique’s brinkmanship (read nuclear blackmail) was immensely negative. It undid the diplomatic gains accrued to Pakistan for its mature diplomatic and political moves after the nuclear tests."

"Three factors point to deliberate manipulation. First, Pakistan was not in such a desperate military situation that it would have needed to opt for nuclear weapons. Secondly, and most importantly, Pakistan did not then have the capability to the deploy nuclear weapons[1158], nor had the Indians picked any intelligence on Pakistan readying nuclear weapons. Thirdly, the Americans deliberately chose an attitude of benign neglect and ignored Indian moves to ready its nuclear missiles for use.[1159] ... "

When a thug breaks in at midnight wielding a gun pointed at you, a policeman with any sense is likely to not ask if the gun is likely to fire or has a bullet, and what's more, would excuse the threatened victims of break-in - for arming and retaliation. 

Especially so in US.

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"Was there a pro-India tilt in Washington during Kargil?

"With the Kargil blunder, Pakistan provided the Clinton Administration a priceless opportunity to invest in strategic trust-building with India. Throughout the crisis, Washington’s key policy men opened multiple lines of communication with their Indian counterparts. It began with the 27 May call by Inderfurth, who called the India ambassador, Naresh Chandra, to inform him about what Pickering had told the Pakistanis. Subsequently, on 16 June, Inderfurth met with Brajesh Mishra in Cologne. After the 23 June Islamabad meetings between US CENTCOM Chief General Zinni and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and army chief General Musharraf, State Department official Lanpher went to brief Delhi on the Islamabad meetings. Similarly, during the crucial Sharif-Clinton summit on 4 July, in a manner unprecedented in summit diplomacy, Clinton would call Vajpayee to brief him of the summit talks. Similarly, the Indian NSA and External Affairs Minister were also updated on Sharif-Clinton talks by their counterparts, NSA Sandy Berger and Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. The sole purpose was to share with the Indians every aspect of their communications with Pakistan."

It's unclear if the above is realistic evaluation or a skewed perception. 

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"Was there a role for the backchannel?

"Washington’s decision to maintain complete transparency with Delhi on its diplomatic and political exchanges with Islamabad had left Islamabad with no negotiating space. Guaranteed for itself a bailout by Washington and for Islamabad an embarrassing retreat, Delhi was left with no motive to engage with Islamabad. The backchannel initiative was, thus, squeezed of any possibility of success."

Translated into normal honest words, there was no space left for duplicity, lies et al that's normal paki everyday language! 

They tried, and desperately so, especially in the most obvious lies maintained simultaneously in internal and international arena, despite the fraud being quite obvious to international community - of claiming publicly that the men invading india were not paki military, for one, while maintaining that their pm was aware of the Kargil invasion all along even as he was hosting the PM of India, for another - but then complain about these lies, once exposed, destroying any possibility of respect for pakis. 

Thus the claim and complaint about lack of equal treatment on par with that meted out to India. 

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"Was the Prime Minister’s Washington dash necessary? 

"As the country’s chief executive, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could have ordered withdrawal of Pakistani troops, bringing an end to Operation KP. In keeping with Islamabad’s public position that the Kashmiri Mujahideen and not the Pakistani troops had seized the heights, Sharif could have announced that Islamabad would use its goodwill to urge the Kashmiri Mujahideen to return from IOK. This would have been consistent with the farcical ‘Mujahideen’ position Pakistan had illogically and clumsily maintained since the beginning of Operation KP. The international community would have been relieved that the battle between two nuclear powers had drawn to a close. The prime minister, however, chose to engage the Clinton Administration because he had hoped that Washington would make a public statement of support for the Kashmiris and of facilitating a political resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Sharif and his close political aides also believed that American involvement at this withdrawal stage would make it more palatable for the army high command since the army chief had himself had sought Washington’s engagement. However, as subsequent developments showed, neither did the Clinton administration make any public statements supporting the Kashmir struggle, nor did the Sharif-Clinton 4 July encounter influence the post-Kargil tensions that surfaced between the elected prime minister and the army chief."

Here, and throughout the book on this point, author tries subterfuge to veil a lie. She claims that the Washington trip was for Kashmir. 

It wasn't. 

Plain truth is that, despite the lies to the contrary position proclaimed repeatedly by author, in reality pakis were being not only pounded relentlessly by India but couldn't take it, and the paki dash to Washington was the bully going crying to the police asking him to stop his intended victim bashing him up, something the bully hadn't expected - and this failed, since everyone in the international community was aware, via satellite footage, of who had invaded. 

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"Could the Prime Minister have Ordered an Inquiry Against The Kargil Planners, Especially the Army Chief?

"Immediately after 4 July, tensions began developing between Sharif and Musharraf, with each worried about his survival. Investigating the why, who, and how of Operation KP, to establish responsibility and to take action against those who had launched an operation that had ended in such a fiasco, was, however, far removed from the prime minister’s mind. Civil-military coordination remained generally smooth almost throughout the Kargil period. Some briefings for the PM were held at the 10 Corps Headquarters. Most, however, were held in the PM House, where the army brass would bring its maps, etc. Often, meetings would almost take the form of the DCC but hardly any decision-making took place in these. The prime minister had, in fact, left the decision-making process during Kargil in military hands. Although Sharif had the constitutional authority to directly lead decision-making, he did not ‘interfere’[1160] and had simply supported the army.

"The thought of holding an inquiry against Musharraf is unlikely to have occurred to a PM who had supported Operation KP. It is true that the PM was first briefed of the Operation only after it was a done deed. The PM had also declined Musharraf’s rhetorical mid-stream offer to withdraw his troops from Kargil. In fact, there was written evidence of the Parliament’s bipartisan Defense Committee’s positive support for Operation Kargil in a letter written by the Committee chairman in praise of the army chief’s presentation."

And, unlike the army chief with his openly thug mindset, Nawaz Sharif remained honest enough and decent enough to not turn immediately on someone when it was a fiasco, despite his own self having neither been aware nor initiated it, and never in control, of the assault, until he was required as the figurehead to get help from US to get India to stop! 

"In the overall asymmetric civil-military relations in Pakistan’s power structure, there have been only two incidences when elected prime ministers sought to hold army commanders to account. One was when, after the 1971 surrender at Dhaka and the breakup of Pakistan, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto formed the Hamoodur Rehman Commission to conduct an inquiry into the military debacle. His army chief, Zia ul-Haq overthrew him in a military coup and hanged him following legally dubious court proceedings. The second was in 1988, when Prime Minister Junejo ordered an inquiry into the deadly Ojri Camp ammunition disaster. No sooner had he announced the inquiry, the military President Zia ul-Haq sacked him."

And the post Kargil coup wasn't different, either. 

"In the absence of a political culture of holding the military accountable, the reactions of military men when held accountable, the complexities of the initiation and, indeed, of the termination of Operation KP, the fiercely anti-Nawaz mood of the political opposition, and the dominant claim of the time that Kashmiri Mujahideen had fought the Indians across the LOC while Pakistani troops fought mostly along the LOC: all these militated against Sharif conducting a Kargil inquiry. ... "

Again author is verbose in attempting to veil facts - namely, that pakis never have had a properly functioning government of any sort other than a military dictatorship, never any culture or education system other than one rooted in invader and looters mindset carrying heritage of history of hordes from Central and West Asia invading, looting and destroying India- which included until 1947 the very land pakis were given, torn out of India - and no other aim set for their very nation other than destruction of India, as a result of this choice of the heritage. 

The so-called nation, in reality is no more than a jihadist factory grown around a military base, for West for freedom of expensive usage against Russia, conceived in this mindset of invading and looting, and aim of destruction of India now grown to destruction of the world, and born of deliberately perpetrated massacres of thousands of Hindus in 1946-47 that were intended to, and succeeded in, forcing India to let a piece be torn out. 

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"Beyond fear, the contradictions of the Operation, Kargil produced serious frictions even in the post-Kargil phase. For example, while maintain its insistence that Mujahideen had been fighting in Kargil, how could the army receive the bodies of the martyred soldiers? Similarly, while insisting that only Mujahideen fought in Kargil, how could major programmes honouring the martyrs of Kargil be organized by the Sharif government? ... The army sought widely publicized honouring of the Kargil martyrs and of those having returned alive from across the LOC."

"Throughout history, the acid test of generals at war or in military operations has been the victories they have piled up. No general is more successful than the outcome of the war he leads. In more complex situations, like those in South Asia in the second half of the twentieth century, the yardstick for assessment has to be what have the wars have achieved. History has examples of individual brilliance leading armies to victories and steering nations away from disaster. Outstanding military commanders, such as Alexander, Khalid bin Walid, Genghis Khan, Julius Caesar, Salahuddin Ayyubi, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Vo Nguyen Giap, were men who wrested victory from situations where deep imprints of defeat were written. Bin Walid became the legendary general who, despite the numerical superiority of battle-hardened adversaries like the Romans and the Sassanids, piled up victories for the Rashiddun Caliphate. Napoleon ‘inspired a ragged, mutinous, half-starved army and made it fight’[1161] like a winning combination that few would fight before or after. Salahuddin, with his less experienced army, reversed the Crusaders’ winning streak with his grand victory in the decisive Battle of Hattin in 1187. Julius Caesar, personally brave in battle, was creative in tactics and engineering. There was Alexander, another general facing most armies who outnumbered his own, but always remaining undefeated. Genghis Khan, a masterful general who, through excellent military intelligence and tactics and by uniting nomadic tribes and confederation and his strategic raids, became the founder of the Mongol Empire, the largest contiguous empire in history, which included most of Eurasia and substantial parts of Eastern Europe. In more recent times, the Viet Minh Commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap, who led his men to defeat a technologically superior adversary by perfecting and applying a unique war technique, which was the most important dimension of the Vietcong’s overall political, economic, and diplomatic strategy for defeating the Americans.

"In the Kargil operation, the performance of the clique of commanders, the quality of their strategic planning, and of their command, all tell a different story. Yet the power equation, absence of any accountability, the absence of censure when it mattered, and bravado minus logic or sound analysis, have ruled the day. Despite repeated blunders, the commanders in charge escaped accountability."

What author is either unable to perceive, or unable to say, is that the paki military is a bully who, thrashed outside, comes home to beat up his wife and children, old parents and helpless siblings. 

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" ... Major General Akbar Khan, the lead military man in Pakistan's first attempt to regain Kashmir, had readily accepted Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's label of ‘raiders’ for the Pakistani forces involved in the 1947–48 ‘Acquire Kashmir’ Operation. ... "

Kashmir had been free until invaded by pakis, and it wasn't Nehru but Jinnah who pretended thst it was tribals, not his military. 

" ... The former general, eulogising the Pakistani ‘raiders’, suggested, ‘We may perhaps also qualify for sitting in that distinguished gallery of personalities like Genghis Khan, Timur Lang, Mahmud of Ghazni, and even Alexander.’ Interestingly, Pakistan's senior-most general equated his own men with history’s prized military leaders, who had raided, ravaged, and even reigned over foreign lands in the pre-Westphalian world. ... "

No, he was far more specific, in his dream and desire to belong to the club that was all comprised of invaders each from elsewhere and attacked India, invaded and looted India, sought to destroy India. 

He included none of the tall figures that were from or of India, despite his own homeland having been a part of India for ever until then less than a year ago, and his own ancestral origins being in India, 

And that's the divide, of India- and those that seek to destroy India. 

" ... This voluntary characterization of a state's army as ‘raiders’, in the context especially of the Kashmir operation, flowed from the juxtaposition in this Pakistani soldier's mind, of the Pakistan Army as a force for right, dedicated to undoing the wrong committed at the time of Pakistan's creation. ... "

That's convoluted fraud seeking to justify invasions, massacres and loot, with fraudulent claims of rights. 

British had in fact given far too much land to pakis in the first place, when plebiscite would have denied them all but East Bengal, which alone had voted for partition. Sindh was evenly divided in vote. Punjab had voted for unionists and NWFP was determined to stay with India - as was Baluchistan. Brits rode roughshod over all of the provinces in handing over the land pakis got, because it was military base needed for use of West against Russia. 

What those raiders were identifying with was, has always been, identity of invaders, looters, destroyers and killers wreaking havoc against India. This isn't due to perceived rights but simply a mindset of a robber. 

And they certainly had no 'right' to Kashmir, which, until pakis attacked, was independent. 

Author does lie on level after level, not very differently from a rotten onion. 

................................................................................................

" ... India's  systematic role in being a mid-wife to the 1971 breakup of Pakistan ... "

Because East Bengal hadn't been subjected to racist discrimination and linguistic chauvinism of denying freedom of language, not to mention massacre of three million and mass gang rapes of half a million, by paki military? 

Or was it because India prevented pakis from massacring further millions? 

No, author simply lies through the rest of the paragraph along the lines. 

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November 18, 2022 - November 19, 2022. 

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CHAPTER 20: CONCLUSION 

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Mostly verbose pentagonese attempted veiling of facts of paki history of military dictatorships, coups and fraudulent pretense of a democracy or any civilian government. 

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"The period from Kargil to the Coup epitomizes the inherent and continuing problems that Pakistan faces in three specific areas. These include two policy areas Pakistan-US relations, relations with India including Kashmir. There is also the third structural issue of thorny civil-military relations. While on the two policy areas of India and Kashmir, there are external players that influence the nature of the challenges that Pakistan faces, Pakistan too as an interlocutor contributes to the dynamic of the relationship. Meanwhile the structural problem of civil-military relations, rooted in the process of State formation, and the unequal stature and authority of the political and the garrison entities, evolved into asymmetrical strengths of both. Within the ensuing power chemistry of Pakistan, the army acquired a dominant role, paving the way to military coups."

"The asymmetry of authority in the army’s favor has continued because of the inability of most elected governments, except for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, to bolster its Constitutional authority through institutional decision-making. ... "

Here author mentions a civilian government's head who was legally executed by a military dictator post coup, as an exception to paki history of "authority in the army’s favor"! 

What could be a better example of the fraudulent writing by the author?!

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November 19, 2022 - November 19, 2022. 

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END NOTES 

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SOURCES OF PRIMARY DATA (INTERVIEWS CONVERSATIONS AND WRITTEN EXCHANGES) 

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

"• AbdusSattar, Former High Commissioner to India, Former Foreign Secretary and Foreign Minister of Pakistan  

"•Admiral Nayyar, Member National Security Advisory Board, Vice Chief of Naval Staff, Commander in Chief (South) February 1986 

"• Agha Shahi, Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan (1973-1977) 

"• Air Vice Marshal Shahzad Chaudhry 

"• Ambassador Aziz Khan, Pakistan's High commissioner to India (June 2003-September 2006) 

"• Ambassador Mufti Abbas, First Secretary in Pakistan High Commission in Delhi (1947) 

"• Arun Singh Additional Secretary Ministry of External Affairs, New Dehli 

"• Arun Jethley, Minister of law and Justice"

That should have been Jaitley. 

Next name surprises, since, if it's correctly given, it doesn't belong with those given here, alphabetically. 

"• S. Dulat, Former RAW Chief and Advisor on Kashmir policy in the Prime Minister’s Office"

Or is it, too, A. S. Dulat, wrongly given? 

"• Ashraf Qazi, Pakistan High Commissioner to India (1997-2002) 

"• Asma Jehangir, Human Rights activist and lawyer

................................................................................................

"• Brajesh Mishra, Prime Minister’s National Security Advisor 

"• Brigadier Aijaz Ahad, CO NLI 3, Pakistan 

"• Brigadier Javed Malik Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Military Secretary 

"• Brigadier Khalid Nazir, CO NLI 

"• Brigadier Masood Aslam, Commander 80 Brigade 

"• Brigadier Nadeem Ahmad Director Military Operations, FCNA Commander Oct 2001-2003 

"• Brigadier Naeem Salik, Pakistan Army 

"• Bruce Riedel, Special Assistant to the President, and Senior Director for Near East Affairs on the National Security Council, USA (1997-2001)

................................................................................................

"• Captain Sarwat Hussain, captain of flight PK 805 on 12 Octobe, 1999 

"• Captain Shah Nawaz Dara, Chief Pilot/Director Operations 

"• Chaudhry Nisar, former Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources and Special Assistant to the prime minister (1997-1999) 

"• Chaudhry Shujaat, former Interior Minister (1997-1999) 

"• Colonel (Territorial Army) Manvendra Singh, Indian Politician and fought at Kargil 

"• Commander 111 Brigade Salauddin Satti, (retired as Lt. General Chief of General Staff) 

"• Commodore Jasjit Singh, Head of Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Delhi

................................................................................................

"• Dr. Maliha Lodhi, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, former High Commissioner to the UK & Ambassador to the US

................................................................................................

"• General (Retd) Anthony Zinni, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command (August 1997-September 2000) 

"• General Jehangir Karamat, Chief Of Army Staff (COAS). 

"• General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Of Army Staff (COAS). 

"• General Ved Malik, former Indian Army chief. 

"• General V. R. Raghavan, Former Director General Military Operations, India 

"• George Fernandez, Indian Minister of Defense. 

"• Gib Lampher, Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs

................................................................................................

"• Hameed Kidwai, Pakistani Diplomat 

"• Hamid Mir, Journalist

................................................................................................

Again, a glaring mistake by author, publishers and editors. 

"• K. Gujral, former Indian Prime Minister & Indian Foreign Minister"

That should be 

"• I. K. Gujral, former Indian Prime Minister & Indian Foreign Minister"

His name was Inder Kumar Gujral, abbreviated to I. K. Gujral. 

"• Inamul Haq, Former Foreign Minister and Foreign Secretary of Pakistan

................................................................................................

"• Jaswant Singh, former Indian Foreign Minister 

"• J. N. Dixit, Former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan (1989-1991), Indian foreign secretary and chief of the IFS (1991-1994)

................................................................................................

"• Karl Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, USA (August 1997 to January 2001) 

"• Kashmiri leaders including All Parties Hurriyet Conference, Mir Waiz Umar Farooq, Sajjad Lone and Shabbir Shah 

"• K. Subramanian, Director Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis and Chairman Kargil Review Committee

................................................................................................

"• Lt. General(r) Abdul Qadir Baloch, Commander XII Corps, Pakistan Army 

"• Lt. General (r)Ehsanul Haq Director General Military Intelligence,  

"• Lt. General ( r)Iftikhar Ali Khan, Defense Secretary 

"• Lt. General (r )Javed Hassan, commander XXX Corps & commander, Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) 

"• Lt. General (r )Jamshed Gulzar Kiani, Commander 10 Corps 

"• Lt. General (r) Tariq Khan, Inspector-General Frontier Constabulary & Commander 1 Corps. 

"• Lt. General ( r) Muhammad Aziz, Chief of General Staff & Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee 

"• Lt. General ( r)Salauddin Satti, Chief of the General Staff (CGS) & Commander X Corps  

"• Lt. General (r ) Jacob, Indian Army 

"• Lt. General ( r) Satish Nambiar, Director of the United Service Institution of India from 1st July 1996 to 31 December 2008, New Delhi

................................................................................................

"• Major Akhtar, NLI 6, Pakistan Army 

"• Marvin Weinbaum, Intelligence and Research Analyst for Afghanistan and Pakistan, US Department of State (1999-2003) and Scholar-in-Residence, Middle East Institute (2003-Present) 

"• M Dubey, Indian Foreign Secretary (April 1990 to November 1991)

................................................................................................

Next, author arranges names seemingly out of order. 

"• Natwar Singh, Former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan 

"• Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan 

"• Niaz Naik, Former Foreign Secretary and Back- Channel Envoy for Pakistan"

This can only be because author wishes to put Nawaz with n, but uses his extended names beginning with m while doing so! 

................................................................................................

"• Pervez Rashid, Chairman Pakistan Television and later Minister of Information & Broadcasting

................................................................................................

"• Raja Zafar ul Haq, Federal minister for Religious Affairs (July 1997-October 1999) 

"• Raminder Jassal, Ministry of External Affairs Spokesperson (1999), later Indian Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington 

"• Ram Jethalani, Chairman of the Indian Kashmir Committee 

"• Riaz Khokhar, Pakistan's Ambassador to India (1992-1997), the United States (1997–1999) and China (1999–2002) and former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan (June 2002 to February 2005) 

"• Riaz Mohammad Khan, former Foreign Secretary, Additional Secretary in charge of international organizations and arms control issues for Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1998-2002) and Spokesman of the Foreign Office (2000-2001)

................................................................................................

"• Saeed Mehdi, Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 

"• Salman Bashir, Former Foreign Secretary 

"• Salman Haider Former Indian Foreign secretary 

"• Sartaj Aziz, Minister of Foreign Affairs (August 1998 until 1999) 

"• Shehbaz Sharif, Chief Minister of Punjab 

"• Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, Chairman PIA, (currently Prime Minister) 

"• Shahryar Khan, Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan (1990-1994) 

"• Shamshad Ahmad, Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan (1997-2000) 

"• Sudheendra R. K. Kulkarni, Former Speechwriter for Former Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee

................................................................................................

Yet another mistake, next. 

"• Professor Riffat Hussain, Defense Analyst 

"• Robert Oakley, US Ambassador to Pakistan (August 1988-1991)

These names belong before s, not after. 

................................................................................................

"• Tanveer Ahmed Khan, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan (1989-90) 

"• Tariq Fatemi, Special Assistant to the prime minister on Foreign Affairs & former Advisor Additional Secretary, Prime Minister’s Office, Pakistan (July 1998 to July 1999) 

"• Thomas Pickering, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (1997-2000)

................................................................................................

"• V. P. Singh, former Indian Prime Minister 

................................................................................................

"• Walter Anderson, Former Chief of the US State Department's South Asia Division in the Office of Analysis for the Near East and South Asia 

"• William Milam, US Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (August 1998-July 2001) 

................................................................................................

"• Zamir Akram, Director General for South Asia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan 1998-2000)

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

................................................

................................................

November 19, 2022 - November 19, 2022. 

................................................

................................................

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

................................................................................................

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................................................................................................

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................................................................................................

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................................................................................................

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"Shah, Aqil. The Army and Democracy Military Politics in Pakistan. India: Harvard University Press, 2014. 

"Shahi, Agha. Pakistan’s Security and Foreign Policy. Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988. 

"Sharma, B. L. The Kashmir Story. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1967. 

"Sharma, General (Retd.) V. N. Overview to Lt. General Y. M. Bammi’s Kargil The Impregnable Conquered. Noida: Gorkha Publishers, 2002. 

"Siddiqi, Brigadier A. R. The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality. Lahore: Pakistan, Vanguard Books Ltd., 1996. 

"Sattar, Abdul. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007. 

"Siddiqa, Ayesha. Military INC., Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, 1947-2007. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007. 

"Singh, Air Commodore Jasjit. Kargil 1999, Pakistan’s Fourth War for Kashmir. New Delhi: October 1999. 

"Singh, Jaswant. India at Risk: Mistakes, Misconceptions and Misadventures of Security Policy. New Delhi: Rupa Publication India Pvt. Ltd., 2013. 

"Singh, Jaswant. In Service of Emergent India: A Call to Honor. Indiana University Press, 2007. 

"Singh, Maj. Gen. V. K. India’s External Intelligence: Secrets of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2007. 

"Sisson, Richard and Rose, Leo E. War and Secession, Pakistan, India, and the creation of Bangladesh. USA: University of California Press, 1990.

................................................................................................

"Talbot, Ian. Pakistan: A Modern History. London: Hurst & Company, 2005. 

"Talbot, Ian. Pakistan: A Modern History (updated edition). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 

"Talbott, Strobe. Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2004.

................................................................................................

Again, author, publishers and editors leave a mistake in, inserting some w's before continuing with t's, and then back with w's. 

"Wariach, Sohail. Ghadaar Kaun? XXX: Saagar Publications, 2006. 

"Whitehead, Andrew. A Mission in Kashmir. New Delhi: Penguin Books India Pvt. Ltd., 2007. 

"Williams, L. F. Rushbrook. Pakistan Under Challenge. London: Stacey International, 1975. 

"Wirsing, Robert G. Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age, New York: M E Sharpe Inc., 2003. 

"Wiessman, Steve and Krosney, Herbert. The Islamic Bomb. New York: New York Times Books, 1981.

................................................................................................

"Tamimi, Dr. Muhammad Jahangir. An Analytical Study of Indian Foreign Policy. Lahore: Centre for South Asian Studies, 2008. 

"Toor, Saadia. The State of Islam: Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan. London: Pluto Press, 2011. 

"The Kargil Review Committee Report. From Surprise to Reckoning. New Delhi: Saga Publications, 1999.

................................................................................................

"Wolpert, Stanley. India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation? California: University of California Press, 2010. 

"Wolpert, Stanley. Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012.

................................................................................................

"Zafar, S. M. Through the Crisis. Lahore: Book Centre, 1970. 

"Zaheer, Hassan. The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951, the First Coup Attempt in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998. 

"Zaheer, Hasan. The Separation of East Pakistan, The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994.

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November 19, 2022 - November 19, 2022. 

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Articles 

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This list has glitches galore as far as alphabetical order goes.  

................................................................................................

"Baruah, Amit, “Raising the Stakes,” Frontline Volume XX, Issue XX, June 20 – July 3, 1998. 

"Baruah, Amit. “A 'sell-out' and some hard-sell.” Frontline, Volume XX, Issue XX, July 30, 1999. 

"Baruah, Amit, “Sharif’s US visit may be a turning point,” The Hindu, July 5, 1999. 

"Beg, General Mirza Aslam, “Response Modalities on Kargil,” The Nation, July 4, 1999. 

"Bokhari, Farhan, “Militants in Pakistan Protests Against Agreement on Kashmir,” Financial Times (London, England), July 7, 1999. 

"Bokhari, Farhan, “Militants in Pakistan Protest against Agreement on Kashmir,” Financial Times, July 7, 1999. 

"Butt, Tariq. “Nisar, Majeed Airdash to US to Assist Nawaz.” The Nation, July 5, 1999. 

“Musharraf planned coup much before Oct 12: Fasih Bokhari,” Daily Times, October 7, 2002.

................................................................................................

"Najam, Adil, "U.S. Response To Tests," The News, June 3, 1998. 

"Yusufzai, Rahimullah. “General Ali Kuli refutes Musharraf's narrative.” The News, October 5, 2006. 

"Zehra, Nasim. “Prime Minister’s Sunday Surprise.” The News, July 5, 1999. 

"Zulfiqar, Raja. “PM Leaves for US Amid Continuing LOC Crisis.” The News, July 4, 1999. 

“Accountability is here to stay.” The Friday Times, Volume IX, No. 9, May 2 – 8, 1997.

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"“China Cautions Against Nuclear Race in South Asia,” The Hindu, June 30, 1999. 

"Cleave, Jan, “Moscow, Delhi to sign cooperation declaration,” Asia Times On-Line, May 28, 1999. 

“Clinton Invites Vajpayee,” Tribune, July 5, 1999. 

"Constable, Pamela. “Domestic Pressures Imperil Kashmir Peace Deal.” The Washington Post, July 5, 1999. 

“Cool Indica,” The Indian Express, June 1, 1999. 

“Crying Nuclear Wolf,” The Times of India, June 2, 1999.

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"Datta-Ray, Sunanda K. “Being Friends of Bill.” The Telegraph, June 26, 1999. 

“DCC Okays 3 Pronged Strategy to Tackle Issue,” The Dawn, July 3, 1999. 

“Declare Pakistan a Rogue State: Ackerman.” The Pioneer, June 11, 1999.

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"“China Cautions Against Nuclear Race in South Asia,” The Hindu, June 30, 1999. 

"Cleave, Jan, “Moscow, Delhi to sign cooperation declaration,” Asia Times On-Line, May 28, 1999. 

“Clinton Invites Vajpayee,” Tribune, July 5, 1999. 

"Constable, Pamela. “Domestic Pressures Imperil Kashmir Peace Deal.” The Washington Post, July 5, 1999. 

“Cool Indica,” The Indian Express, June 1, 1999. 

“Crying Nuclear Wolf,” The Times of India, June 2, 1999.

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"Datta-Ray, Sunanda K. “Being Friends of Bill.” The Telegraph, June 26, 1999. 

“DCC Okays 3 Pronged Strategy to Tackle Issue,” The Dawn, July 3, 1999. 

“Declare Pakistan a Rogue State: Ackerman.” The Pioneer, June 11, 1999. 

"Dubey. Muchkund, “Kargil & the limits of diplomacy,” The Hindu, July 5, 1999. 

"Dugger, Celia W. and Bearak, Barry, ”Kashmir Thwarts India-Pakistan Attempt at Trust,” New York Times, July 4, 1999. 

"Dugger, Celia W. “Pakistani's Pullout Vow: A Very Hard Sell at Home,” New York Times, July 6, 1999.

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"“China Cautions Against Nuclear Race in South Asia,” The Hindu, June 30, 1999. 

"Cleave, Jan, “Moscow, Delhi to sign cooperation declaration,” Asia Times On-Line, May 28, 1999. 

“Clinton Invites Vajpayee,” Tribune, July 5, 1999. 

"Constable, Pamela. “Domestic Pressures Imperil Kashmir Peace Deal.” The Washington Post, July 5, 1999. 

“Cool Indica,” The Indian Express, June 1, 1999. 

“Crying Nuclear Wolf,” The Times of India, June 2, 1999.

................................................................................................

"Datta-Ray, Sunanda K. “Being Friends of Bill.” The Telegraph, June 26, 1999. 

“DCC Okays 3 Pronged Strategy to Tackle Issue,” The Dawn, July 3, 1999. 

“Declare Pakistan a Rogue State: Ackerman.” The Pioneer, June 11, 1999. 

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"Filkins, Dexter, “Pakistani Admits Troops Are Fighting Indians in Kashmir,” Los Angeles Times, June 17, 1999. 

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"Ganon, Kathy, “Will se any weapon’ threatens Shamshad,” Indian Express, June 1, 1999. 

"Gauhar, Altaf, “Four Wars, One Assumption,” The Nation, September 5, 1999.

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"Noorani, A. G. “Truth About the Lahore Summit.” Frontline Volume 19, Issue 4, February 16 – March 1, 2002. 

"Noorani, A. G., “Review Article on Siachin: Conflict Without End by Lt. Gen. V. R. Raghavan,” Frontline Vol 19, Issue 23 

“No Room For Ambiguity.” The News, July 4, 1999. 

“Nawaz Reiterates Call for Dialogue,” Dawn, July 2, 1999. 

“Nawaz Visits Forward Artillery Position,” Dawn, June 25, 1999. 

“No Change in LOC, says Sartaj,” Dawn, July 4, 1999. 

"Nehru, Jawaharlal. Toward Freedom: The Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru. USA: The John Day Company, 1941. 

“New Delhi Rejects Talks Offer,” Dawn, July 3, 1999.

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"“Official Denies Differences Between Sharif, Army Chief,” The News, July 7, 1999. 

“OIC Endorses Pakistan Stand on Kashmir,” Dawn, July 2, 1999.

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"“Pakistan Army Captures Held Kashmir Village,” The Nation, May 15, 1999. 

“Pakistan Bears Burden to End the Confrontation,” The Houston Chronicle, July 7, 1999. 

“Pakistan’s Failure,” The Pioneer, June 1, 1999. 

“Pakistan-India War Delayed Not Over,” The News, July 26, 1999. 

“Pakistan Reinforces Retreating,” Press Trust India, June 30, 1999. 

“Party Leaders Demand Sharif Government Resign,” The News, July 17, 1999. 

“People, Ruling Elite Surprised at PM’s US Visit.” The News, July 5, 1999. 

“PM Accepts talks offer, says situation war-like: PM,” Statesmen, June 1, 1999. 

“PM Dashes to US to discuss LOC tension,” The Nation, July 4, 1999. 

“PM defends bus trip to Lahore,” The Tribune India, April 18, 1999.

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"Reuters, “Japan offers to host Indo-Pak Talks,” The Tribune, August 7, 1998. 

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"Sawant, Gaurav C. “Army Blasts its way for a permanent stay at LOC.” The Indian Express, July 27, 1999. 

"Sehbai, Shaheen, “PM Rushes to US for talks with Clinton,” Dawn, July 4, 1999. 

"Sehbai, Shaheen, “US Congress Asks Pakistan to Pull out,” Dawn, July 3, 1999. 

“Sharif’s sectarian nemesis,” The Friday Times, Volume IX, No. 47, January 23 – 29, 1998. 

"Sharma, Pranat, “Dehli hits Sharif with Army Tape Talk,” The Telegraph, July 4, 1999. 

"Sheikh, Shakeel, “Sharif, Clinton to Hold Strategic Dialogue,” The News, July 4, 1999. 

"Sheikh, Shakeel, “DCC to Approve Final Strategy Today,” The News, July 2, 1999. 

“Shut up or else,” The Friday Times Volume IX, No 41, December 12 – 18, 1997 

"Siddiqui, Aziz. “Downhill from Kargil.” Dawn, June 29, 1999. 

"Siddiqui, Aziz, “In the Aftermath of ‘Jihad’,” The Dawn, July 11, 1999 

"Siddiqi, Kamal, “Pakistan Army Chief Admits Troops are in Kargil,” Indian Express, June 27, 1999. 

"Sood, Lt. General V. K. “No Need for New Pressure Points.” The Pioneer. May 31, 1993. 

"Stateman News Service, “Vajpayee turns down Clinton Invitation,” Stateman, July 5, 1999. 

"Stockwin, Harvey (and Agencies), “China refuses to Bite the Sharif Bait, urges Talks,” Times of India, June 30, 1999.

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"“The DCC Meeting,” The Nation, July 4, 1999. 

“Talking Terms.” Times of India, June 1, 1999. 

“The Stuff of History,” The Friday Times, Volume X, No 22, July 31 – 6 August, 1998.

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"“US Asks Pakistan to Withdraw Mujahideen,” The News, July 3, 1999. 

“US Has Impression Pakistan Wants to Withdraw Forces.” The News, July 3, 1999. 

“US Points fingers at Pakistan.” The Australian, July 6, 1999. 

“US Says Pakistan Will Withdraw, Bradley Graham, Nathan Abse,” The Washington Post, July 5, 1999. 

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“Vajpayee turns down Clinton Invitation,” The Statesman, July 5, 1999.

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"Venkatesan, V. “The BJP’s trauma.” Frontline Volume 16, Issue 10, May 8 – 21, 1999. 

“Withdrawal Not in Pakistan-US Statement,” The News, July 7, 1999. 

“Yeltsin talks to Jaswant Singh.” The Tribune, May 26, 1999. 

“Weiner and Risen: Policy Makers, Diplomats, Intelligence Officers All Missed India’s Intentions.” New York Times, May 25, 1998.

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November 19, 2022 - November 19, 2022. 

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From Kargil to the Coup: Events that shook Pakistan 

by Nasim Zehra  

(Author)  

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August 05, 2022 - 

October 22, 2022 - November , 2022.  

Purchased  August 01, 2022. 

November 05, 2022, November 18, 2022. 

Format: Kindle Edition

Kindle Edition

ASIN:- B07J6RJHFY

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From Kargil to the Coup 

Events that shook Pakistan 

Nasim Zehra

Published May 17th 2018 

by Sang-e-Meel Publications

ISBN13 :- 9789693531374 

Edition language:- English 

Original title:- 

From Kargil to the Coup: Events that Shook Pakistan

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https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/5061643929

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CONTENTS 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

INTRODUCTION: WHY KARGIL? 

CHAPTER 1: THE ROOTS OF CONFRONTATION 

CHAPTER 2: THE KARGIL OPERATION: CONTEXT AND CONTRADICTIONS 

CHAPTER 3: DIVERGENT TRACKS: DIALOGUE VS. OPERATION KOH PAIMA 

CHAPTER 4: NECKS ON THE LINE AND THE LOTUS LAKE 

CHAPTER 5: KARGIL UNCOVERED 

CHAPTER 6: BOLT FROM THE BLUE 

CHAPTER 7: IN THE FIRING LINE 

CHAPTER 8: FIGHT BACK 

CHAPTER 9: MYTH-MAKING AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 

CHAPTER 10: MAPPING EXITS 

CHAPTER 11: NUCLEAR CARD AND WASHINGTON’S GAINS 

CHAPTER 12: ALL FALLS APART 

CHAPTER 13: THE 2 JULY DCC MEETING 

CHAPTER 14: THE END GAME 

CHAPTER 15: IN THE EYE OF STORM 

CHAPTER 16: THE AUGUST QUADRANGLE 

CHAPTER 17: A BRIDGE TOO FAR 

CHAPTER 18: THE COUP 

CHAPTER 19: READING KARGIL 

CHAPTER 20: CONCLUSION 

END NOTES 

SOURCES OF PRIMARY DATA (INTERVIEWS CONVERSATIONS AND WRITTEN EXCHANGES) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY